ML20209F147

Notification of 761119 Meeting with M Kratzer & J Armitage to Discuss Approach Worked Out by State Re Proposed Export of Krsko Reactor to Yugoslavia

ML20209F147
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/18/1976
From:	James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:	Gilinsky, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20209E648	List: ML20209E644 ML20209E893 ML20209E909 ML20209E923 ML20209E934 ML20209E941 ML20209E953 ML20209E960 ML20209E972 ML20209E989 ML20209F147 ML20209F186 ML20209F190 ML20209F200 ML20209F211
References
NUDOCS 9907150241
Download: ML20209F147 (29)

Text

~, v u~ ,

U, x i t (- as, st

' . . . ~

~

0 CONFIDENTIAL

. j # g ,7% UNITED STATES OV 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j,

., y Z, _,j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

.y 9, ,

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Rowden Commissioner Mason Commissioner Gilinsky

Commissioner Kennedy FROM

Jo 's . irector ff e '/In,ternational Programs i THRU: Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

MEETING WITH STATE ON PROPOSED EXPORT OF KRSKO REACTOR TO YUGOSLAVIA Following on the Commission's November 15 meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage, Ambassador Silberman, and Dixon Hoyle, State has worked out an approach to the Yugoslavs and wishes to determine, on an informal basis, the Commission's views on this approach. The Commission is scheduled to meet with Myron Kratzer and Jack Armitage on Friday, November 19, at 11:00 a.m.

State's proposed approach boils down to (1) discussing the basic nature of US concerns with the Yugoslav Ambassador and (2) suggesting that the Yugoslavs send the following note to the US Government (USG):

The Government of Yugoslavia recognizes the concerns expressed by the United States Government regarding the need for additional understandings concerning the KRSK0 nuclear power station, in particular providing for mutual agreement on the retransfer of any material and equipment supplied by the United States and on the reprocessing or other disposition of am fuel irradiated in the KRSK0 nuclear power station, and is prepared to begin discussions with the United States Government at an early date to develop such understandings.

This draft approach would not represent Yugoslav agreement to the substantive assurances and understandings which the US wishes to achieve, but rather Yugoslav recognition of US concerns and a willingness to open discussions "to develop such understandings." While the above language could change overnight, as of this afternoon the State Department XM& intended to give you this proposed language at your meeting tomorrow.

t o y e w,t , p. t -

h Q \)M,M W C) h\1; i

~

1 g ,

1. OL b--

CdOP 01 Ed#.i tka

,h @ - 9 .s b\ MDI

- ensmummes. i e

' ' Wrcoc::= ,Q 3l d in.cis L % ) et Gth dru d m # {. -

SECRET EXDIS ATTACHhTNT 9907150241 990712 PDR ORG NEACAM PDR qq 0716 d I/

,. . sw. ,

l w t m,.,

2-As notcd in my earlier memorandum, the most desirable course would  !

be to have some substantive assurances in hand before issuance of the reactor license. These substantive assurances on reprocessing i

and retransfer could be expressed in the following manner:

The Government of Yugoslavia wishes to inform the USG that it would consult and reach agreement with the USG (1) before the reprocessing or alteration of nucicar fuel supplied by the US or nuclear fuel irradiated in nucicar reactors a supplied by the US; and (2) before the retransfer of material, equipment, and nuclear material produced therefrom to another country.

In the meeting with State, I believe the Commission should first propose that these substantive assurances be sought before issuance ,

of the reactor license. This would allow the Yugoslavs to address the substance and agree in principle if formal written agreement seemed to be long in coming.

Although we believe this more substantive approach is the right one, State staff believes that the issue is at a critical point with the Yugoslavs and that seeking formal substantive agreement now before issuance of the reactor license could create serious political problems affecting US-Yugoslav relations. The Anibassador of Yugoslavia recently discussed his government's concern about delay in KRSK0 with Secretary of Commerce Richardson, who will be visiting Yugoslavia soon. The Yugoslav Ambassador has e.lso requested a meeting with State on Friday, November 19, to discuss the problem. (Attached at Appendix B is a recent assessment of the situation by the American Embassy in Belgrade.)

Therefore, Armitage and Kratzer will probably find serious problems with the approach I have suggested. If so, I believe the Commission should propose a further alternative. This would be based on State's language but be altered to reficct clearly Yugoslav agreement in principle to accept upgraded safeguards. The alternative is set forth at Appendix A.

This alternative does not signficantly dif fer in substance from my preferred approach. However, State might find it more acceptable in terms of working with the Yugoslavs. .

l l

SECRET EXDIS ATTACHMENT l

' X

. w

~

C& J A final point is that none of the suggested approaches includes specific reference to fallback bilateral safeguards rights. These are, in State's view, the most politically sensitive issue for the Yugoslavs and, at the November 15 meeting, there appeared to be an understanding that fallback safeguards rights did not fall in the same category of concern or importance as reprocessing and retransfer controls.

State's view is that these are desirable and should be sought in the l context of broader discussions with the Yugoslavs stemming from the President's statement. At any rate, the "in particular" clause in the draft language leaves open the idea of other subjects and State has indicated that fallback safeguards rights would be raised orally with the Yugoslavs. The Commission may wish to assure itself on this point in the meeting with State. In my view, this would be a satisfactory way of handling this issue.

~

OPE concurs in this memorandum.

1 l

e

~ EXDIS ATTACHMENT

v

, ,a j

t

. APPENDIX A k

(

DRAFT STATE APPROACH J

> l (WITH NRC STAFF SUGGESTED CHANGES)

I 1

- The Government of Yugoslavia recognir.es[the-eeneerne-expressed

. i by-the-United-States-Government-regarding]the need for additional l l

' understandings concerning the KRSK0 nuclear power station, in par-ticular providing for mutual agreement on the retransfer of any l

material and equipment supplied by the United States and on the

, reprocessing or other disposition of any fuel irradiated in the 1

KRSKO nuclear po'wer station, and is prepared to begin discussions achieve with the United States Government at an early date to[ develop]such i

understandings.

8% g e

O M w.

f-

• 4 -

A k h to C, - 4 b O'c~a m e-o G 01 Cs tun l

l l

l l 1

\

M,At /D GrrGr Q-

\y pJ -4G 94-s- 1 i N e s_ hd

/9'MAc. -p,s.,t,n, pur.

l l

4. i  !

2 LONDON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' DISCUSSION Summary. Expanded nuclear suppliers group (now 12 members) met in London June 3 and 4. The group meeting for the first time with 5 new members, maintained informal friendly atmosphere which has heretofore characterized the " club" of I London and which has facilitated practical progress. The group reached agree-ment on physical protection guidelines; agreed to avoid, for now, publication of the guidelines; decided to invite Switzerland and Poland into the group at this time; tentatively agreed to meet in November for review of the guidelines; discussed the interest of some (particularly UK and FRG) in opening a dialogue with recipients in the north-south context, reaching vague consensus that this should initially be done in bilateral contexts; gave preliminary hearing to a  ;

range of U.S. suggestions regarding plutonium management, and agreed to discuss l further at least some of these matters in a study group to be chaired by Canada (Fulford) in September.

Discussion ~. Delegation of expanded supplier group: Belgium (Bousse); Canada Fulford)T France (De Nazelle and Goldschmidt): Federal Republic of Germany Balken); Japan (Otsuka); Netherlands (Van der Valk); Sweden (Liljegren); USSR I Morokhov and Timerbayev); United Kingdom (Thomson); United States of America Vest) met in London June 3 and 4. Main agenda items and results of discussion were as follows:

1. Physical Protection: Physical protection guidelines, including U.S. -

sponsored compromise on categorization for irradiated fuel, were accepted.

Most notable point was agreement by all, including Soviets, that standards should be applied for any recipients, including nuclear weapon states.

2. Possible Publication of Agreed Documents: Group discussed pros and cons of publication. With the caveat that each supplier may of course explain its own export policy as required. They agreed that the guidelines would not be published at least until after review meeting in November.

3. Further Enlargement: Some delegations expressed concern over need to bring all potential suppliers into the group, including the rest of the EC, all Zangger committee members, and possibly certain important recipients. U.S.

and others opposed early expansion in order to maintain possibilities for progress. At the suggestion of FRG and others, it was agreed only to invite Switzerland (an obvious supplier) and Poland (to preserve east-west balance) to join the group at this time. It was also agreed that the mechanism for expansion would be simplified so that a new member need only notify one present member who would then notify other members of the group. Canadian delegation mentioned possible role of Zangger committee in paving way for

.,_ M

. T.4

~..-..; R W g '

oaa woo d $ Y ' M % F M u -

lid .

,Q:

r e,

6 e l

eventual further enlargement. As first step, all agreed that Canada would take responsibility of initiating steps to have Zangger comittee trigger list conform to the suppliers' trigger list but without citing London group l or guidelines. l l

4. Consultation with Other Governments: As indicated in bilaterals, UK pressed view that dialogue with recipient states from the third world should be opened immediately, preferably in IAEA context. Others, notably FRG agreed on need for dialogue, or at least expressed serious sensitivity regarding need to avoid north-south confrontation over nuclear export policies. Several delegations, including U.S. and France, noted dangers that a high-visibility debate with LDCS in IAEA could sharpen rather than reduce differences. The suppliers' consensus was that countries could pursue discussions with recipi-ents and other LDCS of broad non-proliferation goals, t:ut only in bilateral context and as their relationships allow, continuing to preserve confidential-ity of suppliers' meetings and guidelines.

5. Plutonium Management: U.S. del raised need for broad look at all possibili-ties for avoiding or limiting presence of plutonium in national hands; circulated two papers (general plutonium management paper and discussion of international storage of plutonium); asked for ideas or reactions from 1

others; and suggested working group be constituted to study full range of possible actions. ~ Belgium, Canada, USSR, E. Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and to some extent FRG supported setting up study group for this purpose.

France supported study of multinational fuel cycle center and of internation- l al plutonium storage by the IAEA, but said France is not prepared to agree now to multilateral discussion of provision of services or strengthening of safeguards and controls which must be considered by its national government.

UK, Japan and Italy initially avoided agreement to working group.

6. Result was:

A. Decision to approach IAEA DG Eklund informally this month and elicit his suggestions as to best way of initiating an IAEA study of international-izing plutonium storage; and B. Creation of working group, open to all members of suppliers' group and chaired by Fulford of Canada, to coordinate and exchange views initially on multinational fuel cycle center and internationalization of plutonium storage. While official mandate was initally limited to this matter, way was left open to expand official mandate subsequently, and meanwhile exchanges of views on other aspects of' plutonium management by interested members is not precluded. Working group is expected to report progress to November review meeting of suppliers.

s.

e .

7. Significant Elements of Plutonium Discussi.on Included:

A. Economics of Reprocessing: Fulford said ultimately LDCS could not be 4 excluded from field if it proves economically attractive. But it is  !

currently not so for Candu reactors and there also appears to be some 1 doubts at this time in case of LWRS. He also pointed out that LDCS l will pay more attention to what we do than what we say about reprocess- 1 ing and its economics. France and others noted that making the case of economic unattractiveness is difficult. France and FRG also noted extreme difficulty of containing this technology in long term.

B. Possible Impact on NPT: France, Japan, Dutch, and UK dels raised potential problem of perceived incompatibility of plutonium management efforts with Article IV of the NPT, and we need not to undermine NPT and IAEA safeguards. In response U.S. del explained compatibility with aims of NPT.

C. Support of IAEA Safeguards: U.S. , UK, and Canada all underlined central importance of IAEA safeguards and need for active supplier support to achieve technical validity. UK stressed need to avoid publicly denigrating safeguards. U.S. also noted significance of the IAEA system for non-proliferation efforts and the need for high-level statements stressing the importance suppliers attach to ensuring effective IAEA safeguards. i l

8. In their first meeting, new members acted characteristically. GDR paralleled l Soviet positions. Sweden, Netherlands, and to some extent Italy made substan-tive individual contributions which supported U.S. objectives. Although meeting began somewhat stiffly as expected with enlarged situation, proceed-ings under UK leadership evolved into informal, friendly and considerate atmosphere which has characterized club of London efforts to date.

1

9. With regard to written communication transmitted by certain EC members of l suppliers' group regarding relationshil of London guidelines to EC treaty delegations, subject was not raised in multilateral meeting. U.S. had j discussed matter earlier in bilaterals with Japanese and Soviets who, based '

on U.S. explanation, agreed not to raise issue further.

l i

i i

i i

, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS MEETING - LONDON 3/4 JUNE 1976 l LIST OF DEIEGATIONS ,

8 a 1

1 ,

BELGIUM '

Mr Bousse Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Beets Member of S.C.K.

Mr Adam Counsellor B31gian Embassy f l GAMADA Mr Fulford Deputy Director-General Bureau of Economic and l Scientific Affairs, Dept of External Affaire Mr McManus Atomic Energy Control Board a Mr Haynel '

Transport Communications and Energy Dept .

Dept of External Affairs  !

Mr Boomgaardt Legal Advisory Division, Dept of Externa'  :#ftirs 1

Mr Greenwood Scientific Counsellor, Canadian High Comt..ssion l

. Mr Mawhinney First Secretary, Cana'dian High Commission FRANCE Mr de Nazelle Chief, Scientific Affairs Dept. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Goldschmidt Atomic Energy Commission Mr Pettit Atomic Energy Commission Mr Amigues Scientific Affairs Dept.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs l

Mr Vicariot Scientific Counsellor, French Embassy  !

I Mr Chasseriaux Scientific Attachf French Embassy l

Mr Gergorin Ministry of Foreign Affairs

\

! -1 -

a i,

e .

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY .

Mr Balkan Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs l Mr Dittman Ministry of External Affairs Mr Rouget Ministry of External Affairs Mr Gr$ndel Ministry of External Affairs 1

Mr von Wagner Ministry of External Affaire j Mr Schmitz Wenzel Federal Chancellor's Office Mr Struck Ministry of Economics Mr Hein Ministry of Economics Mr Hirzel Ministry of the Interior Mr Scharnhoop, Ministry of the Interior Mr Gruber Ministry of Research and Technology Mr Heil Ministry of Research and Technology Mr DIinwald First Secretary (Scientific) FRG Embassy GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Mr'Thun Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Rabold Head of Dept. State Board of Nuclear Security and Radiation Protection Mr Rudolph First Secretary Embassy of the German Democratic Republic ITALY Mr Bettini Minister Plen r ,entiary Ministry of lueign Affairs Mr Nitti Counseller, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Ferrari Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Albonetti CNEN ,

Mr Civiletti Counsellor, Italian Embassy

-- 2 -

-c..om-....n-

. JAPAN_

Mr Otsuka Deputy Director-General, UN Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs '

Director of Scientific Affairs Division UN Bureau Mr Ota l Ministry of Foreign Affairs }

Mr Ibe Energy Resources Division, Ministry of.

International Trade and Industry Mr Onda Counsellor, Japanese Embassy Mr Hayashi First Secretary, Japanese Embassy l Mr Wakasa First Secretary, Japanese Embassy NETHERLANDS  ;,

Mr van der Valk Head Disarmament & International Peace Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  !

Mr Versteeg Dep head - Branch for nuclear physics, Ministry of Social Affairs Mr van Walsum Third Secretary, Netherlands Embassy j

8WgDEN - .

Mr Liljegren Head of Dept. Ministry of Foreign Affairo Mr Larsson Civil Engineer, Ministry of Industry Mr Eek Head of Section, National Nuclear Energy Authority Mr Revelius First' Secretary, Swedish Embassy Mr Lind First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

. 1,.

USSR EEQ

.'~. ,

Mr Morokhov First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Nucle ar -Energy Mr Timerbayev Deputy Head, International Organisations Dept Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Rogov Counsellor Soviet Embassy Mr Kudriavtsey First Secretary Soviet Embassy Mr Vietrogradov , Attachd . Soviet Embasak

UNITED KINGDOM ,

j Mr Thomson Assistant Under-Secret' ary FCO Mr Herzig Under-Secretary Dept of Energy Mr Edmonds Head, Arms Control & Disarmament Dept FCO -

Mr Butler Dept of Energy Dr Brown Dept of Energy Mr Wilmshurst Energy Dept / Arms Control & Disarmament Dept FCO Mico MacLean UK AEA Mr Broughton Dept of Energy,, ,

O Mr Arnold Arms Control & Disarmament Dept FCO UNITED STATE OF ' AMERICA Mr Vest Director, Bureau of Military and Political Affairs, State Dept Mr Nosenzo Director, Nuclear Folicy and Operations State Dept Mr Kratzer Bureau of Oceans, Environments, Sciences State Dept Mr Sievering Assistant Administrator, Bnergy Resources Development Agency Mr Rosenthal Energy Resources and Development Agency Mr Landauer Office of The Secretary, of Re Mr Guhin Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr van Doren Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Mr Boright Arms Control & Disarmament Agency e

Mr Kahan Policy Planning Staff fence Dept Mr Leshy First Secretary US Mission to IAEA Vienna Mr MacDonald First Secretary US Embassy I

.s

i. .

j

(

, REVISED AGENDA I

I

\

1. Adoption of the Agenda.

2. Cons'ideratio of the report by the I working group on physical protection.

3 Possible publication of the documents' agreedbythf. Group.

l

4. Further enlargement.

5 Consideration of the mechanics by which the Group might be enlarged.

6. Information to or consultation with other l Governments-or Authorities.

l 7 Plutonium' Management. ,

8. Future Meetings.

9 Any other business.

a.

5. !7-

.a .

• ' ' 4* .

9

. f.

• Q '

rl ?.b.

.a b e. *

1. . f< -'

- ?-f.; 6. "

'f3.}

.. ;;,o -

• 5' -

v:

$p:,: ;7 -

..lu,i'

-h:

A e 4 Criteria for Levels of Physical Protection '

1. The purpose of physical protection of nuclear materials is to prevent un-authorized use and handling of these materials. Paragraph 3 (a) of the Guidelines document calls for agreement among suppliers on the levels of l t

protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, and equipment l and facilities containing these materials, taking account of international recommendations.

2. Paragraph 3 (b) of the Guidelines document states that implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the responsibi-lity of the Govenrment of that country. However, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and recipient. (In this context these requirements should apply to all states.)

3. The document INFCIRC/225 of the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" and similar documents which from time to time are prepared by international groups of experts and updated as appropriate to account for changes in the state of the art and state of knowledge with regard to physical protection of nuclear material are a useful basis for guiding recipient states in designing a system of physical protec-

, tion measures and procedures.

4. The categorization of nuclear material presented in the attached table or as ,

it may be updated from time to time by mutual agreement of suppliers shall j serve as the agreed basis for designating specific levels of physical protec- i tion in relation to the type of materials, and equipment and facilities  !

containing these materials, pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) of the i Guidelines document. I S. The agreed levels of physical protection to be ensured by the competent national authorities in the use, storage and transportation of the materials of the attached table shall as a minimum include protection characteristics as follows:

CATEGORY III l Use and Storage within an area to which access is controlled.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, i r:cipient, and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the juris- l diction and regulation of supplier and recipient states respectively in case of -

l international transport specifying time, place, and procedures for transferring transport responsibility. 1 l

I l

m u m m m M d d dsk )

I CATEGORY II Use and Storage within a protected area to which access is controlled, i.e.,

an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, recipient, and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and recipient states respectively  !

in case of international transport specifying time, place, and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

CATEGORY I Materials in this Category shall be protected with highly reliable systems against unauthorized use as follows:

Use and Storage within a highly protected area, i.e., a protected area as defined for Category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons I whose trustworthiness has been determined and which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

Transportation under special precautions as identified above for transportation of Category II and III materials and, in addition, under constant surveillance by Oscorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.

6. Suppliers should request identification by recipients of those agencies or l authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of protection are I adequately met and having responsibility for internally coordinating response /

recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of protected I materials. Suppliers and recipients should also designate points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transporation and other matters of mutual concern.

. 1 1

l

t ,

t u g u

". b t u ,k b _

g b g1 g g t _

0 g ,

g k n e g ) n c e c 05 s5 0a r 0 t i i rr I 51 s1 1h o 05 51

- l f ou e t m l l i f o I

nn l n n nn a a c eh I

aa a ae r u 'f e b/

aa q p s hh rh h r o hh e t s I d tt ot to tt o I a m g n e r r ge l se s k se e h sr k r st sr v  % t o0 eo o eu 0 eo e 0 0 Lm 1 m lb 1 lm l 1 f I 1 n n o ys o a n rd t t t l r ao f, i t

h o oe ge t i _

y u u u r l e a t ec _

r b

g b b g

ume -

i s a t x o g gg g tuu ) d s u ae _

c e aif%t nr a e l C e

k0 kk k0 0n r l a l 0 r 0 od1 e v se t 25 51 o 25 rhe t a o . e au aI CI nn nn m nn othnn te f _

cao h c n d _

aa aa r - aa d ,ihc t di o ee _

hh hh o hh emrt i et p ih _

e tt tt tt tun w hc u ft g eiesl ca i L se se k se l n ss t ir s sm _

A sr sr sr pawes u rp e s o I

R eo eo 0 eo eroli b n t ar E

Lm Lm 1 Lm Dul(f et a l f r n t c T

A t o me um s

se l _

M c ie o . i v R

e e e a ng tn e r r r e . aa o tl A o o o r d rn ni n E m m m e ua et en L

C r r r a t m pc t o _

U o o p f oe ni N

I - - o n m ot t ot g g g i e n eo cai F x se br O

k k k d e ed p l d e iu d aa N

2 5 2 t e tr ll i r O

a b ip ua r I

i t oc ee T

d d nh wi th a l at s at A r u ui ty m Z

r . o qw ih e I id h p el <

R l e s de , l i O a ld nc df ih _

G E 5 U

5 U r u

al ie t y an a d eo sw s -

T 3 3 t ri i md ny il A 2 2 a eh t ur er f e -

C n ts n io v _

0 0 eU d an mu a

u rc oc mog oe l e al y3 n E

2 o

1 o g rr oet t q ha t

n ct ea rc i

gr y -

L t t a n di i o _

B  %  % re a n st rg _

A om oe d d0 d0 c ad i n _

T e e2 e1 . t i e e t h h h t ce f mt nr sa c cn cn s an i uc oe t c _

i i a ia i eo n i e if i _

r rh rh L r g nt tf e _

b b n nt nt b t i ao ci f n d d e e e d r aa s rr ed oo e e s s e e up t t

a t

a me ur ms ue ms ue t

a g

g nr iu l y

de oa r

ed ue i io il o eb pn t c fa d a

nm a

n at il n

at i

d a

i T

r dh e/

l a

c t

ed fi g ru id r r rr ru ru r ts i ll oss ve .

m r r uo ub ub r e ad g pu y rd e r i i i h ia o eo l a

n n n t dr l dh e b ed -

F U U - - - U a o ,s vo b l n r0 i et h e _

i r0 d mI l cyi .

i1 a uI , i ah d r iI ss h ms e tn n ie w n 5 3 i oa a ay hc rr nu a 3 3 d f nh tn l o m 2 2 e i t n uog a eir u a u e l

a i n

m u

m u

- t a

t n

e.

l as is h

t l e at ht gs u

fct i e i

r c t o i n

i n

i d

al d

i re el s ra uC ow he rd ea u

t t u a re t s t tr h re a l r " ru s ar e an li t rn M P U U If A Mo L Ni Ac Oi o 1 2 3 4 a b c d e f r

1J

,s. . .

l (

I Approach to the Reprocessing / Plutonium i

,. , Access Problem The US continues to be concerned with the potential proliferation dangers inherent in the export of repro-cessing plants and related technology. This concern is I reflected in the Guidelines calling upon suppliers to j

" exercise reseraint in the transfer of sensitive facili- '

ties," and to consult with other governments on specific sensitive cases. At this juncture, it would seem.appro-priate for suppliers to attempt to synthesize a strategy utilizing a variety of approaches for averting the risks associated with the spread of national reprocessing g plants, particularly to countries where there exists a potential for conflict or instability and where the g economic requirements for such plants are questionable. '

Some elements for such a strategy are summarized below.

They include but go beyond the concept of encouraging multinational alternatives to national plants (as called

• for in the Guidelines) and cover other aspects such as  !

expanded utilization of existing supplier services as another alternative to national reprocessing, and strength-ening safeguards and controls over reprocessing, as well ,

as establishing an international plutonium storage regime 1 to minimize the dangers of plutonium storage and disposi-tion should excess quantities become availabic. It would be hoped the suppliers would exercise special restraint and prudence in the area of reprocessing tc;hnology trans-fers while these approaches and the relatioaship among them are being considered.

(1) Multinational Fuel Cycle Centers Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines calls for suppliers to encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national reprocessing and enrichment plants, supplier in-

. volvement and/or other appropriate multinational partici-

~ ' - ~ -

pation in resulting facilities. We strongly support the concept of a few suitably si~ted multinational plants serving regional needs as an important alternative to national plants. In particular, we'believe that such facilities should be viewed as " fuel cycle centers" which encompass spent fuel storage, plutonium storage and fabri- '

cation as well as reprocessing, thereby handling the entire 9

e .

m 1

1 "back-end" of the fuel cycle. Suppliers need to continue to explore this concept, focusing particularly on those geographic areas which appear ripe for such an enterprise.

l We also recognize that not every area may have the i basic ingredients for successfully implementing the '

multinational concept, i.e., the countries of a parti-cular region on sub-region may be historically and poli-tically unable to work together in such an enterprise, or the region in question may lack a country with acceptable stability characteristics and non-proliferation motivation. In such cases, the degree of acceptability can be materially improved through possible stabilizing  ;

l factors such as an emphasis on binational facilities with supplier involvement. Nevertheless, in these instances j the preferred solution may well be not to transfer sensi-tive technology under any conditions and seek other alterna-l tives to meet regional needs.

(2) Utilization of Existing Services j one near' term approach to reducing the incentives as well as the rationale for development of national repro-cessing capabilities would be the use of existing supplier reprocessing services when and where actually needed to meet the needs of other countries in lieu of export of reprocessing technology and possible expansion of these capabilities to encompass plutonium storage and fabrica-tion. Suppliers now engaged in or contemplating provision of reprocessing services might explore the elements of common service policies. In particular, it would be important to explore common policies related to return of ','

reprocessed output, such as provisions for the exchange of non-sensitive fuel for separated plutonium, return in the form of fabricated (mixed oxide) fuel rods for immediate l '

use in reactors, or possibly fuel credits with regard to future power needs. .

(3) Strengthening Safeguards and Controls The US has pursued in its Agreements for Cooperation l the concept of supplier consent for reprocessing, fabrica-l tion, and storage of reactor fuel as a means for influencing when and where reprocessing of supplied fuel or fuel used in supplied reactors would be done. Such provisions or equivalent understandings can be used by reactor and uranium fuel suppliers to ensure reprocessing and plutonium storage 1

l l

l l

L

j. .

M- .

. . n 3_ ,

in safe environments (e . g . , storage of irradiated fuel until recovered special nuclear material is needed for near-term applications, use of supplier services or multi- i national facilities rather than national facilities), but  !

l they can also be used to ensure that if reprocessing is performed in either national or multinational plants, maximum efforts are made to ensure the safeguardability of such plants. This latter aspect is complementary te paragraph 13 of the Guidelines where suppliers have agreed to encourage construction of sensitive facilities in a manner to facilitate application of safeguards.

The logic for such an approach giving the supplier a i voice in safeguard arrangements where reprocessing is to I be performed parallels the logic for a trilateral safe-guards agreement -- that is, the responsibility for negoti-ating detailed safeguard arrangements associated with

! sensitive facilities in the recipient country should be shared by the supplier, the recipient and the IAEA.

(4) Internationalizing Plutonium Storace A new and potentially important policy element which complements the above is the concept of " internationalizing" plutonium storage. This concept, based on Article XII of the IAEA Statute, would attempt to reduce the proliferation risks associated with plutonium stockpiling in national l hands (whether the result of national, multinational or j toll reprocessing services) through international control of plutonium storage under IAEA auspices. The basic prin-ciple would be to provide international control of national stocks of plutonium to ensure access to plutonium only for ,,,,

legitimate and immediate power needs.

~

l

• It should be noted that the first two policy elements outlined above focus on supplier efforts to find desirable alternatives to national reprocessing. The latter two  ;

elements attempt to further strengthen plutonium controls I through adequate safeguard arrangements on national repro-cessing plants and international storage to reduce the potential risks associated with national access to plutonium

, stocks. Clearly, none of the elements should be viewed as L  :

l M l e

• A a unmagums .

- I

_4_

a rationale for lowering the threshold on restraint in transferring sensitive reprocessing technology or in -

restricting access'to plutonium where there is a substan-tial risk of proliferation, political instability or l conflict.

I O

4 6

9 9

e

• O e

G 0 . *

• a S

G M .

L

. Je

• ** CONFIDENTIAL >

' k POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL REGIME

. FOR STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL OR PLUTONIUM The Government of the United States wishes to suggest that nuclear suppliers seriously cons'ider a -

~~

new. concept which could form one component of our common effort to abate the spread of nuclear weapons. _  !

i This concept would be part of a broader fabric of ,

constraints designed t,o assure that the plutonium pro-duced in nuclear power plants is handled in an  ;'., -

. .o .

optimal manner from a safeguards and non-proliferation N

, \ l,, .

-standpoint.

The conc.ept is that of an international regime ~ .;

that would serve to place under the physical custody of -

the IAEA civil produced plutonium that is in excess of current peaceful needs. . ;. }'

The factors that have led the United States to .,

suggest a prompt study of this idea and the nature of .

a system which might accomplish it are briefly set out l

in the following paragraphs. - .y The Factors Favoring a New Regime, and Relationship to Other Policies under Discussion Since the advent of the nuclear age, the inter- .

national community has been understandable concerned with ,

the need to assure that the plutonium produced in

- M

' CONFIDENTIAL -

• ll,'

? ._ t :

(

,' ., ' gesagteaummmm.

1 l

nuclear power plants is only put to peaceful use's.

Our' efforts in support of IAEA safeguards and the Non- .

Proliferation Treaty, as well as the elaboration of common supplier export policies, have all, in part, been designed to assure that this sensitive material is not  !

used for non-peaceful purposes. While a series of unprecedented constraints have been developed, the United States believes we should jointly consider further

. steps to help assure' that the nuclear power industry can i

evolve in a safe and prudent manner. .

The genesis of the idea we now wish to put forward l relates to the growing stockpiles of separated plutonium that may be established throughout the world, particularly i

in view of the forecasted growth in nuclear power. f The United States, of course, believes that one of the most effective ways to deal with the plutonium j accumulation problem is to keep the material in an ,

8-irradiated fuel element form until it is clearly

. l ecossary oth economically and technically to carry out

}"

chemical reprocessing. However, we recognize that with time, pressures to reprocess may grow as some nations plan to recycle plutonium and enriched uranium in their  ;

thermal reactors or to embark on commercial breeder programs.

k M

)

. 1 1

-3~

We recognize that plutonium ultimately may 'ecome b

,an important fuel source in helping to fulfill ftiture energy demands. Nevertheless, we believe it is essential to recognize that the growing availability of plutonium around the world will necessarily increase the risks or at least the concerns that are associated with the possible spread of nuclear weapons. We welcome the

. fact that a significant fraction of the civil plutonium produced throughout the world already will be subjected to IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation commitments, such as that embodied in the NPT. However, we believe that it is clear that the unrestricted growth of national stockpiles of plutonium will add to the anxieties and concerns about nuclear power even if these materials are effectively safeguarded. No matter how closely inspected, the presence of sizeable accumulations of excess plutonium in the hands of individual nations may be politically destabilizing in certain regions or a cause of continuing concern in others.

We also recognize that other components of a non-  !

~ prol'iferation strategy which we have discussed, particularly the concepts of multlnational fuel-cycle alternatives and of the possible utilization of .

i

~

existing reprocessing services, have not explicigly '

addressed the question of where produced plutonium should be stored.

enuatamuseas .

~4-With these important consi,derations in mind,' the United States believes it is incumbent'on the interested .

states to concider additive ways of assuring the world at large that any stocks of plutonium that may become ,

l available will not be readily prone to national misuse.

. Fortunately, in the view of the United States, the foundation for such a system can be found in the IAEA Statute as well as in several cooperative bilateral arrangements that are in effect. In particular, it will be recalled that Article XII of the IAEA Statuto l

specifies that with respect to any Agency project, or -

other* arrangement where the Agency is requested to apply l safeguards, the Agency shall have the right:

\

"To require deposit with the Agency of any {

l excess of any special fissionable matc aials re- i covered or produced as a by-product over what I is needed'for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions as stated above."

Although the IAEA has never been called upon to  ;

_ implement this provision, the United States believes

, that we should jointly study the possibility of l

activating this ciause in appropriate circumstances,.

1 l

i  :

L N  !

l i

4 5

4

~

~5-It'is clear that the frame,rs of the IAEA Statute recognized that an inherently greater degree of security can be gained if such stocks are actually deposited with the Agency pending use than if they remain under national jurisdiction. .

IAEA depositories could also include irradiated fuel elements pending reprocessing of separated plutonium.

As such, they could be justified as inherently desirable regardless of the manner in which future reprocessing developments unfold. ' Reg'ional IAEA-controlled storage sites for irradiated fuels might not only be reassuring from a proliferation standpoint, but also economically and environmentally attractive to those nations that are facing critical shortages in fuel element storage capacity. .

The general concept would be an appropriate corollary to multinational fuel cycle centers or to provision of 8'

reprocessing services. Depositories clearly could be

'entablished as an integral part of multinational centers, .

or deposit could be a condition of supply of reprocessing i services or other assistance.

Also, we believe such deposi' tories would appear to be desirable if some further national reprocessing * -

centers are established, notwithstanding our strgnuous efforts to promote other alternatives. If the products of such national plants were indeed deposited, this would

,.v

E .. .

. . .6- .

j provide important added assurance that these materials l

were not being put to misuse. Clearly, however, this concept should not be viewed as a rationale for lowering .

the threshold on restraint in transferring sensitive reprocessing technology or in restricting access to plutonium where there is a substantial risk of prolifera-l .

l tion, political instability or conflict.

l 1 How the Concept Might Be Implemented 1

. To implement this concept the IAEA might be empowered to set up, on an extra-territorial basis, depositories where the excess quantities of material could be stored and monitored under Agency auspices. As noted, both separated plutonium as well as plutonium in irradiated fuel elements would be eligible for storage. Conceivably, these depositories either could be established at the Agency's installation in Seibersdorf or in various region'al locations or both and they might be co-located

.0*

with selected existing facilities. Moreover, it is

' conceivable that these IAEA depositories could be co-i 9 '

located with other facilities that we also might wish to see established such as multinational reprocessing and plutonium fuel fabrication plants. .

~

We would like to jointly explore and develop the e

. modalities. One possibility would be the e;.'cution of a new series of undertakings or agreements between the

- - -- states concerned and the IAEA whereby l M 1

l l

1 N

l l

the states would agree to place with the Agency All of their

, excess plutonium. One critical element would be suitable understandings for defining just what material is reasonably judged'to be excess, and appropriate arrangemonts would have to be devised for assuring the l prompt return of the material to the state when it is j actually needed. We also would expect the Agency to have a voice in determining the form in which the l material should be returned to the state, since we have i an obvious interest in reducing the time interval when

~

the material is in its most " provocative" form (that is, -

l

• 1 in nitrate or metal form rather than in the form of

' fabricated mixed oxide fuel elements). Obviously, considerable work would be needed to better define the concept, to gain widespread acceptance and to address such qu'estions as financing, location, manpower needs and the legal responsibility for the material while it

.8-is under IAEA jurisdiction. In this regard, many

" questions of a detailed nature obviously would have to be explored, including assessing the transportation costs and delineating the physical protection schemes that might be employed, and agreding on the criteria ,

for release and return of materials to national pro-grams. Perhaps most importantly, we would need to

-consider both the possible incentives and disincentives

- M . .

9 t

r .,- ,

l" * = M .

. -8

,

• s l

for nations to agree to participate in a regime of l

this character. Overall, several optional courses of action might be available and they all should be con-sidered.

. While we do not wish to underestimate the difficulties', it is our preliminary judgment that the financial and manpower resources that would be required to establish such depo,sitories would be modest and reasonable when one considers the probable security benefits to be derived from a regime of this character.

We are talking of construction and operating expenses that only would represent a fraction of the costs of other key nuclear facilities such as reprocessing l

Plants and reactors.  !

1 In connection with this concept the principal 1 nuclear suppliers could consider, as a condition of significant nuclear assistance, requiring: (a) that

.f.

the IAEA have the opportunity, in accordance with

' Article XII, to specify the arrangements for storing the excess plutonium produced through the assistance; and (b) that the supplier also have the right to approve the arrangements for storage in the event the IAEA for any reason does exercise this right. For its -

e ,

part, the U.S. has a bilateral right in many of its nuclear power agreements to approve the storage  ;

Ch.

e -

~.

~9- .

arrangements for any derived plutonium that is in excess of current needs for peaceful purposes.

We suggest that suppliers join in support of an IAEA exploration of this idea. Study of this condept l

. . 1 could be promptly factored into the Agency's current l study of the multinational fuel cycle concept. Serious l discussion of the concep't at the forthcoming IAEA General Conference would also be appropriate.

l e

e .

I

.8-

. t l . \

k e

j '-

s l L -

1

.m -

L