Safety Evaluation Approving Technical Evaluation Rept for Waste Handling & Packaging Facility & Recovery Operations Plan Change 36 Submitted on 851112 & 860416,respectivelyML20202H571 |
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Three Mile Island |
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07/10/1986 |
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NRC |
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Shared Package |
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ML20202H558 |
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NUDOCS 8607160369 |
Download: ML20202H571 (10) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217G1001999-10-14014 October 1999 Errata to Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to FOL DPR-50.Credit Given for Delay in ECCS Leakage ML20216F9231999-09-22022 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License DPR-50 ML20211E8731999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License DPR-50 ML20211B1931999-08-19019 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License DPR-50 ML20209G0011999-07-0909 July 1999 Staff Evaluation of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Plant,Unit 1 ML20212H9101999-06-21021 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 212 to License DPR-50 ML20207B6621999-05-27027 May 1999 SER Finding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Periodically Verify design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at TMI-1 & That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Required in GL 96-05 ML20206D4201999-04-20020 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption from Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2.c for Fire Areas/Zones AB-FZ-4,CB-FA-1,FH-FZ-1,FH-FZ-6,FH-FZ-6, IPSH-FZ-1,IPSH-FZ-2,AB-FZ-3,AB-FZ-5,AB-FZ-7 & FH-FZ-2 ML20205Q6111999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 210 to License DPR-50 ML20205Q5981999-04-13013 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 209 to License DPR-50 ML20206P2841999-04-12012 April 1999 SER Approving Transfer of License for Tmi,Unit 1,held by Gpu Nuclear,Inc to Amergen Energy Co,Llc & Conforming Amend, Per 10CFR50.80 & 50.90 ML20196K3561999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Although Original Licensee Thermal Model Was Unacceptable for Ampacity Derating Assessments Revised Model Identified in 970624 Submittal Acceptable for Installed Electrical Raceway Ampacity Limits ML20196F6861998-12-0202 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan Request for Alternative to ASME B&PV Code Section XI Requirements Re Actions to Be Taken Upon Detecting Leakage at Bolted Connection ML20195C6921998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-73 ML20153A9941998-09-16016 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Denying Request to Remove Missile Shields from Plant Design ML20151U8821998-09-0808 September 1998 SER on Revised Emergency Action Levels for Gpu Nuclear,Inc, Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20237A8331998-08-12012 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting USI A-46 Program Implementation at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217K4851998-04-24024 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 207 to License DPR-50 ML20199G8371998-01-22022 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20198K2281997-10-16016 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 206 to License DPR-50 ML20211G8561997-10-0202 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License DPR-50 ML20210Q9991997-08-28028 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Since 25th Tendon Surveillance on Few Yrs Away,Adequacy of Remaining Prestressing Force Will Be Critical to Verify ML20217Q7341997-08-27027 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 203 to License DPR-50 ML20149F9961997-07-18018 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Gpu Nuclear Operational Quality Assurance Plan,Rev 10 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1 & Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ML20149D2671997-07-11011 July 1997 SER Concluding That Exemption from Listed Fire Areas Should Be Granted & Exemption from Fire Area FH-FZ-5 Should Be Denied ML20138H6671996-12-19019 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util IPE Submittal in Response to GL 88-20 ML20134D7811996-10-24024 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 51 to License DPR-73 ML20128L6741996-10-11011 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Third ten-year Interval for Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program for Facility ML20128K1981996-10-0808 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 50 to License DPR-73 ML20094Q0301995-11-24024 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 199 to License DPR-50 ML20092N2551995-10-0202 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License DPR-50 ML20087G5771995-08-14014 August 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-50 ML20086R7421995-07-24024 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-50 ML20077C2901994-11-28028 November 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-50 ML20071N3991994-08-0101 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-50 ML20071K8921994-07-25025 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-50 ML20071L2381994-07-25025 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-50 ML20071K8741994-07-25025 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-50 ML20070H2851994-07-14014 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-50 ML20073S3941994-05-23023 May 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 184 to License DPR-50 ML20059D1771993-12-28028 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 48 to License DPR-73 ML20062M2481993-12-21021 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 180 to License DPR-50 ML20062K1041993-12-0606 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 47 to License DPR-73 ML20058F0311993-11-16016 November 1993 SE Informing That Changes to Pdms Requirements & Commitments List of 930115,does Not Constitute Unreviewed Safety Question,Nor Do They Involve Significant Hazard or an Environmental Impact ML20059K3001993-11-0808 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 46 to License DPR-73 ML20057A8321993-09-10010 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 178 to License DPR-50 ML20057A3641993-09-0101 September 1993 SER Denying Licensee 930216 & 0416 Requests for Relief from Certain Requirements of ISI Program ML20056F0171993-08-0505 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes to Pdms Requirements & Commitments List of 930115 ML20128P7321993-02-19019 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 171 to License DPR-50 ML20128K0771993-02-11011 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-50 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G1001999-10-14014 October 1999 Errata to Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to FOL DPR-50.Credit Given for Delay in ECCS Leakage ML20217K4701999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for TMI-1.With ML20216F9231999-09-22022 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License DPR-50 05000289/LER-1999-010, :on 990830,discovery of Condition Outside UFSAR Design Basis for Flood Protection Was Noted.Caused Because Original Problem Was Not Corrected by Design Change.Flood Procedure Was Immediately Revised.With1999-09-21021 September 1999
- on 990830,discovery of Condition Outside UFSAR Design Basis for Flood Protection Was Noted.Caused Because Original Problem Was Not Corrected by Design Change.Flood Procedure Was Immediately Revised.With
ML20211H5111999-08-31031 August 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to MPR-1820(NP), TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis ML20211Q3551999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With ML20211E8731999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License DPR-50 ML20211B1931999-08-19019 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License DPR-50 ML20210R4791999-08-13013 August 1999 Update 3 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage SAR, for TMI-2 ML20210U4791999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for TMI-1.With 05000289/LER-1999-009, :on 990626,automatic Start of EDG 1A Occurred. Caused by Failure of Fault Pressure Relay on Auxiliary Transformer 1B.Failed Pressure Relay Has Been Replaced1999-07-22022 July 1999
- on 990626,automatic Start of EDG 1A Occurred. Caused by Failure of Fault Pressure Relay on Auxiliary Transformer 1B.Failed Pressure Relay Has Been Replaced
ML20209G0011999-07-0909 July 1999 Staff Evaluation of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Plant,Unit 1 ML20210K7651999-07-0909 July 1999 Rev 2 to 86-5002073-02, Summary Rept for Bwog 20% Tp Loca ML20209H8251999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Commission with Evaluation of & Recommendations for Improvement in Processes Used in Staff Review & Approval of Applications for Transfer of Operating Licenses of TMI-1 & Pilgrim Station ML20209H1421999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for TMI-1.With ML20212H9101999-06-21021 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 212 to License DPR-50 05000289/LER-1999-007, :on 990528,increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays Characterized by Coil Overheating & Failing to Fully re-close After Being de-energized Was Discovered.Cause Indeterminate.Relay Check Procedure Has Been Changed1999-06-18018 June 1999
- on 990528,increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays Characterized by Coil Overheating & Failing to Fully re-close After Being de-energized Was Discovered.Cause Indeterminate.Relay Check Procedure Has Been Changed
05000289/LER-1999-005, :on 990514,open Flood Path Between Turbine Bldg & Control Bldg Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize That Mods Affected Flood Protection.Revised Flood Procedures.With1999-06-14014 June 1999
- on 990514,open Flood Path Between Turbine Bldg & Control Bldg Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize That Mods Affected Flood Protection.Revised Flood Procedures.With
ML20195H0751999-06-0808 June 1999 Drill 9904, 1999 Biennial Exercise for Three Mile Island ML20209G0351999-05-31031 May 1999 TER on Review of TMI-1 IPEEE Submittal on High Winds,Floods & Other External Events (Hfo) ML20195H9261999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for TMI-1.With ML20207B6621999-05-27027 May 1999 SER Finding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Periodically Verify design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at TMI-1 & That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Required in GL 96-05 05000289/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990310,discovered Failure of Manual Balancing Damper in Supply Duct of Control Bldg Evs.Caused by Failure to Adequately Review Risk & Consequences of Change.Failed Damper Was Clamped Open1999-05-0707 May 1999
- on 990310,discovered Failure of Manual Balancing Damper in Supply Duct of Control Bldg Evs.Caused by Failure to Adequately Review Risk & Consequences of Change.Failed Damper Was Clamped Open
ML20206R0571999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With ML20206D4201999-04-20020 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption from Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2.c for Fire Areas/Zones AB-FZ-4,CB-FA-1,FH-FZ-1,FH-FZ-6,FH-FZ-6, IPSH-FZ-1,IPSH-FZ-2,AB-FZ-3,AB-FZ-5,AB-FZ-7 & FH-FZ-2 ML20205Q6111999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 210 to License DPR-50 ML20205Q5981999-04-13013 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 209 to License DPR-50 ML20206P2841999-04-12012 April 1999 SER Approving Transfer of License for Tmi,Unit 1,held by Gpu Nuclear,Inc to Amergen Energy Co,Llc & Conforming Amend, Per 10CFR50.80 & 50.90 ML20209G0071999-03-31031 March 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Three Mile Island,Unit 1 Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion) ML20205K6851999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With 05000289/LER-1999-002, :on 990212,potential Failure of Multiple Containment Monitoring Sys CIV (CM-V-1,2,3 & 4) Was Noted. Caused by Inappropriate Use of Vendor Info.Personnel Will Be Trained on Mgt Expectations.With1999-03-14014 March 1999
- on 990212,potential Failure of Multiple Containment Monitoring Sys CIV (CM-V-1,2,3 & 4) Was Noted. Caused by Inappropriate Use of Vendor Info.Personnel Will Be Trained on Mgt Expectations.With
ML20210C0161999-03-0101 March 1999 Forwards Corrected Pp 3 of SECY-98-252.Correction Makes Changes to Footnote 3 as Directed by SRM on SECY-98-246 ML20207M8461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for TMI-1.With 05000289/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990122,short Sections of Piping Caused by Misplacement of Sensing Elements & Insulation.Caused by Failure to Adhere to Vendor instruction.Re-installed Heat Trace Sys1999-02-19019 February 1999
- on 990122,short Sections of Piping Caused by Misplacement of Sensing Elements & Insulation.Caused by Failure to Adhere to Vendor instruction.Re-installed Heat Trace Sys
ML20196K3561999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Although Original Licensee Thermal Model Was Unacceptable for Ampacity Derating Assessments Revised Model Identified in 970624 Submittal Acceptable for Installed Electrical Raceway Ampacity Limits 05000289/LER-1998-014-01, :on 981210,missed TS Surveillance Was Noted. Caused by Human Error.Absolute & Relative Control Rod Positions Were Obtained Immediately & Verified to Agree within Required Range.With1999-01-11011 January 1999
- on 981210,missed TS Surveillance Was Noted. Caused by Human Error.Absolute & Relative Control Rod Positions Were Obtained Immediately & Verified to Agree within Required Range.With
ML20196G4661998-12-31031 December 1998 British Energy Annual Rept & Accounts 1997/98. Prospectus of British Energy Share Offer Encl ML20207A9291998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for TMI-1 & TMI-2 ML20196F6861998-12-0202 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan Request for Alternative to ASME B&PV Code Section XI Requirements Re Actions to Be Taken Upon Detecting Leakage at Bolted Connection ML20198B8641998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for TMI-1.With ML20195J8591998-11-12012 November 1998 Rev 11 to 1000-PLN-7200.01, Gpu Nuclear Operational QA Plan ML20195C6921998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-73 ML20196B7191998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for TMI-1.With ML20203G1211998-10-30030 October 1998 Informs Commission About Staff Preliminary Views Concerning Whether Proposed Purchase of TMI-1,by Amergen,Inc,Would Cause Commission to Know or Have Reason to Believe That License for TMI-1 Would Be Controlled by Foreign Govt 05000289/LER-1998-013, :on 980916,failure to Perform Fire Protection Program Surveillances at Required Frequency Was Noted.Caused by Changes Not Being Made to Surveillance Schedule.Performed Missed Insp Surveillance1998-10-15015 October 1998
- on 980916,failure to Perform Fire Protection Program Surveillances at Required Frequency Was Noted.Caused by Changes Not Being Made to Surveillance Schedule.Performed Missed Insp Surveillance
ML20155E7511998-10-15015 October 1998 Rev 1 to Form NIS-1 Owners Data Rept for Isi,Rept on 1997 Outage 12R EC Exams of TMI-1 OTSG Tubing 05000289/LER-1998-010-01, :on 980825,potential Violation of Design Criteria During Single Auxiliary Transformer Operation Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Define Job Performance Stds.Temporary Change Notice Issued1998-10-0909 October 1998
- on 980825,potential Violation of Design Criteria During Single Auxiliary Transformer Operation Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Define Job Performance Stds.Temporary Change Notice Issued
ML20154L5541998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for TMI Unit 1.With 05000289/LER-1998-011, :on 980825,Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Was Found Installed Outside Approved Joint Design Arrangement.Caused by Personnel Error.Initiated Continuous Fire Watch & Installed Trowel Grade Thermo-Lag in Void & on Outer Edge1998-09-23023 September 1998
- on 980825,Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Was Found Installed Outside Approved Joint Design Arrangement.Caused by Personnel Error.Initiated Continuous Fire Watch & Installed Trowel Grade Thermo-Lag in Void & on Outer Edge
05000289/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980820,discovered Potential Loss of HPI During Postulated Loca.Caused by Misapplication or Interpretation of Design Inputs.Revised OL Was Implemented & Mut Pressure & Level Limits Analysis Revised1998-09-18018 September 1998
- on 980820,discovered Potential Loss of HPI During Postulated Loca.Caused by Misapplication or Interpretation of Design Inputs.Revised OL Was Implemented & Mut Pressure & Level Limits Analysis Revised
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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NRC STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE WASTE HANDLING AND PACKAGING FACILITY DESCRIPTION The Waste Handling an'd Packaging Facility (WHPF), as described in the referenced Technical Evaluation Report (TER), is designed for the processing and packaging of solid radioactive waste generated during TMI-2 recovery operations. The recent increase in recovery related activities, primarily involving defueling operations, has resulted in an increase in generated solid wastes, including dry active wastes (DAW) such as contaminated clothing, tools, and equipment. As a result of the projected increase in volume and types of solid waste generated, the current processing facilities available in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building (AFHB) were determined to be inadequate. The WHPF will provide the necessary area and equipment for the compaction, size reduction and/or decontamination of solid wastes, as appropriate.
Fuel and core debris will not be processed in the WHPF, except for trace amounts that may contaminate tools and equipment.
The WHPF is located to the southwest of the more eastern Unit 2 cooling tower.
It is a one-story, poured concrete / masonry block building with corrugated roof decking, with approximately 4000 square feet of floor space. The WHPF is physically separated from other Unit 2 structures; the plant fire protection system is the only Important to Safety (ITS) system that interfaces with the WHPF. The exterior walls of the structure will be constructed of reinforced concrete at least 12" in thickness, to provide shielding. The WHPF heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) system is designed to perfonn the following functions: maintain acceptable temperatures in the building; maintain a slightly negative pressure in the building and filter exhausts from the g" manse 9h P
. building to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment; and direct air flow within the building to limit the spread of contamination and minimize radiation exposure to workers. A portable airborne radioactivity monitor with local readout and alarm will be provided in the WHPF for worker protection.
Additional area radiation monitors may be provided as required by radiological control procedures. The WHPF exhaust will be filtered, sampled, and monitored to assure that potential radioactive releases to the environment are maintained within applicable limits. The facility exhaust monitor will have a local alarm, readout and recorder, and a remote alarm in the main control The exhaust system will automatically shutdown if preset radiation room.
limits are exceeded.
Solid waste processing operations to be conducted in the WHPF include:
sectioning and disassembly of large pieces of equipment; decontamination of tools and equipment using electropolishers, paint digesters or abrasive blasters; compaction of DAW in 55 gallon drums; packaging of non-compactible trash and equipment in drums and low specific activity (LSA) boxes; receiving of solid radwaste from the reactor building and AFHB; and shipping of processed waste to an on-site staging facility. The WHPF will not be used to store solid wastes; it is anticipated that typically, wastes will be processed and shipped within several days of receipt at the WHPF.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Due to the physical separation of the Waste Handling and Packaging Facility from other THI-2 structures and the nature of the operations to be conducted in the WHPF, the significant safety issues relating to WHPF operation consist of demonstrating that radiation exposure to workers and off-site releases of radiation under normal and postulated accident conditions will be maintained
. within acceptable and applicable limits. The WHPF walls are designed to provide sufficient radiation shielding to meet set dose rate limits for areas within the. facility and external to it. These dose rate limits are based on radiological protection guidelines specified in the licensee's General Project Design Criteria and on requirements for designation of Radiolcgical Work Permit (RWP) areas. The source terms used in the design calculations are based on conservative estimates of dose rates and quantities of solid radwaste to be processed through the WHPF. Temporary shielding and administrative controls will be used as necessary to keep the actual radiation levels within the design limits during WHPF operations.
To limit the spread of radioactive contamination and thus provide additional protection for workers in the WHPF, all incoming radwaste will be packaged or wiped down to maintain smearable surface activity levels below 1000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) per 100 square centimeters for beta and gamma activity and below 20 dpm/100 cm2 for alpha activity. These limits, established in the June 2,1986 revision to the Corporate Radiation Protection Plan, will be maintained for any radwaste that is staged in the WHPF. The facility HVAC system is also designed to minimize the spread of airborne contamination within the WHPF and to the environment. The system will operate to maintain a negative pressure of at least 0.20 inches w.g. with respect to ambient conditions, thereby restricting exfiltration from the WHPF. Air flow within the facility will be directed from relatively uncontaminated areas to areas of greater contamination. Separate HVAC systems will serve areas of the building that are radiologically clean.
Exhaust hoods or flexarm devices will be used in areas where fumes or airborne contamination could be generated by processing cperations. HEPA filters will be used to treat exhausts from
. these devices prior to discharge. HEPA filters will also process all building exhaust prior to release to the environment.
In addition to filtering exhausts from the WHPF, a radiation monitor will be provided at the exhaust release point. This monitor will sample the exhaust for particulate activity and is provided with local alarm, readout, and recorder with a remote alarm in the TMI-2 control room.
In Recovery Operations Plan (ROP) Change Request No. 36, dated April 16, 1986, the licensee proposed the addition of the WHPF exhaust radiation monitor described above to Table 4.3-3, " Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements", of the R0P. As proposed, with this monitor inoperable, the facility ventilation system would be isolated and all movement of radioactive materials or activities causing the generation of airborne contamination would be suspended until the monitor was restored to operable status.
This monitor will provide for the rapid detection of a relecse of radiation to the environment, thereby allowing sufficient time for the licensee to initiate mitigating actions to protect the public.
We therefore approve the licensee's proposed R0P Change Request No. 36.
Periodic air samples from the building exhaust will be analyzed for alpha activity and appropriate measures will be J
taken as necessary, based on that analysis. A portable airborne radioactivity monitor will also be provided in the WHPF for personnel protection. Area radiation monitors will be used as required based on a review by radiological controls personnel.
A fire suppression deluge system and portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire protection in the WHPF. The deluge system will be actuated by a signal from a temperature or ionization detector or manually.
Fire alarms i
will also be triggered by the detectors and will annunciate at a local panel and in the Unit 2 control room.
. The licensee has perforned off-site dose calculations for WHPF normal operation and accident conditions. The radioactive source terms used for these calculations are based on the projected quantities of solid radwaste to
^
be processed in the WHPF and on historical data for fission product inventories for various contaminated materials. Small calculated quantities of transuranic isotopes were also included as part of the source term. The dose calculations were performed using conservative assumptions, including neglecting the effects of the HEPA filters on the WHPF exhaust, which would reduce calculated doses by a factor of 1000.
For normal operations, the 4
licensee's maximum calculated off-site doses are less than 1% of the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I.
For the worst-case postulated j
accident, a fire in the WHPF, the maximum calculated off-site doses are several orders of magnitude below the accident dose guidelines specified in l
10CFR Part 100 and are actually below the 10CFR Part 50 Appendix I limits for off-site doses resulting from normal operations.
The Waste Handling and Packaging Facility is physically separated from the TMI-2 reactor building and AFHB, will serve no nuclear safety related function i
and will not affect the performance of any safety-related features associated with Unit 2.
The proposed activities are within the scope of those addressed in NUREG-0683, the NRC staff's Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), relating to the cleanup of TMI-2. The dose consequer.ces conservatively calculated for normal and accident conditions during WHPF operations are less than those calculated in the PEIS for-similar waste handling activities. The WHPF will serve to limit f.he occupational exposure l
incurred during TMI-2 solid waste processing activities by providing a separate dedicated facility designed specifically to handle the expected volume and types of solid radwaste generated by cleanup operations.
l 1
. Procedures and equipment for control of radioactive contamination during handling and processing of wastes will be used to further minimize personnel exposure.
The staff concludes that the design and proposed operation of the WHPF do not pose a significant risk to the health'and safety of the public or the on-site workforce. Therefore, we approve the' licensee's proposed use of the facility, as documented in the Technical Evaluation Report, and we also approve the request for the addition of the WHPF ventilation monitor to Table 4.3-3 of the Recovery Operations Plan.
I i
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.i Enclosure t
l FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-73 DOCKET N0. 50-320 i
i Replace the following pages of the-TMI-2 Recovery Operations Plan with the e
enclosed pages as indicated:
i 4
4.3-4a i.
4.3-5a 4
4
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1 3
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TABLE 4.3-3 (Cont'd)
RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
CHANNEL MINIMUM CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNELS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST OPERABLE APPLICABILITY ACTION 5.
FUEL TRANSFER CANAL a.
. Criticality Monitor S
R M
1 Note 11 Note 12 6.
FUEL POOL "A" a.
Criticality Monitor S
R M
1
.Notefil Note 12 7.
FUEL HANDLING BUILDING TRUCK BAY a.
Criticality Monitor
.S R
M 1
Note 11 Note 12 I
8.
. WASTE HANDLING AND j
PACKAGING FACILITY t
a.
. Exhaust Monitor D
SA W
1 Note 1 Note.-13
\\
(See following pages for Notes.)
^
l THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 4.3-4a Change No. 34 4
f 1
O 4
TABLE 4.3-3 (Cont'd)
RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES:
11.
During either of the following operations:
a.
Handling of canisters containing core material.
b.
Handling of any heavy load over canisters containing core materials.
12.
With less than one channel operable, terminate the following operations:
a.
Handling of canisters containing core material.
Handling of any heavy load over canisters containing core material.
13.
With the required monitor inoperable, secure the ventilation system and suspend all operations involving movement of radioactive materials or generation of airborne contamination until the inoperable monitor is restored to operable status.
i
- This shall not prohibit placing a canister in transit in a safe storage location.
THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 4.3-5a Change No. 34-1 i
i F
WM o
i Dr. Thomas Mur15y Willis Of aby. Sitt Manager Regional Administrator. Region I C.S. Departmelt Cf (mergy U.S. meclear segulatory Cosseission P.O. Sea 88 Middletown. PA 17057 0311 i.
631 Park Avenue King of Prussia. PA 19406 David J. McGoff l
John F. Wolfe. (14.
Chairman.
Division of Three Mile Island Programs kl.23 Administrative Judge 3409 Shepherd St.
U.S. Department of Energy Chevy Chase. MD.
20015 Washington. 0.C.
20545 Dr. Oscar M. Paris W11Itan Lochstet Administrative Judge 104 Davey LaLaratory AtomtC Safety and Licenslag Pennsylvania State University Board Panel University Park. PA 16802.
U.S. Nwctear Regulatory Cc==ais
20555 Randy Myers. [ditorial The Patriot
' A6ministrative Judge
Dr. Frederick H. Shon Harrisburg. PA 17105.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panet Robert 8. Borsum U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coassission Babcock & Wilcom Washington. 0.C.
20555 Nuclear Perer Generation Division Suite 220 Karin W. Carter 7910 Woodacont Ave.
Assistant Attorney General Sethesda, MD.
20814 505 Caecutive House P.O. Boa 2357 Michael Churchhf11. Esq.
Harrisburg. PA 17120 PILCOP 1315 Walnut St., suite 1632 Dr. Judith M. Johnsrud Philadelphia. PA 19107
[nvironmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Linda W. Little 433 Orlando Ave.
5000 Hermitage OR.
State College. PA 16801 Raleigh.N". 27612 George F. Trowbridge. Esq.
Marvin 1. Lewis 6504 Bradford Terrace,
Sha w. Pittman. Potts and Philadelphia. PA 1914 Trowbridge 1800 M. St.
NW.
Wasnington. 0.C.
20036 Jane Lee 183 valley Rd.
Atomic safety and Licensing Board Panel Icters.PA 17319 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coninission Washington. 0.C.
20555 Bishop. Lieberman & Cook ATIN:
J. Lieberman. Esquire Atuele Safety and Licensing Appeat Pane) 1155 Avenue of the Americas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission New York, New York 10036 Washington. 0.C.
20555 Walter W. Cohen. Consumer Ad ocate secreta ry M.rtment of Justice U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Strawberry Square.14th Floor ATTN: Chief. Docketing & Service Branch Harrisburg PA 17127 washington. 0.C.
20555
[dward O. $warta Mr. Larry Hochendoner Board of supe,f sors Dauphin County Coanissioner Londonderry Townsnip P.O. Box 1295 Rr0 #1 Ceyers Church ad.
Harrisburg *PA 17108 1295 Middletown. PA 17C57 fred Rice Chairperson Robert L. Enupp. (seelre Dauphin County Board of Comunissioners Assistani Solicitor Dauphin County Courthouse Knupp and Andrews front and Market Streets P.O. Son P Harrisburg. PA 17101 407 N. Front St.
Harrisburg. PA T7108 Dauphin County Office of Emergency Preparednes s John Levin, tsquire Court House. Room 7 Pennsylvania Public Utilities Conn.
Front & Market Streets P.O. Bos 3265 Harrisburg. PA 17101 Harrisburg. PA 17120 U.S. (nvironmental Protection Agency aegion !!! Of fice ATTu: (Is Coordinator Curtis 6vliding (51sth Floor) 6th & Walnut Streets Mr. [dwin Eintner Philadelphia, PA 19106 (secutive vice President Thomes M. Cerusky Director General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp.
100 Br,terpate Parkway
$wreau sf Radiation Protection Parsipr,eny. kJ 0705a Department of tavironmental Resources P.O. 6os 2063 Marrisburg, PA 17120 Ad Crable Lancaster New fra Dan Kennedy Office of Environsental Plannin1 8 West King Street Department of (sivironmental Resources Lancaster, PA 17601 P. O. 80s 2063 Harrisburg. PA 17120
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