ML20209F190
| ML20209F190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/23/1976 |
| From: | Gilinsky, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Gilinsky, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E648 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-75-742-C, NUDOCS 9907150260 | |
| Download: ML20209F190 (2) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner Rowden Commissioner Mason Commissioner Gilinsky
, Commissioner Kennedy FROM: Chairm A dd'
SUBJECT:
FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A US/ USSR EXCHANGE ON LWR SAFETY My quick. reading of the recent Commissioner Action paper (SECY-75-742) discussing the recent meetings with the USSR arid highlighting some of the activities related to the possibility of an exchange in LWR safety technology l indicated a number of potential concerns which might warrant informal e l
Commission discussion.. I am openminded about a US/ USSR exchange ~
on LWR safety, but in view of some of the strong views expressed by others, particularly Admiral Rickover, the Commission may wish to provide some comments and/or guidance to staffin response to the following items.
- a. How should the scope and procedures of such an exchange be structured to properly account for the ERDA concerns on transfer of LWR technology?
Note in particular Admiral Rickover's concern as expressed on page 2 of his memo:
"Further, to the rather extensive degree that U.S. naval technology has been incorporated into the products and technology used by commer-cial nuclear industry, export would provide such information (though not identifiable to naval work) to the Soviet Bloc. Thus, in the areas where commercial technology is also applicable to military applications, direct military benefits could accrue to the Soviet Bloc by obtaining U.S. commercial PWR information. Of course I recognize that some U.S. commercial information is in the public domain or is potentially available to the Soviets through third party countries with whom we NATIONAL SECURIT)f IMFO.U.iATION m vs'!DTCL/.02!F!ED UNDN1331fiSd D7 trcA win $?Sff.0:nesure
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have permitted commercial assistance or sales in nuclear technology.
Nonetheless direct assistance involving person to person contact -
and binding contractual obligations would be of much greater value ,
to the Soviets than any other form of access to U.S. commercial j PWR technology. Much of the information on techniques, " lessons l learned', engineering knowhow, proprietary information are available only through direct assistance."
Also pertinent in this regard is the observation that "ERDA resists an exchange of LWR technology of the kind ofinterest to the Soviets because they believe the Soviets have little to give that is of interest to the U.S. and because of concern about security implications involved in providing the Soviets with U.S. PWR technology. Because the Soviets realize that the main U.S. interest lies in the area of safety exchange, they would like to treat safety and other LWR technology exchange as a single package."
- b. What criteria should one use to judge the degree of reciprocity and balance in such an exchange?
- c. 'What are the NRC's views regarding the scope of the team visits, '
both in terms of the USSR team within the US and the agenda for the U.S. team? ERDA has the lead in firming up these visits, and in view of the apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of ERDA for such an exchange and the differing responsibilities between ERDA and the NRC, some g tidance to staff might be appropriate.
- d. Are there additional actions which might help resolve these potential concerns or which could follow up on the formal and informal discussions with the Soviet Union in addition to the suggested TWX?
This overall subject of a potential LWR agreement seems worthy of our attention at a discussion session. I suggest that such a discussion be held after we receive the Soviet response to our follow-up TWX proposed in SECY-75-742.
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