ML20203L644

Reply to Suffolk County,State of Ny & Town of Southampton 860415 Petition for Review of ALAB-832 Re Emergency Planning.Petition Should Be Denied W/Exception of Issues Re Emergency Planning Zone Boundaries.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20203L644
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	04/28/1986
From:	Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20203L615	List: ML20203L610 ML20203L644
References
ALAB-832, OL-3, NUDOCS 8605010323
Download: ML20203L644 (15)

Text

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h LILCO, April 28,1986 00CKEfE0 USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOf,6 APR 29 P1 :29 Before the Commission

{ r u..

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S REPLY TO INTERVENORS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ALAB-832 On April 15, Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southampton ("Intervenors") filed a joint petition for review of ALAB-832. The petition seeks Commission review of all issues decided adversely to Intervenors. The Commis-sion should deny it (except in one respect discussed below) because it is based on an in-correct statement of law and because Intervenors have failed to establish the necessary predicates for review specified in 10 CFR 55 2.786(b)(4)(1) and (11). The Commission should also consolidate its review of such issues as it takes on review of ALAB-832 with those it takes from ALAB-818.

I. NRC Regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Precedent Do Not Require Detailed, Separate Rulings on Each Issue Presented on Appeal Intervenors' petition begins by asking the Commission to review every issue de-cided adversely to them. Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Petition for Review of ALAB-832 (hereinaf ter "Intervenors' Petition"), at 4-9. Their basis for this far-reaching request is essentially procedural. They allege that by f alling 8605010323 e60428 PDR ADOCK 05000322 0 PM ,

'k to provide its own detailed statement of findings and conclusions on each and every issue raised on appeal from a detailed Licensing Board decision,M the Appeal Board failed to comply with NRC regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and applicable legal precedent. Intervenors' Petition at 4-5.

The starting point for Intervenors' novel, and incorrect, theory is 10 CFR S 2.770(b). That section provides that when the Commission issues a final decision:

(b) The Commission may adopt, modify, or set aside the findings, conclusions and order in the initial decision, and will state the basis of its action. The final decision will be in writing and will include:

(1) A statement of findings and conclusions, with the basis for them on all material issues of f act, law or discretion pres-ented; (2) All facts officially noticed; (3) The ruling on each material issue; and (4) The appropriate ruling, order, or denial of relief, with the effective date.

10 C.F.R. S 2.770(b). Reasoning that if the Commission falls to review ALAB-832, that action becomes final agency action under 5 2.770(b), Intervenors argue that the Appeal Board failed to " state the basis of its actions," and that that failure now warrants Com-mission review. Intervenors' Petition at 4.

Intervenors' analysis goes astray from the start since it falls to recognize that S 2.770(b)is a judicial-review provision designed to ensure that final Commission deci-sions pass later judicial scrutiny, not one intended to dictate the structure of internal review within the agency itself. The decisional record that will be scrutinized by a re-viewing court includes not only the decision of the last reviewing body in the agency, 1/ While Intervenors concede that the Appeal Board was not required "to discuss in minute detail every single aspect of each issue raised by the Governments on appeal,"

Intervenors' Petition at 5, they make no attempt to explain what in their view would have constituted an adequate explanation. Even a cursory review of Intervenors' peti-tion indicates that the Intervenors would require lengthy discourses on each of 38 issues they believe they raised on appeal. See Intervenors' Petition at 5-6 and Attachment I.

a but also all decisions preceding that one. See 5 U.S.C. S 557(c). Clearly then, the ini-tial decision and the Appeal Board decision in ALAB-832 must be viewed together be-fore any judgment can be made about the sufficiency of these decisions under S 2.770(b) for future judicial review.

Viewed in this light, Intervenors' claims are witho t merit. Af ter 77 days of hearings and voluminous written fillrgs, the Licensing Board issued a 409 page initial decision which painstakingly details the factual cases presented by each party on each issue, and then resolves each issue based on the entire factual record. On appeal of that decision, Intervenors were given a larger-than-normal brief of 100 pages to con-Vince the Appeal Board that the Licensing Board had erred. Rather than use this op-portunity to present a focused appeal of matters of significance to public health and safety,Intervenors, in the Appeal Board's words:

made little, if any, effort to select the "most promising issues for review." To the contrary, from all appearances, we have been favored with an uncritical rehearsal of virtually every claim -- large or small -- that was advanced to and rejected by the Licensing Board below.

ALAB-832, at 9-10 (footnote omitted).E Despite this broad, unfocused appeal, the 2/ In footnote 2 on page 2 of the Intervenors' Petition the Intervenors claim credit for all the issues they did not pursue on appeal, naming several examples. This claim is just an effort to make a virtue of necessity. In the first place, the Intervenors re-frained from raising every issue in sight simply because the Appeal Board's page limit kept them from it. In footnote i to their brief to the Appeal Board they said, "This brief does not address all the errors committed by the ASLB because the Appeal Board's 100 page limit has prevented that." The Intervenors asked for 20 more pages to deal with additional errors, for example, Contentions 67 and 73 - two of the issues they now cite as examples of restraint in footnote 2 of their petition for review of ALAB-832.

Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Brief on Appeal of Li-censing Board April 17, 1985 Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning, Oct. 23, 1985, at i n.1. In the second place, the issues the Intervenors did not appeal are insubstantial or frivolous. For example, Contention 20 asserts that WALK-AM does not operate at night. Well before the hearings LILCO advised the County that WALK does broadcast on the FM band at night and needs only to press a button and flip a switch to broadcast over the AM frequency as well. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5254, at 5-6. The (footnote continued)

I

e Appeal Board reviewed each and every claim ("Each claim has received our attention,"

ALAB-832 slip op. at 10) and then concluded that the vast majority of these claims

" lack sufficient merit or significance (or both) to require further discussion" (id.). Nel-ther 5 2.770(b) nor S 557(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires more.W The cases cited by Intervenors (see Intervenors' Petition at 5-7) do not compel a different conclusion; if anything they support LILCO's position rather than the (footnote continued)

County refused to settle the issue and insisted on litigating it, although it presented no testimony on the subject. Similarly, Contention 21.C on public information for Hispanics asserts that there are 1300 Hispanic residents in Brookhaven and Riverhead who speak English poorly or not at all. In f act, LILCO's evidence showed that there are only 419 such people in the entire EPZ, about 0.04% of the population. Clawson et al.,

Tr. 5752, at 6-8, A tt.1-2. Once again the Intervenors presented no evidence on this contention and were unable to defend the 1300 when LILCO asked them its source. To take another example, Contention 64, which alleges that protective action recommen-dations do not adequately account for wind shif ts, was an issue that not even the Inter-venors' technical experts agreed with. See Cordaro et al., f f. Tr. 8760, at 38, Att.11 &

12 (stricken by Licensing Board). The Intervenors again presented no testimony on this issue. And Contention 96 on evacuation during loss of offsite electric power claims, in effect, that an emergency plan is inadequate unless every person's house has an emer-gency generator in the back yard. Once again, the Intervenors presented no witnesses on this issue. In short, the Intervenors do not deserve credit for not raising these issues on appeal; they deserve criticism for raising them at all.

3/ Intervenors' attempt in footnote 5 of their petition to suggest that the initial de-cision cannot be read to support the decision in ALAB-832 is meritiess. First, the fact that the Appeal Board may not have talismanically recited that it " adopted, approved or even recognized" the ASLB's findings does not render its decision infirm. It is per-fectly obvious that when the Appeal Board rejected Intervenors' claims as meritless and/or insignificant, it implicitly accepted the ASLB's decision on those issues. Second, as a matter of law, Intervenors are incorrect that the NRC's regulations require the Commission and Appeal Board to explain in detail their reasoning on all material issues presented to them. In f act, S 2.770(b) has never been interpreted in any NRC decision, and as noted below, see pp. 5-6, courts that have considered this issue in analogous agency proceedings have uniformly held that such repetitive detailed rulings are not re-quired. Third, Intervenors have done nothing more than baldly assert that on some is-sues, "the ASLB never stated a reasoned basis for its rulings." This general claim falls to meet the requirements for concise pleadings detailed in 10 CFR S 2.786(b)(2).

Fourth, the Appeal Board was under no duty to identify the issues presented to it on ap-peal. In fact, given the compulsiveness of Intervenors' appeal this would have been a difficult task undoubtedly subject to additional Intervenor complaints that the Appeal Board had improperly characterized the issues before it.

-a Intervenors'. These cases merely stand for the straightforward and long-accepted rule of administrative law that in order for a reviewing court to carry out its judicial duties under S 706 (and more specifically, in the case of adjudicatory proceedings, S 706(2)(c))

of the APA, it must be able to follow the agency's decisionmaking path to determine whether the agency considered the entire factual record before reaching its decision and whether that decision was supported by substantial evidence.M For example, in a case cited by the Intervenors (Intervenors' Petition at 6), Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), the court noted that the findings of the agency's hearing examiner are part of the record and should be considered:

The Examiner's decision is part of the record, and the record must be considered as a whole in order to see whetner the result is supported by substantial evidence. The agency's departures from the Examiner's findings are vulnerable if they fall to reflect attentive consideration to the Examiner's decision. Yet in the last analysis it is the agency's function, not the Examiner's, to make the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and where there is substantial evidence supporting each result it is the agency's choice that governs.

Here, the Commission accepted the Examiner's findings and conclusions to a substantial degree; and when it did not, the Commission made clear not only its awareness of what the Examiner had concluded, but also its reasons for taking a dif-ferent course.

444 F.2d at 853 (footnotes omitted). In none of these cases did a court single out any one of the agency's internal decisions while ignoring the rest of the agency process.

4/ For example, in Taylor v. Heckler,595 F.Supp. 489 (D.D.C.1984), cited in Inter-venors' Petition at 7, none of the three levels of review in the agency (Administrative Law Judge, Appeals Council, or Secretary of Health and Human Services) had addressed the evidence that needed to be addressed; the district court clearly did not pick out only the Appeals Council's decision and review it in isolation. Indeed, the problem was basically that both the Administrative Law Judges and the Appeals Council had failed to address conflicting evidence. See id. at 492; s_ee also Harborlite Corp. v. ICC, 613 F.2d,1093 n.12 (D.C. Cir.1979) ("The initial Board report and the subsequent Division opinion must be considered together because the Division adopted the findings and con-clusions of the Board.").

0 The cases cited by the Intervenors do not address the relevant question here -

whether successive appellate bodies within a federal agency are automatically required to make specific, separate rulings on each exception brought before them. The courts that have considered this question have concluded that where the agency record is, in the aggregate, adequate, successive intra-agency reviewing bodies are not required "to go through the laborious process of issuing [their] own decision-report (s]," Younger Brothers,'Inc. v. U.S., 238 F. Supp. 859, 861 (S.D. Tex.1965), and that separate, specific rulings are not required on every issue presented on appeal.EI Accordingly, there is no procedural reason for granting Intervenors' petition.

Further, Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that any of the issues rejected by the Appeal Board warrant Commission review under 5 2.786(b)(4). Section 2.786(b)(4) provides, in part, that:

(4) The grant or denial of a petition for review is within the discretion of the Commission, except that:

(1) A petition for review of matters of law or policy will not ordinarily be granted unless it appears the case involves an important matter that could significantly affect the envi-ronment, the public health and safety, or the common defense and security, constitutes an important antitrust question, in-volves an important procedural issue, or otherwise raises im-portant questions of public policy; (11) A petition for review of matters of fact will not be granted unless it appears that the Atomic Safety and Licens-ing Appeal Board has resolved a factual issue necessary for decision in a clearly erroneous manner contrary to the resolu-tion of that same issue by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

10 CFR S 2.786(b)(4)(1) and (11) (emphasis added). Intervenors have made no effort to 1/ Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 63 (3rd Cir.1978);

NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579,585 (10th Cir.1960), cert. denied,364 U.S. 871 ;(1960); Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v. U.S., 302 F. Supp.1095,1106 (E.D.N.Y.1968).

identify whether the issues they raise are matters of law, policy or fact, much less indi-cate how, if those issues involve matters of law or policy, they could significantly af-feet public health or safety, or, if matters of fact, that the ASLB and Appeal Board reached contrary factual conclusions. Indeed they could not possibly show the latter, since with regard to matters of fact the Licensing Board and Appeal Board are in har-mony.

Intervenors have attempted in only one instance to make the necessary showings, and then only in the most indirect way.EI They argue that the plans for schools are inadequate under NRC requirements. Intervenors' Petition at 7-8. But in essence Intervenors' entire argument is semantic, based on the fact that the school dis-tricts have not adopted separate plans specifically for a "Shoreham emergency." Inter-venors' Petition at 7. They argue that school boards have not agreed to implement the LILCO Plan, and that existing school plans are inadequate because they were not spe-cifically developed with Shoreham in mind.

Both arguments are beside the point. The NRC does not require schools to agree to protect their students, for obvious reasons. Nor it does not matter whether the school boards are in favor of or opposed to Shoreham, or whether they thought about Shoreham when they wrote their plans,if in fact they have emergency plans that are in fact adequate to deal with a Shoreham emergency. New York State requires that schools have emergency plans and update them each year, and the plans for most of the schools (as they were at the time of hearing in 1984) are in the record.II j/ In all other cases, Intervenors have summarily stated that those issues " involve similarly critical safety matters and established NRC precedent." Intervenors' Petition at 8. As proof, Intervenors would have the Commission read their voluminous briefs to the Appeal Board and then decide the merits of these sweeping claims for itself. The Commission should summarily reject this invitation as contrary to the pleading require-ments of 10 CFR 5 2.786(b)(2).

2/ As the Licensing and Appeal Boards agreed, it does not matter whether the school plans were developed with Shoreham in mind if in fact they provide for the es-(footnote continued)

In short, the Intervenors' argument has little or nothing to do with whether the necessary actions can and will be taken in an emergency and hence whether public health and safety would be protected. Instead, it addresses the mental states of the people who drew up the plans and of the school officials who are now responsible. As such,it is essentially irrelevant and does not warrant Commission review.

II. The Appeal Board Did Not Err in Limiting its Remand on the Issues of EPZ Size and Congregate Care Centers Intervenors next argue that the Appeal Board did not go far enough in its remand of issues on EPZ size and congregate care centers. The Intervenors' Petition does not make a case for Commission review on either issue. Nevertheless, for the reason given below, LILCO supports review of the EPZ size issue.

A. EPZ Size The Appeal Board remanded aspects of the Intervenors' contention about EPZ size for further litigation but limited the issues to " minor adjustments" such as a mile or two. ALAB-832, slip op, at 20 n.37, 22 n.41. LILCO has asked the Commission to find that the remand was unjustified, and now the Intervenors ask the Commission to over-rule the limitation of "a mile or two." Intervenors' Petition at 9-11. Since these two sides of the issue are tied up together, it does not appear to LILCO that the Commission (footnote continued) sential actions that might have to be taken in a Shoreham emergency. And they do.

The "go home" plan for a Shoreham emergency would involve exactly the same actions taken in a snow emergency, which the schools frequently implement. The sheltering plan is basically " staying put." (Some of the school plans in the record explicitly ad-dress sheltering from nuclear attack.) Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/30/84 Vol. II, at 89, Att. 23, 26A, 29, 32, 33, 34. Finally, the evacuation plan uses the same buses as the "go home" option but simply takes the school children to different destinations. To the extent there may be shortcomings in the existing school plans, LILCO has taken specific mea-sures to fill the gaps; for example, LILCO has committed, for the evacuation option, to find relocation centers and provide maps for the bus drivers.

I

e

_g-can review the EPZ size issue without getting into the Intervenors' claims that more than a mile or two adjustment may be required. Accordingly, although LILCO believes that the Intervenors' Petition does not meet the standards of 10 C.F.R. S 2.786 as to this issue, LILCO recommends that the Commission undertake review nevertheless.

In fact, the Intervenors' clamoring for Commission review of this issue merely supports LILCO's argument, in its petition for review at pp. 7-8, that Contentions 22.B and C have nothing to do with the " minor adjustments" referred to in the Appeal Board's decision, but rather contemplate wholesale EPZ revisions.

Accordingly, although the Appeal Board was correct in deciding that 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(c) contemplates adjustments of no more than a mile or two, and the Intervenors are therefore incorrect in their argument to the contrary, LILCO believes that this issue should be reviewed by the Commission, along with the question raised by LILCO as to whether the remand was justified at all.

B. Congregate Care Centers

" Congregate care" centers are the facilities, mostly schools and churches, that would be used to feed and house evacuees af ter they had lef t the EPZ and been moni-tored for radioactive contamination at the Nassau Coliseum. Under the LILCO Plan these shelters are provided by the American Red Cross. At the time of an emergency the Red Cross chooses the best places from a list of facilities that have agreed to serve as shelters during emergencies.

Af ter the record on the adequacy of congregate care centers closed, the owners of a number of these facilities (mostly school districts) wrote the Red Cross and the NRC to say that their agreements with the Red Cross do not cover an emergency at Shoreham (as distinguished from other types of emergency). There is no dispute about any of this. The Intervenors think it is highly significant.

But the fact that the County's and State's opposition has inducedE some state agencies to oppose Shoreham raises no safety issue, becattSe of the Licensing Board's sensible resolution of the matter. Recognizing that the agreements between the Red Cross and the individual facilities are revocable at will and that many of the agree-ments were somewhat dated, the Board concluded that LILCO should confirm that the agreements between Nassau County shelter facilities and the Red Cross remain in ef-feet. In the event that some agreements ww. not confirmed, the Board expected the Red Cross would find other suitable facilities. The Board lef t the matter of review of the confirmed Red Cross agreements to NRC Staff oversight. Concluding PartialInitial Decision on Emergency Planning, LBP-85-31,22 NRC 410,423 (1985).

The Board's ruling should end the matter. There can be no serious question that the NRC Staff is capable of confirming whether effective agreements exist. If they do

] not, LILCO will not be allowed to operate the plant until they are. There is simply nothing in this issue that would warrant the Commission's attention.

Moreover, even without agreements it is hard to credit the proposition that the American Red Cross cannot find shelters for homeless people in an emergency. (These are people, remember, who will have been monitored and if necessary decontaminated already, and who will therefore be indistinguishable from evacuees from any other type of emergency such as a fire or flood.) As a different licensing board said,"We cannot attribute much weight to a concern that the American Red Cross . . . would not be ade-quately prepared with resources and staff to fulfill its obligation. . . ." Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-18,19 NRC 1020,1046-47 3/ The letters were prompted, apparently, by contacts made by one of Suffolk County's witnesses, a long-time, dedicated opponent of Shoreham. Four of the letters cite the Governor's opposition to Shoreham as a reason for refusing to cooperate. See ff. Tr.15,986.

I L

(1984).EI This is particularly the case here, where the Nassau County Executive has pledged to cooperate in making facilities available. Att. 6, ff. Tr.15,870. It is equally hard to credit the argument that the various schools and churches that have claimed their agreements do not cover a Shoreham emergency would in fact refuse shelter to homeless people because they were evacuating from a Shoreham emergency rather than a hurricane or a fire:EI indeed, LILCO does not believe that even the Intervenors would claim that any particular school district would turn people away in an emer-gency.

CONCLUSION The Commission should deny Intervenors' petition for reviev. of ALAB-832 ex-cept as to its issue of EPZ boundaries, which should be treated with LILCO's issues.

Finally, the Commission should consolidate its review of factual issues at Shoreham, most of them arising out of ALAB-832, with that of legal issues, predomi-nantly raised by ALAB-818. Most, if not all, of the factual issues remaining are struc-tural ones which are purely the result of governmental recalcitrance and LILCO's having to step into the breach. LILCO's " realism" argument and the provisions of 5 50.47(c)(1) are unavoidably related, as LILCO pointed out in its Petition to Review 9/ The County conceded on the witness stand that "it is (not] inappropriate for LILCO to rely on the American Red Cross because the American Red Cross has a good record in dealing with all sorts of natural disasters." Tr.14,878 (Harris). FEMA wit-nesses testified that LILCO's agreement with the Red Cross providing that the Red Cross will furnish relocation centers is all that need be included in the LILCO plan. Tr.

14,572-74,14,611-15 (McIntire, Kowieski, Keller). They also testified that, in their view, it is an accepted fact that the Red Cross provides relocation centers and cares for people in an emergency. Tr.12,989 (Keller).

M/ Mr. Rasbury, the Red Cross witness, testified that during the last major commu-nitywide disaster on Long Island (a hurricane), no agreements were in place and yet school districts and many others responded admirably to house the homeless. Cordaro, et al., ff. Tr.14,707, at 17: Tr.14,815 (Rasbury). Mr. Rasbury explained that as an added measure of planning following the hurricane experience, the Red Cross sought various agreements with the school districts, but that experience showed that people would respond whether or not agreements existed. Tr.14,860 (Rasbury).

l ALAB-832 at 4-5. The Commission's ability to treat the Shoreham problem effectively

- or that of any other completed reactor faced by a government boycott - requires it to be able to view all its related parts together, so that it can, for instance, understand I

the kinds of factual constraints that are associated with a utility compensating plan, in evaluating its compliance with the provisions of 10 CFR S 50.47(b) and (c)(1).

Respectfully submitted, JJP W. Ydylor Rev'eley, III

~

Donald P. Irwin James N. Christman Lee B. Zeugin Kathy E. B. McCleskey Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P. O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 28,1986

LILCO, April 28,'1986 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of REPLY OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY TO INTERVENORS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ALAB-832 were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by an asterisk, or by first-class mail, post-age prepaid.

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman

• Gary J. Edles, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing 1717 H Street, N.W. Appeal Board Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts

• Fif th Floor (North Tower)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 1717 H Street, N.W. 4350 East-West Highway Washington, DC 20555 Bethesda, MD 20814 Commissioner James K. Asselstine

• Dr. Howard A. Wilber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisison Atomic Safety and Licensing 1717 H Street, N.W. Appeal Board Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

+

Commission Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal

• Fif th Floor (North Tower)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 1717 H Street, N.W. 4350 East-West Highway Washington, DC 20555 Bethesda, MD 20814 Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

• Morton B. Margulics, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman 1717 H Street, N.W. Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20535 Board U.S. Nudlear Regulatory Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Commission Chairman East-West Towers, Rm. 402A Atomic Safety and Licensing 4350 East-West Hwy.

Appeal Board Bethesda, MD 20814 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fif th Floor (North Tower)

East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814

w 3 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Donna Duer, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney Board Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory East-West Towers, Rm. 427 Commission 4350 East-West Hwy. East-West (North Tower)

Bethesda, MD 20814 4350 East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.

• Board Special Counsel to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Governor Commission Executive Chamber East-West Towers, Rm. 430 Room 229 4350 East-West Hwy. State Capitol Bethesda, MD 20814 Albany, New York 12224 Secretary of the Commission Mary Gundrum, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorney General Commission 2 World Trade Center Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 4614 New York, New York 10047 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Spence W. Perry, Esq.

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory General Counsel Commission Federal Emergency Washington, D.C. 20555 Management Agency 501 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20472 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Commission New York State Energy Office Washington, D.C. 20555 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.

• Albany, New York 12223 Oreste Russ P!rfo, Esq.

Edwin J. Reis, Esq. Stewart M. Glass, Esq.

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regional Counsel Commission Federal Emergency Management 7735 Old Georgetown Road Agency (to mailroom) 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Bethesda, MD 20814 New York, New York 10278 Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

• Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

• Karla J. Letsche, Esq. Twomey, Latham & Shea Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 33 West Second Street Eighth Floor P.O. Box 298 1900 M Street, N.W. Riverhead, New York 11901 Washington, D.C. 20036

s 3 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq. Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.

New York State Department of Counsel to the Governor Public Service, Staff Counsel Executive Chamber Three Rockefeller Plaza State Capitol Albany, New York 12223 Albany, New York 12224 William E. Cumming, Esq. Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.

• Associate General Counsel Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.

Federal Emergency Management Suffolk County Attorney Agency H. Lee Dennison Building 500 C Street, S.W. Veterans Memorial Highway Room 840 Hauppauge, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Dr. Monroe Schneider Ms. Nora Bredes North Shore Committee Executive Coordinator P.O. Box 231 Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Wading River, NY 11792 195 East Main Street Smithtown, New York 11787 5

.? -

Dothfid P. Irwin Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 28,1986