ML20141F383

Requests Clarification & NMSS Views on Proposed Rule 10CFR11.Areas to Be Addressed Prior to Issuance of Final Version of Rule Identified in Encl

ML20141F383
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/09/1980
From:	Dopp R NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Evans B, Montgomery NRC, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
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References
FRN-50FR39076, RULE-PR-11 AB99-2-04, AB99-2-4, NUDOCS 8601090285
Download: ML20141F383 (4)

Text

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JUL 0 91980 I . .

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L NOTE T0: John !!ontgomery, SD t-F Bud Evans, N:iSS i

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• FROM: Dick Dopp, SEC , ',

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED PART 11

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. The Division of Security, having further reviewed proposed Part l'.. ,

has identified several areas 'where clarification and the views and ddsires of W SS are needed. Ocpending on the direction taken,

. some re-wording _of specific paragraphs within Part 11 may be required.

The areas which we feel need to be addressed before a final version of Part 11 is forwarded to OGC are identified in the enclosure to this note. We cre he;:ing they can be addressed at cur c:ceting with

( you scheduled for Thursday, July 10, 1980 at 10:00 a.m.

Dick Dopp cc: Bob Fonner, OELD Jay !!aynard, OELD . ,

Rick Blackmon, IE -

bec: MJKing, PERSEC' W ,

MC: None '

SEC CEN FILE: None 9601090295 e51223 ,,.. .., . ,,,

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?. 'Q ENCLOSURE 1., Paragraph 11.3 Scope DoesitcoherNRCemployees(i.e.,I&Einspectors,)? Will they need NRC "U"s.or "R"s?

Licensees may not allow anyone access (in accordance with Part 11) .unless they have an NRC "U" or "L".

Paragraph

• tb 11.11(b) states"...andnoindividualmaybepermitted unescorted access to any protected area at any site subject to this part without either an NRC-U or NRC-R special nuclear material access authorization." (Samewordsare in 11.13(a).) .

2. Paragraph 11.15(c)

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( Whatinvestigatthecoherageforrenewalofa"U,"?

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The fee schedule in 11.15(c) would indicate a national agency check only. Is this consistent with information deheloped in the insider threat stud,y?

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3. Various security processing procedu es may be applied depending on the scope and nature of protection desired under the clearance rule.

(Assuming the Commission approves a " certification" procedure recommend in a paper now before thh scheral alternatives can be considered.

Dependingonthepathorprocedureschosen,theymayhahetobeaddressed in the rule itself.) For purposes of this discussion, the following terms are defined:

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/ " Certification" means obtaining some basic security data from

.h another Federal agency which has already granted the subject a g

r clearance with the equivalent investigative basis as an NRC-U or NRC-R would require. The Division of Security would not review any reports of investigation.

"Grandfathering" in this program would mean (1) accepting a certifiedclearance(noinvestigativereportsreviewed);

(2)obtainingtheminimumofsecuritypapers;and(3) waiving the age of investigative material which supports the existing clearance.

Here again, the procedures chosen and the coverage obtained should be

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( analyzed with the infonnation from the insider threat study kept in mind.

4. One aspect of the program which does not seem to hade received much attention is the inspectability by IE. Are there portions or parts of the rule which will be inspected by IE7 Are the requirements being levied upon thelicensees(i.e.,recordkeepin'gandreporting)clearlyidentifiedso ,

as to facilitate IE inspection which would assure conformance with the rule?

. 5. Reference to paragraph 11.21(c) and (d):

Under 10 CFR'Part 10 the " nexus" required to support a denial of access M; authorization is that the facts justify the conclusion of security

1. I risk, i.e., that the agency is unable to make an affirmative finding that granting or continuing access authorization will not endanger

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) the comon defense and security. This seems to differ substantially from the support required under 10 CFR Part 11 to deny a material access authorization. The latter pa.rt does not contain language designed to ensure the access authorization only of persons who are found to be trust-worthy an'd reliable.

6. Visit control

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We note that proposed Part 11 does not specifically, nor by h l'""- reference, incorporate a visit control program to allow for herification and certification of nuclear material access authorizations.. Without such a prohision,' no requirement or mechanism would exist in Part 11 to her~ify/ certify nuclear

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• ) material access authorizations. For example, during the conduct of shipment of SSNf4 between licensee, carrier, and receiver;orforahisittoalicenseebyanNRCinspector; hisitsbetweenhariouslicenseesorbetweenlicenseesand DOE and its contractors. .

(Referto10CFRPart 25(25.37)).

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