ML20140G868
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April 23, 1HO
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7-L. Squires, Chairman Midland Flant Subcommittee DRL MEETING WITH CONSUMERS POWER CONFANY REGARDING THE PROCESS STEAM EXPORTED TO DOW On April 22, 1970 the Regulatory Staff met with Consumers Power Company and Dow Chemical Company to discuss the licensing aspects of the process steam to be provided from the Midland Plant.
Mr. Price said that he saw no alternate to either licensing Dow or issuing a specific exemption for the use of this steam and byproduct material, if any. He said the AEC could never tell the FDA that the process stesa contained absolutely no byproduct material. Be did say that as long as the activity remained below some yet to be defined limit, the AEC could say that the steam contained essentik1ly no by-product material.
l Consumers Power and Dow are quite concerned with these two alterebbi4%s j
since they felt that this issue had been resolved in discussions with the staff over the past two years. They were under the impression that neither a license nor an exemption would be required. This matter will have to be discussed further by the management of both companies.
The applicant discussed this issue with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA could not accept the values in the Dow report as limiting values and suggested that a detector of suitable sensitivity be developed to continuously measure the activity in the steam, as long as the activity remained below detectable limits the steam would be assumed to have virtually no radioactive materials in it.
Such a detector has been developed and its alarm point is 3110-6f c/m1. For the usual mix of fission products this is well below the Part 20 limits on specific isotopes. If the detector alarms the applicant will imme-distely switch to another source of process steam or will stop the flow of this steam.
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52 L. Squires April 23, 1970 The applicant was asked to calculate the concentrations of the barious isotopes present at the alarm point of ths detector. The applicant stated that he would assure that no isotope exceeded the Part 20 limits.
The applicant does not object to the ACAS loc, king at the Dow report for information but does not want that report made a part of the application.
J. C. McKinley Staff Assister.t ec: ACRS Members e
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j Form AEC-Ste (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240
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120th ACRS MEETING
SUMMARY
y CRAIRMAN'S REPORT April 23, 1970 i
Specific Proieces Midland Plant Units 1 & 2 - The Committee held the first of two 1
scheduled meetings on the application by Consumers Power Company (Consumers) for authorization to construct the Midland Plant j
l-A second meeting is scheduled for the May (121st) l' Units 1 & 2.
Items discussed during the meeting included:
ACRS meeting.
Steam for use in the Dow Chemical Plant - The applicant and s.
Dow Chemical representatives reviewed the proposed means of using steam from the Midland nuclear plant in the production
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, of products in the Dow Chemical plant. They propose monitoring 1 for' radioactivity in the steam by detection of N-13 activity, Dow believes the radioactive materials which might be incorporated in their products will be at levels 10~
to 10 of Part 20 g
limits. They will monitor their products for radioactive con-The radio-l tent before and after the use of the nuclear plant.
active materials not returned to the nuclear plant (in the con-in tars densate return) will end up primarily in the river, (to be burned), or in solids (to be buried), The applicant expects that other plant features (e.g., make-up capacity rather than limits or radioactivity), will be controlling in limiting leakage from the primary to the secondary system. A specific limit on leakage from the primary to the secondary system is therefore not proposed, s
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120th ACRS Meeting April 17, 1970 Dr. Morris informed the Committee that Dow has been notified that the radioactivity levels in the steam may be unacceptably high when the plant goes into operation (e.g., from excessive leakage of primary coolant into the steam or fuel failure, possible reduction in Part 20 limits, possible carryover into their product)
Dow has informed him that they were willing to take the risk and would comply with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements regarding radioactivity in their products. The Regulatory Staff did not believe the Environmental Policy Act (implemented by AEC) requires that FDA review the Midland application.
It was recommended that the Staff look further into the need for FDA review and comment. The Staff plans to wait until the operating license review before taking a final position on the process steam issue. It may be necessary for Dow to obtain a radioactive materials license to handle the radioactive material in their plant-b.
Dif ference between Midland and Indian Point / Zion (re:
safety features).
Consumers concluded.that the Midland plant has comparable safety features to those being incorporated in the Indian Point / Zion plants. Examples - capability to anneal reactor vessel, isolation valve seal water system, provision for emergency power, single l
failure criteria for ECCS, provision for PLOCAP. A few items which are different:
reactor vessel cavity - Consumers does not believe catastrophic vessel failure is a credible accident, therefore the vessel cavity is not being designed to accomodate a longitudinal i
split of the vessel (Indian Point / Zion are). Consumers' proposes venting of the containment as the means for coping with hydrogen buildup (post-LOCA); however, they ar'e supporting research for various recombiner designs and will accept the "best" solution for this problem. Midland has a smaller design margin for con-tainment overpressure.
(The Staf f was asked to provide at the next meeting the design margins for containment overpressure used by the Midland and Indian Point / Zion Plants). Consumers believe the CONTEHFTcode (used by B&W) is more conservative than the COCO code (used by Westinghouse). NOTE: The Regulatory Staff was asked to provide ~ a comparison, of the results obtained by both codes, to the Committee at the next meeting. The Staff was also asked to provide calculated off-site doses for Midland and Indian Point / Zion.
3 The Regulatory Staff identified basically the same differences noted by Consumers. The Staff believed the calculated off-site doses (post-accident) to be acceptable.
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EXCERPT FROM 120th ACRS MEETING SIMIARY CHAIRMAN'S REPORT April 23,1970 ef fect on Midland operators)_ -
(re:
Chlorine Release from Dow Plant c.
Dow described their chlorine storage tank and the features to The tank is double prevent gross leakage to the atmosphere.
walled; a containment pit below the tank and a caustic scrubber are available to help limit the quantity of chlorine Dow analyzed that the which could be released to the air.
worst case of a chlorine spill would result in a 20 minute After this critical period, the scrubbers critical period.
should be able to limit to a safe level the quantity of chlorine i
Mr. Allen did not believe a chlorine accident would released.
jeopardize the Midland plant operations (operators).
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Subsidence it had a draf t report from the.applicanf The Staff noted thaton subsidence; the Staff asked for further studies by of the subsidence problem.
Backfittirg e.
The Staff did not consider the statement of AEC policy on "back-fitting" to alter its approach to reviewing applications for i
construction permits or operating license.
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