ML20202F050
| ML20202F050 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1986 |
| From: | Allen C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202F023 | List: |
| References | |
| 1821K, NUDOCS 8607150074 | |
| Download: ML20202F050 (85) | |
Text
7 i
". Cimmonwmith Edisin 4 ( 72 West Adims Street, Chicrgo, Illinois
-f Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 - 0767 June 27, 1986 l
Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 GSEP Annex EAL Revision NRC Docket Nos. 50-373/374
Dear Mr. Keppler:
Enclosed for your review and approval is a revision to the Emergency Action Levels of the LaSalle County Station Generating Statica Emergency Plan Annex. This revision to Emergency Action Levels is being proposed for the following reasons:
- a. To reduce the number of alerts declared based on Technical Specification statements,
- b. To reduce the potential for unnecessary activation of state and local facilities,
- c. To show progress toward a standardized set of emergency conditions as requested by the Illinois Department of Nuclear safety and Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency,
- d. To define initiating conditions that more appropriately comply with the concerns of the general class descriptions in NUREG 0654, and
- e. To provide more definitive wording where possible.
This revision removes most statements regarding Technical Specifications from the Alert category. The only exception deals with the violation of Technical Specification Safety Limits.
k DO F
JUL 71986
s Jun2 27, 1986
. The table of Emergency Action Levels (EALS) is consistent with the concerns of the general class descriptions and the examples provided in Appendix 1 of NUREG 0654. Where possible, these emergency action levels have been related to plant instrumentation readings.
In some instances, it was inappropriate to adopt initiating conditions exactly equivalent to those examples specified in NUREG 0654. Site specific annexes should categorize postulated accidents contained in the Stations Final Safety Analysis Report provided the event produced a concern consistent with the class description in NUREG 0654.
The changes to the Annex are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 App. E, and do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. Since this is a major change to the format of the EAL's, this change will not be imr smented prior to NRC review and approval.
A copy of this letter along with two copies of the proposed revision are being sent to the Document Control Desk. Commonwealth Edison is notifying the State of Illinois of our request for this revision by transmitting a copy of this letter and enclosure to the designated state official.
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.170, a fee remittance in the amount of $150.00 is enclosed.
Sincerely, h
C. M. Allen Nuclear Licensing Administrator encl.
cc: NRC Document Control Desk Mike Parker - State of Ill.
A. Bournia - NRR CMA/df/1821K
'l LA SALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR STATION BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i
NOTES It is the prerogative of the Station Director to upgrade the condition classification as he deems necessary.
If more than one distinctive EAL of different classification levels, ie. an EAL for Alert j
and an EAL for Site Energency, are reachedt ensure that the highest classification level reached (or a higher classifi-cation level) is declared.
If more than one distinctive EAL of the same classification level ie. two EAL's for Site Energency are reached consider classification at a higher classfication level.
Condition Page 1.
Radioactive Effluent Release To The Environment 2
2.
Loss Of Fission Product Barriers 3
i 3.
System Malfunctions 4
4 Secondary System Malfunctions (Not Applicable To Dresden, La Salle or Quad Cities) 5 5.
Fuel Handling Accident 6
6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (Earthquake, Explosion, 1
Fire, Flood, Tornado, Sustained Winds, Aircraft Crash or Missiles From Whatever Sources) 7 7
Hazardous, Toxic or Flannaanle Materials 9
8.
Security Threat 10 9
Other Conditions of Equivalent Magnitude 11 10 Personnel Injury 12 11.
Transportation Accident 13 4
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LSCS BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS C0tolTION 1.
RADICACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASES TO THE ENV lRONMENT (A-MODEL NOT AVAILABLE*)
UNU SUAL SITE GENERAL EVENT ALERT ENERGEtCY EMERGENCY Fcr Classi fication of gaseous release refer to the following:
LZP 1200-2 Classification of a reble Gas Release L2P 1200-3 Classification of an lodine Release NOTE: For gaseous release, if S.B.G.T. g Station Ventilation are Operating, the Stack W. R.G.M. and the V.G. W.R.G.M. readings must be added.
A. Gaseous effluont G. Gasoous ef fluent M. Gaseous effluont S. Gaseous efffuent Instantaneous release Instantaneous release monitors detect monitors detect is 7 eater than or is g eater than or level corresponding levels corresponding equal to 1.22E6 uCl/sec equal to 1.22E7 uCI/see to greater than or to greater tr.an or (IC 7R20.105) as (107R20.105 limit x 10) equal to 50 r@/hr equal to i RbA/hr measured by the vent as measured by the vent (1.3E7 uCl/sec.) for whole body at the stack W%M and/or stack WR3M and/or 1/2 hr. or reater site boundary. This SBGT WRGM and/or SBGT WRGM and/or than or equaI to condition exists when:
counting equipment, counting equipment.
500 mR/hr Q/u is greater than (1.3E8 uCI/sec.)
or equal to 4.5 E7 for 2 minutes at the where:
site boundary Q = release rate in (adverse meteorology).
uC'/sec.
u = mean wind speed in mg or Q/u is greater than or equal to I E8 where:
Q = release rate in uCI/sec u = mean wind speed in meters /sec B. To be reveloped by N. To be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
Sargent & Lundy.
C. To be developed by H. To be developed by O. To be developed by T. To be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
Sergent & Lundy.
Sargent & Lundy.
Sargent & Lundy.
P. 'o be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
- lF A-MODEL IS AVAILABLE, CLASSIFICATION WILL BE MAK IN ACCORDAN WITH A-MODEL OUTPUT.
Emergency Action Levels (EALS) C, D, E H, I, J, K. P, Q, T & U for liquid releases appear on next page.
Condition I continued next page.
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LSCS BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CCNOITION 1.
RM10 ACTIVE EFFLUENT ELEASES TO THE ENVIRCMENT (continued)
UNU SUAL SITE GEERAL EVENT ALERT ENERGENCY EMERGENCY Che of the following:
One of the following:
One of the following:
One of the following:
LlQUID ELEASE For classification of liquid releases refer to the following:
LZP 1200-4 Classi fication of a Liquid Aelease D.
Liquid release
- 1. Liquid release Q. L1 quid release U. Liquid release greater than or opaal greater than or equal greater than or equal greater than or equal to I E-7 uCl/ml to I E-6 uCI/mi to 2 E3 Cl but to 2 E4 Cl total but.less than as measured by monitors less than 2 E4 Cl in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
I E-6 uCl/mi as (Blowdown PRM, WS total in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
sampled and measured PRM or Rift WS PRM) by counting equipment.
and/or counting equipment.
R. let appilecto V. Not applicable to BWRs to BWRs E. Estimated 1Iquid J. Estimated iIquid release reatsr than release reator than cr equal to 4 CI but or equal to 40 Cl but less than 40 CI total less than 2000 Cl total in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
In 24 hors.
F. Not applicable K. fet applicable to BWRs to BWRs L. Pet applicable to BWis 1605A/3/wjm
LSCS BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITim 2.
LOSS 7 FISSim PRODUCT BARRIERS UNU SUM.
SITE GEERAL EVENT ALERT ENERGENCY EN.RGENCY Q1e of the 01e of the Ote of the One of the fol low ing:
fol low ing:
fo llowing:
following:
A. Coolant activity G. Loss of K. Loss of N. Loss of sample greater one Fission tic Fission two Fission Product than or equal to Fo' duct Barrier Educt Barriers Elers with 20 uCl/mi total as indicated by as Indicated by prooaole loss of tne lodine.
any of the following:
any of the following:
thiro Fission Product Barrier as Indicated B. Pririary Containment by any of the integrity is d)7 aced following:
sucn that a Tecnnical Speci fication a) Cladding Action Statement 0 ab sample activity equivalent to 300 uCl/ml of I-131, 62 uCI/mi of requires a Unit to be CS-137 CR di uCI/ml of Xe-133.
placed in Condition 3 cr 4 APO Reactor poor is or has been b) Reactor Coolant System reduced to less than il Containment pressure greater than or equal to 1.69 psig AND or equal to 50% as
- 2) Reactor Vessel level less than or equal to -129 inches GTng other indicated by power than controlled evolutions.
range instrumentation.
c) Prleary Containment.
C. ECCS Initiatic ) due to
- 1) Containment pressure greater than or equal to 45 psig OR a valid signal APO
- 2) Containment temperature greater than or equal to 340 T, OR resul ta nt injecTWn to
- 3) Wet well air temperature greatse than or equal to 275 F Cr 0
the wssel. (Not
- 4) Wet well water temperature greater than or equal to 2000 COR spurious.)
- 5) Unisolable breach of the mntainment.
D. Primary Containment H. Primary Containment L. Primary Containment O. Primary Containment radiation level is radiation level is radiation level is radiation level is greater en cr equal greatergenorequal greater gan or equal greater tgan or equal to 1 x I R/hr.
to 2 x 10 to 4 x 10 R/hr.
to 2 x 10 R/hr. AND than 4 x 10 gut less but less ttian R/hr.
prooable loss of E -
2 x 104/hr.
tainment inte7 ty.
1 E. Failure of a Primary
- 1. A 50 gpn reactor cool-P. Total core uncovery has System Safety or Relief ant leakage rate occurred or is pro-Valve (s) to close with increase as indi mted jected to occur within the affected Unit in by surveillance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> #40 NEITHER Condition I cr 2 APO en adequ Fai capaoITity Suppression Pool " Twirp.
for steam cooling cannot be maintained NOR a core spray 0
less tnan ll0 F.
TFTtem is avallable.
F. Total reactor coolant J. A Main Steam Line M. A Main Steam Line leanage rate to Primary break outside break outside Contalment is greater containment with containment with one than Technical Speci fi-at least one MSiv or more Main Steam Q. Events are in progress cations Limiting in each Main Steam Lines having no Iso-or have occurred which Condition for Operation Line closed.
letion valves closed, involve actual or (25 gpm) lassinent substantial core doradation or molting with procoole loss of containment integrity.
1665A/4/wjm
e' LSCS BWR EtERC-ENCY ACTICN LEVELS C04DITICN 3.
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIO4S UNU SUAL SITE GEERAL EVENT ALERT EERGENCY EERGENCY l
One of the following:
One of the following:
One of the following:
A. Equipment described E. Equipment is degraded I. Equipment is degraded L. Events are in progress in the Technical such that a condition sucn that a condition or have occurred Speci fications is with the reectcr witn the reactw unich involve actual doraded sucn that subcritical AND with subcritical MD with or Ir..minent substan-an Action Statement reactor coolant reactor pressure tlal enre degracation requires a Unit to be tenpera ture less than 1076 psig or emiting with 0
placed in Condition 3 less than 212 F (lonest rollef valve probaole loss of cr 4 g Reactor power cannot be acnleved setpoint) cannot be containment is or has been reduced or maintained by achieved or maintalred Inte rity, to less than or equal any means.
by eny means.
to 505 as Indicated by power range Instrumen-tation.
B. Loss of Instrumen-F. Tecnnical Speci fi-J. Loss of all the M. Total core uncovery tation such that estions Safety Limit following 125 VDC has occurred or accident classification has been or will be d;stribution panels:
Is projected to cr of f-site dose exceeded.
Illy (211Y),
occur within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> asses 5 Tent can not il2Y (212Y),
g NEITHER an be made.
Il3Y (213Y).
adequate capability for steam ccoling g a core spray C. Loss of all power to G. Failure of the K. Loss of power to the system is avallenig.
the Unit Auxillary Reactor Protection Unit Auxiliary Transformar APO the System Instrumenta-Transformer AM) the associated Station tion to initiate Station Anxiliary Auxillary Transformer AM) complete a scram Transformer associated with the Unit not in which brings the with a Unit.
- Cold Shutdown or Refuel.
reactor subcFltical once a limiting safety
_N _4D system setting as D. Loss of all associated speci fied in the Tecn-Loss of cil Diesel Diesel Generators nical Specifications Generators associated with the Unit not in has been exceeded.
witn that thit.
Cold Shutdown or Refuel.
(ATWS Event)
H.
Unplanned loss of most or all annun-clators on all the fol lowing:
lHl3-P601 (ECCS Panel),
lHl3-P603 (Rx Fanel),
IPM0lJ (Electrical Panel),
l g the Hathaway Typer.
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e' LSCS BWR EPERENCY ACTICN LEVELS COtolTION 4.
SECCNDARY SYSTEM MALFUNCTONS (NOT APPLICABLE TO DRESDEN, LA SALLE, OR QJAD CITIES.)
UNU SUAL SITE ENERAL EVENT ALERT EMERGENCY EERGENCY 1
THIS PAE INTENTIGIALLY BLME.
NOTE Condition i 4 will be events dealing with PWRs and are not applicable to BWRs. The nimeering has been created fcr oansistency and to avoid confusion when dealing with State Agencies.
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i LSCS BWR EMERGENCY ACTICH LEVELS CONDITi(N 5.
FUEL HAN[ LING ACCIDENT UNU SU AL SITE GENERAL EVENT ALERT ENERGENCY EERGENCY One of the following:
One of the following:
A. Refuel Floor ARM roads C. Refuel Floor ATM greater than or equal reads 7 eater than or to l R/hr, with at equal to i R/hr APO least one train of Standby Gas Treatment Standby Gas Treatment System is no+ opera-System operational g tional or Secondary Semndary Containment Containment isolation isolation is capable is Incapable of being of being achieved, achieved.
B. Fuel Pool level D. Fuel Pool level decreases below tne decreases below the Technical Specifica-top of Irradiated tions limit.
f ue l.
Ifa65A/7/wjm
LSCS BWR EMERGENCY ACTI(N LEVELS COrolTION 6.
NATURAL MD DESTRUCTIVE PHENOENA (ENITHQUME, EXPLOSION, FIRE, FLOOD, TORNADO, SUSTAIED WINDS, AIRCRAFT CRASH (R MISSILES FRCN WHATEVER SOURCES)
UNU SJ A SITE GEERAL EVENT ALERT EERGENCY EMERGENCY One of the following:
One of the following:
& s of the following:
A. Equipment described H. Equipment is degraded R. Equipment is degraded Y. Events are in in ttw Temnical such that a condition such that a condition progress or have Spect fications is with the reactor sub-with the reacbr sub-occurred which de7 aced such that critical AND with critical MD with involve actual or an Action Statement reactor coolant reactor pressure less inminent substan-requires a Unit to be temperature less than than 1076 psig (lowest tial core degrade-placed in Condition 3 212CF cannot be relief valve setpoir.t) tion or molting with or 4 g Reactcr Power achieved or maintained cannot be achieved probab!e loss of is or has been reduced by any means.
or ma'ntained by any containment to less than or equal mean s.
Integrity.
to 505 as indicated by power range Instru-mentation.
B. Damage is sum that
- 1. As the resul t of a Z.
Total ccre uncovery off-site assistance natural or' destructive has occurred or is required to prewnt phenomena a safety is projected to further degradation system is affected occur within of the level of safety such that it may not 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> g of the facility.
per form its required NEITHER an adequate function.
capaollity for steam cooling g a core spray system is avallaole.
C. Rupture of Cooling J. Control Room evacua-S. Control Room evacuation Pond Lme af facting tion is anticipated is required g control of f-site property.
or required with is not established from control estabilshed local stations.
from local stations.
K. Sustained winds of T. Sustained winds of 80 mph.
90 mph.
with a unit not in Cold Shutdown er Ref ue l.
D. Not appli cat'le to L. Not app l i cab le to U. Not applicable to LSCS.
LSCS.
LSC S.
E. Not applicar e to M. Cooling Lake level V. CSCS Pond level LSCS.
Is less than or equal is less than or equal to 690' elevation tc 685' elevation (top of C$CS Fbnd)
(bottom of CSCS Pond) 1665A/8/wjm
e' LSCS BWR EERGENCY ACTIO4 LEVELS CotolTION 6.
NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA (EARTHQUME, EXPLOSION, FIRE, FLOCO, TORNADO, SUSTAltED WIPOS, AIR 0 RAFT CRASH m MISILES FROM WHATEVER SOUTES.) cont'd UNU SUM.
SITE GENERAL EVENT ALERT EERGENCY EMERGENCY One of the following:
One of the following:
(he of tne following:
F. Aircraft N. Aircraf t W. Aircraf t Impacted Impacted impacted on site, within the within the protected protected area but not area M affecting affecting vital areas.
wita; areas.
G. Eartnquake O. Earthquake X. Earthquane felt inplant experi enced experienced or detected at a level g eater at a level g eater on Stc, tion than or equal than or equal "In house" selsmic to 0.1 g horizontal to 0.2g horizontal Instrunentat ion or 0.066g vertical or 0.133g vertical with level veri fication (CEE) with leve l (SSE) with level frcen tre Aux.
veel fication from the veelfication from Equipment Ibom.
Aux. Equipnent Room.
the Ax. Equipment (Not supurlous)
Room M a Unit not in Cold Shutdown or Refueling.
P. Technical Spec t fication has been CR will be exceeded.
Q. Turbine failure causing casing penetration.
l l
o 1665A/9/wjm l
e' LSCS BWR EERENCY ACTICN LEVELS CCNDITICN 7.
HAZNtDOUS, Toxic m FLNNABLE MATERlALS UNU SU A.
SITE GEERAL EVENT ALERT EERGENCY EERGENCY One of the Che of the One of the following:
fol lowing:
following:
A. Uncontrolled D. Uncontrolled G. Uncontrolled release of release of release of toxic m flam-toxic OR flam-toxic OR flam-mable gas at mable gas at mable gas at li fe tr.reaten ing 11 fe threater.ing li fe threatening levels is levels is detected levels is detected detected MD MD confirmed AND confirmed confirmed on-site.
within the protected within vital areas, area.
B. Release of large quantitles of flanmaele, E. (bntrol 7bom H. 03ntrol Room explosl w OR evacuation is evacuation is toxic material anticipated required g sum that plant or required with control is not operation eay control established estan lished be af facteo.
from local from local sta tions.
stations.
F. Chlorine cr hunonia
- 1. Chlorine or Menonia detected with detected without Control Room Control Room C. Es a direct Emergency Filtration Emer gency Filtration result of System Operable.
Systet Operable.
h azardou s material, a Chlorine 5 PPM Cnlorine 5 PPM person is killed m Mmonia 25 PPM Ammonia 25 PPM hospi ta l ized AtO/OR estima ted property donage exceeds
$50,000.
i l
1665A/10/wjm
e' LSCS BWR EERGENCY ACTIQ 4 LEVELS COCIT104 8.
SECLRITY THEAT LNu SU M.
SITE GENERAL EVENT ALERT ENERGENCY EERGENCY One of the One of the One of the One of the following:
fol low ing:
followings following:
A. Cbvious atternpt to G. Security threat of J.
Imminent loss of L. Loss of pnysical sabotage safety increasing security physical control of control of the relatec equipment.
that persists for the f aci li ty.
facility.
more than 60 minutes.
S. Internal disturbance H. Security threat that K. Security threat that M. l.oss of physical (disturbance that is generates an Unusaal results in loss of control of the not short lived or Event under control of any vital Control Room to is not a harmless another condition, area. (For Control to a security ou+ burst involving Exsuple: lbnb explo-Room refer to General threat.
one or more slon results In loss,
Emergency.)
Individuals within of plant systens the protected area; suf ficient to classif y collective roup an unusual Event.
gathering which disrupts normal operatlons. )
- 1. N eed or forced vital area intrusion.
C. Bonc device discovered inside the protected area.
D. kestage situation *lch d i srup ts norma l opera tion.
E. Civil alsturbance (spontaneous collectise group gathering unich disruots normal operations. )
F. Armed or Forced protected area Intrusion.
i 1665A/i l/wjm
LSCS BWR EERENCY ACTim LEVELS C0tolT:0N 9.
MY OTHER 00rolTl0NS OF EQUIVALENT MGNITUDE TO THE CRITERI A USED TO DEFIE THE AX; LENT CATEGORY AS ETERMINED BY THE STATIM OlECTOR.
UNU SUM.
SITE GENERAL EVENT
- ALERT ENERGENCY EERENCY One of the (he of the One of the One of the following:
following:
following:
fol lowing:
A. A condition that S. A condition that E. A condition teat war-G. Events are In progress warrants increased warrants precautionary rants activation of or have occurred awareness on the activation of Technical emergency conters AND which involve actual part of t'io State Support Center AND/OR
. 'melng teams or a or iminent sut:stan-APO/OR Local of fsite Corporate Q) mand precautlo.ary noti fice-tial core degradation of ficials.
Center, g placing tion to the pubile near or molting with poton-Emergency Operations the site.
tlal for loss of Facility on standby.
containment integrity.
C. Fuel Pool level F. Fuel Pool level H. Total are uncovery decreases below decreases below has occurred or is the Technical the top of irradlated projected to occur Speci fi cations
- fuel, witnin 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> AND Limit.
EITHER en adequate capability for steam D. ARM reading (s) A3 cooling g a' core survey results spray system or survey results is avallaole.
alone conffra an increase in plant radiation levels by a factr of 1000.
1 1665A/12/wjm
LSCS SWR EERENCY ACTim LEVELS r
CONDITim 10.
PERSWAL INJLRY UNU SUAL SITE GENERAL EVENT ALERT ENERENCY EERENCY A. Transportation of a redloactively contaminated injured person (s) to an of f-sita nodical facility for treatment.
1 I
l l
1 I
1 166SA/13/wjm
~
LSCS BWR EE RGENCY'ACTICN LEVELS CONDITICN 11.
TRANSPORTATIO4 ACCIENT A.
A whicle transporting radioactive materials Gt non-rad:cactive Hazardous matarlais from a Connonusalth Edison generatir.g station is involved in a situatim in which:
1.
Fire, breanage or suspected radioactive stamination occurs involving a shipnent of radioactive material M; 2.
As a direct result of Hazardous materials, (a) A person is killed; M (b) A person reoolves injuries requiring hospitalization; M
( c) Estimated carrier or other property damage excese $50,000.
B.
My other condition involving Hazardous material transportation g equivalent to the criterla In Iten A.
4 4
1665A/14/wjm
LA SALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR STATION BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Revision 0 November, 1985 1667A/wjm
e _
1 BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 1.
Radioactive Effluent Release EAL#1A Noble Gas Release Rate This emergency action level action addresses the concern of Example #2 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #2 rends as follows:
- 2 Radiological effluent Technical Specification limits exceeded.
This emergency action level is based on Technical Specification Limits in 10CFR20 guidelines.
Refer to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Section 8.
EAL#1B Iodine Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL41C Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy EAL91D Liquid Release This emergency action level is based on Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity in Liquid Effluents, of the Generating Stations Emergency Plan.
EAL#1E Liquid Release This emergency action level is based on Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity in Liquid Effluents, of the Generating Stations Emergency Plan.
1 EAL#1F Not applicable to BWRs EAL#1G Noble Gas Release Rate This emergency action level addrescos the concern of Example #15 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #15 reads as follows:
l
" Radiological effluents greater than 10 times Technical Specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2
hours, would result in about 1 mr at the site boundary under average meteorological conditions)."
4 This emergency action level is based on 10 times the l
Technical Specification Limit and 10CFR20 guidelines.
Refer to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
Section B.
s 1667A 2-
o' BWR EhERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 1.
Radioactive Effluent Release (cont'd)
EAL91H Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL#1I Liquid Release This emergency action level is based on Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity in Liquid Effluents, of the Generating Stations Emergency Plan.
EAL#1J Liquid Release This emergency action level is based on Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity in Liquid Effluents, of the Generating Stations Emergency Plan.
EAL#1K Not applicable to BWRs EAL#1L Not applicable to BWRs EAL#1M Noble Gas Release Rate This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example
- 13 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #13 reads as follows:
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B.
for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology.
b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment 1
pressure) or are measured in the environs c.
EPA Protective Action Guidelines are projected to be exceeded outside the site boundary.
1667A 3-
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY i
Condition 1.
Radioactive Effluent Release (cont'd)
EAL41N Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL410 Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL#lP Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL41Q Liquid Release
(
This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example 13C under Site Emergency and NUREG 0654.
Example 13C reads as follows:
c.
EPA Protective Action Guidelines are projected to be exceeded outside the site boundary.
This emergency action level is based on the followings a.
EPA Publication
" Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food & Animal Feeds; Recommendation for State & Local Agencies",
Federal
- Register, Vol.
47,
- 205, Oct.
22, 198.2.
b.
EPA Publication " Manual of Protective Action Guides Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents", 1975 (updated 1979).
c.
GSEP Manual, Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels For Radioactivity in Liquid Effluents.
EAL#1R Not applicable to BWRs EAL#1S Noble Gas Release Rate This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #1 under General Emergency and NUREG 0654.
Example #1 reads as follows:
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem /hr W.B.
or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for uxisting containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are measured in the environs.
1667A 4
)
=
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 1.
Radioactive Effluent Release (cont'd)
EAL#1T Noble Gas Release Rate Information to be developed by Sargent & Lundy.
EAL#1U Liquid Release This emergency action level is based on Table 5.0-7, Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity j
in Liquid Effluents, of the Generating Stations Emergency Plan.
EAL#1V Not applicable to BW Rs j
1 j
1 1667A/wjm 5-
_ - - _ ~,., _ - - -.
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers EAL#2A Coolant Activity This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #3b under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 3b resds as follows:
High coolant a c t iv ity sample (e.g.,
exceeding coolant technical specifications for dodine spike.)
This EAL is adopted from the Technical Specification limit.
EAL#2B Loss of Primary Containment Integrity This es.orgency action level addresses the concern of Example #8 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #8 reads as follows:
1 Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown by technical specificiation.
This EAL is very similar to the example provided in the NUREG.
The words "and reactor power is or has been reduced to less than or equal to 50% as indicated by power range instrumentation" were added to clearly define when the Unusual Event is to be declared.
50% power allows for repairs to be accomplished during load drop from 1004 If repairs have not been accomplished by the 50% power mark, an Unusual Event will be declared.
For a BWR control rod insertion will have commenced.
Since control rod i
insertion can occur at any power level for a PWR, the 50%
power mark was selected.
Power reduction to less than or equal to 50%
is indicative of a
commitment to fully shutdown.
Termination should be considered once the Unit has been placed in a Shutdown condition.
i I
1667A i
6
i BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2C ECCS Initiation This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #1 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #1 reads as follows:
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated 4
and discharge to vessel.
The wording, although similar to the NUREG, was enanged to indicate that the signal was " valid" and "not suprious."
It is recognized that this event may not warrant GSEP activation, (i.e.,
loss of VP causes 1.699 and HPCS initiates and injects) however, there are no clear choices on how to cover the NUREG requirements and allow for more operational flexibility.
The HPCS example does not
)
i indicate a " loss of barriers", however, initiation is due to a
"real" or
" valid" signal.
To avoid Operator confusion (i.e.,
how to determine if HPCS initiation was
" valid" or " spurious" 'or " valid signal" but not needed for core cooling or flooding) it was decided the best approach was strict adherence to the NUREG.
Operational experience to date has indicated that these types of events are not very probable.
Such an event may cause declaration and cancellation almost simultaneously.
1 i
1667A/wjm l
l 7-I.
r_.
.----,--------,g-,
o' BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2D Primary Containment Radiation Level This emergency action level is gradation of Example #1, #6 and #12 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 1 Severe loss of fuel cladding.
- 6 Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate a severe degrddation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g.,
increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings within facility.)
- 12 Fuel damage accident with release of radioacti;ity to containment or fuel handling i
building.
This is a gradation of EAL #2I.
The lower boundary for containment radiation level will be the alarm setpoint.
EAL#2E Safety Relief Valve Closure This emergency action level addresses the concern of q
Example #6 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654 Example #6 reads as follows:
Failure of safety or relief valve in a safety related systen to close following reduction of applicable pressure.
This EAL is essentially word for word from the NUREG i
example.
Words have been added to indicate that this is only a declaration if the Unit is in condition 1 or 2,
and S.P.
temp.
cannot be maintained less than 1100F.
La l
Salle abnormal procedures require that the Unit be removed from condie. ion 1 or 2 by SCRAM if the valve does not close 4
after 4 attempts to close, 2 minutes have elapsed, or Suppression Pool temperature reaches 1100F.
Since the abnormal procedure will place the Unit in a safe condition, the GSEP declaration should only be made if the Unit can not be scrammed or if S.P.
temp. can not be kept at acceptable levels.
i, 1667A i
8
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2F Primary System Leakage This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #5 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #5 reads as follows:
Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate technical specification or primary system leak rate technical specification.
This EAL was worded similar to the NUREG example and adopted from Technical Specification.
J 1
i 1667A/wjm i
9-
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of rission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2G Loss of One Fission Product Barrier This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #2 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #2 read as follows:
Loss of 2
of 3
fission product barriers with a
l potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g.,
loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential for loss of containment.)
This EAL provides indications of a LOCA or an undesired release of coolant and/or fission products to the primary containment.
a)
The indication of cladding failure chosen is high coolant activity.
Example #16 under Alert in NUREG 0654, indicates 300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131.
Using NEDO-22215 this correlates to.approximately 6.5% fuel cladding failure.
Using the 6.5% fuel cladding failure, the Cs-137 and Xe-133 levels of 62 uci/cc and 41 uci/cc respectively, were determined.
Actual site specific values for Cs-137 and Xe-133 may be determined using core damage assessment procedures.
If determined these values may be substituted in the EALs.
Classification under this criteria can only be accomplished after isotopic analysis has been performed.
b)
The tndication of reactor coolant system failure is the amargency core cooling initiation signals.
These signals are related by an "and" as a single signal can also be indicative of a
loss of containment cooling.
If only one of these
- signals were present, it could indicate a loss of containment cooling or loss of feedwater and not necessarily a
loss of reactor coolant system integrity.
c)
The indications of primary containment failure are the containment design parameters and the words "unisolable breech of containment."
1667A/
10
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2H Primary Containment Radiation Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #1,
- 6 and #12 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 1 Severe loss of fuel cladding.
i
- 6 Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g.,
increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings within facility.)
- 12 Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling building.
This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #5 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
EAL#2I Primary System Leakage This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #5 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #5 reads as l
follows:
Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm.
EAL#2J Main Steam Line Break With Isolation This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #4 under Alert NUREG 0654.
Example #4 reads as follows:
Steam line break with MSIV malfunction l
causing leakage (BWR)
A Main Steam Line break outside containment is a
significant event even if complete MSIV iso'lation is effective.
If no isolation occurs, and a leakage path still exists, the event would warrant a Site Emergency classification.
If a break occurs and only a single MSIV on a Main Steam Line isolated then the event would be classified as an Alert.
Termination of this event should be considered once the Unit has been placed in a shutdown condition.
1667A/wjm 11 -
-., ~ -. - -.. _,,,
,-,v..,
1 BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers ( c o n t d )
EAL#2K Loss of Two Fission Product Barriers This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #2 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #2 reads as follows:
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g.,
loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential for loss of containment.)
This EAL provides indications of a LOCA or an undesired release of coolant and/or fission products to the primary containment.
a)
The indication of cladding failure chosen is high coolant activity.
Example #16 under Alert in NUREG 0654, indicates 300 uCi/cc equivalent of I-131.
Using NEDO-22215 this correlates to approximately 6.5%
fuel cladding failure.
Using the 6.5%
fuel cladding failure, the Cs-137 and Xe-133 levels of 62 uCi/cc and 41 uCi/ce. respec,tively, were determined.
Actual site specific values for Cs-137 and Xe-133 may be determined using core damage assessment q
procedures.
If determined these values may be i
substituted in the EALs.
, Classification under this criteria can only be accomplished after isotopic l
analysis has been performed.
b)
The indication of reactor coolant system failure is the emergency core cooling initiation signals.
These signals are related by an "and" as a single signal 1
can also be indicative of a
loss of containment cooling.
If only one of these signals were present, it could indicate a loss of containment cooling or j
loss of feedwater and not necessarily a
loss of reactor coolant system integrity.
i i
c)
The indications of primary containment failure are l
the containment design parameters and the words l
"unisolable breech of containment."
l l
j 1667A/wja 12
.. - -..,, ~... - -
,, ~ _ _ - - - - -. - -.,. -,
,..-...m,
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2L Primary Containment Radiation Level This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #2 i
and
- 10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These l
examples read as follows:
l
- 2 Degraded core with possible loss of coolable I
geometry (indicators should include instrumentation to detect inadequate core
- cooling, coolant activity and/or containment radioactivity levels.)
- 10 Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object t
j damages fuel or water loss below fuel level.)
I so long as containment failure remains unlikely, there is no primary containment activity which will cause escalation to General Emergency.
EAL#2M Main Steam Line Break Without Isolation This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #4 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #4 reads as follows:
BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation.
A Main Steam Line break outside containment is a
significant event even if complete MSIV isolation is effective.
If no isolation occurs, and a leakage path still exists, the event would warrant a Site Emergency l
classification.
If a break occurs and only a single MSIV on a Main steam Line isolated then the event would be i
classified as an Alert.
l 1667A/wja 13 -
-~
BW'R EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2N Loss of Two Fission Product Barriers With Probable Loss of the Third.
This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #2 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 2 reads as follows:
Loss of 2 of 3
fission product barriers with potential' loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g.,
loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential for loss of containment.)
This EAL provides indications of a LOCA or an undesired release of coolant and/or fission products to the primary containment.
a)
The indication of cladding failure chosen is high coolant activity.
Example #16 under Alert in NUREG 0654, indicates 300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131.
Using NEDO-22215 this correlates to approximately 6.5% fuel cladding failure.
Using the 6.5%
fuel cladding failure, the CS-137 and Xe-133 levels of 62 uC1/cc and 41 uCi/cc, respectively, were determined.
Actual site specific values for Cs-137 and Xe-133 may be determined using core damage assessment p r o c e du r e's.
If determined these values may be substituted in the EALs.
Classification under this criteria can only be accomplished after isotopic analysis has been performed.
~
b)
The indication of reactor coolant system failure is the emergency core cooling initiation signals.
These signals are related by an "and" as a single signal can also be indicative of a
loss of containment cooling or a loss of feedwater.
If only one of these signals were present, it could indicate a loss of containment cooling or loss of feedwater and not necessarily a
loss of reactor coolant system integrity.
l I
c)
The indications of primary containment failure are the containment design parameters and the words "unisolable breech of containment."
1667A/wjm 14
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#20 Primary Containment Radiation Level With Probable Loss of Containment.
i This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #1b a rid #2 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follower
- 1b These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment precsure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are j
measured in the environs.
- 2 Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g.,
loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential for loss of containment)
If primary containment activity is greater than or equal to 2x10 3R/hr and primary containment integrity is intact and is expected to remain intact, then the classification remains Site Emergency.
If primary containment activit.y is less than 2x10 3R/hr and primary containment integrity is expected to be lost, the classification remains at 31te Emergency.
It is only when primary containment integrity is greater than or equal to 2x10 3R/hr and when loss of containment integrity is probable that a General Emergency would be declared.
i 1667A/wjm 1
15 -
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL#2P Imminent Core Melt This emergency action level is a gradation of Fxample #4 and
- 5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.
This emergency action level is based on the definition of adegaate core cooling described in the BWR Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines.
The time selected should be the nominal evacuation time for the 2 mile radius.
1667A 1
l 1
16 i
SWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 2.
Loss of Fission Product Barriers (cont'd)
EAL# 2Q General Emergency Cl&ss Description This is general guidance extracted from NUREG 0654.
This EAL is written to address Examples #4 and #5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences * (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.)
The term
" probable" was substituted for the term
" potential" to be consistent with GSEP and with other EALs.
1667A/wjm
- 17
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY condition 3.
System Malfunctions EALe3A Technical Specification Requiring Shutdown This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Examples
$9,
- 11 and #15 under Unusual Event of NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows.
- 9 Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system functicn requiring shutdown by technical specification (e.g.,
because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy.)
- 11 Indications or alarms on process or effluent parametes not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant - shutdown or other cignificant loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g.,
plant
- computer, Safety Parameter Display
- System, all meteorological instrumentation.)
- 15 other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of a
plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g.,
cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits, pipe cracking found during operation.)
The EAL is provided to allow for equipment degradations the combinations of which could place a unit in jeopardy.
Rather than listing all possible combinations of equipment
- failures, and thereby establish a
" pseudo" technical specification, reference is made to existing Technical Specifications.
Operating personnel and Station management are intimately familiar with Technical Specifications.
The words
""and reactor power is or has been reduced to less than or equal to 50% as indicated by power range ins trumenta tion" were added to clearly define when the Unusual Event is to be declared.
50% power allows for repairs to be accomplished during load drop from 100%.
If repairs have not been accomplished by the 50% power mark, an Unusual Event will be declared.
For a BWR control rod insertion will have commenced.
Since control rod insertion can occur at any power level for a PWR, the 50%
power mark was selected.
Power reduction to less than or equal to 50%
is indicative of a
commitment to fully shutdown.
Termination of this event should be considered once the Unit has been placed in a shutdown condition.
1667A/wja
- 1D -
l i
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3B Loss of Instrumentation This emergency action level relates to EAL
- 3A and addresses the concerns of Example #11 under Unusual Event of NUREG 0654.
Example #11 reads as follows:
Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters i.o t functionel in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g.,
plant
- computer, Safety Parameter Display
- System, all meteorological instrumentation.)
No attempt to detail the specific instruments that are critical to accident classification or to offsite dose assessment has been made.
As an
- example, so long as manual procedures for offsite dose assessment and the nocessary input parameters are available, this event need not be declared.
The instrumentation necessary for accident assessment is governed by Technical Specifications.
Effluent radiation
- monitots, containment radiation monitors and the avail &bility of meterological data minimize the possibility of declaration under this EAL.
For exampla, GSEP declaration need not be declared if the Prime Computer is lost so long as sufficient instrumentation is available for performing ODCM hand calculations.
Even if the Site Met Tower has been lost, Envi onmental pr,cedures allow the use of Dresden Met Data or Met Data from the Marseilles weather station.
1 1667A 19
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL# 3C Loss of Station Auxiliary Transformer and Unit Auxiliary Transformer.
This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #7 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #7 reads as follows:
Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power,
capability.
Loss of all offsite pcwer refers to the loss of the Station Auxiliary Transformer and the Unit Auxiliary Transformer.
For purposes of the emergency action level, credit is not taken for unit tie breakers.
Therefore, declaration of an Unusual Event cannot be avoided if the only source of offsite power is through the unit tie breakers.
The words "with the Unit not in Cold Shutdown or Refuel" emphasize the fact that such a loss of power should not constitute an Unusual Event so long as Diesel Generators are available.
1667A/wjm O
20
.~
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY
' Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL# 3D Loss of All Diesel Generators This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #7 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654 Example #7 reads as follows:
Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability.
Loss of all Diesel Generators associated with a
unit refers to only the normal diesel supplies.
It does not refer to Diesel Generators related adminstratively thr ou gh Technical Specifications.
For example, the loss of the 0 1A and 1B Diesel Generators is an Unusual Event for Unit I.
The 2A Diesel Generator is associated adminstratively to Unit I
by Technical Specifications and would not be involved in a Unusual Event declaration for Unit I.
The words "with the Unit not in Cold Shutdown or Refual" emphasize the fact that such a loss of power should not constitute an Unusual Event so long as the Unit Auxiliary Transformer or the associated Station Auxiliary Transformer is available.
1 i
)
1667A/wjm 21
e BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3E Loss of Ability To Reach Cold Shutdown This emergency acticn level addresses the concern of Example #10 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #10 reads as follows:
Complete loss of any function needed for plant cold shutdown.
The wording of this EAL is an attempt to clarify the concern of NUREG 0654.
The use of the term "any function" in the NUREG could result in inappropriate GSEP activation and was therefore avoided.
For example, the loss of a single system would generate an Alert declaration despite the fact that numerous methods exist for achieving Cold Shutdown.
The term " Cold Shutdown" was not used since the Technical Specification. definition is not applicable to the concerns of this accident classification.
The Technical Specification definition relates only to the Mode Switch position and to coolant temperature.
Note that the wording chosen for the EAL does not require that "all rods be inserted" or that " shutdown margins be met" but rather that the reactor be "subcritical".
Suberitically is a condition that can be indicated by rod insertion and/or decaying power level.
The use of the words "by any means" allows personnel the opportunity to use available systems to achieve the condition before issuing a declaration.
Cool down using main steam line drains clean up systems, feed and bleed or other methods using normally available systems are acceptable se a.n s of achieving Cold Shutdown.
This wording is not intended to delay declaration once it is recognized that the desired condition cannot be achieved or maintained.
EAL43F Technical Specification Safety Limit Although not specifically addressed in NUREG
- 0654, violation of a
Technical Specification Safety Limit constitutes a degradation in the level of safety of the plant consistent with the Alert class description provided in the NUREG.
1667A 22
O BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3G ATWS Event This emergency action level is adopted essentially word for word from Example
- 11 under Alert in NUREG 0654 Example #11 reads as follows:
Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor suberitical.
This EAL contains additional wording with respect to having reached a
" Limiting Safety System Setting" as specified in the Technical Specifications.
The additional wording clarifies when the SCRAM should have occurred.
EAL43H Loss of Annunciators This eme'rgency action level addresses the concern of Exampic #14 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #14 reads as follows:
Most of all alarms (annunciators) lost.
The term " unplanned" was added to indicate that there may be planned losses of power to the annunciators.
For
- example, D.C.
ground search procedures may result in temporary loss of power to annunciators.
The listing of panels specifies certain annunciator panels to be critical.
The NRC has indicated that this condition should be an "and" condition. Loss of power to all of the indicated panels is required before declaration is made.
1667A 23
~
l l
l BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3I Loss of Ability to Reach Hot Shutdown This emergency action level addresses the concern of Enample #8 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #8 l
reads as follows:
Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown.
The wording of this EAL is an attempt to clarify the concern of NUREG 0654.
The use of the term "any function" in the NUREG could result in inappropriate GSEP activation and was therefore avoided.
For example, the loss of a single system would generate a Site Emergency declaration despite the fact that numerous methods exist for achieving a Hot Shutdown condtion.
The term " Hot Shutdown" was not used since the Technical Specification definition is not applicable to the concerns of this accident classification.'
The Technical Specification definition relates only to the Mode Switch position and to coolant temperature.
In the case of " Hot Shutdown", Technical Specifications placed no upper boundary on cool, ant temperature.
This emergency action level is addressed as a condition in which reactor pressure cannot be maintained below the lowest relief valve setting.
This is an indication that pressure is not being controlled by normal means but still allows for manual operation of the Safety Relief Valves if needed to keep pressure below the safety Limit.
Note that the wording chosen for the EAL does not require that "all rods be inserted" or that " shutdown margin be met" but rather that the reactor be "suberitical".
Suberiticality is a
condition that can be indicated by rod insertion and/or decaying power level.
The use of the words "by any means" allows personnel the opportunity to use normally available systems to achieve the condition before issuing a declaration.
This wording is not intended to delay declaration once it is recognized that the desired condition cannot be achieved or maintained.
1667A l
24
e' 1
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3J Loss of DC Power This emergency action level addresases the concerns of Example #8 under Alert and Example #7 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 8 (Alert) Loss of all onsite DC power
- 7 (Site Emergency)
Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes.
The NUREG addresses an Alert condition for a loss of all DC power and upgrades to Site Emergency if loss is for greater than 15 minutes.
The 15 minutes is of no consequence.
The time to restore power once lost and to complete notification is expected to take more than 15 minutes.
The event is of such magnitude that offsite assistance would be required.
Therefore, the 15 minute time frame and the Alert EAL has been dropped.
This EAL is more conservative than the NUREG without being more restrictive.
Such a
massive degradation of power sources would more appropriately justify a Site Emergency declaration without an interim Alert declaration.
Stations may chose to list busses by number if so desired.
l 1667A l. _ _ _ _.
I BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3K Loss of All AC Power This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Example #7 under Alert and Example #6 under Site Emergency of NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 7 (Alert)
Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power.
- 8 (Site Emergency)
Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown.
The NUREJ addresses an Alert condition for a loss of all AC power and upgrades to Site Emergency if loss is for greater than 15 minutes.
The 15 minutes is of no consequence.
The time to restore power once lost and to complete notification is expected to take more than 15 minutes.
The event is of such magnitude that offsite assistance would be required.
Therefore, the 15 minute time frame and the Alert EAL has been dropped.
Such a massive degradation of power sources more appropriately justifies a
Site Emergency.
This EAL is more conservative than the NUREG wthout being more restrictive.
Credit is not taken for the Unit cross ties.
This EAL is based on the loss of all Diesel Generators associated with a
Unit in conjunction with loss of the Station Auxiliary Transformer and of the Unit Auxiliary Transformer.
]
1667A
- 26
e~
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condicion 3.
System Malfunctions (cont'd)
EAL#3L General Emergency Class Description This is general guidance extracted from NUREG 0654.*
This EAL is written to address Examples #4 and #5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read asifollows:
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core celt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.)
The term
" probable" was substituted for the term
" potential" to be consistent with GSEP and with other EALs.
EAL#3M Imminent Core Melt This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #4 and
- 5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.
This emergency action level is based on the definition of adequate core cooling described in the BWR Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines.
The time selected should be the nominal evacuation time for the 2 mile radius.
1667A 27
I, BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 4 Secondary System Malfunctions Condition #4 will be events dealing with PWR's and are not applicable to BWR's.
The numbering has been created for consistency and to avoid confusion when dealing with State Agencies.
i i
1667A/wjm 28
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY condition 5.
Fuel Handling Accident EAL#5A This emergency action level addresses the concern of Examples #6 and #12 under Alert in NUREG 0654 These examples read as follows:
- 6 Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g.,
increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings within facility.)
- 12 Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling J
building.
Fuel pool exhaust monitors were not chosen to initiate this EAL since their isolation signal is set relatively low and would essentially halt the tracking of higher readings.
In
- addition, the exhaust monitors may not provide a sufficiently high reading in the case of an exposed spent fuel element.
The 1 R/hr on the Refuel Floor ARM was chosen. based upon Example #6 under Alert in NUREG 0654 and upon the range of the Refuel Floor ARM.
EAL#5B Fuel Pool Level This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #10 reads as follows:
Major dama ge to spent fuel in containment or fuel
-handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level.)
i 1667A/wjm 29 -
1 i
l BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY 1
Condition 5.
Fuel Handling Accident (cont'd)
EAL#5C Damage to Irradiated Fuel and High Radiation in the Fuel Handling Building This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 10 reads as follows:
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fueld handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss be' low fuel level.)
Fuel pool exhaust monitors were not chosen to initiate this EAL since their isolation signal is set relatively low and would essentially halt the tracking of higher readings.
In addition, the exhaust monitors would not provide a sufficiently high reading in the case of an exposed spent fuel element.
The 1 R/hr on the Refuel Floor ARM was chosen based upon Example #6 under Alert in NUREG 0654 and upon the range of the Refuel Floor ARM.
EAL#5D Fuel Pool Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 10 reads as follows:
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fueld handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level.)
1667A/wjm 30
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena EAL#6A Technical Specification Requiring Shutdown This emergency action level (EAL) addresses the concerns of Example #9,
- 11 and #15 under Unusual Event of NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 9 Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function requiring shutdown by Technical Specification (e.g.,
because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy.)
- 11 Indications or alarms on process or effluent parametes not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g.,
plant
- computer, Safety Parameter Display
- System, all meteorological instrumentation.)
- 15 Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of a
plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under Technical Specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g.,
cooldown rate exceeding Technical Specification limits, pipe cracking found during operation.)
The EAL is provided to allow for equipment degradations the combinations of which could place a unit in jeopardy.
Rather than listing all possible combinations of equipment
- failures, and thereby establish a
" pseudo" Technical Specification, r3ference is made to existing Technical Specifications.
Operating personnel and Station management are intimately familiar with Technical Specifications.
The words
""and reactor power is or has been reduced to less than or equal to 50% as indicated by power range instrumentation" were added to clearly define when the Unusual Event is to be declared.
50% power allows for repairs to be accomplished during load drop from 1004.
If repairs have not been accomplished by the 50% power mark, an Unusual Event will be declared.
For a BWR control rod insertion will have commenced.
Since control rod insertion can occur at any power level for a PWR, the 50%
power mark was selected.
Power reduction to less than,or equal to 50%
is indicative of a
commitment to fully shutdown.
Termination of this event should be considered once the Unit has been placed in a shutdown condition.
l 1667A nn n
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BWR EMERGENCY. ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPH1t Condition b.
Natufal and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6B
--Offsite Assistance Although not specifically addressed in NUREG 0654, this emergency action level addresses several examples listed the NUREG.
This EAL provides a symptomatic approach based on damage to the facility and/or equipment.
This approach allows other initiating events to be covered by the same
- EAL, for
- example, explosion,
- fire, flood, earthquake, etc.
The statement "to, prevent further degradation..." was used to segregate events which might require off-site assistance for " clean up" measures but which would not constitute an Unusual Event.
EAL#6C Rupture of Cooling Pond Although not specifically addressed in NUREG 0654, this emergency action level has the potential for public interest and impact off-site.
EAL86D High River Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #13b under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 13b reads as follows:
50 year floor or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche.
The river level chosen should co* respond to the 50 year flood level or to the river level that first endangers vital equipment motors, ie.
Service Water Pump Motors, whichever is lower.
This EAL relates to a projection of reaching the level selected.
Not applicable to LSCS..
EAL#6E Low Lake or River Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #13b under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 13b reads as follows:
50 year floor or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche.
The river level chosen should corraspond to the point at which cribhouse
- pumps, ie.
Circulating Water Pumps or Service Water Pumps, would start to lose suction.
This EAL relates to a projection of reaching the level selected.
Not applicable to LSCS.
1667A/wja
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6F Aircraft Crash Onsite This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #14a under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example 14a reads as follows:
Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over f a ci.lity.
T h' e wording selected is consistent with the NUREG.
EALt6G Earthquake This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #13a under Unusual hvent in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 13a reads as follows:
g Any earthquake felt in plant or detected on station seismic instrumentation.
The wording is consistent with the NUREG.
The term "in house" was added to alloviate the problem of free field monitors which are often activated by trains or thunder.
1 1667A/wjm 33 -
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6H Loss of Ability To Reach Cold Shutdown This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #10 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #10 reads as follows:
Complete loss of any function needed for plant cold shutdown.
The wording of this EAL is an attempt to clarify the concern of NUREG 0654.
The use of the term "any function" in the NUREG could result in inappropriate GSEP activation and was therefore avoided.
For example, the loss of a single system would generate an Alert declaration despite the fact that numerous methods
)
exist for achieving Cold Shutdown.
The term " Cold Shutdown" was not used since the Technical Specification definition is not applicable to the concerns of this accident classification.
The Technical Specification definition relates only to the Mode Switch position and to coolant temperature.
Note that the wording chosen for the EAL does not require that "all rods be inserted" or that " shutdown margins be met" but rather that the reactor be "suberitical".
Suberitically is a condition that can be indicated by rod insertion and/or decaying power level.
The use of the words "by any means" allows personnel the opportunity to use available systems to achieve the condition before issuing a dcciaration.
Cool down using main steam line drains clean up systems, feed and bleed or other methods using normally avaAlable s,ystems are acceptacle means of achieving Cold Shutdown.
This wording is not intended to delay declaration once it is recognized that the desired condition cannot be achieved or maintained.
e 1667A/wjm 34
e' BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6I Safety Systems This emergency action level addresses the concarn of Example #13 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #13 reads as follows:
Fire potentially affecting safety system.
The wording of this EAL requires some indication that the system may not perform its required function.
It also applies this criteria to damage caused by explosion, tornado, earthquake, etc.
EAL#6J Control Room Evacuation This emergency action level has been adopted word for word from Example #20 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #20 reads as follows:
Evacuation of control room anticipated or required, with control of shutdown systems established from local stations.
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1667A 35
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL46K Sustained Winds This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example
- 17d under Alert in N UltEG 0654.
Example
- 17d reads as follows:
Hurricane winds near design basis level.
The wind speed chosen should be approximately 90% of the design basis wind speed for the containment.
EAL#6L High River Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #17b under Alert in NUREG 0654 Example
- 17b reads as follows:
- Flood, low
- water, tsunami, hurricane
- surge, seiche near design levels The river level chosen should be the same as the level projected in EAL#6D for the Unusual Event.
The river level chosen should correspond to the 50 year flood level or to the river level that first endangers vital equipment
- motors, ie.
Service Water Pump
- Motors, whichever is lower.
This EAL is declared when the projection described in EAL#6D has been reached.
Not applicable to LSCS.
1667A 36
1 BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL ( E A". ) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6M Low Lake or River Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example
- 17b under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 17b reads as follows:
- Flood, low
- water, tsunami, hurricane
- surge, seiche near design levels The river level chosen should be the same as the level projected in EAL#6E for the Unusual Event.
The river level chosen should correspond to the point at which cribhouse pumps, ie.
Circulating Water Pumps or Service Water Pumps, would start to lose suction.
This EAL is declared when the projection described in EAL#6E has been reached.
All EALS addressing river level at La Salle have been dropped.
Lake level has been adopted.
Should the Lake level drop 10 feet from normal elevation of 700 to 690 the only source of water to the plant would be the CSCS Pond.
Abnormal procedures require that both. Units be shutdown well in advance of this level.
However, an event of this nature would be severe enough to warrant a declaration of an Alert.
1667A 37
3 i
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EkL#6N Aircraft Crash Inside Protected Area This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #18A under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example 18A reads as follows:
Aircraft crash on facility.
The wording is consistent with the concerns of the NUREG.
EAL#60 Earthquake This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example
- 17A under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 17A reads as follows:
Earthquake greater than OBE levels.
The level se,lected is that
- f the Operating Basis o
The words "is confirmed" were added for stations which do not have direct readout instrumentation and to avoid declaration due to spurious actuations.
EAL#6P Safet'y Limit Although not specifically addressed in NUBEG
- 0654, violation of a
Technical Specification Safety Limit constitutes a degradation in the level of safety of the plant consistent with the Alert class description provided in the NUREG.
EAL#6Q Turbine Failure This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example
- 18e under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 18E reads as follows:
Turbine failure causing casing penetration.
This EAL is word for word from the NUREG and, although concerns are covered by. other EAL statements, is retained at the request of the NRC.
1667A 38
4 BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6R Loss of Ability to Reach Hot Shutdown This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #8 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example #8 reads as follows:
l Complete loss of any function needed for plant hot shutdown.
The wording of this EAL is an attempt to clarify the
. concern of NUREG 0654.
l The use of the term "any function" in the NUREG could result in inappropriate GSEP activation and was therefore avoided.
For example, the loss of a single system would generate a Site Emergency declaration despite the fact that numerous methods exist for achieving a Hot Shutdown condtion.
The term " Hot Shutdown" was not used since the Technical Specification definition is not applicable to the concerns of this accident classification.
The Technical Specification definition relates only to the i
Mode Switch position and to coolant temperature.
In the case of " Hot Shutdown", Technical Specifications placed no upper boundary on coolant temperature.
This e'mergency action level is addressed as a condition in which reactor pressure cannot be maintained below the lowest relief valve setting.
This is an in dica t.lon that prassure is not being controlled by normal means but still allows for manual operation of the Safety Relief Valves if needed to keep pressure below the Safety Limit.
Note that the i
wording chosen for the EAL does not require that "all rods be inserted" or that " shutdown margin be met" but rather that the reactor be "suberitical".
Suberiticality is a condition that can be indicated by rod insertion and/or decaying power level.
J The use of the words "by any means" allows personnel the 1
opportunity to use normally available systems to achieve the condition before issuing a declaration.
This wording is not intended to delay declaration once it is recognized that the desired condition cannot be achieved or maintained.
1667A 1
1 i
39
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BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL#6S Control Room Evacuation This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #18 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 18 reads as follows:
Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes.
This EAL is adopted word for word except that the 15 minute requirement to establish control has been dropped with concurrence of the NRC.
Stations with Remote Shutdown Panels may be able to meet the 15 minute requirement.
- However, stations with local control i
]
modifications may not meet the arbitrary 15 minutes.
The need to upgrade from Alert to Site Imergency is in the 1
judgment of the Shift Engineer.
EAL96T Sustained Winds 1
This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #15c under Site Emergen,cy in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 15e reads as follows:
Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess of design levels.
The wind speed chosen is the design basis wind speed for the containment.
The words "with a unit not in Col d Shutdown or Refuel" were added to indicate that if units are in Cold Shutdown or Refuel, a Site Emergency need not be declared.
EAL96U High River Level This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Example #15b under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 15b reads as follows:
- Flood, low
- water, tsunami, hurricane
- surge, seiche greater. chan design levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels.
The river level chosen should correspond to the 100 year flood levels.
The words "with a unit not in Cold Shutdown or Refuel" were added to indicate that if units are in Cold Shutdown or Refuel, a Site Emergency need not be declared.
Not applicable to LSCS.
1667A
BWR BMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd) l EAL#6V Low Lake or River Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #15b under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example 15b reads as follows:
- Flood, low
- water, tsunami, hurricane
- surge,
)
seiche greater than d e s i gn levels or failure of 1
protection of vital equipment at lower levels.
The river level chosen should be the level at which containment cooling service water pumps start to lose suction.
All EALS addressing river level *at La Salle have been dropped and lake level has been adopted.
Should the lake level drop 10 feet from normal elevation of 700 to 690 the only source of water to the plant would be the CSCS Pond.
Abnormal procedures require that both Units be shutdown well in advance of this level.
However, an event of this nature would be severe enough to warrant declaration of an Alert.
If this event would further degrade to the extent that the CSCS Pond were lost, elevation 685 feet is the bottom of,the pond, a Site Emergency will be declared.
EAL#6W Aircraft Crash Affecting Vital Areas This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #16a under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example 16a reads as follows:
Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire.
This EAL is worded similar to the NUREG example.
EAL46X Earthquake This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #15a under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654 Example
- 15a reads as follows:
Earthquake greater than SSE levels.
The level chosen should equate to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
The words "with a unit not in Cold Shutdown or Refuel" were added to indicate that if units are in Cold Shutdown or Refuel, a Site Emergency need not be declared.
1667A 41 l
l
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 6.
Natural and Destructive Phenomena (cont'd)
EAL46Y General Emergency Class Description This is general guidance extracted from NUREG 0654 This IAL is written to address Example #4 and #5 under General Emergency ir. NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 Other
. plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.)
I.. s term
" probable" was substituted for the term
" potential" to be consistent with GSEP and with other EALs.
EAL#6Z Imminent Core Melt This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #4 and
- 5 under Genera 1 Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PWR Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containnent.)
This emergency action level is based on the definition of adequate core cooling described in the BWR Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines.
The time selected should be the nominal evacuation time for the 2 mile radius.
I I
1667A t
42
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 7.
Harardous, Toxic or Flammable Materials EALe7A Life Threatening Levels Onsite This emergency action lov,el addresses the concern of Example #14d under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 14d reads as follows:
Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release.
The significant wording is " life threatening levels" and
" confirmed".
Placing specific limits for all the toxic, hazardous and flammable materials in the table would be difficult.
However, to determine if the release of these materials is life threatening may be easier to assess.
Unless personnel have been affected and until analysis confirms the release and quantity of such materials, the GSEP condition need not be declared.
EAL97B Plant Operation Affected This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #14d under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 14d reads as follows:
Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release.
This particular EAL addresses releases that may occur offsite but which impact plant operation.
EAL#7C Hazardous Material This emergency. action level also relates to Example 14d under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
,# 14 d reads as follows:
Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release.
This EAL addresses the State of Illinois Public Act 79-1442 Hazardous Materials Re gu l a tion.
1667A 43
e-BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY j
Condition 7.
Hazardous, Toxic or Flammable Materials (cont'd) i EAL97D Life Threatening Levels Within Protected Area This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Example
- 18d under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 18D reads as follows:
Entry into facility environs of uncontrolled toxic or flammable gases.
The significant wor' ding is " life threatening levels" and
" confirmed within the protected area".
Placing specific limits for all the
- toxic, hazardous and flammable materials in the table would be difficult.
However, to determine if the release of these materials is life threatening may be easier to assess.
Unless personnel have been affected and until analysis confirms the release and quantity of such materials, the GSEP condition need not be declared.
EAL97E Control Room Evacuation This emergency action level has been adopted word for word from Example #20 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example F20 reads as follows:
Evacuation of control room anticipated or required with control or shutdown systems established from local stations.
Toxic or flammable material entry into the Control Room is foreseen as one possible cause for a
Control Room evacuation.
I 1667A i
44
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BWR EMERGENCf ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILCSOPHY Condition 7.
Hazardous, Toxic or Flammable Materials (cont'd)
EAL#7F Control Room Emergency Filtration System Operable This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Example
- 18D under Alert in NUREG 0654 Example
- 18D reads as follows:
Entry into Cacility environs of uncontrolled toxic or flammable gasen.
The limits should be based on the alarm or trip setpoint for the emergency filtration system.
These limits should i
be based on the maximum concentration allowable in the Control Room for two minutes "without physical incapacitation of an average human."
The basis for this is given in NUREG
-195.
The specific toxic materials identified will be site specific.
EAL97G Life Threatening Levels Within Vital Areas This emergency action level addresses the concerns of Example #16e under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 16C reads as follows:
Entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas.
Entry of uncontrolled toxic gases into vital areas where lack of access to the area constitutes a safety problem.
The significant wording is " life threatening levels" and
" confirmed within the vital area."
Placing specific limits for all the
- toxic, hazardous and flammable materials in the table would be difficult.
- However, to determine if the release of these materials is life thr e a te n in g may be easier to assess.
Unless personnel have been affected and until analysis confirms the release and quantity of such materials, the GSEP condition need not be declared.
1667A 45
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BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 7.
Hazardous, Toxic or Flammable Materials (cont'd)
EAL47H Control Room Evacuation This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #18 under Site Eme r gency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 18 reads as follows:
Evacuation of control room and control of i
shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes.
This EAL is adopted word for word except that the 15 minute requirement to establish control has been dropped with concurrence of the NRC.
Stations with Remote Shutdown Panels may be able to meet the 15 minute requirement.
However, stations with local control modifications may not meet the arbitrary 15 minutes.
The need to upgrade from Alert to Site Emergency is in the judgment of the Shift Engineer.
Toxic or flammable material entry into the Control Room is foreseen as one possible cause for Control Room evacuation.
EAL#71 Control Room Filtration System Inoperable This energency action level addresses the concern of Example #16c under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 16C reads as follows:
Entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas.
Entry of uncontrolled toxic gases into vital areas where lack of access to the area constitutes a safety problem.
The limits should be based on the alarm or trip setpoint for the emergency filtration system.
These limits should be based on the maximum concentration allowable in the Control Room for two minutes "without physical i
incapacitation of an average human."
The basis for this is give,n in NUREG
-195.
The specific toxic materials identified will be site specific.
i 1667A
- 46
,e BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 8.
Security Threat EAL#8A Attempt co Sabotage This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #12 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0 6 ".4.
Example
- 12 reads as follows:
1 Security threat or attempted entry or attempted
- sabotage, l
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
EAL#8B Internal Disturbance This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #12 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 12 reads as follows:
Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
EAL48C Bomb Device Discovered This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #12 under Unusual Avent in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 12 reads es follows:
Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
EAL#8D Hostage This emergency action level addresses tite concern of Example #12 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0658.
Example
- 12 reads as follows:
Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
A hostage situation, which does not disrupt normal operations, should not be declared as a GSEP Event.
1667A 47 i
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I BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 8.
Security Threat (cont'd)
EAL#8E Civil Disturbance This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #12 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 12 reads as follows:
Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
EAL48F Armed or Forced Protected Area Intrusion This emergency action level addresses the concern of 3
i Example #12 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 12 reads as follows:
Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan Contingencies.
EAL48G Ongoing Security Threat This emergency action level adFresses the concern of Example #16 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Exampic #16 reads as follows:
Ongoing security compromise.
EAL48H Security Threat That Generates An Unusual Event This particular emergency action level is not required by NUREG 0654.
- However, some criteria for eucalation was needed above and beyond that presented in EAL#8G.
This emergency action level provides guidance for escalating security event.
For example, if a bomb device were to explode there is no EAL that requires escalation above Unusual Event.
- However, if as a
result of the detonation, equipment degradation meets the criteria for an Unusual Event escalation to an Alert would be required by this EAL..
1667A _,,, -
e' BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY j
1 Condition 8.
Security Threat (cont'd)
EAL48I Armed or Forced Vital Area Intrusion This emergency action levol addresses the concern of Example #16 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example # 16. r e a ds as follows:
Ongoing security compromise.
This is adopted from the list of Security Plan j
Contingencies EAL48J Imminent Loss of Physical Control of Facility This emergency action level addresses the concern of l
Example #14 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 14 reads as follows:
Iaminent loss of physical control of the plant.
EAL#8K Loss of Control of Vital Areas This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #14 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 14 reads as follows:
Imminent loss of physical control of the plant.
This is a
gradation upward from 2AL98I and is more definitive than #8J.
EAL#8L Loss of Physical Control of Facility This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #3 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 3 reads as follows:
Loss of physical control of the facitity.
EAL#8M Loss of the Control Room This amergency action level addresses tha concern of Example #3 under General 3mergency in NVREG 0654.
Example
- 3 reads as follows:
Loss of physical control of the facitity.
This is a gradation upward from EAL
- BK and is more definitive than 8L.
1667A 49
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 9.
Other Conditions of Equivalent Magnitude l
EAL#9A Unucual Event Class Deucription This is general guidance extracced from Example #15 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example #15 reads as follows:
Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of a
plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g.,
cooldown rate exceeding technical specificiation limits, pipe cracking found during operation.)
EAL#9B Alert Class Description l
This is general guidance extracted from Example #19 under Alert in NUREG 0054.
Example #19 reads as follows:
Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activtion of technical support center and placing near-sits Emergency operations Facility and othar key emergency personnel on standby.
EAL#9C Fuel Pool Level This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654 Example #10 reads as follows:
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level.)
EAL#9D ARM Readings and Survey Results This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #6 under Alert in NUREG 0654.
Example #6 reads as follows:
l Radiation levels or airborne contamination which j
indicate a severe degradation in the control of l
radioactive materials (e.g.,
increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation
- readingr, within facility.)
1667A 50
. l
BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 9.
Other Conditions of Equivalent' Magnitude EAL#9E Site Emergency Class Description This is general guidance extracted from Example #17 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 17 reads as follows:
Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams or a
precautionary nctification to the public near the site.
1 EAL#9F Fuel Pool Level This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #10 under Site Emergency in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 10 reads as follows:
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level.)
i EALW9G General Emergency Class Description This is general guidance extracted from NUREG 0654.
This EAL is written to address Example #4 and #5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654 These examples read as follows:
I
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
I
' containment.)
The term
" probable" was substituted for the term
" potential" to be consistent with GSEP and with other EALs.
1667A l
51
.~
s BWR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 9.
Other Conditions of Equivalent Magnitude EAL#9H Imminent Core Melt This emergency action level is a gradation of Example #4 and
- 5 under General Emergency in NUREG 0654.
These examples read as follows:
- 4 Other plant conditions
- exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g.,
any core melt situation.
- 5 Example PW R Sequences (That could lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of the containment.)
This emergency action level is based on the definition of adequate core cooling described in the BWR Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines.
The time selected should be the nominal evacuation time for the 2 mile radius.
1 1667A 1
52
o-i BWR EMERGENC) ACTION LEVEL (EAL) PHILOSOPHY Condition 10.
Personal Injurey EAL#10A Transportation of Contaminated Injured Person This emergency action level addresses the concern of Example #16 under Unusual Event in NUREG 0654.
Example
- 16 reads as follows:
Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital.
1 O
i 1
1667A l
53 -
1 1.2P-1200-1 Revision 5 February 20 198b 3
~
A*4"rAe 'asuhire* A i
1.Sc*. estisiHGnN4!Y Ae "l*lON l.hVht. INDEX 1
4)
Aircratt cs af.ls or suissi les 12) 1,oss of DC power.
A s eas wta<st evea rious en.
- 13) Plant sliutdown functions.
- 14) ottier systeins required by Technical 2) contros Hooi.i evacuatlon.
Specificationis.
15)
I.oss of fission product barriers.
- o )
Eartliquake.
16)
I,oss of primary coolant.
4)
Haplosion caissing elasan<pt.
I'l ) Fuel llandling Accident.
5)
Fire.
4 11 ) Hadiat ton releases f rons the plosit.
(. )
Fi e l.
- 19) Personnel Injury.
- f )
FSAN Analyzed Accleleset t..
- 20) llazardous materials.
8)
Security tiercas.
9)
Torstado/ Severe winls.
- 21) Ollier condit ions.
l
- 22) Tr asispor tatlosi Accident.
- 10) Toute gas.
11)
I,oss of AC powes.
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