ML20210A572
| ML20210A572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1983 |
| From: | Christopher R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209C045 | List: |
| References | |
| Q-1-83-006, Q-1-83-6, NUDOCS 8705050115 | |
| Download: ML20210A572 (7) | |
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% . ATTACHMENT REPORT OF liiQUIRY
SUBJECT:
TH;EE 11LE ISLAND UNIT 2 (Tlil)/ INTERVIEW OF SITE ' OPERATIONS -
Dl;ECR REGARDlHG SAFETY CONCERNS REPORT N'J:'.3ER: Q-1-EI-006 DATE CLOSED: l tar:h 11,1983 On liarch 2,1983':'.r. '.aurence Peter KING, Director, Site Operations, TMI Unit 2 was intervietted at it'.gth by R. Keith CHRISTOPHER, Director, Office.of Investi-
.gations field Office, Region I. A Report of Interview detailing the results
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of the interview is ippended to this report as Attachment (1).
I KING was intervie..ed for the purpose of obtaining detailed information regarding L
two areas of concern to the NRC'; these being an assertion by KING that he was j forced ar.d/or coerced by upper management into signing a Safety Evaluation Report l that he did not a;ree with and secondly, to identify any potential- safety concerns.7 KING had regardir.g tre Operator of TM12. During'the interview KING clarified that he was not c ercid or forced to " sign off" any documents he did not agree with and termed the incident in question as a matter of differing professional r opinion that .:as r.ever satisfactorily resolved to his ' liking.
. Kit:G also provided ir. formation regarding his perceived safety concerns. Subse-quent to the interviEd these concerns were reviewed by this writer with fir *. A.
N. FASANO, Chief, TM: Unit 2 Project Section and J. S. W1EBE, Senior Resident Inspector, TMI Unit 2. These individuals indicated that they were aware of all the issues addressed by KING and that any required corrective actions and/or NRC folic.wup of licersee action on the issues were already in progress. FASA!;0 i noted that action in progress by the licensee and the NRC regarding the concerns I were not initiated bt:ause of KING's allegation. He (FASAt!0) said these items had all been under riview prior to the interview with _Mr. KitiG o'n liarch 2,1983 and KING presented nc new items of concern.,
On Itarch 9,1983 A. N. FASAN0 and J. S. W1EBE recontacted KING in order to review with him his rsmoranda and letters that he had sent to TM1 Unit 2 manage ,
ment regarding his ccncerns. Ys1NG indicated at-that time that the Inspectors l had a "repruentatiVe sample" of his concerns and he could provide no additional information on ar.y new concerns. Further, KING did not indicate that GPUN had withheld any pertinert memoranda or letters from the NRC.
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O j h;iart cf Iriquiry .
I,: sed cr, the substaract of the inforir.ation provided by KING and the additional iriforr.ition provided by the fiRC Inspectors, there is no basis for further actier, by the Office of Investigations.
Prepared by: k /b df. . i . . lWY i R. Keith Christopher, Director 01:R1 0
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r a- Q Approved by: r , .. > . t r , .
R. Keith Christopher, Director Ol:R]
cc: Pete Saci e
REPORT OF INTERVIEW t
'corence Peter KlNS, Director, Site Operations, Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 6,as interviewed by P.. Keith CHR)SICPHER, Director, Of fice of Investigations Tield Of fice, Region 1 on March 2,1983 from 8:45 PM to .12: 45 AM. The intervies
..as conduc'.ed in private at the Marriott Hotel in Harrisburg, PA.
t!NG said he har, been in this position since October,1982 and is in charge of
- 1 ant operations, ir;cluding licensed operators, maintenance, plant engineering and waste shipping. Prior to holding this position, K]NG said he had been the Plant Operations Director at TMI 2 since 1980 and was previously Plant Panager at the Rivertend Nuclear Power Station Construction Project in St.
Trancisville Lousiana.
- r. LNG said in his position as Director, Site Operations, he reports to the Din-ector of TMI 2, Eanam KANGA, but functionaly coordinates his activities through the Deputy Director, TMI 2, John BARTON. He noted that KANGA is employed by Etchtel Power Ccrporation while BARTON is actually an employee of General Public Utilities Nuclear (GPUN).
At the outset of the interview, K]NG stated that he was suspended with pay from his position at TMl Unit 2 ef fective on February 24, 1983 KING said the formal reason given to him by John BARTON was " conflict of interest" in violation of GPJN policy. Kil;G said this suspension was related to his affliation with a pr'vate engineering consulting firm which he identified as Quiltech Inc.
KING stated his opinion that since October 1,1982 when the reorganization c,cdurred putting Eechtel Power Corp. in charge of TMI 2 recovery operations, there has been a significant change in plant operations. When asked for specifics,
' KING said that Eechtel seems to be more interested in getting " paper" out <
(i.e. procedures, safety evaluations and modifications) and meeting milestones rather than doing a thorough safety review and analysis of their projects.
He said that prior to this reorganization, Robert ARNOLD, President of GPUN
>:es directly in charge of the operations and that he employed a more methodical and analytical approach to safety reviews than does Bechtel.
KING alicged that as a result of his disagreement with Bechtel Managcment over various safety issues he was " set up" by either Bechtel or GPUN so they could accuse him of conflict of interest innviolatic'n of GPUN policy thereby giving SFUN the c>cuse to get rid of him. KING did not present or convey any facts or evidence to support his opinion. KING said his opinion was based on the following events; on February 7,1982 he wrote a memorandum to Mr. Phil CLARK, GFUN Executive Vice Fresident requesting a meeting about "getting out of TMI " l Kli;G said his main reason at that time was his inability to reach agreement with John BARTON and B. KANGA. KING said that he received a call from Mr. CLARK several days after he sent his memo at which time CLARK agreed to meet with hin on February 25, 1982.
CLARK about his problems atK]NG TMI 2.noted this was his first direct contact with Continuing, KING said on February 23, 1983 his wife received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as Mr.
SLIZZARD from Bechtel Power Corp. According to KING, BLIZZARD told his wife
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that Lethiel Power Corp. was interested in employing the services of Quiltech KING stated his wife made it clear Inc. to do scme work at Three Mile Island. KING said that on the follow-to LL122ARD that Quiltech would do no work at TMI.he was called to a meeting w ing day, Fetruary 24, 1983 KING said EARTON asked him two TROIELIGER who is the GPUN Personnel Of ficer.
questions; (1) Are you af fliated with an outside company? and (2) Does this outside co pany employee former GPUN employees? KING said when he answered .
affirmitively to both questions CARTON informed him that he was suspended and then had him escorted of f site. KING said EARTON informed him that Mr. CLARK KING voiced and en attorney still planned to meet with him the following day.
his opinion that Bechtel and GPUN tired of his constant disagreement over safety issues and arranged for Mr. BLIZZARD's phone solicitation in order to orchestrate the conflict of interest situation which lead to his suspension. For information purg:ses, KING confirmed that he is President of Quiltech Inc. of Long Island, He New York and owns 2,000 shares of the company's 25,000 shares of stock.
described the company as an engineering consulting firm working in waste proces-sing, fossil and nuclear plants.
During this investigators initial telephone contact with Mr. KING on March 1, 1983, KihG r.ede a general comment that he was coerced by his upper management When questioned to " signing off" safety evaluations that he did not agree with.
specifically about this issue, KING denied that anyone in a superior manage-ment position in GPUN or Bechtel had directly or indirectly threatened or at-tem;ted to coerce him to " sign off" any documents including the safety evaluation on the polar crane move. KING termed these incidents and specifically the polar crar.e SER issue as examples of a differing professional opinion that were never resolved.
- KIN 3 was then questioned in an attempt to determine what his specific safely concerns were. He began by recommending that the investigator obtain a co$y of the notes taken by Mr. Phil CLARK during an interview with him (KING) on February 25, 1982. KING said his safety concerns were addressed in the notes talen by Mr. CLARK. Generally, KING cited the following issues that he viewed as ur.rcsolved safety concerns.
(1) He felt that engineering changes and engineering change menoranda (ECMS) were not being properly classified as important to safety thus assuring a proper quality ass'urance and plant operating review cor.mittee (PORC) review.
(2) He felt that draft procedures, memoranda, ECMS's and Safety Evaluations were not receiving timely review and not enough attention was being' paid to the comments and criticism that were being submitted on these documents. KING felt the main reason for this was Bechtel's desire to adhere to schedule deadlines such as the June 30, 1983 target date for the vessel head lif t.
(3) " Draining of the Steam Generator" In this regard, KING said there is a requirement that a safety evaluation report be prepared and approved for any proposed action which involves an unresolved safety question.
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.v KIN 3 said a Bechtel ECM for level indication was Again, not issued KING and h had to develop procedures to drain the steam generator.
said he felt the thrust of the Bechtel evolution was to adhere He said to the recovery schedule resulting in inadequate review for safety.
comments and questions on these evaluations are not welcomed but dis-couraged. '
(4)
KING said the current practice is to submit draft procedures to the KING felt this practice leads to applying NRC in certain cases.
pressure on GPUN personnel to " sign up because the NRC has no prob with it."
KING said this pressure eminates from B. KANGA and John BARTON.
KING said a draft safety evalua-
"Underhead Vessel Characterization" (5) 18, 1983 or a few tion was provided to his group around FebruaryHe said a meeting wa days before. solving a number or comments which he and members of his t He said this meeting was cancelled and on made on the evaluation.
February 22 a letter proposing to use the " quick look" safety evalua-tion for lowering the water level was being circulated for concurrence.
K!NG said he was concerned at the change and questioned whether or not the procedures for the work, which were based on the "Underhead Vess
- Characterization" Safety Evaluation, would be correct for the " quick look" SER.
KING said KANGA had the Safety Review Group (SRG) review the procedures in parallelKING and said the draft procedures were also furnished that the SRG approved the procedures to the NRC for approval.
" subject to comment" and he did not feel this was the normal way of doing business. KING did say that the NRC commented negatively on
' these procedures. ,
(6) " Polar Crane Load Safety Evaluation" Regarding the polar crane issue, KING first voiced his opinion .that his disagreement with B. KANGA and John EARTON over the load test safety evaluation was the final catalyst that resulted in his being " set up" for his suspension because of the conflict of interest.
KING then launched into the following dissertation regarding his recollection of events surrounding the polar crane load test controversy; he said Edward GISC the Plant Engineering Director had concerns regarding the safety evaluation for KING said GISCHEL consistently made his concerns the polar crane load test. He said as known to the Sechtel Manager of Recovery Programs, James THEISING.
a result, THElslNG complained to John BARTON because the polar crane work ha been turred over to Sechtel under a work request and was their responsibility.
As a result, BARTON instructed GISCHEL and KING to " stay the hell out of the KING said he later wrote a letter to John BARTON for the polar crane work"." record" that they (operations) had been told to stay out of the 4 work. He said John EARTON subsequently criticized himKING for writing the letter said after he saying he didn't need that type of memorandum (KING's).
was suspended, BARTON had the letter recovered from his of fice and con
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- that it was destroys _:. KING continued that after this incident there was a .
r.eeting with plant ;.if f including KING during which a draft safety evaluation for the polar crane **.ad test was distributed for review and comment. He said his staff and partit. arly Edward GRl'SCHEL made numerous critical concents .and
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sent the evaluation a:k to Bechtel Engineering.
KING said there were ;ubsequent meetings held in early Febru' ~
a ry in an attempt to' resolve the various n ments that had been submitted on the load test, all of which were unsuccessf.1. KING said that as a result, Mr. KANGA was asked to make an upper manaSt int decision on the use of the polar crane even though there were 13 proced. es that were needed for the polar crane move that were not j
- reviewed and the saft:y evaluation was not yet resolved. Additionally, he said
! there was still conf'.'ct over the use of the " quick look" SER and the Underhead Vessel Characterizat';n SER. Ih response KANGA stated that he wanted "everything" in place by Friday (: o days hence) and wanted a meeting to resolve the con-flicts at that time. KING said as a result of the failure to reach agreements in the above mentioref meetings. GRISCHEL submitted a memorandum to him (KING) sursarizing his disa; eements with the polar crane load test safety evaluation.
KING said there was a basic philisophical and professional difference of opinion over the need for ar. tctual load test prior to .use of the polar crane. According to KING, this differt.ce of opinion erupted into a shouting match between KANGA 1
j and G15CHEL with the t d result being KANGA's direction to GR15CHEL to further document his concerr:1. KING continued that subsequent to this incident, KANGA met with he and G15C'-El at which time KING made known his agreement with GISCHEL's opinion of the safet;. evaluation. In response, KANGA' reportedly asked KING if he would sign the SEE for the polar crane test to which he (K!NG) said no.
l KING said KANGA cor i-ted that he would get the SER signed even if he had to take it to Robert AR'OLD to which KING responded that action wouldn't be neces-
. sary since John BART '. could supercede KINGS' authority on the decision. *'
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KING continued that t,e following week (mid February) he received an irate phone call from Johr. EARTON wanting to know "why GISCHEL was documenting this j
j staff" referring to Ms concerns over the polar crane load test. According to KING, CARTON cor. t .ted "I ought to fire the guy, I don't need people like that working for me". eferring to G15CHEL. KING said BARTON felt he couldn't !
J sign the SER with Gli:HELS memorandum unresolved because the NRC might question it. KING said he cri G15CHEL next attended a meeting in late February that was
- set up by John BARTC'. to discuss and resolve ,their concerns (KING 5' and GISCHELS').
During this meeting, v.ING reported that KANGA asked he and G15CHEL what it would take to resolvi GISCHEL's concerns. KING said GlSCHEL responded by stating he would like to ha.i a letter addressing his concerns from management. As a result, GISCHEL was : ovided with a letter on February 17, 1983 written by .
R. L. FREEMERMAN, Df:;ty Manager, Recovery Programs which addressed his concerns.
KING said FREEMERMA'; siso told them he thought they had valid concerns and should
" stick to their guns."
1 In response, to this 'stter, KING said he and G15CHEL prepared a memorandum ad-dressed to J. W. THE:51NG, Recovery Programs summarizing the status of site cperations review of the polar crane load test safety evaluation. KING ~said this document provind fundamental disagreement with the crane test program j but agreed to close :Jt his earlier memorandum of concern based on overriding 1
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programatic concer ; which, in be opinion of program management superceded the
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technical concerns .siced by G15CHEL. Subsequent to the submission of this' remorandum,- KING sif t he agreed to sign the polar crane load test . safety evalu-
.ation. KING clarified that the programatic concerns which superceded GISCHELS' concerns were said to be ALARA and schedule considerations.
KING noted at this thae in the interview that he felt it was 'strongly coinciden-tal that GISCHEL re:eived a letter from Stress Control Inc. asking why he had not' received a neurolocital examination that could affect his career on the same day that he submitted his letter taking exception to _the polar crane SER. KING:
conjectured that this may have been a contrived event to put pressure on GISCHEL.
KING also commented ;n several other concerns involving the polar crane test.
He said there was a question in his, mind abcut. the applicability of procedures AP1043 and AP1047 as to whether or not they were being used properly in connection with the polar crar.E test. He also said there was a question in his mind as to.
whether all crane parts were actually replaced "in kind". Further, he voiced questions as to whether a load drop analysis was actually done for the lift test even though the SER said it had been done.
KING said that folicxing his suspension on February 24, 1983 he met with Mr.
Phil CLARK, Executive Vice President, GPUN. KING said he told Mr. CLARK.that he felt he was beinc suspended because he was giving Bechtel a "hard time".
KING opined that CLARK was not fully appreciative of his problems and did not satisfy his (KINGS') concerns.
KING said he felt Mr. ARNOLD and Mr. CLARK are not sufficiently aware of the problems at TMI 2 ard need to be more knowledgeable about safety issues that are i
not being properly rssolved. KING said that a contributing factor to this /
problem is a memorarium issued by John BARTON that instructed site management not to send memoranda to Mr. CLARK or Mr. ARNOLD without first going through the proper chain of command.
In conclusion, KING said his major concern was that Bechtel was more interested in meeting the schedule deadlines rather than fully analyzing safety issues.
Additionally, he said it was his opinion that some of the Bechtel management per-sonnel and specifically Mr. THE1 SING of Recovery Programs, could not be trusted to tell the truth. KING did not provide any ' specific details to substantiate this concern and did not state that THElSING or any of the other individuals had lied or providec false information to the NRC.
KING recommended thEt the NRC obtain copies of the memoranda and letters he had written to KANGA and EARTON which he says document his concerns. He also said it was his belief that after he was suspended, Messrs. BARTON and KANGA broke into his office and removed many of the memoranda of concern that he had written and suspended his secretary in the process. KING opined the GPUN would be un-willing to provide the NRC with copies of his memoranda and letters because they were very damaging.
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