ML20210U572

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Forwards Aslab 840320 Decision ALAB-763 Re Design Qa. Verification Efforts Adequate in Scope & Implementation to Provide Reasonable Assurance That Seismic & Nonseismic Design Adequate
ML20210U572
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1984
From: Cunningham G
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To: Harold Denton, Deyoung R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20210U520 List:
References
FOIA-86-197 ALAB-763, NUDOCS 8610100092
Download: ML20210U572 (2)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ s f a b .i ~2 . s-W. WC. C / I - L AM{ April 3, 1984 l Note to: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement From: Guy H. Cunningham, III Executive Legal Director

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON - APPEAL BOARD DECISION ON DESIGN QUALITY ASSURANCE On March 20, 1984, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board issued its ^ decision on. design qualiff~ assurance issues, ALAB-763, copy attached. In I this decision, which applies only to Unit 1, the Appeal Board found that the l verification efforts, including both the licensee's Internal Technical Program and the Independent Design Verification Program, were adequate in scope and implementation to provide reasonable assurance that the seismic and non-l seismic design of Unit 1 is proper and meets licensing criteria, that any significant design deficiencies attributable to QA have been remedied and that the facility can be operated without endangering the public health and safety. Of some generic interest, the Appeal Board found that the non-statistical sampling program employed for reviewing the non-seismic design aspects of the facility was acceptable. Subject to two conditions noted below, the Appeal Board resolved all issues in favor of the licensee. With respect to conditions, the Appeal Board required that the Director, NRR must ensure that (1) the technical specification proposed by PG&E for opera-tion of the component cooling water system be incorporated in the tech specs-before permitting plant operation, and (2) before " commercial operation", PG&E has performed the appropriate jet impingement analyses for certain lines inside containment. In addition, the Appeal Board, before which is still pending the appeal of the Licensing Board's August 1982 full power Initial Decision, retained jurisdiction over the proceeding, in particular to consider the Joint Intervenors' February 14, 1984 motion to augment or, in the alternative, reopen the record on design QA based on recent allegations. In a concurring opinion, the Appeal Board Chairman raised a concern regarding compliance with Appendix B and GDC 1 of Appendix A. The Appeal Board had previously determined that the requirements of each regulation were, for plant 8610100092 860930 PDR FOIA HOLMt:.S86-197 PDR

such as Diablo Canyon, considered synonymous (i.e. " safety-related" and "important to safety" were not distinguishable in terms of the application of QA requirements). The Chairman noted, however, that in Board Notification 84-011, January 18, 1984, the Staff indicates (in an attached letter to all licensees and applicants dated January 5, 1984) that the requirements of Appendix B and GDC 1 to Appendix A'are separate and historically have been so treated. The Chairman notes that if this position is "now that of the Commission" (slip op. at 106) then the Joint Intervenors and Governor must have an opportunity to litigate the question of PG&E's compliance with GDC 1.

It would thus be appropriate for the Staff to advise the Appeal Board of any Commission action on this issue. uy H. Cunningham, I I Executive Legal Director cc: W. J. Dircks ~ J. B. Martin, Reg. V O 4 9

~ 9 Nrg o UNITED STATES / NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , } f\\ i g E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g .e MAR 3 01984 Docket Nos.: 50-275/323 MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief, licensing Branch No. 3, DL FROM: H. Schierling, Pro,iect Manager, Licensing Branch No. 3, DL

SUBJECT:

MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ON DIABLO cat! YON DATE & TIME: Monday, April 2, 1984 9:00 an - 5:00 pm LOCATION: Sheraton Palace Hotel California Room 639 Market Street San Francisco, California PURonSE: To discuss with PGAE responses to concerns by Mr. i. Yin raised at the meeting on March 28, 1984. Note: A transcript o' this meeting will be taken. PARTICIPANTS: NRC Staff R. Vollmer, J. Taylor, R. Bosnak, R. Heishnan, J. Knight K. Manoly, J. Milhoan, B. Saffel, H. Schierling, T. Sullivan, I. Yin PG&E H. Friend, L. Shipley, et al. Hans Schierling, Project Manager l Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensino cc: See next page Meeting between NRC technical staff and applicants for licenses are open for interested nerbers of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to "Open Meeting Statenent of NRC Staff Policy", 43 Federal Register 28058, 6/28/78. . f en

a s o a April 9,1984 Note to: Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l From: Guy H. Cunningham, III Executive Legal Director

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON - COMMISSION ORDER REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES AND EMERGENCY PLANNING On April 3,1984, the Connission issued an Order in the Diablo Canyon proceeding regarding consideration of the complicating effects of earthquakes in the context of emergency planning, CLI-84-4, copy attached. This Order requires that the Staff (and other parties) respond to several issues raised by the Connission (on pages 2 and 3), by May 3,1984. Except for issue 3.(e), the Staff should develop an appropriate response; this office, in consultation with the Staff, will prepare a response to issue 3.(e). We are also looking into the question of whether the licensee's submittal, referred to in issue 3.(b), has already been provided to the parties, to avoid any unnecessary burden on Staff resources. To assure a timely response to the Connission, draft replies should be provided to Lawrence Chandler, OELD by April 24, 1984. ~ //. / / a Guy'H. Cunninghath,III Executive Legal Director l

Attachment:

Counission Order cc w/ attachment: William J.-Dircks John B. Martin Robert Minogue 1P 1 r I j i l (\\M i t

J t. ~ n o.r ' ~.* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '~ ~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY C069tISSION 14 APR-3 P4:44 Core 11SSIONERS: gn ;. '. u... e Nunzio J. Palladino, Chatman OcriiggC ' Victor Gilinsky Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal ggyb3,., f.- 1 %,.J 1 In the Matter of l L PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY $) Docket Nos. 50-275 h 50-323 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, ) Units 1 & 2) ) ) ORDER (CL N ) 4 This order concerns the issue of the consideration of complicating l effects of earthquakes on emergency planning in the Diablo Canyon licensing proceedings. In the San Onofre proceeding, the Comission declared that current regulations do not require consideration of the impacts on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental radiological release. Whether or not emergency planning requirements should be amended to include these considerations is a question to be addressed on a generic, as opposed to a case-by-case, basis. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Units 2and3),CLI-81-33,14NRC1091,1091-10g2(1981). In the interim, the Comission precluded consideration of this issue in indi-vidual licensing adjudications. Thus, the boards have properly excluded this issue from this adjudication. ] j

.....=.. :.. '... ; ;... ' ~ i. ~ ' ':. ..,.....l....... s.' In response to the Co.snis.s. ion.'.s San Onofre decision, the NRC staff reported its view that gerterii: consideration was neither necessary nor- ~ appropriate, but appears. 'to3eTie've' that some specific consideration of - the effects of seismic. tyimta~en emergency planning any be warranted for plants located in areas.,of rel.ativelf' high seismicity. M NRC staff = memoranda, dated June 22'il982-andJanuary 13,1984, atteched hereto. ~

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c-f[" In v'few of this development, the-Comission has decided to addmss ~ ~ whether to allow such consideration under the circumstances in this 3-With respect to low'-poper o'peration, however, the Commission is case.

l satisfied that.,pursuan.t;te.~10.CJ.R. 50.47(d), this issue need not be N.

reviewed further becausiit pertafnsprimarily to offsite emergency .' 'plartning requirements whj.Q.are.,nh,fjs.sential to low-power license a~- g y.q..;.. a decisions.

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..;... : m.:. - : _To help the Coensissfort with 'it's E.onsideration of this issue, the o: parties are requested,to.,*prpy.t@ Qgir, y.1.ews on the following issues no I l. later than 30 days after..the date' of this order. [.. ..c.....r..-..} x. Issues: .+- 1. b whether MRC meergericy planning regulations can and should be read to.. require some review of the complicating effects.of,. earthquakes on emergency planning for Diabic i.. Canyon; 1; " ~.,. i if the answer.,.,.. c.: "?.- 2. ' presents"tio.ee,Nei.auds' tron' -(1) is no, sh to 'W be perf.o .Diablo Canyon on the ground that it 7 spesial circumstances under 10 C.F.R. 2.758. If. 't i., so, what arye;the..s mial cin:umstances that would pemit considetstind-st'tW sffects of earthquakes on emergency l t plann.in.g.f.o,r..:.0f.a. b..io..,$4nyctif. 3 s..- if the an... :... :.11)'..-(.....2) is yes, then the following e. 3. swer.to er .S - infomati.o.n.s.h. ould be provided: . ~.. r. g. .e g. ..,, y.,. 9; :.- - -" " - g. V .,.,.. t.. :,,.... - ". ______._e.

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to b.e.ccon.e the.j.nes.s..of.. limiting a te ".~. ~ ~ '7 9akst'dered.gni.tude.of the largest earthquake un (- - 2.;. [ (d) The.sMis'tintive'eriteria for reviewing the effects of aanthquakes,on emergency planning. ........s.s., J.. f,, e The,neces,si.ty fpt-littgation of this matter. includ-L ing.$g 3eneril scop 4 of i ) if a thatzsh;M,(.h.);.e.l.d and ((11) proceedings d issues that shou be L. :,.. l i ti.g.d t..ed..%..,..

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......Q....... Q *,h t,l h M h l K L W M W s. .e-a e. ip-f ***syA-VMITED.S.TATES.. .s:5.. :.,c. g .~....:.. . w' NUCLEAR R.EMIMTORY COMMI$3f0N .n win.g... s...;..o.pe...w. :.!.;.:. =- .. e Ws - .. [5gy:,g..... s.'.'.".":. "':.'.... ',n.rsis.s s... ,3. 'TW . m...... '"l3l?,:: . - l : is., s r,s.......... -%..,-l:.l-l.:.:{.:;....... '_r '. .-:.:.;.y p-2--w. =.r:::-:. : - x.:. :... 7 Mm0RANDUM FOR: Chaiman PalladW.J:'... '"."-"""""-" Comissioner s1tm.v.5.7.?li.".'l "1 Cossnissioner Ahehnt. : * ""i =-" n" ^ ? c.. .Comissigner.R6Tiefts ^. ;7. * ..7.. ~.. - T. .Com1ssioner W6Ystfie %.~.-:::::::...... ~

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3 William J. Direkte: c u...'.7.i!..~.."T:."' cO. FROM: i w;- " ' Executive Difec76McFOpsretions-e - '~ 32i% %.== ===== = : ~ - EMMENCY. Pt.AMEU.M.1ME!4.,EAIARDS.... susJECT:;

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y. By memorandum da'ted Ma.rch 1. 9M' WWisaif of the Comission requested I 7.~ the staff to consider several que.stions with regard to emergency planning. . 'f' ". ;,... &f -- - -- -- - - - 1 r-C'*- 'I. ShouTd the eniergency plafsdhTlsc'thiMesTf NRC licensees include 'considera. tion.of.th.e. poseb13.3f.fegs.,4*"*gency plans of a 'very on'emer ' f arge earthquake? f,.pT y.~pr;77 7: .~.:....... It is the. judgment of the staff..that fer most sites earthquakes need not [;C be explicitly considered for.'aisifinsif,'"i1EMfg purposes because of the P veiy' Tow likelihood that an eEtTtquake sekifa enough to disturb onsite or onses will. occur.cennresnt'ly.with. or cause a reactor dr. offsite planned resp'1o'r saithq6W.E.figiy.li'.M@ils "We"fmp fh aceident..F14 ting i Ff. response actions or inittate o'ccurrencer.cM.. Unusual Event or l l i ~- " Alert *,ciassas in areas where;f#d.?slistdc"r:13t; of earthquakes to offsite .sthretures is rtistively.high{ M;;ty;RmMW. trey.; for California sites i.f,. and other areas of relatively 1t..is..efe.d}.s.aard.in the Western U. 5.). .....r.. .If HRC requirements are to #r.nr?m:m,.-!:u.:'-}.hcliidrtfih"considerction

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1-. .:t. ' "2-criteria should be appliit '.%.'.~ev.alua#Wg the adequacy of such plans ' d n in this fespect? ."HF' . -"W i- : --- - - - In view of the. staff response.tc Muetttca b..-v..yr ::. : m... Y.., eurrent.raview criteria are ..: c necessary with regard to.thid.Mp(fyu.4 Jot"Eelieve that rulemakin considered adequate. Also the ~' ntie' WiriPtM analyris cenducted. The Hearing Boar,dp have ' read the-Qcraniss%ss. /_7. ionmliing..in the San On:fre case Jde (C'.1-51.-33) to eliminate con'siM'$.14'tif'MTl4rrtEquakes at California sites ! The interaction. of.eWsup.es. lgs.Jhan.the SSE with emergency J.. was not a matter in contention'44.the.ja.,$AR..f.or. ' san Onofre an mately preparedness was considered in3M..sMff ..:f rr.ho.f e.;p.roceeding. f 7.;, . a W 1/ W. h h. % n....-

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Comissioner Ahearne req 6esi.ed!sittera.1 act$pr%ba taken by the staff and f . these pequest's irere also transii(fyitA;.,in thef.har,@i.'i.~Tg82,_ memorandum from the Secretary of the Comiss3ca.;, th.ese are addressed below. @n-MM ps.;mq;,.q:- 6,_ . i. n*.*!*.,, e.,. u. r.u.. s i. 'For example, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (.Dj.ablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and Z).- Memorancet end. prder, December 23, 1981 (unpublished),' directed certiff.catio.n, denied,;Dy,,5,emiss1,oy,. Order dated March 5.1982. ws 3.'m:.'.2:n.1::.::: : :.- - - -- -.gyg y 3 . m e : ~ ...l ~ -r"M-e w-e-n--,- c,p.

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.,y>.. y.. .. u. s o s.,.,.:,,,, _. _ _ _ _, - ~ - ._g. in cordundfo:,... :.. -h with TEMA,* develop an approach for t should The staff [th'e; abiiity of eineW($dy4TinU.tp.:. cope:wf.th natural phenomena i f 1. checking which would be expected td'6~ccer ddefag.-the.1.ife of the plant. Examples L . earthquakes, blizzardsv. ornadoetr. hurricanes, tsunamis, and t FEMA and the sta1T are: shou.1d develop guidelines'.Wt?:ettinInih,7' f]oods that might be expect'eCliEi:T!WW 9 sn r$1 t assttre flexibilit;y. M. i..

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l_;. As stited in the enclosure, a sWtmittiiricy*pTerty expteted to address all Adverse the site characteristics whichlFIf.~Ni(uitrR.:seergency., response. condition ~s, Which' gede'r 11y'cgrttspendito once in 20 to 40 ye'er events, am considered in the evacuation t'id:'isWititis7dhT.Ted..for in staff guidance 9: (Criteria for P. epar'ation ahdW4hst'14W!19tui.tnogical Emer5ency Response .-" '. Plans and Preparadness in Supp'oH"of;Wucleaf Power. Plants, NUREG-0654/ r a The FEP.A-F.EP-1) which was developef76htty*tiF%i"ftaiY and FDW,timization of e h_( evacuation time estimates are usWd"in' the@p'defcWf6)iWiakers in emerpency shelter plans as well as being Mitlable'toContinuing review 'bf41&ds ready U .? conditions. provided by.1',0',CFR Part 50', Apipitn'i!.if.fthd10'tP1T50.54(t). "..v;r;.';r.:. %s,,;...,- r:" - disisters.most likely"foF M}$st:af...the 'once-in a lifetim .'The staff should develop a 2. QTHt"'ifin~e'r ' holding an operating g. 'lican'se of in the OL proces$%..f.l.9l*..'5'.1.i.. 7 ': n W .r.-.--- -- - -. Because of the relatively' high:M1W,i" current:) METRE.~.' calls for California g.. licensees a6d'ap'plicants to corisTysr tWeffe. W.cf. earthquakes in their ,1 ' 'c ~ emergancy planning'and for the4iti3ispiiWto tonsider the consequences of a Mt. St. Helens eruption in its/flant' 'OthFrplants do consider adverse j i. conditions in developing evacuati.e 1.ine ustimates as discussed above h:t i - i 4 a censo'lidated ifsting does no't..:4hpear.3o.Mffa3t".ttielaffort. ? sj. n. !.* *: v *'.* e:- ~ =- ~ - - = = = ~ T.xisting emergency plans"thalff dete"exaniine.d,.t.c. determine whether /+ adequate flexibility is' p,ee@fWi;* l. '.. 2l1., l.,. 3. i

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. :. T::,::;.y:.,: The ecergency p1'an reviews ind'.'iN:Ws'itu implementation appraisals v n;*. the staf, has.been conductingJTMDNe"e.gettiittlons of. the overall f'exibility of a licensae's esti4Whty.res'p'ensA rapAM11ty and the adequacy of evacuation't'ime estimates", %M1Ffichnft"the tensideration of advene Therefore,.no fuMis.x.C.f.W..i,et.e.:fA. be).ieved to be necessary

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P ..T Q CCOSURE ~ l1.X' '

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BASIS FOR CONSIDERATION OF'-MATURAL HlZARDF'!W' EMERGENCY PLANNING .....,s.. ..m..

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y - :- .. m........ A fundamental premise in the appfMjh'f3'.dinFgMylpTanning utilized by the Federa7 Imergency Management Ag'etcy.:(@h-yq;y;y :;pr.lAh,anf tfta3cennisis ..;.. i:l.=.:.::. emergency 3. anni.ng basis must be;r geld,.:e of:y.,..WipInsdfiig'to a u.;;;;.c. :,.ar;r.r 1 ~ n,:.:.:: r,. This was the conclus'tu...., g.y.etche@, %,y,e.W. Task Force which authend ....r.:,

t e accidents.

..... :.::=: : - :- NUREG-0396 (Pianning Basis f.or..d'.'w.D.N.e..O...p.i. hit..:$ft.S.t ~ ~;h;.... m.. :.v,,:::::....... Radiological Emergency'Respens'e N.WN.16lSiliportof.. Light Eater Nucle ~ar Power ~- .. w.. .u Plants)'. That Task Force report'#n sdbseqWntTf endorsed by the Conr.rission ~-. .... :.s ih2 hhM:v e s": :-=--- -- " - (i.'. t T. in.its Policy Statement with resM3 to ths'.fMdidf.Ta'. sit for Emergency r.- . uw.:.' tym:nn:;: ;= ::n.. Res. pons. es to N.u.c.l.e.a. r..Po.wer.Re.a..c.t..E...N... cG.ed.d...T,,,PilTcf.,Ytatem 44 Fed. 5 ...--.-c--r--... nn e.c:.:.., Reg. 61123. (October,23,1979).. T..Ji.e...;c.o..n..c.ep.t'5.i..W.....e.t..t.e.r..st..ed um:ra. wr.v.mmm.... + -.. (Criteria for Preparation and E"aiTlatiEE'W#aMoTogTeal Emer5ency Response C' ... w.s. m.,...^... .-..=..-w,uanum;m..=-- a -u V-- Plans and Preparedness in.5uppor,t:of Nuclev:PtiW4YM... ants). Consecue'ntly,

  • ^. * " f / *.. ! ***
  • .L*.*.* V *

" Ae.f.t : :.' wow.'. - - b :. as a single specific accide. t sequence ter a;;ik..r.....ttt: water reacter nuclear

t..,.

n l. :*.:r, : ' .:-=............ pewer plint could not be identifQtic.4.'y..3...$..if6TWgrbgiis, beth NUR 1 ....v. -W4 '. ~ .s,. , l. and NpREG-061i4 emphasized that tW.)aptJim.,,,.. .l..e emer.t of any planning ~ pe.rtant. . -.y basis 'is' the distance" fr'om the. r,qd...y:.:...c;.,.. l r. ...,..aaf..,. f... ... ::.,.. W.hi.c.h defines the area over ac hts.. y .e. which planning' for predetermin. e.i.f..,. :.....,,,e'l.u.:tse.m.rri.ed out. Not only

.v.........

6t. .a,.~.i o..n.s.h.,o.u,, d ca ...u. m ..: rit. : 3.>.s..:r.::1, a., ;..c,....... s is this area, tenned the EmergeKc@7.lanr.ing;.Icne or EPZ, crucial but the F- ' ' iW.il".~"C d':'d.?:. :: ~ characteristics of the EPZ are syhiYTh&nr."~~~~-"". :

:a::.. :.:. :.4W::.;?."...

' h? :.G. :: 1. w r_. - ,,; :1-v: a: pz...g; im: Tic. The nee.d for specific.E.,Mo.n c. f arsa's. fo... j .....: -.u-.m..a..or exposure r w.. - pai:Hrays is evident. ',:::".1dath o.of..the population for W whom protective measurist' maEM.~. rih #4K;.:. tspensible Y

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. !.:q 1.;:y :::m-3.:........... auth'orities who wout.d.prty 'o,utj.d..it..'eM. fvei a.c.tions and R.' ..:W.y.i.1 ::;rir,s.....-..... the means of coesunication to these authorities and to ~* the population are a4:.,d.,3,J.U.ry:.-~ :epende... tg.,... . 5+. a;:. .n ~. ~. ~. ~. ~ -. t. of the pl anni ng a rea s u N............,...............Eluphasi. M...- p,1JetQ

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..~ ..n....... ....s... It.is, therefore, inher'ent in this,g.t..... <;.m,.s,:.::c.:.;:.. s hYs..ng uppfcath. utilized by FDiA and a,n,

..r.:..v.:. :.:.~..-w:r:. :- -- -- -- --. -

the Comission. i.e., the EnergeW Plann.i.ng.Z.o.n..e...c.o..n.c.e.pt. that the charac- ......u ~...:7 e o;._s tW.T.,y.. teristics of the Emergency Plannin(Zones'thenifeTfeTEist be factored-into ...n. a,....:;:::v:.. :..- --? emergency planning.consideratio.n.s. 2..M...o'r;.am.. sp}ui if..an;(P.i.i.s..an area with ~ sintular adverse. venther attrib.utM......,...,...,...,,,.,, 'thas'e attributas must be ' considered in ._i_. ~f .~ %**.}.T ?.'d..'.'.?.'. : =. :: = '::- -- - - - - emergency planni.ng. This reasrgn,1$. m:Vodd extenLtosall attributes that 7.~. might adversely affect an Emerge,ny,:f..>, z.;;;;;:..;.-- s :1 w ~.-vrw l:enn. l....'I.onur"Aithough neither 10 CFR n.g 50,47 nor Appendii E explic.itly.m..,.e.!.t?!.;.. =............ state that/.the"4NQ6 for adverse weather conditio. n.s on.,...~., :. r., r,.w!...u.u.. o. " :.w verse Mf6"tWiY6tTeVistics, such .1. E.n cenditions are covered tiy NUP.EG 6ifM. iW:cIGl'fiirhiissior, has adopted to . v.wm m- - -- - - - - provide guidance in developing pigs for, ceci6("With emergencies. NUREG-0654 .. ~.....~...r.w::::...... calls fer required evacuation time.".uls.tfmete.s't..tfonsider adverse conditicas . r. a.,..:.. w..- -. -..-.. which might reasonably be expected"fti('dec~u'r!during the plant lifetime at a 7 L..:.... partrenlar site and be severe enoiig.h.... ffe.4..the. tim.e estimates for a to a pirtiquiar event. .. m:: ::. ::.:. :........ h. r

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v .. ~.u.. -. :. v ;.~.:. ca...... i. Two ccndi tions..he.r.mh.W.....ei. hdve.rse.7,-s.-.e..c.o.n.. n. . :ar sidered in the

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.s...... analyses. Adverse conditions would deesnd on the daracteristics

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... ).... x....:., u, s,., of a scacific site and.%did includ, i,.,.,......'ffNdM G W CW. ice. ...........s ~ foc o r ra i n...If.mphhs.,d.igJ..p;d. ~hd,,:,,,:,.................. .................'.M,......... ......g W.;

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. '....>. ;; :., ;r, :.;;p:: :w--: - -.--------s--- .... c :., Thus, adverse site charactaristic,s. 2.. r...,M,,,. ).<..l .W.. 'gency planning Zone .......,1,y. f s. p 'o a ar r

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rust be taken into ac.co.unt tc. sW.gf.a,cW...n::: fin:p:%:e:m::e-,..he Comission's .. ~. ~ r... .. 9.f.,..,...... nt t 1 amargency planning regulations..:.",,:. :M....,.:j:p...... ty,, - g g,,,,,. 3 i ........~.-......._s._..__., .c @,/,T.t..' w.rsts e....ss. u s. s......,.....s............. . : +:... -......,

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'=' .o 3 Explicit planning for emergency preparedness provides a base capability which ! can be expanded or contracted to address an actual emergency. Backup communi-catiens and feedback of damage estimates regarding transportation routes to decisienmakers after an earthquake would be generally available with or without specific advance planning. The general planning base would al'10w decisionmakers to chcose specific actions from among available alternatives for a spectrum of events. There is no explicit guidance in 10 CFR 50.47 or in Appendix E to Part 50 nor i in NUREG.0654 as to the extent to which adverse earthquake conditions are to ~ be taken into account in emergency planning at particular sites. The staff, hewiver, believes the answer to this questien is dependent upon the nature of the risk and the nature of the remedy co deal with the risk. Except in Californ and other areas of relatively high seismic hacard in che k'estern U. S., the staf l judgment is that the nature of the seismic risk is such that no explicit con-sideration of earthquake effects is needed in emergency planning. (This judgmar is r.ct. based on a quantitative analysis but rather on qualitative observations cf the relatively lower seismic risk tc rests, bridges and coe=unications facili in the east versus the west.) The occurrence of. earthquakes of a nat,ure th.at. cculd have icplications for onsite or offsite ressense accions or initiate cecurrences of the " Unusual Event" or " Alert" class is an adverse characts: of the type discussed above. The NRC staff made requests to California facilit to consider earthquake effects in their emergency planning, and the NRC staff i i also requested FEMA to consider earthquake effects in its evaluation of offsite plans. On the other hand, the staff concluded that additional requirements suc l i _J

~ ~.., as the design of additional facilities, structures and systems to specifically withstand earthquakes was not necessary for the reasons discussed above. In particular, no special seismic design of public notification systems, environ-mental monitoring capability or communications equipment is contemplated. Also, explicit consideration need not be given to a seismic event coincident with a significant accident at the plant from another cause 6ecause of the very low likelihood of such a coincicence. With respect to offsite effects at California sites, the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness staff believes there should be assurance of continued ccmmunicatien between the plant and outside agencies. In attition, the Emerger.cy Operations Centers (EOCs) of each of the jurisdictions involved in the emergency planning effort for a specific nuclear facility should. ~ have seitably distant backup facilities to permit continued functiening of a jurisdiction's emergency response given the possible failure of its primary EOC. i l I

n eccitien, for California sites the capability should exist to cbtain can:ge estimates both to the plant and to transportation anc communication facilities offsite to provide a cata base to facter into the decisionmaking Finally, California licensees snould have availat*e a range cf crecess.

reccmmendations to offsite authorities, taking into account the degree of damage to the plant caused by t,e earthquake and to transportation and h communication facilities offsite.

    • e 1
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.,....ff.,.............. . ;., f,..~ - - a .....j..,.,.,,...,. j e M' g.,.,- ;;- 3, m,..... . :... :r: : :. :.-- Given an earthquake of magnitude less than or equal.-to the SSE, while the earthquake could have impacts upon conamfla'tions and transportation as a . - 2.Y..' : :... consequence of the earthquake, the plant.W.dTd 'li.kely not pose an ismediata radiological hasard. If, however, an earth. Wake substantially in excess.of . %.../...... -he SSE were to occur, then the 'potentiaT%f(tr for a radioldgical hazard cc:;11cated by the nonra'diological.impa. cts Weiby"a' ma'ior earthquake.

s. :..- ~

In the view of the NRC staff, s.uch a contin.a.r.ep.Ees r:ot warrant specific gdecy:- emergency planning efforts because of the.'gi.n'@atplanning base capabilities . '.. '.:g:i"::: : discussed above. We conclude Mat thWiEEfaFpTanning base is adequate ' ' t.1'- i *... j because of the remete likelihood, cf an 'ea'r'thqbake substantially in excess of -a 3, s rys i,s,a

r.

.,1 the SSE. In acdition, the characterjstierof an accide.a. which could i thecratically be created by an 'e.a..rthqua.ke',.iufstantially larger than the SSE j? wculd not be outside the spectfum of acci'de'n'l'J.cbufequences considered in in:RE3-0295 upon which the judj; ment on plaqn.itig zone sizes and other planning

  • .. :.. :::.1.7 :? :. "

~ I 'l elements was based. This un11(e'jy sequence"w'olild not be unlike the case of a i-r , severe accident (not generated by an earthytke),; occurring after a winter storm y at a site in the rorthern U. S..Evacuati6n'.may not he a feasible option in suct s s a circumstance. It also should, het noyed ylQ',li,y,royjde for-a preplanned .< y a :::r -.: - er.ergency respense in til remote circumstarica'sdtfcW eequire a comitment of m..:. :.. g suhstantial societal resources,j.g.,,to,niiure'that houses and bridges would A:.:r..v........ 2*. withstand very large earthquakes. II .7;c." r ..a. ..;mr.w : *. ...... n w...i:: ::... - l ~ :.um:.:::.it::.. t c.er:re.r n:. I a ...:. ;. w.r.r:4.<c. /.... l V- ..:;hy.~ :- - p t. G-a. e e.' ..u. :. ...:i k, i.< :.. l l

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==nas stavas wuctsan macutatomi cor.wissts c .[.-4j.t* ?. ? was iwovow. o. c. seses ...../ JAN 13 384 r MD0RANDUM FOR:, Chairman Palladino i FROM: ill11am J. Dircks ~ c Executive Director for Operations DtER&ENCY PLANNING AND SEISMIC MA2/JIDS

SUBJECT:

~ On September 9,1933, a meeting was held With you to dis' cuss the Staff's views on the need for and extent of consideration of the poten'tially compli i . cating effects of earthquakes in the context of emergency.precaredness. Please recall that this issue emanates from the Comission's Memorandum and Order in the San Onofre proceeding, CLI-81-33, tasued in December 1981, in which the Comission determined that "its current regula: Tons do not l require consideration of the impacts.on emergency planning of earth:;uakes .which cause or occur during an accidental radiological release." The l Comission further noted that it "will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts cf a severe earthquake on emergency planning" and, a memorandam from the Secretary to the IIn the San Onofre proceeding, the Licensing Board sought to raise, sua spente the iss've of the effects of an earthquake exceeding the Safe ShutdoTEartn- ~ quake on the applicants' and responding jurisdictions' abilities to carry out l an evacuation in a timely manner and/or protect tnose in the EFI pending evacuation. It had been the Staff's and FD%'s positions before the Licensir Soard that in that proceeding, while considerati.on of the complicating effect of earthquakes 9e tc the SSE was appropriate, consideration of the potential of earthquakes exceeding the SSE was not warranted. The Licensing Boarc rejected this view and instead af. firmed.its prior position calling'for consi-i l deration of the potential effects of an earthquake exceeding the SSE. There-l after, the Comission, as indicated above, reversed the Licensing Scard's Parenthetically, based on the Comission's' San Onofre decision, t decision. Oconsing Board, in the Diablo Canyon proceeding rejecteo a contention regar ~ consideration of the effects of eartnquakes on emergency preparedness. In a unpublished order issued on March 5.1982, the Comission denied the Governo The Lican request for interlocutory review of the Licensing Board's action. Board's ruling was affirmed by the Appeal Board in ALAB-726. slio op, at 20-(May 18, 1983) and review by the Comission was denied (CLI-83-32. Dece :bar ~ ~ 1983). i l t- % p-g # g-h. ---,--,._,.,.<-,,,,-,*w,n--.,.,y,_ 7..y_yc

l Chairman Pa1.ladino -2

  • l Executive Director for Doerations, by memoraridum of March 1,1982, directed the Staff to undertake such consideration.

By memorandue to the Comissioners dated June 22,1982 (cepy attached). the Executive Directgr responded to the questions posed in the Secrstary's March 1 memorandum.' t After our September 9,1983 meeting with you on this subfect, you recuested further technical discussion to provide a rationale for either inclucing or not including specific eme.rgency planning requirecients for seismic events. The following thoughts are presented to respond to your request: Offsite Damace As'sociated With Extreme' Seismic Events, _* 1. Offsite damage generated by earthquakes can signific'antly affect nuclear emergency response. The earthquake hazard and potential for.su-h danage- . varies across the United States. Severe damage,~ such as the failure of buildir ' bridges, and other engineered structures can typfcally be associated with large danaging earthquakes and their related ground motion. levels. For a large part of the U.S. east of the Rocky liountains, where most nuclear power plants are - located, such round motion levels would be well beyond the Safe Shutdown l Earthquake (55 ). For areas ~ associated with hi her earthquake hazard, such as the West Coast, these ground motion levels ccul 'be at or even less than the i~ 55E. Such high hazard areas may also exist in the east (for example, the New Madrid,' Missouri.. area), however, nc nuclear power plants are prasently sited within these areas in the eas.. 2m The Potential Imcact of 0 site Damace on Emercancy Rescense The impact on emergency response capability fecm earthquakes is clearly site region dependent and is generally proportional to the degree of offsite damage. Tnat is, the higher the intensity of the earthquake, the more extensive and severe is the damage it causes. For seismic events that result in significant and widespread damage to surrounding areas, the response capability would be i . degraded through extensive disruption of transportation and connunication Z io very briefly sunenarizit the Staff's positten as expressed in its June 22nd + response, the Staff concluded that the Connission's regulations do not requira ~ 4:nendment since (1) for most sites there is only a very low' likelihood that at earthquake severe enough to disturo onsite or offsite planned resporises will occur concurrently with or cause a reactor accident, and (2) while planning fc i earthquakes which might have emergency preparedness implications may be warrar

  • in areas where the seismic risk to offsite structures is relatively high (e.g.

i ~ California sites and other areas of the Western U.S.), current review criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 (which are derived from the Courrfssion's regulations ' 10 CFR 550.47) are considered adequate. J (. q.- e

~ ~' ~ j Chairman Palladino 3 networks, and from the failure of major strditures.' In this instance the range of protective actions and the capability of the offsite jurisdictions to initiata and implement them could -be drastically reduced. The degree of this reduction would vary ba' sed on c'onditions in the region around the site. For. example, even with substantial damage to all. bridges, a site might have so few bridges in its vicir.ity that blockage of roads would not be significant'. 3. Plant Damace _ Associated _ With Seismic Events-i I When considering the p'ossibilities of plant damage from seismi~c events, it is-important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabi. l lities, and the potential for reactor accidents caused by seismic events. Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion..The first. i , class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to the Operating ' Basis Earthquake (OBE). The 05E ground motion depends on ' plant location. These. accelerations v'ary in the range of about.05g to.109 (higher in areas of high seisrIcity). During an OBE all plant systems'wou.1d be expected to remain opera. ting. The second class of events includes earthquakes with ground motion higher than ~ the DBE but equal to or less t..an,the Safe Shutdown Earthquakes (SSE); the ground motion of the SSE is typ.ically about twice that of the 06E. Probabili. ties of occurrence for the SSE have typically been estimated to be on the order of one in a thousand or one in ten thousand per year. NRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe shutdown after an SSE. Given en SSE, all' seismically qualified equi;rnant would be expected to function to bring l the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including an SSE would be cause for an alert emergency action level classification. However, only in the event of a c6 incident failure of, a safety function (safety systems are designed l for the SSE) or some undiscovered comnon cause failure mechanism (such as a naj des'ign error) would there he a chance 'of an accident which would require offsit The probability of these two events (SSE and safety functi emergency response. failure) occurring simultaneously is very much lower than the probability of either one, perhaps on the order of one in a million per reactor year or less. The final class of events includes all earthq'uakes with grourid motion levels I above the SSE. Fragility analysis is used to estimate the grobability of l failure as a function of ground r.ction associated with these earthquakes. The Zion, Indian Point, and Li=erick Probabilistic Risk Assessments estimated that, in general, ground action on the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration woul be required to damage a nuclear power plant to the extent that significant release of radioactivity could occur. Of course, some plants, such as those it, . high seistaic regions, are designed to withstand earthquakes with ground motion this high; they would resist damage to still higher levels of ground action. The probability estimates for such ground accelerations are significantly less than the probability estimates for the $$E for these plants (the Zion, IP, and Limerick $$Es are.179,.lig, and.159 respectively). The absolute probabilities for earthquakes at and bey,ond the $$E are extremely difficult to estimate and thus have large associated uncertainties. j

' Chairman Palladino '.~ 4.- Current Emeroency Preparedness considerations Seismic events are considered and evaluated to a' limited extent as part of our current emerg'ency planning reviews. The following planning standards, some of which explicitly address seismic events', are addr.essed by the licensee, state and/or local emergency plans as explained in the following sections from NUREG-0654 " criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Respcnse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." II.D.4 Emergency Class,1fication' Syitan "Each State and local organization should have procedures in place tha' provide for emergency actions to be taken which are consistent with the emergency actions reconnended by the nuclear facility licensee, taking into account local offsite conditions that exist s't the time of the emergency.",, (Emphasis acced) II.N.5.a Emergency Facilities and Equipment "Each licensee shall identify and establish onsite monitoring systems . that are to be used to initiate emergency measures in accordance wita Appendix 1, as well as those to be used for conducting assessment. i ) This equipment shall include: i 'a. geographical phenomena monitors. (e.g., meteorological, hydrologic seismic);" II.M.6.a Eme hency Facilities and Equipment "Each' licensee shall' make provisions to acquire data from or for e.areency access to offsite monitoring and analysis equipment including: (U pnasis acced) ~ ~ l l geographical phenomena monitors * (e.g., meteorological, hydrologic a. l seismic);" l

.J.10.k protective Response "The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include:

k. Identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (e.g., seasonal impassibility of roads use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures)"to For each of the emergency response classes given in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, ? stvera natural phenomena (including seismic events) are included as part of the 1 e --____.-,,,,,--,_,._...n

lo Chairman palladino 5-example initiating conditions. The seismic events 'specifically included in this appendix are the Operating Basis Earthquake, and the Safe Shutdown Earth-quake as well as "any earthquake felt in-p.lant or detected on station seismic instrumentation." The preceding show that seismic events are co'nsidered in emergency planning but, as is evident, these review criteria are not very clear and clarification of them could lead to some improvements in amargency preparedness, perhaps by leading to^more refined analysis of potential road blockage, etc." However, it is not clear that such improvements would sub'stantially reduce'the impairment' of emergency response caused by seismic damage offsite. The Federal Emergency fianagement Agency (FEMA) reviews offsite radiological. emergency planning and preparedness to. insure the adequacy of Federal, State, and local capabilities in such areas as emergency organization, alert and notif.ication, communications, measures tn protpct the public, accident assess. ment, public education and information, and medical support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake consequences and response are not part of this process related to radictlogical emergencies. FEMA does, however, have an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes estimates of damage j i l and casualties, planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and i i assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning and prenaredness activities. FEMA believes that these separate activities would complement each other in the event that a concurrent response to i a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant was + required. 5. Risk Persoectives Recent PRAs (e.g., Zion, Indian point) have indicated that very large earthquake (much greater than~the SSE),can dominate the risk from a nuclear power plant. Such earthquakes can cause massive plant damage leading to imediate offsite .radiologi' cal hazards. In addition, massive o.fsite damage was assumed in these. r analyses which substantially degraded the emergency response. Based upon the PRA results,'the staff finds that for most earthquakes (inc19dir. ' l-some. earthquakes more sevca than the 55E) the power plant would not be experte to pose an inraediate offs 0 radiologica1 hazard. For earth'auakes which would cause plant damage leading to imediate offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would not be seriously affected. For earthquakes which cause more severe offsite damage, such as, for example * . disabling.a siren alerting system, the earthquake itself acts as an alerting l For those risk dominant earthquakes which cause very severe damage to system. both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have marginal - The expenditure of benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage. additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage is of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk reduction which 1 could be obtained. ee .e---+-ow

~ Chairnan Palladino 6- .s-6. Sumarv Based on the preceding discussion the following sumary points can be made: In general. tarthquakes up 'to and including the 55E. are not expected a. to pose an ismediate offsite radiological hazard. Earthquakes beyond the SSE may cause plant damage and radioacti9e b. release under. conoitions where offsite, damage impairs amargency response. Further clarification or~ refinemen't of current requirements and guidance nright reduce the impairmeht of imergency response indicated in b. above, -c. but the value of such reduction is uncertain. w ese m a u m William J. Dircks. Executive Director for Operations

Attachment:

As stated ~ cc: Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Rotarts Cownissioner Asselstine Comissioner Seiw.a1 osc ~ OPE ~ 03 F e t- .i l f l e l l ) ee. ,,---~---,,,-r, ,,.,,.m_m,--,w,,,,w-%,, w,m., ,,,,w-__ _w, -,,,}}

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