Text

Calculation Change Notice CCN-2 to Rev 2 to Calculation M-0050-0917, BTP Rsb 5-1 Condensate Inventory
	ML20206R292
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	08/04/1998
From:	Biba P, Brahms D; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20206R274	List: ML20206R270; ML20206R276; ML20206R280; ML20206R292; ML20206R497;
References
	M-0050-017-CCN, M-0050-017-CCN-2-R02, M-50-17-CCN, M-50-17-CCN-2-R2, NUDOCS 9901190231
	Download: ML20206R292 (93)
	v • d • e

~ - - - - - - "- - - -

Southem Califomia Edison Company CALC.NO. PAGE TOTAL NO. OF M-0050417 fREU CN NO. N-2 1 PAOES 93 INTERIM CALCULATION UNIT CALC.PEV.

BASE CALC REV. CCN CONVERSION .

CHANGE NOTICE (ICCN)I CALCULATION CHANGE 2 2&3 CCN NO. CCN- [ d.

CALCULATION SUBJECT :BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate inventory l NOTICE (CCN)

COVER PAGE ENQlNEERING SYSTEM NUMBER / PRIMARY STATION SYSTFM DESIGNATOR Q CLASS CALCULATION CROSS 4NDEX j Q1 Nom / Updated index meluded l CONTROLLED PROGRAM OR PROGRAM I DATABASE NAME (S) VERSION / RELEASE NO (S)

L_} "9

DATABASE ACCORDING TO l ._

l See Programs /Procedune impact? SO1nXXIV4.1 O NO

YES, AR No AR980201089 PROGRAM !] OATA BASE ] ALSO, USTED BELOW

! 1.BRIEF DESCRIP110N OF ICCN / CCN:

REVISE SHEETS 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 AND A1 ADD SHEETS 2A, BA,88,8C ADD APPENDICES E, F AND G.

DELETE SHEETS 4 AND 11 OF CCN N-1.

l l

l INITIATING DOCUMENT (DCP, FCN, OTHER) AR 960201089 REV. NA

2. OTHER AFFECTED DOCUMENTS (CHECK AS APPLICABLE FOR CCN ONLY):

O YES % NO OTHER AFFECTED DOCUMENTS EXIST AND ARE IDENTIFIED ON ATTACHED FORM 2fp503.

,r

3. APPROVAL: DISCIPLINE I ESC : NI)C / MECH Paul Biba ORIGINATOR ( sign /d 7 7!q/

)'

M[

FLS (Signature /dde) 7khg Wd & Nl

'OTHER (Signitureldale) ' ipa r w e' David Brahm 3,1 IRE (Pnnt name/segnMetof OTHER (Signature /date) OTHER (Signature /date)

/A D 4, CONVERSION TO CCN DATE hbW SCW CDM - SONdS k

Y901bO531990111 '

l PDR ADOCK 05000361-P PDR _

l

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CALCULATION CROSS INDEX = L N4 .

- 3- ,,

CCN CON'ERSION:

CCN NO.

Calculation No. M-0050-017 Sheet No. 2A I

INSERT A f I

Calc. rev. INPUTS OUTPUTS Does the output identify output nurnber These interfacing cakulations and/or Results and conclusions of the sus 1 is.terface interface and documents pnmde input to the subject calculation are used in these interfacing cak/ document cale/ document ji g+,O cakulation, and if revised may require calculations and/or documents. requue revision? CCN,DCN supervisor rewman of the suliect cakulanari. TEN /Rev. or FIDCN initials and ______

YES/NO Calc / Document No. Rev. No. Cak/ Document No. Rhv.No.

7h*/tr 2 FROCEDURE 5023-3-3.30 6 2 2 Mechanical Calculatica M-DSC-336 0 2 90010A (for IEV-3321) 14 2 SO23-401-C-14 14 2 M0014M 0 2 Mechanical Calculation M-DSC-348 0

NES&L DEPARTMENT j

, CALCULATION SHEET iCCa a u PREllM. CCN NO.

y. 2. panr u- nr i

CCM CONVERs!ON 'l Project or DCP/ mP S M CS 213 Calc (40. M-0050-017 cru un crW . A I

subt.ct BTP RSB 5-1 Condonsate irventory w et no. 3 i

MV ORIGINATOR DATE IN DATE REY ORIGINAfon DATE IK DATE f

f i F.D. LUNA 9 23M D. Brahms 9 23M 2 F.D. LUNA Il 29 95

mummmmmmmmmmmmmmme mammmme mummmme mammmme - - mamme - m man i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

J i

i SECTION PAGE l

1.0 PU RPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 i

2.0 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.0 ASSU METIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 i

l

! 4.0 DESIGN INPUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 i

i i 5.0 M ETHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

, 6.0 REFERE NCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 j 7.0 NOMEN CLATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4

4

8.0 CA LCULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

]; Appendixes j A. Spreadsheet Sample Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 4 H. Spreadsheet Listing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 2

C. 14tter to NRC from F. R. Nandy, dated July 25, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 D. Seismic II/I Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 4

, Dard B b MNMO

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET icC~ No.i PREUM. CCN NO.

N2 PAGE l OF _

e

. Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

4 CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Condensate Inventory Sheet' No. _

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORl0lNATOR DATE IRE oATE R i

O Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E

. /\ /\ a

]

INSERT B E. Miscellaneous Outflows /\

............................ E-1 -- .

4 F. Evaluation of Non 1E and Mechanical Control Seismic Interaction Impacts for Piping

. System Leading from T 120 ............ . . . ..... .. F1 G. Miscellaneous Inputs ... . ... . ....... . . ..... ..... G1 I INSERT B1 In addition, the portion of the lines that lead from T-120 to the secondar plant are selsmic I (or II/I) supported from the enclosure wall up to (and including) manual '

b

) isolation valves 2/3 HV 5715 and S2-1414-MU 092. Piping downstream of these valves is non-seismic.

4 i , ;

i !

\

l I l

W E

'f E

O y

. NES&L DEPARThDNr

CALCULATION SHEET icca a u PREt!M. Ctu No. tu ennr c nr CCN CONVER$10N j Pro. ject or DCP/10lP SONGS 213 Cale no. M-0050-017 ccm m rrN - .

j %blect BTP RSR 5-1 Condannate Iriventory sheet No. 4 j nry onrarhaf0A DATE thf BATE REY ORf0 PAT 0A CAff IRE SAft j i F.o. LUNA 9-23-94 D. Braluns 9-23-94 I

2 F.D. LUNA 11 29 95 mmmmm mummmmmmmmmmmmmmme mummmmi .

mmmmmmmmmu ummum mummmu a mumma 1 l

1.0 PURPOSE i 1

J l

) De purpose of this calculation is to determine the SONGS Units 2 & 3 Auxiliary Feedwater i

(AFW) condensate storage inventory requirements from seismically qualified sources per the requizements of NUREG4)800, Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1, " Design Requirernents Of The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System".

4 J I 2

This calculation will also determine inventory margin available from Condensate Tank l 2(3)T120 for the limiting RSB 5-1 scenario by comparing the required volume of water in 2(3)T120 to the minimum volume of water maintained in this tank as a result of Technical Specification (TS) requirements.

BACKGROUND nis calculation addresses technical issues identified in OIR 92-104 and 92-203 with respect to the availability of water from condensate storage tanks 2(3)T121 plus 2(3)T120 and its seismically qualified enclosure to meet the cooldown requirements of RSB 5-1 as applicable to SONGS 213. bclcli-ligwl llaNrntes & Wo20/ opg. b RSB 5-1 (G) " Auxiliary Feedwater Supply" states "The seismic Category I water supply for the auxiliary feedwater system for a PWR shall have sufficient inventory to permit operation i at hot shutdown for a least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , followed by cooldown to the conditions permitting l operation of the RHR system." (Shut Down Cooling for SONGS 2&3). "The inventory l needed for cooldown shall be based on the longest cooldown time needed with either only onsite or only offsite power available with an assumed single failure."

l SCE M424 NEW 4/90

! NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET =ce ~

PRELIO. CCN 300. g"1 PACE ) OF Project or Der /toer SMC 8 m cale iso . M-0 0 50 017 fC -

,. . . s., -.,_.,_ _ ...a m.. .

l j asv oorcreatos onn ras un arv omicratom oAn ras can j 1 P. IX Lt1NA 9 23-94 D, Brahms 9 23-94 i

1 2 P. D. Lt/NA i12995 mummmmmmmmmmmmmme summmmmmu l mummm m mmmmmme mammmmme a ammu l The CST 2(3)T121 water mua be maintained at a range of temperatures to satisfy analysis considerations for heat removal capacity (upper temperature limit), and operational l considerations to limit thermal transient miesses at the steam generator nozzles (lower l temWuie limit). Potential for freezing is another consideration. He maximum temperature ;

I is limited to 100*F to ensure adequate heat removal capacity of the AFW System feedwater 1 per analytical assumptions. He temperature is maintained at a minimum of 70*F by heaters j l

in the tank to ensure that the 40*F cyclic thermal limit is not exceeded in the S/G nozzle.

4 p

l l CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (T-120) AND ENCLOSURE

)

i

), Condensate Storage Tank 2(3)T120 has a capacity of 500,000 gallons (Ref. 6.16 & 6.17). It

) is designed to comply with Seismic Category II requirements. It has a limited tornado missile d

esposure above the enclosure wall. Loading due to transient depressurization under a tomado 4

event is reduced by vents incorporated into the tank design, Ref. 6.32, section 9.2.4.6. His f

tank serves a variety of non-safety related plant services including: Supply and receipt of l condensate as required for the condenser hotwell; Low-pressure turbine spray system; ne blowdown processing system; hand the turbine plant cooling

! water tank.

1 i .

lyoda.) k V

ne aafety function of CST 2(3)T120 is to contain sufficient water for extended use of the l

l AFW System (AFWS). He water in 2(3)T120 can be gravity fed to 2(3)T121through a sesimical"ly qualified line (including downcomer within the tank, see assumption 3.9) by opening a normally closed 8" valve within the 2(3)T121 enclosure. De '0" datum gauging

! elevation for 2(3)T120 is defined by Reference 6.16 & 6.17 as the bottom of the 2(3)T12W2(3)T121 crosstie nozzle. 280,000 gallons are maintained above the "0" datum to comply with TS 3:9+.3, Ref. 6.23. " =b x.;': ::r': =: r!rd e S 'S" d"~

b 2.u Set 9s 4se NG!w 4/9s J

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iccN NO; PREUM.CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE g

OF Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSB S-1 Condensate Inventory Shoot No.

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE 11 4 ! DATE R E

/_\ Paul Biba 5-21 98 []

/\ /\

CALCULATION SHEET = =<

meus cce m N_I a.,3 #

evejset en scr/see N C 212 cah sw. al. ansa.n17 ,",, N7 l w.nu RTP R5a 5 1 t'aadonate ti vantnew em .e n.. 7 )

any : - - ,se em inn mais une -- van am - nar narr i F D LUNA l $3S44 o. W 42344 2 P. D. LUN A 1934s

,,. m m m ...

. ..a non

, . _ -_m_ . , ,

_ h

" "??U,"d'" The tanks crossee noezie was selected as the "0" dansa locanon because the dowacomer was not -ae=tly spelahni However, Ref. 6.24 t =annically qualified this line. Themfore, the weser below 6 elevanan (capable of being gravity fed through this downcomer) is a seismically h source of water la addition to <-

the 280,000 gallons of waner *==rf above the tasks 'O' danan. %

Soissaic failure of this tank is <=== I+=ed la desernumag the waner available for poemble v===nis 1 cooldown tianas following a DBE. The tank is sarreanded by a strecental emelemare designed to Sessanc Category I reaparennents. In the event of fainsre of CST 20)T-130, the emeloanr: provides a basin for marage af the ensk weser. In onder to sene as a seinadeally source of waner for arleil'ia a AFW supply, this

aria-se has =i-leally'h piping (larlswimg 11/1 sesmuc design) leading from the enclosure to the prunary Comdsasale

~

~Teormgi~ Tank, T-12tfThis caelosum and the a-M gravity feed piping are consadsred in i the boondary of the APW3. Gravny serves as the anotive force for feedlag this weser to CST f 20)T121 upon opeaans manually opensed valves in the Sasatic Casesory I piping pnmded.

This weer increases the tisse avadabis for cann-- one of the AFWS for essended pereds to seset the SONOS 2/3 RS8 5-124 boar weer storage aw=-*==e m - -

- - ~

da UM *1-95C."" 3 78 44878 @0/fdff)y

+ g g .,,,, a a , = w h% ma a rni s.m zd. 7t< mJ J w

& s & p ej x4 .a. tMw 4 mKv h+T3 D L..xAa p f 1-o1 o . _

w ii-y

i EC&FS DEPARTMENT 1

CALCULATION SHEET CCN NOJ N2 , 9

PIE!JM. CCN NO.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050 017 CCN CONVERSION; CCN NO.

Subject BTP AS8 5 4 Condenegggjm Shost No.

j REV ORIGINATOR OATE IRE DATE REV ONGINATOR DATE N! DATE R E

i /\ Paul Biba 5-21-98 /\

/\ /\ S 4

uns.msenerr

{ CALCULATION SHEET g m s., _ ,, , u 3

prows er scrnee __ e m , c.) n..N m n.017 E NE. f t tmet ETP RSR $.1 f " Aata 11wantary m .e es. 9 8 F. D t#NA SDee D. $sukas 41844

) 2 f o. Lille A 1136e5 2.0 RESULTS

1. In addman to 144.000 gaunas of waner smaissanned in 20)T121 per Tech Spec l

3.7.1.3 gallons of water nest be -4 in 20)T120 to assuse j ofan.Aaleia==l 200,000 gallons of weser to most the RS8 5-1,24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months y i

j 2. The elasian shows ens T-120 and T.121 provide smalcient Tnme is a of condemasse invoutory samaning la 120 aner f h smarstu

{ sadfying te lisalsag RSS 51 semano Q4 Heer Inventary). 3, la smia= 3 of I this *ias pnmdes a summary of the waner storage trements for f

j 20)T120/20)T121 r'=a=== Storage Tanks. !

i

! NOIR As A=rnamar1 la the background,2 gnBoas of water is ==h la

{ 20)TI20 aisse the ano geging of the tank to comply with Tech '

] Spec 3.7.1.3. As additional 65 gallons of water is la 20)T120 heiow l

! it's "0" dame elevsame. resehs is a talat voimme of 345,164 gnBans

- in 2f31T120 that is la this imak by ein Technical Spec: 6catum. ,

/4323' 1Yisgsusing

^-% is lumed as emiiting the waar h==8 below l l

{ th int this task.

3 l j To support ====5=- 3.14 .16, procedsse 3023-13-3 will supure revision ese to this calcuission to addsess the ' : 1) A four hour ansion is supured to ascere the 3

j t'a-aaaa== Tranadar QQ)p049) and the Blowdows Processing Sysema Snice Waser l

PeepsQQ)P431 Q)P461), 2) Pips bnek Anilme summking la lankaps Ace T 120 seeds 3 to be identdled isolased withis four Mrs. foDowing a DBE. Note: Isaisson of valves 4

HV.5715 414MUO92 wisin four Hrs. foupwing a DSD is am9icient to isoisse all piping failures are sequired to be isoissed withis ibur Hrs. by eis retrailmelan See the f

t' ' - Cross Index and SCE Form 26404.

) $l 0f I

l 1

l I

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NOf N-2 PRELIM. CCN NO. O_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050417 CCN CONVEASION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSS S-1 Condersaie Invents Sheet No. _

REV ORGINATOR DATE BRE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R O Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms /] E

/\ /\ s INSERT C 2.0 RESULTS b c_

The minimum required volume in T-123 above the tank's zero datum is 330.351 gallons.

assuming operator action within 45 m1nutes after a DBE to isolate 52/3-1414-HU-092 and 2/3-HV-5715. The recomended Technical Spec 1fication (T.S.) volume is 360.000 gallons, wtiich includes 29.649 gallons of available margin that can be allocated as required should a future inventory concern occur. These results are detailed in the Table 21 on the following sheet and are graphically illustrated on a schematic diagram on Figure 21.

Notes to Table 2-1:

1) These flow losses are assumed isolatable in 45 minutes by operator action to close S2/3 1414-MU-092 following an OBE (or DBE).

Further, normal isolation of flows from T-120 via closure of MU-092 (with operators standing by when opened) would eliminate losses for both items 5 & 6. Under these conditions the margins identified in line 15 would increase in direct proportion to the reduction in flow losses.

2) These flows are assumed isolatable in 45 minutes by operator action to close 2/3-HV- -

5715 following an OBE (or DBE).

Further. normal isolation of flow from T 120 via closure of isolation valve 1414-MU-048 upstream of the TPCW tank makeup valve LV-6936. (with operators standing by when opened) would eliminate losses for item 11. Under this condition the margins identified in line 15 would increase in direct proportion to the reduction in flow losses.

i

, 3) These losses are assumed for the duration of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

CALCULATION IMPACTS:

1) This calculation affects Operating Procedure 502313 3. which addresses the manual isolations of valves 52/31414-MU 092 and 2/3 HV-5715 post OBE (see Assumption Ell in Appendix E). The change involves extending the isolation time from the current 30 minutes to 45 minutes for both 2/3 HV-5715 and 52/3-1414-MU-092.

2) This calculation will require a chan e of the Tech Spec 3.7.6. revising the existing Tech Spec T-120 volume from 280.000 allons to a volume larger than 330.351 gallons (360.000 gallons is recomended per able 2-1.). Following the approval of the new Tech Spec volume, this calculation (M-0050-017) would need to be revised to agree with the final Tech Spec Value. ,

1 EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ceu m./ N-2 PREUM. CCN NO. OF_

l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050017 CCN CONVERSION:

}

) Subject BTP RS8 5-1 Condensate inventory CCN NO.

h Sheet No.1 A _ b j

! REV ORiotNATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R

/_\ Paul Biba 5-21-98

/_\ -

/\ /\ a l i i

TABLE 2-1 /\

1 Description Gallons - Note Comment j

1. Useable volume in T-120 req'd for shutdown 200,000 S

' ection s.o. Sht. 21 _ _ _

2. Losses through T-120 concrete enclosure 3,000 3 hput 4.1

3. System valve leakage 8,360 3 Section 8.0, Sht. 22

4. Not SG shrinkage loss 9,052 Section 8.0, Sht. 32

5. Line 1414-014-8' ... lose due to the condenser 109,363 1 See Appendix F and hotwell makeup Appendx E, Section 8.7

6. Loss through Emergency Spray Pump P-146 6,615 1 Due to relay chaner. See Appx P Appendx E, Section 8.5

7. Loss due to criticalcrack 2,975 2 tables 8-1,8-2, sht.__34_& as

8. Loss due to the Separator Tank T-132 makeup 225 2 Appendx E, Section 8.6

9. Loss due to the AFW pumps packing 1,080 3 Section 8.0, Sht. 37

10. Unrecoverable volume in T-120 enclosure 2,960 knput 4.2 I

11. Loss due to makeup to TPCW Tank T-050 31,587 2 Appendx E, Section 8,4

12. Losses to the water seals 450 2 Section 8.0, Sht. 37

13. Recoverable volume below T-120 zero datum (45,316) Section 8.0, Sht. 28, (CCN N-1)

14. Total requked volume above zero datum 330,351

15. RECOMENDED T.S. VOLUME 380,000 includes 29,649 gallons margin. j ABOVE T-120 ZERO DATUM l Notes: See pnevious shoot l

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ea FIG. 2-2: Simplified schematic diagram of the p_ip~ing at T-120 f

un,o cum-i.e 9

f.-l 4 8 l

Ti14-022 Arnmorua/

h h. as E $O o

LEGEND: Ilydr. Tanks E @- ? Z To turtune P-145 Emerg. Spray Pump E diitroiValve I 1414 -016 -3* 1 j b

o y bm 1414-020-r E TPW g g NormaBy openisoleton valve C s(p)

Lv-essol TarA P e n MAcup to r NormaNy closedisolaton vahe FC i N 2 3 CD iii4Toos FE---

~

! T-050~~ M k O Lv-s257 Pump j E'

dm E$

M&eup to Condenser Z L__ k 14:4-oo4-e m---

Lv-325s i 1414-070-r E-e VD h Z -4 MAcun to Condenser f loop $ U Fill _

a E 1414-003-r E --- A g ) ITI Lv-3243 Makeup to Condenser MU-092 1414-046-c y

1414-o02-6 3,-- y_ '-nsate o E Lv-325 < --- 1414-014-8" FRI GL 9

(fl E-o Z

d 1414 -019 '

g g

[ Vac. Breaker -

<----- T120 Enclosure ~

E a ss issip - N N m h Seal Wtrsupply // 'T g 6

T-120 ' T-n2 3 4

p '

1414-001-54 g_ 9 mQ Lcv-332: Sep. k je T-121 14i4-ois-r ----> Tane a S'g g 1414 - 03 3 - t - t/2- M g $ C)

MU-476 II)dr Tank Til3 z

l <---- g <---- ,_ _

IIV-5715

~

---> [{ m 4

i

---> [ _] - g_ @

l MU-088 l P-049 Amm. Tank T211 _

c3 Q m

<---- M SUMPF--] p . Transter Pump m l

1414-043-r E To Sluice Pumps Z

- h ,.

i4:4-os2-r E_ W l n

,, y , ;, l S

NI!$&L DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET icC o u PRfLIN, CCN N0. na w.e b nr i CCN CONVER$10N Pro kct or DCP/NMP SONGS 213 Cale no. M-0050-017 reu un trW -

u t.ct BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate Ir ventory sh .t %. 9 REY OR!c!NATOR DATE !RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE !RE DATE i'

I F.D. LUNA 9-23-94 D. BrrAmes 9 23-94 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29 95 mmmme m- monummme mammmmmmmmmmmmmum mummmmmme a summ 3.0 ASSUMPTIONS 3.1 Blowdown from the Steam Generators is isolated within 30 minutes of a unit trip from j loss of offsite power. This assumption is reasonable since the EOls (Ref. 6.30 & I j 6.31) first task is to verify that the blowdown isolation valves are closed. Also, the i isolation valves are located outside containment, which makes them accessible to an-J s *E' # Y Ofcus Wd aum) b 3.2 Normally closed drain and vent valves do not contribute to AFW system leakage.

This is reasonable since leakage from these valves would typically be visible and corrected during normal plant operations. Aho, these are small valves and their accumulative leakage is insignificant.

3.3 Water at or above 50% of the wide range (WR) level for coverage of the steam generator tubes surface area is considered sufficient to efficiently remove decay heat m j the last hours of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months natural circulation cooldown. This is consistent with current EOI criteria (Ref. 6.33) and is also considered reasonable and conservative since per Reference 6.2, decay heat during the last two hours of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months cooldown is approximately 8.2 X 10' BTU /Hr. This compares to 3390 MW thennal or 1.157 X 10 BTUs per hour during normal plant operation. Thus, although only 65% of the l tubes surface area will be covered by water, the amount of heat required to be removed by the tubes is reduced to approximately 0.7% of the heat produced during normal operation. In addition, the uncove:ed tubes will be surrounded by steam and will thus still be able to transfer heat from & RC3 to the steam.

ser54mnrw4m

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET g"1,0. N2 y,,g g,_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050-017 ccN CONVERSION: ,

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSB S-1 Condensate Inventory Sheet No.

REV l

ORIGINATOR DATE IRE oATE REV ORtolNATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul 36ba 7 15-98 D. Brahms /\ E

]

l /\ /\ a INSERT D 3.1 Blowdown isolation valves close on EFAS concurrent with AFW punp receipt of EFAS to \

start. Thus, no blowdown losses are assumed. The single active failure of the "

containment 1 solation valve in the blowdown line is not postulated. The worst case single active failure postulated in this evaluation is the failure of a single ADV to open. The failure of the one ADV to open significantly increases the time required to i reach shutdown cooling entry conditions and is identified in the SER as the applicable single active failure for RSB 5-1 condensate inventory sizing.

Further, it should be noted that if the blowdown isolation valve would be postulated to fail, both ADVs would be available to cooldown (only one single active failure can be postulated). With 2 ADVs available, per CE calculation S-PEC-221 the RSB 5-1 cooldown could be accomplished with approximately 190.000 gallons of water as compared to 344.000 gallons required with only one ADV available. Considering the heat removal capability of blowdown and the fact that blowdown will naturally decrease with decreasing SG pressure, blowdown losses during a cooldown of less than 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months will be significantly smaller than 154.000 gallons. Thus, based on this. the single active failure of one ADV bounds the failure of a blowdown valve to close.

I

) .

4 j NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET 4

iCCN =.'

PRfLIM. CCN h0. u-2 par.c I6 nr il i CCN CONVERSION

Pro het or DCP/MMP SONrd m Calc No, M-0050-017 rem an rrN -

1 sub wet RTP RSR 5-1 Contiantate Ir venterv sh..t No. 11 ll MV ORIO!NATOR DATF 1RE ChfE REY OR101NAf0R DATE 1RE DATE I F. D.' LUNA 9-23-94 D. Brahms 9-21 94 i 2 P.D. LUNA 11-29 95

) M mm mmmmum 3.6 The water level in the steam generators is at its low level pre-trip alarm set point when the reactor trips on LOP. Setpoint is 40% Narrow Range.

4 3.7 De ternperature of the water delivered to the steam generators fmm the AFW system

is 1207. This is conservative since typically the water is at ambient temperatures in l 2(3)T120 (i.e., approximately 707) and is maintamed above 707 and below 10CFF in l 2(3)T121 by a heater.

i 3.8 An operator will shut off the motor driven AFW pump to the steam generator

associated with the failed ADV within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months of a stactor trip. His is considered reasonable since the affected steam generator will be isolated on high level to i prevent overfill and two other AFW pump would be on line to support cooldown to I the operating steam generator.

i 3

3.9 Water below the 2(3)T120 tanks "0" datum gauging elevation is capable of being I

syphoned through the 2(3)T120/2(3)T121 cmss connect elbow /downcomer inside the

2(3)T120 tank. This is considered creditable based on a review of cale. M50.9, Ref. l l

j 6.29. His calc. shows that the bottom elevation of the 2(3)T121 downcomer, associated with this crossconnect, is lower than the bottom of the 2(3)T120 l downcomer.

1 - . _ . _

i 3.10j Blowdown fmm each steam generator is 300 GPM to outfall. This assumption is g I / considered conservative since it will use the highest blowdown rate fmm the steam / '

! l

{

generators, Ref. 6.28. , . -

--_-__ j s~.... / ,

I SCE 36436 NEW 4/90

NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCa ne PGELIM. CCN NO.

to o'- per O nr CCN CONVER$10N Project or DCP/MMP SONGS 213 Cale no. M-0050-017 cru un erN -

subt.et BTP RSB 5-1 Condonsate ir ventory sheet no 12 REW ORIE!NATOR DATE 1RE OAff REV ORIQfNATOR DAff IRE DATE 1 F.D.' LUNA 9 2344 D. Brahms 9-23-94 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29-95 mmmmm mummmmmmmmmmmmmmma summmmmma mumammum mamme mummmmmmmmmmmmme men summmmmmmu a mumm 3.11 AFW and Feedwater system valves not specifically leak tested in the IST program will not leak more than 100 times their designed leakage raghen in the closed position. A iu4tAl E l This is an acceptable assumption since this leakage will be added to the arbitrary 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months cooldown requirements for RSB 51. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inventory requimments contain significant margins above that inventory which is necessary to shutdown the plant following an accident (i.e. estimated to be less than 144,000 gallons maintained in 2(3)T121 based on a review of Refs.6.1 & 6.5. Also, see assumption 3.4). Thus, this additional water inventory (over and above that required to actually mitigate an accident) required by RSB 5-1, is also available to meet potential system leakage concerns.

3.12 The steam generator affected by the failed ADV is isolated at a steam generator level corresponding to 40% NR. This is conservative since the EFAS high level shutoff for the AFW system valves is 26% NR.

3.13 The water level in the steam generators at 0% and 100% power associated with input 4.11, is rd the optimum normal water level of 36.55 FT.

3.14 One non-seismic pipe is assumed to fail outside of the seismic wall enclosure around A b 2(3)T120 (see Appendix C for Basis). The failum is down stream of an isolation valve. Although, the lines through the seismic wall have been analyzed to either seismic I or seismic 11/1 criteria, portions of the line downstream of the isolation valve f have not. The leakage through the break for a four hour period will be added to the /

nventory. Operator action in this time period is considered reasonable.

sCE s64H NEW 4MO

+ aae

71. ._..t.O ._s.u s a a EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET icCN m.i PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 o PAGEboOF_

l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No._M-0050-017 cCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSB 51 Condensate Inventory Sheet No. _

REV OR10lNATOR DATE tRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R l /_\ Paul Bha 7-15-98 D. Brahms /_\ E

! /\ /\ 1 l

l INSERT E

[

'\

3.11 (or more than the gross leakage allowed for these valves closure test, which ever is - >

worse)

INSERT F l 3.14 One worst case moderate energy non seismic piping system Is postulated to fati outside of the seismic wall enclosure around 2(3)T-120. It should be noted that the b

loss due to this MELB is assumed on a voluntary conservative basis, as further explained in Assumption 3.22.

i Per Appendix A. the worst case failure is downstream of cn isolation valve HV-5715.

Although, the lines through the seismic wall have been analyzed to either seismic I or seismic II/I criteria (see Assumption 3.19 for the stress level discussion),

portions of the line downstream of the isolation valve have not. The leakage through the critical crack for a 45 minute period will be added to the loss of inventory, based on the operator action (closing HV-5715 and shutting down pump P049) in this time period, as identified in the post seismic procedure (5023-13-3).

l 1

{

l

\

_= _

NES&L DEPARTMENT i CALCULATION SHEET iCea a v PREt !N CCN NO. u-2 pus N nr l

1 Pr0 ject or DCP/ m P SONGS 213 CCN CONVER$10N Q

Calc No. M-0050-017 cru un crN T subiece BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate ir ventory sheet no. 13 Rfv 0410!NAf0A DAff IRE DAYE REW OR10fMAT09 OATE IRE DATE i F.D. LUNA 9-23 94 D. Brahms 92344 1

e 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29-95 M6 m -

hmmmum 3.15 The non-seismic pipe break ciuss section area is define as 1/2 the nominal pipe I diameter in length and 1/2 the wall thickness in width. This assumption follows the rules for a critical crack size for a moderate energy lines per the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75-087, Section 3.6.1). -

y

__ j .

h

! 3.16 Pipe failure (critical crack) is assumed down stream of the pump Condensate Transfer Pump (2(3)PO49) and the Blowdown Processing System Sluice Water Pumps ,

(2(3)P431 and 2(3)P461). It is assumed that a pump is running aRer a seismic event

] and operator action will be taken within four hours to shutoff the pump. This <

i auumption is reasonable since the controls for the pumps are non-lE. 'Ibe start ;

k. period contacts will be for the pump can close by a seismic event. Further, the four hour shut proceduralized.

f i 'N

) 3.17 Piping leading from the tank is either isolated (i.e. not in use) or if being used to

) transf.:r condensate to or from the tank, the transfer operation will be discontinued and

line isolated should an SSE event occur.

3.18 IAw point for piping connected to 2(3)T120 and/or penetrating the 2(3)T120-

} enclosure will have a low point elevation greater than plant elevation 7 Ft. (i.e.

4

] corresponding to base mat elevation for the Main Condenser, Ref. Dwg. 40006, Rev.

i 6).

1 3.19 A critical crack will not occur in a Seismic Category 11/1 pipe identified in Tables 2 i

j and 3. The stress reports (References 6.71 to 6.79) for the non-seismic lines listed in j

Tables 2 and 3 have been reviewed by the Plant Design Group and those lines that have been analyzed as Seismic Category II/I are so designated in the tables. Piping analyzed to II/I criteria is analyzed to Seismic Category I criteria. The pipe has been analyzed for Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) 1

i l l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT i CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NOj N2 g j l PREUM CCN NO. - - .

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050417 CCN CONVERSION: )

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Condensate Inventory Sheet No.

l REV ORIGINATOR OATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 7-1548 D. Brahms /\ E

/\ /\ t 4

INSERT G l

i

! 3.16 Condensate Transfer Pump 2(3) P-0491s normally always running and Blowdown <

h i

l Processing System Sluice Water Pumps 2(3) P-431 and 2(3) P-461 are normally isolated Y with a manually closed isolation valve. Operator action to ensure isolation of the a lines or shutoff of the pumps is assumed to occur within 45 minutes of initiation of 1

a 501sm1C event by closing the Isolation valve HV-5715.

! j

, 1 i I i

i i i

i a

, l i

l l

r l

4

EC&FS DEPARTMENT l j

CALCULATION SHEET cCN NO/

PREUR CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE p OF l j Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No, M.0050 017 CCN CONVERSION:

q Subject BTP RS8 S-1 Condensate irwentory CCN NO.

k Sheet No.

i 1 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IPE DATE R l . /\ Paul Biba 5-21-96 O

! /\ /\ t :

nasar.as m n x err CALCULATION SHEET =

a. .m.

...i ,_, . r ,, ,

sta casustal l j prow e ocy/sey _ tameA M1 cow es.11.80E0 817 -m een l l

j u nmee iTP HE 1 1 r h auts tswantary m m an. le

)

j saw we - _ enn ur naar nov - i- mara tar narr i i r. o. wMA $344 O Enhas 4548 l l r. o. wNA l H-WM

< 1 j loading. The analync al methods for the piping aanlysis is well doemnemed in UFSAR

) and has been found sxeptable per SBR NUREG.712 Secoon 3.6 SONGS 2&3.

t !

4 11terefose, since the acuHesensic piping has been aanlyised to sciamic crigeda, the :

4 1

i sasse enter 6 can be apphed to We Casspry II/I pipe as hi==- Casagory I pipe

] .

when dieetmining if a pipe break needs to be panslanal Also, frass the seress review, 4 \

1 l it was shows that the ma=*r=== senes level did act caceed the valsa of

.4(1.23 + S. ). Where the tenas S. is the het allowable sames limit and S. la the

thermal e=pa==r= a5owable senes limit. The above term is ese of the ensaia, that if

=W a pipe break is requesd to be posadened. See Appendix 3.68.2, UP5AR, f

SONOS 243 (Modersee-Energy Pipe Bank Cneena) for + list. Since the lines l listed la Tables I and 2 do not exceed this value, a pipe beenit needs not be t'"Iad for these lines.

1 e

i Based on the myiew of the stress reports abr these Ibus, and having found that the f pipe seenons ofinterest ase part of the smausse I analyas scope, thia -m is

! cas.d.ned Ja nn.bie ser see wie ei +

~ -- _

3.t o Jf 4 4 Alw 4y W.'.a 711 i A., A c. '4 3. yn,ari C p > j._ - ., ,gs, ;, n _

rr ... ,. rw M i +-A u n m mpo-xt.m p,apth.,

f A y d.a. Ll. .A d 4. me '&4 /44 .e4. "r"Ja d. p l de Lt. . % k - ~us.~l & zw

p 9 u;.Auw: '=@.

4 uN o 4

i

I EC&FS DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET m m.i N2 g PRELW. CCN NO. ~

Project or DCP/FCN_ _ N/A Calc. No._M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate inventorV Sheet No.

REV ORiolNATOR DATE 1RE DATE REV ORioiNATOR DATE IRE oATE h ,

O Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E

/\ ,

/\ t 1

INSERT H 3.0 ASSUMPTIONS ... continued:

l 3.21 Piping penetration seals are designed to retain the water voluce per Seismic Category I requirements. This is documented in DBO-5023-780. Section 4.3.1 3.22 Effects of High Energy Line Breaks (HELB) are not considered concurrent with the RSB 51 events. HELB effects are evaluated separately and independently from RSB 5-1 scenario in accordance with HELB rules (i.e. there is no overlap of a postulMad HELB ,

with the RSB 5-1 scenario) ... see Meeting Minutes from th! 6/1/98 meeting attached 1 in Appendix G. As the moderate energy line breaks (MELB) fill under (are a subset of) the HELB rules, no moderate energy breaks need to be postulated either. However, as a voluntary conservatism. this calculation will include in the s121ng of the T-120 volume the loss due to MELB in the Condensate Transfer System by postulating a critical crack in the Condensate Transfer Pump P 049 discharge pipe, l

3.23 Failures of piping components installed in non-seismic piping. such as valves. pumps, etc.. are assumed to be bounded by the breaks of the respective connected piping.

This assuli1ption is reasonable as such piping components are much more sturdy than the pipe due to their heavy well (cast) construction.

3.24 The seal water loss is associated with a multitude of valves, supplied by seal water by the Condensate Transfer Pump P-049. as documented on Reference 6.89. The loss occurs due to leaking valve packings and is assumed to be a total of 10 gpm. This assumption is conservative, as normally. Zero leakage is expected at valves with properly maintained packings.

1 i

l l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT 1

i CALCULATION SHEET imu ms PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 , meg OF 1

^

Project or DCP/FCN N/A - Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN COWERSION:

i CCN uO. &

' Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Condensate irwentory Sheet No.

< REV ORKNNATOR DATE OFE DATE REV OHGINATOR QATF NE DATE R I

. /\ Paui sion s.al as a "

! /\ /\ a

.i

nsunnant -

CALCULATION SHEET . ma .a,

.i. tea ._ 4n promst er serior tor ^t 2M tels ns. M-GDio.017 - m u =ce RTP R$R 8L-1 P- ' tate fr usatarv m ie n. 1E I

i ac, ,,,, nam tan nam env ==.---- asse tar mann

$ i e o tussa i

$3= onn $na e

a 3 e O Luma is-apes 1 i 4.0 D NPUT,,, ,,. crcle*Ne j 4.1 l geakage p:r 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (eAer Design Base Earthquais) through seismic

].

enclossie around T-120. Ref. " '

" * " ' ^ " " ' " "

[.8 7

! 4.2 Unrecoverable ea==i===ne in the 20)T120 enclosure is 2.900 gal. Ref. Cale. M50.9, j Rev.0. -

1 4.3 Feedweecr resputed t> be delivered to the naam generseer lo amppost cooldown of the j 3CS to shmakawn sooling sesry * (400'F hot leg) and ca.n-.,1 semoval of i decay heat for a scent of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of waner supply is 344,000 galloos. Ref 6.1 !

4 4.4 A sainiment of 22,510 gal. is anommmed is 2(3)T120 per Tech Spee SAht. 3. 7 6 4.5 A =mi=l====r of 144,000 gal. is h la 2(3)T121 per Tech Spec 3:2;t:S: 7,'7. 6

4.6 The "0" daenas gauges elevanos far 20)T120 is the honom of the 2(3yr120/20)T121 1

8* cross commect dit line at eleva' '%8", Refs. 6.14, 6.15,6.16, and 6.17.

j j 4.7 The ineernal diameser of 2(3)T120 is Mi R., Ref. 6.18.

4% The eleianon of the bonans of the 20)T!20 cross connect dowacoast is 29'-11", Ref.

j 6.7 and 6.24. - .-

1 4.9 a ht.& h l

~~

4.10 (Not IseM N , _

4.11 'Inc moomat of liquid fluid in the seen generator at 100% power is 163.844 LBS.

l hrf. 3023-915-690, Sesam Genermar lastmction Manual, Session I-3-2, and the

{

amount of fluia is 260,411 LBS at On power, aonnal woner level.

f 4.12 These is 65,164 gal. below the seso desem line for tank 27120. Raf. SO23am 13 l 18 0.

4.13 There is 65,264 gal. below the zero deteni line fx tank 3T-120. Ref. 302340713 1

, 20 4.

4.14 Calculmion M-1305-053.AA, Rev. 4. Supplement A. "8 lach Cross C= wean Line, l

20)T120/2(3)T121". '!his r= leal ='=i scimically qualifies the 2(3)T120 dowacomer.

{ =

t t

4

NES"lL DEPARTMEF#

CALCULATION SHEET iCc" " "

PRf(IM. CCN NO. u-1 D A .c m1 nr CCN CONVERSION Project or DCP/MMP SONGS 213 Cale No. M-0050-017 era un cru .

suhi et BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate ir ventory sheet No 16 KY QAIAltlafDR CAff IM OAff REV OR!atNAfon DAff IRE DAff i F.D. LUNA 92394 D. Brahms 9-21-94 2 F.D. LUNA 11-2945 mummmmmmmmmmmmmmmme mummmmme mummmmmmmm ummmmmmmm mummme mummmmmmmmmmmma maamma mammmmmme a ammus 5.0 METHODOLOGY Review 10CFR50, Reg Guide 1.139, UFSAR, Tech. SpCc., NUREG's, and BTP RSB 5-1 to identify the water inventory criteria for Natural Circulation Cooldown to Shut Down Cooling entry conditions. Reconstitute the requirements for the Condensate Storage Tanks, 2(3)T120 and 2(3)T121 inventory considering:

1. Water required delivered to the steam generator to support cooldown of the RCS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of operation with 1 ADV (see Assumption 3.4).

2. Losses through the 2(3)T120 concrete seismic enclosure based on leakage that could occur following a Design Base Earthquake and rupture of 2(3)T120,

3. Losses from valve leakage in the AFW system during delivery of water to the steam DBE a J A generator following agloss of offsite power (LOP) event. /\

4. (Imses due to blowdown from the steam generatop - be /e [6 4..f Unrecoverable water in the 2(3)T120 enclosure.

EE Water Unrecoverable below the Zero datum gauging elevation of tan'c 2(3)T120.

f.T Steam generator inventory surpluses or shortages considering initial SG water levels, shrinkage and minimum tube coverage.

~/J. losses from a moderate energy line break of a non-seismic pipe leaving the 2(3)T120 seismic enclosure (see Assumptior$3.141, s/ 312.)

> mtral H1 Then based on the water volurnes in 2(3)T120 and 2(3)T121 that are ensured via Tech Spec requirements (including the volume of water available below the zero datum gauging of 2(3)T120 not currently included in determining the volame required to satisfy the Tech Specs) the margin will be determined by subtracting the calculated required volumes of water from the volumes of water ensured by Tech Spec.

sCE M 4M NEW 450

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET cglcs ,0. " ,,oEn ou l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No, M-0050-017 CCN COtWERSION:

l CCNNO.

Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Condensate inventory Sheet No. _

REV ORIGINATOR DATE (RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R l

/\ PF.ul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms /_\ E

/\ _ /\ a l

INSERT H1 1

1

8. Losses due to non-lE and/or mechan 1 cal control system interactions __ ,

l 9. Losses through the AFW pump packing l

l 10. Loss due to makeup to seismically cracked TPCW tank T-050 I

11. Seal Water loss l

l l

1 l

I 4

i l

\

l 4

(

T

,, 9 . . ;,_ ___, _

-__-..3- . - - - . . _ . ._

NES&L DEPARTMPWT CALCULATION SHEET icca n e PRELIM. CCN NO. 2 pur 6 nr Project or DCP/MMP KONCe 213 ,, c.1c no, M-0050-017 $[n r b subs.et BTP RSB 5-1 fondimsate Ir ventory weet No. 17 Arv ORIG!NATOR CATE IRE DATE MV Oh1074AYOR DATF 1RE DAff I F.D. LUNA 9-2s44 D. Brahms 92344 2 F.D. LUNA 11-2945 imummm summmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmm mumummunes summmmmmm muussa mummmmmmmmmmmuum ummmes asummu 1

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 C-E Calculation, S-PEC-221, Rev. O. "Feedwater Requirements for Plant Cooldown Following Loss of Offsite AC Power". I 6.2 C-E Calculation, S-PEC-009, Rev. O. " SONGS Atreospheric Dump Valve Study and i Feedwater Requirements for a Plant Cooldown".

6.3 SCE Calculation, C-259-5.02.05, Rev. O. " Storage Tank Building - Concrete Walls -

Crack Width Analysis".

6.4 SCE Calculation, M50-16, Rev. O. "2(3)T120 Enclosure Leak Rates".

6.5 C931104S6163, " Songs Units 2 And 3 Natural Circulation Cooldown Retran Analysis, October 1993".

6.6 Drawing No. 23800, Rev. 23. Condensate Storage & Refuel Tank Building Floor ;

Plan. '

6.7 Drawing No. S2-1414-ML-013 Rev.1. Piping Isometric.

6.8 Drawing No. S2-1305-ML-053, Rev. 5. Piping Isometric.

6.9 Drawing No. S2-1414-MI 014, Rev. 2. Piping Isometric.

6.10 Drawing No. S2-1305-ML-335, Rev. 4. Piping Isometric.

6.11 Drawing No. S2-1305-ML-049, Rev.15. Piping Isometric. '

6.12 Drawing No. S2-1305-MI 047, Rev. 2. Piping Isometric.

6.13 Drawing No. S2-1305-ML-144, Rev. 5. Piping Isometric.

6.14 SO23 407-13-2-24-0, 3T121 Strapping Drawing.

6.15 SO23-407-13-2-22-0, 2T121 Strapping Drawing.

6.16 SO23-407-13-2-20-0, 3T120 Strapping Drawing.

6.17 SO23-4M-13-2-18-0,2T120 Strapping D awing.

6.18 SO23-407-13-24-8,2(3)T120 Condensate Storage Tank Vessel Data.

6.19 SO23-407-13-56-10, Rev. 7. 2(3)T121 Condaawa Storage Orientation & Elevation.

6.20 SO23-407-13-18-2 2(3)T121 Condensate Storage Tank Vessel Data.

I 6.21 SO23-407-13-176-12(3)T121 Condeusate Stomge Tank 8" Pump Suction Outlet.

6.22 SO23-407-13-35-3, Rev. 2. 2(3)T120 Condensate Storage Tank 8" Pump Suction Outlet.

6.23 SONGS Technical Specification 3.M9. 7 7-(I !\ l 6.24 Calculation M-1305 053-AA, Rev. 4. Supplement A. "8 Inch Cross Connection Line, i 2(3)T120/2(3)T121". 1 6.25 IST Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater System, Attachment 1, Valve ID 3HV-4762. l 6.26 Drawing 90030, Set Point, Rev. 26. !

6.27 S O23-915-132-0, Steam Generator General Arrangement Drawing. ;

6.28 Design Bases Document, DBD-SO23-365, Rev. O. Steam Generator and Secondary l Side.

6.29 Calculation M 50.9, Rev. O. Level Set-Point for Tank T-120.

ScE Ne6 NEW Wuo

)

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET cCN m>

PREUM CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE_rfOF_

Project or DCP/FCN NTA Calc. No._M-0050 017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Cendensale trwentgy Sheet No.

REV ORIGINATOR DATE RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE ME DATE R

/_\ Paul Bba 5-21-96 O E

/\ /\ 4 950&L DePMmtENT CALCULATION SHEET ::g,: g. ,,.. g,, ,,,,g,,,,

, , , , . . . , , _ - . - . , , . . . ..eese.es, lll l"'1"J". J !

,_,,._....s.1 - - . . . . . - . se ses esasearns satt tes an,r stv l am ts t astoe este nas este a F. & LU:e4 6-3344 I O asehms SEN 3 F. O LL9dA 38495 l

6.7I Suess Calculation No.1932, Rev. O. I 6.72 Suom Calculation k 3-1414 09. Rev. 3.

6.73 Suess e=wa No. 5-131842. Ret.1. )

6.74 Strom Calculadon No. 5-1305 04. Rev. 5.

6.75 Sueu Calenlation No. 3-2423-568. Rev. 4.

6.76 Suess Calculation No.1104. Rev. O.

6.77 Suez Calculation No. 5-141417. Rev.1.

6.75 Suess Calculation No. M 1305453-AA. Rev. 4.

6.79 Suessralentssian No. 51414-12. Rev. 4.

6.40 NCR 95090033.

6.81 Nuclear Safssy Analysis Sedy. E5ect of Reactor vessel Upper IIead Void Dunns Rapid Namtal Circulation Cooldown Assocassed with RSS 51. Dased 10-1-93 by J.

D. Boyspan. Songs Units 2 & 3.

& LNQ Y. D st- 3 9 tj W,0

, ,,,, m s_ m _u_ ,.., , ~

f f,6Y .543 3-f'7 ~#3' ~ #

dI o 4

I EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET m es PREUM CCN NO.

N2 PAGE U OF _

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M4)050017 CCN CONVERSION-CCNNO.

Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condermate inventory Sheet No. __

REV ORG4NATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R O Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E g

/\ /\ a INSERT I 6.85 NCR 960201089 b 6.86 AR 960201089 6.87 SCE Letter from K. Baskin to Frank Miraglia. Docket Nos. 50 361 and 50-362. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Units 2 & 3. September 29. 1980 l

6.88 Mechanical Calculation H-DSC-336. Rev. O. dated 10/17/96. " Evaluation of the B1sco !

Penetration Seals in the Walls of the Concrete Enclosure of CST T-120' 6.89 Piping Isometric Orawing S2-1305-ML 155. Sheets 1 thru 41 Piping Isometric Drawing 53-1305-it-155. Sheets 1 thru 44 6.90 Mechanical Calculation H-0SC 348. Rev. O. dated 5/31/97. " Condensate Storage Tank '

Operability. Resp to AR 970400421' I

i i

l l

l NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCa a v PRELIM. CCN N0 u-t per nr

~

CCN CONVIR$10N b

Project or DCP/MMP SONCS 213 Cale ha. M-0050-017 nr. .n rrN - C\

% binet BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate Ir ventory sh. e no. 21 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV OR!CthATOR CATE 14E DATE I F.D. LUNA 9-2344 D. Brahms 9-2344 2 P. D. LUNA 11-2945 mummmmmmmmmmmmmm summmmmmme summmmmum umumm mammmmmmmmmmusum mummme naammmmum a summe 8.0 CALCULATIONS i

DETERMINATION OF 2(3)T120/2(3)T121 WATER STORAGE REQUIREMENTS i

4 1

j The volume of water required to support cooldown of the plant in compliance with SONGS 2/3 RSB 5-1 water inventory committments is determined below and further summarized in i

Table by considering the following: b

! 1. RCS RSB 5-1 cooldown requirements

2. Losses through 2(3)T120's enclosure j 3. System valve leakage losses (4' $thn.Ggnerator blowdowDnseg i

4. 6. Unrecoverable water in 2(3)T120's enclosure i

5,4. Unrecoverable water in 2(3)T120 56

(( prinkage losses

7 4. Non- Seismic pipe break losses.

? w z1 RCS Cnnidown Remiiremente-l Per Design Input 4.3, 344,000 gallons are required to support a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months supply of water i

j which meets our committment to the NRC for RSB 5-1 water inventory requirements (see Background and Assumption 3.4 for further discussion).

> kaf I2-Inasee thrnnoh 2(3)T120's Enclnture-Per Design input 4.1, , gallons of water may leak through 2(3)T120's Seismic Category b I concrete enclosure sitould 2(3)T120 fail during a design basis earthquake (DBE) during a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period of time.

scE M46 NEW 490

.. . w : -

EC&FS DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET cCN =.i PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 , 94 Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION: J CCN NO.

Subject BTP RS8 S-1 Condensate inventorv Sheet No.

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORGINATOR CATE IRE oATE R E

/_\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 0. Brahrns /]

/\ /\ s ;

I INSERT Il '

8. Losses due to non 1E and/or mechanical control system interactions b I

i l

9. Losses through the AFW pump packing '

10. Loss due to makeup to seismically cracked TPCW tank T-050

11. Seal Water loss INSERT 12 Per Input 4.5. 144.000 gallons is maintained in T-121 by Tech Spec 3.7.6. Thus. 200.000 b gallons from T-1201s required to support the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months cooldown INSERT 13 The documented leak test rate is associated with an open drain upstream of the check valve.

In the RSB 5-1 scenario. however, concurrent main feedwater line breaks are not assumed and --

the upstream MFly is credited to close (the postulated single active failure for the RSB 51 scenario is the failure of one ADV to open). Thus, the leakage through the check valve is limited to the leakage through the closed MFIV (disregarding conservatively the mit1 gating effect of additional closed valves installed upstream in the feedwater line)

Based on Assumption 3.11, the maximum leakage through the MFIV will be taken as 100 times the design leakage rate. The 100 times value, for the 20* MFIV and a leakage rate of 100 cc/hr per inch of diameter would be:

100

100[cc/hr] /1000[cc/l]

20[1nch] / 60[ min /hr] / 3.75[l/ gal) - 0.9 gpm .say 1 gpm In 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 1

60

24'- 1.440 gal 4

e

NES3L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iccN N u PRftIM PCN No b_q y car.r s I ne CCN CONVERSION Project or DCP/MMP SONGS 2&3 Cale no. M-0050-017 cc un rrN -

sect BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate Irventory sheet we 22 pfv opf0!NATOR OATE TRf DATE nrv OR10fMAton SAff IRE DAff i F. D. I.UN A 54344 D Bratas 92344 2 F D. LUNA Il-29-9s summum- sumummmmi nummmmmme - -

momsmmmammmmmmmmmmmmmmummmeimmmmmmmua sum 1

! System valve lealrwe losses l

DBE d A l Following aAloss of offsite power event and assuming failure of 1 ADV to open, potential / \

leakage through AFW and Feedwater system valves that are closed may occur that will prevent stored. water from being delivered to the steam generator being utilized to conduct the plant cooldown.

l l

The potential lost'4invento7.*TMfrom fr 3leafage (o in the AFW suction ar:d discharge piping anl1 p feedwater piping is/ determined below: Go& in 24 Anua r a 1

/. l l

l A. Inventory Losses Through Check Valve 2(3)l307MUO36 and 2(3)l307MU129 1 2(3)l307MUO36 (S/G 089) and 2(3)l307MU129 (S/O 088) prevent AFW flow from being diverted away from the steam generator and into the Main Feed piping. Leakage through these check valves may cause a loss of available condensate inventory for cooldown.

When two steam generators are available for cooldown, leakage can occur through check i

valves at both steam generators. However, this calculation conservatively assumes that l only one ADV is used for the cooldown. Therefore, this evaluation will assume leakage through only one check valve.

These are 20" Anchor Darling check valves with a design allowable leakage of 2 cc/hr per (MSS-SP-61) inch of nominal valve size (i.e., design maximum allowable leakage is l

therefore .01% gal /hr per valve). NCR 95090033 has documented a leakage rate of 11.52 gpm for S31305MU129. A ddge 'Wge " 15 gp .' and in di: ; ;!y" to be:Ed /\

Me leak rte %cugh $c ch;ck va!w. U5: 'r, ilds duc wouki ic3uli m a iumi of 2iiG) ,

603!0n" 3124 h0ur'; l 55 l sCE 26-426 NEW 4/90 i

NES&L DEPAS~tMENT CALCULATION SHEET iccN au PRflIM CON h0. u. o " sur q> nr CCN CONV[Rs!ON Project or DCP/see _ SONC.S m Cale No. M .0,Q50-017 re, an erN -

, suht.ct BTP RSB 5-1 condonsate Ir ventory w et go. 23 Afv ORiofilafou OATE tRE DATE REV OR10fMAf0R DAff IRE DAff _

i F.D. LUNA 9-2344 l D. Brahms 9-23-94 2 P.D. LUNA Il 294s mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmum muummmmmum mmmmmmme mummum - muummmmmmaammml B. Chemical Injection Inventory lesses from AFW Pump Suction / Discharge Piping.

Condensate inventory could potentially be lost through a total of six 1/2" Kerotest check valves (2 for each pump) isolating chemical injection from the AFW pump suction piping.

ne valves were purchased to specification S023 408-1 which requires that the valves be designed to meet seat leakage requirements of 2 cc/hr per inch of nominal valve size in accordance with MSS-SP-61. Therefore these valves are designed for a_ maximum of (1

- J--

j 0.0000044 gpm.f A ssuming all six valves are leaking at 100 times this design value N

- N' (Assumption 3.11), the total combined leakage would be less than four gallons in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months perio/d 6 66 7 C. Inventory losses Due to S/O Blowdown Valve Leakage Blowdown valves 2(3)HV4053 (3/G E089) and 2(3)HV4054 (E088) are normally open during mode 1 plant operation. Rese valves are designed for Class 5 leakage (sypicximately 60 cc/hr). However, potential leakage through these valves for purposes of this evaluation will be based on specific plant leakage experience. Per NCR 92030206 leakage has been documented to be as high as 2 gpm with 60 psig steam generator pressure. Valve stroke adjustments were able to reduce this to approximately 1.16 gpm.

For purposes of this evaluation a leakage rate of 3 gpm will be assumed. This is considered reasonable based on past operating experience and because this valve is expected to leak less under higher differential pressure. This is due to the application of this valve design, in which flow is over the seat. With flow over the seat, as pressure differential increase across the seat, the leakage goes down. Although this is a severe SCE 36-436 NEw 4/90

l EC&FS DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET cc~ NO.i PREUM, CCN NO.

N-2

,9y OF_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RSS 5-1 Condensate IrwentorV Sheet No. _ ,

REV ORIGtNATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE tRE DATE R O Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E

/\ /\ a INSERT J lhever. IST closure acceptance criteria per procedure 5023-3-3.30.6 is < 100ml/ min. This is equivalent to 228 gallons total for all six valves over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period of t1me. Thus. ~

cons 1 stent with assumption 3.11 228 gallons will be used as the assumed leakage loss for these valves.

1 4

NESOL DEPARTMFNr CALCULATION SHEET icca * /

Pen [M. CCM NO. e 2. pr.r 'w nr SMCS 2A3 CCN CONVER$10N h Project or DCP/MMP Calc No. M-0050-017 rem an cru . Os weet BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate Ir ventorV N et No. 26 REV ORIGINATOR 0Aff IRE DAff mEV OR101NATOR DATE thE CAff i F.D. LUNA 9 23-94 D. Bralmas 9-2344 musmum m[mmmEImmmmmmmmmm umSim"m$m mmmmmmmme mummmum mummme mummmmmmmmmmmmmEmemme mummmmmu a samm the discharge valve downstream of the turbine driven pump. Over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period of time the total leakage would be approximately 2280 galions.

2 b._.r.af _ _M. . . _ _ . . . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ , A

/Rienm Generninr Binwdown Inceen Blowdown losses will be considered to occur for the first thirty minutes after a LOP event f (see Assumption 3.1). This is reasonable based on EOI SO23-12-7, Loss Of Off Site Power

and EOI SO23-12-8, Station Blackout require that the blowdown valves (2(3)HV 4053 &

4054) be closed. Assumption 3.10 provides a max. blowdown rate of 300 GPM per steam l

, generator. This rate equates to 18,000 gal. of Blowdown losses in a thirty minute period for Unrecoverable water in 2(3)T1201:nclnture Design Input 4.2 gives an unrecoverable volume of 2,960 gal. for the tank enclosure. This unrecoverable volume is due to the geometry of the enclosure. The annulus area around the tank is sloped. 'Ihemfore, there is a fixed amount of fluid that is unrecoverable. Reference 6.29 provides detail sketches showing the geometry.

Ifnrecoverable vninme in 2(3)T120 Since the bottom elevation of the downcom is above the floor of the tank, there is a volume of fluid below the tank downcomer , Nich becomes unavailable for use.

The unrecoverable volume in the tank is obtained by calculating the recove.rable volume of water in the downcomer and then subtracting this value from the total volume of water in the tank below the "0' gauging elevation as follows.:

The recoverable volume of water in the downcomer.

sCE 26-436 NEW 438

~ - -

- -_...: ::2 EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET eCN es PREUM CCN NO.

N-2 ,

~

i Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-00SG017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject BTP RS8 5-1 Condensate inventorV Sheet No.

REV ORGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR OATE IRE DATE R I

/_\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms /\ '

/\ /\ a INSERT K F. Inventory losses throuah Check Valves 2422m397. 2422MU398. 2422KlJ04 and 2422MU405 in the Boric Acid In.iection Systes Connectec to the Discharoe of the Auxiliary Feed ~

.PML The leakage through the boric acid makeup manifold is postulated to be caused by the leakage through four small bore double isolation lift type check valves from the auxiliary feecpump discharge. The manufacturer has identified the leakage through that valve to be 40cc/hr (see Appx. G). Thus for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the leakage would be 40

24 - 960cc. which represents approximately .26 gallons per valve. This is a very small value and we will use the typical leakage ecceptance value of 1001:l/ min per procedure 5023 3-3.30.6. resulting in about 38.4 gal per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per valve leakage.

Thus for 2 valves the leakage used is 77 gallons in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

'n NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET nam O. N-2 ,, E S, Project or DCP/MitF SOMCS '2 & 3 Calc Blo M

0 0 50 - 017 0 CC -

,,... a,..s.__..<.,___ .... : ,

DEW ORIGINATOR DATE 1pt ptV Opf0fMATOR

.DA?E DATE IRE DATE I F.D. LUNA 92394 D. Brahms 9 23-94 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29-95 umummmmmmmmmmmum muuammmuu mummmmmme summmera mummmmmmmmmmmmmm mumum amammu

! D. Determine the net steam generator shrinkage loss.

j Net steam generator shrinkage is

, 11,708 - 2,656 - 9,052 Gallons.

i j

)

Nam- Seismic Pine B reak r.a====.

(

This section will determine the loss inventory to 2(3)T120 due to' a moderate energy line break of a non selsnic pipe penetrating the seismic enclosure wall around 2(3)T120. De Standard Review Plan (Reference 6.67) definition for a moderate energy pipe failure is used

to calculate the break cross sectional area that is used in determining inventory losses. A J

4 critical crack is assumed down stream of an isolation valve (see Assumptions 3.14 and 3.15).

De critical crack is taken to be 1/2 the nominal pipe diameter in length and 1/2 the wall j thickness in width. The cross sectional area is converted to an equivalent circular cross section and the Darcy equation is used to calculate a flow rate. De computations are performed with Quattro Pro spreadsheet software, see Appendix A for a sample calculation.

De spreaddieet lies all the lines penetrating the 2(3)T120 seisnic wall enclosure and l selected lines downstream of these lines. For critical cracks, assuming gravity flow only (no j pump running), the low point elevation is conservatively assumed to be 7 Ft. elevation per j Assumption 3.18. A critical crack is also postulated to occur down sucam of pumps P049,

P431, and P461 (see Assumption 3.16). Since the motor starter contacts for the pumps are j non lE, the contact can be made by the relays; during a seisnic event, thereby starting a pump. De flow rate from a critical crack down stream of a pump is shown in Table 1 (Unit l

i 2) and Table 2 (Unit 3). ne lost inventory will be calculated based on the maximum flow l rate over a duration. An Operator diould be able to secure the pump and isolate 1

us a the break by closing the isolation valve within feuediamss (Assumption 3.14 & 3.16). From

t-n a 2-2 Tabist, the inventory loss is tedet gallons.

2p5 i

j j SCa ss.4ss NEw 4#90

nssa narammr t

]

CALCULATION SHEET iCCa n e PREllM. CCW N0. v-t n car,r - nr 1

4 CCN CONVERSION Project or DCP/lWP SONGS 213 Calc No. M-0050-017 reu un erw .

l subtect BTP RSB 5-1 Condonsate Ir ventory weet No. 33 REV OGIGINAfen DATE IRE DATE REV OA10tNAtom CAtt TRE DATE i F.D.I.UNA 9-2344 D. 3rshsts 9-23 94 2 F. D. IENA i1-29-95 mummmmmmmmmmmmmun mammmme mummmmmer h mammu aammu 3

Iralrace Isolation Evalnatinn f-/ M P 2.

The lines listed in Tables 6 are evaluated to determine the ability to isolate a critical

crack in f b 4 5 thIt.ulc

nt

LINE NO. EVALUATION i

1414-035-2*-W-L1h Seismic I line, pipe failure not postulated. This section of pipe is in line with the pipe j below. The same evaluation applies. 3 1414-035-2"-R-LLD Mini. flow line off PO49 which can be 3 al tM by HV-5715 m one end. The other end

! connects to line 015-8"-R-LLD which connects to line 031-8"-R-L1h which is connected j to the T120 tank at the 61 foot elevation. Also, the line is malarmicany design to II/I and

. a postulated pipe failure is not required (assumption 3.19).

j 1414-015-S"-R-LLA This line can be isonned by HV 5715 on one end and is connected to the T120 tank at the 61 fout elevaion on the other end. Also, the line is sensuucally design to II/I and a j postulated pipe failure is not required (assumption 3.19).

l 4

3 1414 023-8"-R-LIA This line can be isolated by HV 5715.

1318-012-6"-T-LLD nis line can be isolated by HV 5715.

i, 4 1414-018-6"-R LLI This line can be isolated by HV-5715. I 1305-180-3"-W-LLI This line can be isolated by 1305-MU 531. The valve is normally closed.

2423422-1"-R-LL8 This line penetrates T120 enclosure at 59.5 foot elevation. There is no pressure head to i

drive fluid per this analysis above 52.7 foot elevation. Also, the line is not comaeded to !

j T120. l 1415-136 l"-R LL4 This line penetrates T120 enclosure at 58.75 foot elevation. There is no pressure head te 1

. drive fluid per this analysia above 52.7 foot elevation. Also, the line is not connected to l 1

T120.

)

1219 068 24*-D-L1h Seismic I line, pipe failure not postulated. Also, the line is not connected to T120. The i

line is a cross tie to the RWST T-005 ami T-006. Does not branch to other lines. ,

1

, 1305447-8"-D-LLD Seismic I line, pipe failure not postulated. Also, the line is not connected to T120. His 1 3

line is the auction to AFW Pump P-141, 1 a

l 1305-048 2"-D-GEO Seismk. I line, pipe failure not postulated. Also, the line is not connected to T120. The l line is, the AFW Pump mini-flow return to T-121. I

1414-014-8"-R-LIA This line cut be isolned by 8" 092-W-212 which is located in the seismic I portion that l penetrate the enclosure. 'the valve is in the IST Program arul is tested quarterly. This valve is located outside of the T120 enclosure.

d SCE E436 IEW 4/90

NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCcN ai PRELIM. CCN NO. u-1 >

pint > nr

)

i CCN CONVlRSION

Project or DCP/PetP <nar,t M3 Calc No. M-MS-M7 rem an res .

$ubiect RTP R$8 5-1 rnndennate !nventnev $heet No. 34 1 REW ORIGINATOR DATE Inf DATE pry ontcluAr0R DAff IRE DATE l 1 F.D. LUNA 9-23-94 D. Brelums 9 23-94 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29-95 i

i i

1414-013-8"-R LI.D This line runs from T121 to T120 and branches to line Ol4-8"-R-LLD. This line is I scianucally design to 11/1 and a pannimad pipe failure is not required (assumption 3.19).

'Ihe line can be isolated whh valve 8*492-W-212.

j 14144318"-R LIA This line is connected to T120 at the 61 foot elevation and T121 a 60.5 foot elevation.

'Ibere is no pressure head to drive fluid per this analysis above 52.7 foot elevation. The other end of the line can be isolated by HV-5715.

e 1305 144-8"-D-LLA Seismic I line, pipe failure not postulated. The line is from T-121 to T-120 sump in the 3 enclosure. Valve 8* 088-D-212 is in line and nornally closed. Valve leakage is not an i issue.

Additioral Lines Downstreens of Pencaration (T120 Ref.). These lines are not included in tables I and 2, since they do not pendrate the enclosure dructure around T 120.

}

1414-028-6"-R LLO 'Ihe line can be isolated by 1414 6"-797-R-212.

l 1414-Oll-8*-R-LIA ' Ibis line can be isolded by HV-5715.

1414-024-8"-R-LIA This line conneds to the tank a the 61 Foot elevation. above the enclosure wall.

i j 1417-188-8"-R LL1 This line branche from 1414-024 8"-R LLO, which connects to the tank at 61 Foot

elevation. No loss of T-120 invenory possible by a pipe failure.

$ 2418-334-2"-R-LLI Nitrogen gas system connected a top of tank.

4 j 1305-309-3"-T-KKI This line can be isolmed by 1305-MU-531-13051027 3"-T-LLI This line can be isolated by 1305-MU 531.

a 4 2418-208-3"-R-LLI Nitrogen gas symem connected a top of tank.

1305 053-8"-D-Ll4 Seismic 1 line, pipe failure not postulated. In line valve 8"-476-D-212 is a seismic cat. I valve and in the normally closed position. The line is a cross connect between the T-121 and T-120 tanks. The valve is not required to be tested since nornally closed.

Valve leakage is not an issue since the line is a cross connect between the two tanks.

1305 180-3"-T-LL1 This line can be isolated by 1305-MU-531.

The evaluation above determined that the lines passing through the 2(3)T120 enclosure can be isolated with the time frame or does not require a critical crack to be posulated.

b Valves HV-5715 and 8"-092-W-212 would require to be closed within if the T-120 inventory losses through a pipe break failure downstream of the two valves are determine.

SCE E426 NEW 4/90 1

1

CCN Af2 n -c~s u -w i xaa a

& ?y y sy: r. o. u s nm a-n-er

/Ml p tr;

TABLEf F-/ A T120 NOfHIEISIhWC LINE LOSSES,4/13f04 UPET 2

' # #~ * ** #8

- ^\

Water lewel elevaton (F0 at 280,000 gebens is 52.7 Maximumlow point elevadon(F0 is 7 Tk Pen Seis. Iso Wall Srs une Sch Elev Elev Ref t D Re H Q Qual. Valve Pool. Notes P6 E 1414 036-2-W 8 i O 40 N/A 38 40418 0.154 2 1.3E+04 45.70 7.8 1 N/A N/A N 1414 03b2-R4.LO 40 NfA 38 40418 0.154 2 1.3E404 45.70 7.8 2/1 2-008-R-108 O On- ^- N of T120 N 1414 0158-RALO 10 N/A 37 40418 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-5715 O Inside. PME of T120 i N 1414 0236-R4LO 10 31 31 #418 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-5715 O Outside. N of T120 N 1318 012 6-T-LLO 10 NIA 39 #418 0.134 6 1.2E+04 45.70 20.4 2/1 HV-5715 O F-e inside RWST 008 Rm.

N 1414 018 6-R-LL1 40 N/A 34.5 40418 028 6 2.4E+04 45.70 42.8 2/1 HV-5715 O F-4 inside RWST 006 Rm.

S 1318 012-6-T-LLO 10 N/A 39 40413 0.134 6 1.2E+04 45.70 20.4 2/1 HV-5715 O Plaine inside RWST 006 Rm.

S 1305 180-3-W-u.1 40 60.5 36.75 #413 0216 3 1.9E+04 45.70 16.4 1 HV-5715 O Inside RWST 006 Rm.

S 1414 018 6-R-LL1 40 N/A 34.5 40413 028 6 2.4E+04 45.70 42.6 2/1 HV-5715 O Pipmo inside RWST 006 Rm.

S 2423 022-1-R-LLS 80 N/A 59.5 40413 0.179 1 N/A 45.70 N/A 2/1 N/A N/A S 1415 1381-R-LL4 40 N/A 58.75 40413 0.133 1 NIA 45.70 N/A 2/1 N/A N/A S 1219 naa-2+D-LLO- 10 N/A 32 40456 025 24 22E+04 45.70 152 2 1 N/A N/A S 1305 047-4-D-LLO 10 N/A 29.67 40414 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 1 N/A N/A S 1305 048 2-D-GEO 80 N/A 57.5 # 415 0.218 2 N/A 45.70 N/A 1 N/A N/A S 1414 014-8-R-LLO 10 N/A 34 40456 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 8-092-W-212 O Inside RWST 005 Rm.

E 1414 013SR-LLO 10 34 31.302 40456 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 8-092-W-212 O Insede T121 Rm.

E 1414 031 O R-LLO 10 61 32 40456 0.148 8 1.3E404 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-5715 O Inside T121 Rm.

E 1305 048-2-D-GEO 80 N/A $9.5 40456 0.218 2 N/A 45.70 N/A 1 N/A N/A E 1305 047-6->-LLO 10 NfA 29.67 40456 0.148 8 1.3E404 45.70 30.0 1 N/A N/A E 1305 144 844.LO 10 NfA 29.67 40456 0.148 8 1.3E404 45.70 30.0 1 8 088-D-212 C ,_

S 2426 52034 YY5 10 NfA N/A 40239 0.12 3 1.0E+04 45.70 9.1 1 N/A NfA "13104 cels. loss in 24 hrs. .

Orsin line to sump 4 Hrs Loss 7209 gels

24 Hrs Loss 13104 gols i Disch 45 ,w u Pump Line Sch it Elev Ref t D Re H Q mtoes. Pump Discharge ;

PO49 010 8-R-LLO 10 170 34 40418 0.148 8 2.8E+04 215.70 65.3 1 1saa' _lgels P431 0114R-LLO 10 320 34 40418 0.134 6 3.3E+04 385.70 57.7 7g, ,

P461 030+R-LLO 10 300 34 40418 0.134 6 3.2E+04 345.70 56.1 -

/

AE pumps can beisolated by HV-5715 ,

4- .[e g nch o f f

_ _ _ . _ . .m . _ . . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ - . . . . . _ _ . ~ . . _ . _ . _ _ - . . . . . . . _ _ . _ .

Ccd N-2. p M ~**S* ~ 0 !' FG 6 '

40 f By; f. D. La)MA 94xl H-29W

k #'

T120 NOESBSMIC UNE LOSSES,#13794 TMAb1 UNIT 3 .cp TN e, 3/.

d '

Water level elevaton (Pg at 200.000 gnBons is 52.7 Maximumlow pointelevaton(FO is 7 >

Tk Pen - Seis. Iso Wall Srs Une Sch Elev Elev Ref t D Re H Q Qual. Valvo Peel. Notes N/A 1414 015 &R ai O 10 NfA 37 41950 0.148 8 1.3E44 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-6715 O Co connected I W 1414 023 &R-LLO 10 31 31 41955 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-5715 O T121 Rm. Ii N 1305 180 3-W-LL1 40 80.5 36.75 41912 0.216 3 1.9E+04 45.70 16.4 1 HV-5715 O T008 RWST Rm 'i N 2423 022-1-R-LL8 80 N/A 59.5 41917 0.179 1 N/A 45.70 N/A 2/1 N/A NIA N 1415 138-1-R-tL4 40 N/A 58.75 41917 0.133 1 N/A 45.70 N/A 2/1 N/A N/A i N 1219 nsut_24 0.LLO 10 N/A 32 41955 0.25 24 2.2E+04 45.70 152.2 1 N/A N/A 'i N 1305 047-6-0-LLO 10 29.67 29.67 41917 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 1 N/A N/A ;

N 1305 048-2-D-GEO 80 N/A 57.5 41917 0.218 2 N/A 45.70 N/A 1 N/A N/A t N 1414 014-8-R-LLO 10 N/A 34 41950 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 8-092-W-212 O RWST Rm T005 W 1414 013-8-R-LLO 10 34 31.302 41955 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 8-092-W-212 . O T121 Rm W 1414 031-8-R-LLO 10 61 32 41955 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 2/1 HV-5715 O T121 Rm t W 1305 048-2-0-GEO 80 N/A 59.5 41955 0.218 2 N/A 45.70 N/A 1 N/A N/A ii

?*

W 1305 047-6-D-..O 10 N/A 29.87 41955 0.148 8 1.3E+04 45.70 30.0 1 8-473-D-212 O T121 Rm W 1305 144 8-0-..O 10 NfA 29.67 41955 0.148 8 1.3E@ 45.70 30.0 1 6485 D-212 C T121 Rm ,i N/A 2426 520-34.YYS 10 N/A NfA 40739 0.12 3 1.0E404 45.70 9.1 1 N/A NfA "13104 aals. loss in 241ws.

Drainline to surnp 4 Hr Loss 7209 Gals

+24 Hrs Loss 13104 gals Pune asch Uno Sch it Elev Ref t D Re H Q m ..

4ttless.PurnpDisdiarge 13802- Igels PO49 010 8-R-LLO 10 170 34 40418 0.148 8 2.8E+04 215.70 85.3__ I .

__P431 011-6-R-LLO 10 320 34 40418 0.134 6 3.3E+04 385.70 57.7 p' g 4 :

P481 03S6-R-LLO to 300 34 40418 0.134 8 3.2E+04 1 345.70 58.1 {

li AE pumps can beIsolated by HV-5715 n ye nA, a +l4 ~.'y Sed h

- -. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _

~ ^ - '

.e .g-n;. - " - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

i NES&L DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET icC" " "

PRflIN. CCN N0 N -2 nr.r 4I nr 1

CCN CONVER$10h 3

Project or DCP/19tP SONGS 213 Calc No. M-0050-017 cc. mn cru - M Sub.iect BTP RSR 5-1 Condonsate ir ventory sNet No. 37 REW ORIGINATOR DAff IRf DATE REV OR10!NATOR CAff IRE DATE I F.D. LUNA 9-23-94 D. Brakes 9-23-94

2 F.D. LUNA Il 29-9$

-- mmmmmmmme mummmmmme mummmmmmmmmmmmum mum mmmmiamuuma d In Sfri ki 4

~ Ammred Inventary In 2(3)T121

'\ b

,' Design Input 4.5 gives the available inventory of tank 2(3)T121 to be 144,000 gal. This ,

j ,

is a Technical Specification minimum required amount.

l i

I t .

I !

A=mred Inventnry In 2(3)T120

.l , .

5 Design input 4.4 gives the minimum inventory for tank 2(3)T120 at 280,000 gal. 'Ihis

! again is a Technical Specification minimum required amount. Reference 6.24 makes

available additional Seismic Category I inventory below the tanks zero datum line. This j -

i reference qualifies the downcomer in the 2(3)T120 tank to Seismic Category I requirements. Design Input 4.12 give the amount below the zero datum to be 65,164 gal,j I

i \

i \ '

r i \ TOTAL CONDENSATE AVAILABIE IN 2(3)T120 & 2(3)T121 IS

/

! /

i j 144,000 + 280,000 + 65,164 = 489,164 GAL. j

/

0

/

X- .

.- /

d ,$t4 t

4 4

scs wasNew4se

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCUL.ATION SHEET iccN Nos PREUM CCN NO.

N-2 PAGEbOF__

I Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION.

CCN NO. )

Subpct BTP RSS S-1 Condensate Irwernorv Sheet %o. _

REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R 1

/_\ Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms

/]

E

/\ /\ 1 INSERT K1 Note to Tables 81 and 8-2:

The values per Table 8-1 and 8-2 are based on a Tech Spec initial volume of 280.000 gallons. b The " worst case" leakage of 2975 gallons in 45 minutes reflects the correction for the I initial tank volume of 360.000 gallons. using the methodology per Appendix A, applied to l line 010 8" R LLO. I INSERT L Non-1E And/0r Mechanical Control Seismic Interactions The impact of Non-1E electrical and/or mechanical control seismic interactions are evaluated in Appendix F. This Appendix concluded the following:

b

1. A seismic event could potentially cause the condenser hot well level to be reduced and thus indirectly cause the makeup valves to open. It is postulated that this would

, occur due to chattering of non IE relays in the condensate over boarding control system (C0CS) activating the system and drain down of one or more hotwells. The total flow in 45 minutes through the makeup valves is the same as that which would occur if the valves'were to be induced to open. The total loss in 45 minutes per Appendix E is 4 109.363 gallons.

NOTE: A DBE could also create a crack in the condenser itself. Such a crack would be outside the scope of MELB assumptions for piping. Since no analysis

has been performed on the condenser. the size of the crack is unknown.

However, the impact would be bounded by the above opening of the makeup valves.

. 2. Relay chatter combined with loss of air supply to TV-2819 could potentially cause the spray water emergency pump P-145 to activate resulting in a flow path from T-120 to the turbine spray system until S21414MUO92 is isolated in 45 minutes. The total flow due to this potential flow path for 45 minutes until operator action is credited to close S21414MUO92 has been evaluated to be 6.615 gallons.

3. Out of the systems leading from HV-5715. non IE seismic interactions may cause opening of the makeup valve to separator tank T-132. The total flow due to this potential flow path for 45 minutes until operator action is credited to close 2/3HV-5715 has been evaluated to be 225 gallons.

4

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN ms PREUM. CCN NO.

N12

, g-l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M4050417 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

. Subt ect BTP RSB S-1 Condensate Inventory Sheet No.

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms /\ E

/\ w /\ a i

INSERT L ... continued: 1 Loss due to makeun to TPCW tank T-050

~ ~

This loss is based on the postulated seismically toouced cracking of T-050, and subsequent opening of the makeup valve LV-6936 for 45 minutes, until operator action is credited to close 2/3HV-5715. This loss has been evaluated to be 31,687 gallons.

1 Seal Water loss This loss is caused by minor leakage of valve packings for valves with seal water supplied by the Cond. Transfer Pump P-049 from T-120. The supply lina is only 1 inch l diameter and normally, with properly maintained valve packings. Zero leakage would be expected. However, to conservatively envelope this potential leakage, 10 gpm is assumed for the duration of 45 minutes per Assumption 3.24, until operator action is credited to close 2/3HV-5715. For the 45 minute duration, this loss will amount to 450 gallons.

Losses throuah the AFV nuno packina The normal auxiliary feedpump packt le6kage has been identified u'y me Station Technical !

personnel to be'0.25 gpm (see Appx. ), based on the full tank T-120. As the RSB 5-1 l' scenario is based,on the " normal operation" of the plant, the use of this leakage is appropriate. Also, as the tank water level is reduced. this leakage would be also reduced. '

thus the use of the 0.25 gpm leakage is conservative. i l

The total leakage for 3 pumps in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s:

l 3

0.25

60

24 - 1.080 gallons -

Total Reauired Volume in T 120:

A summary of the water requirements for T-120 to support the RSB 5-1 cooldown including an accounting of this calculation is provided in Table 2-1 in Section 2 of this calculation.

1

EC&FS DEPARTMENT i

CALCULATION SHEET cc m ; N-2 ,,,,g O, PREUM. CCN NO.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050417 CCN CONVERSION: t]

i CCN NO. (p Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate Irwentory Sheet No.

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R i

) /\ Paul Biba 5-21-98 O h l, 7\ /\ 1 i

\

j essa.asmanssNr --

)

CALCULATION SHEET u= =.i u m em cra an.

u., n me ,, nr n i

' eDi apueste f

$ Prejust er stP,NF N Id Cels Be. 31*"-017 ces em Pf3 l __

< )

)

m, afp tia E.1 r " anta iswantary m se no it i

- nue am - - nam ten I

am l

en, in l t P.o. LUNA SSee D. suuhune 9804 i r. o. wwa naas . _ _ ;

i i PWe - ^ -i la fethe

-sammanaes c weser h 2.storage

. requerennents for 20)T120/20)T121 as _h )

! dagermined aben. .

1 TABLE 3 . ,

i l I i ,

l DESCRIPHON GALLONS CE , I i

a t 1 j 1. RCS RSB 51 coondown sequimasens 344.000 4.3 ,

2. Immees tiuough 20)T120's snelomme 40A00 4.1 j l i

3. Systen valve leakass losses 28.219 SEE ABOVE j 4. Sesem Osmenner bloudown lasses 18,000 SSE ABOVE !

4.2 l l l 5. Umscoverable weser in 20)T120's encsosme 2.900 _ _

6. Umscoverable wesw in 2Qyrl20 it, st' 8 SEE ABOVE ;

' 7. Net SK1 shrmkage losess SEE ABOVE j 8. Non- sessnac pipe break losses 5.662 MiB ABOVE t

! j l

Astia90- ,

411,84I l l l 7tyTAL WATER REQUIRED IN 20 0 FOR 24 HOUR SUPPLY IS ,

I I I l - 144.000 = ALLDNS

! W I'fI 8 S33,aw MARO! = AVAILABLE COND. - COND. REQT. FOR 24 HOURS

$ MARCIN = 449,164 -

{ ,

t 'l11s t4l s

/

4 l

MAROIN =. ALS.

t

/

11.3 7. 3

~. / ._

N -

' ~ *

e.s.o., . . _ , ,,,,,s W 4

N NESOL DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET icC o u rantM CCN .NO. u. 2 pe, 4 5' ne J CCM CONVERSION Project or DCP/MMP SONGS 2&3 Caic no. M-0050-017 cc. un crN -

subiect BTP RSB 5-1 Condansate Irventerv sheet no A l REV ORIGINATOR DATE Int CAff AFV On!OfMATOR DATE IRE DATE I F.D. LUNA 9-23 94 D. Brahms 9-23 94 2 F.D. LUNA 11 29 95 mmmmm -

NmmEM J

l J

i 4

1 APPENDIX A l

5 s

SPREADSilEET SAMPLE CALCULATION

(=0 R C i? I TI C A L. C Rh Cl< floki h WO

.I h

1 l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ccN m.i N2 , q(9,

PREUM. CCN NO.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M4050417 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCEU.ANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E 1 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

[] Paul Biba 5-21-08

[]

/\ /\ 4 i

i 1

l j I 4

i

! 1 v

b APPENDIX E:

ll MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS l

}

i I

4 4

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET 'cCN No; PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 PAGEk7 & j Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E 2 ;

REV ORIGNATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R l

O Paul Biba 5-21-98

/_\ h

/\ /\ a Apox. E. SECTION 1. PURPOSE

{ l 1

The purpose of this Appendix E is to derive various outflows from the condensate storage i tank T-120, such as losses due to the operation of the pump P-145, makeup to the Separator Tank T-132 and the makeup into the condenser hotwells. Flow paths that are !

evaluated in this appendix were identified as potential flow paths in Appendix F.

This calculation is done as part of the resolution of NCR 960201089.

Anox. E. SECTION 2.. RESULTS / CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Appx. E,2.1 MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOW RESULTS The following conclusions are based on the evaluation documented in this Appendix. The outflows for the evaluated cases are as follows:

Case 1:

Flow to the TPCW tank T-050: 31,587 gal total during 45 minutes. This volume is associated with opening of the tank's makeup valve after postulated seismically induced tank cracking.

Case 2:

Loss due to start and operation of Emergency Spray Pump P-145, caused by postulated non 1E seismic interactions, for 45 minutes prior to isolation from the control room is 6,615 gal total.

Case 3:

Loss due to the makeup into the Separator Tank T-132, due to the malfunction of the !

level control valve LCV-3321 float due to seismic interaction is 225 gal total during 45 , I minutes. I Case 4:

I Loss due to the makeup into the Condenser hotwells, due to the malfunction of the Condenser overboard valve in open condition due to seismic interaction, or due to seismically induced condenser cracking, is 109,363 gal total during 45 minutes.

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iccN No./

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 pgg,- -

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050417 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. C 3 _ '

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 5-21-98 /\

/\ /\ s Anox. E. SECTION 2. RESULTS / CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...

continued:

[

The description of the evaluated cases is discussed within the body of this Appendix E and is briefly repeated here:

Case 1. Makeup to the tank T-050 via line 1414-018-6"-R-LLO, with the Condensate Transfer Pump operating, due to T-050 seismically induced cracking.

Case 2. Start of the Emergency Spray Pump P-145 due to seismic non IE interactions.

Case 3. Matfunction of the float level control valve LCV-3321 in an open position due to seismic interaction, providing makeup flow to the Separator Tank T-132.

Case 4: Makeup into condenser hotwell due to the malfunction / actuation of the condenser overboard system, or due to seismically induced condenser i cracking.

I I

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET m Nos N2 PREuM. CCN No. g,-

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. !&ggM017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELi.ANEOUS OUTFLOWS . APPENDIX E Sheet No.E 4 REV OFtGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms /\ E

/\ /\ 3 Apox. E. SECTION 3.. ASSUMPTIONS b E1. The evaluation of the flows will use cold water properties (specific gravity = 1).

This assumption has minimal effects on the results of the calculation as the tank water temperature is normally between 40 - 100F.

E2. The condensate elevation in T-120, which erresponds to the existing Tech Spec volume of 280,000 gallons is 52.7 ft per the main body of this calculation. This Appendix E will assume the water elevation of 58.2 ft, which corresponds to a volume of about 360,000 gallons, to account for the suggested increased Tech Spec volume, described in the Results/ Conclusions (Section 2) of the main body of the calculation.

E3. The flow derivation assumes that the Condensate Transfer Pump PO49 is operating during normal plant operation and will remain operating post-OBE. Also, the makeup valve to the TPCW tank T-050 is assumed to open, based on seismically induced cracking of T-050 and consequent reduction of water level.

E4. The T-050 makeup valve LV-6936 is assumed to be similar to a globe valve in this evaluation. This assumption is reasonable per the image of the valve illustrated on vendor drawing per Reference E9. This analysis conservatively assumes that the valve is fully open while making up into the tank, thus maximizing the flowrate.

E5. The flowrate through the makeup valve 2LCV-3321 is assumed to be same as identified in Reference E11, or 5 gpm.

E6. It will be assumed that the flowrate through the Emergency Spray Cooling Pump P-145 will be equal to the combined flowrate to the bellows and turbine spray system flowrate identified on Reference E10, or 147 gpm. This is conservative since the flow to the bellows has been eliminated due to the installation of a new bellows design.

E7. The condenser vacuum is assumed to be approximately 2 inches Hg or 1 psia, when the condenser hotwell makeup valves open. Also, this Appendix E assumes zero time delay for the opening of the makeup valves, and it assumes that the valves are fully open. These assumptions are conservative as the normal condenser vacuum is over 2 inch Hg, the makeup valves would not respond immediately to makeup the hotwells, and they would modulate to maintain the hotwell level, which would initially mean that they would not be fully open.

l EC&FS DEPARTMENT i CALCULATION SHEET "

$"u" $CN NO. PAGE C Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-o050-o17 CCN CONVERS.ON:

CCNHO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPEND _QQ Sheet No.E s HEV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGrNATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/} Paul Biba 5-21-98

/_\

/\ /\ 4 Anox. E. SECTION 3.. ASSUMPTIONS [

E8. The hotwell makeup will be derived for simplification only for one path out of 4 paths to the condensor. The selected path is associated with the makeup valve LV-3259. This assumption is reasonable, as the condenser makeup system is symmetrical and the selected routing is more conservative than the routing to the i second valve LV-3248, thus resulting in somewhat larger total flow.

E9. Based on above assumption the K factor for the pipes which will pass half or ,

quarter of the total flow will be assumed to be one quarter or one sixteenth of its l value in respect to the common header. This assumption is reasonable, as the flow will be fully turbulent and thus it will be possible to draw quadratic relationships between various flow regimes.

j E10. The N2 blanket pressure in the T-120, which is normally maintained at 1/2 inch 1 H2O is disregarded in this calculation, as the water level in the tank is I conservativeY assumed at 58.2 ft per Assumption E2.

E11. This evaluation will assume the following manual isolation times for T-120 isolation valves for both Units 2 & 3, and will assume that the applicable Operating Procedures will be revised accordingly:

e Manual isolation valves S2/31414-MU-092 are assumed to be closed by the operator within 45 minutes post OBE. This assumption is reasonable and backed by plant walkdown as documented by an e-mail from operations in Appendix G (the current procedure SO23-13-3 specifies 30 minutes isolation).

e Manual isolation vahres 2/3 HV-5715 are assumed to be closed by the operator within 45 minutes post OSE. This assumption is reasonable and backed by plant walkdown as documented by an e-mail from operations in Appendix G (the current procedure S023-13-3 specifies 30 minutes i isolation). l E12. This evaluation assumes seismically induced cracking of the condenser, and subsequent opening of the condenser hot well makeup valves.

i

EC&FS DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NO/

PMLE CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE b OF Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M.0050417 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

SM MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E. p j REV OfMGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R j /\ Paul Biba 5-21-98 []

l /\ /\ s i

Anox. E. SECTION 4.. DESIGN INPUTS b l E1. The configuration of the system piping is taken from Reference E7.

E2. The emergency spray pump P-145 flowrate is taken from Reference E10.

i l E3. The Cv of the condenser hotwell makeup valves LV-3243, LV-3257, LV-3258 & LV-

! 3259, as provided by the manufacturer is Cv = 271, see vendor FAX dated 2/10/98 in Appendix G.

Appx._L. SECT 5QN 5.. METHODOLOGY l Appx. E, 5.0 GENERAL

The computations in this analysis will be done by a computer spreadsheet program i LOTUS. Some hand calculations will be done as well, mainly for the derivation of input j parameters which will be used in the computer spreadsheets. These hand calculations

are printed in this document using the Word Perfect software. However, it should be l noted that Word Perfect is used in this analysis only as a " word processor" and la not used for actually performina any calculations. i .

1

- Appx. E,5.1 EVALUATED CASES: I

! Case 1. The flow to the TPCW tank T-050 with fully open makeup valve, due to seismically induced cracking in T-050. j Ctee 2.

s Start of the Emergency Spray Pump P-145 due to seismic non 1E I interachons.

Case 3. Malfunction of the float level control valve LCV-3321 in an open position due [ ;

to seismic interaction, providing makeup flow to the Separator Tank T-132. i i

Case 4: Makeup into the condenser hotwells due to either seismic interaction on the condenser overboard controls leading to the inadvertent opening of the !

condenser overboard valve and consequent level reduction in the i condenser hotwell, or due to condenser cracking.

I 1

1 l

l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET cCN NOJ PEUM. CCN NO.

N-2 ,,g - -

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M617 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Gheet 'No. 67 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV OR!GINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/_\ Paul Biba 52198

/_\ E

/\ /\ s Anox. E. SECTION 5.. METHODOLOGY ... contined: b Appx. E, 5.3 DETERMINING PlPING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS BY A LOTUS SPREADSHEET The piping system characteristics will be determined by a Lotus spreadsheet, using the methodology documented in Reference E5.

Appx.E,5.2 CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP (PO49) PERFORMANCE CURVE The performance curve of PO49 will be taken from Appendix A and converted to a form:

Head = Head 0 + k1

Q*', by solving 2 equations for 2 selected flow points, as follows:

Headi = Heado + k1

Q1"' [ft] I -

Head 2 = Head 0 + k1

O2*' [ft]

l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT i

}

CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NO.i PHEUM. CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE530 ,

Project or DCP/FCN N/A__ Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION: -

CCN NO.

j. Subject MISCril ANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet'No. 5 8 l REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R h Paul Biba 5-21 98 /\ h

/\ /\ a Anox. E. SECTION 6.. REFERENCES h

E1. ASME steam tables,1965 edition E2. Crane Technical Paper No. 410,1986 edition E3. Piping Design and Material Specification, SONGS 2&3, Dwg. No. 90004, Rev.61, dated 7/7/98.

E4. SONGS 2&3 Mechanical calculation M0050.017, "BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate inventory". This calculation less the appendices is also referred to in this Appendix E as the " main body of the calculation".

E5. SONGS 2&3 Mechanical calculation M0014-006, " Alternate Use of CSP's for SFP Cooling & Shutdown Cooling", Rev.0, dated 11-21-92 E6. SONGS 2&3 P&lD's:

l 40150C, Rev.25, P&lD Diagram, Condensate Pumps System (Tanks), System No.

1305 401500, Rev.32 P&lD Diagram, Condensate Pumps System (Tanks), System No.

1305 l 40151 A, Rev.18, P&lD Diagram, Main Condenser Vents and Drains, System No.

1314 40152A, Rev.36, P&!D Diagram, Condenser Air Removal System, System No.1313 40161B, Rev.25, P&lD Diagram, Turbine Plant Chemical Addition System, System No.2422 40165A, Rev.20, P&lD Diagram, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System, System No.

, 1404- [

i 1

i

EC&FS DEPARTMENT l CALCULATION SHEET oCN NO; PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 pAoE5 Yor l Project or DCP/FCN N/A (

Calc. No M-0050417 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDtX E Sheet No. E 9 1 REV ORONATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORiolNATOR DATE IRE DATE R LX Poui sie. s-2i.es /\

j /\ /\

Anox. E. SECTION 6.. REFERENCES ... continued: h i E6. SONGS 2&3 P&lD's ... continued:

j 40150CSO3, Rev.14, P&lD Diagram, Condensate Pumps System (Tanks), System j No.1305 40150DSO3, Rev.23, P&lD Diagram, Condensate Pumps System (Tanks), System No.1305 40151ASO3, Rev.14, P&lD Diagram Main Condenser Vents and Drains, System j No.1314 40152ASO3, Rev.24, P&lD Diagram, Condenser Air Removal System, System No.

1313 I

40161BSO3, Rev.19, P&lD Diagram, Turbine Plant Chemical Addition System, System No. 2422 E7. Piping isometric drawings:

S2-1414-ML-002, SHEET 1, REV. O S2-1414-ML-003, SHEET 1, REV. O S2-1414-ML-004, SHEET 1. REV. O S2-1414-ML-005, SHEET 1, REV. O S2-1414-ML-013 SHEET 1, REV.1 S2-1414-ML-014, SHEET 1, REV.1 S2-1414-ML-014, SHEET 2, REV. O S2-1414-ML-014, SHEET 3, REV. O S2-1414-ML-014, SHEET 4, REV. 2 S2-1414-ML-016, SHEET 4, REV. 0 1

1 EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iaN os PAEUM. CCN NO.

N-2 ,,,g g ,

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject _ MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS , APPENDIX E Sheet No. 610 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Bibe 5-21-98 /\ h

/\ /\ a Apox. E. SECTION 6.. REFERENCES ... continued: h, E7. Piping isometric drawings ... continued:

S2-1414-ML-018, SHEET 1, REV. 3 S2-1414-ML-018. CHEET 2. REV. 2 -

S2-1414 ML-018, 3HEET 3, REV. O S2-1414-ML-032. SHEET 1, REV. O S2-1414-ML-020, SHEET 2, REV. 0 E8. Diaphragm Actuated Control Valve Log. # SO23-503-7-1-587, Rev. 2 (for valve LV-3259).

E9. Diaphragm Actuated Control Valve Log. # SO23-503-7-1 593, Rev.1 (for valve LV-6936).

E10. Drawing by English Electric Co. Ltd., No. TS- 15372, "LP. Exhaust Spray Cooling System Diagram", SCE Log. No. SO23-401-C-14, Revision 14 (for pump P-145)

E11. NCDB, document 90010A, Rev.47, data field for valve 2LCV-3321 (for valve LCV-3321).

~_. --. -- - -- - - . - -. . . . .-- . -- .

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NO/

PREuM. CCN NO.

N-2 , Eg r

! Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVER$10N:

, CCN NO.

j Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E11

REV ORIGINATOR DATE tRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R 4

/\ Paul Biba 5-21-98

/_\ h i

/\ /\ a )

i

\ l Anox. E. SECTION 7.. NOMENCLATURE _

i k'

Note: Subscripted parameters may be also shown as un. subscripted (such as in Lotus printouts, etc.) throughout this analysis (e.g. A, may be also shown as A1).

Nomenclature not shown in this section is described where used.

l Base ID ... Internal diameter of the " base" pipe (in]

j ,

C ... Flow coefficient for orifices a

i d1 ... ID of the small end of a reducer [in]

d2 ... ID of the large end of a reducer [in]

d,%

o .. Orifice diameter used in the calculation (in]

1

EL45 ... Number of 45a long radius elbows l EL90 . . Number of 90a long radius elbows j ELsr ... Number of 90a short radius elbows

, H ... Length of a reducer / expander Heado,1,2 . . Pump head components for derivation of total dynamic head [ft)

! K ... Hydraulic Resistance Coefficient i d

k1 ... Pump Characteristics Coefficient K. ... K value of a pipe entrance j K, ... K value of a pipe exit i K.,% ... K value for an orifice

} Km ... K value of other, miscellaneous components i Kw ... K value of a pipe reducer

Kx ... K value of a pipe expander i

K ,, ... K value of a valve MLC ... Minor Loss Coefficient m1 ... Pump Characteristics Coefficient i 01,02 ... Pump Flow [gpm)

Pipe ID ... Pipe internal diameter [in)

Tbr ... Number of tees with " flow through a branch .

Tthr ... Number of " flow through" tees

EC&FS DEPARTMENT j CALCULATION SHEET GCN NO./

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 4 l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-Ot7 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCril ANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Shoct'No. E12 REV ORONATOR DATE RE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R )

O Paul Biba 5-21-98 /_\

/\ /\ a Anox. E. SECTION 8.. COMPUTATIONS b Appx. E,8.0 GENERAL:

The computations in this analysis will be done by a computer spreadsheet program LOTUS. No mathematical derivations are made by the software Wordperfect.

Appx. E,

8.1 BACKGROUND

The system piping leading from the tank T-120 consists of two major headers, which penetrate the enclosure and continue beyond the tank to other plant areas. These are pipes 1414-023-8"-R-LLO and 1414-014-8" R-LLO.

The pipe 1414-023-8"-R-LLO supplies water to the condenser hotwells and Emergency Spray Pump P-145.

The pipe 1414-014-8"-R-LLO serves as a suction header for the Condensate Transfer Pump P-049. The Condensate Transfer Pump is not normally isolated and is expected to be operating during a post seismic event. This evaluation also includes the derivation of makeup flow to the TPCW tank T-050 (for information only), as outlined in Assumption E3.

The discharge line from the Condenser Transfer Pump is a line 1414-018-8"-R-LLO, which is routed through the T-120 enclosure and then it continues through the piping tunnel, to the turbine building. In the turbine building, a 4" branch 1414-020-4"-R-LL1 continues to the TPCW tank T-050.

This Appendix E addresses the cases evaluated in Appendix F that result in potential flow paths from T-120 following DBE due to non-1E and/or mechanical control seismic interactions.

Appx. E,8.2 TOTAL DYNAMIC HEAD OF PUMP PG49:

One of the evaluated cases involves system performance with operating Condensate Transfer Pump PO49.

The PO49 performance curve is calculated using the method per Section 5. The pump I heads are taken (or extrapolated) from the pump curve documented in Appendix A.:

150= 170 + k1

1000'"' [ft) 110= 170 + k1

1500'"' (ft]

The solution is k1 = 1.48763409*10-7, m1 = 2.70951129 I

= -_-.

2 EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NO./ N1 , AGE _gg& _

PREUM. CCN NO.

. Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

4 CCN NO. CCN -

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet N'o. E 'S REV ORONATOR DATE IRE DATE Rgv ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R I

/ \. Paul Biba 5-06-98 /\ y

/\ /\ g

. A l !

1 ,

I TABLE E8-1 i l 9 K VALUES OF REDUCERS , . . e :wu .- - .

MMMAND EXPANDgERSKred, Ke j REDUCER / d2 (largo ID) ! d1 (smallID) Sr H alpha Kred Maxp l EXPANDER lach Sch.! inch Sch. (d1/d2) Inch radians per per per per- ,

d1 d2 di d2 I 3 murmumummmmm m m m e mummmune .

m 8x6 7.981 401 6.065 40 0.7599 5 0.158 0.053 0.160 0.073 0.219 k'**_!'**7 '

l f** '"

":'" "E *) "*' *:' ' * "' "*' I J

]

i l

l l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT i

CALCULATION SHEET cCN aoi PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CcN CONVERSION:

CCN NO Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX Ei Shoot No. E14-REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE RE DATE R

/_\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E

/\ /\ 3 Apox. E. SECTION 8.. COMPUTATIONS ... continued:

Appx. E,8.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIPING MODELS:

The piping characteristics will be derived by Lotus computer spreadsheets using the methodology per Reference E5. The spreadsheets will use the values for the various reducers / expanders per Table E8-1.. I 1

3 Case 1. Makeup to the tank T-050 via line 1414-018-6"-R-LLO, with the Condensate l Transfer Pump operating, due to T-050 seismically induced cracking. I Case 2. Start of the Emergency Spray Pump P 145 due to seismic non 1E interactions.

Case 3. Malfunction of the float level control valve LCV-3321 in an open position due i

to seismic interaction, providing makeup flow to the Separator Tank T-132.

, Case 4- Makeup into condenser hotwell due to the malfunction / actuation of the condenser overboard system, or due to seismically induced condenser cracking.

Appx. E,8.4 CASE 1, Makeup to the TPCW tank T-050:

4 The simplified diagram of the evaluated piping is presented on the following sheets on ! l

) Figures E8-1 & E8-2. j l 4

Based on this piping configuration, a Lotus spread sheet is developed as presented on Table E8-2.

The flow derivation assumes fully open makeup valve to maximize the flowrate (see 4

Assumption E4). '

4 The derivation of flows for the Case 1 is presented in a spreadsheet per Table E8-3 and is for information only.

l The results from these calculations are documented in Section 2. of this Appendix E.

i EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ocN uo N1 -g,-

l PiqEUM. CCN NO.

Prok or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M4060417 CCN COWG4810N. ()

CCN NO. CCN - 4 i Subpct MISCELIANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENO(X E Sheet No. E / 6-1

~

r4V ' ORGINATOR DATE f4E I DATE R[V ORONATOR DATE 54! DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 5-06416 O h j /\ /\ s f M -dM8 . <m i ss 4 yet,

, n von u ,v /

40%

b' ht" p v' i

9' A.a ," T-120 f / g' i

8 l 4.s ig/ W l

% h,g.ej *S IN4-ott-t' u,o

y ...

pity - oil- C"- R - LU l

br 34-c, ,

4, 3

i i Iti

- got /('

i n' FI6 E2 -/

i ,

Cavo. TR. Pott? Pon

~ - k? Q,'*j DiscH. PiPid 4

u2 t n. .

. pg,:a'(*

7 p to i 7'

$ met t g' oeo-s"

$ sop 12 9' ?'.* *

)

T. h' on.: J T N 11 M.- 4's ..

- ot o- +M

W hh,w du fer I.,'p EP-2 / '

p EC&FS DEPAFITMENT CALCULATION SHEET cCN NOs PREUIA CCN NO.

N-1 g,-

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050-Ot7 CCN CONVERSION: .

CCN NO. CCN -

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E 8heet No. Ef(

F(V ORONATOR DATE IRE DATE RSV ORGNATOR DATE M 'OATE R

/\ Paul Biba 5-06-98 /\ h i

/\ /\

s l

. b 9.2lk I4 l+- O tt' R- LLI f e

i+ s' "

l

[ feer;.U-d , gr

,2 i l "

l c l l p' 1

(f.30-1 0 n ' y$f/.2r-Ils oe i l

t , l 3' g' I

0. [] -ll 1s' l

\ !

'x , <

1 I

I**S' / '

l ,

11 1914 p20 9 . 2-Lu l6 ' '

s; t i s'

l i i l . - 2 l

1 Hudf8 c l 1, i 1 38 l

\ .

l l 5 l

gg,, g 7' Hao*! fic. E8- 2 l1./;936 HAlceUP To TPCU j TANK T- 050 4

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET g h . N 2. ,, ,, g _

Projec* or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. MMO.417 CCN CONVEfEON.

CCN NO CCN -

i Subject MISCELt.ANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENOlX E Sheet No. E1"?

R$V ORONMTOR DATE IRE DATE R{V OftGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R E

. /\ Paul siba s a ss / \, v

> /\ /\ 1

l i

b _.

TABLE E8-2:

j SONGS 2: MAKEUP TO TPCW TANK T-050 BY 1414-018-6' Ia i s ie . s,1 rw.oi mes.b 1 w e I w s i- m.e i n i ono i c.w l x e i

I eI at I *t [I tini I lied i IW f I I i i fW Iass sifame g IJae 1 Fream '120 wie PO49 to ete-s'sind to T-054 1 m3 33 e.ase s.eus t7lretet F940 0.sl .

] 2 SB 33 0.1 4.05 0805 0 Uta rede O'te0 aus

. & Sa 33 Os 64es esas 0. tee i 7 840 F980 E e. s

< . as sa is saan e ens F915 ree0

$ 5 53 33 13 7 set e. gen retos ree0 e 63 33 14 GaN 6.0E8 0463 05/3 d

9'ee0 7 940 ed en 7 Da 33 1 751 LON

! rees rea0 2 a 33 33 471 est 4.0AB 0.003 4

ree0 reso ese e se as Ste d one ecue t l 4900 rete I maf~ . . tAshe- sauf Ms. W 14usterW eues thune - Cheek Esame ; n Or - esas - eens. Esists ; R&C - TOTAL Vtus ~ Yta ~ 'We iskus esses Est l IEdle } f' E.ar - [I 1TWr lI . . liv. asseO tumo ER E 4

S.998 in t.ine i Fross T130 da Poes to Ott at 88.8 02.8 17s.7 t 18E + 10 a 32 04 04 3 s sE +10 t 0.3 0.7 0.7

- Indtunt t 3 I aE+10 08 0. 8 02 4 t i mE +10 1 2 23 0.2 0.4 touG79 a S t i 1 AE + l9 1 1 1 11 0.7 04

', = = 1 d S 9.M + t 0 a 14 0 0.4 08 j 90 i F 1.0E e10 1 02 (L t 0.1 i ee !

4 15 + 10 la 2 4 4714 4A 18 2 e a t t to 30 8 2 1 30814 78 7 t h4J LVegas se 1

Mole : fo' v.f% t9%1,

ne valve" i. %

Mo$ Ntd two Y. ( W' l l

6 i

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN m/

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 PAGE_gOF_ )

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No._M-0050-017 CCN CONVER$40N:

CCN NO.

)

i Subject MISCEUANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. Eff' REV ORGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 5 21-98 /\ !

/\ /\ a l

TABLE E8-3: DISCHARGE FROM T-120 TO TPCW TANK T-050 W/ PO49 RUNNING 1eas ees cult of emer per font of T-120 h~

Time Tenn E87 flow Elev seus

( usant FLOW dann osv l

sov.

fant tR1 fast fami tRI (R) 1 58 20 704 704 0 05 S8.15 2 Se 15 ' 704 704 0 05 $810 3 SS.10 704 704 0 06 SS 08 l 4 50.00 704 704 0 06 SS 01 1 S SS 01 704 704 0.06 57 98 '

8 57.98 704 704 0.06 57.91 7 67.91 703 703 0 06 57.88 I 4 ' 57.00 703 703 0.06 57.42 '

e 57.08 703 703 0 05 57.77 l 10 57 77 703 703 0 05 S7.72

! 11 57 72 703 - 703 0.00 57.87 l 12 57.87 703 703 0 06 57 83 l 13 57.43 703 703 O OS $7 SS 14 ST.50 703 703 0.06 57 53 l 16 67.83 703 70),_Q.0t 57.45 j is 57.48 703 703 0.00 57.43 1 17 57.48 702 702 0.06 87.30 18 .5753 702 702 0.06 57.34 l

, i 19 $7 34 702 702 0.06 37.29 !

20 S7.29 702 702 0.06 57.24 ?

21 57.24 702 702 0.06 57,19 1 l

l 22 57 18 702 702 0.06 57.16 e 1

23 57.15 70E 702 0.06 57.10 l 24 57.10 702 702 0.06 5L0_6 i 1 26 S7 06 702 702 0.06 67.00 i

)

20 57.00 700 702 0.06 S8 98 l . 27 58 95 TOR 702 0.00 S8 91

! 30 SS 91 701 701 0.06 58.88 SS SS OS 701 701 0.06 58 81 l 30 SS 81 701 701 0.08 $8.70 l 31 SS TG 701 701 0 06 36.72 33 SS 72 701 701 0.06 St47 33 50.07 701 701 0 06 SS 42 l 34 SS M 701 701 0 06 $$ S7 36 M.57 701 701 0 06 S&S3 30 SS 63 701 701 0 06 SS 40 37 58.40 701 701 0.06 $$43 ,

30 88.48 700 700 0.06 St.35 l 30 M.30 700 700 0 06 58.34 40 M.34 700 700 0.08 SS.29 41 58.29 -700 700 0 06 SG 24 42 S8.24 700 700 0.08 SS.19 i I

43 58.10 700 700 0 OS 68.14 44 98.14 _ 700 700 0.00 58 10 ,

45 SS 10 700 700 0.06 $8.06 g l Total disch. vol. 31587 gal e i

I

! l 1

1 l

l i

b

3

.; EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NOJ PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 9g,q I

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 cCN CONVERSION: I CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No.1/8 REV ORIGINATOR DATE RE DATE REV

, ORGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R j _d Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_h E

! /\ /\ 4 Anox. E. SECTION 8,. COMPUTATIONS ... continued-

Appx. E,8.5 CASE 2, Start of the Emergency Spray pump P-145 due to Seismic 4

Non-1E Interactions.

< l The operation of then Emergency Spray Cooling Pump P-145 would result in a flow of i 147 gpm for 45 minutes (see Assumption E6).

I' The total outflow in 45 minutes:

O = 45

147 = 6615 gallons l

l l Appx. E, 8.6 CASE 3, Makeup Flow to the Separator Tank T-132 due to Malfunction i of the Float Unvol Control Valve LCV-3321 in an Open Position due to Seismic Interaction

, The failure of the makeup valve LCV-3321 in an open position would result in a flow of

! 5 gpm for 45 minutes or,225 gallons total, per Assumption E5.

I

ee.-

EC&FS DEPARTMENT

}

CALCULATION SHEET CCN NO/

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 ,

a Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M4050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

j CcN NO.

Subpet MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet'No. 20

]'

REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R O Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms

/_\

E

/\

/\ a 1

! Anox. E. SEC. TION 8.. COMPUTATIONS ... continued: A-l

Appx. E, 8.7 CASE 4, Makeup into Condenser Hotwell due to the

Malfunction / Actuation of the Condenser Overboard System, or due to Seismically j induced Condenser Cracking.

i i

i The simplified diagram of the evaluated piping is presented on the following sheets on

} Figure E8-3.

Based on this piping configuration, a Lotus spread sheet is developed as presented on l

. Table E8-4. The derivation of flows for the Case 4 is presented in a spreadsheet per !

! Table E8-5. I i i l The results from these calculations are documenled in Section 2, of this Appendix E.

1 i i l I

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET 'cca woi N2 g PREljM. CCN NO. -@-

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050-017 CCN CONVEMON CCN NO. CCN -

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. 62. /

R(V ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R[V ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/\ Paul Biba 50698 /,\ h

/\ /\ s A

nu g s <<.2 *a al-474

. /

, d .c' " jyty.Oltf bA"-U0 \

5'a " " ,. r g ,.

I' h ,. ;

M I 1

14(4-ot28R u0 i e I

{/.11'- 3'[ b

! Ig' / ' goe </. I'>

Fis. E2 -3 et

COWb,H0TWFLL k U , - 80! $*I A FRon T-rt o k' ut ,

i 1 Ret C/.f T ,,

L f 9.IA 9

\

> s, e4 7 l

%' , it' f gy.opy.):2 li lL0

(),tEi '$

1 p'

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I 8 g

0 002- C' Co og.$

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i EC&FS DEPARTMENT 4

CALCULATION SHEET m Nm PELM CCN NO.

N-2. ,,,, ,, 7N Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050417 CCN CONVERSION:

cCN NO. CCN -

Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E21 avv onomion om ine om ap onomrOn un su mm n

/,\ Paul Biba 5-06 98 /,\

/\ /\ a i

f TABLE E8-4:

{ SONGS 2: MAKEUP TO CONDENSER VIA 1414 -014 - 8*:

[eg s.=, lsm,, j w. ) *= ej .m.e.e j a-* l ses l *.* l ==. l cr.e.e l .c-a. .- lsg 2 Line , Fe se e.urm 1414-014-.":

4, l ,l u,m,.ilm sea es.n.d. 8.1.aas. io. aa.seneg

. l el r.

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,. ,2. F cus I ,, ,a p.,

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4 , ,.

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4 CONT EQ l re Veho fem of Nm of et l 4 eues eme.en a oma

)t t e.w or s.am s.se. bd6 l ELar l i 1.r tsuis . asLc TDIAL me we I vbs veas swee e f 1

1.v I has G Ansee G K-u ..o.f,. ... m, I

.. t,.. ,o l .i l l i . ...l ; j ..; .l .; , .

l

. - . , u, .... .,

,...., .,r...,- .

i ; , ,

i , ..i ..

,j , . . . ,

, ,,,, , , ... w.. m.

i ,

. m, .

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET cCN No; PRELN CCN NO.

N2

,,OE_gg OF_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No._M-0050 017 CCN CONVERSION.

CCN NO.

Subsect MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E 29 REV ORK31NATOR DATE tRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R O Paul Biba 5-21-98

/_\ (

/\ /\

1 TABLE E8-5: DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM T-120 TO CONDENSER HOT-WELLS Tee Tart h

flow Eev. EM

., W1r. El. does Elev.

8 2

Imrt M inomi M1 Pfl 1 58.20 2494 0.17 $5 03 toe *4ee cutt e waner per voote t- tao 2 58 03 2491 0.17 57.06 14ees mesone per foot of f-120 3 57.86 2486 0.17 57.69 4 57.00 2465 0.17 57.52 5 57.52 2482 0.17 57.36 j 6 57.35 2479 0.17 57.10

.; 7 57.18 2476 0.17 57.02

] 6 57.02 2474 0.17 56.86 j 9 RSS 2471 0.17 56.08 10 M88 2464 0.17 56.51 11 58.51 2465: 0.17 58.34 12 58.34 2462' O.17 56.18

13 58.18 2459 0.17 56'01 4

14 56.01 2466 0.17 M84

15 M84 2453 0.17 55.67 1 16 56.67 2451 0.17 55.51 j 17 56.51 2448 0.17 56.34 18 56.34 2446 0.17 56.17 19 56.17 2442 0.17 K01 20 55.01 2439 0.17 R S4 21 54 84 2436 0.17 MGS 22 MGS 2433 0.17 54.51 j 23 54 51 2430 0.17 54.34 24 M34 2421 0.17 R18 4

25 MIS 2425 0.17 54.01

, 26 K 01 2422 0.16 53.85 27 53.85 2419 0.16 53.88 20 53.00 2416 0.16 53.52 l 29 53.52 2413 0.16 53.30 s 30 63.38 2410 0.16 53.19 i 31 53,18 2407 0.16 53.03 l 32 58.03 2404 0.16 52.08 I 33 52.06 2401 0.16 52.70 l 34 82.70 2300 0.18 52.54 '

36 82.84 2308 0.16 52.37 i 3s 52.37 23e3 0.16 52.21 37 _52.21 2300 0.16 52.06 i 38 52.05 2387 0.16 51.00 30 51.80 2384 0.16 51.72 40 51.72 2381 0.16 51.56 41 51.56 2378 0.16 51.40 42 51.40 2375 0.16 51.24 43 51.24 2373 0.16 51.08 44 51.08 2370 0.16 50.91 46 50.91 2367 0.16 50.75 Total doch.vol 100363 gal I

4

EC&FS DEPARTMENT i

CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NOJ PREuM. CCN NO.

N-2 ggOF_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

9 CCN NO, l Subject MISCELLANEOUS OUTFLOWS . . APPENDIX E Sheet No. E24

} REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IM DATE R 5

/\ Paul Biba 5-21 98 /\ E

/\ /\ t Anox. E. SECTION 8.. COMPUTATIONS ... continued

j

}

Appx. E,8.8 CALCULATION EXAMPLE 1

l An example of LOTUS computations will be shown for the case 1, with P049 operating

and a postulated makeup to TPCW tank T-050.

The overall flow coefficient K of the evaluated pipe is presented in Table E8-2 above, K=175.7. The derivation of the makeup flow is presented in Table E8-3.

Only the last iterations for the first minute of makeup flow are presented here. Let's assume the makeup flow of 704 gpm.

Now, with the pump operating, the pump head would be 2

TDH= 170 - 1.48763409*10'7

704 muas = 162.2... (ft)

The tank water level at this time interval is 58.2 ft.

The elevation of the TPCW makeup is 53'-9"", or,53.75 ft.

'Ihen the flow to TPCW tank T-050 would be:

O = 19.65

6.065 ^ 2

sqrt( (162.2 + 58.2 - 53.75) /175.7) = 703.73 gpm, which is close to the above estimated flow of 704 gpm, and thus no further iterations are needed.

The tank volume per i foot is:

Pi*50^2/4 = 1963.5 cuft, or 14687 gal.

After one minute, the tank level would drop to:

57 - 704/14687 = 57 - 0.05 = 56.95 ft, which matches the water level per Table E8-3. .

I

--l l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT secN No1 N-2 -

CALCULATION SHEET ccycos,ses,0, P y "-

CCN No.

l l Project or DCP/FCN _ N/A Calc No, M-0050-017

)

) Subject BTP RSR 5-1 Condersale Inventory (AnnetidirlF Sheet fI

.i of _

l REv oneGINATOR DATE Int DATE REV ORies4ATOR DATE IRE DAYE

, O Dadd Brahms MW96 Padsee 5/12/98 ,

2 i

i i

l-J

)

1 i

j APPENDIX F Evaluation Of Non IE And Mechanical Control Seismic Interaction Impacts For 1 Piping Systems Leading From T120 segasa Rev.o aos parenE*:E so12Sxxnt.7 is]

1 1

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN No1 N-2 CALCULATION SHEET cc, comms,f ' ' '-

l CCN NO.

! Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. W-0050-017 Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendix) F Sheet F2 of nov onomaron oars me care nev onomaron urs me l oare g 0 oevid Brahms N3516 Paul Bibe s/12S8 i I. PURPOSE b

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

l a. Assess / identify potential non IE seismic interactions that could result in activation of l l

pumps or valves in piping leading from T120 resulting in loss of water in the tank.

j

b. Assess / identify any mechanically controlled valves in piping leading from T120 that could spuriously open resulting in loss ofwater in the tank. '

II. RESULTS There are two potential flow paths from T120 that must be maintained normally open that could cause loss ofinventory from T120 following a seismic event. One flow path which leads to the

]

condenser can be isolated by closure ofvalve S2(3)l414MUO92 and the other flow path which provides flow to both the condensate storage transfer pump P049 and the BPS Sluice Pumps P431 and P461 can be isolated by closure 2(3)HV5715.

The following summarizes the results of these two potentially open flow paths :

NOTE: For additional information see detailed evaluation in section V below.

A. Seismically Induced Leakage Thru S2(3) 1414-MU-092:

Two potential flow paths downstream of 1414-MU-092 could potentially open and cause drainage of T-120 following a seismic event until 1414-MU-092 is closed. These flow paths are through the condenser makeup valves and through the turbine spray water emergency pump P-145. All other flow paths downstream of 1414-MU-092 would remain closed following a seismic event.

Condenser Makeup Valves:

1. A sasmic event will not directly open the condenser makeup valves due to Non l IE seismic interactions or failure of the valve's pneumatic controller.

l l

l' l l ses aS4ae nev a n.4 persasuce soinxw.y.,33

c. -

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN Nol N-2 31 gp CALCULATION SHEET ccN co-s,0N:

CCN No.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-0050-017 Subject BTP RSH 6-1 Condensale Inventorv (Accendid P Sheet F3 of _

nev on - ron are ine are nev on - ron are ine are g 0 Dev6d Brehme 4398 Poul Osba 5/12/98

2. A seismic event could potentially cause the condenser hot well level to be reduced and thus indirectly cause the makeup valves to open due to the b

l following:

i

l. Chattering of non iE relays in the over boarding control system causing l activation of the overboard system and drain down of one or more

{ condenser hot wells.

] 2. High Energy Line Break (HELB) of condensate pump discharge.

j 3. Seismically induced condenser hotwell cracking..

Spray Water Emergency Pump P-145 System

1 Relay chatter combined with loss of air supply to TV 2819 could potentially cause P-145 to activate causing a flow path from T-120 through 1414-MU-092, to the turbine spray system via TV-2819 and parallel bypass valve HV-2819.

B. Seismically Induced Leakage Thru HV5715:

Alllines leading through HV5715 are isolated by normally closed manual valves with the following exceptions:

1. Line S2(3) 1414MLO20 to the TPCW tank T-050 This line leads to a functionallevel control valve. Hov rer, a seismic event will not directly open the TPCW makeup valve due to Non 1E seismic interactions or failure of the valve's pneumatic controller. However, the makeup valve 2/3-LV-6936 may open to maintain tank level, should there be any seismically induced cracking at the tank.

2. 3/4" line S2(3) 1414ML001 to Separator tank T-132 i

SCE 26426 REV O ese l REFERENCE SO123 XXIV 7.15l l

J

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN Noj N-2 CALCULATION SHEET ccN coNvens,of^ " y ' -

1 CCN No Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-0050-017 l

Subject BTP RSB 6-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendis F Sheet F4 of new omienavan o re sie cate nev onneuron oars ine oare g 0 Dodd Brahms 4398 Pad Bibe 5/1248 b l

This line leads to the tanks makeup level control valve. It is conservatively concluded that failure of the float associated with the valve's level controller b

due to a seismic event could result in opening of this makeup valve.

IH.

1 BACKGROUND NCR 960201089 was written to identify that the spurious opera' ion of valves, controllers and/or pumps due to seistmc or raceway interactions could result in diversion of safe shutdown condensate from T-120. The safety evaluation of the NCR identified the following potential !

flow paths from T-120:

)

l

(

a. Flow to the condenser hot well thru potentially failed open makeup control valves.

l b. Flow to the turbine plant cooling water tank (TPCW) from the discharge of the cond--fe transfer pump as a result ofa failure that would drain the tank and cause the j makeup valves to open. l

c. Flow from the discharge of the condensate transfer pump to the 1" seal water supply header. 1 l d. Flow from the discharge of the transfer pump thru a 3/4" to %" line to separator tank l T-132. The assumption in the NCR was that a seismic event may cause the tank's i manual float makeup valve to fail open. l

e. All other flow paths are isolated by manually closed valves including flow thru the sluice pumps which are isolated per NCR step 4d. 1 IV. ASSUMPTIONS

1. High energy line breaks or moderate energy line/ system breaks will be separately

{

addressed in detail in either the body of this calculation and/or Appendix E.

2. This evaluation is intended to support RSB 5-1 T-120 water commitments. Thus, since RSB 5-1 is a safe shutdown scenario under normal operating conditions, this evaluation

, assumes that plant equipment at the time of the seismic event is in its normal operating

configuration with systems at normal pressures, temperatures and level. Based on this a

SCg p nEY.0 444 pteFEREG SO12SXXIV 7.15]

,m._.._ m EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN NOl N-2 CALCULATION SHEET ccucouvonsiosP 'y '

CCN NO.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A calc No. M-0050-017 Subject BTP RS115-1 Condmate Inventory (Accendid F Sheet F5 of __

nev oniewton mis ins are nev oma ston mis me are g 0 cavid Brahms 4/348 Patf Bibe 5/12/98

+

assumption, makeup valves would be assumed closed, as the reservoirs would be normally at their normal operating levels.

b V. REFERENCES

1. NCR 960201089

2. P& IDS 40150A, B, C &D l 3. DWG. SO23-503-7-1-587-2 Fisher " Diaphragm Actuated Control Valve"

! 4. Elementary dwgs 30968, 30969, 30957,30958, 30%0

5. Operational schematic 50150

6. Vendor Dwg. SO23-503-5-2-3 Fisher level controller model 2502-249B

7. P&lD 4016] A & B l 8. P&lD 40151B

9. P&ID 40152A VI. EVALUATION l There are two moderate energy non-seismically qualified lines leading from T-120 hat could potentially drain the tank. One line (S2(3)l414ML014) flows from the tank througi seismic isolation valve 1414-MU-092. This line eventually leads to the condenser, condensate suppiy header, emergency spray water pumps, reheater drain tanks, and makeup demineralizer header.

The other line (S2(3)l414MLO23) flows through seismically qualified isolation valve IIV5715 wiuch branches to the condensate transfer pump and BPS sluice pumps. These two flow paths

{ are evaluated below:

A. Nw Paths Through 1414-MU-092

1. Line 014 from condensate supply header through LV-3245

(

=

. - _ . - _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ ____. _.

l EC&FS DEPARTMENT N-2 ICCN No1 {

CALCULATION SHEET ccNoomsf""5 '

CCN No.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-0050-017 Subject BTP RSH 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendid F Sheet F6 of nav onewon pre me ute may onewon aus me mir g !

O Dmid BrWyne 4r3/98 Paul Bdia 5/12/98 LV-3245 is a normally closed pneumatically operated fait closed (Loss of pneumatic signal) valve. This valve opens on high level in the condenser to b

return excess water via the condensate pumps to T-120. Thus, this valve would remam closed should the condenser loose level. Also the solenoid valve to this valve is normally open to its pneumatic level control signal. Any change in position of this solenoid valve due to Non IE seismic interactions would only vent off the pneumatic signal ensuring closure of this valve.

2. Line 1417MLO41 From Make Up Demineralizer Header

'This flosv path is normally closed via a matami isolation valve MU-049 and flow from T-120 is also prevented by check valve 055. Thus, this flow path can be assumed closed following a seismic event.

3. Line 1301ML515 to Reheater Drain Tank This is a %" line that is isolated by a normally closed manual valve MU-561.

Thus, this flow path can be assumed closed following a seismic event.

4. Line 1414ML016 To Emergency Spray Water Pump P-145 The turbine will be tripped following a seismic event and thus no signals would

, normally be generated to open emergency spray valves TV-2819 or HV-2822.

l However, following a seismic event credit cannot be taken for availability of air supply. Also tubing connections may fail. Since TV-2819 is a F.O. valve, this valve can be assumed to open upon loss of air.

l With TV-2819 operi, operation ofpump P-145 would supply water from T-120 to the condenser. Also, motor operated valve (HV-2822) in parallel with TV-2819 could potentially open if contact "42" on elementary 30511 is impacted to close. Although the 42 contact is considered seismically chatter resistant, j this contact is located in a non seismic location and without a specific civil 1

gCE 38420 nEY. 0 ad9e PtEFERENCE: So12kXWV 718]

l EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN No1 N2 '

CALCULATION SHEET cco cosyane,0,P ' g "-

CCN NO.

! Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-0050-017 "

Subject BTP RSE 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Anoendir)F Sheet F7 of _

=sv onesinion mir me oars nov ono m ron min ins urs g o oev6d Brehme 4W98 Paul ihbe M2/96 h l

analysis to determine otherwise could potentially have an object fall / impact the contact in such a way as to cause the relay to close. Once mechanically closed h ;

it would remain closed until a signal was received to open.

1 Based on a review ofelementary dwg. 30512, the pump will start if all of the following conditions are met:

1. Supply pressure from condensate pump as determined by PSL-2824 is l low.

i l

2. Spray control valve TV-2819 or spray control bypass valve HV-2822 is open as detected by limit switches ZSL-2819A and ZSL-2822A respectively.

3. The system has been activated by the turbine commissioning relay 63SM.

Thus, the pump could start with TV-2819 or HV-2822 failed open, chattering I

of relay 63SM and a HELB downstream of the condensate pump activating l PSL-2824 or simply by simultaneous chattering of all three (i.e. PSL-2824, ZSL-2819A or ZSL-2822A, and 63SM) series contacts.

5. Failed Open Condenser Hot well Makeup Control Valves l

l There are four makeup valves (LV-3243, LV-3257, LV-3259, LV-3258) as shown on P&ID 40150A. Per vendor dwg. S023-503-7-1-587-2 these are pneumatically operated valves designed with a spring to close upon loss of air. l l The air to open is supplied from a mechanical level control (LC-3243, LC-3257, LC-3259, & LC-3258) to the positioner of the makeup valve. From the positioner the pneumatic control signal must also travel through a normally de-energized (Open) solenoid operated valve (tag #'s LY-3243, LY-3257, LY-3259, and LY-3258) before entering the lower diaphragm casing of the valve's actuator.

Based on the following assessment of the valve's propensity to open following

a seisusc event, one seismically induced failure (other than a HELB/ moderate 4

ensgy line break event and/or seismically induced condenser hotwell cracking)

I SCE 26428 RFV O 84d jREFEnENCE. 8012OuGVJ.15]

EC&FS DEPARTMENT tecN Nol N-2 PAGE P or CALCULATION SHEET ccN couvessioN: c, CCN No. CA Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. W-0050-017 Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Aooendid P Sheet F8 of new onouron are are me nev ono mion urs me are g o oevid Brahms 4/398 Paul Bibe $/12/96 that would result in opening ofthese valves would be chattering of certain relays in the condensate over boarding control system (COCS). Under these b

conditions the makeup valves to the condenser would open to replenish the water being over boarded through the condensate pumps.

Makeup Valve Non IE seismic Interactions

a. Makeup valve solenoid valve The only electrical equipment directly associated with the makeup valves are the solenoid operated valves through which air is supplied to the actuator. This valve is normally de-energized open allowing the positioner to open and close the valve based on input from the level controllers. If the valves are assumed to be initially closed (i.e. level in the ccrai,er is at its normal level... condition assumed in the RSB 5-1 scenario) and seismic interaction cause a loss of power, the solenoid valve will remain open and no change to the valve position will occur due to this loss of power. Alternatively, should the solenoid become energized due to seismic interaction, the valve will change position blocking the pneumatic control signal to the makeup valve positioner and venting the actuator ensuring that the makeup valves will stay closed via the force ofits spring.

Thus, Non IE seismic interactions of components associated with the makeup valves cannot cause the valves to spuriously open and cause loss of water inventory from T-120.

b. Condensate Over boarding Control System (COCS)

Over boarding of condensate would lower level in the condenser hot well resulting in the opening of the makeup valves to maintain hot well normal waterlevel.

A review of the condensate over boarding control system was conducted. Some of the key dwgs associated with this review were P &

I D's 40150A, B, & C, Elementary 30968, 30969, 30957, operational schematic 50150.

{

SCE 2H24 nEV 0 844 (nEFERENCE. 8012SXXNJ 15]

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CCN NO1 N-2 CALCULATION SHEET -ocN coNvens,0NP q '

CCN NO. l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. 11- 0050-017 Subject iff? RSil 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendin F Sheet f- 9 of nav oniemmen are me mv nsv urs osuommon as mis o DW BWww 4G98 Paul Bibe 5/12/98 5

'Ihe flow path for over boarding condensate is first through a normally closed motor operated valve on a line coming off of the discharge of each of the four condensate pumps (i.e. total of four valves, one for each quadrant of the condenser). These four lines discharge into a common header which flows through normally closed pt umatically operated valve LV-3211. Thus, at least one of the motor operated valves and LV-3211 raust open in order for over boarding to occur.

Several relays were identified that if they chattered could open either one or mom of the motor operated valves or LV-3211. These relays are discussed below:

1. CNES, Model # GE-CR120AD02241 AA, identdied as CR120-4 on Elementary DWG. 30957 (E-5).

Note: Chattering of this relay (total of four, i.e. one for each motor operated valve, see 30969 for typical elementary) would open one or more of the motor operated valves (HV 3950, HV-3352, HV-3354, HV-3356).

2. AX-1, mohl PB-MRD5061, identified as OC-MDR5061, or RC-MDRS 361 on Elementary DWG. 30957,30958,30959, or 30960 (E 5).

NOTE: Chattering of this relay together with CHH-1 could energize CNEl (30957) or CNW1 (30958) or CSW1 (30959) or CSE1 (30960) which would energize LY-3211 to close. With LY 321 I closed the potential exists to open LV-3211.

3. CHH-1, identified as AGA-7012PEL on Elementary DWG.

30957(E 8). See notein 2 above

4. CNE9, model GE-CR120C31141, identified as CR120-6L on Elementary 30957 (E-3).

scE 2sme new o a*4 ptEFEnENCE: $O12SXxN.715l

EC&FS DEPARM ICCN NO1 N-2 q CALCULATION SHEET oc,ooyyens,osF ' "-

cCN No.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-0050-017 Subject BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendirl F Flo Sheet of ._

nev onneuron are me onre new onesaron care me are g 0 Dodd Brahms 4/3/98 Paul 84be 5/12/98

+

NOTE: Closure of this relay wouki energize LY -3211 A, B, C or D. Once the valves are open (even b

temporarily) they will pressurize the pneumatic line to LV-3211 and maintain this valve open if LY-32II (see item 2 above) rennins closed.

Thus, it is concluded that the potential exists for several different relays

! to chatter such that both a motor operated valve and LV-3211 could open resuhing in over boarding of condensate from the condenser. This would result in the makeup valves opening in response to the lower level in the condenser.

l Makeup Valve Loss of Air / Erroneous Pneumatic Signals Any failure of any pneumatic instrument tubing / connections or pneumatic supply to the makeup valves would only eusure that the valves would remain l closed.

l Further, a review of the level controllers (as discussed below) has determined l

that a seismically induced signal to significantly open for any significant period of time is not credible.

Note: This evaluation below does not include the possibility of a crack in the pressure boundary of the condenser which would result la lowering level in the condenser with makeup valves opening in r response to this moderate energy system break. Identification of a l

bounding HELB/MELB will be performed separately in the main l body of this calculation.

The operation ofthe level controllers were reviewd. These are (Per S023-503-5-2-3) Fisher model 2502R-249B instruments. Based on a review of vendor dwg. and design information in Fisher's instrucibn manual for Fisher 2502 series controllers (Fig 12) plus known field experience (see attached E-mail

! from Controls Fapa- Bill Phoeux) with these devices, it is reasonable to l assume that a catastrophic failure of this controller resulting in a sustained j inadvertent high signal to open (i.e. signal resulting in a significant opening of 4

~

SCE 2H3 REV. 0 444 PEFEnENCE. 30125-MNN-7.1El

~ m .

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ICCN No1 N-2 CALCULATION SHEET '

ccuco m ns d ^" "

CCN No.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A calc No. W-0050-017 Subject - BTP RSB 5-1 Condensate inventory (Annendir) F Sheet F11 of __

nev oRomrom urs me oAre ney ORamArOR Dart mE oATE g o o.u sem. c as p ui sit = sn as E the makeup for a significant period of time) is not credible. This is based on the following:

h '

l. Any failure of the air supply or pneumatic signal connections would result in a "zero" pressure signal (i.e. closure signal) to the makeup valves.

2. These are very robust devices and are used in the plant at locations (i.e.

feedwater heaters) that are subject to vibration and water hammer events. Under these conditions the devices do not catastrophically fail to a high signal.

ihther, since the controller is mounted to the condenser via moderate energy piping connections the instruments can (under HELB mies) be

== mwd to ranain mounted to the condenser (via piping connections).

Under these conditions the internals (which are of very small mass) would not experience shaking greater than that which would be experienced during shipping and handling and/or plant operation inchxhng water hammer for which these devices have proven not to be susceptible to catastrophic failure.

3. The float is encased in a "stillwell" (tube) that would prevent it from excessrve lateral movements. The float itselfis designed to move up and down with level in the condenser and thus would not be damaged by the temporary sloshing of water within the condenser. Although the water movement may cause the float to intermittently provide an open signal this would dampen out after several minutes and would not be expected to result in any significant opening of the makeup valves during this period of time.

B. How Paths Through HV5715

1. 6" Cross Tie Line S2(3) 1414ML018 This line is isolated by a normally closed valve S2(3) 1414MUO89 as shown on P&ID 40150D (F-1) see 26439 REV 0 M4 [ REFERENCE SO121 XXIV-r.1%

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ,ccN No1 N-2 CALCULATION SHEET -

cc,cosyms,J^""#,

CCN NO Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc No. M-00'A-017 "

Subject - BTP RSH 6-1 Condensate Inventory (Annendir) F Sheet F12 of 3 nev on e . aron ute w nate may amosenton oars ma care g o o.vid s,shme 4/3/98 Peuf Bibe 5/12/a6 1

l

2. 2" Line S2(3) 1414MLO22 to Hydrazine Tanks T-108 and T-109 and Ammonia Tanks T-106 and T-107.

b i This line is isolated by normally closed valves S2(3)l 414MU004, 003, 002, 001 as shown on P&lD 40161B (H-2 thru 8).

3. 4" Line S2(3) 1414ML020 To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Tank T-050 This Line is normally closed via LV-6936. LV-6936 is a fail closed valve and thus ifloss of air occurred the valve would close.

l The level controller is a Fisher model 2500-249R similar to the level controller used for the condenser makeup valves previously discussed above. This model contains the same sensor (249B) as the makeup valves and thus the logic used in the discussion of the makeup valves that determined that a seismically induced signal to sioniGr=ely open for any significant period of time is not credible remains applinble to the TPCW controller.

i Note: The above evaluation relates to the seismic non-1E interactions.

However, the makeup valve LV-6936 would open in response to loss of water from T-050 due to seismically induced cracking.

4. 1" Line S2(3) 1414MLO70 to Loop Seal Fill This line is isolated by a nomally closed valve S2(3)l414MU113 as shown on P&ID40152A (E-2)

5. 4" S2(3) 1414MLO46 Condensate Fill.

This line is isolated by a normally closed valve S2(3)l414MU005 as shown on P&lD 40150C (E-2)

6. 2" S2(3) 1414ML019 to vacuum breakers main condenser E-085.

This line is isolated by a nonnally closed valves S2(3)l414MUO45, 046, 047 as shown on P&ID 40151B (A-6, A-5, A-4)

--.~s,__,,

EC&FS DEPARTMENT ccN No1 N-2 CALCULATION SHEET ccN comns

" E '-

ccN No.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A calc No. M-0050-017 Subject HTP RSH 5-1 Condennte inventory (Annendid F Sheet F13 of _

nev ono mion mee me mir new asmaimion mis are me g

_o o.w er hm. cues m a.b. smves i

7. 1" Line S2(3) 1305MLI55 This line is isolated by a normally closed valve S2(3)l414MUO70 as shown on 3

P&ID 40152A (C-5) i

8. 3/4" Line S2(3) 1414ML601 To Separator Tank T-132.

i Flow goes to level control valve LCV-3321. During normal operation the j separator tank would be maintamed at a higher level than the level which

g initiates makeup to the tank due to loop seal line 042. Detailed description i j / vendor demgn detads of this Sont are currently unavailable. Therefore, although '

j followmg a seismic event it is unlikely that damage to this float due to sloshing l ofwater woukt occur it is conservatively assumed that the float would break off I l and the makeup valve would open.

l 9, 1%" Ilse S2(3) 1414MLG33 to Hydrazine Tank T-113, Aussonia Tank T-211.

This line is isolated by normally closed valves S2(3)l414MU005, and 096 as shown on P&ID 40161 A(C-5)

10. 6" Line S2(3) 1414MLO43 To BPS Sluice Pumps P-431 and P-461 This line is isolated by normally closed valves S2(3)l414MU001, and 004 as required per completed NCR %0201089 Rev 0 disposition step 4D.

.cr -e emnence;sotaxw.,w '

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCcN m./

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 PAGEhOF_

Prok or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050417 CCN CONVERSION.

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . . APPENDIX G Sheet No. G 1 REV ORDINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE lP.E DATE R

/_\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Drahms /\ E

/\ /\ 1 APPENDIX G: h

l l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT l l

CALCULATION SHEET m m/

PREUM. CCN NO.

N2 PAGE OF___ j Project or DCP/FCN_ N/A Calc. No.#0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . . APPEND (X G Sheet No. C2 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOM DATE l 1RE DATE R O Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms O E

/\ /\ ,

(4.7J Prom: EDWIN KIMOTO at G48 4/3/98 10:12AM (3581 bytes: 1 in) ~~

l i Toi PAUL BIBA at MESA 2

Subject:

Re(2): BORIC ACID CHECK VALVES I

................................... Forwarded ------------------------------.

i From: CAVE AGUIRRE 3/18/98 8:55AM (3344 bytes: 1 in)

] To: EDWIN KIMOTO

Subjec: : Re(2]: 3ORIC ACID C'{ECK 7ALVES

............................... Message Contents ------- ------..----------.-

.; aEAK KATE:

40 ML/HR t 3960 P a

w 3960 P = 110%(3600 CWP) 4 Reply Separacor Sub)ec:: Re: 3ORIC ACID CMECK VALVES Authort E0 WIN KIMOTO at C48 2

Cqts- 3/17/78 '1436

. AM

d : hey ; ve -he pressure at wnic . :..1.1 leax race wi.". 'e casted?

Forwar:1 Header I suoject: Aes SORIO AC:D CHECX VALVES l Auther: AVE AGUIRRE ac ~;48 l :: ace : I/17/?S ~:31 AM i

a l

i

HE 7:" *.OWI:23 *S PER .A FAX 3ENT **i:S MORNING FROM CURAEULA: l J !

1* SC7- 30CKET WELD 2600 ~*1P .5004; l

37ANDARD

EAK RATE 4 0 MI" *.** **"ERS CC'S) PER HOUR l THIS

ZAK RATE IS "'4E MAXIMUM ALLOWEC FOR METAL O METAL SEATED CHECK VALVES FER "S-SP 61.

1

AVE i

e i

i l

% - .. - .3 2

~< 3 EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NO.i PAEUM. CCN NO.

N-2 e PAGE_g3OF_

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No._ M617 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCEl.LANEOUS INPlJTS . . APPENDDC G Sheet No. Q3 REV ORKMNATOR DATE N DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE N DATE R l

/\ Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms /\ E

/\ /\ a (129) From: DONALD ASHCRAFT at AWS5 4/21/98 1:30PM (1021 bytes: 1 ini To: PAUL BIBA at MESA 2 ' '~

ces DONALD ASHCRAFT, PAUL SCHOFIF.LD at ANS2 Subject AFW Pump Packing lekkage

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mes sage Cont ent s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Paul, per your request, I'm writing to provide you with normal pump packing leak rates. This rate would be considered typical or acceptable by masutenance and operating standards. Much lower leak ratee would not be typically seen or achieved. As we discussed, if the system was used under design conditions, and the tank level lowers, the packing leak off rate would decrease. If you need further information, please let me know.

under norme.1 pump operating and full AFW tank conditions, the pump's packing leak rates are 0.25 gym por pump.

Thank you for your help, 4

Donald Asheraft. AFW system cog engineer.

l 1

J i

i i

i I

l l

. _ ,;_ = .. - .__ _ _; __

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET ICCN NO/

PREUM. CCN NO.

N-2 ,,,,ggW Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M,1Yt50-017 CCN COffdRSION:

CCN NO.

Subtect MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS , . APPENDIX G Sheet No. 6 4 REV ORONATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE tRE DATE R 1

/\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms /\ l

/\ /\ a i) 4 e w h &b J w* b ' M b Lv _ m3, - n n, - n re , - 3 2 51 -

[Caltrol[ FAX !

PE=MJ.J'L..., ,.

are. 2/1048 70 SCE-SONGS

DAV:D BRAHMS

'== ** 714/368-2451 r* GEN CLARK % PAGE8: 1 N'* 826/8 2 3501

SUBJECT:

Fisher 6 mil"EWT,dwyf $3A59%

Dav:d.

Con 6rming our telecon. The rated Cv of valva listad on subject drawing is 271.

Please conmet na ifyou have any quasmans.

BenR gardar l S~ h/

Gene Clark a

cc: Bemic Charest 5 -

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NO./

PRELIM. CCN NO.

N-2 3 PAoE _O7 OF _

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSON:

t CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . . APPENDtX G Sheet No. G 5 i l

nev momTOn oAre ins DATE nev onoisATOn cats ins cars a

/\ Paul Biba 7-15 98 C. Brahms O E

/\ /\ a l

l l

l (32] From: LAURA BARTZ at WEST 3 7/13/98 3:36PM (482 bytes: 1 in) b To PAUL BIBA at MESA 2 cc: MICHAEL JONES at WESTS Subjects Isolation of T-120 for OBE

..............................- Message Contents -----------------------

Paul, I walked down closure of MOO 92 and HV5715. It is realistic to take credit for closing both valves within 45 minutes of an OBE event.

Laura Bartz - ,

87162 m

9 0

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET cCs wo; pneum. CCN NO.

N-2 ,gg - -

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No.#0050-017 cCN oONVERSON: O CCN NO.

Subject _ MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . APPENDIX G Sheet"No. G 6 nev cao sAron oars ins oAre nev omaisAron oars ine oAre n

/J Paul Biba 7 16-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E

/\ /\ 4 DRAFT "' Meetuis Mauias *" DRAIT g r Subjaa: Cand=a= Stange Inventory issues Dees: Juns1.1998 Place- SONGS, E50 Ausndset

. Steve Root ClayWilliams Joe McGow Ed Schamr Ted Vogt Rich St. Oug Taas Raidy Mike Jones Serve Shephant Brian Woods Dwght Numm* Mahnied Hepati Greg Gibson Mike Whensa Houard Sabh

\

put tims Simimary-i De condsmann invousory in eemdsmans sesnes tank T.121, alone is h to assdy shutdown the plant. Diar lia===mm hense furihe kwassary in T-130 se wieli respect to ths ====* e(condsamans urnmenry magia psonded. We believe it is pnmiset hous.emmamated is igipedo to a hae comederense of magia and W emmpamanemy amise to adileve en immunes in condsesses margin. As inadvanas removal o(pmesduel amisa hamuisd to mappest ibs sampassenry margia ineresse is a hihse of aur W esmerol program and is superisbie as thes basis. He pendag LER is to be

! revised to clarify abst SONGS has bene whhis its beseems basis, however, eseest review has a connneed us to papes a ==*=~ revision to T 120 invasory sequmaussmas ao suure adequem magia.

l

! rw I

i Tbs evolumns atibs senums and design bass for condemses stones discussed in relaissemp a pendhg (Juts. ne medsumm inosamry is condamme sesage iak T 121 is mmment a sandy shadoms em phet (st Aaseosolsts) llis limumme bases fur the nonetty selsend condumsses morses temk T 120 mum ==ddiahad

, diving the opensing lismas aview (1982) uses wins would todmy be comedered a

- h appseesh. It is behsted ihm in shbuemag the esadamesse levensory amargia regaromano e(Ibandi Todasoni ptistessa RSB S l, Edison sad the NRC usedjudgmuses to i acuous er inventary uneenamnus and added 80,000 gallons of marsin senp 200,000 gallons of

! mvenemy agend is he renewed in T 12e er trummer to T 121.

I l A h openbilty ammsumsat _- __ , ' . was paymed for a Setty Synum Funceomal bepenian as Compamma raahap Wseur in 1988. This evalunham enesidmed abe impen etasiennessy h ibihees of ass eatory syases and congamme igion its 1

1 i

w 4

j EC&FS DEPARTMENT j CALCULATION SHEET cCN m/ N-2 4

, PREUM. CCN NO. -

j Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0Q50-017 CCN CONVERSION: '

CCN NO.

j Subject MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . . APPENDIX G Sheet No.G7 i REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R j O Paul Biba 7 15-96 D. Brahms

/_\ E j /\ /\ a 1

i safery-relseed portion of CCW. As a pen of LER 2 88 034, SCE censuusd to review each

'~"-

safety reisted sysisen for simular concens Although T 120 is not itself safety reisted, it was

rwmg==t that 200,000 galloss of condsenes inventory is 'importsat to sassy" for post-SSE

! sad possaarnerio plant simas:me, sad wenmend a simular mview. AR960201089 was messed

. I"" *,*'_ *"", W Y~

3 ,- -

. L[-9 m l

To answa the availainhty of 200,000 ofinventory in T 120 for mensfer to T 121 ader tids i r** basis, the aperuhilsty asssamment respeed w emica to inemens the i

rnargia sad resaved avsmary tam 280,000 gallnes to 382,000 sailous in T 120. In = Mea =

1 pmesdarel soups wee added io seqube pasupt ciomre of the T 120 socionse h valves.

Tbses pmesihssi maps wue inadwegundy munned from the seismic AOI procedue in Augut,

-l !

1996.11m pmaschral snaps mammed in the alma response pmcadme for s low investory stann j ; (=. "i q==tiA=8) Som T 120.

! Betwasa the semies of AR96020l009 sad the pensamt tissa, NEDO has basa pospains a l . reness to h M 00$640l? that desmusimase losass tems T 120. This tsak

! I has basa P by cosAimag neurpseemsoms a to the W husas assumpnans that i should be comadered is a mechsmune snelyus. In she mamanam, based upon the OA, revienns f

ham been issued samism the UF5AR sud sendesem APW DB0 that reesand Edissa's intet j ensindshemmummemmHo uppeds the emies basis to mest mechauses saunarus of aa-i====w Icss.

J

! h was suecluded that the licasses basis for T 120 invensory isme. Thisis cenasesut widi ths limmses basis poshion doomssmand eseshiished in Assessment 20 to AR f'i 960201009.

! It was -w that she demies buis Air T 120 condenum unassary was == web the i hemsing basis sail AR9dO20l009 mes W (moes: the AFW DSD taas updmed in 1997 i

! ; to renset meshausels pipe buusk impost a T 120 hevensory dse to usoksies of D8D OIR l ,

92 104) It mes seestuded that th: design basis has dammend tem lhe liosumes basis as a resuk

! of abs OA for AR 960201009 sad the subsupmm mediScauses a the UFSAR sad DBD.

l 4

j Beemass these chmages speciassily endeed spamar amins ao dass the T-120 sociosse isolenos vaivas, the inadvensa semoval ofIbs procubest maps is comesy to dm =h==*arve comemis pseyes sadis repornhis, '

i 7

NEDO was asssened azion to pospus a senman a the desies bass to ===h==na=ily secous i for leesse to T 120 eenasent wish ihe ammusases o(RS85-1 sad the sammense shst opensor j smina at 30 mamses may be audied es issies the T 120 anciense well. As R$B 51 shusdown j is not sumanad in coupesmen whk a HEUI. NEDO will sino doesnnes wins ce be done to add

to the enhusmuss of the systemi(assed the das tr operaar saica) through ressalyas of tavamory squsemens er denies changes. (Accoass Hojsei) j 1 !,

i [

(

i

4 EC&FS DEPARTMENT

CALCULATION SHEET IcCN m> N-2 PAGE_gOF_

PREUM. CCN NO.

l Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc, No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION: (

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELLANEOUS INPUTS . . APPEND (X G Sheet No. Q 8 REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV OF4GINATOR DATE 1RE DATE R O Paul Biba 7-15-96 D. Brahms

/_\ E l /\ /\ 3 i - _.

]

NRA was assiped an a tion to revise the salve LER ad claify that SONGS remamed witha l the liansing bassa, based upon OL review enginsennsjude==r and to commus to extend the '~ '

l bases to approprisasty address -heconadsrutions (Acconse:Smish. Due:&22/93) j

&re was Anther d=== sessnhas the reportshdity, as osside design bums, of this issue.

l Since we had evolved nrw desigs bases to cope with sysesin imenramos, it was expressed that t'nis repreenats an impikit adsmowledgmass tbs: the time befuse lhe design basis diangs was time i

outade the design bois, laammandi a the hcensmg bois has always basa est, such evohman is

} evidence of Edison's ==g cSort to i:.aprove safety margins, only, and does not constmee a faihare to have adequais design bases.

i '

l Reconied by Steve Sbspbsid, &l>93 Appmved by: Rich St Once 4

I I

l

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCUL.ATION SHEET iCCN Nos N2 ,,,, 3, @

PRELM CCN NO. - -

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M 0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELiANEOUS INPUTS . APPENDtX G Sheet No. Ga9 REV ORIGINATOR DATE 1RE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE R

/[\ Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms []

E

/\ /\ a All, Compliance has a different recollection of the meeting. Howard Smith has compiled our thoughts below. If you have any questions, please let me know.

Clay E. Williams Steve's minutes do not agree with what I recall regarding a few key issues.

1. "An inadvertent removal of procedural action intended to support the compensatory margin increase is a failure of our administrative control program and is reportable on that basis."

Violations of admin controls are not reportable, per se.

2. "The pending LER is to be revised to clarify that SONGS has been within its licensing basis, however, recent review has convinced us to prepare a mechanistic revision to T-120 inventory requirements to assure adequate margin."

a. The design bases changed no later than February 1996, when AR 960201089 was issued. That AR accomplished, amoung other things, a new T-120 required volume (382K gals) and operator actions post OBE to preserve the safe shut down volume (200K gal.) . The deletion of the ACI steps placed T-120 outside its " revised" design bases, and is reportable under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (ii) .

b. Plant Licensing was to reseach the UFSAR changes and the DBD to determine whether an earlier date for the design bases change can be established.

Based on the outcome of 2.b., a second I.ER may be required if the design bases did change prior to 2/1996. If 2/1996 is che change date, I would suggest we return to a single LER (procedure error) and place the design bases history in the Additional Information section to document why and when the design bases changed.

3. "It is believed that in addressing the condensate inventory margin requirements of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1, Edison and the NRC 969

EC&FS DEPARTMENT CALCULATION SHEET iCCN NO/ N2 ,A,,97 O, j PREUM CCN NO.

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No. M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSON: ;

CCN NO.

Subject MISCELIANEOUS INPUTS . . APPENDIX G Sheet No.@10..

REV ORfGINATOR DATE IRE DATE REV ORGINATOR DATE tRE DATE R

/_\ Paul Biba 7 15-98 D. Brahms

/_\ E !

/\ /\ 4 .

1 i

used Judgement to account for inventory uncertainties and added 80,000 gallene of margin atop 200,000 gallons of inventory required to be h

reserved in T-120 for transfer to T-121."

I do not believe the documentation supports the notion that the 80K gals I

was " margin." The 80K was required to protect the 200K gals. It was

known that 40K was unrecoverable from the tank / vault and that 40K gals

could leak threngh cracks in the vault wall caused by the DBE. The

leakage through the cracks is recognized as very conservative (maybe

even incredible), but that was the number assigned. Margin would be j water above 200K gals which are not earmarked for something. There may be margin in the 200K itself.

4. "NEDO was assigned action to prepare a revision to the design bases l to mechanistically account for losses to T-120 consistent with the assumptions of RSB 5-1 and the assumption that operator action at 30 minutes may be credited to isolate the T-120 enclosure wall. An RSB d 5-1 shutdown is not assumed in conjunction with a HELB. NEDO will also detennine what can be done to add to the robustness of the system (extend the time for operator action) th: rough reanalysis of inventory requirements or design changes. (Actionee: Hojati)"

1 This should be included in the LER as a corrective action. The I.IR should be revitsed when the design bases is finally established, i

5. "There was further discussion regarding the reportability, as outside design basis, of this issue. Since we had evolved new design bases to cope with system interaction, it was expressed that this represents an implicit acknowledgement that the time before the design basis change was. time outside the design basis. Inasmuch as the licensing basis has always been met, such evolution is evidence of Edison's continuing effort to isprove safety margins, only, and does not constitute a failure to have adequate design bases."

I still disagree with the blue text. It ignores the fact that existing but previously unrecognized conditions can put us outside the design bases. Errors of osmission should be included as well as errors of commission.

The origiani design bases did include an allowance for some known or anticipated losses following a DBE (the 80K gals). It also anticipated losses in the secondary plant with the requirement for isolation valves.

Those losses have been ideutified and no margin is available to compensate for them.

I don't understand the difference between T-120 and the ccw issues which put CCW outside its design bases. These were existing but previously .

EC&FS DEPARTMENT

- CALCULATION SHEET ccu m./ N-2 5 PREUM. CCN NO. -

Project or DCP/FCN N/A Calc. No._M-0050-017 CCN CONVERSION:

CCN NO.

Subject MISCEU ANEOUS INPUTS . . APPENDIX G E Sheet No. C,11 REV ORIGINATOR DATE tRE DATE REV ORIGINATOR DATE IRE DATE l R

/_\ Paul Biba 7-15-98 D. Brahms O E i.

/\ /\ 4 4

unrecognized conditions which were not explicitly included in the CCW design bases.

J j 6. We may want to consider reporting the pre-1996 condition as "a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures. " (also 10CFR50.72 (a) (2) (ii)) . This provides the same i

~ infomation to the NRC (the real goal), and eliminates the need to define what the original design bases was, whether it was adequate, who thought what when, and at what time did we change the design baas to require additional water and operator action. I think we all agree that, while early on our procedures relied on " skill of the crafta, we evolved to more and more detailed procedures. It is still uncertain as to exactly when SONGS would have put the operator actions into the AOI, but it seems highly likely it was af ter 1982 but before 1996. ,

HSS Steve -

Good sumary. I've provided my comments in the form of redline and strikeout changes to your WP file (attached) .

Jon McGaw Reply Separator subject: 6/1 Condensate Meeting Minutes Author: STEVE SHIPHERD at NISL6 Dater 6/2/98 7:33 AM All, Draft minutes for yesterday's condensate meeting are attached. Please review and provide any comments by 6/3.

Thanks, Steve Shepherd {

ML20206R292

Text

6.0 REFERENCES

8.1 BACKGROUND

Subject:

SUBJECT:

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