ML20209E972
| ML20209E972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/23/1975 |
| From: | Huberman B NRC |
| To: | Anders, Gilinsky, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E648 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9907150190 | |
| Download: ML20209E972 (3) | |
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. summmme. - y UNIT 80 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 23, 1975 MEMORANDUM TO Chairman Anders Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Mason Commissioner Rowden FROM: Ben Huberman:Y.
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SUBJECT:
SUPPLIERS CONFERENCE A second meeting of the seven nuclear supplier nations was held in London on June 18 and 19. Britain was in the Chair, with Canada, France, the FRG, Japan, the USSR and the United States participating.
George Vest - Director of Political-Military Affairs for the State Department - chaired the U.S. delegation, on which Norm Terrell participated for the NRC.
The meeting generally went well. In accordance with expectations, the principal substantive thrust was given by the effort to pursuade the French to go beyond the NPT in imposing safeguard requirements on recipient countries. The French showed a little movement, but basically made no major concessions beyond the points they told the U.S. bilater-ally they would agree to last fall. The French are-not isolated, however, for three reasons. First, the FRG does not want to distance itself too far from France for reasons of EC unity. Second, for practical reasons the FRG wants to protect its deal with the Brazilians., ' Third, all the i participating countries realize that in the end it will be better to have the best possible deal with the French included rather than to seek a more ideal solution with which the French will not associate itself.
In a nutshell, the French have agreed to accept the obligations that the NPT places on supplier countries, but are resistant to using their posi-tion as a supplier to compel recipient nations to accept the NPT or NPT-type obligations.
The next meeting of the suppliers group will take place on September 16, 0 when the participants will attempt to werk out the text of a conference document embodying agreed supplier understandings. The other partici-l pating countries would have preferred to meet next in July, but the 3 French wanted the extra time for their government to consider the results
- of this meeting. The French maygilso want the extra time to put further p h $ N D W f % 9
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The Commissioners June 23,~1975 l
i pressure on the United States to ease restrictions on reactor sales to corrunist countries - a demand they have loosely linked with their ,
participation in the suppliers deal. l i
The principal substantive points discussed last week in London are:
Prohibition on Nuclear Explosives. All countries are agreed that suppliers will require formal assurances from recipient governr.ents l that peaceful nuclear exports will not be diverted into making nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.
-- Safeguards. !
There are two alternatives: IAEA safeguards on all of j the recipient country's physical nuclear activities as a condition :
for supply (full fuel cycle safeguards), or alternatively IAEA i safeguards only on the specific facilities and materials furnished i by the supplier. All countries but France and Germany prefer full ;
fuel cycle safeguards. The French argue that the acceptance of full !
fuel cycle safeguards is the principal substantive obligation !
recipient countries accept under the NPT and that France will not use its supplier leverage to force other countrios to accept a {
political regime (i.e. the NPT) which France itself does not accept.
This is the key point of difference among the suppliers. However, it is unlikely to cause the suppliers arrangement to break down since ,
everyone recognizes the value of having the French in. '
In an effort to achieve the substantive full fuel cycle safeguards without referring to this provision specifically, the United States i proposed a complicated series of ancillary restrictions on enrichment '
and reprocessing facilities and technology which end up amounting to full fuel cycle safeguards. For example, under the U.S'. arrangements a reprocessing facility would become " contaminated" w'en it reprocessed supplier-furnished fuel elements sb that thereafter, all reprocessing done at that facility would have to be under safeguards. The French and Germans recognize that the complicated U.S. proposals boil down to j
full fuel cycle safeguards under another name and are not willing to j accept them. j Physical Security Measures. All the suppliers agree that recipient l countries must impose adequate physical security measures within ;
l their own country as a condition of supply. The Canadians - with
.some support from the U.S. and USSR - would like to codify physical '
security requirements, perhaps by tying them to the IAEA Gray Book. j The other countries are unwilling to do this because of the sensitive international security implications of physical security.
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The Commissioners June 23, 1975 Multi "ationni Enternrises fer Enrichment and Reprocessirg.
This is another U.S. idea. Uhile the U.S. would like to make this a requirement for supplying enrichment or reprocessing facilities, we would also settle for an undertaking by the suppliers to
" encourage" multi-naticnalization. The rationale for this proposal is that recipient countries will find it much more difficult to divert plutonium or HEU to a nuclear explosive program if supplier nationals take an active part in the management of these key facilities. The French and Germans may agree to " encourage" this measure, but this is about as far as it will go.
Controls On Retransfer. All suppliers will have no trouble agreeing that recipients can retransfer nuclear facilities only when the original suppliers agree.
Consultation on Special Export Cases. A very important understand-ing reached by the supplier countries is that they will hold frank and confidential consultations on any nuclear supply case that causes concern for any one of the suppliers. If this system works out in practice, it will help dispel a lot of the suspicion and uncertainty that now characterize international relations in the nuclear supply area.
-- Sanctions. The Canadians -- who are the most enthusiastic non-prolif-erators because of their unfortunate experience with India -- asked the conference to consider whether the suppliers should not agree to mandatory sanctions against recipient countries which viola *.e supplier understandings. All countries agreed to think about this before the next session, but there is little prospect for its success.
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