ML20147C185
| ML20147C185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek, Comanche Peak, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1988 |
| From: | Denise R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Noonan V, Taylor J NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147C031 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-413 NUDOCS 8801190107 | |
| Download: ML20147C185 (15) | |
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, , g NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION UNITsD STATES wAumeoToN.o C.20506
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l MDt0RANDUM FOR:
J. M. Taylor, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement V. Noonan, Director, Comanche Peak Project FROM:
R. P. Denise, Director, Division of Reactor Projects and Safety
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF CPSES SAFE TEAM ACTIVITIES In accordance with discussions between V. Noonan and R. Denise on June 18, 1985, this memorandum proposes to establish a general approach to the review of !
This review is part of the inspection activities CPSES SAFE TEAM activities. '
which RIV expects to execute 'or CPSES.
i Discussions a:nong NRR, IE, O! and RIY last week led to a decision to perform a scoping review of SAFE TEAM 'lles by an NRR/01/IE/RIV team on June 14, 1985.
This review focused on (fler which were identified as containing worker concerns categorized as intimidation and harassment in order to assist the IAH panel in reaching a decision on whether to review these files in detail prior to completion of the panel work, and in esttem.ing tha effort required to perfone a detailed review. It is our opinion that the !$H panel itself should review these files, and that it would take 3 to 5 days to do so.
Insofar as the general review of the SAFE TEAM program is concerned, we anticipated an inspection activity which has initial i.nd follow-on phases as described below:
Initfal P_hase
- 1. Review of program description documentation to determine intended objectives, responsibilities, organization, organizational relationships, infonnetton ficw, qualifications of personnel, etc.
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- 2. Review of program practice _s_ as they relate to the items noted above.
would expect to note any differences between stated intentions and actual practices.
- 3. Evaluation of intentions and practices as the NP.C sees them. This would be a general comparison of TUGC0 practices to NRC practices if the NRC had received the worker co ern as an allegation. This P. valuation would include considerations of concern classification, M :...t: W confidentiality, investigation / inspection completeness, s- ,
, ID l 8801190107 880112 /
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I J. M. Taylor /V. Noonan l
documentation completeness, identification of corrective actions, corrective actions taken, timeliness of actions, and feedback to the .
- concerned worker. (The team visit of June 14, 1983, has already permitted the femation of some preliminary views in these areas.) ,
- 4. Review of all presently open and closed files to determine appropriate classiffcation.
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- 5. Selection and review of. e non-random sample of about 20% of Nuclear Safety classification closed files to detemine appropriate aspection/ investigation, corrective action, and closure. 1
- 6. Selection and revie-t of a non-random sample of about 205 of Management l classification closed files to determine appropriate action.
- 7. Selection and review of a non random sample of about 20% of Security classification closed files to determine appropriate action.
- 8. Selection and review of a non-random sample of wrongdoing closed files to determine appropriate action. The SAFE TEAM does not have a classification of wrongdoing, but a sub-sst can be sorted from the compucer listing. The I&H panel will deal with such a sub-set. It is anticipated that O! would also deal with this and other sub-sets.
Items 5 and 8 depend upon a finding in item 4 that the concerns are properly classified or categorized. 1he non-random samples would be selected based on the sumary description of the concern. For example, we would not expect to perform detailed reviews of pay level concerns in the Management classification, but would expect to review intimidation, harassment, falsification, unjust tennination, etc., concerns in this classification. ;
Follow-on Phases 1 l
The' follow-on phases Auld involve periodic reviews of new files opened since the last review using the general approach cutlined in items 5 throu h 8, l above. The reviewer would be directed 'to review additional closed f les of )
high interest which were not reviewed in p vious inspections, with the goal of having reviewed at least 50% of all high interest files before a scheduled l
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licensing decision. ,
Documentation The reviewer (s) would document the results of the review in inspection reports issued by RIV. A standard fonn containing, evaluation points and coments would be used during the inspection, and a record would be kept of all files reviewed. .
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J. H. Taylor /V. Noonan .
We would appreciate your raview of this approach, and your coments for change and improvement.
. R. P,. Denise, Director Divistor. of Reactor Safety ar.d Projects cc: R. D. Martin R. K. Herr, 0!/RIY p
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November 9, 1985 Mr. Richard Walsh
Dear Mr. Walsh:
As you requested, enclosed is the Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station-SAFEFEAM response to concerns I expressed in a meeting with them on 8/24/85.
Although I would rather not have any further interaction with either the Utility or the NRC, the Team's response is so_ inaccurate, inadequate, and mis-leading, that I feel it necessary to register my disagreement. It appears to me that their main focus is to discredit my statements, glossing over specific ccncerns and disragarding broader implications in the process.
Since the August :Ne:ing, the I & C Shop has placed more stress on attention to datail and folle'.eing precedures. Nonetheless, I believe that Hope Creek is a potentially dangerous plant and is likely to have especially serious problens during pre-op and start-up.
Yours truly, jf kW' s
f tu,w A. L. Francis P.S. Specific caments are attached. They are numbered corresponding to numerals on the xeroxed SAFEITAM report.
ec: Jack Strosnider
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RESPC '3E TO HOPE CREEK SAFT. TEAM ItNESTIGATION NO.11043 Date: 8/24/85
- 1. "Excessive attention" is not my wording. Absolute attention to detail'is what I feel is required on critical systems in this industry.
- 2. W e technicians do not have a totally free hand as to what they can write in the exception list. Wey are instmeted to consult with their supe: visors before taking exceptions.
- 3. GKC - 0176 -- W e revisions cited were made as a result of my returning the package. We two previous packages had been ecnpleted by technicians who failed to identify these probles, accepted by a supervisor who failed to identify the problems, and finally corrected by the responsible engineeer who was cware of the problem only after we identified it on the third package.
3.5.Pcwr for these MODS is 480 VAC. It would be scrnething less than respnsible for a technician or for engineering to attempt to use any" sort of tmporary power.
At the ti.m I retumed the package, the ccordinator who issued it thought the supply pcuer was 120 VAC and, although many of the technicians are qualified to work the 480 VAC, not all are. Because of this, the statment noted as 3.5 is totally irresponsible.
4 I don't believe it would have been necessary to build a new package if no work had been done on the package. All that would have been required was the corrected data. I suspect the package was worked and when checked, wat found to be deficient and then voided.
- 5. PKG AFE - 002) -- Rese were loop checks on transmitters 1531 B and 1532 li.
Wnen the technicians started to perfom the loop check, they found LT 15318 with a calibration sticker reading LT 1532 B and wired incorrectly. Later we found the engineer who had switched the tags, but was unaware that the calib-ration data taken would not match the switched transmitters. This mistutch would also apply to the installation evaluation sheets which identify the instrument with serial nmbers.
- 6. PKG GSC-0194 -- We technician identified the error on the exception list because I instmeted him to do so. Prior to this, we had been told it wasn't necessary to correct the EE-580 because the logie drawing was the controlling document.
- 7. PKG-GKC-0044 -- When we found this device could not be calibrated per procedure, we were told that the day shif t was perfoming similar tests witn no probices. We evaluated the procedure and performed the test -- taking exceptions to the changes needed in the precedure. Re p'ackage was returned witt the infomation that the exceptions had to be reworked and were acain told that day shif t was ccepleting similar tests. I assigned a different technician to calibrate the instrment and requested a procedure writer to assist. Ken Mooney, head of the procedure writers, spent several hours with the' technician, making the necessary changes to the procedure and ICD eam.
and dee menting these ch;nges on the exception shcot. Tnere was no neoc
- void the package if the changes were made to the prccedure.
7.5.Tnis instrunent was calibrated and would have been acceptable if the exct : icns had been dispositioned by revisL: 'he procedure.
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- 8. PKG HBC - 0424 -- FIN 120 was identified by me as a caponent, since the package nmber wasn't available to me at the time of the SAFEFEAM interview.
Since this instrument does not operate on a linear function, it would require a flow curve, which would be in the proper vendor's manual. . Also',
the instrument is equipped with a damping pot to which oil cost be added.
I believe the vendor s manual wculd have required that the oil be added prior to calibration. De fluid had not been added as of early November when last I checked.
- 9. My centention all along has been that the accuracy requirements are too tight. However, the calibration sheets call for +/ .016ma and it is the reponsibility of the technicians and supervisors to ensure that test equip-ment meet or exceed the accuracy required or, if not, that exceptions are taken to the calibration. My concern was that other supervisors were ignoring this issue and signing the calibration sheets as complete without exception.
9.5.his justifies only the calibrations that had _ exceptions taken. All calibrations that did not list this exception are technically incorrect.
- 10. It is interesting that SAErrEAM denies that there is a b1cWcun statement in the DITS, scknowledges the undesirability of such blowdowns, and then ignores the fact that most of the sensing lines in the plant have blcudown valves installed. Originally, I only sought an answer as to why they were being installed.
- 11. Ccepression Fittings: Tne substitution statment was added to the specs as a result of the F,Q. I wrote. Dere still are installation details which specs fy welded fittings. Scce of these details appeared to have been revised specifically to show welded fittings.
- 12. Although not a requirment, the tests were one of the positive aspects I found when eming to the job at Hope Creek. It indicated to me that the Utility was serious about staffing with qualified people. The test appeared to be very fair and would provide supervision with a valuable tool as to not only if the technician was qualified, but also in what areas he excelled or was weak.
- 12. H e method used for background searches is, essentially, to verify time 5 spent at a previous job site. It should not be used for an ability rating. ,
But if we waived the value of this test for qualification, and substituted -
smething less, what then would we be saying about the integrity of the people involved in the cheating? Can we new ass m e that having secured their jobs, they will be honest and forthright in filling out reports and data as required?
Although their identity was kncun, no action was taken against any of the men involved in the copying and distribution of the test. Also, the test was not stopped at this point, but only some time later. '
- 13. The SAFEWs investigation did not include any technicians frcm the night shift of which I am a part. It is predictable that all muld feel qualified.
I suppose the word "cany," as used here, indicate that not all of the technicia.~ felt that there was enough support available.
- 14. Procedurec are developed addressing the method of cbtaining data -- the ;
cethod of :taining being as important as the da- itself. A review of tne ,
data alt : a ccepleting only half the job. l In 17 nenW on this job, I do not kncu of a single TPR, W.O., or procedure
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page 3 that was audited by QA as it was being performed. I believe that to rely strictly on a review of papereork, without actual kncwledge as to how the data is generated, is not sufficient for the quality needed in a nuclear plant.
14.1.I had two technicians assigned to the INCOR monitoring system doing "Q" listed work. I did not directly oversee the testing or review the packages, as this was done by the STEs. 'Ihe packages were large -- scme taking weeks to ccmplete. To expedite the test, an open W was maintained to handle all problems that might arise. If QA waived this Wh, and the right TPR, then thg would have missed cost of the work.
14.2.Does this mean the NRC has approved'a QA program that has virtually ignored the method in which data is collected? Why does the Ulitity waste tine with procedures, if the only concern is the resulting data?
Also, I notice that the SAFETEA'i made .no mention of any questions pertaining to QA being addressed to the sixteen technicians interviewed.
- 15. The response to the FQ not only suggested a change, but also identified the problem as a violation of IEEE standards and a violation of OSHA safety standards.
15.1."Hcmicide" is not my wording, and is used, I believe, to ridicule what I did say. My statement was to blatently ignore a safety violation could result in criminal charges against the responsible people, in case of a serious accident."
15.2.If the attention to details such as differentiating between pipe and cable tray supports had been used throughout the whole investigation and not just in areas to discredit me, thin this could have possibly been a viable report.
15.3.This is in direct conflict with the answer to the field questionaire which PSE & G Engineering answered in Feb. 85, identifying the installation as a violation of the OSHA code. Since OSHA generally is more concerned with safety than naintenance, I tend to agree with the original response.
15.4.Does OSHA agree with this?
Also, the greater concern I have with this last item is that, because the inspector that the Utility used for acceptance of electrical equipent-was not aware of the existance of the code for clearances around equipment, he could not identify the_ code when it was suggested to be in violstion.
Further, he failed to act on it when the exact code was identified. Since he is the person doing the electrical inspections, but is so unfamiliar with the electrical codes, I wonder if he is really qualified to make these inspections? If this same man inspected the Class 1E systems of the plant, and any doubt exists as to his qualifications, than this should warrent a review of his qualifications (not just a verification of time spent on other jobs)and an on-site review of his previous acceptances by an agency that has the technical expertise and motivation to do the job correctly.
Yours truly, J&A w'Y A.L. Francis I
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