ML20235R367

Summary of 870820 Meeting W/Util Re Adequacy of Support Design Verification.List of Attendees Encl

ML20235R367
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	09/30/1987
From:	Chan T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8710080025
Download: ML20235R367 (29)

Text

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SEP E F 1387 L 1 )

' Docket No.: 50-344 LICENSEE: Portland General Electric Company (PGE)

FACILITY: Trojan Nuclear Plant

SUMMARY

OF THE AUGUST 20, 1987 MEETING ON SUPPORT DESIGN VERIFICATION ADEQUACY On August 20, 1987, the staff met with representatives of and consultants for

-PGE to discuss those aspects of the support design verification program which impacted restart following the review of PGE's July 27, and 31, 1987 response to staff concerns expressed during the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) July 21-23, 1987 audit of the Bechtel/PGE verification effort. A list j of attendees is contained in Enclosure 1.

The staff's concerns regarding the adequacy of support design verification centered on five issues:

1 verificationofanchorbolt(RockBolt) adequacy; 2 support load verification; 3 weld design verification; 4 Quality Assurance adequacy with respect to the Bechtel/PGE support verification effort'; and

5) major scope and schedule of the long-term verification program.

PGE's submittal of August 18, 1987 provided the background for this discussion. Following a general summary of the evaluation of the support verification effort, PGE discussed each of the above identified concerns.

Regarding Rock Bolts, discussion centered on the installation of the anchor, and its means of providing the required pull-out capacity. Although a few anchors were found to have been installed at a depth less than the minimum specified depth, PGE demonstrated, through the use of in-plant pull test data, that the anchor itself would destruct prior to either the concrete failing, or slipping / pull-out failure of the anchor. It was demonstrated that for the Rock Bolts which were subjected to the pull test, that the anchorages would withstand the expected SSE demand load, with a Safety Factor of 2 as a minimum.

PGE also briefly discussed the means by which they statistically determined, from the ultrasonic measurement of anchor length of 609 Rock Bolts, that the minimum expected embedment depth would have been around 6.1 inches, which was consistent with their actual observations.

Regarding support load verification, the licensee stated that all calculations and reviews performed for those supports within the support design review program were based on original design loads, with the exception of the main steam supports in containment, pipe anchors in containment, and snubbers /

restraint supports. All of the loads, however, had been verified to the latest revision of the piping stress analyses.

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'Regarding the weld design verification, the licensee described the means by which welds were identified, the weld verification process, and the means by ,

r which the weld verification was documented. There was also discussion as to i whether physical, verification of welds _were required as part of the design verification, since one of the support packages.(Sib.305) which was reviewed

'by the NRR audit team did not appear to reference any drawing that specified

the required weld length, size and type which was assumed in the weld verification calculation. The staff determined that physical verification of welds was not r:equired as part of the weld design verification. 'In addition, Bechtel subsequently produced a " shop'.' fabrication' drawing of SR-305 which )

appropriately indicated all welds, thvs desolving staff's concern of weld j specification. i With respect to A-E Quality Assuranbe (0A) during the. verification effort PGE stated that their commissioned review concluded that programmatic aspects were adequate to validate the conclusions of the verification program. Although icertain deficiencies were identified, they were related solely to documentation and that those deficiencies did not impact the verification program. PGE stated that additional QA review and resolution of current documentation concerns would be completed'as part of the long-term program.

As part of the long-term program, PGE has included as part of the undertaking, I a verification of;all additional large bore pise support design, additional QA

, reviews of A-E activities, and resolution of t1e remaining NRC long-term ~,

• concerns. PGE stated that the detailed scope and schedule of the long-term program would be provided to the staff by September 30, 1987. -

PGE's presentation handout on support design verification is included as Enclosure 2.

+

Based on the information presented during itt'e meeting, it was ' concluded that PGE: had adequately demonstrated the validity of the support verification program and support capabilities to perpit heat-up. It was also anticipated that.resumptionofpoweroperationyeuldbeauthorizedbyAugust 21, 1987.

l Terence L. Chan, Project Manager Project Directorate V ,

i Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects .

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation b

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4 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission

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( [I TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM j

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1 AUGUST 20, 1987 )

i AGENDA

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1. INTRODUCTION - T. D. WALT, PGE; MANAGER, NUCLEAR o

SAFETY & REGULATION 1 )

"il. SUPPORT DESIGN J

, VERIFICATION - A. N. ROLLER, PGE; MANAGER,. NUCLEAR d

J' PLANT ENGINEERING ,

III. ROCK BOLT D. W. C0CKFIELD, PGE; VICE PRESIDENT EVALUATION - NUCLEAR y

N l u .IV. SUPPORT LOAD R. W. FOSSE, BECHTEL; PROJECT ENGINEER

.H DESIGN VERIFICATION - ,

e V' SUPPORT WELD DESIGN VERIFICATION - R. W. FOSSE VI. QUALITY ASSURANCE - C. P. YUNDT, PGE; GENERAL MANAGER, TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS 4

VII. LONG-TERM DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM - C. P YUNDT Vl'lI. CONCLUSION - T. D. WALT 1944W.887 i

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SUPPORT DESIGN VERIFICATION  !

BACKGROUND MAIN STEAM SYSTEM SUPPORTS TURBINE TRIP DYNAMIC LOADS (1975)

A-E CIVIL ENGINEERING 1

PROGRAM VERIFICATION PROCESS LOADS i MEMBERS WELDS BASE PLATE ANCHORS FINDINGS OF DESIGN VERIFICATION 493 SUPPORTS VERIFIED 457 SUPPORTS ACCEPTABLE 19 REANALYZED ACCEPTABLE 17 MODIFIED l

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NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM VENDOR ARCHITECT-ENGINEER DESIGN. ERROR LOADS OF RECORD MAIN STEAM. SAFETY-lNJECTION SS-81 SR-82 SS-88 SS-1022-SS-92 SS ,86 RTD BYPASS

.SR-90 SS-143 SR-86 SS-144 SS-91 SS-145 SS-146 MODIFIED TO INCREASE MARGIN SS-147 SS-80 SS-148 SS-83 SS-149 SS-91 SS-150 4 SS-1210 1956W.887

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BOLT 10 GROUT BOND FAILURE.

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DETERMINE $1GNIFICANCE OF EMBEDMENT DEPTH.

• DEMONSTRATE ADEQUACY OF ROCK BOLTS WITH A SAFETY FACTOR OF TWO.

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ROCK BOLT ANALYSIS CONSERVATISM CRITERIA CONCERVATIEMS SHEAR-CONE EMBEDMENT DEPTH MEASURED FROM -10P 0F EXPANSION SHELL AS OPPOSED TO THE BOTTOM.

• NO CREDIT FOR REINFORCING STEEL IN CONCRETE.

• SAFETY FACTOR OF 2.

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• SEISMIC LOAD DEMANDS 1.67 X OBE WITH DAMPING RATIO FOR PIPING ONLY 0.5 PERCENT. ,

EVALUATION CONCERVATIENS BOLT WITH MINIMUM CAPACITY IN EACH SUPPORT USED.

FOR ROCK BOLT EMBEDMENTS NOT MEASURED MINIMUM DEPTH WAS ASSUMED.

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Port BOLT CAPACITY

. TROJAN ROCK BOLTS ONE-INCH ROCK BOLTS, 8-INCH NOMINAL EMBEDMENTS

HIGHEST DEMAND (SSE) - 14.4 KIPS

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WILLIAMS FORM ENGINEERING ACCEPTABLE FOR USE IN CONCRETE EMBEDMENT DEPTHS CAN BE ADJUSTED USING ACI 349, SECTION B.7 CALCULATED CAPACITYC(F ' = 5000 PSI)

WILLIAMS FORM ENGINEERING 50 KIPS ULTIMATE 37 KIPS MAXIMUM WORKING LOAD TO YIELD 25 KIPS RECOMMENDED DESIGN LOAD (FAC10R OF SAFETY OF 2)

CONSERVATIVE ASSESSMENT FOR TROJAN 32.7 KIPS ULTIMATE 16.3 KIPS BASIC ALLOWABLE (FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2)

DEMONS 1 RATION TEST PULL TEST 9 ROCK BOLTS TO 33 (-0, +2) KIPS (Fc' = 5000 PSI) ALL SATISFACTORY PULLED ONE ROCK BOLT TO STEEL TENSILE FAILURE '

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ROCK BOLT FMBFDMENTS

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609 ACCESSIBLE ROCK BOLTS MEASURED (58 PERCENT).

• OTHER BOLTS NOT MEASURED DUE To ALARA OR SAFETY REASONS.

• MEASURED DEPTHS ADJUSTED FOR UT MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY (0.16").

MINIMUM DEPTH OF 6.1" USED FOR INACCES$1BLE BOLTS l (98 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL) USING DATA FROM MEASURED BOLTS.

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. THE ROCK BOLTS ARE ALL ADEQUATE TO CARRY THE MAXIMUM SUPPORT LOAD WITH AT LEAST A FACTOR OF SAFETY OF TWo.

FOUR SUPPORTS WERE MODIFIED TO ACHIEVE THIS SAFETY FACTOR. i

• FROM THE TESTS, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A BOND FAILURE MECHANISM OCCURRING BETWEEN A FAILURE ROCK BOLT IS AND GROUT OR MORI BETWEEN GROUT AND THE CONCRETE.

PROPERLY REPRESENTED BY THE SHEAR-CONE MECHANISM AS DESCRIBED IN AMERICAN CONCRETE INSTITUTE (ACI)

STANDARD 349.

• A SINGLE TEST-TO-DESTRUCTION ILLUSTRATED THE EFFECT OF THE ABOVE CONSERVATISM BECAUSE A "REAL" FACTOR-OF-SAFETY OF 4.9 WAS OBSERVED.

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' TROJAN PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN REVIEW SOURCE 0F SUPPORT LOADS i

GROUP OF PIPE SUPPORTS NO. SOURCE OF LOADS .

A.. SAFETY RELATED

. MAIN. STEAM 64 BECHTEL PIPING. STRESS ANALYSIS L.

PIPE ANCHORS IN 33' WESTINGHOUSE /BECHTEL PIPING CONTAINMENT STRESS ANALYSES SNUBBER / RESTRAINT 265 WESTINGHOUSE /BECHTEL/IMPELL LSUPPORTS PIPING STRESS ANALYSES DYNAMICALLY LOADED 76 BECHTEL/IMPELL PIPING t-

~ STRESS ANALYSES SUPPORTS **

OTHER SUPPORTS 38 WESTINGHOUSE /BECHTEL PIPING STRESS ANALYSES B. NON-SAFETY RELATED TURBINE BUILDING- 41 BECHTEL STRESS ANALYSIS-STRUCTURES OTHER SUPPORTS 2 BECHTEL STRESS ANALYSIS

• FOUR ANCHORS DISCONNECTED DURING DESIGN MODIFICATION DURING 1987 OUTAGE. THUS VERIFICATION NOT REQUIRED.

• • 26 SUPPORTS IN THIS CATEGORY ARE ALSO IN THE SNUBBER / RESTRAINT SUPPORTS CATEGORY.

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ALL PIPE SUPPORTS VERIFIED TO ORIGINAL _ DESIGN LOADS EXCEPT:

ORIGINAL VERIFICATION LOAD LOAD SUPPORTS MAIN STEAM IN CONSERVATIVE TURBINE TRIP CONTAINMENT TURBINE TRIP LOAD LOAD BASED ON TEST DATA PIPE RUPTURE WESTINGHOUSE /BECHTEL PIPE ANCHORS LOADS PIPING STRESS ANALYSES SNUBBER / RESTRAINT SNUBBER RATING WESTINGHOUSE /BECHTEL/IMPELL SUPPORTS PIPING STRESS ANALYSES 1970W

SUPPORT LOAD DESIGN VERIFICATION CONCLUSION ALL SUPPORTS VERIFIED USING CURRENT PIPE STRESS ANALYSES-BASED LOADS 1967W

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_b PIPE SUPPORT WELD DESIGN VERIFICATION

1. WELD IDENTIFICATION

2. WELD VERIFICATION PROCESS

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3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTATION LI . CONCLUSION I

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2. WELD VERIFICATION PROCESS SAFETY-RELATED SNUBBERS AND PIPE RESTRAINTS

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DETAILED CALCULATIONS'FOR GENERIC TYPE I, II, AND 111 SUPPORTS EXISTING CALCULATION FOR TYPE IV SUPPORTS TYPE V SUPPORT CALCULATION COMPARED TO TYPE IV SUPPORTS CALCULATION INDIVIDUAL SUPPORTS COMPARED TO GENERIC TYPE SUPPORTS DETAILED CALCULATION WHERE DIRECT COMPARIS0N WAS NOT APPLICABLE OTHER SUPPORT TYPES

• INDIVIDUAL CALCULATIONS RECOGNITION OF WELD STRENGTH RELATIVE TO MEMBER STRENGTH j ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT y

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3. WELD VERIFICATION DOCUMENTATION i

DETAILED CALCULATIONS ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT SUMMARIZED I

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4. CONCLUSION WELDS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY EVALUATED IN THE f PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICATION PROGRAM

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?" ' ARCHITECT-ENGINEER (A-E)

QUALITY ASSURANCE 1 DURING VERIFICATION i

. INDEPENDENT 0A AUDIT / TECHNICAL QUALITY REVIEW BY IMPELL OF A-E PERFORMANCE DURING PIPE SUPPORT-VERIFICATION.

REVIEWED IMPLEMENTATION OF A-E QA PROGRAM IN THE PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICATION PROGRAM, REVIEWED TECHNICAL INTERFACE AND SELECTED SUPPORT DESIGN QUALIFICATIONS.

RESULTS:

PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS ARE ADEQUATE TO DEMONSTRATE INTEGRITY OF STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS IN' VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

CONCERNS IDENTIFIED RELATED-TO IMPLEMENTATION OF QA PROGRAM WERE DOCUMENTATION ISSUES.

DEFICIENCIES:

CONTROL 0F QA DOCUMENTS - PROCEDURES NOT UPDATED - CORRECT PROCEDURES USED FOR VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

CORRECTIVE ACTION OF PREVIOUS AUDIT FINDING NOT COMPLETED -

NOT RELATED TO VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

. LACK OF DOCUMENTATION REGARDING POSSIBLE USE OF EXPANSION ANCHORS '

ON SOME SUPPORTS IN VERIFICATION PROGRAM - NO IMPACT ON PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICATION PROGRAM AS EXPANSION ANCHORS USED ONLY FOR VERY LIGHT LOADS.

INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION CLEARLY IDENTIFYING WELD DETAILS FOR QUALIFICATION.0F WELDS. NO IMPACT ON PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICATION PROGRAM, DOCUMENTATION EXPLAINING HOW WELDS WERE IDENTIFIED NOW EXISTS.

SUPPORT LOADS RECEIVED FROM WESTINGHOUSE WERE NOT IN A FORMAL LETTER (I.E., WERE TELEC0 PIED). FORMAL LETTER NOW EXISTS - NO IMPACT ON PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICATION PROGRAM.  ;

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

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, RECOMMENDATIONS .

DESIGN CRITERIA PROCEDURES USED BY A-E CIVIL GROUP NOT AS h DETAILED AND COMPLETE AS THAT.USED BY A-E PLANT DESIGN GROUP. ]

DID NOT IMPACT VERIFICATION' PROGRAM. 1 J

- SIX RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DOCUMENTATION, NONE'0F WHICH I IMPACTED VERIFICATION' PROGRAM. ]

CONCLUSIONS: j i

CONCERNS WERE RESOLVED DURING AUDIT AND PRESENT NO SIGNIFICANT QA 1 OR TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATIVE TO SUPPORT ADEQUACY.

SEVERAL CONCERNS' RELATIVE TO DOCUMENTATION WILL BE RESOLVED IN LONG-TERM VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

A-E RESPONSE TO AUDIT A-E AGREES WITH IMPELL THAT OVERALL VERIFICATION PROGRAM It:

ADEQUATE, BUT DOCUMENTATION CONCERNS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED.

A-E.HAS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION WHICH IDENTIFIES SOURCES AND MAGNITUDES OF SUPPORTELOADS AND IDENTIFIES HOW WELDS WERE VERIFIED. DOCUMENTATION ADDRESSING OTHER CONCERNS WILL BE COMPLETED IN THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM.

1 i

PGE ASSESSMENT OF A-E RESPONSE PGE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED WITH IMPELL AND A-E DURING THE AUDIT-(TWO PGE ENGINEERS WERE PRESENT IN THE A-E OFFICE DURING THE AUDIT) AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE CONCERNS RAISED BY IMPELL HAVE NOT IMPACTED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE PIPE SUPPORT VERIFICA-TION PROGRAM. PGE IS CONCERNED WITH THE INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTA-

. TION AND, AS A FOLLOWUP TO THE IMPELL AUDIT, PLANS TO ENSURE THAT I THE A-E. ADDRESSES ALL CONCERNS.

- PGE ALSO PLANS, IN THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM, TO CONDUCT AN INDEPTH AUDIT OF THE A-E QA PROGRAM AS IT RELATES TO ALL DESIGN WORK DONE ,

FOR TROJAN BY THE A-E. {

1955W.887

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. LONG-TERM DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM p

PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE, AS A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING:

L VERIFY ALL ADDITIONAL LARGE BORE PIPE SUPPORT DESIGNS:

4

- SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE BY JULY 1, 1988

- FINAL DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE BY SEPTEMBERL30, 1987  ;

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CONFIRM PIPE WHIP RESTRAINTS:

- FINAL DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 i

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0A AUDIT 0F A-E TROJAN PROJECT AS A MINIMUM WILL INCLUDE:

PROCEDURES FOR DESIGN CALCULATIONS j INTERFACE BETWEEN DESIGN GROUPS ]

EVALUATION OF A-E CIVIL ENGINEERING DESIGN ACTIVITIES

- RESPOND TO REMAINING NRC CONCERNS BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 1

RESOLVE INDEPENDENT QA AUDIT DOCUMENTATION CONCERNS BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 I

i 1952W.887

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