ML20204J811
| ML20204J811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1986 |
| From: | Kalman G, Minor S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608110202 | |
| Download: ML20204J811 (20) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Region V THRU: John Stolz, Director PWR Project Directorate.#6 Division of PWR Licensing-B Rick Weller, Section Leader PWR Project Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing-B FROM: Sydney Miner, Project Manager &
George Kalman, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing-B
SUBJECT:
RANCHO SEC0 - NRR SALP REPORT FOR PERIOD JUNE 1, 1985
' THRU JUNE 30, 1986 Enclosed is the.NRR input for the SALP. The input was prepared in response to your memorandum of July 8,1986 and is in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0516. 'The report contains enclosures that provide background of activities, reviewer ratings and licensing actions used in preparing the report.
OR!C!NAL S!GNED BY
- ' Sydney Miner, Project Manager &
George Kalman, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing-B
Enclosure:
i As Stated
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Mr. John E. Ward Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Sacramento Municipal Utility District Station cc:
Mr. David S. Kaplan, Secretary Sacramento County and General Counsel Board of Supervisors Sacramento Municipal Utility 827 7th Street, Room 424 District Sacramento, California 95814 6201 S Street P. O. Box 15830 Ms. Helen Hubbard Sacramento, California 95813 P. O. Box 63 Sunol, California 94586 Thomas Baxter, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. Ron Columbo Sacramento Municipal Utility District Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station 4440 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95638-9799 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division ~
Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Resident Inspector / Rancho Seco c/o U.~S. N. R. C.
14410 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95638 Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Director Energy Facilities Siting Division Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Commission 1516 - 9th Street Sacramento, California 95814 Mr. Joseph 0. Ward, Chief Radiological Health Branch State Department of Health Services 714 P Street, Office Building #8 Sacramento, California 95814
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Docket No. 50-312 FACILITY: Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station LICENSEE: Sacramento Municipal Utility District EVALUATION PERIOD: June 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986 PROJECT MANAGERS: Sydney Miner, George Kalman I. INTRODUCTION This report presents the results of an evaluation of the licensee, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), in the functional area of licensing activities. It provides NRR's input to the SALP review process as described in the NRC Manual Chapter 0516. The review covers the period June 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986.
The approach used for this evaluation was in accordance with Office Letter No. 44 which requires that each organization responsible for developing a Safety Evaluation also provide a SALP input upon completion of the evaluation.
Additional inputs were solicited for selected review areas of particular significance. The Project Managers also provided inputs on selected licensing actions. In most cases the staff applied the SALP evaluation criteria for the performance attributes based on first hand experience with the licensee or with the licensee's submittals.
The individual SALP evaluations for each rated licensee issue were assembled into a matrix which was then used, with appropriate weighting for the importance to safety of the licensing issue, to develop the overall evaluation of the licensee's performance.
This approach is consistent with NRC Manual Chapter 0516 which specifies that each functional area evaluated will be assigned a performance category based on a composite o# a number of attributes. The single final rating is to be tempered with judgement as to the significance of the individual elements.
II.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS Based on the approach described in the Introduction, the performance of SMUD in the functional area of licensing activities is rated Category 3.
III. CRITERIA Evaluation criteria as given in NRC Manual Chapter 0516 Table 1 were used in this evaluation. Weighting was used to temper the evaluation of each individual licensing issue depending upon its importance to safety.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS Generally, the licensee's performance was evaluated for the seven attributes specified in Manual Chapter 0516. These are:
- Management involvement and control in assuring quality
- Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint
- Responsiveness to NRC initiatives
- Enforcement History
- Reportable events
- Staffing
- Training This performance assessment is based on our evaluation of the licensee's performance in support of licensing actions which had a significant level of activity during the evaluation period. These actions included the licensee requests for license amendments, responses to generic letters, and various submittals of information for multi-plant and NUREG-0737 actions and the licensee's response to a number of events that occurred following completion of the Cycle 7 refueling outage in June 1985. Active actions during this period are classified below. A total of 39 licensing actions were completed.
o 54 Plant-specific actions (24 completed). Included in this category and used to provide input to this evaluation are:
Minimum Boron Concentration During Refueling Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Emergency Power Testing 10 CFR 50.61 Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule Requirements, Phase 1 Nuclear Instrument Calibration Alternate Shutdown Capability
- Snubber Surveillance Requirement Pressurizer Heater Capability t
l
- Miscellaneous Corrections to the Technical Specifications Regarding l
Fire Hose and Reporting Requirements
- Reactor Vessel Head Vent Exemption
- Review of Management and Operational Problems (June to December 25,1985) 1 - Review of December 26, 1985 Transient Closure Times of Containment Isolation Yalves l
Deletion of Appendix B Specifications AFW Operability and Surveillance Requirements Editorial Changes o 24 Multi-Plant Actions (14 completed). Included in this category and used to provide input for this evaluation are:
- Generic Letter 83-28, Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 Post Maintenance Testing - RTS and other Safety Related Components Generic Letter 83-28, Items 4.2.1 and 4.2.4 Preventative Maintenance Program for Reactor Trip Breakers
- Generic Letter 83-28, Items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 Post Maintenance Testing Procedures and Vendor Recommendations
- Generic Letter 83-28, Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 Post Maintenance Testing - Vendor Related Modifications
- Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.5.1 Reactor System Functional Testing - Diverse Features Trip
~
- Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.1 Reactor Trip System Reliability
- Natural Circulation Cooldewn, MPA B-66 Instruments to Follow the Course of an Accident (RG 1.97) o 10TMI(NUREG-0737) Actions (1 completed). Included in this category and used to provide input for this evaluation is:
Generic Letter 83-37 NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications i
A. Management Involvement and Control in Assuring Quality The overall rating for this attribute is Category 3.
Since completion of the 1985 refueling outage early in June 1985, the beginning of the evaluation period, there have occurred a number of failures and transients at Rancho Secc. This resulted in a large portion of the staff time and effort being devoted to reviewing the licensee actions taken in
- response to the failures and/or transients. SMUD management took a direct and active participation in the recovery program. However, these programs were, in general, narrowly focused to correct the specific problems identified by the failure or transient. After the December 26, 1985 overcooling transient, the licensee still narrowly focused on addressing those issues highlighted by the l transient with direction towards short term fixes to the problems so that the plant could resume operation. This narrow focus was typical of the SMUD management response even though the series of failures and transients that had occurred since the June 1985 startup would indicate significant programmatic and design deficiencies. Finally in April 1986, the licensee, in response to an NRC senior management meeting at Rancho Seco, embarked on a major Management and Performance and Improvement Program. In June 1986, the licensee submitted a preliminary version of its Action Plan for Performance Improvement for staff evaluation of the scope and content of the plan. However, the plan was not clear as to what was to be completed prior to restart nor did it indicate that ;
more than a minimal post outage test program was to be conducted.
As a result of a site visit by an NRC staff team at the end of June 1986, the staff noted that very little progress had been made to define and implement a meaningful system review and test program. The NRC considers the system
, review and test program to be a key element in demonstrating that Rancho Seco can be operated safely and reliabily.
During the evaluation period there have been two re-organizations, including changes in most of the senior management of the nuclear organization. These positions are now occupied by contractor personnel with extensive outside experience who are expected to occupy these positions over the next year or two.
There are indications that the management changes have resulted in management improvement, especially in the latter part of the evaluation period. However, the licensee Management and Performance Improvement Program is still being implemented and there is insufficient information for us to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the program.
In the area of amendment requests, SMUD submittals are still of poor quality and they appear to have little management attention. In our previous evaluation we suggested that management attention be increased in the screening of amendment requests to assure that they provide sufficient discussion of safety issues and the bases for proposed changes. This has not been done. Licensing applications 4
and submittals still fail to address relevant safety concerns and include errors, omissions, duplications and superfluous calculations and documentation. In addition, the "No Significant Hazards Determinations" have been inadequate and,
- in general, do not address the three guidelines provided in the 10 CFR 50.92(c).
Examples of recently received applications that have these deficiencies are Deletion of Appendix B Specifications, AFW Operability and Surveillance Requirements and Editorial Changes, t
B. Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint The overall rating for this attribute is 3.
In general, the licensee has an understanding of the issues and provides acceptable resolutions to problems. This was demonstrated in the resolution of issues associated with the Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28), Pressurizer Heater Testing and Snubber Surveillance Technical Specifications.
However, in some areas there is a lack of thoroughness and depth in the approach to resolution of issues. For example, in the area of Technical Specifications a number of the submittals have been incomplete and have taken considerable time and effort to arrive at acceptable resolutions. Examples of this are Minimum Boron Concentration During Refueling, Emergency Power System Testing and NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications (Generic Letter 83-37). With regard to the NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications, in our previous evaluation we noted that this item was not resolved even though about one year ago we thought we had all the problems resolved. Subsequent submissions had errors, revised approaches that did not meet the guidelines, duplications and omissions such that this issue was not resolved until November of 1985. An acceptable submission was compiled only after step by step guidance was provided to a member of the SM'JD compliance staff by the NRC project manager. Repeated NRC contact with compliance management had been ineffective in resolving this matter.
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. C. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives f The overall rating for this attribute is Category 3.
In the area of responding to individual licensing items other than Technical Specifications, the responses are generally complete and on schedule. The licensee generally alerts the staff when extension to a particular submittal date is needed. In the area of Technical Specifications, a number of the responses are still late and incomplete.
- In a number of instances the licensee is behind the other B&W plants and the industry in general is making plant improvements. The licensee did not i install a safety related system that would initiate auxiliary feedwater on loss of main feedwater. Tha auxiliary feedwater pumps start on loss of feedwater but the control valves are still controlled by the Integrated Control System. This was a major contributor to the overcooling transient that occurred on December 26, 1985. The licensee does have safety grade control valves in the AFW system but these are controlled by the Safety Features Actuation System which is not initiated on loss of main feedwater.
The safety grade automatic initiation will be installed next refueling outage which is beyond the implementation dates for similar improvements at other
- B&W plants. Another example is the licensee's failure to complete the
! requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Instrumentation to Follow the Course of
, an Accident. The licensee's responsiveness did not meet NRC guidelines and singled out Rancho Seco as one of the slowest plants to implement the required changes. This item remains unresolved.
- Other problem areas include SMUD actions related to offsite releases of radioactive liquid effluents. In 1984 the licensee took the initiative to reduce radioactive liquid effluents by changing from their practice of regenerating secondary side demineralizer resins to utilizing throw away resins. During this evaluation period, when it.became apparent that its initial initiative to reduce liquid waste inventory was not sufficient, the licensee abandoned constructive means to resolve the problem and instead, manipulated sampling techniques to meet the Technical specification limits.
The resultant discharges exceeded the Technical Specification for offsite i exposure.
- Development and implementation of the SMUD Management and Performance l
Improvement Program in response to an NRC concern regarding the narrowness of SMUD's approach to the plant transients and failures is an indication of recent improvement in this attribute. Even though we have not reviewed the program in detail, the Systematic Assessment portion of the program appears to be structured to uncover equipment, procedures and maintenance problems.
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D. Enforcement History During this period, NRR participated in three enforcement conferences dealing with radioactive liquid releases and the December 26, 1985 transient. The licensee's performance related to these issues is reflected in the other attributes. ,
E. Reportable Events The overall rating for this attribute is 3.
During this report period Rancho Seco Unit I reported eighty-five events to the NRC Operations Center as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Twenty-four of these events were also reported as Licensee Event Reports (LER) as required by 10 CFR 50.73. Twenty-two of the eighty-five 10 CFR 50.72 report descriptions indicate reportability under 10 CFR 50.73 for which LERs were not submitted.
Additionally, three of the 30 LERs submitted during this report period indicate 10 CFR 50.72 reportability for which no 10 CFR 50.72 report was made.
During this report period eight of the above events were considered serious enough to warrant presentation at the NRC Operating Events Briefings:
- 1. The May 30, 1985 emergency diesel generator (D/G) circuitry problem (LER 85-009). The D/G circuit problem was identified as a design deficiency that had existed for the plant life having potential generic implications in all plants with similar Bruce-GM D/G sets.
- 2. The June 5, 1985 reactor trip breaker failure (LER 85-006). The reactor trip breaker test failure was caused by an incorrect setting of the rivet-to-armature clearance. IE Information Notice 85-58 (July 17,1985) addressed this issue.
- 3. The June 23, 1985 reactor coolant system (RCS) high point vent i
unisolatable leak (LER 85-010). The RCS high point vent pipe failure leak was caused by fatigue cracking due to deficiencies in the as-built piping / support configurations.
- 4. TheOctober2,1985reactortripanduncontrolledcooldown(LER85-019).
This first uncontrolled cooldown resulted from the lifting of two relief valves on a feedwater heater following a reactor trip. Personnel actions were required to mitigate this fairly complex event, whereby the Technical Specification cooldown rate was exceeded.
- 5. The October 7, 1985 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump bearing failure. The AFW pump bearing failure resulted from an approximate 2 hr. run time on the motor driven AFW pump following a loss of both auxiliary boilers.
Subsequent to the cooldown and AFW pump failure events, an NRC headquarters team was dispatched tn the site and a licensee " Project
. Restart" list was developed which included repair of AFW pump bearing, an endurance run, and root cause analysis of both events.
- 6. The December 5, 1985 reactor trip on high pressure resulting from underfeeding the main feedwater system (LER 85-023). An attempt to place the Integrated Control System (ICS) back in fully automatic mode resulted in a positive feedwater flow anomaly. Operator response to this anomaly resulted in a reactor trip on high RCS pressure caused by underfeeding the main feedwater system.
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- 7. The December 26, 1985 reactor trip and uncontrolled cooldown (LER 85-025).
, An ICS failure initiated an overcooling event that exceeded Rancho Seco's pressurized thermal shock (PTS) guidelines. NUREG-1195 documents the incident investigation team (IIT) fi.ndings. The licensee has initiated a PlantPerformanceandManagementImprovementProgram(PP&MIP)asa corrective action.
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- 8. The March 3, 1936 Class IE station battery problems (LER 96-005). Extensive erosion (flaking) inside Class IE station batteries and incorrect battery spacing has instituted an evaluation of the licensee's battery t surveillance program. '
4 Considering all reported events for this period, five reactor trips were experienced, with four of these being automatic trips resulting from reactor protection system actuation. Twenty of the above reported events were due to ,
, engineered safety features (ESF) actuations. Eight of the reported ESF
- actuations were similar events concerning spurious instrumentation signals Cdusing the closure of the decay heat pump suction valve with subsequent loss 3
of decay heat cooling. The repetitive nature of these events indicated that j the utility has had trouble responding and dealing with the root cause.
Review of the date for this reporting period indicates that automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System and manual SCRAM resulted in 4.00 l trips per 1,000 critical hours. A recent study conducted by ORAS has 4
indicated an industry average 1985 total SCRAM rate of approximately 1.7 per 1,000 critical hours. Therefore, the operational experience indicates Rancho Seco to be performing well below the 1985 industry average for this criteria.
Events at Rancho Seco are generally reported within the required time period following the occurrence. Reporting usually appears to be accurate and j complete. However, three initial phone call reports, a scram report made on i June 12, 1985 and two ESF activation reports made on May 12, 1986 and May 13, i 1986, were not reported in the required 10 CFR 50.72 time period. Also, a follow-up LER 85-011 did not identify that the Group 1 control rods had scrammed upon RPS channel trip as previously reported in the June 12, 1985, 10 CFR 50.72 report. As noted above and identified in appendix B twenty-two 10 CFR 50.72 reports indicated the need for reportability under 10 CFR 50.73 for which subsequent LERs were not issued. Additionally three LERs indicated the need for 10 CFR 50.72 reportability for which none were made. The utility must take greater care in describing the nature and complexity of events to the NRC in their initial phone call as well as ensuring the required LERs are submitted. This identified weakness is recommended as an item to be incorporated and resolved in the licensee's proposed Management and Performance Improvement Program.
Based on the above observations, we are of the opinion that weaknesses are evident and t5at licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory perfonnance with respect to operating experience is achieved.
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F. Staffing The overall rating for this attribute is Category 2.
In general, there now appears to be adequate staffing in the licensing area.
The licensee has recently increased the staff directly involved in the management and oversight of Technical Specifications and, as a result of NRC staff communication in this area, has improved since the last evaluation 4
period. However, as noted above, although staffing appears to be adequate, Technical Specification amendment submittals were still of poor quality, indicating that better management review of these submittals is needed. The manager of licensing has recently been replaced by a contract person with extensive experience in licensing.
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G. Training The overall rating for this attribute is 2.
During this report period we completed our review of the licensee's revised Operator Training Program for NRC Hot License Candidates and NRC Licensed Operator Retraining Program and found the training programs acceptable.
H. Housekeeping and Control Room Behavior Overall Although no rating is provided for this attribute, based on the limited number of site visits during this period and the time of such visits relative to shutdown preparations, we conclude that housekeeping efforts are adequate, and that control room operators conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner.
V. Conclusions Based on our evaluation of licensing activities, an overall rating of 3 is assessed for SMUD licensing performance for the period June 1,1985 to June 30, 1986.
VI. Recommendations SMUD's management should provide a high level of involvement in licensing to assure improvement; and specifically in the oversight of Technical Specifications to improve the quality of amendment submittals.
Appendix A
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES
- 1. NRR/ Licensee Meetings (15)
Rancho Seco MSRC Meeting Actions Arising out of INP0 Evaluation SALP Meeting Enforcement Conferences (3)
PASS (2)
Maintenance Survey October 2,1985 Transient December 26, 1985 Transient and the Performance Improvement Program (5)
- 2. NRR Site Visits (10)
Rancho Seco MSRC Meeting Maintenance Survey October 2,1985 Transient (2)
Participate in Monitoring Plant Startup December 5, 1985 Transient and the Performance Improvement Program (4)
NUREG-0737 Technical Specification License Amendment Application
- 3. Commission Briefings - None
- 4. Schedule Extensions - None
- 5. Reliefs Granted (1)
ISI of Reactor Coolant Pumps
- 6. ExemptionsGranted(2)
Reactor Vessel Head Vents Fire Protection - 72 Hour Cooldown
- 7. License Amendments Issued (14)
- 8. Emergency Technical Specification Changes Issued - None
- 9. Orders Issued - None
- 10. NRR/LicenseeManagementConferences'(3) 1
Appendix B Ranco Seco Reporting History A. LERs Not Reported Under 10 CFR 50.72 LER # 50.72 Requirement Description 85-013 (b)(2)(ii) Engineered Safety Feacture (ESF)
Actuation 85-017 (b)(2)(iii) ' A' D/G breaker locked out 85-020 (b)(2)(iii) CR/TSC Essential HVAC inoperable
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- 8. 50.72 Events Not Reported Under 10 CFR 50.73 50.72 Event # (Date) 50.73 Requirement Description 01039(6/5/85) (a)(2)(ii) Loss of containment integrity 01117(6/11/85) (a)(2)(ii) ESF degradation 01121(6/12/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation
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01130(6/12/85) (a)(2)(ii) (similar to event 01117) 01139(6/13/85) (a)(2)(ii) (similar to event 01117) 01319 (7/2/85) (a)(2)(vii) Both CR/TSC HVAC trains inoperable 01927(8/30/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation 02027(9/9/85) (a)(2)(i) Technical Specification (TS) violation 02030(9/10/85) (a)(2)(i) TS violation 02161(9/23/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation 02587(10/30/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation 02905(11/30/85) (a)(2)(1) TS violation 03084(12/16/85) (a)(2)(1) TS violation 03180(12/29/85) (a)(2)(1) TS violation 03185(12/30/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation ll 03189(12/30/85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation
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50.72 Event # (Date) 50.73 Requirement Description 03194(12/31[85) (a)(2)(iv) ESF actuation 04561(5/9/86) (a)(2)(iv) Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation 04593 (5/12/86) (a)(2)(iv) RPS actuation 04825 (5/28/86) (a)(2)(iv) ESF Actuation 04903 (6/3/86) (a)(2)(i) TS violation 05228 (6/26/86) (a)(2)(1) TS violation 4
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RANCHO SECO EVALUATION MATRIX Appendix C i
Branch Licensing Management Approach to Responsive- Enforcement Reportable Staffing Training Action Involvement Resolution ness History Events PWR-B Natural R. Jones Circulation -
2 3 - - - -
Cooldown, MPA B-66 47170 1
PWR-B Instruments G. Kalman to Follow 3 3 3 - - - -
Course of An Accident (R.G. 1.97)
, 51126
- Not Completed PWR-B NUREG-0737 G. Kalman Tech. Spec. 3 -
3 - -
3 -
(G.L. 83-37) 54352 RV, Minimum Boron J. Zwetzig Concentration 3 3 2 - - - -
During Refuel.
57293 RV, Low Temp.
J. Zwetzig Overpressure 2 1 1 - - - -
Protection 59325 Not Completed
! RV, Emergency Power J. Zwetzig Testing 3 3 1 - -
3 -
57587
P.ANCHO SECO EVALUATION MATRIX Branch Licensing Management Approach to Responsive- Enforcement Reportable Staffing Training .
Action Involvement Resolution ness History Events PWR-B, 10 CFR 50.61 P.N. Pressurized 2 2 2 - - - -
Randall Thermal Shock Rule Req:
Phase 1 59976 Not Completed RV, Nuclear J. Zwetzig Instrumentation 2 1 1 - -
2 -
Calibration 52607 RSB, Reactor Vessel R. Jones Head Vent -
2 2 - - - -
Exemption 57558 DSL:ASB, Alternate D. Katze Shutdown -
2 2 - - - -
Capability 52291 RV, Snubber J. Zwetzig Surveillance 2 1 1 - -
2 -
Requirement 43606
RANCHO SECO EVALUATION MATRIX Branch Licensing Management Approach to Responsive- Enforcement Reportable Staffing Training ,
Action Involvement Resolution ness History Events ICSB G.L. 83-28 D. Lasher Items 3.1.3 & 1 1 1 - - - -
3.2.3 Post Maint.
Testing - RTS and other Safety Related Components 53036, 53875 RV, G.L. 83-28 J. Zwetzig Items 3.1.1 & 2 2 1 - - - -
3.1.2 Post Maint.
Testing - Vendor Related Mod.
52955 RV, G.L. 83-28 J. Zwetzig Item 4.5.1 2 1 1 - - - -
Reactor System Functional Test.
Diverse Features Trip 54102 RV, G.L. 83-28 J. Zwetzig Item 4.1 2 1 - - - - -
Reactor Trip Sys. Reliability 53091
, O RANCHO SECO EVALUATION MATRIX Branch Licensing Management Approach to Responsive- Enforcement Reportable Staffing Training .
Action Involvement Resolution ness History Events l EQB G.L. 83-28 N. Romney Items 4.2.1 & -
2 2 - - - -
4.2.2 i Preventative i Maintenance
! Program for Reactor Trip Breakers 53144 1
RV, G. L. 83-28 J. Zwetzig Items 3.2.1 & 2 2 2 - - - -
1 3.2.2
- Post. Maint.
. Testing Proced.
& Vendor Recomm.
53792
) CSB, Closure Times i
C. Li of Containment -
1 1 - - - -
j Isolation Valves 55532 a
4 RV, Pressurizer J. Zwetzig Hetter 2 1 - - - - -
1 Operability 4
Tech. Spec.
56366 I
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RANCHO SECO EVALUATION MATRIX '
l Branch Licensing Management Approach to Responsive- Enforcement Reportable Staffing Training Action Involvement Resolution ness History Events I
RV, Misc. Correct.
J. Zwett.ig to Tech. Spec. 2 - - - - - -
Regarding Fire i Hoses and Report.
Requirements 57127 PWR-8, Delete "All" &
G. Kalman " Entire" from 3 -
1 - - - -
) Audit Section 61480 i
Not Completed
- PWR-B Management & '
2 S. Miner Operational 3 2 3 - - - -
Problems (June i thru Dec. 25, i 1985)
! MTEB, 59691 j B. Elliot 3 2 3 -
2 - -
1
! PWR-B, Review of i S. Miner Dec. 26, 1985 3 2 3 - - - -
l Transient I 60462 I
i r