ML20209E941
| ML20209E941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1976 |
| From: | Tharp R NRC |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E648 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9907150183 | |
| Download: ML20209E941 (24) | |
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ATTACHMENT 1
PHYSICAL PROTECTION SUBGROUP SUPPLIERS' COMMITTEE March 31, 1976 Meeting Thirty-two delegates from ten nations (Attendees - Enclosure 1) met at the U.S. Embassy, London, England, on March 31, 1976, to draft a working paper on levels of physical protection for nuclear material and equipment and facilities containing these materials in impicmenta-tion of paragraph 3 of Suppliers' Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.
The United States tabled a draf t agenda, criteria for levels of physical protection and a table for categorization of nuclear material (Enclosure 2). FRG and France also tabled draf t papers on levels of physical protection (Enclosures 3 and 4). The U.S. draft agenda was accepted by the nations.(Belgium was an observer and did not partici-pate in the proceedings.) '
V. H. Hudgins, ISA, ERDA,. representing the U.S., explained the U.S.
position and basis for the draft criteria for levels of physical protection.
By way of background, Mr. Hudgins briefed the Working Group on U.S. concern for subnational threats to nuclear material and the action taken by the U.S. to determine adequacy of physical protection for nuclear material transferred to other nations. He indicated the deep interest of the U.S. to exchange information on physical protection technology and systems. He advised that the U.S.
fully supports the IAEA guidelines on physical protection of nuclear materials and that the protection characteristics in the draft criteria were,in fact, based on the IAEA international recommendations.
A. Von Wagner, FRG, spoke on the FRG proposed levels of physical protection of materials.
He advised that the IAEA guidelines provided the basis for the FRG paper, indicating that FRG physical protection system met the levels of protection in each of the categories of materials identified in the IAEA guidelines. He then raised two points - 1) penal sanctions were important legal considerations for member states and should be considered by the Suppliers' Committee but the reference to such sanctions should not be included in the
" level of protection" paper; 2) the level of protection should be an agreement between the Suppliers and should subsequently be intrc-duced into agreements between suppliers and recipient states. In this context there should be no distinction between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states. "" U - ' T TK.FROU g-ByAuthM:k txrm7 rnex mcunn C3.v3mt esctAT,"DCAUCN SCHEDUIS CF gg (Occ!ns;t' W -N i
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s 2-A. Petit, CEA, France, advised that the IAEA guidelines were useful, but that the levels of physical protection for materials should be j adopted by the Suppliers without reference to the IAEA recommendations.
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He advised that the French position was similar to the U.S. criteria j l
except that U.S. criteria in some respect were beyond " levels of protection."
K. Kato, Japan, stated that the " levels" of protection must be stated in general terms as set forth in the U.S. criteria, but no reference {
j should be made to the IAEA guidelines.
H. Vander Valk, Netherlands, advised the IAEA was in process of developing plans for an international convention on physical protection and taised the question whether there should be a link between the IAEA effort and Suppliers agreement. He also raised the question of ,
the need for standards of physical protection based on IAEA guidelines - l to be incorporated into agreements between Suppliers and recipients.
Representatives of the U.K., USSR and Sweden all indicated support of l
the IAEA guidelines, believing that " levels of protection" should meet the principles set forth in the IAEA document.
l While the general consensus of-the Working Group indicated support of the U.S. criteria, the French indicated the passive deterrence elements were not levels of physical protection and the forcible entry controls with all the examples were details not needed. Other delegates supported the French position. The Chairman of the Working Group decided that the U.S. and French should meet separately and develop a balance between the U.S. and French criteria. Represents-tives of the U.K., FRG, The Netherlands and Sweden also elected to meet with the subgroup. After a full discussion of the matter the subgroup developed Use and Storage and Transportation criteria for each category of material . The criteria contain broad principles clearly indicating the differences in levels of protection for the three categories. The Working Group subsequently accepted the revised version.
With regard to the table on Categorization of Nuclear Material, J. McManus, Canada, tabled a proposal for protecting irradiated fuel.
He suggested that spent fuel in storage or transit was not a target for theft, only for sabotage. He believed that the protection required for health and safety reasons would make it difficult to sabotage the material. He recommended that the level of protection for irradiated fuel be Category III with a footcote to require higher level of protection depending on the type of material and level s..
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v NR of radiation. This was fully supported by all delegates except the U.S. delegates, who believed Category' III did not provide sufficient protection against sabotage.
Other changes accepted by the delegates in the IAEA Guidelines Table were:
- 1) PU-238 was not included (ref, to Trigger List)
- 2) PU was identified in one form and level of protection for Category I was 2 Kgs. or more; Category II, 500 g. to 2 Kgs; Category 2II, less than 500 g. j l
i A. Petit, France, indicated that his government would subsequently recommend changes to amount of material in CategoryIII believing that some bottom should be indicated.
Enclosed is the final draft document adopt.d by the Working Group as a criteria for levels of physical protection (Enclosure 5).
l As stated in Paragraph 1 of the document, the purpose of physical pro ';
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tection is to prevent unauthorized use and handling (in the recipient state). Paragraph 2 recognizes that the responsibility for implementing physical measures is that of the recipient state, but that the level of j protection will be based on agreement between the Suppliers and the recipient. Paragraph 3 acknowledges that the IAEA guidelines are useful in guiding recipient states in designing a physical protection program. Paragraph 4 establishes a Categorizction of Nuclear Material as agreed basis for level of protection. Paragraph 5 establishes an i
understanding between the Suppliers and the recipient states as to which authority in the recipient states is responsible for ensuring the required level of protection for internally coordinating response and recovery; and for cooperating on international shipments of .
material.
l The U.S. representatives believe that the levels of protection could have been more explicit and that the Table of Categorization should not have been altered. The representatives realizc , however, all of the provisions in the IAEA recommendation for physical protection of nuclear material are not appropriate for every recipient of nuclear material - due to type or amount of material. Also the U.S. representa-tives were not in agreement with the level of protection for irradiated fuel decided by the other delegates. In addition, the U.S. representa- !
tives believe that the recovery operation must be addressed by the Suppliers' Committee.
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Although it was clear that the Working Group did int believe that IAEA should call a convention on physical protection, it was indicated that a convention on international transport, recovery and other legal issues would be acceptable. ,
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Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. U.S. Draft Agenda (R. Tharp, ERDA)
- 3. FRG Draft Paper 4 France Draft Paper ;
- 5. Working Group Final Draft l
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SWEDEN: Alf Larsson Henrik Liljegren Johan Lind Paul Ek Nils Gunnar Revelius USSR: A.I. Belov NETHERLANDS: H. Van der Valk J. Versteeg R.J.S. Harry-JAPAN: K. Kato Mr. Onda A. Hayashi M. Wakasa i
GDR: M. Rudolph H. Schieferdecker .
j FRG: Paul-Georg Gutermuth Armin Hagen Adolf Von Wagner J. Heil BELGIUM: A.C. Adam FRANCE: R. Dugas
- L. Amigues A. Petit CANADA:. B. Mawhinney J. McManus UK: M.J. Wilmshurst F. Brown P.I.M. Irwin
, USA: L.V. Nosenzo V.H. Hu.dgins R.G. Page R.E. Tharp J.P. Leahy i
I Enclosure 1 f l
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DRAFT AGENDA Physical Security Subgroup March 31 Meeting I. 'AD0'PTION OF THE DRAFT AGENDA j II.
GENERAL COMMENT
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I III. DISCUSSION OF S.S. SUBSTANTIVE DRAFT PAPER A. CATEGORIES OF MATERIALS B. ASSOCIATED LEVELS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION C. OTHER ITEMS IV. DATE, PLACE, AND AGENDA 0F ANY FURTHER MEETINGS l l
j Enclosure 2
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US Substantive Draft Criteria for Levels of Physical Protection
- 1. Paragraph 3 (a) of the Guidelines document calls for agreement among suppliers on the levels of orotection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, i j
equipment and facilities , taking account of international recommendations.
- 2. Paragraph 3 (b) states that implementation of measures of physical security protection in the recipient country '
is the responsibility of the Government of that country.
However, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have to be based should be the subject of an i l '
agreement between supplier and recipient. i
- 3. The document INFCIRC/225 of the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" and similar documents which from time to time are prepared by internationally recognized experts and updated as appropriate to account for changes in the state of the art and state of knowledge with regard to physical protection of nuclear material are a useful basis for guiding recipient states in designing a system of physical security measures and procedures.
4 In particular, ,the categorization of nuclear material as presented in the-attached ~ table (see Table I of INFCIRC/
225) or as it may be updated from time to time by mutual agreement of suppliers shall serve as the agreed basis
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for designating spccific Idols of physical security protection in relation to the type of materials equipment I and facili'ies, c
pursuant to parar,reph 3 (a) and 3 (b) above.
- 5. The egreed icycls of protection to be ensured in the use, storage and transit of the naterials of the attached table are as follcus.
Category I Materials in his catcyory shall be protected with highly re).i.able sys tems against t heft ,or sabotage highly motivated, trained end eqe pped attackers with insider collaboration. Oring system characteristics as discussed below, the required level of protection shall
- ply in all environments including use, storage and troosportation.
"Sysical protection systems shall as a . minimum include in-d..c: h protection characteristics as follows:
A. Passive deterrence ele;:ents (e . g. , cevere penalties and rewards).
B. ForcibJe e:.try controls EeLect assault (e . g. , alarms, lighting, patrols, surveillance)
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Delay access to nuclear material to permit roLilization and engagerent by.rosponse forces (e . g. ,
teults, multiple barriers and vehicle immobilization)
Deploy response forces (on and off site) that permit timely mobilization fe.g.,
se*aration distances)
Employ connunications sufficient for mobilization cnd cffective deployment of response forces (e . g. , alarms: sirens , radics) .
C.
Internal threat controls Ascare access to nuclear material only by !
authorized personnel (e. g. , vcults , barriers, and personnel identification)
Predetermine trustworthiness of authorized personnel Exclude ~ weapons, _ explosives and other contraband from protectea area (e . g. , 7ntry search or inspection of personnel, packages and vehicles)
Detect unauthorized personnel access to nuclear material (e . g. , alarms and surveillance)
Assure integrity of physical containment of nuclear material (e. g. , vaults, barriers and facility inspections)
Prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material (e.g. , exit search or inspection, of personnel, packages and vehicles)
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~4-Ca tect uncuthorir.cd rc:;. oval of nucicar 9 materi al (e . g. , al arms , and surveillcnce).
) Category II and III
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, Physical protection systems for .mterials and facilities in these categories should ensure graded 3evels of protection consistent with the threat and i
i potential risk involved cnd based on the above character.4 s tics . INFCIRC/225 contains recommendations on how a graded system might be structured.
6.
In e.s tablishing physical protection sys tems ,
recipients should designate one or more central authorities as having responsibility for ensuring that levels of protection are adequately met and as having responsibility for internally coordi.nating recponse/ recovery operations in the event of theft or sabotage. Recipient should also designate points of contact uitnin these authorities to intertace with the supplier and other countries on v.atters of out-of-country transit and in the event of thef t or sabotage involving out-of-country response / recovery ope ra tions .
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'Draf t Working Phper for the Meetink' of the ' working Group
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.in London on 31 March 1976 l concerning the implementation of paragraph 3 of the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 1 .- The purpose of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities is to prevent unauthorized use and handling of these materials and facilities. ,
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- 2. In order to reach this aim all nuclear materials and faci-lities contained in the agreed trigger list should be subject to specific levels of physical protection.
These levels should be agreed between suppliers and should subsequently be introduced into agreements between supplier states and recipient states. In this context no distinction shal~1 be made between nuclear weapon states and nons. nuclear ,
weapon states. !
- 3. Different nuclear objects according to their properties, there sensitivity and with regard to local circumstances require different degrees of protection. A further diffe-renciation will be made according to whether these nuclear objects are either in use or storage or in transit. Corres-
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ponding to the different degrees of protection required three different-levels of physical protection will be envisaged:
3.1. L'evel'I For objects requiring the highest degree of pro-tection comprehensive measures of physical protection are necessary. These measures shall be selected for objects in use or storage from those listed in paragraph 5.2 of INFCIRC 225.
- for bjects in transit from th ,s listed in para-graph 6.2 of INFCIRC 225 l 3.2. Level II l
For objects requiring a higher degree of protection strong measures of physical protection are necessar'y".
These measures shall be selected ,
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- for objects in use or storage from those listed in paragraph 5.3 of INFCIRC 225
- for objects in transit from those listed in para-graph 6.4 of INFCIRC 225 i
3.3. Level TII For objects requiring a normal degree of protection regular measures of physical protection are necessary.
These measures shall be selected
- for objects in use or storage from those listed in paragraph 5.4 of INFCIRC 225
- for objects in transit from those listed in para-graph 6.5 of INFCIRC 225.
3.4. For all three levels an expedient combination of sul-table measures should be envisaged; other measures of equal standard may also be selected.
- 4. In determining the categories of nuclear objects for which these levels of physical protection have been envi-saged, the following criteria shall be observed:
l 4.1. Nuclear materials will be devided into three
.