ML20210Q777

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Forwards Dec 1996 - Aug 1997 Documentation of AP600 Telcon Calls Re Details of AP600 Human Factors Inspections,Tests, Analysis & Acceptance Criteria
ML20210Q777
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 08/28/1997
From: Joseph Sebrosky
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9709020149
Download: ML20210Q777 (23)


Text

  • .

August 28, 1997 APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation PROJECT: AP600

SUBJECT:

DOCUMENTATION OF AP600 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALLS TO DISCUSS HUMAN FACTORS INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSIS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (ITAAC) from December of 1996 through August of 1997, a series of phone calls was held to discuss the AP600 ITAAC between members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion (NRC) staff, and Westinghouse. The purpose of the telephone calls were to discuss the details of the AP600 ITAAC in the area of human factors. The purpose of this letter is to document the material that the staff sent to Westinghouse during this review.

In the above time frame Westinghouse proposed changes to the ITAAC in the human factors area to resolve the staff's concern with the ITAAC. The proposed changes to the Human Factors ITAAC were in the form of faxes that Westinghouse sent to the staff for review. Westinghouse subsequently docu-mented the faxes in letters that have been placed on the docket. Attachment 1 provides a synopsis of the fax and the letter that documents the fax.

Attachment 2 provides informal comments that the staff provided to Westing-house concerning the AP600 ITAAC in the human factors area. It should be noted that the above process has led to an extensive change to the AP600 ITAAC in the human factors area as documented in comparing Revision 2 of the certified design material to Revision 3. The staff is continuing to review, and will provide comments to Westinghouse for the ITAAC in this area, original si Joseph M. Sebrosky,gned by: Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003 Attachments: As stated 3 {

cc w/atts: See next page J DISTRIBUTION w/ attachment:

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ACRS (11) JMoore, 0-15 B18 i DOCUMENT NAME: A:HFE. SUM *See previous concurrence is rectve e copy of thle document,indcate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure *E' = Copy with attachment! enclosure *N' = No copy 0FFICE PM:PDST:DRPM - D:PDST:DRPM D:PDST:DRPM NAME JMSebrosky:sg W JBongarra* TRQuay W U

DATE 08/L6/97 08/27/97 08/ 31/97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY n7.j77 p f- n 9709020149 970828 '

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August - 28, 1997 -

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-APPLICANT: Westinghouse ' Electric Corporation PROJECT:. AP600

SUBJECT:

-DOCUMENTATION OF.AP600 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALLS TO DISCUSS HUMAN-FACTORS INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSIS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA--

(ITAAC)-

. From December of.1996 through August of 1997, a= series of phone calls was held to discuss'the AP600 ITAAC between members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- >

sion (NRC) staff, and Westinghouse. -The purpose of the telephone calls were.

-to discuss:the. details of the AP600 ITAAC in the -area of human factors. The purpose of this letter is to document the~ material that the staff sent to iWestinghouse during this: review.

In the above time frame Westinghouse proposed changes to the ITAAC in the human factors area to resolve the:steff's concern with the ITAAC. :The l !

proposed changes to the Human Factors ITAAC were'in'the form of faxes that j Westinghouse sent'toothe staff:for review. Westinghouse subsequently docu-mented'the faxes in letters' that have been placed on the docket. .. Attachment 1 l provides a' synopsis.of the fax and the-letter that documents the faxE Attachment -2 provides informal comments--that the staff provided to. Westing-house concerning the AP600 ITAAC in the human factors area. It should:be noted-that the above process has led tolan extensive change to the'AP600 ITAAC  :!

in>the human factors area as documented in comparing Revision:2 of'the certified-design material to Revision 3. - 3The staff is continuing:to review, and will provide comments to Westinghouse for the;ITAAC" n' this area. ,

U Ifu

/

/JsephM.Sebrosky. ioject_ Manager

't t andardization Project Directorate M ivision of Reactor Program Management' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 52-003-i Attachments:- As stated.-

i cc w/atts: See next page -

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-Westinghous) Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 '

Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Technology Westinghouse Electric Corporation 19901 Germantown Road P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Russ Bell Mr. B. A. McIntyre Jenior Project Manager, Programs l Advanceu Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Westinghouse Electric Corporation -I 1776 Eye Street, N.W. I Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 '

Box 355 _

Washington, DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Ms. Lynn Connor Ms. Cindy L. Haag Doc-Search Associates Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 l Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818

, Energy Systems Business Unit

Box 355 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager i Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Advanced Reactor Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125

, Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor-19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. S. M. Modro .

PWR Design Certification Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Electric Power Research Institute

-Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 1625 Palo Alto, CA 94303

' Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification NE-50 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD _20874

Date of fac- Description Westinghouse let-simile ter that documents the fax 12/19/96 Draft Tier 1 material for " Task Analy- January 31, 1997 sis" (NSD-NRC-97-4966) 3/10/97 Proposed changes to section 3.2 and 2.5 March 21, 1997 of the certified design material (NSD-NRC-97-5033) 4/25/97 Draft Tier 1 material for emergency re- May 20, 1997 sponse facilities (NSD-NRC-97-5137)

( 4/26/97 Draft Tier 1 material for minimum inven- May 20, 1997

. tory (NSD-NRC-97-5137) 5/16/97 E-mail from Robin Nydes to Joe Sebrosky May 20, 1997 concerning suggested preface to WCAP- (NSD-NRC-97-5137) 14690 5/16/97 Markup of SSAR section 18.8.3.2 to sup- May 20, 1997 port changes being made to the ITAAC (NSD-NRC-97-5137) 6/2/97 Draft Tier 1 material concerning table July 10, 1997 3.2-1, table 2.5.2-8, and 2.5.4-2 (NSD-NRC-97-5231)0 I

Attachment 1

jf Notes on CDN & ITAAC 5/5/97

1. Section 3.2, p 3.2-1: The list of HSI facilities does not include EOF or local control stations, which are within scope of the HFE program.
2. section 3.2, p 3.2-1: A brief description of the MCR and RWS is provided but none for the TSC and ops support center. Why is there no description beyond their mention in the intro . paragraph? (and as per 1 above, no description of the EOF or local control stations is provided either)
3. Section 3.2, p 3.2-1: Computerized procedures are mentioned in Tier 1 in the first paragraph and in item 8. It seems inappropriate to lock in to Tier
1. Westinghouse has deferred the procedure issue to a COL item, in discussions concerning computer-based procedures, the staff has made it clear that its

' position is that the locking in of compiater-based procedures is premature and

' needs to be evaluated and validated as an acceptable method of procedure presentation (see NUREG-0711, Element 8, Procedure Development, criterion 7, computer-Based Procedures. Based on this position, the staff considers it inappropriate to identify computer-based procedures in Tier 1 material.

4. Section 3.2, p 3.2-1: There is no text lead in to the list of 12 items.
5. Section 3.2, p 3.2-2: Should there be a similar item to item 12 for the MCR. Should there be any items for the other HSIs (see comment 2 above.)
6. The CDM item 6 Section 3.2, p 3.2-2 and p 3.2-v: Design Commitment 6 may

. be beyond our review, i.e., did we review to use of two operator workstations and one SRO workstation?

7. Section 3.2, p 3.2-2: Mentions ITAAC for the program, MCR, and RSW, but not for the other resources (see comment 2 above).
8. Secti?n 3.2, p 3.2-3 and -4: Design Commitment 2, acceptance criteria 4 provide a list of functions / tasks / scenarios. However, the SSAR (p. 18.5-1) states that "A set of tasks to be analyzed are not identified as part of .

design certification." and provides a method and guidance to select tasks.

Thus, the Tier 1 material may be inconsistent with the SSAR and contains a level of detail greater than that provided in the SSAR.

9. Section 3.2, p 3.2-5: Design Commitment 3, the list of guidance documents does not match the list on page 18.8-4 of the SSAR. For example, a guidance document on anthropometric consideration is identified but is not listed in the ITAAC. The SSAR identifies display guidelines, while the ITAAC identifies the plant information system. The SSAR identified controls, while the ITAAC identifies soft control (however, the AP600 will have soft and dedicated controls).
10. Section 3.2, p 3.2-7: Design Commitment 5, criterion b - Regarding the specific reference to AP600 specific guidelines in HFE design verification -

while the use of AP600 guidelines is appropriate where they can be used, Westinghouse may find it necessary to utilize additional guidance as well to address aspects of HFE design not addressed in the specific guidance documents to be developed by Westinghouse. One example may be control room environmental factors.

Attachment 2

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Ibis document provides a pg, cd4 level description of the AP600 Human Paciots Vennsadon l . and Valklation (VAV) plan. It spectnes at a high level the asdvitime to be performed a pan of de i AP600 V&V. Individual implen-th= plans that provide more detailed deemiptions of the tests to j be performed, and q== criteria to be used, will be developed fe each V&V activity specified in j this report. Individaal V&V implementasjon plans will be developed efine duip oortineenon.

l 1.1 AP600 V&Y Activities ned Objecoves

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5' b Human Factors lingineenns F.giw Review Model (PRM) developed under the sponsorship of

the U. S. NRC (NUREG 07t t) specifies that an HFE V&V program shonW include five acdvities with -
i. the followims objoetives:
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j 1. Task Support Verincation: Verines that thek 4- Man

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desip pamdes all neconnery s. and connels to i

support plant personnel tasim, -

l l, 2. HFE Desip Verincariam Veri 6es that the M MIS design ocafonns to burEnn factors l engineering (HFE) principios, guidelines, and standards l 3. Integrated System Validanon: Validsens that the M MIS desip can be effecdvoly . - *=1 by

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l. 4. Iuus Resolution Venfication: Vennes that the M MIS desisc assolves all identined HFE
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! 5. Final Plant HFE Verification: Verifies that the fina(E h4 prAlaNsonas to the versned c-6f.g and validased design that resulted the M MIF design

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L The AP600 VAV will inclede all five of these activities. Figue 11 passets the AP600 V&V l andvisies and sequence in whic'h these estivities shall be perforsned. The sequence for completing j these V&V activities will be as follows:

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(Subsection 4.5 & 4.7) 77 Tlas not of test sessarios speciflod will be sufficient to validass the as implemented in
Qansmsa proce.s.] '

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i by will also include sc narios to validate key HRA modeling apanytions for event sequenom that ppm Pp,/t,1 l

i involve risk-inportant human nedons, Examples of assumptions to be confirmed are that particular Y,3

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human actions that need to be performed are satisfactorily completed within the time window Socified '

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l 'Ibo set of test scenanos included in integrated system validation will be deflaed by a j maki-disciplinary team that includes impet fWwn EOP developes, M MIS L';--s, human feeton gg specialists, and benan reliability analysis /PRA analysts.

i N H/+ 4.7 Roetistie VaBdation Sesearies l -

! The innplanumtation plan will specify how test scenarios will be malisec with respect to plant

[ conditions that are likely to hold for the simations being represented (eumber of perswmel in the i consol room, communication requirernents with personnel outside the control toom, requirements for notificarian to outside or =ba noise level and temperums).

4

Selected scenarios will include environmental conditions, such as noise and distractions, which may affect human performance in an acteal nuclear power plant.

l For acdons outside the control roam that are within the scope of the inegrated system validation, j performance impace of potentially harsh environments that reqaus additional time will be mausticauy j simutmed (for example, time to don protective clothing sal accea: S:* areas).

4.8 Perfonmance Measures and Acesplane Criteria

'Ihe impitmentation plan Will spoCify Perfonnance unassures used to establish that inission goals und opermor performance toquiremana are achieved. Performance munes willinclues:

  • System measures relevam to plant safety 1
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1. 'neTSC has floor speos of et least 75 square flame per pomnn ihr a minimum of 25 persons.
2. Dad 3C han voice comunnalcatico oculon..ut for comunualesdan wieb the MCRfaseranneyl ,

Coperations theilityysc, and me U.S. Nuclear Regulosory Cuomimmiuu (NRC).

3. The displays listed lastTabh, M" L inventory table, in subsection 2.

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The Tsc has et least 1275;. .,

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25 persons.

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2. The TSC has voice An laspection and test willbe
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installed, and voice communicadon with the MCR. communication equipment. transmisslos and recepdon are emergency operations thcillry, i

l OEC, and the NRC. accomply'Ng p J 'ha leploys listed in As laspection will be

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Staff Response het AP600 "Computeriznu Procedures System" (R. Hydes note to B. Huffman of 5/14/97) l

1. leave references to " computerized procedures system" in SSAR (Tier 2), including WCAPS-14690, 14645.
2. insert the following statement as new paragraph 3, section 18.8, section " Human 18.9, System Interface Design", and as new paragraph 2,

" Procedure Development":

Although the AP600 human system interface resources include a computerized procedure system, evaluation of the acceptability of the system is not part of the NRC staff AP600 Human Factors Engineering Program review. The NRC neither endorses nor rejects the possibility of using a computerized procedures system as a means for providing instruction to personnel. At the time of AP600 design l

i certification, plant there was insufficient information available to the NRC staff to either support or deny the acceptability of implementing a computerized procedure system in a nuclear power plant environment. The acceptability of cuch a system ,

for application to the AP600 design will be determined during the implementation of the AP600, verification and

- validation, program (ITA gA3 A "Hunan Factors Engineering").

'[ Staff response to remaining items of R. Hydes note of 5/14/97 to B. Huffman All changes acceptable except, Reference to "two reactor operator workstations..p.18.8-17. .". As a result of our previous telecon ret ITAAC 5 workstations was r,emo/13/97, reference to the specific number of inserted. The 5/14/97 ved and option to use " workstation (s)" was diff erent than the ITAAC.

draft mark-up of SSAR p.18.8-17 is Rationale for difference?

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Tfwld b lilt Review of Minimum Inventory ITAAC

Reference:

SSAR Rev. II, Section 18 (particularly 18.12) and Section 7 Chapter 18 draft FSER Comments;

1. Page 2.5.2 3, item 11 contains a four step design process that does not agree with that presented in Chap.18 of SSAR and reviewed in the FSER.
2. For the MCR, Table 2.5.2 8, Jtem Ball: ITAAC for displays ordy verifies retrievability of displays, does not check that the displays work. Should also perform a calibration or accuracy check.
3. Table 2.5.2 8, item Balil: ITAAC for visual alerts should clearly state that all alerts listed 1.i Table 2.5.2 5 will be tested and that they actuate at the correct values.
4. Table 2.5.2 8, item Sc:: ITAAC for controls should clearly state that each control listed in Table 2.5.2 5 will be tested. Also, the ITAAC is vague in that it only states that an operational test will be performed, it should test the control through to the actuated component to assure proper operation. His more specific commitment could be included in this ITAAC, be referenced to an implementation plan here, or even included in the V&V implementation plan of Section 3.2.
5. For the RSW Table 2.5.41, item 21 and 11: Same comments as for the MCR Table above in comments 4 & 6.
6. Table 2.5.41, item 2: The RSW Table does not contain any test of the visual alerts and should contain a test as noted in comment 5 above.

$ftI{9'1 ap6itanc.que DRAFT QUESTIONS / COMMENTS ON REV 3. AP600 CDM FOR HF ENGINEERING l QJ. Referengs Question i

1. p. 3.1 1 per 5/8/97 telecon, WEC was to include EOF in Design Description. it is not included. Please explain.
2. p.3.12 Item # 5, under Acceptance Criteria. This criterion is missing additional information supplied by Emergency Preparedness Branch - "The TSC is adjacent to the passage for the annex building to the nuclear Island (control room)." Please include.
3. p. 3.21 second paryraph, refers to " visual alerts, ..." What's the difference between a visual alert and an alarm? SSAR uses the term alarm in the minimum inventory, not alert. Please explain / correct.
4. p.3.21 fourth paragraph, appears to be missing the word " stations" after " local control". Please explain / correct.
5. p.3.21 fifth paragraph. See comment #4.
6. p.3.2 2 #6 and #9. Reference two reactor operator workstations, one senior reactor operator workstation, etc. The SSAR (e.g., p 18.817) no longer specifies number of workstations. Please correct CDM to be in agreement with SSAR.
7. p.3.2 2 last paragraph, please insert " stations" to be consistent with comments #4, #5 above.
8. p.3.2 2 #6 and #9. Non safety related controls, displays, and alarms should also be addressed. Please correct.
9. p.3.2 3 #1, acceptance criterion. HRA should be used as input to training and staffing as well as HSI design and procedures. Please correct /axplain.
10. ' p.3.2 5 acceptance criterion, third " ", insert after the word " documents", "(based on accepted HFE guidelines, standards, and principles)".

11 p.3.2 9 design commitments #6 and #9 and acceptance criteria #6 and #9: see comment #6 above.

12. p.3.2 9 #6, design description only mentions safety related displays and controls.

Non safety related controls, display, and alarms should also be addressed as part of ITAAC. Please correct.

13. p.3.211. Figure 3.21, title is inconsistent with same figure title on SSAR p18.15.

Please explain /ccrrect.

2 21 Reference Questlo,n

14. p.2.5.2 2, #8a. term
  • visual alerts"is used rather than alarms. Please explain / correct.
15. p.2.5.2 8. In SSAR first column is titled " parameter" and last column is titled
  • alarms". Title of table should include " alarms". Please correct ITAAC table.
16. p.2.5.213, #8a. see previous question #3.

-17. p.2.5.41, #2. see previous question #3.

18. p.2.5.4 2. see previous question #15.

19 p.2.5.4 4. #2, ITAAC, include " controls, displays, and alarms..." in design description. ITA, and acceptance columns.

20 p.2.5.71, design description, is unclear. Please clarify / rewrite.

4

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