ML20210B980
| ML20210B980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/05/1979 |
| From: | Walker H Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210B278 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-346 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8609180209 | |
| Download: ML20210B980 (19) | |
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! , f. ( ( gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n, , \/ .. p ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS g , .e jg t, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 5, 1979 ACRS Members BRIEFING FOR NRC COMMISSIONERS BY DR. S. I. AUERBACH ON 1958 S0VIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT On May 25, 1979 Dr. S. I. Auerbach, of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, briefed the NRC Commissioners on the 1958 Soviet nuclear accident.
Commissioners Present:
- 1. Victor Gilinsky
- 2. Richard T. Kennedy
- 3. Peter A. Bradford'
- 4. John F. Ahearne The briefing was based on an article that appeared in the March-April 1979 issue of Nuclear Safety magazine. The article, entitled "Another Perspective of the 1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident", was co-authored'by Dr. Auerbach (see Attachment 1).
The briefing also included a slide p'resentation (Attachment 2) that was an expose' of information sources and a comparison of conditions in the area before and after the postulated accident.
Dr. Auerbach said that one of his sources (Z. A. Medvedev, a former Soviet citizen) may have reached untenable conclusions about the exact source and the extent of the contaminated area; but from all available evidence, it appears that a fairly large area contaminated with relatively high levels of radio-activity probably exists in the general geographic location he suggested.
Moreover, Dr. Auerbach said that the authors of the article did not investigate the probability of human contamination but, he said, Medvedev indicated that there was some human contamination associated with the accident.
He also said that an exhaustive critical analysis of the Soviet literature is warranted in order to resolve doubts about the exact nature and consequence of the postulated accident.
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Another Perspective of the 1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident By J. R. Trabelka,' L. D. Eymen,' F. L. Parker,' E. G. Struxness,' S. I. Auerbeeh*
Abstract: The occunencr of a major Soviet nuclear accident military nuclear waste during the winter of anolving stored. reprocessed. long-livedfissson wstes has been 1957-1958. They both believe, on the basis of reported by forme Soviet citisent Z. A. Medvedev. writingin the popular science magasine New Scientist believed that the information supplied to them from a variety of accident resulted in significant loss oflife and required the sources, thct the accident resulted in a significant loss pamanent eracuation of the civilian population from a large of life (hundreds of people) and requited the area (seveal thousand square miles). Although Medvedev permanent evacuation of the civilian population from a appears to have reached untenable conclusions about the exact large area, origin and extent of the contaminatedarea. It does appear that a credible case can be made for an accidental airborne releas, Extensively edited and unevaluated information offission wstes in the generalgeographiclocation he suggested released from the illes of the U.S.CentralIntelligence la view of the growintimportancr of nucitar power es s world Agency (CIA) to a citizens' groups indicated the energy source. an exhaustive critical review of the Soviet presence of military nuclear facilities near the city of literature is wtranted to resoire doubts about the exact nature and consequences; endeed even the occurrence. of the Kasli (Fig. I). Although the accident has been 8-postulated accident. designated in various reports
- as the "Kyshtym Disaster," the choice of the name appears to be Retrospective accounts by former Soviet citizens'-* associated with the largest city near the accident site have ' indicated the presence of an extensive, unin. The actual facilities reported were located northeast of habited area contaminated by radioactive materials in Kyshtym.' Th'e city of Kasli may be a more suitable Cheliabinsk Province (in the Ural Mountains) of the reference point for the actuallocation (Techa,Sungul)
USSR. Two independent sources (Medvedev and of the nuclear facilities described in the CIA docu-L Tumerman8 ) have indicated that the highly radio. ments. These facilities were located among manylarge active restricted area, which lies between the cities of lakes in the upper Techa River drainage. The Techa Cheliabinsk and Sverdlovsk, was established after an River itself reportedlys has been contaminated with explosion at a storage site for long-lived high level radioactivity throughout its course. The CIA docu-ments' indicate the occurrence of a nuclear.related
- J. R. Trabalks and L D. Eyman are Research Staff incident (or incidents) and subsequent high-level radio-members in the Environmental Sciences Division at Oak Ridge active contamination in this area between 1956 and Natior.al Laboratory. F. L Parker is a professor in the 1961, most probably during the winter of 1957-1958.
Environmer.tal and Water Resources Engineering Department at VanderbDt University, E. G. Struxnen is an assodate No cause was clearly identified; the possibilities director of the Environmental Sciences Division at Oak Ridge suggested were either an explosion in a high-level-weste storage area or an experimental altbome nuclear National laboratory, and S. I. Auerbach is the Duector of the Environmental Sciences Division at Osk Ridge National weapons test. The scope of the accident, in human 12bora tory.
terms, was not well defined but appeared to involve NUCLE AR SAFETY. Vol. 2o. No. 2. MarcfwApril 1979 ottachrent 1 l
l
OPERATING EXPERIENCES 37 g era and Tumerman's subsequent account, Medwder con-y cluded that the accident actually occuned in an area g , between the lary Ural dties of Cheliabinsk and Sverdlovsk, east of Kyshtym.8 We have no mason to doubt either the veracity or sincerity of the reports made by these former Soviet dtizens. However, we I *"'ne-ures mu concluded that additional objective information might 4
g 3 ~7 be needed for a scientific evaluation of the incident.
e we amed ,.( ) esa Ti e first (and most comprehensive) reports are attributable to Medvedev,b8 an internationally
.} w, g , a g recognized geneticist now living in I.ondon. During a Kverve ,' ,* recent visit to Oak Ridge National laboratory, he 8
4,, reiterated his claim that the location, year of a,,,em , 3 ,, occurrence, areal extent, and even the type of nuclear i i i accident could be confirmed within reasonable limits Kaometers by a Critical an8Iysis of the extensive USSR radio-ecology literature based on studies of the contaminated area (over 100 publications).
Yamanshalirsk e
'8 MEDVEDEV'S CASE Fig.1 Geographic Ngion in which major Soviet nuclear accident Nportedly occurred. -am,- ,reEroad; Medvedev's contention was first published in an
. seed or (whese named) river; -- , boundary between article in the Popular science magazme New Scientist.:
svedlovsk and cheliabine1 provinces. Response to this article has been mixed and in some cases highly critical.8 A careful examinatica of Medvedev's article provides some support for .the some loss of life (magnitude undetermined), evacua- reported negative responses. For example,in one line tion of the dvilian population from a large area, and of reasoning, he suggested that ! x 10' Ci of"Sr was establishment of a restricted, radiation contamination present in the watershed of one lary contaminated
, zone near the Kasti site.s lake.8 '8 If it is assumed that the watershed area is one The CIA documents appear to corroborate some or two orders of magnitude larpr than that of the lake important aspects of the conclusions drawn by former itself (10 to 20 km 2), the original level of surface Soviet dtizens. However, any objective observer must contamination is calculated to be approximately I to also conalude that there are significant inconsistent 10 Ci/m*. This concentration is 108 to 10' greater elements present in these two separate sets ofinforma- than lewis reported in terrestrial studies (~1 mO/ms )
tion. For example, two CIA reports, based on inter- in the same area. Yet Medvedev concluded that runoff
. views conducted in November 1961, are questionable and erosion from the terrestrial zone was responsible in terms of their relationship to the Kasliincident (our for the activity present in the lake. If one assumes that nomenclature). Intemal inconsistencies about dates in the activity reported to be in the lake's watershed is the two reports, coupled with the location of alleged conect and that all the "Sr originated from fissionin radioactive fallout (130 km south of Kasli), raise plutonium-production reactors, this would correspond serious doubts about their validity or that they refer to to a reactor operating history of 10 8 to 108 MW(t)/
the same event. A disturbing feature of both sets of year in order to pnerate the "Sr waste inventory information (from the CIA and from the Soviet required.' This is clearly inconsistent with the known citizens) is the notable absence of either first or accumulated history of reactor operation (all types)in second. hand accounta of the incident itself or con. the entire world during 1957 and 1958. Further, the firmed authoritative information related to its after- total activity of "Sr wastes in storap at Hanford (the math. The absence of first-hand information originally primary U.S. production site for weapons 1,rsde plu.
led Medvedev to conclude in his original report' that tonium) in 1978 was 1.27 x 10' CI'-less than the acddent occurred near the dty of Blagoveshensk Medvedev's estimated I x 10' Ci after a much lonpr (over 300 km west of Kasti). From his literature search time.
NUCLKAR SAFETY, Vol. 20, No. 2, Marcfi-Apru s979
300 OPERATtNG EXPERIENCES Both terrestrial and freshwater studies reviewed by activity was probably associated with the same pneral Medvedev indicate that 8"Cs was a minor constituent area.
in the contaminated zone. For example, in the The m' ajor thrust of Medvedev's argument la that terrestrial atodies, concentrations of "Sr reportedly certain radioecology studies were conducted in areas ranyd from 0.2 mci to 3.4 mci /m*, and 8 "Cs far larpt and more heavily contaminated than one corcentrations ranyd from 4 pCi to 7 pCi/m8 . would expect do have been set out for purely ex-Further, in another aquatic radioecology study dis- Perimental purposes. For example, two contaminated cussed (that conducted by Rovinskii), there is no takes were reported to be 4.5 and 11.3 skm i,,,,,;:a i
evidence that 8"Cs contributed significantly to the another contaminated lake was estimated by Medvedev total initial activity. Cerium-144 was the dominant to be 10 to 20 km8 in extent. In addition, at least 21 isotope (* **Ce/"Sr activity
- 10 : I); '"Ru and deer were collected from a contaminated terrestrial site "Sr appeared to account for the remainder estimated to be at least 260 km8 in area.8 De areal
('"Ru/"Sr activity er i : 1). The conspicuously low estimates were based on the carrying capadty of the levels or absence of '"Cs in these studies, coupled system in relation to the size of the sample collected.
with the obserud levels of '**Ce and8"Ru, argues We should point out here that we believe that the strongly against an accident resulting in release of assumptions Medvedev used to estimate the size of materials from a long4ved wsrte burial facility-the study areas appear to be valid. Our own calculations of crse so firmly maintained by Medvedev. the areas it, quired to support the fish populations and the deer herd are in reasonable agreement with his.
However, we recognize that (( the totalpopadesions DISCUSSION were removed, rather than a subsample, dere estimaars Criticisms leveled at the interpretation of both the uould be brveM Dus the actual size of the con.
scale and type of accident may appear to be warranted taminated areas might be much smaller (order of magnitude) than previously stated. Another estimate of l by the evidence presented by Medvedev himself.De j evidence in Soviet radioecology publications alone the contsminated terrestrial area,8 based on the migra-tion rate of rodents during a lifetime, is not well.
indicates a more complex case than that suggested by any observer (including critics) thus far. De mcon- founded and was not considered furth> r. A reasonable siaten:les in Medvedev's argument might have led some estimate of the total minianum area required in the
+
to doubt even the existence of a nuclear accident. cited studies is well in excess of 25 km8 under the However, one must recognize the likelihood that most conservative assumptions. This area is far greater Medvedev encountered difficulties in interpreting infor. in size than any known radioecology study area established by deliberate design.
mation about an actual nuclear accident because he is a pnetidst attempting to draw mnclusions in areas in Genetics studies conducted on the contaminated j which he has, not been formally trained,14., radio. area indicate that the leveh of "Sr were approaching j radiotoxic levels (as indicated by significant increasea ecology and nuclear technology. Thus it would seem in chromosome aberrations and other pnetic effect:8) prudent Arst to perform an objective analysis of the i Yet much of the research effort reviewed by Medvedev information he presented, with no prior judgments has been on studies of radionuclide transport in the being made about either the type or the scale of a potential nuclear accident or an alternative source of associated ecosystem. Biological studies involving i radioactive contamination.
radiotoxicity and radionuclide transport are p n-erally considered to be mutually exclusive because
) An independent source, L Tumerman,8 reported radiotoxicity confounds investigations of radio.
! encountering a zone of ra3ioactive contamination nuclide cycling. The reported levels of "Sr con-
] extending along 20 to 30 km of the highway between 8 i
tamination (~1 mci /m ) are many orders of magni-Cheliabinsk and Sverdlovsk in 1960. The zone was tude above those required for analyteal purposes encountered northeast of Kyshtym, approximately (fallout background <1 x 10-8 mci /m 8 throudi 100 km south of Sverdlovsk. Turnerman, former head 1972)'8 and would be considered high (by the of the Biophysics laboratory at the Institute of authors) for anything but radiation effects studies. ne Molecular Biology in Moscow, would certainly appear pattern of "Sr contamination in a 100-m8 plot frasa to be a credible sdentific observer. De CIA reports, the contaminated terrestrial area (Fig.2 in Ref.2) although highly edited, also indicate that some type of appears to be almost random-hardly that which one abnormal occurrenn involving the release of radio. would design for a carefuRy controlled experiment.
NUCLEAR SAFETY, Vol. 30. No. 2. March-April 1979 l
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OPERATING EXPERIENCES 200 Again, we agree with Medvedev's conclusion about those already cited by Medvedev would be required to l
these points. We can also estimate the initial "Sr define properly the study area.
surface concentrations in the two lakes studied by Rovinskii by paphical analysis. The estimated areal CONCLUSIONS 3
"Sr concentrations are both approximately 0.8 8
mci /m 8 (mean depth 1.0 and 1.9 m, We believe that Medvedev may have reached respectively)-far higher than one would consider untenable conclusions about the exact source of the using in research on such large systems with such a radioactive materials and the extent of the original long-lived, radiotoxic material. We believe that there is contamination zone. From all the available evidence,it
' 2 sufficient evidence that these study areas were not appears that a fairly large area (>25 km ) con. 1 t
deliberately contaminated for research purposes, but taminated with relatively high levels of radioactivity rather that radioecology studies were designed to take (=1.0 mci /m' "Sr reference radionuclide as opposed
- advantage of a large, inadvertently contaminated area. to <1 x IO-* mci /m8 from nuclear weapons fauout)
The previous estimate (by Medvedev 2
) of I x 10' probably exists in Cheliabinsk Province of the USSR in Ci of "Sr in the drainage wea of one large con. an area northeast of the city of Kyshtym. The total taminated take is much too high for several reasons area of cor.tamination may be significantly greater than (one reason was cited previously). The original estimate indicated; Medvedev's literature dtations do not of 5 x 10' Ci of "Sr in lake water
- is perhaps provide information for an accurate estimate of the reasonable, but the activity in biota and sedirnent may total area involved.
have been only a relatively small multiple (<20) of this On the basis of the cited radioecology data, a :
j total, not 1000 times greater as suggested by waterborne release (i.e., involving contamination of a l
Medvedev. We believe that this assumption resulted river system, a series oflakes/ reservoirs, and associated from a misinterpretation by Medvedev of statements floodplain / marsh areas) cannot be completely ruled made in the original papers.' out; however, the occurrence of an accident cannot be If the lake in question had a closed drainage and conclusively demonstrated. For example, one could the "Sr activity reported in the water represented speculate and suggest that the contamination resulted only soluble material (no suspended sediment in. from imprudent chronic releases from a large radio.
cluded) under equilibrium conditions,we might obtain chemical separations complex over a number of years.
a total activity 20 times that in the water for the entire However, proponents of this argument would have to lake ecosystem [i.e.,1 x 10' Ci of "Sr (Ref.10)]. negate the observations of Tumerman and some of the i Since the lake described appears to have had an open information provided by the CIA. Thus the most
! drainage,8'8 8 an, or a significant fraction, of the credible case does appear to involve some sort of radioactivity may have entered from upstream water. accidental airbome release.
bome (e.g., river) sources (or, conversely, from di-ect The disparity of reported "Sr/is'Cs activity airborne inputs to the lake alone) rather than fromits ratios in terrestrial studies relative to unseparated Immediate watershed. Equilibrium conditions did not fission wastes and the dominance of '**Ce activity at I.
! appear to exist in any event.8 Thus the total the start of one aquatic study suggest (1) that an activity in the lake and its own watershed may have irtervening mechanism for '8'Cs removal was present been much less than I x 10' Ci. The great disparity and (2)that long-lived wastes (apd >l year) were not between the "Sr concentrations in other terrestrial prominently involved. The absence of short. lived areas subjected to study and the surface concentration fission products in radioecology studies suggests that applied to this lake (and its watershed) are eliminated events involving nuclear explosives (weapons test, under this set of conditions, weapons accident, construction accident involving Medvedev suggests that the nature of the plant and nuclear explosive, etc.) or reactor accidents as the sole source of.the decontamination are not presently very ,
animal species described in research papers indicates '
credible unless data couection and analysis were the approximate geographical location of the con.
tamination zone. One reference apparently specifies delayed for a period of time.
the Oieliabinsk region as the source of biota obtained However, a number of cases can be postulated for research purposes. We would agree that, given wherein the venting mechanism is not reflected in the enough information, this technique of biogeography resulting contamination produced. These would in.
would be useful; however, additional sources beyond clude (1) accidental detonation of a smau nuclear NUCLE An SAFETY Vol. 2o, No. 2. Ramre-Aaru 1979 l _ _
e 210 OPERATING EXPERIENCES device (either a weapon or construction device) near a 3.W. E. Farrell, Ex-Soviet Sdentist, Now in Israel Tintis of radiochemical separations or waste storage facility,(2) Nuclear Disaster,New York 77mes. Dec,9,1976, p. L conwntional explosion following a nuclear criticality 4. Evidence on the Urah Inddent,New Sci, 72(1032): 692 either in a radiochemical separations plant orin a waste ,'er 3, h en lo ures) from G. F. Wilson, U. 5. Ostral storage tank, (3) explosion followingignition of highly Intellisena Agency, to R. B. Fonock Otizen's Movement flammable solvents used in some radiochemical for Safe and Effident Energy, Nov. II,1977; Subiset:
separations,(4) detonation of certain nitrate wastesin hformation Relating to a Nuclear Disaster A8eged to Have a radiochemical separations facility or high-level. waste Occuned h the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union in storage tank, and (5) venting of a high-level. waste
- 6. Iubbs, 'the TNyenty-Year Secret, New 368 Set, 74:
storage tank by an explosion resulting from either (Nov.10.1977).
steam pressure buildup or ignition of radiolytic 7. A. L B*yenko, Concentration of Strontit.m-90 and hydrogen. The range of possible explanations for the Caesium-137 by Freshwater Fishes,ho6L IcArAyol (now contamination zone in Cheliabinsk Province appears to J. IcAdyol)(EngL Tran 1.),10: 860 862 (1970).
be potentially much broader than the explanations "
""* * "I * ' 8I'"I "'I " ** N I"'
suggested by Medvedev or his critics.
Radiologiest Nealth Nandbook,' Report PB-121784(Rev.),
U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, NTIS.
The implications of a catastrophic rele,ase from a 1970. .
nuclear waste storage facility are obvious. We believe 9. Netiona; Academy of Sciences, Asdoscrire Wasteser de that an exhaustive critical analysis of the Soviet NdV rd Reservati n. A TecAntalRcWew, NAS, Washing-literature associated with both nuclear technology and radioecology is warranted in order to resolve doubts 10. .' . Method for Calculating the Radioactive impurity concentration in the Water and the Bottom about the exact nature and consequences,indeed even Layer of Stagnant Reservoirs, Sor. Ar. Enary (Engl.
the occurrence, of the posttilated accident. TransL),18(4): 480485 (April 1965).
II. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, lonizing Radiation: Levels and Effects.
REFERENCES Vol. i. Levels, Table 26, p. 86, United Nations, New York, 1972.
1, Z. A. Medvedev, Two Decades of Dissidence New Sci, 12. A.1. D*yenko, rome Features of Oesum 137 Conan-72(1025): 264-267 (Nov. 4,1976).
tration in Fish Populations in a Body of Fassh Water, 2.Z. A. Medvedev. Facts Behind the Soviet Nudear Disaster, hobl lehrhyol (now J. Ichthyot) (Engl. Tran 1.),12:
NewSct,74(1058): 761764 (June 30,1977).
149 153 (1972).
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .___ . _ . . . _ _ _ ._ .. _____._ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ - . = . - _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . . _ . . . . . _ . . _ _ . . _ , .__. . . .
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INFORMATION SOURCES 1 .
j 1. ACCOUNTS BY FORMER SOVIET CITIZENS 1
l 2. CIA RELEASES TO PUBLIC 1
j 3. SOVIET SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS i
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i SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
- 1. MEDVEDEV ARTICLE ON SOVIET DISSIDENCE.(ll/76)-
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- 2. " SCIENCE FICTION" RESPONSE BY SIR JOHN HILL (UKAEA)
- 3. TUMERMAN REPORT (12/76) i MEDVEDEV ARTICLE ON "NDCLEAR DISASTER" (6/77) 4.
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- 5. MEDVEDEV VISITS ORNL (10/77) j 6. CIA RELEASE TO U.S. CITIZENS GROUP (11/77) i 5
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POPULATION OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS YEAR CITY.
KAMENSK-URAL'SKII' SVERDLOVSK CllELIABINSK 1939 423,000 273,000 51,000 i
1959 779,000 . 689,000 141,000 1967 961,000 836,000 161,000 1978 7 1 MILLION F 1 MILLION NO DATA l
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1 CHELIABINSK PROVINCE i
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! POPULATION DENSITY / ARgA YEAR POPULATION km 2 km
< 1959 3 MILLION 34 8.8'x 10 4 l 1.1 x 105 1970 TN 3.9 MILLION 36 l
i- 1966 LAND UNDER CULTIVATION - 32 PERCENT 1966 PRINCIPAL CROPS: GRAIN, FODDER - 97 PERCENT.
i 1
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t CLIMATE
. SVERDLOVSK CHELIABINSK TEMPERATURE MEAN ANNUAL 1.2 C (34 F) 1.5 C (42P)
MEAN JANUARY -17 C (4.5 F) -16 C (2.5P)
MEAN JULY 17 C (63P) 18 C (65 F)
PRECIPITATION (mm)
MEAN ANNUAL 400-500 ~400
- SNOW COVER 500-600 ~500 PERIOD (days)
^
FROST FREE 115 118 SNOW COVER 166 155 ICE COVER 159 (ISET R. ) 159 MIASS R.)
9 C________ __ _. .a w a - y 5 m e e e w ,? ww. e,. , e-= , +. e r,
, v LOVIE1' FADIOCCOLOGY STUBY SITES REPOP,' RED DO NOT APPEAll TO IIAVE BEEN DELIBERATEIX CONTAMINATED
- AREAS TOO L'.AltGt. - WI.TER ,110 DIES (4.5, 11,3, AND + 10-20 50. KM SURPnCE) AND TERRESTRIAL AREA WilERP, 21 DEER WBitR COLLECTED.
- ACTIVITY LEVELS TY)O HIGH EFrilER FOR FIELD OR WASTE DISPOCAL RESEARCH AREAS 90 S 'A UP TO 3. 4 MILLICURIE/M2 IN TEBRESTRIAL AREAS AND 0.2 MICAOCURIE/ LITER IN AQUATIC STUDIES.
- PATTERN OF CONTAMINATTON IN ONE PEOT (100 M X 100 M) NOT UNIPORM ENOUGil TO TIAVE LIERN I)ULlI4ERATELY APPLIED.
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ISOTOPIC RATIOS REPORTED IN RADIOECOLOGY STUDIES
.- TERRESTRIAL (9-12 years DECAY TIME)
Sr-90 0.6-3:4millicuriesfm2 4.-S. microcuries/m Cs-137
. AQUATIC (INITIAL L'ONDITIONS)
Ce-14 4 :S r-90 :Ru-106 er 10 :1: 1. NO INDICATION OF CB-137 AT TIME ZERO o
b t
.. IL'ENKO'S " HOT" LAKE - AN ENIGMA l '. STUDIES CONDUCTED IN 1969-70 (12-13 years DECAY)
J.
. 2. OPEN DRAINAGE: WIDE FLUCTUATION IN RADIDACTIVITY CONTENT
- 3. LARGE SYSTEM ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 20 km2 IN AREA
- OVER ONE QUARTER METRIC TON OF PIKE (ES0X LUCIUS) COLLECTED DURING 7 months IN 1970; 3 IN 10-12 kg CL ASS 2-
- 4. ESTIMATED TO CONTAIN 105 -- 106 Ci 0F Sr-90 e
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. . _ _ _- __ _ _ - . _ - - . .- _ .. ~ _ . - .
- 1 POTENTIAL ACCIDENT MECHANISMS INVOLVING 4
REPROCESSED WASTES i
i 1. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY
)
- 2. CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIONS, FIRES.
i A. HIGHLY FLAMMABLE SOLVENTS (ETHERS)
B. SOLVENT RESIDUES, NITRATE WASTES j
C. AMMONIUM NITRATE WASTES D. RADIOLYTIC HYDROGEN-0XYGEN MIXTURES
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Cs-137 REMOVAL MECHANISMS FOR REPROCESSED
- .! NUCLEAR WASTES 3
". 1. VOLATILITY AT HIGH TEMPERATURES (> 400 C)
- 2. RADI0 ISOTOPE PRODUCTION i I
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OUR CONCLUSIONS INDICATE THAT AN EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET LITERATURE IS WARRANTED
- MEDVEDEV'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT S0; CE AND EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION ZONE MAY BE UNTENABLE.
EVIDENCE EXISTS FOR FAIR-SIZED AREA (it 25 SQ. KILOMETERS) ACCIDENTIALLY CONTAMINATED WITH HIGH . LEVELS OF RADIDACTIVITY (~-1 MILLICURIE/M2 90SR)
IN CHELIABINSK PROVINCE IN THE U.S.S.R.
- BEST EXPLANATION PRESENTLY SEEMS TO INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT, ALTHOUGH A CHRONIC WATERBORNE RELEASE CANNOT BE RULED OUT.
REPORTED ISOTOPIC RATIOS (IF ACCURATE) RULE OUT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OR REACTOR ACCIDENT AS SOURCE.
DOMINANCE OF CERIUM-144 AT START OF ONE AQUATIC STUDY (I44CE:90SR ACTIVITY RATIO -10:1) SUGGESTS THAT FISSION PRODUCTS WERE l-2 YEARS OLD WHEN RELEASED.
ISOTOPIC RATIOS IN TERRESTRIAL STUDIES (90SR:137CS ACTIVITY RATIO 7 100:1) INDICATE THAT AN INTERVENING CESIUM REMOVAL MECHANISM WAS INVOLVED.
COMBINED INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT EXPLANATIONS INVOLVING RELEASE FROM A RADI0 CHEMICAL SEPARATIONS /HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STORAGE FACILITY ARE PRESENTLY MOST CREDIBLE.
'I RATIOS OF FISSION WASTE PRODUCT ACTIVITIES .
TO Cs-137 DAYS ISOTOPE 350 500 700 1800 Sr-89 0.45 --- --- ---
Sr-90 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Y-91 0.92 0.16 --- ---
Zr-95 1.1 0.23 --- ---
Nb-95 2.5 0.54 --- ---
Ru-106 0.84 0.64 0.44 ---
Ce-144 14.0 9.6 5.7 0.39 Prn-147 1.8 1.6 1.4 0.62 PERCENT OF INITIAL ACTIVITY _2.4 1.5 1.0 0.3
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UNITED STATES 8' ,
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- g. ' :j ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 C
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June 5, 1979
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ACRS Members BRIEFING FOR NRC COMMISSIONERS BY DR. S. I. AUERBACH ON 1958 SOVIET NUCLEAR ' '
ACCIDENT ,
On May 25, 1979 Dr; S. 1' Auerbach, of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, briefed the NRC Commissioners on the 1958 Soviet nuclear accident.
Commissioners Present:
- 1. Victor Gilinsky
- 2. Richard T. Kennedy
- 3. Peter A. Bradford
- 4. John F. Ahearne .
The briefing was based on an article that appeared in the March-April 1979 issue of Nuclear Safety magazine. The article, entitled "Another Perspective of the 1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident", was co-authored by Dr. Auerbach (see Attachment 1).
The briefing also included a slide presentation (Attachment 2) that was an expose' of information sources and a' comparison of conditions in the area before and after the postulated accident.
s Dr. Auerbach said that~one of his sources (Z. A. Medvedev, a former Soviet citizen) may have reacised untenable conclusions about the exact source and the extent of the corit'aminated area; but from all available evidence, it appears that a fairly large area contaminated with relatively high levels of radio-activity probably exi~sts in the general geographic location he suggested..
Moreover,-Dr. Auerbach said that the authors of the article did not invastigate the probability of human contamination but, he said, Medvedev indicated that there was some human contamination associateo with the accident.
He also said that an exhaustive critical analysis of the Soviet literature is warranted in order to resolve dcubts about the exact nature and consequence of the postulated accident. .
M/, ,
Harold Walker ACRS Fellow Attachments as indicated cc: ACRS Technical Staff ACRS Fellows
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