ML20196L321
| ML20196L321 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook, Diablo Canyon, 05000000, Shoreham, Crane |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1988 |
| From: | Riccio J NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| FRN-53FR16435, RULE-PR-50 53FR16435-01579, 53FR16435-1579, OL, NUDOCS 8807070360 | |
| Download: ML20196L321 (14) | |
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Nuclear Information and Resource SeWice.50:33
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142416th Street, N.W., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-0002 5 ; t. N L -
June 23, 1988 Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch
Dear Sirs:
Enclosed please find the commenss of the Nuclear Inforraation and Resource Service on proposed rule: 10 CFR Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading and Initial Low-Power Operations.
Sincerel',
kY' J:rmes P. Riccio l
8807070360 880623 53 16435 PDR l
dedicated to a sound non nuclear entre polin.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Proposed Rule:
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Emergency Planning and
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Preparedness Requirements for
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Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading
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and Initial Low Power Operations
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)
53 End. Egg. 16435
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NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE COMMENTS INTRODUCTION On August 19, 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in response to the accident at Three Mile Island, published revised and upgraded emergency planning and preparedness requirements.
The new regulations were predicated upon the Commission's determination that safe siting and design-engineered features alone could not adequately protect the public health and safety.
The Commission recognized that emergency planning was equally as important as sitircJ or design in protecting the public.(44 End.
Egg. 75167).
On July 13, 1982 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgated as a final rule a rewrite of 10 C.F.R. 50.47(d) which provided that only a finding of the adequacy of an applicants onsite emergency planning and preparedness would be required for 1
low power operations.(47 End. Eng. 30232).
In the language accompanying the rule the Commission stated that onsite planning and preparedness would necessarily involve aspects of some offsite elements.
Among the offsite elements cited by the Commission was the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway.
(See 46 Egd. Eng. 61132, SECY-81-570).
On May 9, 1988 the Commission published a proposed rule which, if implemented, would weaken the emergency planning and preparedness-requirements for nuclear power plant fuel loading and low power operations.(53 Egd. Egg. 16435)
This proposed rule is not premised upon any new finding as to the safety of low power operation.
In fact, the aafety rationale put forth by the NRC is identical to that issued in the 1982 rule change.
- Rather, the proposed rule has been brought about solely by the inability of the Seabrook plant to obtain a low power license due to the absence of emergency notification systems in Massachusetts towns near the facility.
We at the Nuclear Information and Resource Service believe that emergency planning and preparedness regulations have been promulgated to protect the public in the event of an accident.
We further believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can best fulfill its statutory obligation to protect the public health and safety by ensuring that applicants for low power l
licenses meet emergency planning requirements rather than i
altering existing regulations to compensate for site specific l
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shortcomings of any one particular plant.
Toward this end, we submit the following comments for the Commission's consideration.
I.
IIIR NRC FAILS TO PROVIDE A REASONED ANALYSIS FOR CHANGING THE PRESENT RULE AS REQUIRED BLTHE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency that rescinds a rule is required to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance. (Motor Vehicle Marufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
463 U.S.
29, 42 (1983)).
In the present instance, the NRC's rationale fails to pre, vide ample justification for the proposed rule change.
In fact, the Commission's analysis of the need for a rule making is merely a rehashing of the analysis it undertook for the July 1982 rule change.
While the NRC "sees no reason to doubt the safety rationale stated by the Commission in promulgating its 1982 rule", it fails to acknowledge the conclusions based upon that rationale.
In 1982, the NRC stated that, "(w)hile the propored rule wculd eliminate the need to have any NRC or FEMA reviev, findings, or determinations on the adequacy of offsite age:icies' emergency planning and preparedness, the NRC review of licensees onsite response r.achanism will necessarily include aspects of soue offsite elements...." (46 Ead. Egg. 61132, SECY-3 l
l 81-570).
Among the offsite elemento cited by the Commission was the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace.
The proposed rule now under consideration by the Commission contradicts the 1982 determination without providing any justification for such a reversal.
The proposed rule not only contradicts the Commission's 1982 findings, it ignores the lessons learned as a result of the Three Mile Island accident.
On December 19, 1979, the NRC proposed to upgrade its emergency planning and preparedness regulations. (44 End. Egg. 75167).
The commission stated that its rationale for the proposed rule was predicated, "on the Commission's considered judgement in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island that safe siting and design-engineered features alone do not optimize protection of the public health and safoty." (44 Ead. Eng. 75167, 75169).
The NRC added that altb
'h emergency planning had previously beer.
considered a
.dary and additional means of protecting the public, its perspective had been, "severely altered by the unexpected sequence of events that occurred at Three Mile Island."
The Commission then concluded that, "the protection provided by safe siting and engineered safety features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident."
In the instant case, the Commission seems to have forgotten or chosen to ignore the lessons of Three Mile Island.
While the risks associated with operation at low power are less than at 4
full power, low power operation still poses a threat to the public health and safety. (See Section II., below)
To address this risk through the use of ad hoc measures is both inappropriate ar.d unnecessary.
In putting forth this proposed rule for consideration, the NRC is reverting to a pre-TMI mind set.
Before making a determination on this rule, perhaps the Commissioners should heed the words of George Santayana that,
"(t) hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
II. THE COMMISSIQN'S DETEPMLEATION THAT THE RISKS OF LOW POWER OPERATION ARE LESS THAN THOSE POSED BY FULL POWER OPERATION DOES NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS DURING LOW POWER OPERATIQN AND FUEL LOADING The Nuclear Information and Resource Service agrees with the Commission that the risk posed by 5% rower is lower than that of operation at full power.
However, this is not to say that the risks posed by low power operation are inconsequential. The NRC bases its position upon the same safety rationale cited in the 1982 rule change.
The Commission bases its argument in part on the fact that during low power operation the plant produces a lower fission product inventory than at full power.
While this is true, substantial inventories of biologically significant radionuclides will be developed during low power testing.
Indeed, at 5% power, the shortlived isotopes of 5
p I
iodine and tellurium, the significant contributors to prompt public health consequences, approach 95% of their equilibrium condition (5% of their full power value) in 8 to 40 days, depending on the radionuclide.
The inventory of radionuclides, while reduced from the full power level, still poses a substantial prompt health hazard.
(Affidavit of Richard Burton Hubbard, Concerning Public Risk Associated with Proposed Low Power Test Program, April 16, 1981, pp. 4-5. E_acific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2],
Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 OL. )
The fission products that pose a substantial prompt public health risk consist of the following radionuclides:
Ruthenium-103 and -105, Tellurium-132, Iodine-131 and 135, Cesium-135 and
-144, and Holybdenum-99.
An estimate of the build up of these radionuclides was conducted for the Diablo Canyon plant operating for one month at 5% power:
Tellurium-132 7,000,000 Curies Iodine-131 4,500,000 Curies Iodine-135 9,100,000 Curies Cesium-134 9,700 Curies Cesium-144 520,000 Curies Holybdenum-99 9,200,000 Curies (Testimony of Dr. William K.
Brunot on behalf of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, May 19, 1981, Contention 4, Table I, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, (Diablo Canyon Nucl0ar Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 OL.)
Thus, it is evident that while the fission product inventory is smaller at 5% power there are none the less significant quantities of biologically hazardous radionuclides produced 6
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during low power operation.
Furthermore, it is clear that in tl.e evant of an accident at low power these radionuclides would pose a significant threat to the public's health and safety.
l The risk to the public can best be mitigated by effective offsite emergency planning and preparedness.
The Commission's reliance on ad hoc procedures in this instance is an unjustifiable abrogation of its statutory duty to protect the publi
~.<cith and safety.
- .ia WRC attenipts to bolster its position by relying on the argument that at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of the safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an acc;Csn.
T'.e Commission concludes that operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radioactive release from occurring.
This argument, however, is unconvincing given the nature of the low power test program.
While the Commission's contention as to the capacity of safety systems at low power nay well be true, the NRC fails to mention that these safety systems will be purposely defeated during tests at low power.
While the capacity of the safety systems to mitigate the results of an accident are greater at low power, there are questions as to whether these systems will even be brought into play.
Coupled with the intentional override of safety systems is the possibility of operator error during low power operation.
The NRC acknowledges that at low power plant operators typically have less experience.
Given the operators lack of experience, 7
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it would not be unreasonable to expect a greater number of operator errors.
Operator errors are especially important given the fact that in some instances they can result in the complete loss of safety systems.
A study undertaken for the TMI Lessons Learned Task Force found that approximately 5% of all human errors and cases of procedural deficiencies resulted in complete loss of safety function.
Among the systems affected were:
the emergency core cooling system, emergency power systems, emergency feedwater systems, reactor protection slutem and containment integrity.(Memorandum from C.S.
Lc?g to Roger J. Mattson,
SUBJECT:
"Review of LERs fcr Loss of Safety Function Due to Personnel Errors and Defective Procedures", July 30, 1979).
The possibility of operator error is of added significance during low power operation and testing because it can result in multiple loss of safety systems.
Therefore, while safety systems will not normally have to operate at full capacity to mitigate the consequences of an accident at low power, it is possible that one or more of these j
safety systems will be unavailable due to either testing, operator error or a combination of the two.
This, coupled with the biologically significant radionuclides built up in the fission product inventory during only one month of low power testing, reveals the potential danger of low power operation.
For the Commission to address this threat to the public health and safety by merely relying upon ad hoc means of offsite emergency planning is irresponsible.
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III. THE PROPOSED RULE IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO LICENSE THE SEABROOK PLANT AND LOWER EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS REOUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE MET PRIOR TO LOW POWER OPERATION As the Commission has acknowledged, attention has been refocused on the issue of emergency planning due to the dismantling of the early warning sirens in Massachusetts towns adjacent to the Seabrook facility.
While the NRC did not intend for the emergency planning regulations to provide local governments with veto power over the plants within their jurisdiction, just that has come to pass.
At both the Shoreham and Seabrook facilities emergency planning concerns have led to local and state government refusal to participate in emergency planning, thereby preventing the plants from operating.
While the fate of the Shoreham facility is more or less sealed, the proposed rule would significantly alter the status of the Seabrook facility.
Under the proposed rule, regulatory compliance with emergency planning regulations requiring early notification systems will not be necessary prior to the issuance of a low power license.
It is obvious that the proposed rule was not prompted by a re-examination of the safety basis for the 1902 rule, but by the NRC's desire to avoid the emergency planning problems encountered at Seabrook and license the plant for low power operations.
In 1982, the Commission clearly stated its justification for 9
J
l requiring offsite emergency planning, including emergency notification systems, prior to low power operations.
The Commission stated that,"(t)he public knowledge that no offsite protection exists could cause chaos in the event of an incident during fuel loading or low power testing." (47 End. Beg. 30232, 30233).
The NRC's purpose in requiring early notification j
capability focused not on the actual dangers of low power operations but on the public perception of those dangers.
The Commission viewed early notification capability as a means of preventing an uncontrollable and chaotic evacuation.
The NRC's 1982 rationale is no less true today.
Rel'ance on ad hoc m0thods of offsite emergency planning and preparedness will undoubtedly result in chaos in the event of an "incident" at low power, whether caused by operator error, construction defects, a terrorist attack or an earthquake.
Furtherac-because the NRC has chosen to deal with this issue through
,eric rulemaking rather than in the context of the Seabrook adjudication, the proposed rule will apply to all future applications for low power licenses.
It appears unsound l
to make policy based upon the site specific problems encountered at a single plant, however, this seems to be what the Commission intends to do under the proposed rule.
IV. THE MERITS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO OPERATION AT FULL POWER Under the proposed rule, offsite emergency planning and 10 l
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preparedness requirements, including the ability to provide prompt early warning to the public in the event of an emergency, will still be a prerequisite to operation at full power.
For the Commission to merely change the point at which emergency planning and preparedness requirements must be met within the licensing procedure appears irrational.
It is only within the context of the Seabrook case that the rationale for this proposed rule can be understood, unless of course the Commission is planning on obviating the necessity for emergency notification systems at full power as well.
In light of the proposed rule, it appears that the NRC is leading the people of New Hampshire and Massachusetts down the same path that led to the Shoreham debacle on Long Island.
If, as the Commission contends, emergency planning and preparedness requirements will remain the same for full power operation, the Seabrook facility will face the same fate as that suffered by the plant at Shoreham.
If the NRC approves the proposed rule change and the Seabrook plant goes to low power operation, the plant i
will still be precluded from operating at full power due to the absence of an early notification system in the Massachusetts towns adjacent the facility.
The result will be an idle plant that must now face the added expense of decontamination.
The Commission can prevent the Shoreham fiasco from being a total waste by learning from its mistakes and preventing the same thing from happening at Seabrook.
As stated by former Commissioner Asselstine, "as a matter of 11
policy, the Commission should not issue a low pc'er license to a plant when there are fundamental uncertainties about whether the plant can be licensed." (Public Service Company of New Hamnshire, gt al. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) CLI-87-02, April 9, 1987).
In the instant case, the Seabrook plant fails to meet even the requirements for low power operation.
To change present regulations in order to obtain a low power license for the plant, in light of the fact that it cannot under present regulations be licensed for full power, seems foolish at best.
At worst, it could be a precursor to disaster.
CONCLUSION The Nuclear Information and Resource Service believes that the Commission should reject the proposed rule.
To do otherwise would fly in the face of reason and the valuable lessons learned through experiences at Three Mile Island and Shoreham.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission can best serve the public by ensuring that the emergency planning and preparedness l
requirements it has promulgated are met prior to the issuance of l
l a license whether it be for initial low power or for full power operation.
To do otherwise would be an abrogation of the Commission's duty to protect the health and safety of the public it serves.
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DATED: June 23, 1988 Respectfully submitted, James P. Riccio Nuclear Information & Resource Service 1424 16th Street, Suite 601 Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 328 - 0002 13
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