ML20210B303

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Partially Withheld Review of New Production Reactor & Other Considerations for Hanford Reactor.Major Safety Features of Proposed Design Listed.Recommends Use of Bldgs Strong Enough to Withstand Reactor Pressure Buildup in Future Designs
ML20210B303
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/08/1958
From: Mccullough C
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To: Strauss L
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20210B278 List:
References
FOIA-86-346 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8609180035
Download: ML20210B303 (2)


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March 8, 1958 ,

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CLASSIFI;ATION CANCELI,ED f OR CHAN. C 70 BY AUTH;..LTk

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' Honorable Lewis L. Strauss Chairman, U. S. Atenic Energy Cammission Washington 25, D. C.

Subject:

REVIN OF NEW PIODUCTION REACTIOR AND OTHER HANFORD CONSIDERATIONS e-

Dear Mr. Strauss:

l At the fifth meeting of the Advisory Committee on anactor Safeguszds, {

I on March 7,1958, representatives of General Electric (Hanford) and the Hazards Evaluation Branch of the Atonnic Energy Commission described to the Cemittee the conceptual design of a new production reactor which has been developed by General Electric. asport 15(-54492, Pr*14 =i a=7 Hazards Evaluation, New Production anactor, gives more detail regarding the concept for this reactor.

The Committee appreciated the opportunity it has been afforded to

-ant on the safety features of the proposed concept. N Countittee r

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- is especially pleased to note the importance which has been attached to safaty considerations in establishing design criteria for the new reactor. /

l Five major improtements in the safety of the proposed new design een- l empt compared with the present Hanford reactors ares

1) Ioss of water Amuses deezwase in remotivity.
2) 'Ibe control system has sufficient worth to prevent at+=i emnt of criticality under all conditions in which criticality would materially increase hazard.

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3) h speed of response of the control system is adequate to prevent melting of any component during a reactivity excursion in an intact reactor.
4) Use of a eluster of rods in large, 2 7-inch Mamater, coolant dannal s reduces significantly the ina14hard of a blocked ahann=1
5) h buf1Mns confinement concept proposed greatly reduces the probability of fisalon product, release in the ease of failure of a few fuel ehannels. '

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March 8, 1958 ,

2 Honorable Ievis L. Strauss On the other hand, the new design has two elements of increasei 3000-4000 megawatts, the 1)

At the pmposed power level of fission product inventozr vouhi be greater than fbr any present reactor.

2) Operation of the pmposed reactor with water pressures of 538 psigh or hi6 er increases the difficulty a in the case of a major break in the coolin6 system.

At the high power level proposed, the Connaittee believes that pro.

ft vision of a bui144ng adequate to contain The fission features integrity ofof thecooling the. new reactor and itsbereunote system cannot guazunteed location absolutely at H Escape fmst the butiding of a large fraction of.the ld be all precautions.

fission products accuszulated in the reactor of this power level wou so catastrophic that adequate con +=f == ant must be provided.

the but1 Ming ht=_'ains this reactor to l t h possibility of designin6 pezicit escapo of the burst of steam that would scenany loss of e and then to be sealed againct subsequent escape of fission produ h Casmittee

( an interesting idea worthy of further encineerin6 v study.

is not very hopeful, however, that therequirovfortthi's pri:Sciple3 pb,e found mvide the degree of depardah411ty of con +^4=="t e Consequently, 'it de eanMed that future design studies'for reactors consider alternatively the use of bvf1 A1"5s strong In enou6h withstand without rapture the builanp of pressure frtxa the zwactor. f studies of the optimum reactor size and coolant pressure, the cost o pmviding adequate cont =i==

Consideration of theant costabould be included of con +=4=aant with cost may move the of reactor' itself.

opt 4=n=t desi6n toward lower power levels, lover pressure, an reactors.

Sincerely yours, A

C. Rogers McC"11* gh, Chai21 san Mvisory Cennittee on Beactor Safeguards