ML20196L222

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Summary of 880531 Meeting on Pressurizer Surge Line Movement & Pipe Whip Restraint Program.List of Attendees & Presentation Handouts Encl
ML20196L222
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/1988
From: Chan T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8807070300
Download: ML20196L222 (28)


Text

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-  ! g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g ,E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 s.....j June 23, 1988 Docket No.: 50-344 LICENSEE: Portland General Electric Company (PGE)

FACILITY: Trojan Nuclear Plant

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF THE MAY 31, 1988 MEETING ON PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE MOVEMENT AND PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT PROGRAM On May 31, 1988, the staff met with representatives of and consultants for PGE to discuss the licensee's findings, evaluation and resolution of issues related to pressurizer surge line (PSL) movement and pipe whip restraint (WR) adequacy. A list of attendees is contained in Enclosure 1.

By way of background, PGE developed a long-term design verification program for large bore pipe supports after the 1987 refueling outage as a result of pipe support deficiencies identified during the outage. As part of this program, the adequacy of WR design and their anchorages were to be evaluated.

As a result of this evaluation, thermal and seismic piping deflections and WR gaps were calculated to be different from those used in the original design.

Field measurements of WR gaps were obtained in order to evaluate the as-built conditions with the new calculations.

Field measurements revealed that piping contacted their whip restraints in the "cold condition" at eight locations. New analyses utilizing actual field measurement data also indicated that contact would occur during heatup or system operation at 47 locations.

While taking field measurements of the WRs associated with the PSL, pipe to WR contact was observed at one location.

The discussion centered on the postulated cause(s) and corrective actions of ,

the observed PSL movement and pipe to WR contact, the details of which were contained in a PGE technical evaluation dated March 31, 1988. PGE attributed l the WR deficiencies to a combination of errors which occurred during original construction, and pipe movement associated with thermal shakedown of the piping system.

The observed movement of the PSL was postulated to be caused by thermal strati-fication within the surge line of a magnitude greater than that which was anticipated. Since the PSL whip restraint gaps would not accommodate the full range of movement of the PSL during the heatup phase when the maximum thermal stratification occurred, portions of the PSL would have experienced permanent deformation. This deformation would be evident after the plant cooled down to "cold shutdown" conditions.

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PGE stated that the temperature profile and movement of the PSL would bc.

monitored this startup and during select portions of power operation to verify the validity of their analytic assumptions.

PGE's presentation handouts are included as Enclosure 2.

Based upon the discussion and e preliminary review of a limited sample of pipe stress and fatigue evaluations, the staff expressed that the relevant aspects of these issues appeared to have been adequately addressed and appropriately considered in a timely manner, given the complexity of the effort.

In closing, the staff requested that PGE:

a) consider the need for additional PSL temperature profile monitoring along the horizontal run of the PSL between the pressurizer and WR 1.5, b) consider additional ultrasonic testing of the PSL elbow closest to the hot-leg, in the vicinity of WR 1.1, c) provide the staff with a summary report of PSL observations that includes the PSL monitored data, once data acquisition is completed, and d) notify the staff of any observations of the PSL that differs significantly from tnose which were postulated to occur, hu .

T rence L. Chan, Project Manager Project Directora:e V Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects .

Enclosures:

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1. List of Attendees
2. Presentation Handouts cc: w/ enclosures See next page

a .

PGE stated that the temperature profile and movement of the PSL would be monitored this startup and during select portions of power operation to verify the validity of their analytic assumptions.

PGE's presentation handouts are included as Enclosure 2.

Based upon the discussion and a preliminary review of a limited sample of pipe stress and fatigue evaluations, the staff expressed that the relevant aspect-of these issues appeared to have been adequately addressed and appropriately considered in a timely manner, given the complexity of the effort.

In closing, the staff requested that PGE:

a) consider the need for additional PSL temperature profile monitoring along the horizontal run of the PSL between the pressurizer and WR 1.5, b) consider additional ultrasonic testing of the PSL elbow closest to the hot-leg, in the vicinity of WR 1.1, c) provide the staff with a sumary report of PSL observations that includes the PSL monitored data, once data acquisition is completed, and d) notify the staff of any observations of the PSL that differs significantly from those which were postulated to occur.

original signed by Terence L. Chan, Project Manager Project Directorate Y Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees
2. Presentation Handouts cc: w/ enclosures See next page 1i j DRSP/PDV DR TV TLChan:dr Gk h[ ton 6/2 2/88 6/ /88

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" Mr. David W. C0ckfield Portland General Electric Company Trojan Nuclear Plant CC: .

Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Trojan Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 0 Rainier, Oregon 97048.

Mr. Michael J. Sykes, Chairman Board of County Commissioners

+ Columbia County St. Helens, Oregon 97501

  • Mr. William T. Dixon Oregon Department of Energy Salem, Oregon 97310 Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 i.

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. ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES March 31, 1988' Rockville, Md. 20852 NRC PGE G. Holahan D. Cockfield i G. Knighton T. Walt T. Chan A. Roller Wm. Ang L. Erickson P. T. Kuo S. Bauer S. Hou M. Hoffman L. Marsh G.DeGrassi(BNL)

WESTINGHOUSE BECHTEL D. Roarty L. Memula B. Maurer IMPELL W. Bak i

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PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS AND PRESSURIZER

-SURGE LINE PROGRAM INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . T. D. WALT, MANAGER NUCLEAR SAFETY & REGULATION PRESENTATION . . . . . . . A. N. ROLLER, MANAGER NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING i

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9 SENIOR REVIEW COMMITTEE A. N. ROLLER, CHAIRMAN . . MANAGER, NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING / NUCLEAR DIVISION /

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY L. MEMULA, PHD . . . . . . CHIEF PLANT DESIGN ENGINEER /

BECHTEL, SAN FRANCISCO W. BAK . . . . . . . . .

. MANAGER, ENGINEERING DIVISION /

IMPELL CORPORATION D. ROARTY. . .

. . . . . . SENIOR MECHANICAL ENGINEER /

WESTINGHOUSE l

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L. W. ERICKSON . . . . . . MANAGER, NUCLEAR QUALITY l ASSURANCE / PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY l

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,1 i SENIOR REVIEW COMMITTEE REVIEW ALL ISSUES AND RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO RESTRAINT GAPS AND SURGE LINE MOVEMENT

-- PROVIDE OVERSIGHT p

-- ENSURE THOROUGHNESS

-- REVIEW CONCLUSIONS i

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  • SAFETY-RELATED LARGE BORE PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN VERIFICATION COMMITMENT

- VERIFY DESIGN OF ALL 2-1/2 INCH AND LARGER PIPING SUPPORTS (3.560 SUPPORTS)

- SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE BY JULY 1, 1988

- REPORT EVALUATION WILL BE SUBMITTED IN SEPTEMBER 1988 EVALUATION INVOLVED

- VERIFY OR CALCULATE ALL DESIGN LOADS

- CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF THE SUPPORTS TO FSAR REQUIREMENTS

- 118 SUPPORTS TO BE MODIFIED PRIOR TO HEATUP TO RESTORE MARGIN

-- ADDITION OF WELDS / STIFFENER PLATES / BRACES /  ;

REMOVAL OF SOME SUPPORTS

- CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF HANGER SUPPORTING STRUCTURE (LOCAL EFFECTS) TO WHICH HANGERS ARE FASTENED

-- 23 SUPPORTING STRUCTURES MODIFIED TO RESTORE MARGIN PRIOR TO HEATUP

--- ADDITION OF WELDS /STlFFENER PLATES ESTIMATED COST OF PROGRAM - 510 MILLION

, ROCK BOLTS USED IN WHIP RESTRAINTS EVALUATE USE OF ROCK BOLTS IN WHIP RESTRAINTS MEASURED EMBEDMENT DEPTH OF ROCK BOLTS USED IN WHIP RESTRAINTS

- 118 WHIP RESTRAINTS WITH ROCK BOLTS (APPROXIMATE 650 TOTAL ROCK BOLTS)

MEASUREMENT RESULTS

- MEASURED 253 ROCK BOLTS ON 45 WHIP RESTRAINTS

-- 211 (83%) EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN SPECIFIED LENGTH

-- 42 (17%) LESS THAN SPECIFIED LENGTH

-- SHORTEST BOLT 18.9% LESS THAN SPECIFIED i

--- 9-INCH EMBEDMENT SPECIFIED

! --- MEASURED AT 7.1 INCHES

- USED STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (95% CONFIDENCE)

-- NO ROCK BOLTS MORE THAN 20% SHORTER THAN SPECI

- USING EITHER ACTUAL ROCK BOLT LENGTHS OR ASSUMED i SHORTER THAN SPECIFIED

-- CONFIRM HEATUP OPERABILITY FOR WHIP RESTRAINTS PRIOR TO

-- COMPLETE EVALUATION TO CONFIRM DESIGN MEETS FSA

. ALLOWABLE IN 1988 l

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PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS OTHER THAN PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE 5

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i PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS .

16REACTORCOOLANTL0bPWHIPRESTRAINTS

- CALCULATIONS AND GAP ADJUSTMENTS COMPLETED IN 1986 14 WHIP RESTRAINTS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

- 13 ON MAIN STEAM LINE

-- 9 COMBINATION SEISMIC AND WHIP RESTRAINTS

-- 8 ON SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING EVALUATED FOR PIPING INTERFERENCE IN 1927

-- 1 ON NONSEIMSIC CATEGORY l PIPING

-- 4 WHIP RESTRAINTS EVALUATED FOR P1 PING INTERFERENCE IN 1987 '

- 1 ON MAIN FEEDWATER PIPING l

- ALL TO BE REEXAMINED PRIOR TO HEATUP i

142 WHIP RESTRAINTS ON NON-REAC10R COOLANT LOOP PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT l

- 8 WHIP RESTRAINTS ON PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE i

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TYPICAL PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT I

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WHIP RESTRAINTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT (OTHER THAN SURGE LINE)

  • CALCULATED NEW THERMAL AND SEISMIC GAPS ON ALL 134 WHIP RESTRAINTS AS A RESULT OF REVIEW / REANALYSIS OF PIPE STRESS CALCULATIONS
  • COMPARED NEW GAPS TO DRAWING SPECIFIED GAPS

- GAPS FOR 67 0F 134 WHIP RESTRAINTS SHOWED CONTACT

. USING NEW ANALYSIS

-- NO ORIGINAL RECONCILIATION OF WHIP RESTRAINT GAPS WITH PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS

-- GAPS ORIGINALLY SET BASED UPON FIELD MEASUREMENTS DURING HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

--- DID NOT CONSIDER THERMAL GROWTH FROM HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING CONDITION TO MAXIMUM THERMAL DESIGN CONDITION

--- DID NOT CONSIDER SEISMIC MOVEMENTS

  • MEASURED ACTUAL GAPS IN THE FIELD AND REANALYZED AFFECTED WHIP RESTRAINTS - ANALYSIS SHOWED:

- NO CONTACT AT 79 LOCATIONS

- THERMAL CONTACT AT 24 LOCATIONS

- SEISMIC CONTACT AT 23 LOCATIONS

- COLD CONTACT OBSERVED AT 8 LOCATIONS

'l COLD CONTACT WHIP RESTRAINTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT (OTHER THAN SURGE LINE)

PIPE RESTRAINT ANALYSIS SYSTEM NUMBER DISPOSITION RESULTS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 5.4 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM PRESSURIZER SPRAY 17.21 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE PRESSURIZER SPRAY 17.5 TO BE RESHIMMF.D ACCEPTABLE "D" REACTOR COOLANT 33.2 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE PUMP SEAL WATER (CVCS)

CHEMICAL VOLUME AND 48.3

  • ACCEPTABLE ACCEPTABLE CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN CHEMICAL VOLUME AND 48.4 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN 49.5 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE ,

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN Sl.4 TO BE RESHIMMED ACCEPTABLE

  • DESIGNED AS A SEISMIC RESTRAINT

3 PAGE 1 0F 2 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT (OTHER THAN SURGE LINE)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PRIOR TO HEATUP

- EVALUATE CAUSE OF PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT GAP DEFICIENCIES

- EVALUATE EFFECTS OF COLD AND THERMAL CONTACT ON PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND OPERABILITY

-- SECTIONS OF ONE PIPING SYSTEM (CVCS NORMAL CHARGING) EXCEEDED CODE ALLOWABLES BASED ON ELASTIC ANALYSIS

--- PERFORM FATIGUE ANALYSIS

--- PERFORM UT AND PT

--- PERFORM REVIEW OF PIPE SilPPORTS TO ENSURE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITS ARE MET

--- CHECKING OVALITY OF 4 ELBOWS WHICH WERE >3 SM ,

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--- VISUAL INSPECTION OF PIPING IN VICINITY OF ONE WHIP RESTRAINT WHICH ANALYSIS SHOWED EXCEEDED 3 SM

-- ONE PIPE SUPPORT (CVCS LETDOWN) i 1

--- PERFORM NDE

--- CONFIRM MEETS FSAR REQUIREMENTS

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

RESHIM PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS AS REQUIRED CONFIRM OPERABILITY 0F PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS ESTABLISH INSPECTION PROGRAM i i i:

-- PERFORM AFTER HEATUP '

-- INSPECT NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE l

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'1988 HEATUP

- VISUAL INSPECTION OF SELECTED WHIP RESTRAINT GAPS AND MEASUREMENT OF HANGER AND SNUBBER POSITIONS ADJACENT TO SELECTED WHIP RESTRAINTS 1989 OUTAGE

- PERFORM GAP MEASUREMENTS ON ALL WHIP RESTRAINTS FOUND IN COLD CONTACT IN 1988

- PERFORM GAP MEASUREMENTS ON A SAMPLE OF OTHER WHIP RESTRAINTS

PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS INSIDE-CONTAINMENT (OTHER THAN SURGE LINE)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AFTER STARTUP EVALUATE GAPS WHICH ARE LARGER THAN SPECIFIED TO CONFIRM PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS MEET DESIGN CRITERIA PERFORM NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS IN 1989 t

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SURGE LINE HISTORY 1982:

SURGE LINE-REACTOR COOLANT LOOP THERMAL S

- THERMAL SLEEVE WELDS HAD FAILED 1983:

CONTACT OBSEPVED AT TWO WHIP RESTRAINTS (1.2 AND 1.4) - RESHIMMED RESTRAINTS 1984:

CONTACT OBSERVED AT WHIP RESTRAINT (1,2) - RESHIMMED RESTRAINT 1985:

SURGE LINE MOVEMENT NOTED AGAIN

- THERMAL STANDBY STRATIFICATION POSTULATED BASED ON H

- MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED

- IWO DEGRADED STEAM GENERATOR SNUBBERS POST TO HAVE RESTRICTED RCS THERMAL GROWTH CAUSING ERRATIC SURGE LINE MOVEMENT 1986: EVALUATION CONTINUES

- EVALUATED STEAM GENERATOR SNUBBER LOCK-UP i AND i

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-- THESE THOUGHT TO BE CAUSE OF SURGE LINE MOVEMENT

- WHIP RESTRAINT 1.4 CLAMP FOUND ROTATED l

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WHIP RESTRAINT 1.4 MODIFIED TO CHANGE RESTRAINT DESIGN - PLANNED FOLLOWUP TO 1986 l 1988:

SURGE LINE FOUND IN CONTACT WITH WHIP RESTRAINT 1,2 DURING WHIP RESTRAINT GAP MEASUREMENT PROGRAM

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PIPE REINSTALLATION FOLLOWING THERMAL SLEEVE REMOVAL s

-- CONSTRUCTION - NOT. CONSIDERED A FACTOR

-- THERMAL SHAKEDOWN - NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR

- RCS AND PRESSURIZER MOVEMENT VERIFIED PROPER - NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR

- THERMAL STRATIFICATION

-- PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED FOR HOT STANDBY AND POWER OPERATIONS

--- aT MEASURED IN 1985 - 100*f AT HOT STANDBY, 50 F AT POWER OPERATIONS

---AT NOT GREAT EN0 UGH TO EXPLAIN MOVEMENTS

-- DRAWING PRESSURIZER BUBBLE AND HEATUP i

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--- POTENTIAL 300'F AT BETWEEN REACTOR COOLANT LOOP AND PRESSURIZER

--- STRATIFICATION AT MEASURED AT BEAVER VALLEY 2 SURGE LINE OF ABOUT 200'F

--- CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT THIS COULD CAUSE OBSERVED SURGE LINE MOVEMENTS

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  • TEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION IN HORIZONTAL RUN suRiZER Nu

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STEADY-STATE INSURCE OUT3URCE Not To Scale

PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE ANALYSIS

- CONSULTING ENGINEER BOUNDING ANALYSIS

-- SUPPORTS THERMAL-STRATIFICATION AS PROBABLE C

-- PROVIDES INFOR,MATION FOR NSSS VENDOR FATIGUE ANALYSIS

-- PROVIDES INFORMATION FOR GAP SETTINGS FOR WHIP RESTRAINTS

- NSSS VENDOR

-- FATIGUE ANALYSIS CONFlRMS OPERABILITY OF PIPING AND N0ZZLES

-- PROVIDED RECOMMENDED NDE FOR PIPING AND N0ZZLES

- ARCHITECT ENGINEER

-- CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF WHIP REST'RAINTS WITH NEW GAP

- MODIFICATIONS HEATUP TO BE IDENTIFIED AND COMPLETED PRIOR T

  • MONITORING PROGRAM

- STRAP ON RTDS (MEASURE THERMAL STRATIFICATION)

- DISPLACEMENT TRANSDUCERS (MEASURE PIPE MOVEMENT)

- DATA LOGGER IN CONTROL ROOM I

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! RfD = RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR '

l LP = LINEAR POTENTIOMETER  !

TE = TEMPERATURE ELEMENT I 4

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PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE CONCLUSIONS -

- THERMAL STRATIFICATION PROBABLE CAUSE OF SURGE LINE MOVEMENT

- PIPING AND WHIP RESTRAINT OPERABILITY CONFIRMED FOR CONTINUED OPERATION

- MONITORING PROGRAM TO MEASURE TEMPERATURES AND MOVEMENTS DURING HEATUP AND OPERATION - RESULTS TO BE l

EVALUATED TO CONFIRM ANALYSIS i

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MEETIf;G NOTICE DISTRIBUTION

-Docket File-

'PDV' Reading NRC PDR Local FDR TMurley/JSniezek DCrutchfield GHolahan SBlack OGC-White Flint EJordan JPartlow GKnighton ACRS (10)

OPA NRC Participants

, Service List (See next page)

Licensee FMiraglia DKirsch Project Manager l WLanning l GPA/PA VWilson 1

DMorley i

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  • Meetings between flRC technical staff and applicants for licenses are open for i

interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to "Open Meeting Statement of NRC Staff Policy" 43 Federal Registerl 28058, 6/28/87.

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