ML20210B575
| ML20210B575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/13/1964 |
| From: | Kouts H Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210B278 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-346 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8609180116 | |
| Download: ML20210B575 (3) | |
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AFEGUARDS ADVISORY COM UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
. WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
h y 13, 1964 -
Nonorable Glenn T. Seaborg, Cimizman hf U. S. Atcanic Ehergy Commission Washington, D. C.
Subject:
REPORT ON BAEFORD N-REACTOR
Dear Dr. Seaborg:
At its fifty-fifth meeting at Argonne,1111mnis on by T-9,19(4, the Advisory Come:ittee on Reactor Safegards reviewed the status of the Banford X-r m m r. A Subcommittee meeting was bald to consider
~
this project on April 20,19(A. In its rwriev, the Cossaittee had
' the benefit of discussions with rwprweentatives of the Genen1 Electric Cocpony and the AEC Staff, ami of documents referenced. The last Cam-( mittee review of the N-reactor took place at the fifty-first meeting in November 1963
'Ibe N-reactor has now opersted to a Part== of 10% of design power.
Dystem testina is reported to be essentially ocuplete, to the sutent poscible at this power level. Operation is zwported to be entisemetory at this point. Increasing the power in a stepwise amaner to its Gesign value is now N W d.
Some uncertainty remains as to the reactivity changes with tegersturus, and as to the coatzul-rod effectiveness. After tests are ande at higher powers, this uncertainty should be reduced. The inform tion poweented does not rule out the possibility that, at some time in oore life, in-advertent cold water enn1=nt injection would be capable of introducing more recctivity thnn can be held down by the control-rod system alone.
The als rute of reactivity build-up from cold water injection and the presence of the hil 3 X backup system should, even so, reduce the effects of cold water injectica to an acceptable level of hasard. Mare precise informtion developed during power escalation =h=1A provide a more complete answer to this poetion.
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< Eamorable Glenn T. Seaborg my 13,19A i ,
l Addittomal ftatures of reactor behavior test unequire develoyeest of further information during power e=1ation are mainly those sammeeted with the behavior of the primry ecoling system under various ahmotsal conditions. Because of the relatively esall sine of the penseuriser, the design provides for certain actions that take 31aee auteentically if a scram occurs. These imelude additiemal water injection hr youps and reprogranaing of ooolmat flow. The adequacy of these asamures mal the results of ahmesal osaditions mood further study at the hi$sr powers.
Another area involving the eeolant system is the tasasiest perforumane on emergency rav vater addition. While the design aanlysis for behavior in this unlikely situation would not be tested directly, further inforum-tion om flow and pressun distributione abould help umeerstanding of the possibility, or extent, of fuel damage following a dump aat emerpacy cooling. Since there is a remote abance of activating this series of ennte accidentally, further informatise en this question is desirshle. !
There is also ocue geestion as to how feg sprays la the soutfinement !
building are to be operated in the ownt of a mar 1== aredible sec1Asat.
Duilding collapse due to large negatin pressures and high lankage antes
( due to positin pressures represent problem areas idtich abould be re-solved during further discussions between representatins of the Sonoral Electric Cosspany and the ABC Staff.
The filters in the natilation system, as presently desigmod, have ao auxiliary means of cooling. Nence, in the event of a severe accident, '
they would be heated by fission products. The Comeittee has been ad-vised that littic or no fuel meltdown would occur under eredible sesident ecoditions, provided the power lawl has been held to assa thaa 30% of i the des 1p level. The Committee recommends that, prior to seconsion ,
above 30) of rated power, a filter cooling system be lastalled and tested.
The Cossaittee beliens that it would be proper to review the perforumace of the N-reactor again at some power less than the design lowl, with particular attention given to the guestions mentioned abow. The repre-sentatiws of the Gesaml Electric Cv_y han suggested that this could reasoambly be done when the reactor has operated at 73% of the design power.
Nomersbie eier.n T. Be*bora stay 13,196k 1
l l
It is the ordaion of the Coenittee that the proposed stepwise power !
encaintion of the N-n actor can be santimund to 75% of the ensign wlue, with, further review at that stage, without signittomat incrosse to the hasards of the Ennford opentions.
Simeenly yours, Original cignoaW Ecrtert Kcuts Werbert Routs Chaimaa Re fervnce s-
- 1. K4-790$1, "N-Roactor Ensards Summary Report, Sup Ansvsrs to Questiens", es.ted December 7,1963 (5/planant RD). No. 5, ,
- 2. W-80204,
- Estimates of Ground-Iowl Air Bryceures Nasulting from Protrseted Fais.sions from 70-Meter Stacks at Anaford,
[ dated .1ammary 2,19%. l 3 Arc Manuni, RL ctwsyter 06R1, '71ocedure for Plant Engendered Ihmergencies" with Apperriix, Derseed December 9,1963 j
- 4. F-60782, 'N-Reactor Ns.sards Sasutry Report, Supplement No. 6, Answers to Saastions", dated Feinaary 11,19fA (C/RD).
5 p.00643, 'Istianted Distances for acelusion Area ama Iov Population fome kaundaries: N-aeactor', dated February 3,19%
(8/RD).
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