ML20151H263
| ML20151H263 | |
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| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1988 |
| From: | May P WASHINGTON, UNIV. OF, SEATTLE, WA |
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Text
O a CONSIDERING EARTHQUAKE RISK REDUCTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES
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Peter J. May Associate Professor of Political Sdence and Public Affairs -
University of Washington Seattie,WA 98195 This paper addresses relevant social science considerations to earthquake risk reduction within the context of the USGS Puget Sound / Portland carthquake hazards assessment. Unfortunately, social science considerations are often relegated a secondary role in discussions of earthquake risk reduction.
As noted in what follows, social scientists have made useful contributions to our understanding of factors affecting natural hazards policy adoption and implementation. This knowledge base alor.g with information about current policies and problems proside important lessons for tho design of appropriate and feasible risk reduction strategies for the Puget Sound / Portland areas.
Polley Formation and Implementation '
There is a burgeoning social science literature about policy formation and implementation that ,
is relevant to discussions of policies for earthquake hazards. The focus of recent political science research on policy formation has been upon factors associated with opportunities for policy enactment.
The recent focus of the closely re'ated, but disciplinary more diserse, implementation research has t
been upon the relationships between policy design and the incentives or disincentives that particular policies create for desired behasioral changes.
Poliev Entretireneurs and Poliev Formation I
In studying poucy formation, political scientists have in recent years moved away from rational policy making models to moie free-Gowing models of poucy making. The new models emphasize the separate streams of policy ideas, prob! cms, and political currents from which occasions for policy enactment arise as unpredictable windows of opportunity. What emerges from such descriptions is a policy making world in which political entrepreneurs must champion causes and a store of proposals need be at the ready when fleeting windom of opportunity open.
In applying these newer theoretical perspectives, social scientists who have studied policy formation concerniog earthquakes and other hazards had little success in identifying conditions other than earthquakes themselves which occasion opportunities for policy enactment. While several case studies (e.g4Alsch and Petak,1986; Wyner and Mann,1986) exist of policy enactment for earthquake risk reduction, they reDect the broader literature in depicting Deeting episodes when political currents l
are supportive of specific policy action. Typically, new policies are considered only after long periods j of Dedgling efforts to draw attention to the need for reforms.
i The main lessens of this research for those advocating enactment of new policies for i earthquake risk reduction are: '
(1) Erpect a long "aftrning up* period. Given the low placement of earthquake hazards on policy agendas, it takes a long time - often a decade or more - for officials and relevant professionals to grapple with the impvrtant technical, political, and economic considerations of 1
introducing changes in existing practices.
Alesh and Petak (19S6),in their study of retrofit policies for hazardous buildings, note that it took eight years from the time 1.os Angeles Councilmember (now Mayor) Dradley formally
( requested a feasibility study for addressing the problem of pre 1934 unreinforced rnasonry 8G08010206 880615 PDR P ADOCK 05000334 Prl ,
Pohey Consideranons P. May, pg. 2 buildings u:stil the Council enacted their 1983 ordinance. It will be another 3 to 10 years
( before owners will have been required to comply with the ordinance.
In Washington state, it has been some 15 years since sustained state level efforts to build a constituency for earthquake risk reduction were initiated with the Washington State Engineering Adsisory Council formed by the governor in 1971, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Geologic Hazards formed by the state Senate Committee on Commerce in 1973.
(2) Anticipate tmptedictaNe andfeeting % indows ofopportunity". Windows of apportunity for enacting policy changes are not predictable and rarely last more than a few weeks or months.
The norm is for situations to arise where earthquake proshions can be tacked onto related legislative measures. For example, seismic proshions rnight be added to new provisions for historie structure rehabilitation. Or, earthquake education prosisjons might be folded into new science curricula as part of education curriculum reforms. On rarer occasiens when earthquakes occur in nearby areas, there will be more widespread, but still fleeting, interest in addressieg earthquake risks.
(3) Leam to be more entrepreneurial about advocatingpolicy reforms. Even when ',iewed from the inside, one of the central features that stands out in descriptions of policy making in federal, state and local legislative arenas is the level chaos that dominates policy making. .
Some types of indisiduals or organizations - which have been labeled
- policy entrepreneurs'in the policy literature - tend to thrive in such situations. Their skills lay in first recogmzing when windows of opportunity might open, and second in hasing ready concrete proposals to offer as solutions to the problem at hand.
Policy Instruments. Imntementors. and Intermediaries
( Perhaps the greatest contributions to date of social sdentists to earthquake risk reduction have been both identifying the complex chain of implementing actions various risk reduction measures cutail and sorting through the relevant decision making considerations that affect implementation success.
The state-of art for this work has involved analyzing implementation considerations for risk reduction measures aimed at influencing people's behaviors with respect to land use, design, and con truction or rehabilitation of new and existing structures.
Implementation relevant research by hazards specialists, geographers, planners, and political scientists can be summarized as follows (see, May and Bolton,1986 for further discussion):
(1) De range ofprospective risk reduction measures isfairWellpresenbed. While the appropriateness and feasibility of implementing particular measures varies considerably
- mong different jurisdictions, the types of meuures that might be employed have been detailed by planning professionals and hazard researchers (e.g., Blair and Spang!c,1979; Jaffe, Butler, and Thurow,1981; Kockelman,19S3; Nichols,1982). These indude building code prosision for new construction, hazardous abatement proshions for existing construction, various zoning proshions, spedal use or critical facility permits, lifeline location or design restric. ions, seismic area impact resiew requirements, real estate disclosure requirements, and the purchase of property rights or property itself.
(2) ne relevant chain of actions, actors, and decision making considerations affecting implementation success are important to consider. In depicting the prospects for successful policy implementation,implernentation theories have focused attention on two aspects of the !
policy process: (1) the chain of actions that must be undertaken in order to achieve desired behavioral changes among
- target groups' affected by a given policy, and (2) the )
i dedsionmaking considerations that affect behasiors of
- target groups
- and latermediary 1
( implementors with respect to the policy un der consideration. Social scientists have applied )
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Policy ConsMerations P. May, pg 3 these broad notions about policy implementation in identifying the relevant considerations to
( implementation success for risk reduction policies. The difficulty lay in specifying which of the generic considerations apply to any particular set of policies and locations.
(3) We have teamed to be much more cautious about assumingimplementation success. One oi the salient lessons of the earthquake risk reduction implementation studies (e.g., Palm,1983; Wyner and hiann,1986),is the extent ofimplementation problems and resultant lack of implementation success for risk reduction policies. These findings call attention to the importance of careful analysis of relevant decision making considerations so that policies can be designed that anticipate implementation problems. In addition, we should be cautious about accepting cost benefit studies or other policy analpes that assume full implementation of policies under consideration.
Risk Reduction Policy for Washington and Oregon Within this region there have been case studies of risk reduction efforts within selected communities but no comprehensive studies of risk reduction practices. As a consequence, there is limited knowledge of existing local level policy and less understanding of actual development, land use, or building practices. In brief, presious research and other documents (more generally, see the resiew of state policy actions by the Washington Seismic Safety Council,1986) concerning this region tell us:
(1) State-sidepolicies exist with respect to new construction. The chicistate level poUcy action in Washington state is adoption in 1975 of a State Building Code which mandates state and local governmental adherence to seismic prosisions of the Uniform Building Code (UBC) -
currently referencing the 1982 UBC provisions - for nonresidential, new construction .
Oregon also has a state wide building code. Neither of these codes address existing j construction.
(2) The consensus seems to be that the current UBCprovisionsfor this region have prosided satisfactory state-of-the-art desigrss for construction of new ' engineered
- buildings. While the delineation of the zones and peak acceleration estimates are subject to change as the USGS assessment findings are released, the current prosisions appear to be unlikely to experience
- ub:tantial change except possibly in a localized, site specific cases. In assessing ths. impact of the NEHRP Recommended Prosisjons upon cost of wnstruction, designs using the recommended prosisions when applied to Seattle were found to be slightly less expensive than designs using the blodified 1979 UBC prosisjons which at that time were the applicable Seattle Code (reported in Weber,1985)
(3) Some for 11 jurisdictions in this region arefairly advanced in their risk reduction effons.
l Seattle was cited by Holmes and nurston (1985) in a FEhiA sponsored rational resiew of i
private sector aethities for its parapet ordinancs and prosisjons for scismie upgrading when !
rebabilitating buildings. Lsad use practices la some jurisdictions reference seismic hazards,
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particularly secondary effects, as documented by discussions of the King County, Washington sensitive areas ordinance (Bolton et al.,1986). Tacoma requires a strong motion recording instrument be installed and maintained in all buildings six stories or higher, funded through a !
city surcharge en building permits (discussed in Drcbek, hlushkatel, and Kilijanek,1983, p. l 132).
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Policy Considerations F. May, pg. 4 (4) The risks posed by existing construction an noteworthy in this region. The problems of
( existing unreinforced masonry buildings in this region are similar to what has been reported nationally for high risk areas (FEMA,1985a,b). Relatively little has been done at the state or local level to address the problem. The Washington Seismic Safety Council cited the particular problem of unreinforced masonry schools. Hawkins and Burke (1985),in a NSF-funded study of unreinforced masonry buildings in seven small towns in the Pacific Northwest, found the seismic problem to be acute in such small towns. Moreover, theyjudged the prospects for addressing the problems to be limited by a lack of local technical expertise and financial considerations.
- Barriers to Poliev Develooment and imelementation The 1986 Washington Seismic Safety Council Report identified a number of barriers to policy ,
developnsent that apply at both state and locallevels of government. The following were noted by us as continuing themes in discussions of earthquake reduction policy by officials in Washington state:
(1)Inadequateplanninginfomsation. We cited a need for risk maps that are appropriate for guiding planning and building decisions. Such maps, or the capacity to produce and interpret them, exists in some jurisdictions. But in manyjurisdictions, the capacity does not exist.
Equally important, given the relatively low perception of earthquake risks among planning and .
policy officials, one might suspect there is little perceived nesd for such maps. 7he dual challenge is to produce usable infomsation and to create capable users of the infomsation.
(2) Limited directgovemmentalcontrol. Ultirnately risk reduction efforts entail changes in indhidual behasiors. Governments adopt and attempt to enforce regulations governing land use and building practices, but compliance decisions ultimately rest upon private citizens. In addition, enforcement of regulations typically entails multiple intermediaries. As such,
{ governments have indirect means for influencing risk reduction practices.
Complicating the intergovernmentalimplementation problem is the fact that the Puget ;
Sound / Portland areas contain multiple, overlapping jurisdictions. Within or overlapping the six counties of the Puget Sound area and the two counties of Portland are some 100 cities and towns,365 special districts (e.g., recreation, utility, transit, drainage),114 school districts, and 11 active ports. The challenge is to developpolicies that recogni:e the diversity ofgovemmental entities and the complexity ofintergovemmentalimplementation.
(3) Concem about costs. Clearly, the costs of undertaking earthquake risk reduction programs is a majot concern of polic)nsakers. As such, a high prioriy of the assessment effort should be both estimating costs and identifying ways to finance reduction programs.
Unfortunately, as we noted in the Washington state policy report, the high costs and long time l frames for risk reduction programs tend to blind polic>nelers to other more immediate and 1 icis expensrve risk reduction efforts. Priorities should be placed upon identiffog immediate, low cost actions.
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(4) Concem about liabilly. A related concern we identified is a fear ofincreased governmental ;
assu,nption ofliability for earthquake damages and losses that might follow from documenting i earthquake risks and public building wlactability. As noted in the report and by others in this !
Puget Sound / Portland resiew session, there are several reasons for suggesting that such
! thinking isinappropriate. The fact is that in the event of a major earthquake, the state may already be held liable in some circumstances for dunages or deaths. 7he challenge is to ideMfy risk reduction measures which appropriately address liability issues.
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Policy ConsMerins P. May, pg. 5 Ormortunities for Action The lessons of the social science literature about policy formation and implementation establish the broad contours concerning earthquake risk reduction policy prospects. The listing of noteworthy barriers to policy development no doubt diminish expectations for enactment of far.
reaching policy initiatives. Taken together these lists may suggest that any efforts to legislathely enact risk reduction policy reforms are fruitless, Unfortunately, such thinbng seems to be all too common unong state and local policymakers who have responsibilities for addressing the risks posed by eart1. quakes and other natural hazards.
One implication of this discussion is that rather than seeking comprehenshe and expensive legislative initiatives, advocates should promote a more limited set of policy proposals for legislathe enactment. In this respect, advocates need to become more entreprenarialin taking advantage of wiadows of opportunity to insert seismic prosisions where relevant into non. hazard specific policy initiathts. Even though the changes will be less sisible and by definition more marginal, the cumulative impacts of inserting seismic considerations into rules, regulations, and guidance concerning state and local health and safety issues can be very important for earthquake risk reduction.
A second implication is that advocates of risk reduction should place greater emphasis on actions that do not require legislative action. One of the surprising findings of our work in resiewing ,
state. level earthquake risk reduction practices in Washington state is that state agencies already possess most of the necessuy authority for undertaking risk reduction programs. In this respect, sestral specinc suggestions concerning immediate opportunities for advancing risk reduction practices come to mind:
(1) Create a state-level agency wrkinggroup. As part of our resiew of seismic programs within Washington state, we found some aethiry in rnany state agencies and much aethity in a few.
' While we judged the overall level of effort as shirking state leadership responsibilities, there is a clear potential for administrative action. A first step in promoting such action is to create an effective state level agency working group. This does not require legislative action.
Presumably, a simibr effort could be undertaken in Oregon.
(2) Anticipatepolicy.rrievant questions. As part of efforts to insert seismic prosisions into existing legislation, rules, and regulations rnany questions will inesitably arise concernicg costs, liability, and need. Without answers to these questions, there is little hope of even marginal additions to existing policies. It is remarkable how little prepared advocates or relevant state and local ofDcials are to answer these questions. The USGS cffort will help address some of these questions, but institutional mechanisms need to be created to make sure that the necessary answers are being developed. This requires an institutional capability to synthesize research resitlts from the USGS cffort. Such capability is provided in other states by seismic safety commissions.
(3) Erplore non-govemmentalavenuesforrisk reduction. blost oithe attention concerning carthquake risk reduction efforts is upon governmental policy as a means of mandating or otherwise inducia,, risk reduction bebasiors. However, much risk reduction aethity takes place outside of the governmental arena, Professional engineers participate la the ;
development oflocal, regional and national standards or recommend appropriate l
modiScations to standards. The !nsurance and banking community adopt their own standards ;
or procedures for dealing with hazardous areas. Various companies deciding whether or not l
to locate in an area, or build facilities, have their own set of considerations.
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Popey Comideratiou P. May, pg. 6 Given these considerations, more attention should be given to the prospective role of the
( design professions in enhancing local earthquake risk reduction, rather than assuming risk reduction is necessarily accomplished through governmental actions. This requires an understanding the relationship between governmental policy - the standards adopted by governments - and professional recommendations of architects, planners, geotechnical and structural engineers, and other design profeuions concerning design standards and acceptable levels of risk.
As should be evident from this brief discusion, there are noteworthy behasioral and social science considerations at the heart of earthquake risk reduction efforts. Just as phpical scientists use
, the Puget Sound / Oregon area as a laboratory for refining their theories about seismic events, socials scientists should be encouraged to test and apply relevant theories about policy formulation and implementation in the Puget Sound / Oregon politicallaboratory. Social science research is necessary :
to help answer inquiries concerning liability, costs, and risk acceptability More basic social science research should also be encouraged concerning such things as the relationships among nongovernmental professional practices and gowrnmental policies.
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Policy Consukrations P. May, pg 7 References Alesch, Daniel J. and William J. Petak.1986. The oolities and economics of earthquake hanrd mitigation. Monograph #43. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behasioral Science, Unhttsity of Colorado.
Blair, M. L. and W. E. Spangle.1979. Seismic safety and land use planning Selected exampics from California. United States Geological Sunty Professional Paper 941.B. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Bolton, Patricia, Marjorie Greene, Susan Heikkala, and Peter J. May,1986. Land use planning for earthquake hazard mitigation. Special Publication No.14. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Sciences, Unhtrsity of Colorado.
i Building Seismic Safety Council.1986. The potentialimpact on the building regvlatory system of using the NEHRP recommended prosisions. Report prepared for FEMA. Washington, D.C.: BSSC.
Drabek, Thomas E., Ahin H. Mushkatel, and Thomas S. Kilijanck.1983. Earthauske mitiestion '
oolies- The experience of two states. , Monograph #37. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behasioral ,
Science, University of Colorado.
FEMA.1985a Proceedines: Workshoo on reducine seismic hsneds of existine buildinet, Esrthquake Hazards Reduction Series No.15. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, i
FEMA.1985b An action plan for reducine earthouake haneds of existine buildines. Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series No.16. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Hawkins, Neil and Padraic Burke.1985. Seismic hazards in unreinforced masonry buildings in small tous in the Pacific Northwest. Report to the National Science Foundation. Seattle: University of Washingten and the Northwest Institute for Historic Presenation.
Hays, Walter W. and Paula Gori, Eds.1986. A workshop on earthquake hazards in the Puget Sound, Washington Area, Proceedings of conference XXXIII. Open File Report 85 253. Reston, VA: USGS.
Holmes. William T. and Howard Thurston.1985. Identification of private secte r on.g:ing aethities. In Societalirneticatione Selected resdines. Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series No.14. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Jaffe, Martin, JoAnn Butler, and Charles Thurow.1981. Reducing earthquake risks: A planner's guide.
Planning Adsisory Senice Report No. 364. Chicago: American D: ting Association.
Kockelmaa, William J.1983. Examples of the use of geologic and seismologic information for
! l carthquake hazard reduction in Southern California. USGS Open file report 83 82. Washington, D.C.:
USGS. l l
May, Peter J. and Patricia Bolton.1986. Reassessing earthquake hazards reduction measures. Journal
_j of the Ameriesn Plannine Association. Autumn, 1986: 443-451.
i 4 Nichols, Donald R.1982. Reducing earthquake damage through land use planning. In Walte. Nys, ed. Proceedings of Conference XV, Workshop on Preparing for and Responding to a Damaging ;
Earthquake in the Easurn U.S. Reston, VA: USGS: 127143. '
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Polwy Considerations ,
P. May, pg. 8 Palm, Risa.1983. Home mortanae lenders. real oronerry nooraisers and earthauake haneds.
(. Monograph #38 c(the Program on Technology, En ironment and Man. Boulder, Colorado: lastitute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
Washington State Seismic Safety Council.1986. Waihincton seismic saferv council recommendations.
Report to the Governor and legislator, Division of Emergency Management, State of Washington.
Weber, Stephen F.1986. Cost impact of the NEHRP recommended proeions on the design and !
construction of buildmgs. In SocietalImnlicatione Selected readines Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series No.14. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Wper, Alan J. and Dean E. Mann.1986.,Preparina for California's earthauakes: 1.ocal Government and Seismic Safety. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies, Uniwrsity of California . '
Berkeley, i
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f Policy ConsMerstions P. May, pg. 9 Appendix Washington Seismic Safety Council
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1985 86 Accomplishments and Issues
Background
Et:ablished October 1985 as an addrory group to the Disision of Emergency Management (DEM). Prior to its establishment, the Governor vetoed legislation establishing a commission I and directed the DEM to carry out the functions of the proposed commission Funded through September 30,1986 out of federal funds prosided DEM by FEMA. ,
(Supplemental funding provided by FEMA to publish the council report.)
Council membership included 12 members plus ex officio representation from DEM and FEMA.
Council ActMiles >
Met nine times with monthly meetings held beginning November 1985. Attendance fairly good l wsh alternates participating wben necessary.
Background work by/for the council consisted of:
Inventory of state agencies - questiomaire asking about attention to seismic issues
[ -Questionnaire to selected professional associations Consultant report by Professor James Huffman, Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law on liability issues Completed report in September 1986. Related slide presentation prepared by Carole Martens
' and Linda Noson. Related publication ~ R*ducing Eanhquake Risks: Seismic Safent Policy, University of Washington, Institute of Pubbe Policy and Management - prepared by Peter May and Linda Noson.
Dissemination of Council Findings ,
i Report issurd to list of state agencies, legislators, and other relevant indhiduals.
Presentation made by Linda Noson to State Board of Education. Presentations to key 1
legislative committees censidering earthquake hazard reduction related legislation. No i speciGe legislation introduced because of the report.
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Policy Notts publication being mailed to extensive malling list of indhiduals within Washington ;
state and h> cal government (several thousand indhiduals).
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Policy Considerations
, P. May, pg.10 Issues For Future Efforts Future of Council- FEMA funding czpired, DEM has no state funding for continued Council
, activity. Council membership has agreed that without strong staff support and funding, there can be no follow up in terms of detailed studies, media events, and so on that are necessary for an effective Council. Issuing reports is not enough.
Staffsupport - DEM proSided staff support for the council. Several factors undermined the usefulness of the support: changcowr in DEM personnel during council methities; physical separation of DEM from ccxhairs limiting turnaround for clerical work; limited DEM capacity for carrying out background studies; and no specific budget assigned to council chairs for Council aethities. Bulk of staff work carried out by the co-chairs.
State-leveladsocacy - Getting action on the recommendations of this council or any
, subsequent effort requires strong advocacy among state agencies and the legislature. DEM and other state agencies are restricted in their ability to undertake such advocacy, particularly concerning legislative actions. The Councilitselfis limited because of the part time, volunteer nature ofits membership. Lack of this advocacy is a key barrier to implementation that needs :
to be addressed. L 4
Capacity to undenake background studies - The Council was only able to raise a number of issues that are central policy questions of state policyinakers induding such issues as the expected losses from major earthquakes, the costs of various recomm:ndations, and liability.
Any adsisory council will not have the time or resources to carryout the detailed work required to address these issues. Yet, until answers are prosided concerning these and related implementation considerations, we cannot expect significant legislative or agency action.
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