ML20198B190

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Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Insp Resource Planning Meeting on 981110.Details of Insp Plan for Next 6 Months Encl
ML20198B190
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/10/1998
From: Doerflein L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Mueller J
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9812180099
Download: ML20198B190 (29)
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o O-December 10, 1998 Mr. John H. Mueller Chief Nuclear Officer Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Operations Building,2nd Floor P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT:

MID YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING - NINE MILE POINT

Dear Mr. Mualler:

On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999.

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Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.

The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normal ,

issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months.

Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan, if you hbve any questions, l please contact me at 610-337-5378.

l Sincerely, Original Signed by:

l Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Projects Branch 1 1 9812180099 981210 4 -

e PDR ADOCK 05000220 D. . .ivision of Reactor Proj.ects 1 0 PDR j l

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY - Mt40 C ,

.bbb! obi- _

l l John H. Mueller 2  ;

Docket Nos. 50-220,50-410 l

Enclosures:

1) Plant issues Matrix l 2) Inspection Plan cc w/ enclosures:

G. Wilson, Senior Attorney M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn I J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law J. V:nquist, MATS, Inc.

F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research I

and Development Authority l

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John H. Mueller 3 Distribution w/encis: I l H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA (1)

. C. Hehl, DRP .

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J. Wiggins, DRS '

R. Crienjak, DRP L. Nicholson, DRS DRS Branch Chiefs L. Doerflein, DRP L J. Lanning, DRP R. Ragland/L. Eckert, DRS L.Cheung, DRS G. Smith, DRS D. Silk, DRS W. Cook, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP l R.Junod,DRP Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

- Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector l Distribution w/ encl: (VIA E-MAIL) l- G. Shear, RI EDO Coordinator I

G. Hunegs - Nine Mile Point i ,

S. Bajwa, NRR l D. Hood, NRR L M. Campion, RI Inspection Program Branch (IPAS) l R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK I

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\lRPM\NM-IRPM.LTR I- To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy l OFFICE Rl/DRP l Rl/DRP

OAME WCook M(,, LDoerflein gfy DATE 12/$/98 T 12/10/98 i

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY L

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Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/4/98 Positive IR 98-17 N OPS 2B The Unit 1 simulator configuration and management controls, including the computer upgrade, 3A were implemented properly. The simulation facility was maintained and operated as certified in 3C accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.45 and ANSI /ANS 3.5-1985, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.149, Rev.1. Training department personnel routinely briefed trainees on simulator deficiencies that may affect planned training evolutions. Overall, there was no evidence of negative training as a result of simulator deficiency problems and of untimely or uncorrected simulator deficiencies.

8/11/98 NCV IR 98-13 N OPS SA The licensee appropriately resolved past inspection findings and appropriately identified and Positive NCV 98-13-01 3A acted on violations dealing with senior reactor operator duties in the control room.

and O2 SC 8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 1C Operations departrnent management was proactive in initiating quality assurance surveillances 3A and establishing the mentoring program. The self-assessment and quality assurance audits were effective in identifying the recent decline in operations performance. The assessment of DER trends, the mentoring program, and quality assurance's 1997 audit of operations and recent surveillance collectively provided a thorough assessment of the operations organization performance.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 3C The shift supervisor provided appropriate oversight of shift activities and pre-evolution briefs 1A were well managed. Operations management was observed providing appropriate oversight of control room activities.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 3B Control room and plant operators demonstrated appropriate knowledge of plant systems and 1A administrative requirements necessary to safely operate the plant. All cperations and testing 3A evolutions observed were conducted in a safe and controlled manner.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 3A Operators implementing several surveillance tests exhibited good procedure adherence skills.

1A Operators interviewed were fully aware of management's expectations for verbatim procedure compliance.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 2B Appropriate procedure guidance was available for the risk significant operator actions revieved.

3A The procedures were walked down in the field with licensed operators and the operators were 1C found to have a thorough understanding of the procedure guidance. The surveillance procedures used for the tests observed were of good quality.

Page 1 of 25

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I Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 2B The administrative guidance for temporary modifications, control room deficiencies, and 3C operator work-arounds was appropriate. However, the effectiveness of the implementation of 3A the programs could not be determined, as operators were still in the process of developing a comprehensive list of deficiencies and work-arounds.

8/11/98 Negative IR 98-13 N OPS SA Plant operators were effective in identifying deficient plant equipment and had established SC appropriate thresholds for including deficiencies in the corrective action program. However, the 3A inspectors noted that a poor interface existed between operations and the work planning organization in identifying and resolving deficient or incomplete work packages.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 2B The administrative guidance goveming safety and configuration tagging was appropriate to 1A protect workers and the integrity of safety-related systems. The implementation of the safety and configuration tagging administrative requirements by plant operators was effective.

8/11/98 Positive IR 98-13 N OPS 3C The management standards and expectations for plant operators were appropriate and clearly 1A documented in the Operations Manual. Operations personnel consistently adhered to 1C expectations regarding communications, control room access, control board awareness, and shift tumovers. Log keeping and annunciator response were acceptable. Operations personnel were effectively tracking technical specification equipment status but operators were unclear as to management expectations on the equipment status log entries.

6/26/98 VIO IR 98-11 N OPS 5A The identification of FCV 80-118 as a primary containment isolation valve by the systems VIO 98-11-02 5B engineer was good, but the oversight by the operations staff of this valve's primary containment SC isolation function reflects poorly on their systems knowledge and sensitivity to containment 3B integrity monitoring. The failure to maintain primary containment integrity for 3.5 days was a violation of the Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.0. (VIO 50-220!98-11-02) 6/26/98 Negative IR 98-11 N OPS SB The licensee's immediate action to conduct control panel system line-up verifications without SC referring to the system operating procedures was a poorly founded decision based upon the control room operators not having identified the flow control valve out-of-position for 3.5 days by relying on unaided memory of proper systems' configuration.

i Page 2 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1

  • 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 6/26/98 Negative IR 98-11 N OPS 3A Petween April 7 and 11, over sixty control panel walkdowns were unsuccessful in identifying 3C his containment spray system mis-positioned valve. This was a significant operations staff SA oversight and indicative of a lack of attentiveness to safety system conf;guration. In contrast, the in-plant operator's identification of the breaker open/ closed indicating lights deficiency demonstrated good attention to detail, proper awareness of plant condiaons, and prompt and appropriate response to a deficient condition.

6/26/98 VIO IR 98-11 L OPS 3A A Unit 1 reactor operator failed to follow the operating procedure for restoration of the VIO 98-11-01 3C containment spray system to its standby configuration resulting in the system being in a 1A degraded condition for 3.5 days. This was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, involving the failure to implement procedures, as written. (VIO 50-220/98-11-01) 8/5/98 NCV IR 98-06 L OPS 4C During the Unit 1 planned shutdown on April 28, the licensee determined that the rod block Positive NCV 98-06-01 SA function of the rod worth minimizer had not been properly tested since a 1974 Technical SC Specification change. This licensee identified and corrected violation of TS surveillance requirements was not cited.

8/5/98 Negative IR 98-06 N OPS 3A Licensee response to the May 11,1998 engineered safety feature actuation was appropriate.

3B The cause of the event was poor work package and tagout development and a subsequent 3C poor plant impact assessment by the Station Shift Supervisor prior to re-energizing the Division 11 trip unit power supplies.

8/5/98 Positive IR 98-06 N OPS 3A During sustained Unit 1 control room observations, operators' attentiveness, procedure 1A adherence, shift tumovers, log keeping, and control of activities were found to be acceptable.

Supervisory oversight and communication were good, particularly during a control rod drive pump post-maintenance test and a feedwater pump swap. In-plant operators were knowledgeable of system and equipment functions Material condition in the reactor building was acceptable.

7/7/98 Negative IR 98-05 N OPS 1A While transferring a double blade guide (DBG) from the spent fuel pool to the reactor vessel, 3A the DBG became disengaged from the grapple and came to rest in the fuel transfer canal.

NMPC determined that the root cause was the refueling crew did not properly verify engagement of the grapple. NMPC's root cause investigation was methodical and thorough, the root cause determination was technically sound, and the corrective actions adequately addressed the cause.

Page 3 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/7/98 VIO IR 98-05 L OPS 1A During performance of a Unit 1 surveillance test, the containment spray raw water inter-tie VIO 98-05-01 3A check valve did not open with the required torque and the station shift supervisor (SSG) filed SA to enter the core spray system TS 3.1.4.d action statement, as required by the surveillance test.

The relieving SSS identified the procedural non-compliance and took prompt and appropriate action to comply with the surveillance procedure. The failure to property implement the surveillance test is a violation of TS 6.8.1.

2/17/98 Negative IR 98-03 N OPS 1A An assessment review of the initial examination submittal of November 19,1997 consisting of 3B the written, job performance measures and operating tests found that the submittal was inadequate. NRC staff concems were noted in a letter dated December 2,1997 and the examination was postponed until the week of January 20,1998. A revised examination was resubmitted and another assessment indicated that the submittal did not require additional modifications. NRC inspection report 50-410/97-08 (OL) documented significant areas of difficulty identified by NRC staff of an NMP-2 initial license written examination submittal of April 7,1997. There was apparent ineffective corrective actions to improve the quality of initial examination submittals that resulted again in the postponement of the examination.

The inspectors determined the applicants were well prepared for the examination and met all regulatory eligibility requirements.

5/27/98 Negative IR 98-02 L OPS 3A LER 50-410/98-02 appropriately documented the circumstances involving a Unit 2 reactor eel eel 98-02-04 SA operator who left the "at-the-controls" area of the control room. The NRC staff's disposition of 3C this apparent TS violation remains under review.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 L OPS 1A A non-conservative operating philosophy resulted in exceeding the Unit 1 maximum allowable NCV NCV 98-02-03 SA core thermal power during the eight-hour shift-average. The computer program which 5B calculated and reported the shift-average power did not provide a sufficiently accurate readout SC of reactor power to assist the control room staff. NMPC's investigation identified seven other instances since the beginning of the year where the TS limit of 1850 MW,was exceeded. This licensee identified and corrected TS violation was not cited.

5/27/98 Negative IR 98-02 N OPS SA The NRC noted several degraded conditions in the Unit 1 control room which were not formally NCV NCV 98-02-02 SC identified as Control Room Deficiencies. However, the operators and system engineers were aware of the problems and actions were in-place to address them. This minor procedural non-compliance was not cited.

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Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATIUX Data Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 N OPS 1A The Unit 2 residual heat teToval system walkdown and performance history reviews indicated NCV NCV 98-02-01 2A that the material condition of the system was good, and that the system demonstrated a high SA level of reliability. However, two minor discrepancies were identified which differed from the design contained in the UFSAR and were not cited due to their minor safety consequence.

2/14/98 Negative IR 98-01 N OPS 2B The quarterly reviews of extended markups at Unit 1 were weak in that the reviewers failed to 5A identify numerous markup discrepancies that were later identified by the inspectors. Unit 1 management was aware of the weaknesses, and proposed corrective actions appeared appropriate.

2/14/98 NCV IR 98-01 N OPS SA Most catch containments installed in Unit 1 were adequately installed and maintained.

Negative NCV 98-01-02 1C However, many designated as " permanent" did not have an engineering evaluation to determine if a plant change or modification was required. The most recent semi-annual catch containment review lacked depth, in that NMPC failed to fully evaluate whether catch containments should be removed or that those designated as " permanent" had the required engineering evaluation. This minor procedure violation was not cited.

2/14/98 NCV IR 98-01 N OPS 3A During an inspection in the Unit 2 residual heat removal pump rooms, the inspectors identified Negative NCV 98-01-01 SA inadequate separation between conduits for safety-related temperature elements of different divisions. A breakdown in communications between an Assistant Station Shift Supervisor and a system engineer resulted in a one week delay in recognizing the impact that inadequate conduit separation had on the operability of safety-related plant equipment. This minor 10 CFR 50, Appendix B violation was not cited.

2/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N OPS 4B Routine monitoring of the Unit 2 refuel reliability index allowed NMPC to identify a reactor fuel 5A leak early, before it degraded any further. Tha flux tilting and power suppression evolution was methodical and well-controlled due, in part, to good communication and coordination among all involved organizations. NMPC took aggressive actions to prevent further leak degradation.

2/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N OPS 1A Unit 2 operators responded app apriately to the failure of the Division 11 containment LER 98-01 atmosphere gaseous / particulate radiation monitor that occurred while the Division I monitor was inoperable for maintenance. Station Operations Review Committee members maintained the proper safety focus during the meeting to discuss the basis for requesting enforcement discretion. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was issued to preclude a unit shutdown while working to restore the Division I radiation monitor to an operable status.

Page 5 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/23/98 NCV IR 97-12 L OPS 1A The Unit 1 operations and reactor engineering staffs

  • initiative to perform a procedure review Positive LER 97-11 3B prior to an infrequently performed evolution, (reactor shutdown by full control rod insertion), was NCV 97-12-03 appropriate. This review was good in that it identified the need for some procedural enhancements. The review also identified that, in the past, on several occasions the mode switch was placed in REFUEL contrary to the TS. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

1/23/98 NCV IR 97-12 N OPS 3A Unit 2 licensed control room operators were not aware that the posted surveillance test data for Negative NCV 97-12-02 1A standby liquid control was out of date and that the surveillance was potentially overdue. A 1C chemistry technician failed to post the surveillance summary sheet after completion of the surveillance, as required by procedure.

1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N OPS 2B The Unit 1 shutdown safety verification procedure was considered a valuable aid for the control 3A room operators to assist in monitoring plant conditions and assuring that safety functions were 1A sufficiently available during shutdown conditions. Periodic briefings of safety function status during work contro! meetings and shift tumover was good, in that, it ensured personnel awareness of system status and allowed for feedback of any current or potential deviations.

1/23/98 Negative IR 97-12 N OPS 2A Fol!owing the inspectors

  • identification of the Unit 1 hydrogen / oxygen analyzer cabinet doors 4A being improperly secured, the licensee completed a technically sound and extensive analysis to 3C determine that operation in this condition did not adversely impact the equipment operabi!ity.

However, past operations with the cabinet doors improperly secured indicated a poor questioning attitude on part of the Unit 1 operators, in that they failed to recognize the potential safety concem associated with the condition.

1/23/98 Negative IR 97-12 N OPS SC Upon identification that the SRV position indication at the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel (RSP) 4B was unreliable during a control room fire due to a portion of the cabling and components being contained with the control room fire-zone, NMPC engineering staff recommended the incorporation of a caution in the RSP procedure regarding the potential unavailability of the indication. Since the loss of SRV position indication could have been confusing to the operators during a plant shutdown from the RSP, the inspectors considered the time to the scheduled procedure revision date to be excessive, and the licensee promptly incorporated the caution statement.

Page 6 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/23/98 NCV IR 97-12 L OPS 4A NMPC identified that the Unit 2 condensate storage tank building temperatures were not being Positive NCV 97-12-01 SB maintained in accordance with the UFSAR, and took appropriate corrective action to change the temperature control switches to the proper set point Additionally, NMPC identified that the capacity of the building heaters needed upgrading to maintain desired temperature; this was appropriately evaluated and adequate compensatory actions were established. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N OPS 1A The shift brief for the newly-installed emergency cooling condenser keepfull modification was 3A synergistic and provided sufficient detail on the system hardware and operation. The conduct of control room activities during the Unit 1 plant startup fo!!owing repairs to the condensers was good and improved compared to previous startups. The overall reactor startup appeared to run smoother than previous startups due to the improvement in control rod drive performance.

1/23/98 Positive IR 98-03 N OPS 3B The inspectors determined the Unit 1 applicants were well prepared for the examination and met all regulatory eligibility requirements.

1/23/98 Negative IR 98-03 N OPS 3B NRC IR 97-08(OL) documented significant areas of difficulty identified by NRC of an NMP-2 3C initial license written examination. There was apparent ineffective corrective actions to improve the quality of subsequent initial examination submittals.

1/23/98 Negative IR 98-03 N OPS 3B An assessment of the initial examination submittal consisting of the written, job performance 3C measures and operating tests found that the submittal was inadequate. A revised examination did not require additional modification.

11/8/97 Negative IR 97-11 L OPS 5B NMP1 operations staff operability evaluation for the channel 12 GEMAC, though reasonable, 4B did not probe deep enough into all potential reference leg leakage paths.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 L OPS 2A An NMP2 SSS's oversight & questioning attitude was good & identified improper APRM gain 3C setting adjustments.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N OPS 1A Control room activities during an NMP2 shutdown were well-coordinated, with good supervisory 3C command & control.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N OPS 2A System walkdowns & performance history reviews indicated that the material condition of 3A NMP2 SLCS was good, and that the system has demonstrated a high level of reliability. The knowledge level of the technicians and operators observed during the performance of a test was good. Some minor poor work practices were observed.

Page 7 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID CFA Code item Description 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N OPS 1A Special simulator training resulted in good operating crew performance during the 9/15/97 3B manual reactor shutdown at NMP1. During the unit shutdown, CROs' use of alarm response 3A procedures, 3-part communications, & self/ peer checking were noticeably improved.

9/10/98 eel IR 98-09 L 1A During preparations for maintenance on the Unit 1 containment spray system, the markup for eel 98-04-01 MAINT 3A isolation of the system was inadequate, resulting in a breach of the primary containment 3C integrity. This issue remains open pending the NRC inspectors' review of NMPC's completed root cause analysis and determination of corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

7/23/98 Strength IR 98-12 N SA The licensee's self assessment, provided substantialimprovements to the MR program. An MAINT 5B aggressive program was in place to continue self monitoring by the licensee.

SC 7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 3B System engineers and operations department personnel were knowledgeable of the MR, and MAINT 3C their associated duties and responsibilities were adequate to ensure it's implementation.

7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 2B The licensee used appropriate administrative controls for the conduct of on-line maintenance.

MAINT 1C A review of completed and planned on-line work activities identified thorough risk assessments 1A for the activities reviewed. Responsible work control staff interviewed demcpstrated good knowledge and use of the risk assessment computer software. >

7/23/98 Strength IR 98-12 N 2B The licensee's systematic approach to the development of the risk monitor from the enhanced MAINT 3A PRA model was considered a strength. The team concluded that integrating the individual plant examination of extemal events (IPEEE) and containment functions into the current PRA model made it a comprehensive risk evaluation tool.

7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 2B The licensee's approach to balancing unavailability and reliability adequately contributes to MAINT preventing failures of SSCs while minimizing unavailability as required by the MR.

7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 2B The periodic assessment was timely and adequate.

MAINT SA 7/23/98 NCV IR 98-12 L 2B The licensee's SSC scoping, function identification, and system boundary descriptions were Positive NCV 98-12-01 MAINT SA acceptable. However, the licensee added 13 SSCs to the MR scope after the required SC implementation date of Ju!y 10,1996. The licensee was credited with identifying und correcting a violation of 10 CFR 50.65.

Page 8 of 25 L

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 2B SSC performance criteria for reliability and unavailability were conservatively established, and MAINT SC were directly related to the failure rates assumed in the PRA. Appropriate corrective actinns were taken when an SSC failed to meet its goal, performance criteria, or experienced a functional failure. The condition monitoring program, for structures, was good and the overall material condition of the SSCs walked down was good.

7/23/98 Positive IR 98-12 N 2B The licensee's approach to performing risk ranking of structures, systems and components MAINT 1C (SSCs) for the Maintenance Rule (MR) was acceptable. Perfoanance criteria for reliability and unavailability was commensurate with the assumptions in the enhanced probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model for the sampled systems. Decisions by the expert panel, regarding performance criteria, and their knowledge of online and shutdown risk assessment were appropriate to effectively implement the requirements of the maintenance rule.

8/5/98 Positive IR 98-06 N 4C The Unit 2 post-refueling hydrostatic test procedure was well written, and provided good MAINT 3A instructions for control of activities. The inspections performed by NMPC during the test were 1C comprehensive, and the licensee made the required repairs to reduce the total leakage to within specified acceptance criteria. The licensee took the necessary actions to request and obtain NRC approval for relief from the ASME Code requirements for noted leakage.

8/5/98 Positive IR 98-06 N 4C The second ten-year inservice inspection plan for Unit 2 was updated to reflect industry MAINT 3A operating experience. The bases for selected relief requests were valid and accurate. Core 1C shroud inspections were conducted in accordance with industry guidelines. NDE personnel were trained in accordance with the industry standaids.

7/7/98 VIO IR 98-05 L 28 During this inspection period, the NMPC staff self-identified that the TS required service test of VIO 98-05-02 MA!NT 4B the Unit 2 Division I battery was not completed during the previous two refueling outages.

NMPC had improperty credited the battery cyclic performance test for satisfying the requirements of the service test. NMPC requested and was granted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) to avoid the consequential TS required shutdown. The NOED was exited on May 2,1998 upon the unit achieving Cold Shutdown conditions and the service test was completed satisfactorily on May 7,1998. Notwithstanding, the failure to have properly service tested the Division i battery, since April 1995, is a violation of TS 4.8.2.1.d.

Page 9 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 2A The recent lubrication procedure improvements at both units were good. Program MAINT 3A enhancements at Unit 2 have been effective in eliminating component unavailability related to 2B the lubrication program. The inspectors considered that past operator training and lubrication procedures at both units were weak and that some individuals exercised poorjudgement when adding grease. Overall, the lubrication programs at both units were acceptable.

5/27/98 'G IR 98-02 N 3A During troubleshooting of the Unit 1 control room ventilation system temperature control valve, VIO 98-02-05 MAINT 5B an unanticipated repositioning of the control room ventilation system dampers occurred. This 2B resulted in the control room emergency ventitation system being declared inoperable. The inspectors determined that the planning for the troubleshooting should have identified the impact on the dampers. The failure to have identified this plant impact during the work order preparation was a violation of TS 6.8.1. (VIO 50-220/98-02-05) 2/14/98 VIO IR 98-01 N 2B Based upon the NRC inspector's questions, NMPC management declared the Unit 1 liquid VIO 98-01-03 MAINT SA poison system inoperable. Portions of the system piping had not been periodically flow tested and NMPC was unable to readily ascertain whether the piping from the liquid poison tank to the pump suction valves was obstructed. NMPC's decision to declare the liquid poison system inoperable and commence a shutdown was conservative, and the actions taken to test the system were appropriate. The special evolution brief was thorough. Although the previous Unit 1 liquid poison system surveillance testing met TS, the testing was inadequate to verify system operability. This was a violation of 10CFR50, App B Crit XI.

2/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N 5B NMPC appropriately evaluated the impact of a leaking fuel delivery valve on the operability of MAINT the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator.

1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N MAINT SB Licensee's actions were appropriate in response to an unexpected isolation of the Unit 1 vent LER 97-14 and purge system that occurred during radiation monitor troubleshooting. The licensee's root cause of the event was reasonable and the Station Operating Review Committee's review of the event maintained the proper safety focus.

1/23/98 Negative IR 97-12 S 3A Due to inattention during a surveillance test, a Unit 2 technician inadvertently inserted a circuit MAINT 2B card extender upside down, causing a reactor protection system half-scram signal. In addition, the surveillance test procedure did not contain a precautionary note which could have wamed the technician of the potential plant impact if the card were incorrectly inserted.

Page 10 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N 3A Pre-evolution briefs for the Unit 1 emergency cooling condenser capacity test were detailed and MAINT 1C safety-focused. Operators demonstrated a questioning attitude and the briefs were synergistic.

The control room environment was very good and clear and formal three-part communications were consistently used.

1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N 28 A Unit 1 emergency cooling condenser hydrostatic test pre-evolution brief was adequate.

MAINT 3A Communications during the test were good, in that formal three-way communications were 1C consistently used. Operations and inservice testing supervision provided good oversight and assistance, which resulted in a well-coordinated evolution.

11/8/97 Negative IR 97-11 N 3A An I&C technician incorrectly performed a step in a calibration procedure and this was not IR 97-06 MAINT 3C identified during supervisory review. A 1995 NMP1 main steam break instrument trip channel VIO 97-06-01 2B calibration procedure change was in error and received an inadequate review. In addition, the SC wrong APRM was adjusted during an NMP2 reactor shutdown. These violations were additional examples of the violations cited in IR 97-06.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N 3C NMP2 SW system surveillance tests were performed in a contro!!ed manner. ASSS effectively MAINT 2A coordinated testing activities & provided a detailed brief. Operators & technicians used clear three-part communications & adhered to the test procedures.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N MAINT 2B NMP1 forced outage work scope was adequately managed & appropriately safety-focused.

3C 11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N MAINT 2A Material condition of the NMP1 CRD nousing support & MSL flow restrictor piping and instrumentation was very good.

10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 L MAINT 2B The discovery by the NMP2 I&C technician of the missed calibration of NMP2 H2 recombiner VIO 97-07-03 3A system components was good, however, the failure to perform TS 4.6.6.1.b.1 was a violation.

LER 97-07 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N MAINT 1C During a NMP1 EC condenser pipe cutting evolution, a poor safety & radiological work practice was identified, in that, maintenance personnel were using a rubber-gloved hand to remove metal shavings.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N MAINT 3A During NMP1 EC condenser repair activities, maintenance personnel adhered to work order 5A requirements & all associated procedures & documentation were readily available & the 2B revision current. OA oversight of activities was appropriate. FME controls were appropriately 2A maintained. Material accountability & system cleanliness were well controlled.

Page 11 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 9/10/98 NCV 1R 98-09 L ENG 4A At Unit 1, an inadequate engineering evaluation of a 1997 configuration change resulted in a NCV 98-09-02 4C non-conformance with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, by opening the core spray high point vent valves to address GL 96-06 thermal over-pressurization concems.

Upon identification, NMPC took prompt and appropriate corrective actions. This licensce identified and corrected violation of Appendix R was not cited. (NCV 50-220/98-09-02 9/10/98 NCV IR 98-09 L ENG 4A During Unit 2 surveillance testing, NMPC identified that both control room air conditioning units .

NCV 98-09-03 4C were running in parallel, contrary to the intended design. This design vulnerability could have potentially resulted in the system being inoperable, under certain design basis accident scenarios. This licensee identified and corrected violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion lil, Design Control, was not cited. (NCV 50-410/98-09-03) 7/31/98 Positive IR 98-10 N ENG SA The Quality Assurance (QA) audits and independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)

SC assessment were thorough and of good quality.

7/31/98 Positive IR 98-10 N ENG SB The licensee's corrective actions and preventive actions for recurrence for six escalated SC enforcement items, two violations, and four unresolved items and one inspector followup item were found acceptable. A!! 13 items were closed.

8/5/98 NCV IR 98-06 L ENG SA During their Generic Letter 96-01 review of safety-system logic testing, NMPC identified that Positive NCV 98-06-05 58 portions of the Unit 2 service water pump loss of offsite power (LOOP) automatic start l 4C sequencing and the LOOP / loss of coolant accident manual start interfock logic circuit were not being tested as required by TS. Prompt and appropriate actions were taken to demonstrate ,

logic system operability. This licensee identified and corrected surveillance testing deficiency was not cited. t 8/5/98 NCV IR 98-06 L ENG SA During the review of Unit 2 safety system logic testing per Generic Letter 96-01, NMPC l Positive NCV 98-06-04 SB identified that a number of logic circuits were not being tested as required by TS. Specifically, 4C these circuits were not being properly test with the attemate offsite supply breaker supplying the divisional bus. Prompt and appropriate Getions were taken to demonstrate logic system operability. This licensee identified and corrected surveillance testing deficiency was nct cited. -

8/5/98 NCV IR 98-06 L ENG SA Unit 1 engineering staff identified that since 1990, the reactor vessel level instrumentation could Positive NCV 98-06-03 5B have been indicating as much as 6.5 inches higher than actual This resulted in the low reactor 4C water level trip settings being non<onservative and outside the allowable values provided in the TS. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

Page 12 of 25 i

1 Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source l ID SFA Code item Description 8/5/98 NCV IR 98-06 L ENG 4A The Unit 1 design deficiency involving the control room emergency ventitation system and Positive NCV 98-06-02 SA interfacing auxiliary control room fire dampers (reference LER 98-12) was property identified by SC the licensee and promptly corrected. Accordingly, this violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111, " Design Control," was not cited.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N ENG 5A The inspectors observed that NMPC's follow-up of the Part 21 report conceming GE SBM-type 2B control switches and their identification of the susceptible switches at Unit 1 was thorough and 5B an example of an improving questioning attitude by the engineering staff.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 L ENG SA During a review of the control room emergency ventilation system initiation logic, NMPC NCV NCV 98-05-05 48 determined that the system would not automatically initiate, as required. Specifically, the 4C system would not automatically start as a result of a main steam line break or a loss of coolant accident. This licensee identified and corrected violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI,

  • Test Control," was not cited.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 L ENG 2B During a review of Unit 1 operating procedures, NMPC identified that the normally open vent NCV NCV 98-05-04 4B valves on the containment spray raw water heat exchangers violated secondary containment SA integrity, in that it provided a potential release path from the reactor building to the environment.

This licensee identified and corrected violation of secondary containment integrity requirements was not cited.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N ENG 4A The design and installation of the new ECCS pump suction strainers appeared adequate to 3A ensure sufficient net positive suction head for the pumps in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

7/7/98 VIO IR 98-05 N ENG 4A During surveillance testing of the Unit 2 Division 11 EDG, a fuelleak developed between the fuel VIO 98-05-03 4B filter and the fuel injectors. NMPC determined that the leak was caused by vibration of the fue!

4C supply piping, which caused fretting of the pipe at a pipe support. Subsequent licensee investigation identified notable, but less severe, fretting on the Division i EDG fuel supply piping. The fuel line supports were installed in 1993, but the specific design change to install a protective grommet was not adequately incorporated into the final design package. This is a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion 111,

  • Design Control."

Page 13 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 L ENG 4C Prior to October 1993, NMPC failed to perform TS logic system functional testing of the reactor NCV NCV 98-02-15 SA vessel high water level main turbine trip at Unit 2 in accordance with an established 4B surveillance test procedure. Fortuitously since October 1993, NMPC has tested this trip function per a repetitive work order. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 L ENG SA At Unit 2, probabilistic risk arguments were incorrectly used to justify less restrictive pipe stress NCV NCV 98-02-14 4B limits in seismic qualification analyses for temporary shielding. Based on the analyses, the 4C temporary shielding installed during refueling outages in 1992,1993,1995, and 1996, resulted in four systems exceeding allowable pipe stresses. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 L ENG 4C The engineering calculations, supporting analyses, temporary modifications, and safety NCV NCV 98-02-11 48 evaluations associated with the operability determination for the degraded condition of the Unit 3A 1 control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) were generally well prepared. The inspectors identified that 1991 calculations projected, under worst case conditions, that the CREVS may not have been able to maintain the control room temperature below the UFSAR value of 75*F. This minor 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation was not cited.

5/27/98 VIO IR 98-02 N ENG 4A NMPC's failure to properly maintain the control room emergency ventilation system design VIO 98 4B attributes and to properly test the system to demonstrate operability in accordance with the 08,09,10 4C UFSAR is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria Ill and XI. (VIO 50-220/98-02-08,-09, and -10). The immediate actions taken by the NMPC staff to initiate a detailed design review, implement interim compensatory measures, and to report this problem in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 were determined to have been appropriate.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 L ENG SA During their Generic Letter 96-01 review of safety-system logic testing, NMPC identified that NCV NCV 98-02-07 SC portions of the loss of power / degraded voltage circuitry at Unit 2 were not being tested as 4C required by TSs. Prompt and appropriate corrective actions were taken to demonstrate logic system operability. This licensee identified and corrected surveillance testing deficiency was not cited.

2/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N ENG 4B NMPC responded quickly and appropriately to a vendor notification related to a possible fai!ure Part 21 3C of spring-retum switches used in the emergency cooling and containment spray systems at Unit

1. Control room operators were aware of the potential failure mode; however, the associated operating procedures were not revised to include a precautionary note related to the concem.

Page 14 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 2/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N ENG 5A The licensee's actions at both units to address an industry concem with potentially defective 4B emergency diesel generator air start solenoid valves was timely and technically sound.

3A 2/14/98 NCV 1R 98-01 L ENG 28 NMPC identified that a portion of the Unit 2 testing for the recirculation pump trip in response to Negative NCV 08-01-09 an ATWS was not completed in accordance with the TS. Specifically, the logic system LER 97-16 functional test ng failed to include the high reactor pressure trip of the low frequency motor generator. In addition, the failure to specify an acceptability range for the lower frequency motor generator time delay in the subsequent procedure change procedure indicated weaknesses in the procedure and in the review of the associated procedure change.

Furthermore, in December 1996, NMPC missed an opportunity to identify the inadequate surveil lance test due to a non-conservative interpretation of the UFSAR. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

2/14/98 NCV IR 98-01 L ENG SB Prior to April 30,1992, Unit 2 operated with circuit breakers in the racked out position, and Negative NCV 98-01-07 3C failed to recognize the adverse impact on switchgear seismic qualification and, therefore, NCV 98-01-08 switchgear operability. Although NMPC took appropriate actions in 1992 to preclude future LER 97-13 operations with breakers in the racked out position, they failed to recognize that they were in an unanalyzed condition, and that the condition was reportable. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

2/14/98 VIO IR 98-01 N ENG SB The inspectors identified that the temperature control valve for the Unit 1 control room VIO 98-01-06 3C emergency ventilation system had been inoperable since 1983. The administrative controls to 2A disposition the faited valve had not been property implemented; i.e., the controlled drawings did not indicate the inoperable valve, nor was an engineering evaluation performed, as required by procedures, to deiermine if continued operation with the degraded condition was acceptabie.

This was a violation of TS 6.8.1.

1/23/98 NCV IR 98-01 N ENG SA The inspectors identified that NMPC failed to perform a design change for permanently installed Negative NCV 98-01-05 3C scaffolding. This minor procedural violation was not cited.

2/14/98 NCV IR 98-01 L ENG 3A As a result of a good questioning attitude by a system engineer, NMPC identified that Positive NCV 98-01-04 2B maintenance on the Unit 1 S'N drag valve in the reactor building violated secondary 4B containment integrity. Past maintenance on the valve exceeded the allowable LCO outage time, and a reactor shutdown had not been initiated in accordance with TS. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

Page 15 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N ENG 4B The licensee's review of an industry concem regarding possible communication between the Part 21 SB drywell and the wetwell was appropriate, and their evaluation of other possible evolutions which Notification created a drywell-to-wetwell flow path was good. Actions taken at both units to address identified discrepancies were adequate.

1/23/98 VIO IR 97-12 L ENG 4B The 1997 engineering review of the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis and Fire Protection VIO 97-12-07 5A Engineering Evaluation documents was good, in that it disclosed previous engineering LER 97-12 deficiencies, particularly that emergency lighting required to support attemate shutdown of the plant was missing. However, earlier reviews of these documents were weak in that they failed to identify these deficiencies. This was a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix R.

1/23/98 NCV IR 97-12 L ENG SA Prior to September 1996, NMPC failed to monitor the Unit 2 relay room temperature, as Negative LER 97-12 4B required by TS. Furthermore, when the licensee identified this issue in 1996, they incorrectly NCV 97-12-06 SB dispositioned it, resulting in a failure to recognize that the condition was reportable, and missed an opportunity to identify other subsequently identified concems related to the UFSAR description of the control room envelope. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

1/23/98 VIO IR 97-12 L ENG 3A A Unit 2 reactor operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude in identifying that a TS VIO 97-12-05 4B required surveillance test for the rod sequence control system was inadequate. This was a LER 97-14 5A victation of TS4.1.4.2.b.1.

1/23/98 NCV IR 97-12 L ENG SA At Unit 2, NMPC's identification of a breach between an equipment qualification classified harsh Negative LER 97-15 SC environment area and a mild environment area, an original construction deficiency, was NCV 97-12-04 4B considered good. Particularly noteworthy was the recognition that in the event of a high energy line break, the breach could result in the potential loss of several safety-related systems. Once identified, the licensee took appropriate actions to repair the breach and to verify no other similar openings. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

1/23/98 Posieve IR 97-12 N ENG 4A The Unit 1 modification of the EC keepfull system was well designed. The modification was 4B installed according to the drawings, and adequately tested.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 L ENG 4B An engineering safety analysis identified a NMP1 GEMAC level instrument reference leg leakage path which was appropriately resolved within the TS allowed outage time.

11/8/97 NCV IR 97-11 L ENG 4A APRM gain setting adjustments at both units were not performed in accordance with the NCV 97-11-05 2B respective TSs. This licensee identified violation of TS was not cited.

Page 16 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 11/8/97 VIO IR 97-11 L ENG 2B A design review team identified that the positive pressure surveillance test for the NMP2 control VIO 97-11-04 4A room envelope did not include the relay room. This was a violation of TS 4.7.3.e.2.

11/8/97 VIO IR 97-11 L ENG 4B The discovery by NMP2 system engineers of missed surviellance testing of APRMs indicated a VIO 97-11-05 2B good questioning attitude; however, the failure to perform these surveillance tests was a cited LER 97-11 violation of TS 4.3.1.2.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N ENG SA NMPC's self-assessment of procurement activities was critical & in-depth.

10/4/97 NCV 1R 97-07 L ENG 2B The interface between NMP1 smoke purge system and CREVS was inadequately evaluated NCV 97-07-05 4A during modifications in the early 1980s. NMP1 operator's questioning attitude of the control LER 97-07 5A room smoke purge system was very good & resulted in an engineering operability evaluation of 2A the impact on control room emergency ventilation system operability.

10/4/97 NCV IR 97-07 N ENG 4C Review in 1996 of the calculations to support the modification to bring the NMP1 blowout Negative NCV 97-07-04 panels within the design basis identified minor calculational errors & corrective actions in early 1996. elated to the NMP1 blowout panels design control concem had not been fully effective.

This violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion ill was not cited.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N ENG 4B NMP2 PRA associated with de-energizing one of the two offsite 115 kV supplies for planned maintenance accurately accounted for all equip out of service at the time of maint, & provided a thorough evaluation justifying the conclusion.

10/4/97 NCV IR 97-07 N ENG 28 NMP2 ops considered a catch containment used to collect oil leaking from a RCIC pump gear Negative NCV 97-07-01 3A box to be a permanent installation; however, contrary to NMPC procedure, a plant change request had not been initiated. This minor procedural violation was not cited.

8/5/98 Positive IR 98-06 N PS 4C The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective ventilation system SA surveillance program.

SC 8/5/98 Positive IR 98-06 N PS 4C The licensee established, implemented, and mairitained an effective radiation monitoring 28 system program with respect to electronic e sib ations, radiological calibrations, system 3A reliability, and tracking and trending.

Page 17 of 25

Enclosure i NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 1C The DER system and the self-assessment program were effective in their use to identify, 5A evaluate, and resolve radiological program deficiencies.

5B SC 7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 1C The contractor laboratory continued to implement effective QA!QC programs for the REMP, and SA continued to provide effective validation of analytical results. The laboratory demonstrated the SC ability to accommodate and incorporate difficult media and geometries into the program. The programs are capable of ensuring independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive material in environmental media.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 1C ALARA goals were effectively used as a tool to aid radiological planning to minimize radiation 2B exposure. Numerous ALARA initiatives including publication of a pre-outage report, use of 3A cameras, use of temporary shielding, planned reactor vessel nozzle hydro washes, and an attempt to chemically decontaminate the reactor recirculation system demonstrated management support and a commitment to maintaining radiation exposures ALARA.

7/7/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 4-PS 2B Procedure S-RPIP-5.4," Dose Tracking and Timekeeping," lacked clarity with regard to the SA method for determining the available administrative extremity exposure, and several examples 3C of inaccurate determinations of available adntinistrative extremity exposure were identified.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 3C Radiological controls for outage work were well planned and health physics personnel 1A maintained close oversight of work.

7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 2A Housekeeping was adequate in that aisles and walkways were clear and free of debris, 1C radiological boundaries and postings were clear, and access controls to radiologically controlled areas were effective.

7/7/98 VIO IR 98-05 N PS 2B Overail, the licensee effectively maintained meteorological monitoring system operability, and VIO 98-05-06 3A satisfactorily performed channel calibrations and channel functional tests for the meteorological SA instrumentation, with the exception of the wind speed channel. The failure to perform the channel calibration of the wind speed channel according to the channel calibration definition in TS 1.4, in that the accuracy of the entire wind speed channel was not measured from the sensor to the channel output, constitutes a violation of Unit 2 TS 3/4.3.7.3. ,

i Page 18 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/7/98 Positive IR 98-05 N PS 1A The licensee effectively maintained and implemented the Radiological Environmental 28 Monitoring Program in accordance with regulatory requirements. The licensee performed a comprehensive review of an ancmalous indication of lodine 131 in an environmental milk sample.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 N PS 3A Radiological controls for the Unit 1 1998 Fuel Pool clean out project were thorough and sound,  ;

3C and included lessons leamed from industry events and close health physics oversight.

5/27/98 Positive IR 98-02 N PS 2B Radioactive calibration and check sources were well controlled in that procedural guidance for 3C the control and issuance of radioactive sources was clear, storage cabinets for radioactive sources were securely locked, sources were stored in a neat and orderly fashion, and source  ;

issuance records for 1998 were complete.

4/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N PS 1C The licensee was conducting security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected 2A public health and safety in the areas of access authorization, alarm stations, communications, and protected area access control of personnel and packages. This portion of the program, as implemented, met the licensee *s commitments and NRC requirements.

4/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N PS 2A The licensee's security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment aids 2B and personnel search equipment were determined to be well maintained and reliable and were able to meet the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.

4/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N PS 3A The security force members (SFMs) adequately demonstrated that they have the requisite 3B knowledge necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with their position. Security force personnel were being trained in accordance with the requirements of the Plan and training documentation was properly maintained and accurato.

4/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N PS 1A The level of management support, in general, was adequate to ensure effective implementation 1C of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.

Page 19 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code iterat Description 4/21/98 eel IR 98-08 N PS SA The effectiveness oflicensee management controls relative to the administration of the security eel 98-08-01 SC program was a weakness. Management's less than aggressive actions to address and resolve eel 98-08-02 the issues associated with the improper control and storage of SGI resulted in two apparent violations of NRC requirements. The first apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to properly control, store, and classify safeguards information (SGI) and the second apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to properly report the violation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.

4/21/98 NCV IR 98-08 N PS 1C In 1996 and 1997, the licensee failed to conduct unannounced drug and alcohol testing at an Negative NCV 98-08-03 5A annual rate equal to at least 50% of the work force as required by 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2).

However, the NRC has determined to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a violation but willissue an NCV.

3/13/98 VIO IR 98-04 S PS 1C One violation of transportation regulations (10CFR71.5) was identified involving the release of VIO 98-04-02 3C vehicle (flat-bed trailer) for unrestricted use, that exceeded the radiation limits specified in 49CFR173.443.

3/13/98 Positive IR 98-04 N PS 1C A generally effective program for the collection, processing and retum to the plant of liquid wastes, and for the collection, processing, storage and transportation of radwaste was established.

1/23/98 Negative IR 98-01 N PS 1C Control room and fire brigade personnel appropriately responded to numerous Unit 1 fire alarm 3A actuations, and the investigation efforts appeared adequately coordinated. However, the failure SA to fully investigate and resolve previous similar false fire protection system actuations was a weakness and likely contributed to the recent event. Although Unit 1 fire suppression system operability did not appear to be affected by degraded components, the impact of the deficiencies could hinder plant personnel responding to an in-plant fire due to potential multiple false alarms.

1/23/98 VIO IR 97-12 S PS 3A An inadvertent automatic isolation of the Unit 1 drywell vent and purge lines, occurred due to  ;

VIO 97-12-09 1C personnelinattention-to-detail, particularly a failure to follow procedure. This was a violation of LER 97-13 TS 6.8.1.

1/23/98 Positive IR 97-12 N PS 2A An inspection of normally inaccessible areas of the Unit 2 reactor water cleanup system found 1C the material condition of the equipment to be satisfactory, with the condition of the equipment in the valve aisle to be particularly good. Housekeeping in the areas inspected was acceptable, and appropriate radiological controls were established.

Page 20 of 25 ,

b Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description _

11/8/97 Negative IR 97-11 N PS 2A NMP2 radwaste facility fire-door removed for over 3 years without being evaluated as a URI 97-11-08 4C permanent modification. This was considered a weakness in the licensee's breach permit program to have allowed this permit to remain open. This issue was left unresolved pending further NRC review.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N PS 1C A OA audit of the security program was comprehensive in scope & depth. NMPC security &

safeguards programs were effective & received management support.

11/8/97 NCV IR 97-11 L PS 3A inattentiveness to postings within the RCA resulted in an NMP2 employee & three visitors Negative NCV 97-11-07 1C entering a posted HRA without authorization. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N PS 3A NMP2 operator performance during examinations was generally good, although communications & commar.d/corrrol were noted weaknesses.

11/8/97 Positive IR 97-11 N PS 3B NMP2 licensed operator requalification training program was effective & the remedial training 3C program remained strong. During NMP2 LORT event recognition & diagnosis, understanding &

interpreting alarms, board manipulations, TS usage, event classification performance were good. Facility evaluator's assessments were objective & thorough.

10/4/97 Posit:ve IR 97-07 N PS 1C Plant personnel were trained & equipped to cor* bat a control room fire.

3C 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 1C NMP security personnel response to a " suspicious looking" package was acceptable.

1B Declaration of an UE by the NMP2 SSS was appropriate & in accordance with the NMP2 Emergency Plan.

10/4/97 SL-ill IR 97-07 S PS SA On three different occasions, NMPC inadequately controlled shipments of radiological materiol EA 97-530 3A to facilities offsite.1) shipment shifted during transport & caused radiation levels in occupied 3C space of truck to exceed limits; 2) a wrong liner of low-level radwaste was shipped offsite for disposal; 3) a sample was shipped to an unlicensed facility - a similar occurrence happened in 1995. All of the examples appeared to be due to a lack of procedures describing radwaste operator ac'ivities, inattention-to-detail, & a lack of supervisory oversight. (Escalated Enforcement docketed per NRC letter dated 1/22/98, Violations 97-530-1013,1023,1033, and 1034 issued. Eels 97-07-07,09, and 10 closed.)

10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N PS SA A number of required audits of vendors pmviding shipping casks were not performed, indicative EA 97-530 of a lack of attention by management oversight. (Eels 97-07-12 and 13 withdrawn,1/22/97)

Page 21 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N PS SC QA program failed to identify the defects within the unit specific PCPs, & in one instance failed EA 97-530 1C to ensure that corrective actions were taken to address an identified defect, indicative of a lack of attention by management. (eel 97-07-11 withdrawn,1/22/97) 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 2A At NMP2, plant conditions were generally very good relative to radiological housekeeping in radwaste.

10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N PS 3C The lay-up of the NMP1 #11 waste concentrates tank was questionable. Indicative of lack of 2A attention by management.

10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N PS SA The Process Con *rol Programs and associated procedures have not been properly maintained.

EA 97-530 3A Indicative of a lack of attention by management. (eel 97-07-06 withdrawn,1/22/97) 3C 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 1C At both units, good programs have been established for the processing of liquid & solid radwaste.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS SA QA oversight of the RP, ALARA, contamination control, & extemal dosimetry programs was wellimplemented; audits & self-assessments were of appropriate scope & technical depth.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 1C RP program area was being well-implemented at both units.

10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 L PS 3A NMP1 RP staff inattention-to-detail & failure to self-check a completed surveillance test data VIO 97-07-02 sheet resulted in the failure to perform a ventilation radiation monitor instrument channel calibration within the required frequency. This was a violation of TS 4.S.2.a.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 1C Radiological controls during NMP1 EC condenser repair activities were satisfactory.

10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N PS 1C Questioning attitude of NMP1 chemistry tech & heightened sensitivity of NMP1 staff to the SA possibility of an EC condenser tube ieak were good.

Page 22 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ABBREVIATIONS USED IN PIM TABLE ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable APRM Average Power Range Monitor CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRD Control Rod Drive CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EC Emergency Cooling FME Foreign Material Exclusion H2 Hydrogen HRA High Radiation Area l&C Instrumentation & Contro!

NMPC Nine Mile Power Corporation PRA Probabalistic Risk Assessment SLCS Standby Liquid Control System  ;

SSS Senior Shift Supervisor UE Unusual Event ATWS Anticipated transient without scram SW Service Water SRV Safety Relief Valve ,

RSP Remote Shutdown Panel CST Condensate Storage Tank CRO Control Room Operator UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE COLUMNS Page 23 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information DMe was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspection period (for irs).

Type The categorization of the item or finding - see the Type / Findings Type Code table, below.

Source The document that describes the findings: LER for Licensee Event Reports, EAL for Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspection Reports.

ID identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).

SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.

Code Template Code - see table below.

Details of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in irs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplFying information Ifem Description contained in EALs.

TYPE / FINDINGS CODES MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),

Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc. The ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty type of a!I MISC findings are to be put in the item

" "~

Strength Overati Strong Licensee Performance Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance eel

  • Escair.*ed Enforcement item -Waiting Final NRC Action VIO Violation Level I,11, lit, or IV TEMPLATE CODES NCV Non-Cited Violation DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC 1 Operational Performance: A - Norma! Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and Positive Individual Good Inspection Finding 2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor inspection Finding LER Licensee Everit Report to the NRC 3 Human Performance: A-Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities /

URI ~ Unresolved item from inspection Report 4 Engineering / Design: A - Design; 8 - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Licensing Licensing issue from NRR S Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C - Resolution Page 24 of 25

Enclosure 1 NINE MILE 1 & 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX NOTES:

  • - Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the

" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement .;

Action"(Enforcement Po6cy). NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by >

the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final <

decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.

~

URis are unresolved items about which rnore information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its f:nal conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

Page 25 of 25 <

Enclosure 2 NINE MILE POINT INSPECTION PLAN FOR DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH MAY 1999 Inspection No. Program Areamtie Planned Dates No, inspectors Type 82701 Operationtal Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program 12/7/98 1 Core 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Corrective Action Program 2/1549 4 . Core 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure - Outage 4/05/99 1 Core 73753 InserV.ca inspe_ction Program 4/19/99 1 Core Legend: i IP -

Inspection Procedure Number Ti -

Temperary Instruction Program / Sequence Number Core -

Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory at all plants)

OA -

Otherinspection Activity RI -

Additional Inspection Effort Planned by Region I SI - Safety Initiative Inspection t

E2-1

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