ML20195B278
| ML20195B278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1977 |
| From: | Catton I CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155H438 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-196 NUDOCS 8806210367 | |
| Download: ML20195B278 (5) | |
Text
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES etnAttt). D a s s
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LOS ANCELE.1, CALIFORNIA 90024
#4 i j/g May 13, 1977 V'I k
A 'N gIIh g[h JI Edson G. Case Acting Director D
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Washington, D. C.
20555
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- 5 DOCKET NO:
50-142
Dear Mr. Case:
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Due to the sensitive nature of the contents of this letter, we request that this document be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part !
In regard to.your letter dated April 12, 1977, we are enclosing Amendment di to our Security Plan dated January 20, 1977.
Please replace pages 2, 3, 6 and 9 of the security plan with the enclosed pages.
We hope that this plan may be accepted as now amended and replace the Security Plan dated April 1, 1976.
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'1ht Ivan Catton, Director Nuclear Energy Laboratory IC:CEA:vl
Enclosures:
pages 2, 3, 6, 9 cc:
Chief Boyd Lynn, UCLA Police Department C. E. Ashbaugh, Laboratory Security Of ficer Dr. Harold V. Brown, UCLA Office of Environmental Health & Safety (without enclosures) 8806210367 880603 PDR FOIA AFTERG 085-196 PDR D i * 'l' 4
NUCLEAR ENERGY LABOR ATORY IVAN CATToN. Dtreetor EZW
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I.
Design Features A.
Essential Equipment The materials described in the preceeding paragraph and the nuclear reactor comprise the essential equipment of the laboratory. The essential equipment is described in pages 1 through 5 of the Appendix. The reactor console is considered essential equipment but it is located in a controlled area (B-level), not a security area (A-level).
(See also paragraph IClc.)
B.
Security Areas 1.
Security Areas (A-level)
Security areas require A-level access or higher.
These areas, the reactor room (1000) and the radioactive storage room (within room 1540) are identified in figures 6 through 8.
Security areas are protected by an in-trusion alarm system, permit limited access, and present well defined physical boundaries to both innocent and overt intrusion.
The alarm system is shown with the ultrasonic transmitter and receiver transducers identified by an "X",
the magnetic door switches by a "Y",
and the master control units by a "Z".
The radioactive storage room is located below ground level so that all outside walls are backed by earth fill.
The inside walls are two-foot-thick concrete block, and the two steci mesh doors provide the only access to the area. The inner door, #1, is backed by a steel plate and has two locks.
One of the locks is keyed to "A" level, the Master level, and the other lock is a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock No. 8077A, which meets the specifications outlined in AEC Regulatory Guide 5.12.
The outer door, #2, is keyed to "A" level. The fuel plates and i'uel scraps are stored in a Metal File Cabinet Safe, Model T-20. Serial No. 48727, made by Underwriters Labora-tory.
It is secured to the north concrete wall and floor by 1x1xl/8 angle iron. A separate key and combination are required to open it.
One fuel bundle with attached thermocouples is stored in an 8 foot long, 6 inch diameter steel schedule 40 pipe with a steel lid hinged and locked with a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The pipe is welded to the north concrete wall.
All the bolts securing the safe and the schedule 40 pipe are welded to the angle iron to prevent easy removal. The two Pu-Be neutron sources are kept in steel dru=s filled with paraffin, chained to the east wall, and secured with the same type of Sargent and Greenleaf Combination padlocks. The uranyl nitrate (250 ges) is stored in padlocked steel lockers at the south end of the room.
For the' purpose of radiological control and personnel safety, the sub-critical facility of room 1540 requires A-level access.
Upon occasion, en-capsulated neutron sources may be lef t overnight in a suberitical assembly to provide sufficient neutron fluence for class demonstration purposes. That room houses a Kaman 1001-A neutron generator that is tritium-contaminated and uses tritiated targets.
Permissive entry by A-level access provides a prudent means of radiological control, but the security implications are regarded as negligible.
2 Amendment 1
s 5
The storage pits in the reactor high bay contain irradiated fuel elements and a 5 curie, Co-60 radioisotope source. Other radioactive materials may be stored within these pits as demanded by special circumstances. The storage pits are co= posed of cylindrical holes, 6.5 feet deep, set into the concrete floor.
The cylinders are secured with a 4 foot long,10 inch diameter, 380 pound steel-lined concrete plug. The plug can be removed with a special handling device and the reactor room crane. The concrete plug handling device and the crane are both secured with a Sargent and Greenleaf padlock.
The remainder of the enriched uranium is kept in the reactor.
Due to its power history, the fuel is too hot to handle without cumbersome shielding. The crane, the handling cask, shielding and a great deal of time are required in order to remove it from the reactor and then from the facility.
2.
Controlled Areas (B-level) i Controlled areas require B-level access or higher.
These areas include the reactor control roo=, a classroom, and laboratory space. The classroom is used primarily for undergraduate instruction, the laboratory areas for undergraduate experiments and graduate or contract research.
These areas, because of physical and administrative controls, serve as a buffer region or perimeter of the security areas.
3.
Non-Security Areas (C-level)
Non-security areas require C-level access or higher.
These areas are peripheral areas of the laboratory and include the reception room, adj acent offices, a transformer vault, and the third floor penthouse.
T'e areas denoted C-level are not within *he scope of the security plan pres ated here.
Figures 6 and 7 delineate these areas as parts of the laboratory without implying that they constitute a part of the plan. These areas are controlled only for the purpose of preventing petty thef t of office equipment, books, etc.
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knendment 1
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II.
Administrative Controls A.
Organization 1.
Security Organization The Director of the Laboratory is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Security Plan.
The Director shall appoint a Security Officer to maintain control of keys, key distribution records, and the Security log.
The Security Officer shall also maintain updated personnel access lists and communicate with and provide limited training for campus police.
He performs the annual review of the security system.
There is a Security Committee consisting of the Director, the Security Of ficer, the Reactor Supervisor and two others familiar with the Laboratory operations.
Three committee members shall constitute a quorum The Security Officer shall act as Secretary to the Committee. The purpose of the Security Com=ittee is to advise the Director of the Laboratory in security-related matters.
The UCLA Police Department is responsible for detecting any intrusion during working and non-working hours, and for taking the appropriate action in the event of a security violation. The Police Department hao at a minimu=
6 units (men) on duty at all times.
Four units (worst case) would be able to respond to an intrusion.
The Police Department provides routine on-site inspections (physical checks) once every four hours during working and non-working hours, including weekends and holidays on a twenty-four hour basis.
This includes a check on the outer doors of the facility and, depending upon the officer's discretion, will enter and patrol the controlled areas and the perimeter of the security areas. These checks can be accomplished either by mobile units or foot patrol officers.
On a day-to-day basis, all A-level keyholders are responsible for observance of the Security Plan and for reporting security violations, infrac-tions and the malf unction of any security-related equipment, i.e.,
door locks, etc.
2.
Local Law Enforcement Authorities The UCLA Police Department has as a back-up the West Los Angeles Police Departmeht.
This is possible because of a mutual aid agreement between the two parties.
6 Amendrent 1 l
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C.
Surveillance 1.
Working Hours There are two separate alarm systems and each alarm system can be deactivated only by specified individuals.
All A-level personnel are authorized to deactivate the alarm system of the reactor high bay by tele-phoning the University Police Department, stating ~ his name, waiting for recognition and permission, and then properly deactivating the system at the master control unit. While the system is deactivated, the surveillance is done by the working personnel holding A-level keys and by students, staff and faculty who are in the facility.
All A-level personnel are authorized to reactivate the system by first telephoning the University Police Department, stating his name and intention, reactivating the alarm system at the master control unit, and then again telephoning the University Police Department to see if the alarm system has cleared and that the system is functioning properly again.
Two individuals appointed by the Director of the Laboratory are authorized to deactivate the alarm system of the radioactive storage room.
Their names and an entry code are on file with the UCLA Police Department.-
Legal entry can only be effected between the hours of 0800 and 1700 on University working days. The normal sequence of events for entry into the radioactive storage room is for one of the above two individuals to call the police, wait for recognition, state his name, his intent, and the entry code. Upon recognition, he estimates the probable duration of the entry.
Upon entry, he deactivates the alarm at the master control. Upon departure, he reactivates the alarm, secures the door, calls the police department, gives his name, states that the area is secured, and asks for confirmation of the alarm system reactivation and condition of non-alarm. This alarm system is rarely deactivated, but when it is, at least one of the four authorized individuals will remain in this room during the entire period.
Normally, this alarm system is kept on and surveillance of this area is accomplished by the working personnel, the lock and key system and the ultrasonic alarm system.
Backing up these systems are the UCLA Police Depart-ment and the West Los Angeles Police Department.
i 2.
Non-Working Hours During'non-working hours, the lock and key system and the alarm system provide the surveillance of the security areas.
In addition, there are on-site inspections (physical checks) randomly every four hours on a twenty-four hour i
basis. The on-site inspection includer a check on the outer doors of the f acility i
and, at the off,1cer's discretion, entrance and patrol of the contrclied areas and the perimeter of the Security Areas. The West Los Angeles Police Depart-ment backs up these systems.
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Amendment 1
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