ML20198D177
| ML20198D177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1992 |
| From: | Tietz G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GCT-92-22, NUDOCS 9205180346 | |
| Download: ML20198D177 (127) | |
Text
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6 Ccmm:nw:alth Edis:n-ouad Cthes Nuclear Power Staten 22710 206 Avenue N9rth "
Cordova, Illir@ts 61242-9740 ~
Telephone 3091654 2241..'
I GCT-92i22
-May1,l'9921
-U; 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
+
-ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-s
SUBJECT:
Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes; Tests, and Experiments Completed n
- BBC D95LeL.h9L-59-254 3hL59-255 Enclosed'please find a~ listing of those facility and procedure changes, tests, and experiments requiring safety evaluations completed from January 1, 1992
.thru April 15; 1992, for QuadiClties Station Units ~1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPRa30..-A summary of-the safety evaluations are being; reported in compliance-
-withc10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e),
i espectfully,.
R
-COMMONHEALTH EDISON COMPANY-
- 00AD-CITIES NUCLEAR P0HER STATION f.
Geraid_ Tletz Technical-Superintendent GCT/dak c'
Enclosure:
lt cc:
A. B.; Davis, Regional Mministrator L
T. Taylor, Senior-Resident ~ Inspector C
l 3ONb h
/
.(i
/
TS;92 I
9205:80346 920501 v
PDR3 ADOCK.05000254 j
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PDR:
SE-92-01 Temporary Procedure Run 2A Cors Spray with Torus Drained DESCRIPTION:
To outline the steps to lineup the Unit 2 Core Spray System to have lhe A loop available as a high capacity injection source while the torus is out of service and to provide direction for operation of the Unit i Core Spray pump in this. condition.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPNARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine eacn accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or conponent is explicitiv or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accidant.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffeient type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created beccuse the initial conditions for a loss of coolant accident evaluated in the FSAR is full power (2511 MWT).
With the unit in Shutdown there will not be the same level of lodine in the fuel.
The Technical Specification does not require Core Spray to be operable while the Reactor is shutdown.
However, while the torus is unavailable no work is allowed that has the potential to drain the vessel.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-03 Special Test 2-101 Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION:
Perform special test to measure heat exchanger thermal performance, for the 2A and 2B heat exchangers.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM1ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None-For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change l
described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the special test does not change the operation or control of the RHR system.
The test operates the RHR system per approved station procedures.
Either Torus Cooling or Shutdown Cooling will be used to develop a temperature gradient across the heat exchanger.
Temperature data will be collected to measure the heat transfer rate.
A temporary temperature recorder is used to improve accuracy of readings.
Vessel temperature is normally monitored using recirc system.
If recirc is off, bulk temperature monitoring is available using vessel metal temperatures and the temporary recorder.
No functional change to the RHR system will be performeu by the special test.
3.
The margin of safety, is not. defined in the basis for any Technical l
Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-04 Hork Package Installation of Pneumatic Pipe Plugs DESCRIPTION:
Installation of pneumatic pipe plugs in the feedwater lines while the feedwater containment isolation check valves are being worked on.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUWARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change-alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criceria are listed below:
Refueling UFSAR SECTION 14.2.2 Loss of Coolant UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change desc:1 bed above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously svaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the pneumatic pipe plugs are rated for much higher pressure than is required by the UFSAR Secondary Containment accident condition.
Proper installation will be verified prior to opening the inboard feedwater check valve.
A once a shift check of the pressure integrity of the pneumatic plug will be performed to ensure no depressurization. A pump will be more available to maintain plug at proper pressure.
Site engineering has evaluated and approves the usage of pneumatic pipe plugs for this application.
In addition, the reactor building DP is monitored to ensure the status of the secondary containment.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Technical Specification limits are to be able to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum with a filter flow train rate not more than 4000 cfm.
The pneumatic pipe plugs have a rated sealing capacity of 40 ft of water which is significantly more than required for secondary containment.
l-
SE-92-05 QCTP 1110-3 Rev. O DESCRIPTION:
Procedure upgrade from QOP block to QCTP block.
Change use of Nitric Permanganate (NP).to Alkaline Permanganate (AP).
SAFETY EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not intrease the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffe.ent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the FSAR did not consider chemical decontaminations, so the effects of chemicals used for the decon on plant equipment was not considered.
The technical evaluation referenced in #5 determined the following:
1.
Meta >iurgy - specifications for recirculation system, RWCU, and RPV annulus allow for general corrosion.
Experience shows that the decon solvent corrosion rates are less than original allowances.
Corrosion verification using 304 stainless steel coupons will be used for assurance of actual corrosion rate.
2.
Core Spills - solvent will not come in contact with equipment necessary to mainta' reattor safety.
If solvent does enter core or suppression pool, tnere is an acceptable amount of dilution of the solvent.
i
-e-SE-92-005 CONTD
- L l Chemistry - Residual solvent will-be negligible since reactor coolant -
affected by decon will be returned to acceptable conductivity and TDC levels.
F 4.
Gaskets / Seals --Experience _ indicates no adverse affects on gasket, seals, or valve packing.
LS.. Leaks / Spills - Outside-drywell visual surveillance will take place during operation and leaks will be isolsted if they occur.
Inside drywell, the sump pumps will be isolated during operation.
Diluted solvent-is compatible with radwaste system.
Reactor Building Ventilation system will monitor any gaseous releases.
6.
Hydrostatic Testing - Equipment is tested before decon operations to assure integrity, operability, and adequacy of system and shutdown safeguard.
- 7. : Equipment failure - should vendor equipment fall, it can be isolated for repair..
Time required for repair is not constrained by the expected corrosion rate of stagnant solvent in plant systems.
8.
Radiation Protection - Access to high rad areas'during decon activities will be strictly controlled by Radiation Protection Department.
Based on.the extensive review performed for this technical evaluation, it was determined that the probability'of impact on safety equipment as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not increase, and the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not-created.
3.
The. margin of safety, is not defined'in the. basis for-any Technical Specification, therefore,-the safety margin is not reduced.
P i
l
o SE-92-06 Procedure QCTP 1110-2 Rev. O DESCRIPTION:
Procedure upgrade from QOP block to QCTP block, plus change in chemical scheme from nitric permanganate to alkaline permanganate (from NP to AP).
SAFETY EVALUATION St# NARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the FSAR did not consider chemical decontaminations, so the effects of chemicals used for the decon on plant equipment was not considered.
The technical evaluation referenced in #S determincd the following:
1.
Metallurgy - specifications for recirculation system, RHCU, and RPV annulus allow for general corrosion.
Experience shows that the decon solvent corrosion rates are less than original allowances.
Corrosion verification using 304 stainless steel coupons will be used for assurance of actual corrosion rate.
2.
Core Spills - solvent will not come in contact with equipment necessary to maintain reactor safety.
If solvent does enter core or suppression pool., there is an acceptable amount of dilution of the solvent.
1 y
SE-92-006 CONTD.
k 3.
Chemistry --Residual solvent will be negligible since reettor coolant' affected by decon will be returned to acceptable conductivity and TDC levels.
4.
Gaskets / Seals - Experience indicates no adverse affects on gasket, seals, or valve packing.
5.
Leaks / Spills --Outside-drywell visual surveillance will take place during operatica and leaks will be isolated if they occur.
Inside drywell, the sump pumps will be isolated during operation.
Diluteo solvent is compatible with radwaste system.
Reactor Building Ventilation system will mor.itor any gaseous re' eases.
6.
Hydrostatic Testing - Equipment is tested before de:on operations to assure integrity, operability, and adequac of system and shutdown safeguard.
7.
Equipment Failure - should vendor equipment fall, it can be isolated l
for repair.
Time required for repair is not constrained by the expected corrosion rate of stagnant solvent in plant systems.
8.
Radiation Protection - Access to high rad areas during decon activities will be strictly controlled by Radiation Protection Department.
Based on the; extensive review performed for this technical evaluation, it was determined that the probability of impact on safety equipment as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not increase, and the possibility of an accident or malfunction-of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,.therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
1
SE-92-07 QCTP 1110-4 Rev. 0 l
DESCF IPTION:
Procedure upgrade from QOP block to QCTP block.
Change ese of Nitric Permanganate (NF) to Alkaline Permanganate (AP).
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used ir the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitiv or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Oper;r;on or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UfSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated la the UFFAR is not created because the FSAR did not consider chemical decontaminations, so the effet ts of chemicals used for the decon oi. plant equipment was not considered.
The technical evaluation referenced in #5 determined the following:
1.
Metallurgy - specifications for recirculation system, RWCU, and RPV annulus allow for general corrosion.
Experience shows that the decon solvent corrosion rates are less than or?ginal allowances.
Corrosion verification using 304 stainless steel coupons will be used for assurance of actual corrosion rate.
2.
Core Spills - solvent will not come in contact with equipment necessary to maintain reactor safety.
If solvent does enter core or suppression pool, there is an acceptable amount of dilution of the solvent.
,p e
r
-~
y
SE-92-007 CONTD 3.
Chemistry - Residual solvent will be negligible since reactor coolant affected by decon will be returned to acceptable conductivity and TDC levels.
4.
Gaskets / Seals - Experience indicates no adverse affects on gasket, seals, or valve packing.
5.
Leaks / Spills - Outside drywell visual surveillance will take place during operation and leaks will be isolated if they occur.
Inside drywell, the sump pumps will be isolated during operation.
Diluted solvent is compatible with radwaste system.
Reactor Building Ventilation system will monitor any gaseous releases.
6.
Hydrostatic Testing - Equipment is tested before decon operations to assure integrity, operability, and adequacy of system and shutdown safegs ed.
7.
Equipment failure - should vendor equipment fall, it can be isolated for repair.
Time required for renair is not constrained by the
~
expected corrosion rate of stagnant solvent in plant systems.
8.
Radiation Protection - Access to high rad areas during decon activities will be strictly controlled by Radiation Protection Department.
Based on the extensive review performed for this technical evaluatio., it was determined that the probability of impact on safety equipment as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not increase, and the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not reated.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
P I
SE-92-09 lemp Alteration DESCRIPTION:
Install a 250 resistor in series with TB 1 positive lead and install a s ecorder Scross the 250 resistor for nonitoring the service water rad monitor output signal.
SATETY EVAL.UA110N SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The d Anged structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assun..) to function during or after the accident.
Operattaa or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the thenge described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the Unit i SHRH is inoperable.
Chemistry Department did taring 1 per 12 hr grab samples as required by Technical Specification Table 3.2-5.
The recorder does not change the operation or alter the performance of the SHRM.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the monitor is inoperable and chemistry is pulling grab samples 1 per 12 hrs, as required by Technical Table 3.2-5.
SE-92-10 Loading Evaluation 92-002 DESCRIPTION:
Place a total of 48 lead blankets on 3 sets of scaffolding in the area of the Unit Two Decon equipment.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to d6termine each accident or anticipated tt?nstent described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or imp'icitly assumed o function durin' or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each or' these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created w.ause the design n
los/ftgoftheflenris350lbs/ft',whiletheadditiona:
loadin load of 160
-is much less than the design limits.
Such that even if the scaffolding fails and all of the lead falls on the floor, the increased load will never exceed the design allowables.
No other equipment or systems will be affected when the scaffolding performs its intended function nor will the scaffolding failure affect any other systems or components in an adverse manner.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
~
l
SE-92-il Loading Evaluation 92-003 DESCRIPTION:
Place 100 lead blankets on Drywell grating, not exceeding 2 layers high.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLM MRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or af er the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possiollity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than anypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotcreatgdbecausetheadded weight of the lead blankets will only be 20 lbs/ft, while the design limit is 100 lo/ft.
Therefore, no new failure modes will be created, nor will any existing failure modes be affected.
No other systems or components will be affected, because the gcating will be the only component that supports the lead blankets.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-12 Loading Evaluation 92-001 DESCRIPTION:
Place an IPM-8, along with 20 lead blankets to be hung from scaffolding,
- n 595' near the Unit 2 nersonnel hatch.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters l'
'tial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structt t, > !stV
,e mnent is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function Ar'.r1 dti %e accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below-None For each of these accidents. It has been determined that the change descilbed above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previcusly evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than anypreviouslyevaluatedinthgUFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefloorhas adesignloadingof350lbs/ft,whiletheadditionalloadisonly214 lbs/ft.
Therefore, the ability of the floor and its supporting structure will not be stressed beyond their design limits.
The only identified failure would be a scaffolding collapse.
This would probably damage the IPM-8, but should not affect any other systems or components nor their ability to perform their intended function.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-13 Setpoint Change #482 DESCRIPTION:
Adjust setpoints of TSH/TSL 1/2-5741-317 down by approximately 6 degrees Fahrenheit.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPHARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because reducing the setpoints of TSH/TSL 1/2-S741-317 will not adversely affect or impact systems so as to create an accident or malfunction not evaluated in the
'UFSAR.
The change will leave the system operating in it normal range.
The change only serves to reduce the average CR air temperature while running the "B" Train, and it does not introduce new operating modes which could lead to an accident.
The reduction in CR air temperature will provide greater operator comfort, but will not begin to approach any equipment's minimum temperature ratings.
Therefore,there will be no measurable effect on any other equipment or systems by this change.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
b...
SE-92-15 Loading Evaluation 92-005 DESCRIPTION:
Place an IPM-8D with scaffolding to hold lead blankets on 678' elevation.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
1he changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previcusly evaluated in t adesignratingof400lbs/ftgeUFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefloorhas
, while the added loading is only 280 lbs/ft.
Therefore the ability of the floor and its supporting structure will not be stressed beyond-their design limits.
The only identified failure would ve a scaffolding collapse.
This would probably damage the IPM-BD, but would not affect any other systems or 4
components nor their ability to perform their intended function.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
_.m.-__-
.--_-.--..__--m._____
~1 1
}
SE-92-16 HR Q96441 & WR Q96442, Set Pt #481 DESCRIPTION:
Change all SRMs high voltage power supply from 350 VDC to 550 VDC and adjust the discriminating curve.
SAFETY EVAL.l!ATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
~
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the changes do not alter the UF5AR design. The UFSAR has no specification for setting the SRM high voltage supply.
The function has not been changed.
These-changes do not introduce any new failure mode.
Increasing the voltage will increase the-ability to detect neutrons. Adjusting the discriminate curve to reflect the new voltage will allow us to measure the neutrons more accurately, since the ability to distinguish between noise and true neutron counts has improved.
These changes are a recommendation of General Electric per SIL 079.
The vol". age increase is within the capability of the system.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-17 Temp Alteration #92-2-12 DESCRIPTION:
Jumper out rod block caused by two or more CRD accumulator troubles.
SAFLTY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial tonditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during o, after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of thae accidents, it has been determined that the change described abovr will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as prevlossly evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the rod block due to two or more accumulator trouble alarms occurs to prevent rod withdrawal with accumulators not completely charged and therefore, degraded in their scram capability, The Temp Alteration described in Question I will only be in effect during the following conditions:
1.
No fuel in the vessel, 2.
All rods in and the rod motion control switch 0.0.S.
Therefore, no rod withdrawal will be possible with fuel in the vessel during the time this temp alteration is in effect.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
c
SE-92-19 Temp Alteration DESCRIPTION:
Install a 250 resistor across T81-+ and TB1-- (DAM-4 2251-557).
The control room recorder cable will be determed.
A test recc'rder will monitor the voltage drop across the resistor.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAP, where any of thr following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the Unit 1 SWRM is presently inoperable.
The Chemistry Department pulled grab samples once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification Table 3.2-5.
Manipulations of components will not create accidents or malfunctions of.other systems or components.
Therefore, the UFSAR accident analysis remain valid throughout this temp alt.
- 3. -The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the monitor is inoperable and chemistry is pulling grab samples once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Table 3.2-5.
I l
SE-92-20 Procedure QGA 500-4 RPV Flooding DESCRIPTION:
Change step wording to clarify step that evaluates success of RPV flooding evolution.
The step directs injection into the RPV to maintain 5 ADS valves open and while RPV pressure is 53 psi above torus pressure.
Within that same step structure, the operator is directed to verify that those conditions can be maintained and if not, branches to the appropriate procedure.
The step has been revise to more clearly state its intent but the intent is unchanged.
SAFETY EVALUATION St# MARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been deteruined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the nature of this change is administrative.
The intent and actual function of the steps has not changed and therefore does not affect plant operation or equipment failures. -Since no change in action has occurred this change cannot affect the possibility of an acc' dent or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-21 QGA 300 Secondary Containnient Control DESCRIPTION:
Delete reference to non existent detail column.
Reword to further clarify intent of "2 or more areas" Change method that main steam line radiation setpoint is stated.
Scientific notation vs Technical Specification stated valve.
SAFETY EVALUATION St# MARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transicnt described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of tl.e accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previouely evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the mature of these changes is administrative.
The intent and actual function of the steps has not changed and therefore does not affect plant operations or equipment failures.
Since no change in action has occurred, these changes cannot affect the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-22 QGA 500-3 Drywell flooding DESCRIPIION:
Delete valve numbers from statements directing RPV venting through HPCI and RCIC steam line drains.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initia) conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the nature of the change is administrative.
The intent and actual function of the steps has not changed and therefore does not affect plant operations or equipment failures.
Since no change in action has occurred, this change cannot affect the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-23 QGA 101 RPV Control (ATHS)
DESCRIPTION:
Change font size in start block.
1 Change method that main steam line radiation setpoint is stated.
Scientific notation vs Technical Specification stated value.
Hove step for defeating MSIV violation in-line with flow path rather than presenting it by branch off of main flowpath.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents wnich meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an 0;currence or tns consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment impc; tant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the nature of these changes is administrative.
The intent and actual function of the steps has not changed and therefore doe snot affect plant operations or equipment failures.
Since no change in action has occurred, these changes cannot affeci the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The-margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical l
Spfcification, therefort, the safety margin is not reduced.
I 1
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SE-92-24 FSAR Change Sect. 10.17.1 Hydrogen Water Chemistry DESCRIPTION:
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 10.17.1 incorrectly states the Design Basis for reactor water conductivity when Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HHC) is operating.
The curient limit for reactor water conductivity in the FSAR is.2uS/cm when HNC is operating.
The proposed change to section 10.17.1 is to increase the reactor water conductivity limit of.2 US/cm to
.3 u-mobs /cm, where (US/cm = u-mhos/cm).
SAFETY EVALUATION SUP94ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the Changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Nene for each of these accidents, it has been determir,ed that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the proposed value of.3 US/cm conforms to the current GE fuel warran*
- contract guideltr.es, and current GE/EPRI recommendations.
Therefore operation of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry System with reactor water conductivity less than or equal to.3 US/cm is sufficient to mitigate Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC), on the recirculation system piping, without endangering fuel cladding integrity.
The current value of.2 US/cm is stated as an " achievable value" and is not intended for regulatory or evaluation purposes.
The proposed change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE ?7 Injection of Boron using the Reactor Water Clean-Up System QCOP 1200-10 DESCRIPTION:
Allow manipulation of '201-80 and 1201-133 to maintain system pressure on a system restart.
Include set of steps to drain the RHCU demin prior to filling with boron solution.
St.FETY EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are liste! below:
None for each of these accidents, it has beta determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consecuence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the sequence of steps allow restart for RHCU system following system trip or isolation.
In establishing operating conditions, it is necessary to achieve 140 psig system pressure to insure adequate system flow through the RHCU pumps.
With the demins bypassed, this pressure cannot physically be achieved without tripping the system due to 1201-80 valve closure during same conditions.
This change allows throttling the 1201-133 to allow continued system operation while adhering to the 140 psig requirement.
The 133, demin bypass, is designed to be throttled to accommodate various system configurations such as different combinations of pumps and demins.
Therefore, this change enhances system operation and cannot create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from the evaluated in the UFSAR.
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3 SE-92-27 CONTD The RWCU system can be used to inject boron into the RPV during an ATHS situation.
This procedure provides the guidance for that evolution but did not previously contain steps to allow draining of the demin following each injection cycle.
The steps to drain the demin are now included and are consistent with a currently implemented procedure for manual backwash of the RWCU demin.
Since this change is used to implement steps which are currently approved and are normal operating function of the system as described in the UFSAR, no accident or malfunction is created of a type f
different from those previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SF-92-28 HPCI System Manual Startup (Injection Pressure Control) QCOP 2300-6 DESCRIPTION:
Revise steps which direct HPCI control during pressure control operation to include use of MSC.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Small Break LOCA UFSAR SECTION 6.2.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change will increase the operator ability to control RPV pressure when an initiation signal is present and HPCI is being operated.
Therefore, this change impacts the ability to control an accident and does not create the possibility for a new accioent.
Previously the proc-dure required use of the HPCI flow controller to regulate speed.
This was restrictive because HPCI operates over a wide range of RPV pressure and it is possible to need to regulate HPCI speed at 3
a speed below the range ofothe flow controller.
Therefore this expanded guidance accounts for that need by allowing use of the Motor Speed Changer.
Since the MSC is a normally used method of speed control, when HPCI is at low speed, this addition does increase the ability of the crew to control RPV parameters with HPCI and still accomplish this within the design of the equipment.
SE-92-28 CONTD HPCI is designed to function over a wide range of RPV pressures as shown by the Tech Spec requirement for flow at RPV pressures between 150 and 1150 psig.
Since this is part of the system design to function at this I
i range of pressures and the equipment supports that function, this does not affect the probability of an accident but instead increases the operator ability to adequately cope with accidents that occur.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-29 Procedure Change to QTS 160-2, S2 DESCRIPTION:
Change the procedure to add pulse made injection testing.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUDMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are Ilsted below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this procedure change involves pulse made injection testing as a method to test the leak tightness of the charcoal adsorcer.
This pulse made testing uses the same basic concept as continuous _ injection used turrently-Therefore, this different type of testing does not cause the charcoal adsorbers or another component to fail.
The pulse method is recommend for small systems and systems with fast break through.
It will not effect the efficiency of the charcoal adsorber.
This change will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction.
SE-92-31 Temporary Procedure for DP Test of H0 2-1402-4A DESCRIPTION:
Provide steps to demonstrate the ability of CS Valve MO 2-1402-4A to stroke open and closed against its design basis differential pressure under system flow conditions.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlMMRY 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transiet described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The cha5ge alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.-
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffarent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the test procedure does not adversely impact taw Core Spray loop in a manner that would create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those in the UFSAR.
The test operates the loop within it normal design parameters.
Stroking MO 2-1402-4A open and closed with the Loop A CS pump operating places the system in a condition similar to that in which the CS subsystem must re-position from its normal monthly surveillance lineup to the reactor vessel injection lineup following an ECCS automatic initiation signal.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-32 Temporary Procedure for DP Test of MO 2-1402-4B i
DESCRIPTION:
Provide steps to demonstrate the ability of CS Valve MO 2-1402-4B to stroke open and closed against its design basis differential pressure under system flow conditions.
SAFE 1Y EVALUATION SUMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 6.2.2, 6.2.3 14.2.4 for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the test procedure doss not adversely impact the Core Spray loop in a manner that would create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those in the UFSAR.
The test operates the loop within its normal design parameters.
Stroking M0 2-1402-4B open and closed with the Loop B CS oump operating places the system in a condition similar to that in which the CS subsystem must re-position from it normal monthly surveillance lineup to the reactor vessel injection lineup following an ECCS automatic initiation signal.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-33 Temporary Alteration DESCRIPTION:
Connect test recorders and SOAD test equipment to the following parameters:
a.
SWRM Sample Pump Power b.
SWRM DAM-4 Power c.
+12 VDC feed to D/A Board d.
Inputs from the detector I/O board to the D/A board.
e.
2 Strobe Lines SAFETY EVALUATION SUPDMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will act increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the Unit 1 onRM is presently inoperable.
The chemistry department is presently pulling grab samples once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification Table 3.2-5.
Monitoring of components with recorders will not create accidents or malfunctions of other systems or components.
Therefore, the UFSAR accident analysis will remain valid throughout this Temporary Alteration.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety is not reduced
.because the monitor is inoperable and chemistry is pulling grab samples once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification 3.2-5.
i EE-92-34 Loading Evaluation 92-006 DESCRIPTION:
RHR that is being shielded must be out of service.
Place 10 lead blankets on scaffolding that is around the Unit Two RHR motor oil coolers.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or antic'9ated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the-UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operatten or failure of the c. hanged structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the technical evaluation that was performed shows that the floor is capable of supporting the increased load due to thc lead on the scaffolding.
From a point of a possible scaffolding collapse, the lead blankets and scaffolding might damage the pipin) below.
Because the loop of RHR will be out of service and is not required to perform any function in this mode, a scaffolding collapse might damage equipment but any resulting failure of the RHR system will be no different than those failures alrea.,
described in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Spec!fication, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-37 Temporary Proteaure Gamma % canning, Sampling and Dose Rate Profi7' of Components in the fuel Pool l
DESCRIPTION:
The proposed procedure covers the methods used to characterize and classify the spent fuel pool for the purpose of cleanup.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to cetermine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or mal'41nction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR lt not created because this procedure establishes control over activities necessary to ensure that the cleanup and radiological requirements associated with tne Unit Two/One Spent Fuel Pool are known prior to the spent fuel pool cleanup.
The-tools used for the characterization process are not new to the fuel Pool Environment and as such do not constitute any new accident or malfunction potential that has not been analyzed in the UFSAR, A similar characterization and pool cleanup was performed for the station between 1988 and 1989.
There were no 3ccidents or malfunction of systems different from those analyzed in th9 UFSAR reported.
Also, nn accident or system malfunction are expected by-implementing this procedure.
By performing the parts sampling and dose rate as essment outlined in the procedure addressed in this safety analysis, the personnel dose exposure could be kept as low as reasonably as achievable.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. therefore. the safety margin is not reduced.
1 SE-92-38 Temporary Procedure
" Testing for the Unit Two Reactor Mode Switch Operation" i
l 1
DESCRIPTION:
Temporary Procedure to test each contact of the newly replaced reactor mode switch.
Jumpers and finger blocks will be required on certain relay contacts to facilitate the test.
These jumpers and blocks will not affect the full SCRAM or Group I Isolation.
No control rod movement will be allowed during the test.
The Mode Switch will be moved to all positions during the test.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicit'y assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because a full scram inserted and a full Group I Isolation will be maintained throughout the test. All control rods will be maintained fully inserted thrcughout the test.
The jumpers and finger blocks installed on relay contacts during the test will not affect the full scram and will not affect the full Group I Isolation.
By stipulating no control rod movement the test will affect rad blocks but will have no affect on the fully inserted control rods.
The movement of the reactor mode switch to all positions during the test will likewise have no affect on the full SCRAM inserted, the full Group I Isolation, or the full insertion of all tantrol rods because no control rod movement is a stipulation of the test.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-39 Temporary Alteration 92-2-29 DESCRIP110N:
Block in relays 595-104A, 8, C, D in the 902-15 & 17 panels.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The r. hanged structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because bypassing the
+8" Reactor Level Trips, +2.5# Hi Drywell Pressure and Drywell Hi Radiation, isolations with the Primary Containment open and the Reactor defueled does not adversely inpact th* operation of the plant.
These associated automatic actions of these setpoint are to serve as a primary containment function.
However Primary Containment is not required.
Since the Reactor is defueled the RBV isolation and SBGT autostart are not needed for Reactor to Level.
~3.
.The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
1
SE-92-40 Temporary Procedure " Loss of T-12 During Power Operation Hith the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Inop witn Unit Two Shutdown DESCRIPTION:
Procedure describing detailed steps to take Unit One from Power operation to cold shutdown, without 1/2 Diesel Generator or Transformer 12 available.
SAFETY EVALUATION St# NARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitiv assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Failure of 1 Diesel Generator to Start UFSAR SECTION 8
'.3 for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibliity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created beca"se the failure of one diesel generator to start totally bounds the activities described in this procedure.
3.
The r'rgin of safety, hs defined in the basis for any Technical Spec,fication, is not reduced because no limit identified, actions to be saken at directed by 3.
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l SE-92-41 Loading Evaluation 92-007 DESCRIPTION:
Place 12 lead blankets on scaffolding 15 the Unit Two n tar Building basement.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explic.itly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
P>ne For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because during the Refuel / Shutdown mode there is no equipment in the area that is required to be oper able.
Even though the torus is right next to this scaffolding, a scaffolo!ng collapse will not affect the torus or any other equipment due to the way in which the scaffolding would fall to the floor.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-42 QOS 202-6, QOS 005-S1, QOS 005-519, QOA 202-1 DESCRIPTION:
These changes provide additional guidance to the operating staff that v111 compare core flow and core plate DP to determine if a shround access cover has failed. Additionally, these procedures will require the unit to shutdown if the access cover is failed.
SAFELY EVALUATION SW4!s':
1.
The change described above has Leen analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component cocid lead to the accident.
The acci ents which meet these criteria are listed below:
v None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because these chang'.s are procedural changes that provide instruction to the operations department on detecting a shround access hole cover failure.
The additions do not change any system interaction or components.
The procedures instruct the operating department to commence a shutdown if the shroud access hole cover fails. While not specifically addressed in Technical Specification, this condition requires the plant to begin an orderly shutdown because of the loss of core floodability.
By identifying this and commenting an orderly shutdown it will assure that core fleodability will be maintained during all operating conditions that would reacired core flooding due to a RECIRC line break.
Therefore, these procedure changes ensures that the plant remains in an analyzed condition and does not introduce any new accidents or malfunctions not previously identified.
l
1 SE-92-42 CONTD 3.
The margin of safs.y as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifica+1on, is not reduced because these precedure changes requi.e the reactor to 71 aced in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of determining a shroud access hole cover failure.
Since this failure has the same effects, 0Jring accident conditions, as do jet pumps failure this action ensure the same margin to safety as the current Technical Specification Limits.
c e
SE-92-44 Drawing Change Request #4-92-032 DESCRIPTION:
DCR is to formalize ABB Impell Drawing No. 1T-7000-M-PS-21 Rev. A.
This drawing provides an alternative to PSA supplied pins for mechanical snubbers.
SAFETY EVAL.UATION SUHHARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is ;r.plicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet tt' criteria are listed below:
Seismic UFSAR SECTION 12.2.2.5/12.2.2.7 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the pins manufactured from these prints are made from material equal to or better than supplied by the vendor.
The chances of a pin failure will not increase by using pins manufactured on-site.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the pins manufactured on-site will be of a better than or equal material, so the snubber using these pins will perform their intended function.
The margin of safety will remain the same.
SE-92-45 QCAN 901(2)-3 F-8 DESCRIPTION:
1.
Provides the Operator with more complete guidance to identify and take corrective action in the event of a TIP loss of Shear Valve power condition.
It also incorporates guidance to De followed to check the 125 VDC control fuses.
2.
Provides the Operator with more complete and improved indication of Shear Valve firing in the event that Shear Valve firing was necessary.
3.
Includes the actual " SENSOR" and "SETPOINT" which reflect the "as-built" wiring of the alarm circuit as well as direction in the event that TIP equipment should become inoperative.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly atiumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None
.ar each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typr. than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because UFSAR Section 7.4.5.4 states that a Group II signal with any Ball Valve open in annunciated in the Control Room.
The annunciator as-built engraving which does not reflect this condition does not affect the ability of the Ball Valve to close with a Group II isolation signal present.
SE-92-45 CONTD The procedure requires that the Operator ch;tk the valve position for the existing mode of TIP operation (i.e. standby, tracing, etc) regardless of the mode of plant operation which provides the same level of protection and therefore:
1.
Does NOT change existing equipment function.
2, Does NOT affect the probability of equipment failure.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
h se
SE-92-46 UFSAR - Fuel Storage y
DESCRIPTION:
Reword sections of UFSAR to agree with current criticality assessment for high density fuel storage racks.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the original criticality assessment 'or the HDFR assumed no credit for fuel depletion or gadolinium.
The p;:sent assessment does take credit for fuel depletion and gadolinium.
The UFSAR must be updated to reflect this. There is no change to the TS. Design Limit (Keff 5 0.95) of the spent fuel storage pool therefore there is no reduction in safety margin.
3.
The margin of safety, i; not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-49 Set Point Change 491, 492, 493, 494 DESCRIPTION:
Change the set points of the FSL 1-262-6A, 1-262-6B, 2-262-6A and 2-262-6B from the 43 GPM as listed in the I.M. Kardox File and D.B.D (G.E.K.-9597) to 20 GPM as recommended by pump manufacture Byron Jackson.
This is the RBCCH flow to cool the recirc pump seals.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUl44ARY:
l.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is o
true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 (Small Line Break)
For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of egalpment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this set point change provide for adequate cooling to recirc pump seals.
The 20
' GPM at 95* F. for this line is recommended by the pump manufacture as equivalent or better than the original set point of 43 GPM at 105* F. for the combined flow of the pump seal cooling water and the jacket cooling water. Also if the pump seals do fail creating a small line break LOCA in the Drywell, this accident is bounded by the Large Line break accident.
Pump siezure was also analysized in UFSAR but a seal failure due to lack of cooling water would not cause the instantaneous pump; seizure described in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-51 Temporary Alterations DESCRIPTION:
Connect the recombiner thermocouples to an alternate recorder so that the normal recorder can be removed and repaired.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4AR(:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the hccident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None-For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accidant, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is_not created because the temporary replacement of this recorder does not reduce the margin of safety that the
. existing recorder provides.
The temporary recorder will function in the same manner as the existing recorder, and a recorder failure will not affect any UFSAR accident analyses.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the baseline plot of recombiner outlet temperature vs reactor power for either Unit One recombiner will not be changed.
This temporary recorder will function in the same manner as the existing recorder, such that, the Technical Specification will still be met.
The temporary recorder will be secured, such that during a seismic event, no safety related equipment will be affected.
SE-92-52 Temporary Alternation DESCRIPTION:
Relocate Level Indicator (LI) 1-1602-3 and Computer Pint C171 from level Transmitter (LT) 1-1626 loop (-25 to + 25 inches) to Level transmitter 1-1602-9 loop (-5 to +5 inches).
The 1-1602-3 indicator will be re-scaled for -5 to +5 inches.
Computer point C171 will be changed to -5 to +5 inches as per computer software.
Temporary Alternation #90-1-16, which relocated Level Switch 1-1602-6 to the 1-1602-9 loop, will be incorporated by this Temporary Alternation.
SAFEW EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or troplicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
DBA LOCA UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 Instrument Air Failure UFSAR SECTION 10.7 Main Steam Line Isolation UFSAR SECTION 11.2.3 Valve Closure Turbine Trip with failure of UFSAR SECTION 4.4.3 Bypass System Main Steam Line Break Outside UFSAR SECTION 14.2.3 the Drywell For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change l
described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to l
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because component failures creating an open circuit and thereby causing the instrument loop to be inoperable are within the scope of the UFSAR.
Redundant indication is available because single component failure are expected due to random failure of piece parts of components, such as a resistor.
SE-92-52 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because there is no affect on the margin of safety.
Failure of the LT-1-1602-9 loop would place the reactor in a 30 day LCO condition.
This Temp-Alt does not increase the probability of a failure. The components being added to the loop are no more likely to fati due to random component failure than he existing components are.
SE-92-S3 Loading Evaluation 92-008 DESCRIPTION:
Rad Protection is going to place 6 - l'X4' and 4 - l'X6' lead blankets on scaffolding in the MSIV Room.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to (7termine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used na t~ne uFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed belcw.
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above wil' act increase the probability of an occur rence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previousiy evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the floor is capable of supporting 700 lbs while only 480 lbs is being added to this area.
The only new failure mode identified is a scaffolding collapsc, and this will not affect any equipment required to be operable in these modes.
Therefore, no new accidents or malfunctions will be created by the scaffolding and lead blankets.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-54 Temporary Procedure
" Testing for the Unit Two Reactor Mode Switch Operation" DESCRIPTION:
This temporary procedure tests each contact of the newly replaced reactor mode switch.
Jumpers and finger blocks will be required on certain relay contacts to facilitate the test.
These jumpers and blocks will not affect the full SCRAM, nor will they affect the Group I Isolation valves. All Control Rods will be fully inserted OR there will be no fuel in the reactor vessel.
No control rod movement will be allowed during the test.
The Reactor Mode Switch will be moved to all positions during the test.
SAFETY EVALUATION StP9MRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR ana'ysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet there criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not incrcase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because a full scram will be maintained throughout the tert.
All contro! rods will be maintained fully inserted or there will be no fuel in the reactor vessel.
Reactor water temperature will be maintained less than or equal to 212 degrees F and therefore Primary Containment is not required.
No control rod movement will be allowed during the test.
The jumpers and finger blocks installed on relay contacts during the test will not affect the full SCRAM, nor will they affect the Group I Isolation valves.
Each Group I Isolation valve will be Out-Of-Service (005) or maintained fully closed.
The test will affect rod blocks but will have no affect on control red movement.
The reactor mode switch will be moved to all positions during the test.
This movement will have no affect on the full SCRAM and no affect on the Group I Isolation valves.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l 1
SE-92-S7 Loading Evaluation 92-009 DESCRIPTION:
Rad Protection is going to Place 2 l'X4' @ 40 lbs and 2 - l'X6' lead blankets on scaffolding in the Regen Non Regn Hx Room.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each acciderit er anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lecd to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the prcbability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment importani to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
.2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than anypreviouslyevaluatedinthegFSARisnotcreatedbecgusetheflooris capable of supporting 400 lbs/ft, while only 200 lbs/ft is being added to the area.
The only new failure mode identified is a scaffolding.
Collapse, and this will not affect any Equipment required to be operable in these modes.
Therefore, no new accidents or malfunctions will be created by the scaffolding and lead blankets.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-59 Temporary Procedure for OP Test of H0 2-14-02-38A DESCRIPTION:
Provide steps to demonstrate the ability of CS Valve M0 2-1402-38A to stroke open and closed against its design basis Differential Pressure under system flow conditions.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUPHARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
T!.. accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occu-snce or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment Impt, ant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type tnan any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the test procedure does not adversely impact the Core Spray loop in a manner that would create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those in the UFSAR.
The test operates the loop within its normal-design parameters.
Stroking MO 2-1402-38A open and closed with the Loop A CS pump operating places the system in a condition similar to that in which the CS subsystem must re-position from its normal monthly surveillance lineup to the reactor vessel injection lineup following an ECCS automatic initiation signal.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-60 Temp Procedure for DP Test of MO 2-1402-38B DESCRIPTION:
Provide steps to demonstrate the ability of CS valve MO 2-1402-38B to stroke open and closed against its design basis differential pressure under system flow conditions.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the test procedure does not adversely impact the Core Spray loop in a manner that would' create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those in the UFSAR.
The test operates the loop within its normal design parameters.
Stroking M0 2-1402-38B open and closed with the Loop B CS pump operatth1 places the system in a condition similar to that in which the CS subsyste m must re-position from its normal monthly surveillance lineup to :he reactor vessel injection lineup following an ECCS automatic initiation signal.
3.
The ;..argin of safety is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, there1 ore, the safety margin is not reduced.
SE-92-61 Quad Cities Beginning of Cycle Startup Test Program DESCRIPTION:
The startup test program is designed to demonstrate at the beginning of each cycle that no reactivity anomaly exists and the shutdown margin requirement of the T.S. can be satisfied for the cycle following the refueling outage and the unit can be safely operated throughout the cycle.
The tests are also performed to verify the operability of the nuclear instrumentations necessary for monitoring the unit during all phases of operation.
j SAFETY EVALUATION SlH MRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this administrative procedure describes the physics tests required to ensure the current cycle analysis are met.
The procedures used in the Beginning of Cycle Startup Test Program are the latest revision of the approved Station procedures or an approved temporary change to the procedure.
No changes have been made to any of the procedures without a proper evaluation with regards to the UFSAR and current cycle analysis.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this procedure ensures that these reports are completed.
\\
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1 SE-92-66 Temporary Procedure For Removal & Restoration of T-22 from Service DESCRIPTION:
Provide specific procedural guidance for the T-22 outage during Q2R11C12 outage.
These procedures provide specific guidance on the configuration of the electrical distribution and emergency diesel generator systems.
SAFE 1Y EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Refuelling Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2.2 For each of these accidents it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because in the plant configuration which w111 exist during the T-22 outage no new accidents or malfunctions are created.
Adequate. electric power (AC) will remain available. All DC systems including chargers will remain available.
Major change involves auto starts of the 1/2 and Unit 2 Diesel Generators Only those auto starts which would be initiated by the electrical bus configuration will be disabled. AC electric power will be available from Unit 1, the 1/2 DG and the Unit 2 Diesel Generator.
The Unit 2 Diesel Generator will remain operable as it will auto start on an ECCs signal or a loss or power /undervoltage signal.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-92-67 Temporary Patch on the 2C RHRSH Vault Room Cooler.
DESCRIPTION:
Temporary patch on the 2C RHRCH vault room cooler.
The repair will consist of a 'Belzona' patch to seal the leak, and a clamp over the region to strength the patch.
The repair will seal the leakage from outside the cooling tube so that cooling water flow is not obstructed.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant / Containment Characteristics after Reactor blow down UFSAR SECTION 5.2.33 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the temporary repair to the 2C RHRSH Vault Room Cooler will place a patch over the outside of the cooling coil tube.
This will seal the leak and allow the operation of the cooler.
This repair method is described in the maintenance manual for 'Belzona'.
The 'Belzona' patch material is of a viscous consistency and will not flow into the tube.
The 'Belzona' will be applied to the outside of the tube, so that the interior will be unaffected. One tube has been plugged, so this repair is preferred over a second tube plugging.
The repair will require the removal of no more than 3 inches of fins located next to the leak.
This reduction in surface area will be less than 0.1% total number of fins. As this removal will be from the edge of the air flow and so small the effect would be unmeasurable if a thermodynamic test were possible.
This repair constitutes a in ignificant reduction in total heat transfer.
~
c.;
SE-92-67 CONTD The potential failures of the patch are described in question 6.
The worst case being the total failure of the cooler-This would not result in a-inability of the RHR system to perform its design function.
The loss of one RHRSH pump places the unit in a 30 day LCO. This failure is unlikely because the region of the leak will be strenghtened by the use of a copper tube being placed over the patch and held in place by the
'Belzona' and a hose clamp.
This repair is the best option in that it seals the leak with minimal affect to the coolers operation.
This repair has been reviewed and approved by BWR Engineering.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the patch will allow the room cooler to perform its design support function for the 2C RHRSH pump.
Successful operation of the patch will not result in a change to the design bases.
Failure of.the patch (le room cooler)=would require the associated RHRSH-pump to be declared inoperable.
This is allowed as a 30 day LCO per Technice.1 Specifications 3.5.B.2.
9 t
~
SE-92-68 DESCRIPT.lON:
The proposed change will bypass the RPIS rod inserted switch for CRDs with a faulty RPIS probe.
The change will provide a full in indication for control rods with bad probes.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or af ter the eccident.
Operation or failure of the chauted structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Refueling Accident UFTAR SECTION 14.2.2 For each of these accidents, it har been datermined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accide?i, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously e*alo-ded in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an acc'.3ent o,' malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the change does not affect the refuel interlocks or rod block system such that a different type of accident could occur.
The change merely compensates for failed equipment and is controlled administratively.
3.
The maigin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the change is.in a conservative direction because the administrative actions to taken will not allow the affected.ods to be withdrawn and the'efore the additional reactivity caanot ce added to the core.
I
u o
P04-2-91-084 CONTD The qualification of the new and modified components is intended to make the installation fully qualified for all potential accident loads.
A loss of primary contai.nment is not an accident evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
For the reasons identif!?d above, the Minor Plant Change does not create any additional risk-of losing primary containment.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new equipment added by this Minor Plant Change is intended to improve the Type B and C testing program required by 10CFRSO, Appendix J.
The benefits to the testing program changes are described in the Dev -intion and Codes and Standards sections of the approval letter.
The cv...guration is as described in the ECN.
The test methodology should be similar to the description in the Procedure Changes section of the approval letter.
Since the configuration chosen is fully qualified by the designer and the methodology is as described in the regulations, the margin of _ safety has not been reduced.
i TS 93
3 P04-2-91-084 Addendum No. 1 DESCRIPTION:
This Minor Plant Change installs flanges on the inside of the torus penetrations X-203A and X-205 and the drywell penetrations X-25 and X-26.
Local leak rate test apparatus are provided to temporarily install on each penetration and allow pressurizing each test volume from inside the containment.
'bese test apparatus shall be removed prior to unit operation or making the pressure suppression system operable.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine eacn accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
I The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LUCA ' bounding)
FSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probat'llity of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there are no new r? stem interfaces created by this Minor Plant Change.
The flanges addeu uy this Minor Plant Change are additions to the pressure suppression system and used for containment testing.
There are no other systems 3ffected indirectly.
There is a new failure mode created by the change. A personnel error could cause a test apparatus to be left in place blocking a pressure suppression line.
This error would adversely affect the safety of the plant.
Personnel errors are not a new type of failure mode.
The redundancy built into the pressure suppression system and the adcrinistrative procedure changes recommended by the MPC approval letter is intended to make this failure very unlikely.
TS 93
a P04-2-91-084 Addendum No. 1 CONDT The calcut.ations performed by the designer for the new and modified components is intended to make the installation fully qualified for att potential accident loads.
A loss of primary containment is not an accident evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
The Minor Plant Change does not create any additional risk of losing primary containment.
- 3. -The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new equipment added by this Minor Plant Change is intended to improve the Type B and C testing program required by-10CFR50, Appendia 1 The benefits to the testing program changes are described in the >{scription and Codes and Standards sections of the approval letter.
The configuration is as described in the ECN.
The test methodology should be similar to the description in the Procedure Changes section of the approval letter.
Since the configuration chose is fully qualified by the designer and the methodology.Is as described in the regulations, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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TS 93 i
SE-91-593 Minor Design Change F04-2-91-142 DESCRIPTION:
Installation of Argo Brated Packing and ' Live-Load' washers to the feedwater heater string isolation valves.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the f'llowing is o
true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the' accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change
-described abcVe will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, oi malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2, The possibility _for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change impacts the condensate and feedwater system only.
The failures associated with'this change are packing leaks or valve inoperative due to binding.
Subsequent failures / events from the valve failures (loss of feedwater, feedwater overfill) have been-analyzed previously in the UFSAR.
- Further, these failure events have much more dynamic impact than would be expected when valve packing leakage or valve failure of the heater string outiot isolation valves potentially occurs.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-92-50 Minor Design Change P04-1-Q2-021 DESCRIPTION:
This design change will rewi e the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCD Group I signal points from the Alarm Typer (Computer) to the Sequence of Events Recorder. A total of sixteen Group I signals will he impacted.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the llFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is exDlicitly or imglicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead tc the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For eacn of these accidents, it has been determined that the changt desc.rlbed above will not increase the probability of an occur ence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment impoitant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because-this change w111 not impact any plant systems or equipment except for the sequence of events recorder, which will receive a signal from the PCI relays.
The sequence of events recorder and the PCI system are electrically isolated from each other by the PCI relays.
Therefore, failure of the sequence of events recorder will not affect the PCI system, or any other plant systems or components.
In the unlikely event of relay failure, it will most likely fall to a de-energized state, which will set up that particular channel for a reactor scram. This situation is more conservative than having the relay not set up to scram the reactor.
Since this design change is not affecting the Group I PCI relays (le no alterations are being made to them), this failure analysis of the relays is not applicable.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical l
Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l TS 93
SE-92-SS Minor Design Change PO4-2-92-021 DESCRIPTION:
This design change will re-wire the Primary Containment Isolation system (PCI) Group I computer signal points from the process computer alarm typer to the sequence of events recorder. A total of sixteen Group I signals will be impacted.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or coraponent could lead to the accident.
-The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR-is not created because this change will not impact any plant systems or components except for the sequence of events recorder.
The sequence of events recorder and the PCI System relays are electrically isolated from each other by the PCI relays.
Therefore, failure of the sequence of events recorder will not affect the PCI system, or any other plant systems or components.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
i i
TS 93
Minor Design Change P04-2-92-025 I
DESCRIPT10N:
The Limitorque motor for valve M0-2-1601-57 on Nitrogen Make-up system hne 2-8702-1", is being replaced to standardize MOV component hardware and meet Generic Letter 89-10 requirements.
The current 2 ft.lbf. motor proouces a small thrust window.
The new 5 ft.lbf. motor will increase the motor gearing capacity of the valve and will result in an increase in the idlVe thru$t kindow.
The function of this valve is to control the flow of nitrogen / air to the Drywell/ lorus from either the altrogen make-up system or the pumpback system.
This valve is a primary contaittont isolation valve.
The basic functions of this valve, including primary containment, will not be affected by this replacement of the notor.
SAFETY EVALUAfION SUPMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial cond'tlons used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly
'mplicitly i
assumed to tunction during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or componeht could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA (bounding)
St,R SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2, 1+ possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than atJ previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created tecause this change involves the replacement of a Limitorque notor on Primary Containment isolation valve 2-1601-57 with a different type.
The result will be an increase in the torque output of the motor actuator which will not adversely affect the ability or' the valve to isolate within 15 seconds upon a Group 2 isolation signal.
The increased torque capacity of the actuator will decrease the probability of binding problems from occurring.
The function of the valve remains unchanged.
TS 93
lB lll P04-2-92-025 CONTD No changes have been made which could adversely affect the boundary conditions of the UFSAR accident analysis for a LOCA.
No new failure modes have been created by these changes.
1herefore, the 'hange does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create _the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the bas!s for any Technical Specification,-is not reduced because the replacement of the Limitorque motor on valve H0-2-1601-57 does not directly impact the margins of safety used to establish Technical Specifications.
The operation of the valve will still be within the Primary Containment isolation requirement of less then or equal to 15 seconds.
The operation of Pressure Suppression system
!s verified to be operational by surveillance testing on a quarterly basis.
Therefore, the_ margin of safety as defined by Technical Specifications is not reduced.
4 T'
s T5 93 i
1 Modification No. H-4-0-87-019 Security Diesel Generator Building DESCRIPTION:
Install an access control system to the Security Diesel Generator Building.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of 6n occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previoJ91y evaluated in the final Safety Analysit Report is not increased because installing an access cc'.rol system will reduce the vulnerability of critical equipment necessbry for safe operation to acts of industrial sabotage as stated in section 10.15; 3A cf the FSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident c-malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the final Saftsty Analysis Report is not created because the equipment being installed has proven to function successfully 4 other areas of the plant and personnel is already familiar with its use.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the addition of access control devices will increase the margin of safety by providing greater security control for the Security Diesel Butiding.
5 4
TS 93
Minor Design Change MC-4-2-90-111 Air Start Piping for U2 Emergency Olesel Generator DESCRIPTIAN:
This HL
!??;ign Change improves the configuration of the pipe supports on the U-2 L.wrgency Diesel Generator (EDG) air start piping.
There are 2 new supports added, 2 existing supports modified, and I existing support removed.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the EDG air start piping has been analyzed to have stresses belor UFSAR and code requirements in the modified configuration.
The new configuration has been qualified by calculation for design pressure, piping waight, and seismic loads.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunctico of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this minor design change does not create any new system or equipment interfaces or failure modes.
Therefore, the possibility of a new accident not bounded by the UFSAR analyzed SFE.
Reference UFSAR Section 8.2.3.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the Technical Specifications require in section 5.6 that the EDG, as part of ECCS, be seismically qualified.
The support configuration installed in this Minor Design Change meets all seismic (and the pipe stress) requirements for the air start piping, which is a necessary-subsystem of the EDG.
TS 93 l
l t
Minor Plant Change P04-2-90-004 New Fuel Oil filter Subsystem DESCRIPTION:
[
This Minor. Plant Change replaces _the twin fuel oil filter assembly, crossover manifold, and miscellaneous tubing, pipe, and supports on the U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator.
The changes to the fuel oil system were necessary due to obsolescence.of current equipment.
The replaced equipment is supplied i
Safety Related and fully qualified.
The new tubing, pipe, and supports have been qualified Seismic Category 1.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the new i
equipment is capable of performing the same function as the replaced equipment.
Because the new equipment is supplied by an approved 10CFR50, Appendix B vendor, it is fully qualified for the Safety Related application.
Failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator has not been made more-likely.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not-created because the change to the Emergency Diesel Generator does not make the failure of other equipment (besides the Emergency Diesel 7
Generator) more likely.
The risk of fuel oil spills or a fire have not been increased.
There are no new system Interactions created by this_ change.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification-is-not reduced beciJse the margin of safety as definded in the basis for Technica1 Specification 3.9/4.9 is not reduced.
The fully qualified, seismically mounted equipment shou;d offer a high degree or reliability.
Inere is no functional change to the fuel oil subsystem of the. Emergency Diesel Generator.
f i
TS 93
i Minor Design Change HC4-1(0)-90-097 Pressure Indicator (PI) Tubing on Emergency Diesel Generator fuel 011 i
DESCRIPTION:
These minor design change involve rerouting two copper tubing lines for
[
the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG).
Both tubing lines connect the fuel oil i
supply line on each EDG to pressure indicators (PI) on the local control panels.
The tubing routing for the U-1 EDG will remove a " pigtail" bend in the tubing.- The tubing routing for the 1/2 EDG will remove a flexible hose.
EVALUATION:
1.
1he probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated
-in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the change to the tubing routing will reduce pipe stresses.
The revtsed configurations meet the UFSAR allowable stresses as documented ir S&L calc. EMC-066454.
The probability of failure of an EDG to start has been reduced.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the change, while improving EDG reliability, does not adversely impact any other systems.
Therefore, the possibility of any other type of accident or malfunction is not increased.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the basis for Technical Specification 3.9 and the margin of safety is not reduced.
The i
reliability of the EDG's is increased by reducing pipe stresses to code 6nd UFSAR allowables.
l I
s I
L TS:93-t l,.
r
~ - - -. - - - - - - - - -,
Modification M4-1(2)-89-052 Drywell Floor Drain Sump Discharge Isolation Valves DESCRIPT10N:
This modification will replace the existing Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs), 2 per unit which are gato valves because of crud build-up in the valve seat preventing proper shutoff and causing excessive leakann which is not acceptable per 10CFR50, Appendix J.
The valves will be rep aced with plug valves which do not have a crud trap in the valve seat and should have no problem attaining a good shutoff. Also one in-board test tap will be added to the discharge line to facilitate system drainage and Local Leat Rate Testing (LLRT). Also an outboard test tap will be added for Unit 2 only for the above same reasons.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to so.fety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this modification consists of replacing two existing valves within the reactor building.
These new valves will perform the same safety function as the existing ones.
Upon initiation of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal the valves will close to provide primary containment isolation.
Therefore, there is no in
't on the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an act.Jent as previously evaluated in the FSAR or Updated FSAR been increased.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new types of malfunctions are created since this modification involves the replacement of the existing CIVs which will still meet the design basis for primary containment isolation as previously evaluated in the FSAR and Updated FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because as described above, this modification has no impact on the probability of an occurrence of an accident since the replacement valves will perform the same safety function, to provide primary containment 1sclation upon loss of air.
Their will be no new control or power cables run per this modification.
The existing circuitry protection features will not be compromised.
The closing times of the new CIVs are within Tech Spec requirements of < 20 seconds as listed in Table 3.7-1.
Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced.
TS 93
Modification M4-1(2)-88-09 Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Position Switches DESCRIPTION:
This modification will relocate / replace the vacuum breaker " closed position *' limit switches to the lower partion of the vacuum breaker bolt ring.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this modification entails the relocation / replacement of existing equipment.
This modification does not change the primary function of the limit switches.
The failure of the new switches (out of calibration) is less likely because of their relocation.
During closure of the vacuum breaker valve disk, the valve disk comes in
-contact with the plunger of each close position limit switch, This contact exerts a force on the plunger of each limit switch which compresses the plunger into the limit switch body.
Prior to each limit switch reaching its overtravel Ilmit, the valve disk is stopped by the vacuum breaker valve seat.
The force exerted by the valve disk is then transferred from each limit switch plunger to the valve seat and is absorbed by the vacuum breaker valve bod Therefore, the impact loads imparted to the limit switches via the valve disk are of insufficient magnitude to damage the switches and subsisquently jeopardize vacuum breaker valve performance.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not createa because this-modification does not add 'ny additional equipment or systems.
It only involves replacing
..d relocating an existing limit switch to new location to improve performance and decrease maintenance.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the purpose of the modification is to make switches with tech spec limits easier to maintain within specified limits per Tech, Spec 3.7.A.4(4.7.A.4) on vacuum breaker position indication.
f TS 93
Modification M4-1/2-86-111 Hydrogen Water Chemistry DESCRIPTION:
Purpose of modification is to suppress recirculation water oxygen by means of adding hydrogen to the feedwater thus mitigating the effects of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC).
Hydrogen is added by injection into the condensate system.
To ensure that all excess hydrogen is safely recombined in the recombiners, oxygen is injected into the off-gas 4
system. Dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant is monitored.
Oxygen concentration in the off-gas flow will also be monttored.
System control is from a self-contained panel to be added in the main control room, or from local control panels.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the additional delay introduced into the main steam isolation sequence, due to the Hain Steam Line Radiation Monitor (HSLRH) setpoint increase from 7 to 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition will result in a small increase in the consequences of the CRDA.
A licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for review, and was subsequently approved via a January 19, 1989 SER.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the hydrogen addition system design does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR. -The storage areas have been analyzed to be located at a sufficient distance to mitigate the effects of a hydrogen fireball or explosion, and to prevent hydrogen or oxygen rich air from entering any safety-related air pathways into the station.
Excess flow check valves are located at the hydrogen and oxygen storage areas, and at the Turbine Building entrance point for hydrogen to prevent large hydrogen or oxygen relenos due to a pipe break. Also, hydrogen area monitors are interfaced with a hydrogen supply isolation valve which will terminate hydrogen flow into each units Turbine Building if there is a high area hydrogen concentration for that unit.
In addition to these safety features, normal Hydrogen Hater Chemistry System shutdown is performed by closure of the active train's flow control valve and each hydrogen injection solenoid isolation valve, which are located just prior to the injection point to the condensate pump discharge piping.
An electronic interlock between the Hydrogen Injection Solenoid Isolation Valve and its corresponding condensate pump motor also prevents inadvertent hydrogen injection into a non-operating condensate pump.
These features should prevent spurious hydrogen addition into the condensate system.
TS 93
M4-1/2-86-11 CONTD 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical i
Specification is reduced because the HSLRH setpoint is defined in the Technical Specification.
Bases for the Reactor Protection System (Sec. 7.1) and the Protective Instrumentation (Sec. 7.2) as seven times normal full power background.
This modification will increase the HSLRH setpoint to fifteen times normal full power background.
This change does not reduce the margin of safety for the Reactor Protection System, however, it does promote an increase in the radiological consequences for the CRDA.
This is because th& primary purpose of the HSLRH is to mitigate the radiological consequences of a CRDA once the fuel damage has occured and not to minimize the fuel damage from the CRDA.
l Therefore, a licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for approval.
The NRC has approved the HSLRH setpoint increase to 15 times normal full powe,* background without hydrogen addition via a January 19,1989 SER.
This SER has accepted the required Tech. Spec. changes and their insignificant effect on the total activity release and resulting dose to the public t
9 e
9 TS 93
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..... -...,,,.. _,. ~..
~ -
e Modification H4-2-87-059C & D Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation 9.
DESCRIPTION:
Changes resulting from the 9mplementation of this partial nodification are the installation of new containment penetrations (X-108 and X-109) and the instrument line spool pieces through the penetration.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurro7te or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the penetration design, weld joint design, and materials meet or exceed the requirements invoked for existing penetration designs.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the function of the subject drywell penetration remains unchanged.
It is part of the primary containment boundary and is to prevent the release of fission products following a DBA.
This is accomplished by using a totally welded design for the penetration assembly, penetration to containment seal, and pipe to penetration seal.
This is the same approach used with the original penetration design.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because there is no margin of safety defined for the penetrations in the basis of any Quad Cities Technical Specification.
In lieu of design safety factors there l' a limit on the total containment leak rate.
This total integrated tak rate is verlfled through testing required / defined by 10CFR50, Appendix J.
TS.93
l Modification M04-2-90-006A RHR Valves
'A' Loop DESCRIPTION:
This modification installs additional permissive interlocks in the RHR system valve control circuits to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel to the suppression pool.
Interlocks prevent opening the 1001-43A or 1001-43B valves if the 1001-19A valve or the 1001-34A valve is already open.
In addition, the 1001-34A valve cannot be opened if either the 1001-43A or the 1001-43B valve is already open.
Manual bypass of the interlocks is limited by station procedures to specific plant evolutions under administrative control.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipaent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident has not been increased by the interlock protection against inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.
Since the design of the modification is consistent with the quality and design of the existing circuit, there is no increased risk cf circuit failure.
Redundant loops of RHR and other ECCS systems provide the necessary protection against a single component failure.
2, The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the modification is limited to the control circuits of RHR system valves, the malfunction of an interlock is limited to a failure in one loop of RHR.
Loss of a single loop of RHR is bounded by the consequences of a failure of a single diesel generator to start, a previously analyzed Single Failure Event.
Therefore, the probability of a new and different type of accident is not increated.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the capacity of the RHR system to perform its function to provide core cooling, containment cooling, and LPCI injection has not been changed or reduced.
The valve positions prohibited by the valve interlocks are not required for the RHR system to perform these Safety Related functions.
The added equipment is of a high quality and reliability that is compatible with existing control circuits.
Since the added interlocks address concern from industry operating experience (SOER 87-2), the margin of safety against inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel has been increased by this modification.
TS 93
~
Modification M04-2-90-006B RHR Valves
'B' Loop DESCRIPTION:
This modification installs additional permissive interlocks in the RHR system valve control circuits to reduce the like11haod of inadvertent draining of the teactor vessel to the suppression pool.
Interlocks prevent opening the 1001-43C or 1001-43D valves if the 1001-19B valve or the 1001-34B valve is already open.
In addition, the 1001-340 valve cannot be opened if either the 1001-43C or 1001-43D valve is already open.
Manual bypass of the interlocks is limited by station procedures to specific plant evolutions under administrative control.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed aLcident has not been increased by the interlock protection against inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.
Since the design of the modification is consistent with the quality and design of the existing circuit, there is no increased risk of circuit failure.
Redundant loops of RHR and other ECCS systems provide the necessary protection against a single component failure.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction cf a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because since the modification is li-ited to the control circuits of RHR system valves, the malfunction ci an interlock is limited to a failure in one loop of RHR.
Loss of a single loop of RHR is bounded by the consequences of a failure of a single diesel generator to start, a previously analyzed Single Failure Event.
Therefore, the probability of a new and different type of accident is not increased.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the capacity of the RHR system to perform its function to providi core cooling, containment cooling, and LPCI injection has not been changed or reduced.
The valve positions prohibited by the valve interlocks are not required _for the RHR system to perform these Safety Related functions.
The added equipment is of a high-quality and reliability that is compatible with existing control circuits.
Since the added interlocks address concern from industry operating experience (SOER 87-2), the margin of safety agal' a* inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel has been increased by this modification.
I TS 93
Modification M4-(2)-88-019
)
Circulating Lube 011 System DESCRIPTION:
Diesel generator lube oli system upgraded per Vendor recommendation to provide continuous lube oil supply to engine P.A turbocharger bearings during engine standby and, consequently, to reduce cui..ulative bearing damage due to lack of prelube.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the safety function of the lube oil modification is maintain pressure integrity of the engine oil system.
The consequence of a passive breach in pressure integrity will be mitigated by seismic design and support of all pressure boundary items in the new system.
i 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type thar any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because failure of-a diesel generator has been considered in the overall safety analysis presented in the FSAR.
Physical and electrical separation of units remain unaltered.
J.
The margin c,f safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical j
Specification is not reduced because the lube oil system modification has no effect on the start and load rate capability, overall capacity, or operability status of the diesel generator units as outlined in the Technical Specifications.
The lube oil system modification will enhance reliability by minimizing the dearading effect of frequent start and operability. tests, as described in the Dresden Technical Specifications.
TS 93
l PO4-2-91-ill DESCRIPTION:
This Minor Plant Change replaced existisg ARM stations 3, 4, S. 6, 7, 8, 16, and 23 with new General Electric Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) equipment.
These ARM stations are used during reactor building radiation events where Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) flowchart QGA-300 is followed.
The existing ARM stations are unable to detect the " max safe" radiatien levels specified on QGA-300 detail QGA-D12.
The current " max safe" data is obtained by local survey.
This change will eliminate the need for local surveys under potentially hazardous conditions.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM V.RY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or imolicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or llure of the chhnged structure, system, or component could lead to che accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed ' elow:
o All accidents where there is a possibility of an increase in rad tion dose rates throughout the plant.
SAR SECTION Section 14 for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaiuated in the UFSAR is not created because this min;r plant change installs a General Electric Nuclear Measurement Analy;te and Control (NUMAC) Log Rad Monitor and new sensor / converters compatible with the new monitor.
The basic function of the ARM system is to continu)usly monitor selected plant locations and to provido an alarm indication of abnormal radie&. ion conditions based on alarm setpoints.
Installing a new monitor and sensor / converters does not change the intended function of the TS 93
)
l PO4-2-91-111 CONTD i
system. The changes made by this Minor Plant Change are enhancements of the ARM system.
The enhancements are required in order for the instruments to have sufficient range as required by QGA-300.
The enhancements are direct replacetnents of existing equipment and do not affect-the operation of any system required for safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because there are no Technical Specifications which are applicable to the Area Radiation Monitoring System.
I a
a b
Ii
'TS.93
P04-0-91-033 DESCRIPTION:
This Minor Plant Change involved the installation of corrosion coupon holders in the 1/2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System, downstream of the heat exchanger.
The corrosion monitoring equipment is being installed as part of the station response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13.
SAFETY LYALUATION St#94ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of tne following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment imporiant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because in response to NRC Generic letter 89-13, corrosion coupon holders are being installed to monitor corrosion rate in the Diesel Generator Cooling Heter (DGCH) e system.
The system is passive and a failure discharges the broken pieces to the river.
By monitoring the internal pipe corrosion rate, the probability of a pipe failure is reduced.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the corrcsien tvupon holders are being added in response to NRC Generic tatt:r 9913 to monitor internal pipe corrosion rates.
The possibility of a pipe failure due to corrosion would be reduced, therefore, the margin of satety from a pipe failure will improve.
TS 93
Minor Design Change MC4-1/2-90-147 DESCRIPTION:
This minor design change replaced fuse holders F23 and F24 in the U-1/2 0.G. local control panel with new bakelite-material fuse holders.
SAFETY EVALUATION St>HARY:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probability of the U-1/2 EDG not functioning properly has not increased. The probability of an occurrence of an accident or malfunction is not increased (FSAR Sect. 8.3.1).
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the change is limited to the fuse holders internal to the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator control panel.
There is no other accident than the loss of the Unit 1/2 EDG, which has been previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Function of Diesel Generator control circuitry remains unchanged.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the new fuse holder material is of better quality than the originals, and are being dedicated to safety related.
The dedication process will assure the reliability of the new fuse holders.
l TS 93
Minor Design Change P04-2-90-124 DESCRIPTION:
I The Mince Plant Change (MPC) replaced an existing chart recorder in the control room.
The replaced recorder is 2-750-2.
The recorder is replaced as part of a program to replace all control room recorders with a
" standard" recorder model.
SAFE 1Y EVALUATIDW MJPMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
j The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA (Bounding)
FSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the installation of the new recorder should be performed with the unit in the Shutdown or Refuel modes.
It is recommended that the work also be performed when no fuel movements are in progress and when fuel has been removed from the reactor.
Under these circumstances, the installation does not result in hay Technical Specification LCO's.
The new recorder has no new failure modes or system interactions that would cause accidents that have not been previously analyzed.
Since the MPC does not in any way reduce the quantity or quality of l
control room indications (as described in the UFSAR and Technical l
Specifications), the ability of the operator to respond to accidents or off normal conditions is not reduced.
Human factors Engineering has been performed.
TS 93 l
P04-2-90-124 CONID All new components (i.e., the chart recorders) have been procured Class 1E from 10CFR50, Appendix B suppliers.
This has upgraded the quality documentation of instrumentation used in the modified systems.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new chart recorder design does not require the SP.M's to be out of service.
The station shall be in compliance with Technical Specification 3.10/B/4.10.B at all times.
While the SRM's have no automatic SCRAM function, Technical Specification 3.1/4.1 and its bases were also reviewed for applicability to this Minor Plant Cnange.
The SRM's provide a Rod Block signal and there are operability requirements for the system contained Technical Specification 3.3.B.4/4.3.B.4.
These sections of the Technical Specifications and their bases were also reviewed.
The SRM's (ind the SRM recorder) also provide post accident monitoring capability anu are required to be operable and calibrated in accordance with these tables.
Post accident monitoring is not required in Refuel and Shutdown modes.
TS 93
Minor Design Change P04-2-91-103 DESCRIPTION:
The proposed change involves reinforcement of embedded steel plates used for piping support on the vacuum relief system.
It was determined through piping and support load reanalysis that the stresses on this embedded plate exceeded FSAR allowable limits.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine ea:h accident or anticipated transtant described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA FSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes have been created.
This change restores the embedded plate and piping system to FSAR compliance.
No changes are being made tM t affect previously evaluated accidents or malfunctions.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any ' technical Specification, is not reduced because the current condition of the Pressure Suppression system is operable; this change will return it to FSAR compliance.
TS 93
Minor Design Change MC4-0-90-093 Air Start Piping Support for 1/2 EDG DESCRIPTION:
A new pipe support was provided for the air start piping on the 1/2 EDG.
This pipe support replaces an existing support that was identified as being poorly designed.
EVALUATION:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probability of a fatture of the 1/2 EDG is reduced by the installation of the new support, because of its improved design.
The risk of damage to the 1/2 EDG during the installation is minimal due to the detailed instruction provided.
- 2. - The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the affected and interfacing equipment is limited to the 1/2 EDG.
The redundancy of the two EDG's available to each-Unit and the potential loss of one EDG is evaluated in the FSAR and Technical Specifications.
No new failure modes are identified.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the 1/2 EDG system is not rendered inoperable by the installation of.the new pipe support.
Technical Specification 3.9/4.9 and its bases are not adversely impacted by performthg this work with the EDG operable.
I TS 93
P04-2-92-032 DESCRIPTION:
flodify bushs 21 and 22 switchgear to increase momentary short circuit current rating to 80 KA.
This was done by adding extra bracing components to the switchgear.
SAFETY EVAtilATION SUPHARY:
)
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed ttructure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction vf equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the addition of bracing to Bus 21 and 22 switchgear increases the momentary short circuit rating of the switchgear to 80KA which is its designed value.
The reliability of the switchgear has been increased therefore the equipment
.normally powered by these fuses has a more reliable power source.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Techr.ical Specification, is not reduced because the addition of Bus bracing increases the reliability of the switchgear and thereby increases the reliability of the supplies systems and components.
This is in a more conservative direction and therefore no margins of safety are reduced.
TS 93 I
l' SE-92-69 Special Test #2-106 DESCRIPTION:
This special test will run the Unit Two Diesel Generator Cooling Hater Pump witn test equipment connected to measure motor terminal voltage ind motor current.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria arr listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because performance of this special test will not create the possibility of an accident different then those described ir the UFSAR.
The Unit 2 DGCHP will be operated from its' normal power supply and controlled from the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room.
All normal isolations for the electrical power supply from Bus 29 are still in place In addition, fusing will be used in the test equipment to prevent the potential for adversely affecting the Unit 2 DGCHP, All redundant equipment required (i.e. 1/2 DG and Division I ECCS pumps)will be available if required for other niant operations.
- 3. -The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety provided is that specified in Technical Specification 3.9.E.3.
Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety.
l l
i
r SE-92-70 Reactor Vessel and Class I System 10 year Hydrostatic Testing for ISI QCOS 201-7 DESCRIPTION:
1.
Provides the Operator with more complete guidance in performing the 10 year Reactor Vessel and Class I systems hydrostatic test.
2.
Provides visual enhancements.
3.
Includes the incorporation of QOS 201-S3 and S4 into the procedure.
4.
Changes the procedure number from QOS 201-5 to OCOS 201-7.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM1ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probab'lity of an occurrence or the a
consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to V
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this procedure change provides more detailed steps to pressurize, maintain pressure and/or depressurize Reactor Pressure Vessel and Class I piping which is required for the 10 year hydrostatic testing and will not affect plant operation.
The procedure change does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l
SE-92-71 HOV Torque Switch Setpoint Changes DESCRIPTION:
Change settings on motor operated valve torque switches to set thrust within acceptable limits.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been a" lyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFS 6.2, 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because setting MOV Torque Switches within a thrust window does not change any system / component function or configuration.
The thrust window is evaluated, such that any level-of thrust within that window will allow each individual motor operated valve to produce enough thrust to perform its function under design basis conditions, while staying below the structural limits of the weakest component in the valve or actuator.
This results in a higher probability that the valve will perform its safety function under all conditions evaluated for that valve.
3.-
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l l
1 1
l
SE-92-72 Temporary Alternation DESCRIPTION:
Unit 2 Diesel Generator, Thermocouple #8:
Remaining operable with a C-clamp holding in place a broken " Easy Out" and thermocouple.
I SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impilcitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed st ucture, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed b :ow:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in_the UFSAR.
7 The possibility for an accident or malfenttion of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the operation of the engine and generator are not changed.
Monitoring exhaust gas temperature is only for operator awareness of long-term cylinder performance / injector timing.
No new accidents or malfunctions are created by this temporary change.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l l
l
SE-92-73 QTS lts-10, 160-S9 Control Room Emergency filtration System DESCRIPTION:
Incorporate steps Jf the procedure to test and retest charcoal adsorber test canisters dependent on results of the lab ana., sis.
Steps were res.srded so the procedure would be directed toward Technical Staff.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMMRY:
?.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient describrd in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
i The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of 'at cf.& aged :tructure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will root increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffecent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change to the charcoal adsorber test canister analysis procedure is implementing a testing method that is nore conservative than Technical Specifications require.
This change does not physically change any system, structure or components on the Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit.
However, the more conservative testing criteria may increase equipment failures.
This procedure change will not create the possibility of an accident as described in the UFSAR or different than those described in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, us defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the procedure -hange has the testing criteria of 99.825% while the Technical Specification say 2 90% for methyl todide removal efficiency.
The procedure change testing criteria is more stringent than Technical Specifications and therefore is in the conservative direction.
1 1
SE-92-75 Temporary Alteration DESCRIPTION:
This Temporary Alteration will connect a strip chart recorder to monitor and record 6 connection points in the system.
The points being monitored are HPC1 pump suction, discharge and steam exhaust pressure. Also, torus pressure, flow, and speed.
SAFETY EVALUATIC5 WeW:rY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR V:e s any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed strutture, system or conwonent is explicitly or implicitly assuted to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Coolant Acti dent UFSAR SECTION 1.3.5, 6.2.2, 6.2.5, 6.2.7, 7.7.2 Inadvertent Injection of HPCI UFSAR SECTION 4.3.3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or tia consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to
(
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction o# a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because HPCI 2-2300-TI-2 (Turbine Speeds), 2-2340-2, 5, 7 (Pump Discharge Press, Exhaust Pressure, Pump Inlet Pressure), FI 2-1602-1 (Torus Pressure), have no automatic safety system actuations associated with them.
They are not considered in the UFSAR single failure criteria.
Fuses will also be used to provide isolation between safety and non-safety related power supply.
If the torus prcssure indicator were to fail, the wide range torus pressure indicator is available for monitoring purposes and has its own separate circuitry.
The FIC for HPCI will not be affected due to the parallel circuitry.
Additionally, chart recorder failure mode is to that of an "open circuit" assuring non "short" would occur through the logic circuits.
There are no ident**ied failure modet or interactions more severe than a steamline break or inadvertent injection.
Therefore, the potential failures are still bounded by the UFSAR analysis.
a n
---_----_____--_------__-------___.._-----__m_
_--.-__._---_--_o
SE-92-75 CONTD
-The chart-recorder design cortains multiple high impedance resistors assuring no alternate current paths.
Thus, a true signal to the pressure indicators and flow controller will be maintained.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specificption, is not reduce 6 Secause there is no change to the Technical Specification limits.
This. Temperature Alternation will have no affect on the margin of safety because the margin of safety will be prosided in the required LCO same as before.
k n a
SE-92-76 QEP 600-Tl DESCRIPTION:
Relocation of the Operational Support Center (OSC) from its present location adjacent to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to the service building 3rd floor meeting room (348A).
SAFETY EVALUATION SLDMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
(
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there is no impact on any systems or functions that could create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l 1
SE-92-77 Temporary Procedure #7711 DESCRIPTION:
Add steps to throttle valve 1/2-5799-409 for RHRSW supply to RCU.
Also add a precaution about the multimeters being used to obtain h?ater performance data.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARY:
1.
The change described above has been arialyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because by throttling valve 1/2-5799-49 closed to deliver only 120 gpm to the RCU, the RCU is ensured to have the minimum cooling water flow assumed in an accident condition where the RCU could be used for the "B" Train.
As long as there is flow to the RCU, there is no adverse impact on the RCU that could cause it to fail, thereby creating a possibility of an accident or malfunction different than those evaluated in the UFSAR.
Also, as mentioned eaeller, the RCU will automatically trip if the discharge pressure gets too high.
This trip can be rest immediately.
No new flow paths will be intrcJuced and no other systems arc affected by this change so no possibility of different accidents or malfunctions exist.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
k
\\
SE-92-79 Temporary Alteration #92-120 DESCRIPTION:
Temporary patch on 1/2 Diesel Generator fuel oil supply line.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM1ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each acciJent or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is i
true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
Yhe changed structura, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function uring or atter the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Offsite Power (Loop)
UFSAR SECTION 8.2.2 Loss of Coolant Acc (LOCA)
UFSAR SECTION 14 s
For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this temporary repair does not impact under pressures / stresses on the flexible hose connection.
It is a temporary patch only The connections is still a flexible one. Any failure of this patch will not degrade operation of the fuel oil system or 1/2 EDG.
The design intent of the hose remains the same. All previous UFSAR accident analysis will remain unchanged due to the altered hose.
The patch will not interrelate to any other SSC; therefore no new accidents previously unanalyzed will be created by the implementation of this temporary alteration.
Even if the patch were to fall off; Diesel Generator would still continue to function, fuel leak is not such that it will prevent operation.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
I l
SE-92-80 QTS 160-4,160-S4 SBGT Test Canister Analysis DESCRIPTION:
Inc 'porated steps of the proc fure to test and retest charcoal adsorber tes' canisters dependent on results of the lab analysis.
Steps were reworded so the procedure would be directed toward Technical Staff.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each ac'ident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the fol#owing is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to fuaction during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None 3*
For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of aa occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunctian of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change to the charcoal adsorber test canister analysis procedure is impleranting a testing method that is more conservative than current Technical Specifications require.
This change does not physically change any system, structure or component on the Standby Gas Treatment System.
However, the more conservative testing criteria may increase equipment failures.
This procedure change will not create the possibility of an accident as described in the UFSAR or different than those described in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safaty, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the procedure change has the testing criteria of 98.0% while the Technical Specification say > 901 for methyl iodide removal efficiency.
The procedure change testing criteria is more stringent than Technical Specifications and therefore is in the conservative direction.
l_n
SE-92-81 Temporary Alteration DESCRIPTION:
A Formanite clamp will be installed on the 1-1330-1"B, RCIC Steam Drain Line in order to repair a steam leak.
SAFELY EVALUATION SUINARY:
1.
The change described above nas been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or impliritly j
dssumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Reactor isolated from Main Condenser Combined with Loss of Feedwatcr UFSAR SECTION 1.6.2, 4.5, 5.2.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dir'ferent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the installation of the pipe clamp will not reduce the ability of the RCIC system to operate during the loss of feedwater combined with reactor isolation from the main condenser.
The pipe clamp has been evaluated in order to meet design conditions and found acceptable for operation.
In the event of the clamp falling, the radiological release would be directed into the Reactor Building where the flow would be monitored and processed through Standby Gas' Treatment System.
This would limit exposures below regulation limits if necessary.
The overall piping integrity of the steam drain line is increased with the temporary alteration.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any sechnical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
~.
I SE-92-82 1/2 DG Room CO2 Concentration Test DESCRIPTION:
Install a jumper to bypass the ventilation trip which isolates the I
ventilation during CO2 injection, install alternate CO2 discharge nozzles to increase the flow rate of CO2 and perform a manual injection of CO2.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
l.
The change described above hat been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
l-The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure. system, or component l
could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria arc listed below:
Loss of Offsite Power UFSAR SECTION 8.2.3.1/10.10.6 Fire In Diesel Generator or Day UFSAR SECTION 10.6.2.6.e Tank Rooms Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 l
l For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to l
safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
l l
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the performance of the CO2 concentration test has no impact on the availability of offsite power or the integrity of the primary coolant system. Also, the 1/2 Diesel Generator will be available throughout the test to provide emergency power in the event that off site power is lost.
The CO2 flooding system will have an improved flow rate of CO2 as compared to the existing system performance through the temporary installation of larger CO2 discharge nozzles.
However, since the ventilation trip upon CO2 actuation will be bypassed, the effectiveness of the CO2 in the event of a fire with the 1/2 Diesel Generator running will be limited.
The CO2 system will be declared inoperable during the test, and the LCO l
requirements for having an inoperable CO2 system will be met which includes back up fire suppression equipment at the affected area and twice per shift fire watches.
The backup fire suppression used will be dry chemical cart extinguishers which are not dependent on isolation of the
SE-92-92 room as with the-C02 flooding system. Also,-the station fire brigade will be in attendance throughout the test, which will ensure timely response to fighting a fire in the event of an equipment failure.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety during the test will not be reduced, since the diesel generator will not be made 4
inoperable during this test.
In the event that the diesel generator was inoperable, the Tech Spec LCO would be entered which allows continued operation for 7 days provided the operability requirements of the other diesels and associated loops of RHR and Core Spray can be met.
muu f
l
a SE-92-83 Unit 1 Diesel Generator CO2 Concentration Test DESCRIPTION:
Install alternate CO2 discharge nozzles to increase tFa flow rate of CO2 and perform a manual injection of CO2 into the Unit One Diesel Generator and Day Tank rooms to determine the actual CO2 concentration achieved.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlMiARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Offsite Power UFSAR SECTION 8.2.3.1/10.10.6 Fire In D!esel Generator or Day UFSAR SECTION 10.6.2.6.e Tank Rooms Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The pos,'bility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the performance of the CO2 concentration test has no impact on the availability of offsite power or the integrity of the primary coolant system.
During the test, the CO2 flooding system will be operated in the manner it was intended, however the CO2 flow rate will be greater than the existing flow rate due to the installation of larger discharge nozzles. A previous test determined that the -ricentration of CO2 achieved using the existing nozzles was below the required level.
Since CO2 concentration achievable using the new nozzles will be unknown until the test has been completed, the CO2 flooding system will be declared inoperable during the test.
The LCO requirements for having a CO2 system inoperable will be
~
SE-92-83 met, which include backup fire suppression and twice per shift fire watches. -In addition, a fire hose station is located near the Unit One Diesel _ Generator room, the room is surrounded by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers, Land the thermal heat detection in the room will be operable throughout the test to provide fire alarms and cause injection of CO2 to supplement the backup suppression equipment.
The effectiveness of the CO2 is unknown, however, and will be determined during the test by measuring
.the concentration level.
Due to the trip of the ventilation for the Unit One Diesel Generator room during the test, the Unit One Diesel Generator will be declared inoperable.
The LCO requirements for an inoperable Diesel Generator will be met, which include operability tests of the 1/2 Diesel Generator and associated Unit One loops of Core Spray and RHR systems. These requirements will be met prior to the test.
Although, the u
Unit One Diesel Generator will be declared inoperable, it will be available to start and load during the CO2 test and may supplement the 1/2 Diesel Generator in supplying emergency power in the even'; of a loss of coolant accident or a loss of off site power.
3.
The margin cf safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because since the 1/2 Diesel Generator and associated loops of Core Spray and RHR'for Unit One will be demonstrated to be operable prior to declaring the Unit One Diesel Generator inoperable due to the ventilation supply fan and dampers for the Unit One Diesel Generator. room being unavailable for operation during the test.
Also, the Unit One Diesel Generator will be declared operable within 7 days.
l 4
L TS 93
SE-92-84 Temporary Procedure Change QTS 110-3 DESCRIPTION:
1.
Incorporate degraded voltage modifications M4-2-91-019A. B, C & D 2.
Incorporate HPCI modification M4-2-91-013B 3.
Add recorder to monitor Diesel Generator voltage and current.
4.
Add testing of Core Spray undervoltage logic contact (relay 1430-112A(B) contacts 8 and 8).
5.
Close RHR and Core Spray pump discharge valve instead of injection valves and only those discharge valves associated with the division to be tested will be closed (other division available for shutdown cooling or injection).
6.
Allow set-up of the two multi-pen recorders to occur out of step order (early).
SAFE 1Y EVALUATION 5tMMAR'/:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, sys.:m, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Offsite Power UFSAR SECTION 8.2 Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR SECTION 14.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
TS 93
. ~.
-.. ~.
s SE-92-84 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of-a different type than-any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the changes made to this procedure do not create the possibility of accident different from those evaluated in'the UFSAR.
The simulation of the ECCS signal and response of the ECCS will remain the same as the original-procedure.
The changes-made to the procedure were the result of plant modifications which were previously evaluated and do not affect the intent of this procedure.
This procedure verif;es the design intent of modification M4-2-91-019.
The remaining changes were to clarify test setup, reduce radiation exposure, and to allow for additional data acquisition.
The recorder added to collect DG operating parameters has been fused to properly electrically protect the plant circuitry.
During performance of this test, one division of ECCS equipment still remains available for use, if needed.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined'in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because during performance of this test, a fprerequisite must be met requiring that no work is being done which can drain the reactor vessel.
In addition, the reactor is in Cold Shutdown, and therefor no ECCS systems are required.
However, during performance of this' test, one division of ECCS pumps will be available, if needed.
Additionally, one DG will be available at all times during the performance of this test.
3 TS 93
SE-92-86 Emergency Operating Procedure (QGA) Execution Standards QCAP 200-10 DESCRIPTION:
Add an attachment to the procedure that states the initiating condition for a Group 6 Isolation and the components that are affected.
SMETY EVALUATION SURRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Large Break LOCA UFSAR SECTION 5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change adds a listirig of the initiating signal and affected components for a Group VI Isolation.
It could be used by the operating crew to evaluate the need for and_affectivnass of the Isolation.
It would be used in response to an accident or malfunction and therefore could not contribute to the possibility of them occurring.
The only impact on operation would be making the information readily available to the crew and this type of change cannot impact operat Mn in such a way as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR, 3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical t
l Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l t
TS 93
o SE-91-70 Mod Test for M4-2-87-51B, HR #Q84610 DESCRIPTION:
Modification test for M4-2-87-51B.
Test will verify that the AP Power for the 902-8 annunciator system field contacts has not been disturbed during installation of Beta Sequential events recorder power feeds performed under HR #Q84610, SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has b;?n analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described.,. the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analy',is.
The changed structure, system or componrnt is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the annunciator system is not specifically described in the UFSAR.
This mod test will jumper breaker auxiliary contacts used specifically for the annunciator system.
Performance of this test will have no impact on plant systems or functions. Therefore, no accident or malfunction of a different type evaluated will be created.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Snecification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
r SE-91-S98 Modification Test for M4-0-83-009 DESCRIPTION:
Modification Test for M4-0-83-009.
SAFETY EVALUATION St# NARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probabliity of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or m?lfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or inalfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because Technical Specifications 3.9.E.1 places the plant in a 7 day LCO as such as the 1/2 Diesel Generator is made inoperable.
This 7 day period is an analyzed set of conditions for our plant showing that the risk of failure during those 7 days is very minimal.
If the 1/2 Diesel General inoperability should exceed those 7 days then both units must be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These conditions then place you under Technical Specification 3.9.E.3 where only 1 Diesel Generator is required per Unit, which we will comply with.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-91-481 Modification 1/2-83-009 Q76705 DESCRIPTION:
Install upgraded alarm panel at the local alarm cabinet.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because all work will be accomplished with Technical Specifications limitations.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
I i
SE 586 Modification M4-0-88-077 Q84404-6.01 DESCRIPTION:
This modification was performed to upgrade the Lube Oil system on the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator set.
This task was accomplished by performing General Motors - Electro Motive division (GM-EMD) Maintenance Instruction No. 9644 (MI 9644).
This vendor upgrade provides a continuous supply of preheated lubricating oil to the main engine bearings, accessories, and to the turbocharger bearings.
This system enhancement will help minimize the affects of fast auto starting on the engine.
SAFE 1Y EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change b
described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because Technical Specification 3.9 E.1 places the plant in a 7 day LC0 as soon as the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator is made inoperable.
This 7 day period is an analyzed set of conditions for our plant showing that the risk of failure during these 7 days is very minimal.
If the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator inoperability should exceed those 7 days, then both unit must be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Those conditions then place you under Technical Specification 3.9.E.3, where only 1 Emergency Diesel Generator is required per Unit which we will comply with.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93 l
SE-91-571 Modification Test for M4-0-88-007 DESCR17 TION:
Acceptance test of modification M4-0-88-007.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlMMRY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet thtse criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because Technical Specification 3.9.E.1 places the plant in a 7 day LCO as soon as the 1/2 Diesel Generator is made inoperable.
This 7 day period is an analyzed set of conditions for our plant showing that the risk of failure during those 7 days is very minimal.
If the 1/2 Diesel Generator inoperability should exceed those 7 days then ooth units must be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Tnose conditions then place you under Technical Specification 3.9.E.3 where only 1 Diesel Generator is required per unit, which we will comply with.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-91-569 Modification M4-0-88-007 084404-7.01 DESCRIPTION:
Installation of Modification M4-0-88-007 Diesel Generator Prelube Kodification.
SAFELY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because Technical Specification.3.9.E.1 places the plant in a 7' day LCO as soon as the 1/2 Diesel Generator is rade inoperable.
This 7 day period is an analyzed set of conditions for our plant showing.that-the risk or failure during those 7 days is very minimal.
If the 1/2. Diesel Generator inoperability should exceed those 7 days then both units must be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These conditions then place you under technical Specification 3.9.E.3 where only 1 Diesel Generator is figured per unit, which we will comply with.
- 3. 'The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety mar 3 1n is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-91-321 Modification Test M4-1-82-049 for WR 037505, Q36709 DESCRIPTION:
Modification test to verify anchor brackets on battery charges were installed correctly and plates on condenser supports are installed correctly.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUtMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFEAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the pcobability of on occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because modification test is a viscal test of battery chargers and does not involve a change to the system.
Therefore the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
1 SE-91-ll3 Minor Design Change MC4-0-90-108 DESCRIPTION:
Run conduit and outlet to auto trap presently powered via drop cord.
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or inplicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the change does not affect the function of the component or other systems.
The function of the component remains the same and the possibility of accident or malfunction is decreased because the extension cord is belts removed, which could have.been unplugged, making the component inoperable.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l TS 93
SE-92-47 Modification M04-1-90-092 DESCRIPTION:
Replace the Barton flow transmitter for main steam flow indication (transmitter #1-6458) with a Rosemount transmitter with the same output.
SAFETY EVALUATION StM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as_previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the Barton main steam flow detectors provide indication of main steam line flow to the. control room.
The Rosemount Detectors will operate the exact same as the Bartons, will use the exact same wiring connections, and the exact same sensing points as the Bartons.
The detectors are non-safety related and non-seismic.
No new failure modes will be created by the Rosemount transmitters since they perform the exact same function as the Barton Detectors. All mainsteam flow indication Flow transmitters on Unit 2 are Rosemount-transmitters as well as the 1-6450 transmitter.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
s s
Minor Design Change PO4-2-89-001 DESCRIPTION:
This Minor Design Change involves the replacement of circuit breakers in 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel #2.
These circuit breakers are being replaced because the existing circuit breakers (Model EH) are obsolete.
The replacement is a Westinghouse Series C, Type HFD Circuit Breaker as recommended in the Engineering (BWRSD) Letter from J. S. Abel to R. L. Bax, dated August 24, 1989.
Circuit Breakers #3, #8, and #17 do not require replacement.
These bre?.kers were replaced during the previous Unit Two Refuel Outage (Q2R10).
In addition, the breaker for the reactor water cleanup system recirc shutoff isolation valve 2-1201-5 will be replaced.
This breaker is located in the 250 VDC MCC 2A compartment F(02).
Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 04-00071M-01 provides the mounting details for the new 125 VDC and 250 VDC breakers.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where an, of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which m'et these criteria are listed below:
e Loss of auxiliary power SAR SECTION 8.2.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this Minor Design Change does not alter the design, function, or method in which the 125 VDC and 250 VDC Systems operate as described in the UFSAR sections 8.2.3.2.2 and 8.2.3.2.1.
Replacing obsolete circuit breakers with a new model circuit breaker does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the SAR.
TS 93
PO4-2-89-001 CONTD The change involves replacing existing circuit breakers, Westinghouse Model.EH, with a new model circuit breaker, Westinghouse Series C Type HFD.
These new breakers require a new mounting bracket on the load end.
This new mounting configuration is qualifted by the Sargent and Lundy Calculation Number CQD-047005 and.the change does not impact plant operation.
The new 250 VDC breakers require drilling and tapping four new holes in he existing mounting bracket.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this Minor Design Change to the mounting configuration of the 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel
- 2 breakers and the 250 VDC breakers, does not affect any set points, operational limits, or special conditions that prescribe the margin of safety.
The change does not impact any system or component as described in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the margin of safety has act-been reduced.
l c
TS 93
SE-91-336 Minor Design Change MC4-2-89-002 DESCRIPTION:
This Minor Design Change modification will add seal welds, barstock and hole plugs to the EHC System HPU skid.
SAFETY EVALUATION SU H RY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UfSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the EHC system HPU skid and minor design change to the skid oil reservoir are non-safety related, non-code related and non regulatory related.
There is no interaction with any safety related system, structure or component.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-92-302 Minor Design Change MC4-2-90-126 DESCRIPTION:
Fabricate a new cutout /op;ning in panel 902-2 in the control room to prepare panel for new recorder addition for Main Steam Line radiation level recordings. Use seismically qualified detail; ECN methodology.
SAFETY EVALUATION StMIARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the cnange described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because panel rigidity is unaffected by change.
Plate and hardware installed are seismically qualified.
Change is to take place during the Unit 2 Q2R11 refuel outage.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced br:ause neither Main Steam Line radiation or Off-Gas system are inoperable.
Seismic effects per Sec. 5,6 are included in the design therefore the margin of safety is unaffected.
TS 93
SE-91-299 Minor Design Change MC4-2-90-134 DESCRIPTION:
Rewire the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group I, II, and III isolation computer point logic to match the actual group isolation trip logic of "one-out-of-two-taken-twice".
SAFETY EVALUATION SIM4ARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to jetermine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis, The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these critoria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluat in the UFSAR is not created because there will not be an increase ir i probability of malfunction of the Primary Containment Isolation, stem by the change.
The computer and PCI System are isolated by the i sys in the Minor Design Change.
The change will restore the computer paint logic to initial plant intentions.
The change will correct computer history logs, as well as the SPDS display in the Control Room.
The PCIS relays and computer point circuitry are not mentioned in the UFSAR/FSAR or Technical Specifications, therefore no changes to either are required.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
TS 93
SE-91-531 Minor Design Change P04-1-91-126 DESCRIPTION:
Remove jumper wire in 901-37 panel for 901-5 annunciator system.
SAFETY EVALUATION SlDMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following 13 true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analvsts.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation er failure of the changed structure, system, or compor. int could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Nonn For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The nassibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated ir the UFSAR is not created because the change will not adversely impact systems since the annunciator system is not part of the UFSAR accidet.t analysis and the change is to the annunciator system only.
Failure of the non-safety annunciator system will not have any Lffect on the operation of any othtr plant system.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety is not reduced since the annunciator system is not part of Technical Specifications.
TS 93
l Minor Design Change PO4-2-91-039 DESCRIPTION:
This dnor Plant Change:
- 1) replaces the M02-1201-2 valve; 2) replaces the motor and a gear set in the existing Limitorque valve operator; 3) permanei.ily removes the " abandoned in place" valve leatoff line, including drywell wiring of a thermocouple and pipe supports for the leakoff line;
- 4) replaces snubbers and a U-bolt on support M-10?5D-17 to increase the load capability of the support; 5) new spring can settings and tolerances are provided for 3 other supports (to be re-adjusted, if necessary); and
- 6) temporary installation of lead blankets, pipe supports, and the pins in existing supports are provided for ALARA and structural loading while the line is cut for valve removal.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of P4 abanged structure, system, or compocent could lead to the accide "
The accidents which meet r'teria are listed below:
SAR SECTION 14.2.4 HELB OUTSIDE CONT.
SAR SECTION 14.2.3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to sufC as-previously evaluated in the UFSA3.
puaaibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than 2.
any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the Safety Evaluation concludes that the replacement valve has no fluid flow characteristic (e.g., stroke time, flow coefficient, etc.) that would have an adverse impact on the RWCU system.
The Safety Evaluation concludes that there is no significant increase in the potential for a high energy line break (HELB) or reduced capability to mitigate the consequences of a HELB.
The Safety Evaluation concludes that the valve has design features that should be an enhancement to containment design and performance as indicated by 10 CFR50, Appendix J testing.
The Safety Evaluation concludes that there is no significant increase in the potential to uncover irradiated fuel (as a result of the installation).
The Safety Evaluation concludes that there is not a significant increase in the rist of localized flooding inside the plant (as a result of the installation).
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F04 2-91-039 CON 1D There are no new failure modes identified that would increase the possibility or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
There no new failure modes that would increase the possibility or consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
Syslentlnierac.tions The design changes have interactions with the.RHCU, RHR, EDG (and Electrical Distribution System) and Recirculation piping, as well as a drywell pipe penetration and flued head.
These interactions have been (or will be) reconciled by ABB 1mpell hnd others (through the processing of ROL's) by-calculations.
There are no new system interfaces (or interactions) created as the result of this Minor Plant Change.
The interaction between the RHCU system valve and the drywell. equipment drain piping and electrical penetration is
-permanently. removed.
The possibility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR is, therefore, not changed.
The possibility or consequences of an accident not previously evaluated in the r5AR/UFSAR is similarly unchanged.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new valve is able to perform its intended function of closing to mitigate the consequences of a HELB or to isolate primary containment in the event of a LOCA.
The Technical Specifications provide the required closure time.
This Minor Plant Change shall not make closure of the valve within the required time less likely.
1.
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Minor Design Change P04-2-91-053 DESCRIPTION:
The Limitorque notor on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) valve M02-1001-36A is being replaced to standardize MOV component hardware and meet Generic Letter 89-10 requirements.
The current 60 f t. Ibf. notor produces a small thrust window.
The new 80 f t.lbf. motor wl',1 increase the notor gearing capacity of the valve and will result in an increase in the valve thrust window.
The function of this valve is to direct the flow of water to the suppression po)1 Juring pHR pump testing and during the suppression pool cooling mode of RHR.
This valve is also a primary containment, isolation valve.
The basic functions of this valve, including primary containment, will not be affected by the replacement of this motor.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, systam or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation oc failure of the changed structure, system, or component
[
could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
o 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not treated F cause this change involves the replacement of the Limitorque actuator motor with one that has a higher torque output on a normally interlocked closed containment isolation valve.
The result will be an increase in the thrust window for the valve, which will not affect the stroke time of the valve.
The RHR system is unaffected by this change and no DBAs or Transients are affected.
This change, therefore, does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from those evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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O Minor Design Change PO4-2-91-055 DESCRIPTION:
The main steamline temperature switches that piovide a Primary Containment Isolation (Group 1) signal require calibration each refuel outage.
In order to calibrate these instruments accurately, it is necessary to remove the switches and perform a calibration in the Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) shop.
New electrical connectors are added at each temperature switch in a 1" LB conduit fitting (Mogul series).
Additional local junction boxes are provided for installing Raychem splices, if necessary, to lengthen the cable at the switch.
In addition, the conduit support arrangement in the HSIV Room has been upgraded (based on field walkdowns by the A/E).
The additional and modified supports maintain the l
seismic qualification of the conduit, junction boxes, and wiring.
Local to the MSIV Room, additional conduit is added to upgrade cable segregation inside the MSIV Room between the RAI and RBI (of RA2 and RB2) channel cables.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The cha1ge described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Main Steam Line Break SAR SECTION 14.2.3 for each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because all wiring changes affect only the PCI wiring for the MSL temperature switches.
There are, therefore, no new system interfaces created by this Minor Plant l
Change.
The changes replace existing Raychem splices with an electrical connector supplied by a 10CFR50, Appendix B supplier.
The seismic and Environmental Qualification test reports have been reviewed by engineering.
A prototype was also inspected.
The new connectors shc"'d not significantly increase the potential for equipment fdilure.
No new l
failure modes are anticipated.
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P04-2-91-055 CONID The changes to the local wiring include additional cable segregation within the HSIV Room to keep wiring for different trip channels (in the same electrical division)-in different conduit.
This change should slightly increase the reliability of each division, but has no impact on divisional separation, which has been maintained.
Tne functionality of the FCI system is not being changed.
The normally energized logic of the PCI system mitigates the consequence of most types of failures.
The equipmert shall be thoroughly tested following the HPC to verify that the equipment still functions as anticipated and that to inadvertent errors have been made during the installation that would render the PCI trip sensors or logic inoperable 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis-for any Technical tsecification, is not reduced because the wiring for the HSL temperature switches mitigate the consequences of a HELB outside containment.
The trip function does not affect
'ntainment integrity, except for the HEL.
accident.
Since the functior arformance, and reliability of the modified equipment is not significantly affected, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
The EQ and seismic qualification test report prepared by the nianufacturer of the connectors show that the new connectors should perform their intended-function following an accident.
Other configuration changes described in this Minor Plant Change have been qualified by the designer so as to not adversely affect equipment performance following a seismic event or HELB accident.
r l
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~.
Minor Design Change P04-2-91-084 DESCRIPTION:
)
This Minor Plant Change installs flanges on the inside of the torus penetrations X-203t. and X-205 and the drywell penetrations X-25 and X-26.
2 small, personnel access platforms are mounted inside toe torus to the i
top of the downtomer vent header.
Local leak rate test apparatus are provided to temporarily install on each penetration and allow pressurizing each test volume from inside the containment.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient descr'hed in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters-the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitiv or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structuro, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA (Bounding)
FSAR SECTION 14.2.4 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The potsibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there are no new system interfaces created by this Minor Plant Change.
The platforms and flanges added by this Minor Plant Change are additions to the pressure suppression system and used for containment testing.
there are no other systems affected indirectly.
There is a new failure mode created by the change. A personnel error could cause a test apparatus to be left in place blocking a pressure suppression line.
This error would adversely affect the safety of the plant.
Personnel errors are not a new type of failure mode.
The redundancy built into the pressure suppression s,< tem and the administrative procedure changes rer.ommended by tois letter is intended to make this failure very unlikely.
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