ML20134N338
| ML20134N338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1985 |
| From: | Logan K, Andrew Ward NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132D012 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-428 INQ-85-42, NUDOCS 8509050097 | |
| Download: ML20134N338 (12) | |
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..... June 19, 1985 MEMORANDUM REPORT
SUBJECT:
AllEGFD ALTERATION OF COPY OF AAMODT MOTIONS OIA NO. INQ 85-42 BACKGROUND On August 24, 1984, Dr. William A. MILLS, t.hief, Healtn Effects Branch, Division of Radiation Programs and Earth Sciences (DRPES), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), sent a letter to Dr. Glyn CALDWELL, Assistant Director for Epidemiology, Chronic Diseases Division, Center for Environmental Health, Atlanta, Georgia indicating that a Motion prepared by Intervenors Marjorie and Norman AAMODT (AAMODT Motion) was enclosed and that a review was requested. The AAMODT Motion is entitled AAMODT Motions for Investigation of Licensee's Reports of Radioactive Releases During the Initial Days of TMI-2 Accident and Postponement of Restart Decision Pending Resolution of this Investigation, Docket No. 50-289.
On September 7,1984, Dr. CALDWELL sent a letter to Dr. MILLS stating that the copy of the AAMODT Motions he received was missing pages 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, Figure 1, Affidavits 2, 4, 7, 9 and parts of Affidavit 1, and Attachment 2.
CALDWELL further related that he had received another copy of the AAMODT Motions from Dr. George TOKUHATA of the Pennsylvania Department of Health which was complete and used for his review.
On or about December 13, 1984, the NRC sent orjorie and Nonnan AAMODT a copy of a Ccmission Order, CL1-84-22 with a copy of the September 7,1984 lette from Dr. CALDWELL to Dr. MILLS. The AAM0DTS allcge that the alterations v the AAMODT Motions were a deliberate act on the part of NRC to deceive Dr. CALDWELL in his review.
SUMMARY
On June 3, 1985, Desiree MILTON, Branch Chief Secretary, Health Effects Branch, DRPES, RES, was interviewed and related that there was no attempt made by Dr. MILLS or her to deceive Dr. CALDWELL in his review of the AAMODT Motions. Dr. MILLS had given MILTON the AAMODT Motions to photocopy and send to Dr. CALDWELL by overnight mail. MILTON did not realize that some of the pages had two sides and only xeroxed one side. MILTON packaged the AAMODT Motions and mailed them to Dr. CALDWELL. Dr. MILLS and MILTON did not realize the oversight in the photocopying until they received CALDWELL's letter of September 7, 1984. ~
THIS REPORT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR PLACED IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM WITHOUT WRITTEN PERMISSION, 8509050097 850718
'a FDR FOIA l3 4 KUC M B85-428 PDR l
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s ThW.Y According to CALDWELL's September 7, 1984, letter, he received the AAMODT Motions from MILLS minus pages 2,4, 6, 9, 11, Figure 1, Affidavits 2, 4, 7, 9 and parts of Affidavit 1, and Attachment 2. CALDWELL, however, was able to review a complete copy of the AAMODT Motions provided to him at approximately the same time by Dr. TOKUHATA.
A raview of the complete AAM0DT Motions provided by MILTON revealed that pages
- 2. ,, 6, 9, 11, Figure 1, Affidavits 2, 4, 7, 9 and parts of Affidavit 1, and Attachment 2 are on the reverse sides of document pages. A review of the AAMODT Motions provided to CALDWELL disclosed that the document pages 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, Figure 1, Affidavits 2, 4, 7, 9 and parts of Affidavit I and Attachnent 2 were missing and that only one side of the document pages was photocopied causing this error.
On May 3, 1985, Dr. MILLS retired from the NRC. Based on the statements of MILTON, MILLS was not interviewed.
CONCLUSION There is no evidence which indicates any attempt or deliberate act on the part of Dr. MILLS, MILTON, or the NRC to deceive Dr. CALDWELL in his review of the AAMODT Motions.
On February 20, 1985, the U.S. Department of Justice (D0J) notified the AAM0DTS that there was no evidence that Dr. MILLS deliberately withheld portions of the AAMODT Motions from the information provided to D0J by the AAMODTS.
Based on the feregoing, this inquiry is closed.
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Anthony War)i, Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor
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Keith G. Loga W tant Director for Investigations Office of Inspector and Auditor
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Attachments
- 1. U.S. Department of Justice letter to Mr. and Mrs. Nortnan 0. AAMODT, from Julian S. GREEN $Puri, dated February 20,1985 (with eight attec$mentt).
- 1. Report of Interview - Desiree MILTON, June 3, 1985.
- 3. Dr. William A. MILLS letter to Dr. Glyn CALDWELL, dated August 24, 1984
- 4. Dr. Glyn CALDWELL letter to Dr. William A. MILLS, dated September 7, 1984
- 5. AAHODT Motions, Docket 50-289, dated June 22,1984 (complete copy).
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June 4, 1985 Report of Interview On June 3,1985, Desiree MILTON, Branch Chief Secretary, Health Effects Branch, Division of Radiation Programs and Earth Sciences, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was interviewed concerning the missing document pages from the AAMODT Motions sent by Dr. William A. MILLS, PhD, former Branch Chief, Health Effects Branch, to Dr. Glyn CALDWELL, Assistant Director for Epidemiology, Chronic Diseases Division, Center for Environmental Health, Atlanta, Georgia, on August 24, 1984. MILTON stated essentially as follows:
The documents that were received on the AAMODT Motions were given to me by Dr. MILLS as a rush job. I had to zerox the packet and send it out to Dr. CALDWELL in the overnight mail. When I xeroxed the packet I did not realize that there were two sides to some of the pages and inadvertently did not reproduce them. I mailed the packet to Dr. CALDWELL. Because the job was a rush job, I did not give it back to Dr. MILLS. Dr. MILLS did not L:;ow the pages were missing.
This was not an intentional act on my part or on the part of Dr. MILLS.
It was just an oversight when I xeroxed the copies. Dr. MILLS discovered the oversight when he received a letter from Dr. CALDWELL which stated that there were pages missing from the packet. Dr. CALDWELL also stated in the letter that he had received another copy of the Motions which was complete and from which he performed his review.
MILTON provided a copy of the AAM0DT's original Motion (complete) and a g copy of the packet sent to Dr. CALDWELL which has the missing pages.
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.....,,,,,,,, June 3, 1985 e Bethesden Md . ...,= Ina 85-42 Anthony Ward, Investigator, OIA [ , ,
June 4, 1985 TMsS DOCUME NT iS PROPE RT v OF NRC 88 LOANE D TO ANOTHE A AGE NCY iT ANO I"S CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE O'STRIBUTE D OUTSiOE THE RECEIVING AGENC Y witMOv7 PE AMsSSION OF THE OF 6eCE OF INSPECTO A AND AVOITO A
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REPORT OF INTERVIEW.
.Karl E. Plumlee, Radiation Specialist, Radiation Support Section, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I,-was interviewed telephonically on December 2,1980, by Roger A. Fortuna and David H. Gamble of the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA). Plumlee indicated that he did not have his notes regarding the
-TMI accident readily available, therefore, his responses were based enti. rely upon his recollection.
Plumlee said he arrived at TMI's North Gate around 10:00 to 10:30 am on March 28,1979, with four other Region I employees: Ronald Nimitz, Charles Gallina, Donald Neely, and James Higgins. He believed it took about a half hour to get in and that by 11:00 am they were certainly in the room adjoining- the Unit 1 Control Room (CR). Upon arrival they were informed by Met Ed that all personnel entering the Unit.2 CR had to wear respirators; because respirators were in short supply, Met Ed asked that only. two NRC inspectors go to the Unit 2 CR. Plumiee recalled that Neely and Higgins donned respirators and left for Unit 2 CR. He did not believe there was much delay after their arrival in Unit 1 before they left,-so he estimated their departure time at 11:00 am. Plumlee said that Nimitz, Gallina, and he remained at Unit 1.
Plumlee said they established telephone contact from Unit 1 to Region I
-shortly after arriving. He recalled that about ll:30 George Smith (his branch chief) asked him to survey the radiation levels outside the buildings out of a concern over possible airborne releases. Plumlee said he conducted these surveys with Joe fianosky (a Met Ed plant operator) from about 11:30 until noon. Plumlee said he did not go inside Unit 2 then or anytime that day; he surveyed as close as Unit 2's innermost fence. Plumlee understood that Nimitz and Gallina continued to review Met-Ed's efforts in the Unit 1 CR during the time he (Plumlee) was surveying.
Plumlee said he returned to Unit i shortly after noon. He said that by this time Raymond Smith and another Region I inspector had arrived.
Plumlee said that not long after he returned with his outside surveys, he discussed the condition of the plant with the senior Met Ed manager in Unit 1: Plumlee believed it was James Seelinger. Plumlee said they
-discussed things such as the plume and whether it came-from the plant or the' steam dump lines. Plumlee recalled that he informed Seelinger that because the wind was variable, the airborne radiation probably would get into Unit l's air intake structure. Plumlee said it was only about a half hour later that the Unit 1 CR area became filled with airborne t
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2 j radiation and the NRC inspectors were asked to leave because they did i not have respirators. Plumlee said that he, Nimitz, and (he believed) l Raymond Smith and the inspector who arrived with Raymond Smith all moved l off the site to a reception center. Plumlee said Gallina remained at Unit 1. Plumlee said that he and Nimitz then performed (separately) offsite radiation surveys with Met Ed personnel. He believed that he next returned to the site about 5:00 or 6:00 pm that day, but that Nimitz did not return until the following day (March 29,1979).
Plumlee related that he and the other inspectors were briefed on the status of TMI before they lef t Region I on the morning of March 28, 1979. Plumlee said that at the briefing heunderstood George Smith to say that one of Met Ed's samplings of the reactor containment atmosphere
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showed it contained 2.4 percent hydrogen. Plumlee said that when he sought to confinn this with George Smith after the briefing, George Smith said that he (Plumlee) was mistaken and George Smith actually had imparted that the containment had 2.2 pounds overpressure. Plumlee indicated
! that this exchange had him thinking about hydrogen during the day. He said that based on this concern, during his conversation with Seelinger
! -(just before being asked to leave Unit 1 in the early afternoon), he asked Seelinger if he had any better information about hydrogen content -
in the Unit 2 containment. Plumlee explained by way of background that
, the only gas analyzer at TMI which could detect hydrogen was in Unit 1; l so samples pulled from Unit 2 were taken to Unit 1 to be analyzed.
Plumlee recalled that Seelinger had a sequence of numbers representing l
the percentage of hydrogen in each of the samples tested. He recalled that Seelinger had varying amounts, with a lower current figure than the one Plumlee thought George Smith mentioned (2.4 percent), but with another figure that was higher than 2.4 percent. Plumlee said that Seelinger indicated he had been in contact with a number of people in Unit 2 CR and that some Met Ed personnel had guessed that there might have been an explosion based upon the reduction in hydrogen levels.
Plumlee understood that Seelinger received his instructions that day from TMI Station Manager Gary Miller, but Plumlee did not know whether the conjecture about the hydrogen explosion came from Miller.
Plumlee said his conversation had to have occurred between the times he arrived at Unit 1 (about 11:00 am) and left (about 1:00 pm) on March 28, 1979. He said that based upon surroc.uing events, he would estimate the time to have been sometime between 12:00 and 12:30 pm.
Plumlee did not recall anyone being with him when he discussed hydrogen with Seelinger. Plumlee said he did discuss with Gallina what he learned from Seelinger. Plumlee said Gallina was manning the telephone to Region 1 at.the time and it was just at this time that they were told to
-leave Unit 1 because of the. airborne radiation. Plumlee said that they (he and Gallina) did not report his ir. formation to Region 1 because they assumed the inspectors in Unit 2 CR (Neely and Higgins) were providing this infonnation. He said it did not occur to him that the inspectors in Unit 2 CR did not know everything he knew. Plumlee said that in restrospect he has no indications that Neely or Higgins actually knew of the hydrogen content of the containment.
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Plumlee related that two or three days after the accident, he and Gallina discussed his conversation he had had with Seelinger. He said that Gallina then indicated that he believed it occurred later in the day on March 29,1979 (the day after the accident). Plumlee indicated, without refuting his recollection of when the conversation had occurred in relation to other events, that the conversation thus could have been either on the 28th or the 29th of March 1979.
Plumlee believed that in general, Unit 2 managenent was only following the policies they were expected to follow. He explained that it appeared Met Ed's main interes+ was to get the plant back on line to start generating electricity. Plumlee felt this influenced much of the underlying logic for the actions of Met-Ed personnel, and it is something of which they are not now proud. Plumlee said they followed a strict attitude of
" mind your own business" vis-a-vis NRC until the problems got big enough that they realized it could not be done. Plumlee expressed the opinion that flet Ed only told NRC what it was bound to tell and that at his level, Met Ed personnel pretty much only providad the information that was asked of them.
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t i REPORT OF INTERVIEW Karl E. Plumlee, Radiation Specialist, Radiation Support Section, Fuel facility and Materials Safety Branch, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I, was reinterviewed on December 3,1980, by David H. Gamble of the Office of Inspector and Auditor. Plumlee indicated he had located his notes for March 28,1979, 'and was providing OIA with a copy. He
.said the notes were taken on single sheets of paper which he numbered consecutively at the time. He said he was providing all his notes for the 28th except one page that only contained motel infomation.
1 Plumlee said it was common knowledge, even in Unit 1, that the trips
-associated with the hydrogen explosion had occurred. He said that it was obvious that the only thing that could have caused these trips (e.g., the actuation of the containment sprays) was a pressure increase
.in the containment. Plumlee said his. notes reflect that he was at the North Gate on his way out at 1:30 pm; therefore, he estimated that he was asked to leave Unit 1 sometime around 1:20 pm. Plumlee said that by i 1:50 pm he was probably at the observation center. l Plumlee said the first time he heard about the spike was from Gallina.
He believed that Gallina told him about it immediately after he (Plumlee)
' informed.Gallina about his conversation with Seelinger about hydrogen in j Unit 2's containment, - i Plumlee recalled that Gallina said.he received this information either from the NRC inspectors in Unit 2 or from a Met-Ed person, such as Greg Hitz who was relaying information. Plumlee said that his belief
- that Gallina already knew of the pressure spike indicates that his
! -(Plumlee's) conversation with Seelinger may have been on March 29, 1979, ;
or even later. .
l Plumlee then related that the possible reasons Met-Ed and NRC may have [
had for keeping some ' details about the accident from being widely disseminated must be considered. He said that, if it were known that the accident
! -was far beyond anything anticipated and that the fuel had lost much of l its cladding, they would have run the risk of some Met-Ed employees
- walking out, some number of NRC inspectors deciding against going in,
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and a major problem of frightened citizens jamming the highways leaving !
the area.
l Plumlee recalled what he thought he heard George Smith say during their briefing
- .regarding hydrogen content of.the containment. Plumlee said his guess at the time was that Met-Ed had told NRC (probably Smith or Eldon.Brunner -
another Region I branch chief) about the hydrogen and Smith " slipped"
'when he mentioned hydrogen during his briefing. Plumlee said that it
- was fo~r this reason that he broached the subject of hydrogen with Seelinger.
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tion that theWu- NRC with a "delih rate coverun I clearAmid nurnptarsrComminion wHf crucial to the t2 tac bealth," said .
YtI!Fo6* restart of 'Ihree mue w Joanne Mn===Iman a spotesmatn I J' land this moath, a Coatesville for the Concerned Citizens of.TMI '
couple today asked the U.S. Jus. group thatis backing thepetition.J tice Departm9nt and the Congress Referring tc the radiation-re-to investi ate the NRC for cover. lated illnesses alleged in the ing up radiation doses and Aamodts' study, Miss Musselman cancer eaths after the 1979 acci- aald. "This is somethmg you dent. didn't see a year after the acci-In a Washington press confer. dent. You're just going to start ence, Norman and Marjorie five years tater."
Aamodt also requested that the - She said volunteers who con-NRC delay a decision on restart ducted the door-to door investiga-until completion of a fttil-scale in- tion found "quite a few" cases of vestigation that higher-than-re- people whose hair or pets' hair ported radiation doses along cer- fell out after the accident or de-tain plumes caused a" grossly teloped rashes.
high" cancer death rate in the, . Their study determined that area. - the normal cancer rate in the A simHar request was reject. ' rural area is below the state aver- .
ed by the NRC last month by a 3 ' age at about 153 cancer cases per to 2 vote because of "instJDeient* 100,000 people. But during the reljable information." . , . four year period, the cancer rate But in an interview this moreg was 1,097 100,000, Mrs.
ing. the Aamodts said they havt Aamodt said.per more flally documented theiruni- Since the prehminary study, tialfindings. t. . Mrs. Aamodt said the researchers Of 433 people' in the samplei have been provided access to l areas studied in the Aamodts'in- y death certificates to justify verbal -
vestigation,20 cancer deaths oc . reports from residents. Several curred and another 26 tumors di. cancer cases had been diagnosed agnosed from 1980-1984 - a seven- before the accident, she said but fold increase from the area's were apparently exacerbated. j normal cancer rate, Mrs. Aamodt Members of the Susquehanna g said. Valley Alliance participated in She said the new documenta- the study, she said. Lancaster tion of radiation-related illnesses area residents involved in re-and allegations that TMI ofHcials , search included Francine Taylor. ;
destroyed information during the Norma Ritterspach. Brenda -
early hours.olthe accident and i Witmer, Sally Stephenson and -
lied about sending out radiation Irma Weaver.
' teams justify a delay in the re- - - - --
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.NRC cover-up is. alleged in 3~ **" Mile IsINhMhh}ent l semed in b ensuutaden's 2MI re-WASHINCTON - A citisens '
p Teesday charEed the Neeisar "dtddy states that
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/ toveredtoryup- demBring dubbersedy * %e espear esoth rete in true ersas leformbhas ^ _ C ,& W AD'900 t "ebat the harmfel effsets et the e sa seposend nur Three Mlle Island aselear power ~ the sendr shoes 30 ths plant acculent. ihree woeld have been i
la a ceanplaint filed with the Jestace b :--='.
'i Ottaeus M Three Mile ie-Consdrued.Ehldi taladd 1
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( i etarged the NRC tried to mislead weeld.he 168 1 . rate the Centers for Disease Castrol asund in to tuas 1,$rf per
{ aheet a health esaducted le 100,000. :
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, the area near the at he study "Me matter what the cause of
, found an alarming h of con- tese sameer emeths, this is a dam-eer deaths in the See years alem which easset he the TMI meltdarn is 8',tt. -
he aqr ausre emetressass-Norman and brjorie Aamodt tal insults tres a sentarted old so-of Concerned Otizens are protesting eisar plast er he asked to Bye with a proposal to restart the controver- te stuk of aesther aseident," Aa-alal power plant and have later- met sold, . .
Aaenedt sold they asked the NRC to tarostigste rindings they pressaand in Jane 1984 they said
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SUMMARY
r TITLE: AAMODT's rqst investigation re File No.:Inq 85-42 "Aamodt Motions" re TM1-2 Accident Date Opened: 4/23/85
& restart decision Investigator: A. Ward I
NRC REGION:
SITE: Inspection:
Investigation:
(cri:nina1-integrity-EED-other)
Review:
LICENSEE:
CONTRACTOR:
ALLEGATION: Aamodts' rqst Commission to reconsider 1s decision denying Aamodt's motion rqst. study of health-e2fects re TIM. Aamodts also requested TMI-restart proceedings be reopened to consider these health issues.
DATES: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS 1/15/85 Ltr Smith, Att. Gen US, fm Aamodt, rqst investigation of criminality of NRC employee.
1/25/85 Ltr Trott, DOJ, fm Connelly, attaching 1/15/85 Itr to Smith fm Aamodt 2/20/85 Ltr Aamodt im Greenspun, subject above, no investigation to begin.
3/5/85 Ltr Specter, l' . S . Senate fm Palladino-re Aamodts' health study.w/ encl.
1/15/85 News clippings " Couple Wants NRC Probed" i 2/1/85 Ltr Cochran, Nat. Res. Defense Council fm H. Plaine, NRC, Commission I considering action to be taken re Aamodt's 1/15 motion, i
2/23/85 Case assigned to Tony, Ward,
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