ML20210B445
| ML20210B445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/10/1962 |
| From: | Gifford F Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210B278 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-346 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8609180079 | |
| Download: ML20210B445 (3) | |
Text
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C0PY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS UNITED STATES ATOMIC 20545 ENERGY COMMISSION -
WASHINGTON. D.C.
April 10, 1962 10 CI.ASSIFICATIon CA:
oR CHANGED TO BY AUTHORITY OF d 83fl #
sy _/d&______ DATE ________
Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Comission Washington, D. C.
Subject:
REPORT Off NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR
Dear Dr. Seaborg:
This letter is written in response to your oral inquiry concerning a possible transfer at some future time of the i
1 It is clear that we can make an evaluation only on the basis of present reactor technology, safety experience, and site usage.
Within this context we have considered only two possible alterna.
with their safety features and confinement f d as pleted this year; and the second shut down of the present Ha reactors without change in the present exclusion area size.
The operation of the NPR assuming the continued operation f o existing Hanford Production Reactors was covered in our letters o We are sure that you are aware of the possibility March 14,1960.
that an accident at one of these reactors might force a shu the NPR.
The problem of operating the NPR as a pow The Comittee's views on this question are presented below.
Present design criteria for a reactor on this site, as quoted fro HW-61628, (P. 40), are as follows:
8609180079 860915 PDR FOIA TAYLOR 86-346 PDR COPY rs - -- __ . - _ _ , __ - - - ,
C0PY April 10,1962 Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg .
"The Atomic Energy Comission has directed that any additional reactor at the Hanford site shall possess additional safety features such that the additional reactor, of itself, would not prevent release of land on the Wahluke Slope. This di-rective has been interpreted as implying that the quantity and character of fission products which may be released to the surroundings must be such as not to require long term evacuation of land outside the boundaries of the present Primary Con-trol Zone of the Hanford reservation in the event of any credible reactor incident.
"The term 'any credible reactor incident' is defined as an incident resulting from equipment failure, operator error, or natural phenomena which do not involve gross perforation or structur-I al damage to the buildings or enclosures which are i essential to the confinement of fission products released from the fuel elements. Incidents result-ing from acts of war, large scale sabotage, falling objects, or earthquakes more severe than those for which(protection would be provided under Criterion tion."
It is evident that these criteria are not necessarily the same as those given by the new Part 100.
Calculations made by the General Electric Company show that the dose from noble gases at the nearest Hanford site boundary, which is five miles from the NPR, under the assumption of certain accidentFor condi-the tions for this reactor, will be approximately one r/ hour.
.1% leak rate and other conditions assumed in the Technical Inform tion Document referenced in 10 CFR 100, it would appear that this site would meet the exclusion area, minimum low population zone, and population center distance requirements, although there are several populated areas including Richland, Pasco-Kennewick, and 'fa 100,000 There are at present aboutIt should be noted that the General Electric Co the reactor.
- HW-53612-Rev., " Technical Criteria and Bases Pressurized Water-cooled, Graphite Moderated Production Reactor," R. L. Dickeman, October 24,1958,(Secret).
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C p, P,1 April 10, 1962 ,
Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg study postulates certain accidents, the most serious of which could result in a release of fission products to the environment somewhat in excess of that contemplated by 10 CFR 100 for a reactor of this size. .
29-31, 1962, the Committee met At its fortieth meeting on March with representatives of the General Electric Company, and the AEC Hanford Operations Office to review further the present At this meeting, the Committee was pre-status of the reactor. 2 fuel when the reactor sented information concerning the use of UOThe change of fuel from is converted to power only operation.
metal to oxide appears, on the basis of a brief The General review, Electric to increase Company also the inherent safety of the NPR.
presented further evidence in support of their confinement concept.
In sunrnary, the NPR on this site appears acceptable as a power reactor, intended.
assuming that the proposed The confinement basic site syste
- tory information on the reliability of this system.
is better than most other power reactor sites that we have considered bly cause serious damage to the facility In and c The confinement, on the other hand, is somewhat unconventional.
particular, the proper functioning of this confinement system re-quires the sequential release of steam and fission products, and ha other novel features which have not yet been constructed and tested by usage.
While it seems likely that in a major accident the sequential release of steam followed by fission products is most probable, it is not possible at this stage to state positively that in all cases this wi occur.
It is the belief of the ACRS that engineered safeguards could be incorporated which would suitably reduce the consequences of a no sequential release accident, i
Sincerely yours, Original Signed by F. A. Gifford, Jr.
F. A. Gifford, Jr.
Chairman
References:
1.
GE Ltr to AEC, Hazards Evaluation of NPR During Power-Only 2.
operation, dtd 3/16/62.HW-61628, Interim Hazards Review New dtd August 21, 1959 (SECRET).
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