ML20138S097
| ML20138S097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/11/1980 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138Q140 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-481 PROC-800911, NUDOCS 8511190520 | |
| Download: ML20138S097 (503) | |
Text
FE __ , . , _ _ _ - 1 INSPECTOR'S MANUAL Table of Contents Chapter Title
- 1. The Mission of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement
- 2. Legal Aspects of Inspection
. 3. How to Prepare for an Inspection
- 4. Conducting Entrance and Exit Meetings with Licensee Management
- 5. How to Perform an Inspection Involving Documentation Review and Observation of Work Activities
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How to Deal with Apparent Fraud and/or Prevarication
- 7. Effective Communication During the Conduct of Inspections
- 8. Investigation and Followup of Allegations
- 9. Identifying Appropriate Legal Commitments and Require-ments for Enforcement Action
- 10. Participation in Public Hearings
- 11. Handling of Safety Related Matters Not Covered by Requirements or Commitments-
- 12. Followup of a Major Incident (Brown's Ferry Fire)
- 13. Personal Conduct of IE Inspectors
- 14. Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts and Their Impact on the Inspector
- 15. Evaluation of Licensee Management Effectiveness 8511190520 e51107 P g481._PDR i
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The Mission of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement
- Introduction In order to properly perform as an NRC inspector, it is necessary that an individual have a base of technical knowledge and skill and many.
attributes. These attributes include honesty, objectivity, sense of proportion, initiative, confidence, ability to communicate and maturity -
essentially a " laundry list" of the sterling qualities sought in every technical person. It will be particulary important for the resident inspectors to possess all of these qualities. Regardless, however, of
) the personal qualities possessed by an individual, to properly perform as an NRC inspector he must understand the IE mission, the basis for this mission, and have a sense of dedication to the mission.
During this initial session of the FUNDAf1ENTALS OF INSPECTION COURSE I shall examine this mission and philosophically consider how it fits into the overall mission of the agency and how, in my view, this mission is
-best ' accomplished. This initial session is not " inspection techniques" -
rather, it is a discussion of the basis on which the. inspection program is founded -- the basis that must shape and tone the application of techniques to achieve the mission of IE.
- Presentation for use in the Fundamentals of Inspection Course 1-1
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In this time of energy concern, it is apparent that nuclear power is an essential part of the energy mix planned by our national leaders.
However, the public has questions 01 the adequacy of safety and safe-guards. One thing that will go-far in convincing the public that it is adequately protected is a regulatory agency that is tough and fair and right and that the public perceives acts in its best interest. That is, NRC must be tough, fair and correct... and must act aggressively in the public's interest.
i NRC Mission The NRC mission is simply stated. It is to protect the public in the uses of nuclear facilities and materials. As the NRC Chairman has stated, this mission is the reason for the existence of NRC -- the reason NRC was established as a separate and independent nuclear
. regulatory agency. Our mission encompasses protection of the public health and safety and the environment, safeguarding of nuclear materials and facilities, and assuring consistency with this nation's anti-trust laws. This mission must remain uppermost at all times. This mission does not make the NRC the natural adversary of the industry. Rather, the NRC and the industry seek the same ultimate goal -- OPERATION WITH ADEQUATE PROTECTION. However, disagreements sometimes result as to that which is necessary for safety and safeguards. NRC is, s conservative on l l-2 l
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safety and safeguards and we are committed to the position that if the industry cannot operate with sufficient safety and safeguards it should not operate.
NRC Organization To achieve this mission, the NRC is organized into three separate line functiors which are discharged by four line offices:
. Standards setting. The Office of Standards Development has the basic responsibility of expressing the requirements to be placed on the industry generally in discharging the NRC
( responsibility. This Office develops and expresses these
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requirements which members of the regulated industry must meet to protect the public. The Office also suggests changes to the basic _ law, provides guidance as to the intent and understanding of the requirements, and leads in the agency effort for the industry to develop strong and meaningful codes and standards.
. License issuance. The Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and of. Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, operating a
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within the framework of tne regulations, develops those specific requirements that are placed, in the form of licenses, on specific firms within the nuclear industry. The regulations of OSD speak to the industry in general; the licenses of NRR and NMSS speak to an indi-vidual firm in specifics. Specific licenses are issued, based on applications submitted, only after NMSS and NRR are convinced that the firm can operate in such a manner that the public is protected. Specific conditions placed on the licenses are intended to assure the protection of the public.
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Inspection and enforcement. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement is involved in the three NRC functions. IE provides comments on proposed regulations, guides and codes and standards based upon relevant field experience.
IE comments on certain proposed licenses based upon pre-licensing inspection activities or previous experience.
IE directly examines the activities of licensees to deter-mine whether they meet the requirements of regulations developed by OSD and the licenses issued t, NRR and NMSS.
In addition, IE proposes changes to regulations or licenses when a change would contribute to increased protection of the public.
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Basically, the NRC regulatory process consists of standards setting, license issuance, and inspection and enforcement. Another line office, the Office of Reactor _Research, inputs strongly into this process.
This office sponsors, manages and supports research for the total process. It researches areas where new requirements may be needed, evaluates the technical effectiveness of existing NRC technical positions, identifies alternatives, and assesses techniques for work performance. Tha Office of Reactor Research provides the research base that certifies the correctness on which the agency's technical reputation depends.
The other organizational units within NRC suoport the Commission and
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the Executive Director of Operations to assure that the line offices discharge the Commission's mission of protection. It is the coopera-tive interworking of all the Commission's organizational units that lead to mission accomplishment.
IE Mission j In examining the IE mission in support of the overall NRC mission of public protection, we have identified three principal functions:
(1)inspectandinvestigate,(2)evaluateandinformand(3) enforce.
4 The role of providing feedback.to the regulatory process permeates i
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these functions. IE must feed its inspection experience back into the regulatory process to provide the other offices with the field results obtainable only from IE. These field results may lead to changes in licensing and standards setting functions as well as to modification of the inspection program.
In performing the IE functico to-inspect and investigate, licensees and their contractors and suppliers, applicants, persons, individuals and any organizations subject to NRC jurisdiction are inspected hv IE to:
. Ascertain the status of compliance with NRC requirements including rules, regulation, orders and license provisions. ')
. Identify conditions within areas inspected that may adversely affect public health and safety or the common defense and security or the environment or the safe-guarding of nuclear materials and facilities.
. Provide a basis for recomending issuance or denial of an authorization, permit, or license.
. Determine whether suppliers of nuclear safety-related services, components, and equipment have implemented quality assurance programs meeting NRC criteria to provide high quality products to the nuclear industry for public protection.
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L In addition to inspection, IE investigates incidents, accidents, I
allegations and other unusual circumstances involving matters which ,
- may be subject to NRC jurisdiction. The purpose of our investigations is to ascertain the facts and to take or recommend appropriate action.
i To evaluate and to inform are important and growing elements of IE functions. In performing this function, not'iiicatiens and information i concerning incidents and accidents that present a potential or actual threat to the public health and safety, the environment, or the safe-1
- fguarding of nuclear materials and facilities are promptly assessed on j a real time basis to
. Assure adequacy of the overall response to the incident or accident.
. Provide for prompt on-going response by appropriate NRC
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. Develop information and provide notifications as appropriate.
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As' appropriate, this real time assessment may lead to the activation of I
l .the Incident Response Center in important and significant cases.
l On a .less immediate basis, IE evaluates the results of inspections, ,
investigations, inquiries, enforcement actions'and reports by licensees t
1- and other organizations and individuals.to:
. Determine the adequacy of licensee performance. '
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. Understand that which has transpired and provide a basis to take or recomend appropriate action.
. Verify the effectiveness of the inspection, investigation, and enforcement programs.
. Identify areas for consideration for change in the regulatory process.
Keeping others appropriately informed is a continuing function of IE.
IE informs the Comission, the NRC offices, other governmental agencies, licensees, and the public of notices or reports of occurrences received by IE and of actions taken by IE. Also, special comunications are sent to licensees so that precautionary or corrective action can be taken by licensees.
In addition to its functions of inspect and investigate and evaluate and inform, IE has the important function of enforcement. In this function,' IE takes the enforcement actions necessary to correct situations that may require imediate action and to insure compliance with NRC rules, regulations, orders, and license provisions thereby assuring public safety. From the regulatory viewpoint, public protec-tion is the payoff. The prime objective is to assure correct licensee performance in the public interest. Enforcement is a route for obtaining correct licensee performance.
All three functions -- inspect and investigate; evaluate and inform; enforce -- combine in the achievement of the IE mission of public protec-tion. ,
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i IE is organized to perform this mission. The organization consists essentially of a headquarters component and a field component whose roles are distinct and complementary in accomplishing the IE func-tions. Simply stated, IE Headquarters establishes policy, develops a program'for accomplishment of policy, appraises the program and its implementation, and supports the operations of the regions.
The regions, in turn, implement-the IE program and provide feedback i
in the form of coninents and recommendations to assure optimum effec-
! tiveness-of.the NRC regulatory process.
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Bases For IE Program i
Underlying .the IE program are certain basic tenets which form the philosophy of IE:
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. The NRC exists to protect the public - if this protection i cannot be assured the industry should not be permitted to
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. The regulated nuclear industry is ultimately ress 'sible
-for the safety and safeguarding of its activities. The'NRC assures that the industry adequately discharges this ultimate responsibility.
.The NRC and the regulated industry are not natural adversaries but should seek the same goal - operation with adequate, safety and safeguards. _
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. Safety and safeguards cannot be inspected into a licensee activity - rather than result'from conservative design, proper fabrication and construction, adequate testing, and controlled operations.
. A planned " sampling" inspection approach is sound. The findings resulting from this planned and selective sampling are valid indicators of the licensees overall performance.
, . Inspection must focus on areas of greatest risk with appropriate independent verification.of licensee performance.
. The -IE. inspection does not supplant any inspection or control
! or activity performed by the licensee but examines licensee controls and actions for adequacy in protecting the public.
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. The IE inspection program must be tough and fair and technically correct and must bring about licensee adherence to requirements and good practice to the degree necessary for public protection.
Inspection Program Elements Using this basic philosophical foundation, IE has fashioned a program designed to assure compliance with requirements and adherence to good
" practices. From the standpoint of the program, there are two distinct elements - (1) the preventive element and (2) the reactive element.
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k Preventive Inspection The preventive element of inspection - sometimes called the " routine inspection program" - is a carefully constructed program performed on a scheduled and repetitive basis to evaluate the licensee's control of his activities in the discharge of his ultimate responsibility for public protection. The thrust of this effort is to critically examine, on a planned. sampling basis, the implementation of the licensee's controls to assure that the licensee is exercising the p sper control to prevent events that threaten the public. The inspector should approach performance 4
of the preventive inspection element with an aggressive, inquiring attitude to firmly and factually establish how the licensee performs -- both con-firming the correctness of his actions and identifying where improved per-formance is needed. By critically examining the licensee's actions, the in-spector ferrets out that which is not done according to requirements and good practice so that corrective action -- and improved protection -- can be achieved. The preventive element is not aimed at confirming proper actions on the part of the licensee. Rather, it establishes, factually, how the licensee performs and requires upgrading of this performance where needed.
In attempting to achieve uniformity of inspection performance and identi-fication of those areas important to safety and safeguards which are to be insoected, a great deal of'IE staff effort has gone to express-ing an " inspection program" in medular form in an inspection manual.
The purpose of performance of this program must be understood.
In the judgment of the individuals who developed the program, performance of the program would lead to identii;:stion -- within important areas --
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of improper licensee actions so that correction could be achieved. The program is the path or filter for problem identification but " completion" of the program is not the en'dobjective. The program is only a means of
- determining whether the licensee is providing adequate protection to the public. Going through the motions of performance of the program requirements without the probing, inquiring attitude necessary to identify problems is a worthless--perhaps dangerous-. undertaking. Rather than place primary attention on "getting through" all inspection require-ments identified in the program, the inspector must perform the requirements in sufficient depth and detail to be professionally i
satisfied as to the true adequacy of licensee performance. Too often in IE, investigations cover areas which have been subject to inspection and '
the investigations reveal problems of significance not detected in the inspection. . Recognizing that investigations usually are intense probings in areas of narrow interest, inspections still must be conducted with the same zeal, enthusiasm, and inquiring natt.re as investigations. Anything less is deluding ourselves, the licensees, and the public as to the true
- condition of the regulated industry. The undirected effort--20% of the E inspection time--is provided to permit inspectors to probe into areas they believe important. It should be wisely used to follow technical " hunches" to identify problems. We consider this undirected effort to be especially important in problem identification. Unfortunately, we do not believe it l
has reached its potential.
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- / v Reactive Inspection The reactive element of our work is that which the name implies -- it i is IE response or " reaction" to some influence outside the defined and described program. Usually, the reactive program is evidenced by an i investigation, in depth, in response to an event or allegatica. Reactive efforts have an unusual importance beyond their technical implications.
For a regulatory program to be truly successful the public must perceive that it operates in the best interest of the public. Much of the public perception of IE, and NRC, is based on IE reaction. Consequently, our efforts in reaction must be not only technically correct but also correct from the viewpoint of convincing the public that IE genuinely protects the public. -On occasion, the need for building public confidence may dictate
- a reactive response that available technical information does not dictate.
Such response should be viewed and accepted as a part of the IE work effort.
If IE does not convince the public that we are responding to the public's
- welfare regardless of how well we perform our job from the. technical stand-point we will continue to be subject to criticism and suspicion by elements of the public. Because of this "public perception" aspect of 4 our job as well as gaining first-hand information for sound technical
) decisions, IE must. nave a " low threshold" for response in its reactive i '
effort.
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The Inspector This discussion, on a somewhat philosophical level, leads us to the subject at hand -- the IE MISSION vis-a-vis THE INSPECTOR. We will approach this on a philosophical basis.
We in IE have a view which highlights the importance of each individual inspector. Specifically, we believe that THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE IE PROGRAM ULTIMATELY DEPENDS ON THE INDIVIDUAL INSPECTOR. The most
- perfectly conceived and devised inspection program will fail if inspectors don't perform properly; but a flawed program can be successful with
, skilled and properly motivated inspectors. This leads to a description of the inspector as seen by management ... his qualifications, his
J attributes, his attitude.
i Inspector Qualifications 4
We believe that each inspector must be highly qualified by training and experience to perform his job. He must be well grounded in basic scientific or engineering understanding of his speciality. He must be capable of analyzing situations he encounters as to their technical significance. He must match technical capabilities with the licensee's 1 staif.
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With the introduction of the resident inspector concept, we fully expect that the resident inspector will "know" the plant to which he is assigned with the same thoroughness and understanding as licensee senior
- operators for reactors. The resident inspector will be " backed up" by equally skilled and qualified specialists who are highly expert in their fields of speciality.
IE must be technically correct and this correctness is founded on the technical competence of the inspector. It is not enough for the inspector to perfom " inspection requirements." Rather, he must assess the technical l
l correctness -- not only administrative or control or management correctness --
of licensee actions to assure that the public is being adequately protected.
We have developed a rigorous training program to upgrade the technical qualifications of inspectors. Not only will this program provide an upgrading but it will give IE a basis for identifying and asserting the high qualifications of its staff. We are the protectors of the public and as such we must be highly qualified to judge and assess the true condi-tions of licensee operations. This a tough challenge but one we believe the IE staff will eagerly confront.
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Inspector Attributes We seek certain attributes in our inspectors. These attributes are essential to the proper F.erformance of the inspector. These frequently
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are referred to as " personal characteristics" and they are personal.
Certain of these characteristics can be enhanced by training and experience. Other, are basic to the personality of the individual.
The selection process for inspectors is critical and thorough and seeks individuals who have the desired characteristics. We view the more important of these attributes to be:
Honesty. The success or failure to the inspection effort depends ultimately on the inspector. A bedrock of this dependence is the honesty of the inspector. IE management must be able to rely wholly on the fact that
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the inspector is honest and open in his actions.
Significant and important actions are taken by IE and )
the NRC based on the situation as observed and reported by the inspector. The inspector must present all pertinent facts that relate to a situation and must not tone by emphasis or de-emphasis certain facts to justify actions or positions. Complete honesty in his dealings with his organization and the licensee is necessary.
The inspector also must be honest to himself. He must honestly recognize when he is dealing with matters outside his expertise and request support from appropriate specialists. It is absolutely essential 1-16 l- .
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V that IE be technically correct. To be technically correct the proper skills must be focused on a situa-tion. The only person who knows when an individual is outside his capabilities is that individual. We do not look upon requests for technical support as a sign of weakness on the part of an inspector. Rather, it is an indication of the strength and honesty of the inspector. If it is intended that the individual have the capabilities for which he has requested assistance, training will be scheduled to provide the capabilities.
This recognition of professional limitations takes on k added significance in the resident inspection r,rogram.
The resident inspector will not have the currently available supervisory or peer review of his actions.
The resident inspector will promptly destroy his credi-bility if he attempts to deal in areas outside his capabilities.
Objectivity. The inspector must maintain his ability to judge situations on their technical merits. He must 4
. successfully resist permitting emotion to influence his relationship with licensees. This emotion may lead an inspector not to be sufficientiy demanding of the licensee.
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l The first time that an inspector permits a questionable situation to pass without needed evaluation and action, he begins an erosion process that is difficult to change.
Conversely, an inspector who becomes obsessed with "getting the licensee" rapidly reduces his usefulness. The goal of our efforts is the pcotection of the public. Lack of objectivity is detrimental to achieving this goal. An inspector should be alert to a loss of objectivity on his --
part. If he believes he is losing his objectivity he must take conscientious efforts to correct the situation. If he cannot, it is his duty to discuss this matter with his
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supervisor so that corrective action -- including reassign-l j ment of work responsibilities -- can be taken.
Proportion. The inspector must have an appropriate sense of proportion and perspective. Everything is not of the same importance or the same urgency. The inspector must l.
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- recognize this. One of the major differences between the licenses and the inspector is the proportion ascribed to situations. IE has served an important role by focusing attention on matters which have not been considered impor-tant by the licensee but have had significance.- This role must continue. However, over emphasis on minor matters l 1-18
,/M, reduces the effectiveness of the inspection program. A frequent criticism of IE has been that it emphasizes " nits."
" Nits" generally are easy to handle. A technical challenge to the inspector is to apply appropriate proportion and deal with the important issues. The resident inspection program should enhance the ability of IE to focus on impor-tant issues because of the significant upgrading in the inspectors knowledge of the situation at the licensee's facility and his understanding of the licensee's plant, process, and control system.
( Initiative. The inspector must have initiative to inquire, to probe, to seek any weaknesses in the licensees activities and to achieve corrective action. Simple perfonnance of an inspection program - essentially by rote - is not sufficient.
The program identifies the areas to be inspected. Inspector initiative assures that the implementation of the program seeks out the weaknesses which may cause the protection of the public to be inadequate. Initiative will have a high effect on the success of the resident inspector. Without initiative the temptation for " routine" performance will ,
be difficult to resist.
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- Confidence. Self assurance and confidence are essential ingredients for the successful inspector. These are founded on knowledge - knowledge of his discipline, the plant, the program, the facts surrounding any situation
- and the correctness of support he has available. This confidence leads to the inspector establishing his rela-tionship with the licensee on a basis of mutual' respect.
This type relationship is needed.~ The inspector must guard against being overbearing. He should gain his goals by being correct, not by taking the authoritarian view that a licensee must perfonn some act because the inspector, exercising the weight of the agency, demands it. Mutual, professional respect is the basis for dealing with licensees.
Ability to communicate. ~ Internal knowledge may be gratifying from the point of. self fulfillment. However, if this know-ledge cannot be appropriately communicated to others, it is of little value to an inspector. To some technical people this is the most difficult task. Many engineers find it difficult to take positions, support these positions, criticize technical peers, etc.
Consequently, some avoid issues, obfuscate points, and generally make comunication 1-20 L _
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difficult, particularly when the communication may create
, controversy. Inspectors must be candid, describe situa-tions as they observe them, be direct in communication, and sufficiently confident in their facts and positions to debate them.
Maturity. The inspector must be mature in his actions.
This means managing his time, maintaining a business-like attitude, control of himself and situations, prepara-tion, and a degree of persone remoteness from the licensee.
The inspector is not "one of the boys." He is the official representative of the NRC presenting the interests of the public.
Assuming possession of these aptitudes in sufficient quantity the inspector should be able to perform in a highly effective manner. However, there is one overriding consideration that can make or break the effectiveness of the inspector and that is ATTITUDE.
Inspector Attitude ATTITUDE is strongly influenced by the value the inspector perceives in his job and his mission. The public and the Congress firmly believe that a tough but fair inspection program is absolutely necessary for the 1
protection of the public. This agency shares that belief. An, essential o'
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element j_n, n this program ij; the dedication o_f, f the inspector M guarantee the safety o_f, the public -- a most important mission. We expect dedication of
- the inspector to-the mission of public protection. Dedication entails sacrifice -- long preparation, unusual work hours, shifting work environment --
but dedication brings satisfaction. This satisfaction results from knowing that a person's-efforts are meaningful and essential. Inspectors have a job to be_ envied. They deal with reality. They actually can see the results of their efforts in achieving a higher level of pr.otection. AN INSPECTOR WH0 IS NOT COMITTED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC AND WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT HIS ROLE IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS PROTECTION SHOULD IMEDIATELY RESIGN. He simply cannot perform as he must perform. ,
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The purpose of this discussion has been to emphasize how we view the inspection program and the inspector. Fundamental to proper work performance is the inspector's understanding of:
. The purpose of the NRC
. The mission of IE
. The bases of the IE program
. The qualities of the inspector IE's ONLY REASON FOR EXISTENCE IS THE PROTECTION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSPECTION I. Learning Objectives A. Understand the legal authority of NRC B. Understand the legal authority of IE C. Understand the legal authority of individual inspectors II. Introduction Federal agencies are granted limited authority by Congress.
It is important for NRC inspectors to understand both the authority and the boundaries to the authority granted to NRC and IE by Cong assional directive and agency division of responsi-bilities. Our government is one of express, limited powers granted by the Constitution and limited by the Bill of Rights.
The American public is guaranteed protections from abusive govern-ment by the fundamental concepts of the Constitution. This balance of rights and duties under law is to establish a government of laws, and not the whims of individual persons. It should be the concern of all inspectors that their activities conform to their authority and do not go beyond the limits of that authority.
III. Discussion Agencies are delegated authority from Congress to perform certain activities as described in the enabling act. NRC authority to regulate the use of radioactive materials is delegated by Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization 2-1
Act of 1974. Generally the authority given NRC is regulation of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material and construction and operation of nuclear facilities to provide for the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public.
By division of responsibility within the Agency, enforcement authority is given primarily to IE, although NRR and NMSS also have certain limited enforcement authority. This enforcement authority lies in the respective offices and not in individual members of the offices.
Authority to inspect licensee facilities is contained in the Atomic Energy Act, Section 161. Consent to inspection by the licensee is contained in the license. If this consent is revoked by the licensee, inspectors may not enter without a warrant. The courts have held that administrative inspections w3hout consent may be made only with a warrant because the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, apply to such inspections. In the case of NRC inspectors, no warrant is necessary unless the licensee refuses entry, since con-sent is given in the license.
Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act directs that criminal investigation be referred to the FBI and criminal prosecution, to the Department of Justice.
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Section 234 authorizes civil penalties for violation of regu-lations issued pursuant to specified licensing sections of the Act or for violations of any requirements for which a license may be i
revoked.
Section 186 describes situations for which licenses may be revoked, but because of the limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act, no license may be suspended or revoked without notice to the licensee and an opportunity on its part to correct the probl em. An exception to this is where the violation is willful or the public health, safety or interest requires immediate suspension.
Other statutes affecting NRC authority are the Administrative
, Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
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(NEPA). The APA controls the procedure by which NRC conducts hearings, issues rules, and determines final review in federal courts. This Act also affects civil penalty actions, cease and desist orpers, license suspension or revocation and license require-ments.
l NEPA requires an environmental impact statement on any federal action significantly affecting the environment. NEPA is a major l
1ssue in licensing, and important license conditions are imposed to implement NEPA.
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There is an important distinction between a statute, which is an act of Congress, and a regulation, which is a rule of an agency ]
issued in order to perform the activity directed by Congress. The agency may change the regulation but not the statute.
Regulations must be applied by inspectors to situations at licensee facilities. To apply a regulation correctly, the language in the regulation must be carefully noted and applied exactly.
Particular attention should be given to use of the words "and",
"or", "shall", and "may" in determining whether a requirement exists or a noncompliance has occurred. Also, special note should be taken of the definitions in the regulations, which appear both as general definitions in Part 2 and in each particular section of the regulations. Regulations and license conditions nust be applied correctly in order to support enforcement action.
The NRC issues many Regulatory Guides. These are not enforceable I regulations unless specifically incorporated in a regulation or license condition.
Because the Commission has decisional (or adjudicatory) responsibilities the legal staff which advises the' Commission is separate from the legal staff which advises and represents the staff as a party in adjudicatory proceedings before the Commission. The Office of General Counsel advises the Commission and represents NRC in federal court. The Office of the Executive Legal Director advises the regulatory staff and represents t ir licensing and enforcement proceedings. It has five divisions: (1) Administration, (2) Regulatioas, (3) Antitrust, (4) Hearings, and (5) Rulemaking and Enforcement. The division of Rulemaking and Enforcement serves as counsel to IE and ,
represents it in all enforcement actions.
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Under our statute and regulations, a licensee which is the subject of an enforcement action may obtain a hearing to contest the action before an f1RC administrative law judge or hearing board panel. The licensee can appeal an adverse decision at the hearing to the flRC Appeal Board and ultimately to federal court, if he desires.
In the event a licensee refuses to pay an order imposing civil penalties, NRC may refer the case to the Department of Justice for a collection action in federal court.
The evidence required to support an enforcement action must be sufficient to support the case in court, since court action is a possibility in every enforcement action. Such evidence must be direct, first hand knowledge of the inspector either by personal observation or authentic documentation. Second hand knowledge, or hearsay, is not sufficient alone, but may be added to other evidence to support it. Care must be taken during inspection to verify all apparent items of noncompliance. Inspec-tors are fact finders and must be prepared to show the accuracy of the facts presented in their reports. Regulations must be care-fully applied to the facts to verify the actual terms of the noncompliant.e. Inspectors are rest snsible for determining whether or not licensees are complying with written regulations and M.
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!! license conditions. Any situation which causes the inspector e
- concern for the public health and safety should be reported to IE headquarters which will' take the appropriate action. Licenses '
l may be modified where necessary.
IV. Summary Inspectors are responsible for performing their duties within the bounds of their lawful authority. Inspection reports must contain sufficient evidence of noncompliance with a specific regulation or license condition to support enforcement action.
Authority to inspect'is granted in the Atomic Energy Act and the L license. Enforcement action is taken by Headquarters, IE, by authority granted in the Atomic Energy Act. s
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V. References The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 10 CFR United States Constitution 4
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i HOW TO PREPARE FOR Aff IflSPECTION I. Learning Objectives The objective of this course is to provide Inspection and Enforcement inspection personnel with a good working knowledge of the details n'eces-sary to edequately prepare for an inspection, and to provide a recommended systematic app 9ach and technique to follow during the preparation stage of the inspection effort. This course of instruction should result in providing specific guidance and detailed information in the following areas:
A. Types of Inspections
- B. Scope of Inspections C. Inspection Requirements D. Inspector's References E. Development of Checklist / Data Sheets F. Development of Acceptance Criteria G. In-Office Inspection Effort Independent Inspection Effort H.
I. Special Techniques including:
- 1. Outstanding Inspection Items / Unresolved Items
- 2. Enforcement Followup J. post Inspection Documentation
- II. Introduction Figure II-l lists several items that are essential in preparing for an inspection. The priorities which are established, however, may be such
[
that the last item, " material for inspection," may too often be the last item on.the list.
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I The public health and safety is dependent in part on the actions of the NRC. Licensing procedures act to assure that personnel are qualified and responsible and that facility designs are adequate. However, evaluation of the licensee's activities with regard to regulations and terms and conditions of the license are the responsibility of the Office of Inspec-tion and Enforcement. The effectiveness of this evaluation is largely dependent on how well the inspection program is implemented.
Licensee's on the most part, abide by the regulations and license re-quirements, however, occasionally either through ignorance, or inatten-tion, or deliberate action, the licensee fails to do so. The inspector's job is to identify such noncompliance, and start the licensee toward a corrective action and an evaluation process which should result in }
taking the necessary steps in preventing reoccurrence.
Experienced inspectors can look back at different inspections and identify those that were conducted efficiently and effectively, and those that were not. Our concern in this course it to identify the elements of preparation that lead to good inspections.
III. Detailed Discussion A. Preparation
- 1. General
- a. Types of Inspections Inspections can be categorized in several ways. For example:
Announced or Unannounced Routine or Nonroutine 3-2
s i They may also be categorized on the basis of the type of facility or licensee to be inspected and the inspection expertise to be applied to any given regulated activity.
For example, consider the following categories of acti-vities and professional specialities involved in an in-spection.
i Activity Specialities Reactors _ Reactors Construction Construction Preoperational Operations Operations Specialists Quality Assurance Metallurgy Welding NDT, etc.
Materials FF&MS Industrial Rad. Protection Academic Environmental Medical Waste Management Fuel Facilities Criticality Safeguards Branch Physical Security Material Control & Accountability 3-3
In view of the many factors that bear on the inspection process, it is appropriate to consider each in turn.
- 1) Announced and Unannounced Inspections The best place to start is with the policy as stated in the IE Manual Chapter TI 1200/1, Policy on Unannounced Inspections. This instruction states that inspections and investigations are to be conducted on an unannounced basis. Regional management may authorize the perfor-mance of announced inspections in the interest of economy and efficiency. If for some reason an announced inspec-tion is planned, the inspector should obtain prior approval from his Section or Branch Chief for the inspec-
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tion. Therefore in planning inspections it is appro-priate to keep in mind any limitations that might be imposed by performance of unannounced inspections. For reactor inspections, preparations should include alter-natives to allow for the possibility that certain licensee personnel may not be available for interview, or the facility operational status may be such that certain system or equipment may not be operational.
In any case of Materials Licensee inspection preplanning may reduce or eliminate problems in contacting licensee personnel. At academic institutions inspections during
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traditional vacation periods should be avoided if possible.
Medical programs are normally busiest in the mornings and early in the week, therefore afternoons later in the week are generally preferred. In the case of large medical programs that have a radiological physicist or health physi-cist on the staff, while this rule of thumb still applies, usually the inspection can be conducted at any time.
In the case of industrial radiographers, it may be neces-sary to arrive early in the morning or in the late afternoon or at night if observation of field activities are to be included in the inspection. Much field radiography is per-formed during other than day shift periods.
It is appropriate to note that initial inspections by tradi-tion are nonnally announced. This is in part due to the fact that initial materials inspections contain a strong educational element. The content of the Initial Management Meeting is described in IE Procedure 30800. The inspector should be prepared to inform the licensee concerning the Commissions's inspection and enforcement policies and pro-grams, organization and, in addition, be prepared to res-cond to questions concerning inspection frequency and other matters. The inspector should be careful to inform the licensee that future inspections will probably be performed 3-5
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on' an unannounced basis and, if possible, identify any scheduling considerations related to the performance of subsequent unannounced inspections. .
In the case cf reactor and fuel facility licenses the inspector is dealing with individuals who are normally much more familiar with the Commission's activities than in the case of most materials licensees. For these licensees e Initial Management Meetings are detailed in IE Procedure 300018 of the IE Manual.
Certain inspections preclude unannounced inspections com-plately. For example, certain procedures in the 82000 series, Emergency Planning, require the inspector to witness the licensee's performance of tests or drills of the emergency plan. Such inspections cannot practically be conducted without the cooperation and assistance of the licensee.
Even in a case where the licensee is requested to inform the Regional Office of all planned tests or drills, the licensee will be aware that an inspector will be onsite for at le,ist one such inspection every year or two. For reactor inspections, it may be necessary to announce inspections that involve witnessing selected tests, or require inter-viewing certain personnel.
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-w Points to remember:
a) Inspections are to be unannounced.
b) Administrative approval is required for announced inspections, c) Schedule inspections in such a way as to minimize the impact on the licensee's normal activities, while at the same time accomplishing the purpose intended by the inspection.
- 2) Routine and Nonroutine Inspections The principal difference in these inspections is the amount of preparation time available. In the case of routine in-spections the inspector has the opportunity to prepare for the inspection in the normal manner. Some inspectors as-signed to specific facilities prefer to prepare for a sub-sequent inspection immediately after completion of an in-spection. Preparation at the time of the subsequent in-spection is minimized and requires only updating with respect to intervening events and circumstances; but is in no case lost since the preplanned inspection must be conducted in '
any case.
In the case of nonroutine inspections, preparation time may by limited or non-existent in cases where an inspector is required to go to a licensee facility on short notice.
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Occasionally this will involve a facility that the inspector has,never before visited. Nonnally such inspections are of
( limited scope and are in response to an unusual occurrence l l ,
- l. or event. In such cases the inspector may be required to rely on his past experience, basic knowledge of similar facilities and organizations and the licensee's copies of !
the license, technical specifications, FSAR and other sup. :
porting documentation, .
Nonroutine inspections in the Fuel Facility and Materials !
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Safety and Safeguards programs could result from a variety of causes including, but not limited to: allegations of I
or apparent threats to public health and safety, thefts
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or losses of SNti or significant qupntities of byproduct materials, actual or threatened sabotage or security viola-tions. .
Procedures contained in the IE Itanual speak directly to the problem presented by such nonroutine inspections. Procedure 93700, inspector Dispatched to Site, contains specific l 1
guidance in conducting an inspection of the occurrence or f event that called the inspector to the site, procedure 93701, ,
Followup on Siontficant Event _that Occurs Durino inspection -
In Section !!! defines and gives examples of "significant :
events" and in Section !! provides a basic inspection plan l for the inspector. l 38
l P
l . !
l ,
p
. All inspectors should be familiar with both procedures since !
i
- of all the procedures contained in the Manual, these are the [
only ones that deal specifically with the unplanned nonroutine. f inspection. *
- b. Scope of Inspection
(
The scope of inspections is specified in IE Manual Chapter 2500, Reactor Inspection program, Chapter 2600, Fuel Cycle L Facility inspection program, Chapter 2700, Licensee Contractor
- and Vendor. Inspection Program and Chapter 2800, Materials Inspection program. Preparation for inspections can be sub-divided into several sections as follows: ;
- 1) Inspection Sub.iects The previously mentioned Manual Chapters identify speci-l
- fic inspection procu ures and inspection frequencies.
I All Chapters incorporate certain inspection procedures ,
l
, that are a part of every inspection, for example:
30703 fianagement Meetings i
92706 Independent inspection Effort j 92702 Followup on Items on Noncompliance !
i l which is required only if noncompliance was identified ,
during a previous inspection, or f 92703 Bulletin Followup / Action Letter Followup ;
l which is not required if there are no outstanding bulle- [
tins or action letters requiring followup.
i l l
39 !
I
The basic scope of any inspection is contained in one or more inspe,ction procedures identified in the appropriate manual chapter, plus those procedures that are normally l included in all inspections and those procedures included l
due to special circumstances.
I For materials licenses a single procedure for, each type of Itcense is sufficient to provide adequate guidance for inspections of radiography. medical. waste disposal, industrial-academic and processors and distributors.
For materials licenses the inspector must select the appropriate procedures from those identified in 11anual ,
Chapter 2800 to prepare an inspection plan. These pro-grams generally involve a single inspector who plans and executes a given inspection. An example is provided in Figure !!!-1. Each material inspection is usually substantially complete, that is, there is usually no deliberate effort or plan to exclude one portion of an l inspection procedure to provide for continufng contact ,
with one portion of the licensee's activities over an extended period of time. In this context the term
" complete" inspection relates to the completion of the applicable inspection procedures and not : 100% inspection of the licensee's program. For example, during the
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i inspection of a hospital the inspector should complete his review of the licensee's radiation protection pro- '
gram during each inspection. However in the case of an inspection at a power reactor, the radiation specialist may deliberately spread the inspection over 2 to 4 inspections during the course of a one-year inspection program.
In the case of a power reactor, fuel cycle facility and licensee contractor and vendor inspection programs, all contain multiple inspection procedures with varying specified inspection frequencies. See Figure !!!-2 1 for examples of inspection topics. For such licensees no single inspection incorporates all possible proco-dures and no inspection visit necessarily constitutes a complete inspection. An inspector may deliberately or not of necessity conduct only a portion of a single procedure and complete the inspection effort under that procedure during subsequent inspections. A good example of this occurs on inspections under procedures 84332, i 84711 and 84844, Radioactive Waste Management - OC and papabilityandConfirmatoryMeasurements. Under these procedures the inspector examines the Itcensee's QC progran as it relates to Waste Management and either l
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supplies or collects samples for analysis. The infor-mation relating to the CC program is discussed with the licensee during the exit interview and is included in the report resulting from that inspection. The analy-tical data however is not normally available for inclu-sion in the report resulting from the inspection during which the samples were collected. The results of the analyses must be compared later, discussed with the
- licensee, and either incorporated into a subsequent'*
- report or become the basis of a separate report.
For reactor inspections, a schedule is developed which covers the inspect' ions required for an entire year and each procedure or element of the program may often be completed during a given inspection. A schedule window is provided for each frequency interval; i.e., an annual frequency inspection may be conducted as early as nine (9) months and as late as 15 months. This provides the flexibility needed to adjust to varied situations and also permits the inspector to vary the intervals such .
that a licensee cannot easily prepare for an inspection based on being inspected at regular intervals.
It is obvious that the more complex reactor and fuel fabrication facility inspections be planned and a schedule l
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___m_____ _,__.__ ____-_._____- ___-_ _ _ . ___ _ _ ____.__.__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . . . . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i l developed which will assure completion of the designated t ,
i inspection program. Regional offices and individual in-spectors have developed methods for scheduling and main-taining control of inspections to assure the accomplishment of IE Manual Inspection goals. Figure III-3'is an example of a method for ensuring schedules and program control is maintained.
- 2) Numbers and Types of Inspectors i Materials licensed programs are usually inspected by an l individual inspector. However, for larger reactor programs l or in inspector training situations, a team approach is l
occasionally used. Research reactors are usually in-spected by a single reactor inspector supported by a radiation specialist.
In the case of fuel facilities an inspector with special qualifications in criticality control is assigned as the principal inspector. He may be responsible for radiation protection, waste management, and environmental concerns or these areas may be delegated to a radiation specialist.
Because of the potential for loss or diversion or SNM, security and safeguards inspectors have the greatest im-i pact in this area.
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In the area of power reactor inspections the full scope l
l of inspector talents are applied. Since these programs more than any other are subject to inspections from their inception, inspectors versed in all areas of construction,
! metallurgy, welding, quality assurance, reactor operations, l
environmental protection, waste management, radiation protection, security and safeguards are utilized. Most l power reactor and fuel facility inspections are conducted i
by all inspection branches. Usually a principal or pro-ject inspector.is assigned to a facility, and dependent on the status of the reactor may be from the Construction or Operations branch. The principal or project inspector does not perform all the inspections at his particular facility, but may maintain an overall status of the in-spection program.
Speciality inspectors are usually assigned to specific facilities and will include radiation specialist, environ-mentalists, security, and material safeguards inspectors.
Dependent on the size of the regional office, the number may vary. Operational support type inspectors are also used, and may be called upon to inspect in certain pro-blem areas or followup on long-term items. They may also
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be used in teams for accomplishing initial or followup Quality Assurance program verification inspections.
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Specialists at reactor facilities may inspect indepen-dently or at the same time as the reactor inspector.
Occasionally when particular problems arise a reactor j inspector and a specialist make a team it.spection.
Team leadership is usually assigned to the inspector principally responsible for the major area of concern.
l An example would be an environmental problem at an operating reactor. The radiation or environmental l
specialist could be assigned as the lead inspector I
with assistance from the reactor inspector.
l In any case the lead inspector in any team inspection is responsible for assuring that the inspection pro-l cedures included in the inspection plan are completed with the most efficient use of manpower and licensee l
time. The reference to time leads to the next subject, duration of inspections.
l
- 3) Du ation of Inspections f
! The basic decision for estimating the length of an inspection rests with the individual inspector where l
only one person is involved or with the team leader or principal inspector in a team inspection. It is f
the responsibility of all NRC employees to utilize l
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3-15
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t t
i government funds and time efficiently. Inspectors
- should be flexible in their approach to inspections.
If a particular individual or record is not available on a prompt basis the inspector should be prepared to continue the inspection with other personnel or records that are available. This can tend to break up the continuity of an inspection; however, if the inspector should be prepared to continue the inspection with other personnel or records that, are available. This can tend to break up the continuity of an inspection; however, if the inspector has prepared properly and has a system for recording inspection accomplishment on a step-by-step basis,possible omissions of required in-spection procedure steps are minimized. Preparation of checklists and data sheets is discussed in Section III.A.2.c.
The ability to estimate inspection length comes with experience, fiany factors are involved, the skill and experience of the inspector, licensee organizational structure, record keeping inethods, and accessability, licensee attitude. In some cases the most and least cooperative licensees tend to cause the longest inspec-tions. The uncooperative licensee is reluctant to say 3-16 l
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t more than the absolute minimum requiring the inspector to question in detail and dig for infonnation. On the other hand, the most cooperative licensee sometimes attempts to conduct the inspection for you, usually on a disorganized basis,in an attempt to speed the inspector on his way. In these cases, it is sometimes effective to say something to the effect that the inspection might be speeded up if the inspector follows his inspection plan since it would reduce the need to go back and check for possible missed or inadequately answered questions.
For new inspectors, data is available for detennining the average inspection time used for completion of inspection modules. Observation of experienced inspectors is also beneficial in that experience has guided their estimates.
The variability of inspection length is extreme from the half hour it takes for the small material licensee to inform you that his program has terminated and establish that all material has been disposed as required by the regulations to a week long inspection at a fuel fabrica-tion facility or power reactor. This excludes,of course, the investigations or extended inquiries that occasionally require large amounts of time. On one
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occasion two inspectors and an investigator spent a total of 30 man days on-site time investigating alle-gations made by a former employee.
- 4) Licensee / Inspector Interface Proper interface with licensee personnel should be considered during the planning phase of the inspection.
to ensure that minimum impact on the licensee's activity occurs, yet permits the inspector to conduct a thorough and efficient inspection. Licensee-personnel duties vary with regard to the times during the day when their k workload is the heaviest so it is necessary to take ,
this factor into consideration when scheduling the day's )
activities. For example, maintenance supervision is busiest at the beginning of the day, getting work assigned and tasks started, whereas operating personnel are busiest during the late afternoon at shift changes. The inspector should use the entrance interview to inform the licensee regarding the personnel that will be interviewed. This will provide the licensee an opportunity to plan their activities accordingly.
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In some cases such as materials inspections, you are sometimes unable to clearly identify specific indivi-duals you will need to interview. However, if you are returning to a facility where you know the licensee's organization, identify specific individuals you will wish to see.
Also identify the records you will wish to examine.
Certain records may be necessary during specific inter-views. Identify these records to the licensee so that they will be available when required. If certain re-cords which are to be reviewed do not require the-pre-I sence of a licensee representative at the time of the review, arrange to have those records available to you for review during periods when licensee personnel are not, available.
- 5) Overall Schedule For the individual inspector working by himself, a de-tailed day-to-day schedule of activities may or may not be required. If the inspection is at a single facility, an estimate of the time required to conduct various
~
portions of the inspection can be of assistance in plan-ning daily work and assuring that the estimated duration of the inspection is adequate for the work to be accom-plished.
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The other case in which detailed prescheduling is ad-visable occurs with team inspections. In these cases different inspectors may'have to interview the same licensee personnel. Such possible conflicting activi-ties should be scheduled to increase inspection effi-ciency. These schedules will have to remain flexible, however, since your schedule may conflict with licensee activities over which you have little or no control.
Don't overlook the possibility in such cases of' stag-
.gered inspections; that is; scheduling inspectors to the site at different times to ~ avoid a schedule conflict.
For the materials inspector with a list of inspections )
to accomplish within a specified period, preplanning is
~
essential. Arranging-travel schedules to minimize the loss of productive time, identifying the map location of licensees in advance so that each move from one faci-lity to another isn't an exercise in intuition and map reading and planning inspections geographically to min-imize travel are all a part of such planning.
In addition, this' planning when combined with the estimated duration of the inspection will ' determine whether it is likely that all the inspections can be accomplished in a
the available time.
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You may find that this planning indicates that more time is available than you originally thought. In such a case, it is appropriate to inform your supervisor so that he can assign additional work to most efficiently use the available time. Another idea for the materials inspector is to take one or two extra licenses along on a longer trip to use for fill-in work where a licensee is not available for inspection. With resinspections being conducted on an unannounced basis, the likelihood of uninspectable programs is substantially increased.
- 6) Inspection Patterns--
Most inspectors who have worked in the field for some time have had the experience of having a licensee at an unannounced inspection tell us that an inspector was due, or that he is right on schedule.
In such cases, although the inspection was unannounced we had telegraphed our inspection. Licensees become aware of inspection patterns and in some cases, plan for them. For unannounced inspections to be truly unannounced, watch for patterns in your own work and attempt to vary them. Some patterns are " built" into the system, others are generated by the inspectors themselves. Frequencies assigned to specific inspection s
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areas tend to cause the inspections to occur at re-latively the same interval. For example, the quarterly
~
operations-inspection is likely to occur every three months within a week or two of the previous inspection; the required yearly review of training is likely to occur during the same month each year. However, the scheduled windows are such that the quarterly operations inspection could occur as early as two months, and ,
as late as four months, and the required yearly 1nspec-tion could occur as early as two months, and as late as four months, and the required yearly inspection of training could occur as early as nine months, and 'N as late as 15l months. Therefore, it is important that
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the inspector lay out the yearly schedule with the above in mind.
Materials licensees are inspected at frequencies esta-blished by license priority. It doesn't take long for a radiographer to learn that inspectors arrive at approx-imately yearly _ intervals. Climate also has an impact --
who wants to go to Alaska in the winter (inspectors have) or the Texas or Arizona desert in the summer
'(inspectors have been there,too).
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O Inspectors also create patterns by their modes of travel. If you always take the same flight or leave by car at the same time on routine visits to a parti-cular site you are establishing a pattern. fiost of us find particular motels or hotels in certain areas that we tend to return to for a variety of reasons.
Some rotels near facilities rely on routine business from utilities or other large corporations for rentals to construction, maintenance, and corporate office personnel. Inspectors are often recognized by many more people than they themselves recognize and this
,- is a possible source of information for the licensee from both motel or hotel personnel or licensee per-sonnel temporarily visiting the site.
The.IE Manual TI 1200/1 Policy on Unannounced Inspections identifies most of the previously described modes of telegraphing an announcement of an unannounced inspec-tion. It also suggests that the initial plant tour be conducted as soon as possible after arrival. Also plan to arrive in the site vicinity in the evening and visit the site at night on occasion, before manage-ment knows you are in the area. Another possibility is to conduct inspections of field radiographic inspec-tions at night. It is sometimes surprising what you 3-23
observe. Remember, variety is necessary to let the licensee know that an inspector could show up at any time. Thus, the incentive is created to always comply with regulations lest an inspector surprise him in a compromised condition.
- 2. Detailed Planning and Organization
- a. Requirements
- 1) Inspection rianual In preparing for an inspection it is necessary to iden-tify the appropriate chapter in the IE Manual and pre-pare an inspection plan based on the guidance contained in that chapter. For the least complex inspections, this may require only the elimination of inappropriate inspection procedures from the inspection plan contained in the Manual. For example, Manual Chapter 1005.
Enclosure 4, page 1005E4-2 (Figure III-1) contains an inspection plan applicable to all materials inspections other than fuel facilities. All that must be added is the appropriate inspection procedure from Manual Chapter 2800.
An examination of this form will show that it is unlikely that all the procedures listed will be applicable. A notation should be made on the inspection plan indicating a positive disposition with respect to each iten. For example, if the inspector was not dispatched to the site 3-24 i
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k (93700), note that it is not applicable. Disposition of these items may not be possible until the license file and correspondence have been reviewed; for example, Followup on Noncompliance and Deviation (92702) or i until after the inspection, Followup on Significant Event Occurring During Inspection (93701).
For the more complex inspection programs, a longer list of inspectable procedures is included. In these cases, the inspector again eliminates items not to be included based on applicability and inspection frequency require-ment. Inspectors should prepare schedules to assure that the inspections during the course of a year include all the required inspection procedures.
An example of a checklist for such planning for a Manual Chapter 2515 Light Water Reactor Inspection Program -
Operations Phase is shown in Figure III-3. This parti-cular form was prepared by a reactor inspector for his use and therefore, does not include environmentai, radia-tion protection, waste management and emergency planning items; however, an example of a similar more detailed listing covering the sam 2 Manual Chapter but with emphasis
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on environmental, radir. tion protection [ waste management, and emergency planning permits planning in which individual i
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o e L
- inspection procedures may be accomplished over several inspections is shown in Figure:III-4. This type of re-.
cord permits the. inspector to evaluate the' inspection status.at any time with a minim ~um of file review.
The procedures contained in the IE Manual are each divided into three sections.Section I identifies the inspection objective.Section II specifies the inspection require-
- ments. The items specified in Section II must be accom-plished to the inspector's satisfaction and to the satis ,
faction of.his supervisor or the lead inspector. In most cases the responsibility for: evaluating the depth of detail included in establishing compliance or comfor-
~~
mance. rests with the-inspector.
Section III cf the procedure provides inspection guidance which may expand the basic description in Section II, provide technical guidance or administrative instructions in dealing with possible situations experienced by the-inspector. It should be remembered that the goal is to accomplish Section I, using Section II, assisted by the guidance contained in.Section III.
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- Certain of the procedures contained in the manual are applicable to all-inspectors; for example, Management i.
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4 Meetings - Entrance and Exit Interviews (30703),while others are applicable only to selected inspectors, Radiation Protection - Operations (83740). In these cases, there is no particular difficulty in determining inspection responsibility. Some procedures,however, appear to overlap in several areas of inspection exper-tise, for example, Surveillance of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (61721) of Manual Chapter 2515, Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. In these cases, although the principal responsibility for the accomplishment of Chapter 2515 rests with Reactor Opera-tions Branch, the area of expertise lies in Reactor Con-( struction Branch. In some regions these ambiguities are resolved by formally documented agreements between branches as to the specific areas of responsibility.
Where this is done, the customary process involves the preparation of a memo of understanding by one Branch Chief.
In other cases, the lead inspector arrives at an appro-priate agreement with an inspector in anotherdiscipline on an informal basis. A specific case involves an in-formal agreement between the Reactor Operations and Construction branches that inservice inspection pro-cedures will be accomplished by Reactor Construction inspectors at operating plants.
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Finally, the IE Manual specifies the inspection objectives, provides the method for accomplishing the objective and includes guidance to assist in accomplishing that objec-tive.
- 2) Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended directed the Atomic Energy Commission to develop regulations to pro-vide for licensing and inspection of users of licensed
~
materials and the construction and operation of utili-zation facilities. The authority for the issuan' c e of construction permits, licenses, and the performance of inspections and enforcement actions taken is traceable to the Act. The Regulations (10 CFR Energy) contain the basic rules applicable to all licensees and the authority to impose additional requirements in the form of license conditions, technical specifications, and orders on licensed activities.
Certain of the regulations contain detailed limits or requirements which are specific in nature. An example is 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, which provides specific numerical exposure limits, and limits on concentrations of radioactive materials in air and water. On the other hand,10 CFR 50, Licensing T
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of Production and Utilization Facilities,does not pro-vide such numerical limits or specific instructions as they might relate to the operation of a reactor,for ex-ample. This section of the regulations instructs pros-pective licensees on requirements for licensing and the content and procedure for submitting applications. The application and other documents submitted become the basis for a construction permit / license and the technical specifications which with certain of the submitted docu-ments,become the basic data base against which inspections are conducted.
As a result of difference in the content of the various parts of 10 CFR, most citations for noncompliance with radiation protection requirements are made against vio-lations of 10 CFR 20, while most violations of operations related activities are made against license conditions, technical specifications, license applications for other supporting documentation incorporated in the license by reference; such as the licensee's Quality Assurance Program which implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
In preparing for an inspection, the inspection procedures included in the inspection plan should be examined for o
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references to 10 CFR. The inspector should review
.the appropriate sections of 10 CFR prior to the inspec-tion, and should have a copy available during the in-spection. Inspectors at larger facilities frequently rely on the fact that such facilities have current copies of the regulations available. For the materials inspector placing such reliance on smaller licensees can be a trap in that the licensee may not have a current copy of Parts 19 and 20 of the regulations (citable under 10 CFR 19.11) or they may not be immediately available. It is a good idea to carry a copy of the !
pertinent regulations on an inspection.
)
- 3) NRC Licenses / Permits and Technical Specifications As previously mentioned, much of the data base against which licenses are inspected is contained in the NRC licenses / permits, associated documentation and technical specifications. Since there is considerable difference between the types of licenses issued by the Commission, it is appropriate to deal with each separately. Figure III-5 provides some perspective of the number of licenses, inspectors, and inspections involved in the inspection program, s
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Materials licenses are numerically the largest group k of license, issued by the Comission and have a direct impact on the largest number of individuals. Materials licenses include conditions that specify the nuclide, form and quantity that may be possessed, the authorized use and location of use.
In addition, other conditions provide specific limita-tions or requirements on the licensee. These conditions may include such items as sealed source leak test require-ments, temperature limits on gas chromatographs, the number of patients on which a specific medical procedure may be performed and reports the licensee may be required to submit. One condition which appears in most materials licenses states that "except as specifically provided otherwise by this license, the licensee shall possess and use licensed material... in accordance with state-ments, representations, and procedures contained in the licensee's application..." The inclusion of such a condition in a license incorporates the identified docu-ments in the body of the license. Figure III-6 is an example of a material license.
In preparing for an inspection, the inspector must review the license in detail including any referenced applica-tions or correspondence to identify those items to be 3-31
reviewed during the inspection. It is advisable to include requirements and reference to specific license conditions on the form that will be used to take notes during the inspection. A sample copy of such an inspec-tor's guide or note form for a radiographic inspection is shown in Figure III-7. You will note that there are spaces to insert references to license conditions as well as notes pertinent to the inspection during the planning stage as well as during the in'spection.
Fuel cycle facility licenses are constructed with sub-stantially the same format as other materials licenses; however, the volume and detail of referenced documenta- )
tion is much greater. Where the simpler material pro-grams have a single inspection procedure for a specific activity, multiple inspection procedures are applicable to fuel cycle facilities as in the reactor inspector program.
For reactor licenses and construction permits, the or-ganization of the license / permit is considerably differ-ent from materials licenses. The license document it-self, contains essentially no specific data relating to the plant or its operation. The portion of the license document analogous to the conditions of a i
3-32
4- B materials license are contained in the Technical Speci-fications Appendix A and B. Appendix A to a Ifcense contains an introduction; safety standards, minimum conditions for operations, or limiting conditions for operation (LC0's), surveillance standards, design fea-tures, and administrative standards. These topics en-compass all of the license imposed conditions related to plant operation, including reactor operation, re-fueling, radiation protection, and waste management.
Appendix B, the environmental technical specifications imposes LC0's in the areas of thermal, chemical, and 1 radioactive discharges and established requirements for environmental surveillance programs and studies and includes a section on adninistrative controls.
In preparing for an inspection, the inspector must review the Technical Specifications in order to identify those specific sections of Appendix A and/or B that apply to the specific inspection procedure under preparation.
Figures III-8 and 9 show sample pages from inspectors checklists. References to the appropriate Technical Specification.section should be noted as well as any specific requirements or limits to be used by the inspector during the review.
3-33
, ~ . , . -- -,
I i
i During the review of licensing documents, inspectors occasionally find license conditions or technical speci-fication items in which the intent of Licensing is not clear. In such cases, it is advisable to discuss the problem with your Section or Branch Chief and,if the question is not resolved,with appropriate Licensing representative to clarify the intent of the particular item.
Construction pertmis-(CP's) contain some specific condi-tions imposing requirements on applicants for licenses,
!. usually in areas dealing with environmental monitoring programs or studies and mitigation of the impact of I construction on the environment. See Figure III-10.
f The major portion of the requirements imposed on the
,i applicant are in the form of commitments contained in the application and the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) which is identified in and incorporated -
in the CP. CP's also frequently reference the Final Environmental Statement (FES) and impose specific NR,C staff recomendations contained in the FES on the applicant in -the areas of environmental matters. In preparing for an inspection, it is necessary to review the CP, application, PSAR, and FES to identify those
)
I 3-34
t - conditions against which the applicant's activities are to be compared. The same type of reference data, requirement, and source, should be noted for ready re-ference during the inspection.
During the discussion of requirements a number of dif-ferent documents or sources of information relating to the preparation for an inspection have been mentioned.
A summary of these references is shown in Figure III-11 and will be discussed briefly,
- b. References
- 1) Preliminary / Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR/FSAR)
These documents are portions of the applications for the CP and operating license and contain the basic .
description of the , site, facility, and licensee com-mitments in areas of- administration, construction,
, operation, radiation protection, waste management, emergency planning, and physical security on which the Connission bases its action in the issuance of a CP (PSAR) or operating license (FSAR). The content of PSAR's and FSAR's is identified in 10 CFR 50.34.
After issuance of a CP, the PSAR remains substan-tially unchanged. The FSAR is developed during con-struction from the PSAR and incorporates changes necessitated by changes in design, equipment, and regulatory requirements. Failure to construct the l
~- facility in accordance with provisions of commitments
~
3-35 l
b'
A contained in the PSAR may be cited as items of non-compliance or deviations depending on the item. At the conclusion of the construction phase, it is IE's responsibility to determine whether the facility was constructed in substantial compliance with the FSAR.
This finding is prerequisite to licensing the facility.
- 2) NRC Regulatory Guides The Reg. Guides have been developed to augment the guid-ance given to applicants and licensees in the regulations.
They describe acceptable methods of implementing speci-fic parts of the regulations, identify and describe
)
l NRC staff techniques used to evaluate specific problems or postulated accidents and to provide guidance to applicants concerning information needed by the staff in its review of applications for pennits and licenses. '
Lt Reg. Guides are not intended to supplant the regulations and compliance with the guides is not required. Alter-
. natives are acceptable if they provide an adequate basis for the issuance of a permit or license.
- 3) Standards and Codes In 10 CFR 50.55(a) Codes and Standards, various Reg.
Guides and in PSAR commitments references are or may i
3-36
s be made to a variety of codes and standards. These include or may include such references as the following:
Boiler and Vessel Code - American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC)
American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM)
American Concrete Institute (ACI)
Portland Cement Association (PCA)
American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT)
Americco Welding Society (AWS)
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
American Petroleum Institute (API)
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
These codes and standards impact most in the area of reactor construction and operations; however, they can also extend as far as the radiation specialist. For example, ANSI 13.1-1969, Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities. In pre-paration for an inspection, the applicable codes or standards must be identified and reviewed to assure adequate coverage during an inspection. Enforcement action for failure to conform to codes and standards is dependent on the context in which the specific code or 3-37 m
standard is identified. If identified in 10 CFR 50-55(a),
nonadherence is noncompliance; if identified as a commit-ment in the PSAR, nonadherence is probably a deviation.
- 4) Licensee Procedures FSAR's contain licensee commitments to develop procedures relating to all aspects of plant operation, radiation protection, and emergency planning. Technical Speci-fications contain requirements that procedures and ad-ministrative policies be established, implemented, and maintained and that the Onsite Review Committee review and Plant Superintendent approve the procedures and
)
changes. The requirement for maintenance of procedures require licensees to review procedures periodically.
In preparation for an inspection, the inspector should identify either prior to the insp3ction, if a controlled copy of the procedures are available, or otherwise during the inspection, any changes in procedures or new pro-cedures issued in the areas covered by the inspection plan. Various inspection procedures require that inspectors verify that procedures have been established, implemented, and maintained. Failure to adhere to procedures is non-compliance with the Technical Specification condition relating to implementation. The licensee's failure
)
3-38
to review procedures at the frequency specified, or in accordance with the procedure requiring review, is also noncompliance with the Technical Specification l
condition relating to implementation.
- 5) IE Bulletins / Circulars IE Bulletins are discussed in PI 0600/5, Compliance Division Bulletin Dissemination and Circulars in MC 1126, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Circulars, i
Both bulletins and circulars must relate to safety matters that have app'.icability to other facilities.
In the case of bulletins, the significance must warrant immediate dissemination of the information and action on the part of the licensee or permit holder. For cir-culars the significance must warrant timely, but not immediate, dissemination and may necessitate corrective 1
action by the licensee or pennit holder, but not a written response. Inspection procedure 92703, Bulletin / Circular /
Immediate Action Letter Followup, identifies the in-spection requirements in this a.ea. Prior to each in-spection, the inspector should determine whether any Bulletins / Circulars /Immediate Action letters applicable i to the licensee / permit holder have been issued, and whether the licensee / permit holder response and correc-tive action appeared to be appropriate and timely, i
3-39 l
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, s
- 6) Licensee Event Report (LERs)
- Regulatory luide 1.16, Reporting of Operating Informa-tion - Appendix A Technical Specifications, in Section 2 Reportable Occurrences, requires as a minimum that the licensee submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within time limits specified in the Regulatory Guide. Inspection procedure 92700 Licensee Event Followup, identified the inspection requirements for followup of such reports.
On-site followup is determined by the significance,of the event requiring the report. Inspection procedure 90712 Inoffice Review of Event Reports provides for an inoffice review of all LERs submitted. From those LERs reviewed inoffice, the inspector selects LERs for onsite review on a sampling basis. It is the intent of the inspection procedures that the onsite review of LERs supplement, and not duplicate,the inoffice review. In reviewing LERs received the inspector should select specific reports for onsite followup based on the guid-ance contained in the two inspection procedures identified.
A list of LERs received should be prepared during the inoffice review for later review, and selection of appropriate LERs for onsite review.
)
3-40
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- 7) IE Inspection Reports During the preparation phase of an inspection, the inspector should review previous-inspection reports L to identify previously unresolved items, noncompliance items requiring followup, inspector identified problems, and concerns and commitments for review during a sub-sequent inspection. For the inspector inspecting a licensee for the first time, previous reports provide
- background information concerning licensee personnel, management attitudes and problems or concerns specific l to this licensee. For the inspector returning to a licensee's facility, a review of the previous inspection reports sharpens the inspector's recollections concern-ing the facility and the licensee.
- 8) Final Environmental Statement (FES)
Environmental impact statements are prepared by the Commission staff in accordance with the requirements
!- contained in 10 CFR 51 which implements the requirements !
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
The FES contains much site specific detail; however, the principal impact is on the inspector assigned re-f sponsibility for environmental inspections. Construc-tion permits reference the peroperational monitoring *
's i
i 3-41 1
i
. - . - - , - , . .--.:.~._,,---.-,..- , _ - - - - . ,,,
.a programs, and staff recommendations for modificatio'ns, requirements for administrative and construction control programs, and management audits, and requirements to evaluate and report previously unevaluated construction activities or effects or evidence or irreversible damage.
and provide an acceptable analysis and plan for correc-tive action. These items must be identified by'the inspector in the FES and addressed during the inspection.
Inspection procedures 80210, Environmen'tal PrEtection -~
Initial Inspection, and 80210, Environmental Protection -
Construction Inspection, identify the inspection re-quirements in this area and provide for a sampling of the applicant's actions in response to CP or FES require-ments.
- c. Checklist / Data Sheet Development In order to ensure that a thorough and efficient inspection is conducted, and all elements of the inspection module have been covered, it is recommended that a check sheet / data sheet be developed for each procedure. The check sheet / data sheet will aid in accomplishing the following:
- 1) Review of each inspection element
- 2) Development of the requirements for the particular element
')
3-42
t s
- 3) Documenting the completion of each element
- 4) Providing the necessary data for developing the inspec-tion report.
The complexity of the check sheet / data sheet will vary de-pendent upon the particular module being inspected *, however, it should include as a minimum the following elements:
- 1) The inspection requirement
- 2) The licensee's requirements (i.e., Technical Specifica-tions, licensee procedures, FSAR, license, etc.)
- 3) Space for appropriate notation to indicate compliance or noncompliance
- 4) Space for comments.
Refer to Figures III-8, III-9, III-12, and III-13 for examples of check sheets.
- d. Acceptance Criteria Development ar.d Authorization Inspection preparation must include development of accep-tance criteria for comparison with the inspection findings.
The acceptance criteria must also be authorized in order to accept or reject the inspection findings and provide the necessary basis for taking proper enforcement action.
The authorization may come from any one of the documents discussed in Section III. A.2a. or any one of the references discussed in Section III. A.2b if specified in a requirement document.
C 3-43
i X. 1
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'During this review, it may become evident that the particu-p lar licensee may not have any requirement to comply with a particular procedure element. In this case, it would'be appropriate to note this and review the item with your supervisor and determine if further action is necessary.
Some of the older licenses may not have the same require-ments as more recent ones, however, a conscious decision should be made regarding the. necessity for pursuing the matter further with IE Headquarters or NRR.
At any rate, each inspection element must be reviewed and compared, and the appropriate acceptance criteria noted.
.)-
- e. Inoffice Inspection Effort Inoffice inspection, when possible, is recommended and can significantly benefit a more efficient onsite' effort. Some-ir,spection modules,-such as 42700B.(Procedures), require.
application of significant amounts of time for. review of licensee procedures and when available in the office, will allow more time at the site for interviewing personnel, direct observation of activities, and independent inspection
-effort.
1 The decision regarding what can be done in the office varies with different circumstances, and is one that the inspector 3-44 1
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a-can make as he reviews the inspection elements. As a mini-mum, however, inoffice effort should include review of all available licensee procedures, completion of all module elements possible, and formulation of all questions re-quiring clarification upon arriving at the site.
- f. Independent Inspection Effort e ,
In the development of the inspection program, it was. deter-mined that the inspector should not be restricted to the defined inspection program and nothing else.
Opportunities for independent inspection should be considered
, as part of preparing for an inspection. It should be under-stood that this independent inspection time allowed the inspector (20%) is for the purpose of expanding his effort to a) areas not specifically defined in the regular pro-gram, orb) it also may be considered as an exransion of the regular program if desired, i.e., instead of reviewing two surveillance tests the inspector may elect to review several additional tests.
The inspector may pre-select areas of interest such as special walk throughs of the plant during regular or non-regular hours, observing certain operations tests or main-tenance, exploring potential problems, or merely looking v +, -
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- . 3-45 , .
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at areas of specific interest to the inspector. In this regard, pre-inspection preparation in the form of gathering information, reviewing requirements, and formulating ques-tions can be beneficial. It also tends to include inde-pendent inspection effort in the regular schedule, whereas, if it is considered only on an impromptu basis, could be overlooked or forgotten in the effort to complete the re-gular inspection program.
In summary, the inspector should make a conscious effort to include plans for independent inspection effort as part of his regular program schedule.
- g. Inspection Team Briefing
.)
In the case where more than one inspector is used for an inspection, briefings should be considered to ensure a smooth inspection effort. The inspection schedule should be reviewed to ensure each inspector is aware of the areas he is responsible for, the personnel he will probably be ir,iterviewing, and highlights of the overall plant staff, how they function, and their reporting chain. Alternatives should also be discussed so that a minimum amount of time will be lost if plans must be adjusted. The assigned lead 9
inspector should maintain coordination of the inspection effort and should be the overall spokesman for the team.
)
3-46
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- 3. Special Techniques A variety of techniques are used by inspectors to keep track of outstanding inspection items, unresolved items, and enforce-ment followup. The recommended approach to identification, status keeping, and closing of these items is presented below.
- a. Outstanding Inspection Items (0II's)
,1 In general, an 0II list should be maintained for each facility or licensed activity as an aid to the inspector concerning items which require inspection followup. The list should have provisions for a description of each item and a reference to the item's origin. Further provisions
,, should be made for the item's resolution with reference s
u to the appropriate documentation.
Figure III-14 is an example of a format for an 01I list. Use of computer lists y
- s by some regions have also been an effective method of track-ing outstanding inspection items.
' '? s Typical items which may be included on the OII list are un-resolved inspection items, licensee commitments, questions raised by the inspector requiring some inspector followup, or any other inspector identified problems.
Responsibility for maintaining the list usually rides with the principal ~or project inspector for the facility. The d \'
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3- 3-47 s
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I list should be reviewed prior to each inspection and items that can be resolved should be included in the inspection plan for resolution and close-out in the inspection report.
l
- b. Enforcement Followup An enforcement followup list should be maintained for each facility or licensed activity in a manner similar to the OII list in paragraph a. above. The list should have pro-
, visions for a brief description of the enforcement action, and reference to it's origin, also provisions for corrective action and completion dates, and references to the licensee's response should be included along with a method for close-out. Figure III-15 is an example of a format for enforce-ment followup. In some situations, where licensee activity warrants, it would be considered acceptable to combine the
, 0II and enforcement in one list. Computer utilization has also been effective in this regard.
As with the OII list, the responsibility for maintaining the enforcement followup usually rests with the principal or project inspector. The list should be reviewed prior to each inspection to ensure prompt followup by the cogni-zant inspector.
)
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- 4. Post Inspection Documentation
- a. Report Format With the issuance of MC 1005, Inspection Reports (3/28/77),
which defines inspection report formats, an additional sig-nificant step has been taken in the. effort to reduce the size of reports. Detailed information is now required only to support findings of noncompliance or to report on speci-fic problems or areas of concern. In preparation for an inspection, the inspector can simplify the final report preparation by adequate preparation. If the preparation includes the use of a note form which satisfied the require-ment of the' specific inspection procedures, items of non-compliance, deviations, and other concerns can be more easily identified both at the time of the exit interview and during report preparation.
For the less complicated materials license inspections, the use of the headquarters supplied materials report format forms for taking notes could preclude the report prepara-tion step completely. See Figure III-7. In most all cases, any preparation that will assist in organizing and speeding the inspection will simplify the preparation of the report as well.
3-49
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- 5. Statistical Data At the conclusion of the inspection during the report prepara-tion phase, the inspector is required to supply information on form NRC 766 relating to the inspection for statistical purposes.
The use of the 766 and 766S forms are discussed in MC 0535. The l inspector is required to identify the number of items of non-compliance and deviations contained in the letter to the licensee,
- and the number of items of noncompliance identified by the licensee, and not cited. The inspection procedures included in the inspection, the percent completion, and the time expended on each procedure must be recorded. During the inspection the inspector will find it helpful if a record of time spent on each inspection procedure is maintained. The accounting of this in-
[ formation can be factored into preparation for subsequent in-spections. This will improve the accuracy of the time data reported and increase the reliability of the resulting statis -
tical reports.
IV. Summary This course describes the necessary details involved in preparing for an inspection and includes a description of the various categories of in-spections as they apply to di,fferent types of licenses, the scope of l inspections, and inspection patterns. It covers the detailed planning l and organization of an inspection effort and discusses some special
)
l 3-50 l
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techniques. The necessary post inspection documentation including its relationship with good inspection preparation is also discussed.
Types of inspections include announced and unannounced, routine and nonroutine. Most inspections are required to be unannounced and alter-native inspections subjects must be considered to allow for contingen-cies.
The' scope of inspections are described in the IE Manual, and vary as will the number and types of inspectors and the length of a specific inspection. Interface with the licensee staff must be well thought out in advance and formulation of an overall schedule is advantageous.
Detailed Planning and Organization should consider the overall inspection requirements, applicable references, preparation of checklists and accept-ance criteria. Inoffice inspection effort should be used, when possible, for initial review of inspection material and pre-planning of independent inspection effort. Team briefings when several inspectors will be in-volved in an inspection are considered necessary to ensure a smooth inspection effort.
Special techniques,in maintaining a status of 0!!'s, unresolved items, and enforcement followup is necessary for ensuring the conduct of an efficient and thorough inspection effort.
Planning and organizing for the conduct of plant tours is important and will help to ensure that all areas of the plant are examined as appro-priate.
s 3-51
Careful planning and organizing of an inspection will result in adequate documentation of the inspection effort in the form of report details, enforcement, as applicable, and statistical data input.
V. Course References
- a. IE Manual Chapters
- 1. PIC 0535, Statistical Data Reporting
- 2. MC 0800, Enforcement Actions
- 3. MC 1005, Inspection Reports
- 4. .TI 1220/1 Policy on Unannounced Inspections
- 5. MC 2500, Reactor Inspection Program
- 6. MC 2600, Fuel Cycle Inspection Program
'7. MC 2700, Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Program
- 8. MC 2800, Materials Inspection Program
- 9. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.16, Reporting of Operating Information
)
3-52
l PREPARATION FOR INSPECTIDH ,
MONEY TRANSPORTATION - AIRLINE LIMO AUTO - AT SITE RENTAL - GSA P.O.A.
M0TEL RESERVATION COPY OF ITINERARY TO WIFE MATERIAL FOR INSPECTION x.
4 FIGURE 11-1 3-53
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- Enclosure 4 1
MC 1005 i,
i Approved Dater INSPECTICH PLAN APO REPCRT PAkeER Page of Licensee: License no.
Scheduled for Post-inspection
' inspection status M'o dele No. 766 Time info Inspection Items Management Meeting - Entrance 30'/135 and Exit Interviews (Required]
1 Initial f
- Hansaament Meetina Program requirements, i MC 28 (Required]
b Licensee Event Fo11eeep 927005 l u, e 1
!- [n Followup on Inspector-identified problems 92701B !'
i i Followup on Noncompliance l 927025 1
and Deviations j IE Bulletin /Inmediate Action 927035 Letter Followup Followup on Headquarters Requests 927043 ,
I [j Followup on Renional Requests 927055 g;
i -< Independent Inspection
~
Effott (Required} 927068 la Inspector Dispatched to Site 937008 l
Followup on Significant Event l Occurrina During Inspection 937018 i
4 -
1005E4-2 3/2s/77 1
z Enclorura 1 to MC-2515 Issue Date: 1/1/77 INSPECTION PROCEDURES, LIGHT WATER REACTORS - OPERATIONS PHASE Inspection Procedure Inspection Number Title Frequency 307005 Management Meeting - Third Corporate Man- Once agement Meeting 30702B Management Meetings - As Needed and 3 Years W 30703B Management Meeting - Entrance and Exit Interviews Each Inspection 350308- IE Input to NRR Review of QA Topical Reports W l 35701B QA Program - Annual Review A 36700B Organization and Administration A
- 37700B Design, Design Changes and Modifications A
- 37701B Modifications W 38700B Procurement A
- 39700B Records A
- Review and Audits 407008 A
- 41700B Training A
- 41701B Requalification Training A
- 42700B Procedures A **
42702B Fire Prevention / Protection A
- 54700B Cleanliness A *
- Eligible for conduct at 2515 El-1 reduced frequency FIGURE III-2
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FACILITY __ LWR - OPERATIONS PHASE (MC 2515)
YEAR
,, INSPECTION N0. & DATE 4
j LICENSE NO.
1 PROCEDURE TITLE /SU8 HEADING FREQ.
30703 Management Meetino (Each)
- 1. Entrance i
, 2. Exit i
. Y S
4 54700 Cleanliness (A) l 1 !
- 1. Verify Controls Established l
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- 2. Verify Procedure Content
- 3. Verify Cognizance and Use i
! 4. Verify Implementation &- Effectiveness l I i e n 1 8
! g 80710 Environmental Protection (A) i = 1. Management Controls 7
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- 2. Analytical QC i
j 3. Program Implementation i
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- 4. Nonradioactive Releases i
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LICENSES - INSPECTIONS - INSPECTORS ACTIVITY REQUIRING NSPECT[ONS CONDUCTED INSPECTION AND NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES l{>URINGMTH00ARTER1976 INSPECTORS (JAN. 1977)
MATERIALS LICENSES 8700 525 75 FF&MS BR.
REACTOR POWER 225 160 140 REACTOR NON POWER 90 20 SAFEGUARDS 220 70 43 SAFEGUARDS VENDORS 120 50 17 CONTRACTOR Y
O DATA IS APPROXIMATE ONLY. NUMBER OF INSPECTORS INCLUDES ONLY REGIONAL PERSONNEL, AND EXCLUDES SUPERVISORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, INTERNS AND LO-OPS.
FFEMS BR. PERSONNEL NUMBERS INCLUDE THOSE RADIATION-ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALISTS ASSIGNED TO WORK AT REACTORS.
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" " ' * * " Page 1 of 3 Pages U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAAISSION MATERIALS LICENSE Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1964. as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-438), and Title 10. Code of Federal Regulations. Chapter 1. Parts 30, 31. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40 and 70, and in reliance on statements aid representations heretofore made by the licensee, a license is hereby issued authorizing the licensee to receive, sequ.4e. peeeeos, and transfer byproduet, source. and special nuclear material designated belows to use such material for the purposeis) and at the place (si designated below; to deliver or transfer such matertal to persons authorised to receive it in secordance with the regulations of the applicable Partisi; and to import such byproduct and source material. This license shall be deemed to contain the conditions specified in Section 183 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and is subject to all applicable ruise, regulations and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now or hereafter in effect and to any conditions specified below.
Licensee
- 1. St. Mary's Health Center
- 3. L.leense number 24-17477-01
- 2. 610 West Elm Street Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 4. Empiration date July 31 1982
- 5. g,7,,',",,,[ go, 030-12819
- 6. Byproduct, source, and/or 7. Chemical and/or physical 8. Manimum amount that licensee special nue' ear material form may peoness at any one time under this license A. Any byproduct A. Any radio- A. As necessary for material listed pharmaceutical uses authorized in in Groups I and listed in Groups Subitem 9.A.
!! of Schedule A. I and !! of Section 35.100 of Schedule A, 10 CFR 35 Section 35.100 of 10 CFR 35 B. Any byproduct B. Any form B. 2 curies of each material listed .
listed in Group byproduct material in Group !!! !!! of Schedule A, authorized in of Schedule A. Section 35.100 Subitem 6.B.
Section 35.100 of 10 CFR 35 of 10 CFR 35 C. Any byproduct C. Any radio. C. As necessary material listed pharmaceutical for uses in Group IV listed in Group authorized in of Schedule A. IV of Schedule A. Subit)m 9.C.
Section 35.100 Section 35.100 of 10 CFR 35 of 10 CFR 35 7'or the 11 S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 7 1977 Ori 9tnal Signed By I.E0 WADE, JR.
Date July 01 1977 by Radio 110toges Licensino_ Branch
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foss4 FIGURE !!!-6 3-65
l (fthv3Cf!CN iCUtr M16.ft __ Fege 3 of 15710s - nadiography AutAs fle'tI1ED No FitolNGS t.fcansee: Lleanse no A.senet no: _
(M5PECT!0N ITOI CRITRIA FINDING
- 1. ilanaament cong,Lsystem_ Ltc cond
$tnu:ture of organization as described in repalements?
men 8 aarmaErd
- 2. Trefnine and quellf teation of personnel Ltc cond Tretning a retraining conducted as required?
Ifritten & oral exus conducted? Examination results reviewed by managwwtnti instructions to workers per 19.127 19.12 surus a assamars
- 3. Licensee internal audits Ltc Cand Scope and frequency of audtts as required?
Conducted by appropriate persons? Aecords maintained? Rayfewed oy management?
Deffciencies idwitified & corrected?
WWW d astaaENs
- 4. Insaection and mainteninc3 Llc Cand Program fmplemented! Cover devices and M.B storage containersi Precedures implenentedt M.3t(j)
Records maintained? Aevie w i by management?
Super a sanssar, II V Form 621A 3-67 FIGURE III-7
[ 407458 Review & Audit Function. 1/1/77
- 1. Committee Membership (s) and/or Auditors
- 2. Quorum
- 3. Design Changes (Review & Approval per TS & 50.59)
- 4. Examination of Design Change
- a. Acceptance /Preoperational Test Records
- b. Operating procedures revised & approved
- c. Facility drawings reflect change
- 5. Experiments - Committees recommendations implemented (1-3 experiments)
- 6. Audits
- a. Conducted per TS
- b. Not by individual responsible for activity
. c. Audit Reports - Problem resolution
",n 3-69 FIGURE III-8
/
Licensee- Inspection Procedure
, ~,4 Date 83740
' Radiation Protection - Operation
- 1. Qualifications - Persons Contacted Identify changes or additions to radiation protection staffs since inspection. . dated .
Infonnation source ,
Qualification requirements specified in:
Technical Specification Section FSAR Section Review records to verify that individuals meet qualifications.
Records Reviewed for: Meet qualifications Yes No Specify inadequate qualifications:
3-71 FIGURE III-9
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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
-SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRICT EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO AND ARIZONA ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED
- DOCKET N0. STN 50-529
-PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT Construction Permit No. CPPR-142
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) having found that:
.A. The application for construction permit complies with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission, there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the pemit will be conducted in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Commission, and all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been ' duly made; B. The applicants have described the proposed design of the t ,
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (the facility),
including, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design and have identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public;
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C. Such further technical or design information as may be required to complete the safety analysis, and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report; D. -Safety features or components, if any, which require research and development have been described by the applicants and the applicants have identified, and there will be conducted, a research and' development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components;
, *Hereafter referred to as applicants
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FIGURE III-10 3-73
_ -fx REFERENCES A. PRELIMINARY / FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (PSAR/FSAR)
B. NRC REGULATORY GUIDES C. STANDARDS AND CODES D. LICENSEE PROCEDURES E. IE BULLETINS / CIRCULARS F. LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LER'S)
G. IE INSPECTION REPORTS
.' H. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT FIGURE III-11
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Licensee (Facility) Docket No.
Iten l Resolution SL No. Description thit Reference
- Action Reference Review I
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3 c1 NS - Nuclear Support l g
- 1. ~
[ m intain list with consecutively numbered items for each facility.
- 2. Md items which result from an inspection because of inability to inspect, deft- S - Security ciencies noted or followup required.
- 3. Md items between inspection as directed by SRI.
4 *ote items resolved follwing each inspection.
- 5. Forward this list to the SRI for review with each inspection report.
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DITORCDfENT ITDtS Sheet No.
g,1censee (Facility) DUANE mm DM NM m mWC Um m N & M a b. W W l Resolution SL Ites Unit Reference
- Action Reference Review so. Description 1
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2 cs NS - Nuclear Support
- Indicates followup group: C - Construction
-- Instructions for completing: W - RU Facilities
- 51. Maintain list with consecutively nisabered items for each facility. ~
- 2. Add items which result from an inspection because of inab111ty to inspect, defi- S - Security ciencies noted or followup required.
- 3. Add items between inspection as directed by SRI.
- 4. Note items resolved following each inspection.
- 5. Forward this list to the SRI for review with each inspection report.
. . _ _ . . _ , , . _ . . . _ . . . . = _ , - _ _ _. , _ . . _
CONDUCTING ENTRANCE AND EXIT !!EETINGS WITH LICENSEE MANAGEMENT
!. LEARNING OBJECTIVES This session is intended to provide guidance and effective techniques for conducting routir? meetings with licensee management at the beginning and conclusion of onsite inspections. You should obtain a working knowledge and understanding of the following topics that will be discussed:
A. Elements of a successful meeting B. Proper levels of management to meet with C. Entrance / Exit meeting objectives D. Use of recording devices in meetings E. Third party attendance at meetings F. Preparation by the inspector'for such meetings G. Presentation of inspection plan H. Presentation of inspection findings
!. Obtaining licensee coments and commitments J. Uncooperative and/or non-responsive licensee
!!. INTRODUCTION Effective comunication with the licensee during entrance and exit meetings is as important as the actual inspection for the following reasons:
A. Inspection findings are likely to be invalid or incomplete unless thit licensee clearly understands what the inspector wants to see. If the question is not understood the answer may not be apparent, even though the licensce's program may meet applicable requirements.
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- 8. The licensee will not be easily convinced of the need for corrective action, unless the inspector clearly defines the basis for and applicable comitments and requirements that support his findings.
C. If findings are not clearly understood corrective actions are likely to be inappropriate.
D. Failure to properly prepare for entrance and exit meetings may make the inspector appear ill prepared and professionally incompetent. Consequently, the licensee will resent giving up valuable time for these meetings.
Inspection findings will not be respected and the licensee may be hesitut to initiate corrective action.
If the inspector is to be effective in implementing NRC IE policies )
and programs, proper preparation for and conduct of management meetings is essential. The purpose of this training session is to adequately prepare the inspector for conducting effective management meetings.
!!!. OETAILED DISCUSSION A. ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL MEETING
- 1. preparation
- a. Scheduling Schedule the meeting far enough in advance to ,
assure that all parties will have adequate time to prepare. In most cases the productivity of a meeting is directly proportional to the effort spent in preparation. /
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- b. Determine Meeting Objectives L To have a productive meeting it is essential that you know what the meeting objectives are. Unless objectives are clearly defined and understood, the likelihood of a productive meeting is remote.
Few people achieve goals or meet objectives unless they know where they want to go, before they start.
- c. Establish Meeting Agenda An agenda (outline) is a detailed listing of topics <
to be covered and pertinent related information.
Once the meeting objectives have been defined an agenda should be prepared to lead you through the -
i u.eeting step-by-step. Each meeting objective should be researched to identify related information and to adequately prepare for a meaningful discussion of each topic.
- 2. Meeting Environment
- a. Meeting Facility t Whenever possible, the meeting should be conducted in a place that optimizes the attentiveness of meeting participants. For example:
- 1) The meeting leader should be centrally located:
visible and easily heard by all participants.
- 2) The environment (temperature, lighting, seating, l
noise, etc.) should not distract from the meeting.
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- b. Who and How Many Should Attend i Entrance and Exit Meetings should be conducted with 1
f the senior licensee representative having direct V
l responsibility for the areas to be inspected. This l-
- is normally the plant manager. Plant supervisors l with responsibility for areas to be inspected or I.
l which have been inspected should also be requested to attend the meetings. . Generally it is desirable to conduct meetings with a small group of key plant .
personnel that have direct responsibility for areas l
inspected. The discussion of a small group is t
easier to control and generally results in fewer s
distractions. )
l L Some licensees desire that large numbers of plant l
[ employees attend meetings cond0cted by IE, particularly exit meetings, where the inspection results are discussed. Attendees in large numbers may present some discussion control problems that might not be encountered with a smaller group. However, if the I inspector does not object to the larger group, the licensee should be encouraged to have-interested individuals attend. If large numbers of licensee representatives do attend the meetings, the inspector should requast that active participation-in the
! discussion by those other than site or corporate management be held to a minimum.
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!~ . c. Use of Recording Devices Tape recorders are not to be used (by NRC) during the conduct of entrance or exit meetings. If the ,
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, licensee, expresses a desire to tape meetings...tne.
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- s - .' inspector should explain to the licensee %he dis-'
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' advantage of taping, emphasizing thatIrit could ' ' -
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inhibit the free flow of communications. However, '
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l if such tapes are made, the inspector must request's ' ,
copy of the tape or a, verbatim transcript an{4Qs y
request must be made prior to the refirding., ' The l inspection report should make it clear thaE a
. rec [rding was made and that a copy was requested.
- 3. Presentation
- a. Leadhr5Mp/ Inspector Image rk,,
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NRf,1s represented by the inspector at entrance and j exit'hetings. To a large extent the inspector is
- the.only direct contact that site personnel has with ~
t e
,heNRC. Consequently, the licensee's image of and . < 'c l
t r'eceptiveness to the NRC are largely detennined by
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/ the manner in which these meetings are conducted. - f,
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At t g meetings the inspector h the NRC. Personal , ,
! prefc'rences'and opinions that differ from NRC policy '* *
. T l pr pGs~1 tion should not be stated.
N' Meetjngleadershipistheresponsibilityofthe '
, . - n, inspector. He determines the objectives, and ,j ,/ ,, ~
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establishes the gaenda and controls the meeting.
If the inspector is not prepared or does not'take
' the leadership at entrance and exit meetings, com-munications between NRC and the licensee will suffer.
Consequently, inspection effectiveness and resolution
-of NRC concerns will be hampered.
Inspector dress for the interviews should be appro-priate for the occasion. At the corporate office it is never improper to wear a suit or sports clothes with a tie. On site, you-are never wrong to wear a suit or sports clothes with a tie; however, due to inspection activities or the standard of dress worn ,
by-licensee representatives it may be acceptable and -)-
more comfortable to be less formal.
The inspector's attitude is important. You have or will take a considerable number of licensee manhours to support your inspection activities. You, the inspector, are a professimal, knowledgeable in the nuclear field and regulatory requirements and should not portray yourself to the licensee as a " good ole boy." Don't join in " bull" sessions or attempt to increase your popularity with the licensee by telling ethnic or off-color jokes: to do so may be humorous, but your professional image and effectiveness in dealing with the licensee are deminished. ,
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- b. Getting Your Point Across The sure way to get your point across is to know the facts and be prepared to concisely present them.
Speak in specifics and avoid generalities. Don't ramble in your presentation: present your point concisely and support your position with facts.
- c. Getting Input From Others Before you go into a meeting know what information you want from the licensee. This should be identi-fied on the meeting agenda. Be prepared to ask for specific comments or connitments. In the case of the exit meeting, the licensee should already have
\~ knowledge of your inspection findings and thus can be prepared to provide the information you request.
Allow him adequate time to research your request, as this will minimize misunderstandings.
If organizations other than IE, such as NRR, are to attend meetings, the inspector-in-charge should know their role or objectives before the meeting starts.
o Any comments or questions that they may have should be made known to us so that there are no surprises.
Also any commitmer.ts that NRR or others desire to extract from the licensee should be made known to the inspector.
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- d. Summarize Conclusions To minimize the possibility for misunderstandings, major points of the meeting should be summarized at the meeting conclusion. Particularly those items that require further action or commitments should be reiterated. For example',' enforcement items and new unresolved items should be restated at the conclusion of the exit meeting.
B. ENTRANCE MEETINGS
Purpose:
To assure that licensee management is aware of the overall scope and schedule of the inspection. The entrance meeting is normally conducted with licensee management on the first day of the inspection and as soon as possible after your arrival onsite or at the place of the inspection.
- 1. Pre-Meeting Inspection Effort If you have an area that you desire to check after arrival onsite, but before the licensee has time to prepare or correct'possible discrepant areas, i.e., check that guards are posted, doors are locked or controlled, control room manning is as required, etc., proceed with an inspection of those areas prior to conducting the entrance meeting.
'2. Meeting Objectives
- a. Determine Status of Open Inspection Items and Licensee Comitments Prior to the entrance meeting (normally done inoffice as part of the preparation for the inspection), the ;
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r inspector needs to identify those items that require followup during the inspection:
- 1) Enforcement Items
- 2) Unresolved Items
- 3) IE Bulletins and Circulars
- 4) Outstanding Inspection Items Specific items which require followup should be placed on the entrance meeting agenda. The inspector should be prepared to discuss the history and license commitments related to each item. During the entrance meeting, the licensee's progress and/or status relative
.. to each item is determined. Doing this refreshes the licensee's memory relative to plant activities that the NRC is pursuing. Additionally, it identifies areas where inspection effort will or will not be productive.
- b. Discuss Plant Problems and Status
- 1) Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
LER's should be reviewed to identify those requiring followup per IE Procedure No. 92700B,
" Licensee Event Followup." LER's with prompt reporting requirements or which may involve enforcement action should be followed up on-during a relatively short time frame. Specific LER's requiring followup would be identified on 4-9
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entrance meeting agenda. The inspector should review circumstances relative to each LER, identify pertinent questions and concerns, and then discuss these during the entrance meeting.
- 2) Current Plant Status and Problems Information relative to current plant status and problems is important to the inspector for coordinating inspection effort and identifying areas of potential interest. The inspector should question the licensee relative to the a) Present plant status b) Recent or current problems c) Plant evolutions that are planned during )
the time period of the inspection.
d) Items of general interest such as publicity, impending strikes, etc.
- c. Discuss Items of General Interest
- 1) Discuss events that have occurred at other facilities that could have generic implications at the site being inspected. Don't criticize other licensee's performance, personnel practices or reveal information that was given in confidence or information that could cause embarrassment to another licensee.
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- 2) Discuss industry developments such as new standards or Regulatory Guides that would be of interest or have application at the site being inspected.
- 3) Discuss changes in the NRC as they effect the licensee such as Regional organization changes, enforcement policy, etc.
- 4) Offer the licensee an opportunity to raise questions concerning industry developments or NRC policy or procedures.
- d. Make Arrangenents For Exit Meeting
- 1) Set the time for the exit meeting. Exit meet-ing environment and attendance (paragraph III.A.2 above) only needs to be discussed if distractions or other problems are encountered ,
or if it is desired that personnel be present at the exit meeting who do not normally attend, i.e., Corporate Officers, QA Director, etc.
- 2) Determine how plant management prefers to be informed about apparent negative findings during the course of the inspection. The inspector can periodically update the plant manager relative to inspection status or apparent findings can be highlighted to lower level plant supervisors. If the exit meeting is to be 4-11
productive it is essential that the plant staff know the issues to be discussed in time to review the pertinent infonnation.
- e. Discuss Inspection Scope The key to this part of the entrance meeting is
" adequate preparation for the inspection." A discussion of the inspection scope should specifi-cally include the following:
- 1) Records, procedures or documents that will be reviewed.
- 2) Personnel that the inspector will need to interview should be identified. It may be .,
necessary for the inspector to identify the subject of interest and have the licensee identify the appropriate contact for further discussions.
- 3) Activities the inspector wishes to witness that require coordination between the licensee and inspector should be identified to accomodate inspection activities.
Making the licensee aware of planned inspection activities and required licensee support will generally enhance inspection effectiveness and efficiency. However, there are certain inspections
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involving visual observation's that even short time prior notification is undesirable and therefore, should not be discussed during the entrance inter-view, i.e., off shift inspections, cleanliness inspections, compliance with manning requirements, shift turnover, control of personnel in protected /
vital / security areas, etc.
C. INSPECTION FINDINGS
- 1. Criteria For A Valid Finding A valid inspection finding takes into account four important considerations as follows:
- a. Applicable requirements that apply to the area inspected must be identified.
- b. Facts relative to the licensee's program and its implementation must be identified and checked for confonnance to applicable requirements.
- c. Conclusion relative to facts observed as they compare to applicable requirements,
- d. Obtain licensee's position. Preliminary findings should be brought to the attention of the licensee in a timely manner so that he has time to review findings and make additional infonnation available if appropriate.
Taking each of these considerations into account should minimize misunderstandings with the licensee.
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- 2. " Form" vs " Substance" It is important that findings be valid and of significance:
a) Don't raise issues for which you cannot provide specifics.
b) Don't say or imply that you don't like the way they are handling something and threaten to keep looking for an item of noncompliance.
c) If one signoff out of several in a procedure is inadvertently missed don't make a big deal of it, if it appears the procedure was being followed.
d) Don't raise findings that lack significance or which can't be substantiated, as this takes away from the credibility of other findings.
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e) Don't criticize other licensee's performance, personnel practices or reveal information that was given in confidence or that you were privileged to receive because of your NRC employment.
f) Don't be a party to a rumor, remember it's more than a rumor if you, NRC, passes it on.
g) Don't get involved in discussions with licensees that involve volatile issues, such as political issues, pay structure or labor issues that don't affect the plant.
h) Don't hesitate to admit that you don't know, but will find out.
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- 1) Don't make a deal with the licensee or turn your back on noncompliance, in the end you're the loser.
j) Don't resort to argument or anger to win a point,
. be cool - be professional - state the requirement and your finding, k) Don't get involved in items that are being pursued by NRR or another regulatory agency.
- 3. Accepted Industry practices To Which The Licensee Is Not Committed If the licensee's program does not meet or connit to an accepted industry standard or Regulatory Guide the
. inspector should bring this to the licensee's attention.
, Point out that this item is not a legal requirement on the licensee but is consistent with accepted industry practice. Corrective actions planned by the licensee relative to the accepted practice should be identified by the inspector. If the licensee plans no corrective action, the item should be brought to the attention of IE:HQ for evaluation and possible action.
- 4. Inspector Preferences and Opinions Inspector preferences, opinions and recommendations which are not supported by legitimate requirements or substan-tiated by fact should not be discussed with the licensee.
. Many licensees will automatically respond to suggestions
< or comments made by the inspector. The inspector should avoid inadvertently imposing his preferences or opinions on the licensee.
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D. EXIT MEETINGS
Purpose:
To communicate by discussion the preliminary inspection findings and provide the licensee ~an opportunity to provide additional information that could change or refute the findings. .
- 1. Prerequisites The exit meeting is just as important as the inspection and adequate preparation is a must. To optimize effective-ness the following are necessary:
- a. The licensee has been informed of preliminary negative findings in a timely manner before the exit meeting - no surprises. Often times the .
licensee can provide additional information or other-wise clarify issues that the inspector initially identifies as a potential-problem. It is unreason-able to expect a meanine#LI exchange of ideas at the exit meeting, unless the licensee is aware of the issues before the meeting begins.
4 -b. The inspector-in-charge should debrief assist inspec-tors, usually at the end of each day of the inspection.
This serves two purposes: (1) it provides an oppor-tunity for the assist inspectors to draw on the lead inspector's knowledge of the plant and its program, and (2) it allows the lead inspector an opportunity to provide guidance to a less experienced inspector on inspection techniques.
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- 2. Meeting Objectives
- a. Present the status of previously identified open inspection items such as:
- 1) Enforcement items and deviations
- 2) Unresolved items
- 3) IE Bulletins and Circulars
- b. Present inspection findings for each new area inspected including:
- 1) Scope of inspection effort. Briefly sumarize what was inspected and how you inspected it.
- 2) State your inspection conclusion as appropriate.
a) Clear - no apparent discrepancy identified.
b) Unresolved Item - identify the apparent potential problem area including the requirement or commitment that the licensee may not be in conformance with, c) Noncompliance or Deviation - identify the specific requirement violated and the supporting facts. Explain what the licensee is or is not doing and why this does not meet the identified requirement or comitment.
- c. If negative findings are identified that involve continuing operation of a licensed facility contrary to Regulatory requirements or operation in an unsafe manner, they should be promptly resolved before the inspector leaves the site.
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E. CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE LICENSEE
- 1. If the licensee disagrees with the findings and/or becomes hostile it is important that the inspector not engage in
-an argument. The inspector must maintain control over the meeting. When this situation comes up the inspector should present his findings and then allow the licensee to state his position. If it is obvious that agreement over the findings cannot be reached the inspector should simply state his position and request a senior licensee representative to state their position. Resolution of the difference of opinion will then be worked out in inspection correspondence and/or direct communication between Regional and Licensee management.
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- 2. The licensee may attempt to justify not meeting a require-ment by stating that another facility with equivalent systems / components is not required to do this or that and NRR agrees with the licensee. You might respond by stating, "I'm not familiar with their requirements; however, your FSAR or Technical Specifications state . . ." or "we haven't received any correspondence from licensing reliev-ing you of that requirement. Have you requested relief from the requirement / commitment in writing?"
- 3. Occasionally, a member of the licensee's staff takes a ridiculous position on a finding or makes light of an
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item of noncompliance or deviation. One suggested method of handling this situation is to ask the senior licensee representative present if the position expressed by the individual represents the position of the company.
If the answer is in the affimative, request the manage-ment representative to repeat the Company's position, as you don't want to misstate the position in the inspection report and the letter requesting confirmation of their position.
F. THIRD PARTY ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS The occasion may core up where a third party such as a state regulatory group or concerned citizen group wants to attend licensee /NRC meetings such as the exit interview. When this occurs, the inspector should contact his supervisor for guidance. Generally speaking, before a third party is granted pennission to attend licensee /NRC meetings, an understanding of the ground rules is reached and in some instances, a formal agreement is documented establishing meeting rules. The meet-ing rules would generally establish that NRC is in control of the meeting and the third party participation would be limited.
(Region V and the State of Oregon)
IV. REFERENCES A. IE Procedure No. 30703B - Management Meetings - Entrance and Exit Interviews B. PI 0200/4 - Use of Tape Recorder C. IE Procedure No. 927008 - Licensee Event Followup 4-19
HOW TO PERFORM AN INSPECTION INVOLVING DOCUMENTATION REVIEW AND OBSERVATION OF WORK ACTIVITIES I. . Learning Objectives The learning objectives of this topic are to:
A. Understand the importance of preparation for inspection.
B. Understand the need to develop own mode of operation during inspections.
C. Obtain sufficient guidance and detailed information to perform adequately during on-site inspection.
D. Obtain sufficient guidance and detailed information to perform inspections.
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II. Introduction
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Th'e key to effective review of records and observation of activities is knowing what the regulatory requirement should look like on the job and then looking for it. It is important to always know what you're looking for; if you don't know what you're looking for you'll never find it.
This topic will discuss some of the methods used by inspectors, both pro's and con's. Hopefully it will save you the hardship of learning completely through trial and error. This section will also discuss some typical on-the-job observations. What's presented is not mandatory, just one way of doing the job.
The essential idea of this section is to be innovative, be aware of what j other. inspectors are doing, and ask what caused another inspector to
. find something.
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III. Preparation for the Inspection
$ A. Inspector Qualification and Training
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Inspector assignments should be consistent with the guidance of MC 0226, App. A, which specifies minimum hiring qualifications- for
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the varicus types of inspectors in IE. MC 0226, App. B, specifies
. applicable training to be given each inspector based upon the areas to be inspected. Satisfaction of these policy directives should assure the capability of personnel to effectively perfonn their inspection function.
B. Review of Inspection Procedures l Prior to performance of an inspection, the applicable inspection procedure should be reviewed to identify discrete actions to be performed. For each line item in Section II of the inspection procedures the inspected observation should be envisioned, i.e.
the form of the item or area to be inspected, the format or content of records, or the group perfonning the activity.Section III of the 1.
inspection procedure provides supplemental guidance as to a means ,
i of perfonning the inspection prescribed by Section II; but does not limit the inspector to its guidance.Section III also frequently contains references as an aid to the inspector. If used, inspection data sheets or similar field note plans should be generated based
)
) on the line items of Section II of the inspection procedure.
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C. Establishment of Acceptance Criteria
- 1. Docket Material
-A review of the docket material should be performed for the -
area to be inspected to establish discrete acceptance criteria for each line item of Section II of the inspection procedures. Additionally, the inspector should become familiar with aspects of the area to be inspected other than those identified in the inspection procedure. These other aspects should provide a general background of licensee commitments and should help the inspector in envisioning the field application of discrete regulatory requirements.
Specific examples of docket material which would contain acceptance criteria, or establish regulatory requirements, or-licensee commitments are:
- a. preliminary and/or Final Safety Analysis Report
- b. Docketed letters between the licensee and the NRC (both IE and the licensing offices).
- c. Prior enforcement correspondence
- d. Safety Evaluation Reports
- e. Facility License
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- 2. Codes and Standards In addition to the requirements identified in the facility 5
- docket, specific acceptance criteria are also contained in Codes and Standards invoked either by 10 CFR 50.55a, by SAR or letter commitment, or by Regulatory Guides committed to by the licensee. These Codes, Standards and Guides are generally specific to an area of inspection; and are frequently listed in Section III of the inspection procedures. Care must be exercised to avoid application of requirements to which the 1
licensee is- not committed, e.g. , later edition of Codes, or
- Regulatory Guides to which the licensee has not committed.
D. Consultation f
An essential ingredient of preparation, especially for newer inspectors, but also important for experienced inspectors, is the discussion of inspection objectives and techniques with other inspectors. Frequently, experienced inspectors will be able to
~
speed the inspection by advising of the form applied regulations will take at- a particular facility. Likewise, the form of records and the identification of site responsibility can reduce lost time.
E. Applied Regulatory Requirements It is of paramount importance that the inspector attain two principal objectives during the preparations phase of inspections:
3 1
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He must develope the knowledge of the form, format, and 1.
practices which he will observe in the field which will constitute acceptable compliance with regulatory requirements; and
- 2. He must identify discrete acceptance criteria to be applied I during his inspection.
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ba IV. Preliminary Review (Onsite)
This phase is really scoping the portion of the actual inspection when the inspector first arrives onsite. The amount of time required for this depends upon the inspector's knowledge of the site and its operations. The inspector shculd obtain the infonnation needed to be efficient with his time and the licensee's time. The items listed below should be considered.
A. Who are the licensee contacts for the activities to be inspected?
It should be remembered that if the inspector is looking at more than one facet of the activity there may be more than one contact.
It is helpful at this time to identify the depth of knowledge required from the contact. Obtaining phone numbers of the contacts can save much shoe leather.
B. Obtain infonnation regarding the records associated with the activi ty. Include the procedures used, location of records, and amount of records. If records are needed from pennanent storage, identify these to the licensee so that they can be retrieved and will be available when required.
C. Where are the locations of the activities to be inspected? What are the access requirements? If unescorted access is needed, what badges, training, etc., will be required?
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D. Ascertain the status of the activities to be inspected. This could include records and the licensee's review of results or data. Use this information to establish the order of the inspection.
During this preliminary review period, the inspector should have considered if specific areas of inspection are going to be announced or unannounced. For example, if the inspector wishes to observe maintenance activities, he can ascertain what activities are in progress, then either identify those activities to the licensee or just drop in on one. He should consider the following. Observing an activity without prior knowledge by the licensee gives greater confidence that what he is seeing is the way the licansee normally conducts that type of activity. Infonning a licensee of specific areas to be observed can be more efficient for both the inspector and licensee. It can also preclude the activity be ng completed prior to the inspector seeing it.
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r V. Observation of Activities A. Preparation preparation has been discussed earlier in this session and in other sessions; however, its importance cannot be overemphasized; l The more known about the activity, the easier and better it can be inspected. Review the licensee's procedures and obtain copias if desirable. The procedures may contain references that have been overlooked or were not known to the inspector. If the licensee is using pre-work training or conferences, consider attending to increase the depth of knowledge, as well as to assess the quality of the training.
Select the portion or area of the activity to be observed. Try to select the heart of the activity, not the frills if time for observation is limited.
When developing an inspection plan for this area, be efficient.
Use the copier, cut and tape sections of Technical Specifications, MC, etc. , to save time and preparation. A marked-up copy of the procedure which highlights the specific areas or items may be sufficient. It is not a bad idea to be prepared for items in addition to those specifically required by the MC for use as independent inspection time or for use if the activity is not going as scheduled.
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B. What to Look For?-
By the time the inspector arrives at the activity, he should have knowledge of what the regulatory requirements are going to look like on the job. If he does not, he is just sightseeing and not inspecting. If an inspector sees an activity that does not fit his preconception, it does not mean he has found noncompliance.
The inspector has only reached a point to start asking questions and digging. There are a number of ways of meeting many regulatory requirements. It is probably best to get to the bottom line at this time. For example, if a procedure is to be used and one is not observed, ask the licensee how he is fulfilling the Tech Spec requirement to have a procedure. He might say to the men, "Do a step, then call Joe Blow on the phone," and Joe checks the step off and reads them the next step. That might be ok, but make sure that it is that way by questions and observation before accepting it. The inspector should look for everything he has expertise in.
He should not wear blinders or be a slave to his checklist or inspec-tion plan. If he is properly prepared and has a good plan or check-list, he will be able to get the things needed without constant referral to the list.
When items are observed which are inconsistant or odd, it is time to question. Many times there will be logical reasons for the odd 5-10
things. Just because the licensee can provide a logical reason it does not make the item right. Some regulatory requirements for review or approval might have been bypassed or the item might suggest a weakness in the way the licensee was attempting to control the activity.
If a procedure is to be used for the job, look for evidence of use or disuse. Dirty procedures could indicate use, but procedures can get dirty if they are left lying around unused and stuff 1s piled on them. Is the procedure up to date? Does the procedure fit *.he job? An example might be a repair procedure for rod drives.
In the office the procedure looks good, i.e. the ' disassembly, inspection and reassembly of a drive can be followed. On the job 40 drives are being worked on in parellel and reassembled in assembly line fashion with parts going every which way. The procedure which reads well in the office probably is not controlling the job as it is being performed.
Always look at safety in and around the activity. Besides the specifics the iniaector is looking for, if not included, he should look for fire hazards, radiological hazards, and industrial safety hazards. Why industrial? Two reasons: One it is the inspector's body that is being hazarded; Two, industrial accidents in contam-inated are n can mean radiological problems. If someone gets seriously injured or killed in a nuclear related activity, even 5-11
though its a ty'pical industrial accident, it not only affects the individual.but could also have far reaching implications to the NRC and the industry.
Look for the posting required in the area of the work; radiological permits, fire / hot work permits,10 CFR 20, etc. Compare the job to the posting, and posting to the job.
Develop the ability to always "see" the important aspects of the activity even though they may not be part of the specifics being inspected at the time. For example, if calibration is important, then when observing a meter face for a reading value the inspector should also read the calibration sticker.- This comes through experience. One way to develop this is to write the routine items on a 3" x 5" card. Periodically while observing the activity, the card should be referred to see if the inspector is "seeing" those items listed.
Look at the peripheries around the activity that is being inspected.
Many times the specific activity may be all right, but it is degracing something else. For example, maybe safety related pipe is being using for rigging, material is being_ stacked around a radiation monitor shielding it or nearby equipment is being damaged by the activity. Watch for workmen standing on instrumentation and tubing.
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Look ahead at future inspections where possible. Establish an infomation base for future inspection areas or identify a
" suspicion" to be followed up at tne next inspection. Remember though if it is an obvious noncompliance, develop it at' the
- time. not at a later inspection.
$ The inspector should make independent measurements where he can.
This can include recording data, calculations, observing tests, measuring, using instruments where possible, etc. Sometimes just acting like he is. recording items increases a~11censee's awareness and performance in that area.
Observation on back shifts sometimes include looking for negative actions on the part of the licensee besides the positive actions-taken to meet regulatory requirements. For example, if the licensee is only staffed to provide QC coverage on the day shift- for welding activities, the inspector's observation on a back shift should verify the absence of welding activities.
C. Interviewing A good interviewing technique is probably the strongest tool of -
our trade. Interviews during an inspection can be anything from a simple question or two, to a detailed questioning covering many hours. The techniques covered here are applicable to both. There are two important points to remember. If the inspector is doing all the talking, he is not getting the information. So loosen up the individual and let him talk. Impressing him with the inspector's 5-13
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J knowledge does.not gain much.
In' fa'ct, acting.somewhat dumb in ,
subject areas probably gains more as &e individual then must ,
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. verbalize more detail s to try and cocynonic, ate with the inspector.
Most workmen want to " educate".,an inspector about what they are M.< -
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doing, if asked. '
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The second important point .-
is that an inspector cannot take information off the record that reYhtes to. safety or noncompliance #
. with the regulations: The only thing he can do is protect the ,
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source. . -
'The following ' lists 'of Do's and Don'_ts should help the inspector ,
in. developing his-interviewing tecknique. 'y
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- 1. Do's ' '
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- a. Get individual relaxed.
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- b. Be as-priv te as possible iin the individual's own environment.
- c. 'Use' terms interviewer can relate to. '
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- d. Sfay'away from questions that can be answered by "yes" or "no", <'
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- e. Watch for mood changes or changes in response to questions.
These can be clues as to problem areas that need,to be developed or about the openness of the response. 7 a
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5-14 ,
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- f. Try to dress to fit the situation. Suit and' tie do not fit when interviewing a welder on the job, as grubbies do not fit in the corporate offices.
- g. Ask the right questions. Most people-do not lie. They stretch things and do not volunteer information that they are afraid of.
- h. Do try a different track if the interview is not developing the required information. Sometimes appearing to drop the interview and starting a bull session will get the answers if the bull session is steered in the right direction.
- 2. Don'ts
- a. In general, do not take a lot of notes during the inter-view. Write the notes after the interview while they are fresh in mind. Never use a tape recorder to record othert conversations. If the notes are going to be part of the report or record, read them back to the individual to see if he agrees that that is what he said.
- b. Don't made accusations, but rather try to develop incon-sistencies in answers.
- c. Don't interrupt, but do steer at pauses.
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- d. Don't put pressure on the ' individual by harsh tones, inflections, etc. If pressured, he will clam up and only answer yes or no.
- e. Don't give that feeling that you are above or better than him.
- f. Don't take things off the record. You can not if it-relates to safety. - The only thing you can do is protect the source.
- g. Don't get between the individual and his company's policy.
- h. Don't take general allegations. Get the specifics. If _
possible, do not take allegations that are not our concern. Refer alleger to responsible agency,
- i. Don't let the interview interfere with the safe perform-ance of what the individual is doing if the interview is on the job. Know when to back off and come back later.
j . As a general rule, don't tie up people at breaks, after normal working hours, etc.
- k. Don't sandbag an individual. If you do not like what he knows or is doing and will be discussing it with his boss or management, let him know. Most individuals will let
, you do it only once.
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i
., g D. - What If's Every inspector will come up against odd situations. A few of the more common situations will be presented in this section. Improve-ment can be gained in handling "what if's" by recognizing them, 4
then through critical self-evaluation of the event after the fact.
Discussions with.other more-experienced inspectors is also helpful.
- 1. - What. if the inspector arrives at the area of the activity to be inspected and finds nothing going on? Do not go away.
Look at the general conditions. Is the procedure up-to-date?
I Does the "as left" condition fit the procedure? Any safety hazards? Equipment, system and/or material properly protected or stored? Calibration stickers?
- 2. What if work stops when the inspector shows up? Many times workers are. hesitant to do things in the presence of an inspec-o
- tor. Informing them of the purpose of the_ inspector's presence and starting a conversation about the weather will relax them enough to restart the work. If work cannot be restarted in this manner, first try waiting them out. If that doesn't
. work, leave the area and return with a supervisor.
- 3. What if you see something wrong?
- a. Alone.
(1) Obtain a licensee representative to explain'the specifics to and have as a witness.
5-17 7 -y ., *'y , .$-. 4 +.-,-.-,.--w, -
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(2) If the item needs action, get a representative from the licensee.
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(3) The inspector may come across items which need imediate corrective action. These situations. require
- - a great deal of judgment on the inspector's part.
I The inspector should have given some thought to this prior to going into the field. He should know his .
capabilities and limitations. For example, if the
_ inspector comes upon a fire, he should always report it to the licensee. Now does he fight it or wait and watch the licensee's reponse? Picking up a l fire extinguisher and putting out a small waste material fire may better protect public health and
)
safety than watching the licensee fight the larger fire that developes. An inept inspector trying to fight a large fire and hindering the licensee's well-trained fire crew could have just the opposite effect.
4
- b. Appears to be leading to noncompliance?
^
Stop it from happening if possible. A case can be made that a facility is safe as long as it operates within the regulations. As an NRC representative, an inspector cannot allow a licensee to proceed down a path that would lead to noncompliance and the implied unsafe condition. -)
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- c. An activity needs to be stopped for safety. The only official method is through the Order or Immediate Action Letter which requires IE:HQ action. It is sometimes quicker and more efficient to explain the problem to the individuals involved and suggest that they consider stopping until it can be resolved. If this does not work, do the same with the facility management.
- d. If something appears to be of first order safety, it i
should be corrected (immediate corrective action) by the licensee prior to the inspector leaving the site.
- 4. What if operators question the inspector?
The inspector should try to answer the questions to the best -
of his ability, as the questions relate to the regulatory aspects of his job or inform the individual where the answer might be obtained. The inspector should not interpret licensee policy or get caught in licensee's internal politics.
S. What if the inspector is told he is disturbing work or inter-fering with safe operation?
It is possible for an inspector to be overly aggressive.
The inspector should make an honest evaluation of the situa-tion. Maybe the inspection can be done another way or at another time. It might be that the licensee is trying to hide something. The inspector has a legal basis for being
- 5-19 4
- - - . . . - - - - - . - - .n , . -.- ..--r - -
a 4 there, for having access, and to conduct the inspection, but not to interfere with operations. If the inspector feels the licensee is trying to hide something he should remain in the area and make what adjustments he can to remove the licensee's claim he is interfering.
- 6. What if an overly helpful or interfering licensee representa-tive is encountered?
The inspector can request that no one accompany him during that portion of the inspection or he might take the frank approach of asking the representative to keep quiet. If the inspector cannot tolerate the individual or work it out with him; the inspector should meet with the licensee management to work out a compromise. )
- 7. What if the inspector feels he cannot walk away from an activity? This is a sure sign that there is a problem. If the inspector's presence is required for safe operation, the licensee is not doing his job. Sometimes the feeling is generated by the inspector's intuition. It is something he has seen, but it just has not registered yet. If the inspec-tor remains in the area and continues his observation, he will ususally identify the problem.
- 8. What if the licensee is mad at the inspector?
It makes the job hard. The best remedy is to avoid it.
The inspector should try to avoid the appearance of being s
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overly aggressive and argumentative with the licensee.
The inspector should establish a code of conduct for his inspection activities. Three good starting points are:
a) Do not hassle operators or workers, b) Do not get between an operator and his control panels without specific permission, and c) know and try to follow the licensee's policies relative to access, conduct, etc. One approach is to participate in licensee trainin, sessions when convenient to learn his internal policies and procedures.
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VI. Record Review )
4 A. General The inspector must know what he is'looking for. The inspector must-know what the regulatory requirements will look like on paper. The inspector who is just reviewing' the records will find nothing.
The process of generating the records to be reviewed should be observed so the inspector can visualize the record generating process during his review of the records.
B. Preparation The inspector should select a sample size. The sample size can be based upon the manual Chapters or some statistical basis.
Another approach is to do a 100% scan of the records over a selected -)'
time period picking selected interesting ones for more detailed review. The inspector should know and understand the basis and purpose of the records prior to initiating his review.
The inspector should select a location for_ the review. Things to consider are where the records are stored and the ability to locate and retrieve them. It is sometimes beneficial to review them near a licensee representative who can answer questions when they come up. It should be recognized that if records are being reviewed just as they are being generated, test data for example,
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m the licensee's review process may not have had an opportunity to function; and if the review process is to be verified as part of the inspection, other records will have to be reviewed. For many inspection efforts the fact that the licensee's review identified an omission or odd data, is just as important or more important than the fact that it occurred. The licensee must function and identify his own problems when the inspector is not present, which is most of the time.
C. Types of Reviews
- 1. Directed. A review of records to establish or verify a specific function or regulatory requirement.
Inspection procedures from the IE Manual usually indicate specific records reviews to establish that the licensee is doing certain things. In many cases it is only a starting point. Reviews, approvals, etc., do not always establish that the licensee is doing the job properly or that the record is valid. This will be covered later.
- 2. Explorative. Looking for the results of a suspected or alleged weakness. This type of review requires a prior knowledge by the inspector either through knowledge of weaknesses in the licensee's administrative controls, 5-23
+
procedure review, experience or allegations. The inspector then alleges in his mind what and where the error will be and reviews the records to see if he can confirm his hypothesis.
- 3. Specific. Probably the most deadly review is a 1007, scan using the above approach to select the sample for the requirements of the inspection procedure. This approach should not be used to fulfill 100% of the inspection procedure requirements as it is important to establish that the licensee is functioning properly in more routine easy areas also.
- 4. Information. A review conducted to obtain information, trends
)
or identify problems for followup.
- a. The key to this type of review is to know what information is to be developed.
- b. For many inspectors, the more and faster the records are covered the better the review. When it is done right it is like speed reading.
- c. For Reactor Operations inspectors, the ability to follow plant operating modes and a knowledge of the related Technical Specifications requirements is essential to be efficient.
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-d.. . Key word notes are helpful in this type of review.
.. Reconstructive,- a review to reconstruct a specific event.
a.. Many times this type of review will require the -review of more than one log and/or record supplemented by
~
interviews. After information from all sources is gathered, it must be reconciled.
- b. For this type of review the following should be considered.
(1) Detailed notes should be taken from each source so that the information can be reconciled later.
(2) Unrelated items can be important as something can be mutually exclusive.
-[
(3) Times are always a pron 1am. Some people use only a guess or en approximate time in logs. If logs are in different locations, there can be clock errors. People's estimates of how long something takes are usually poor. Walk-throughs help give a better estimate.
D. Techniques
- 1. This section will cover some of the techniques used by inspectors and identify some pitfalls.
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- 2. When reviewing records the inspector should be aware of patterns in the records. Many people can tell from a person's actions when he is lying or covering something. This can also be true in logs and records.
- a. Understatement or overstatement can be the key to identifying something for further review or followup,
- b. The odd entry can be meaningful. Either in itself or the reason it was made.
- c. Changes in neatness, or the lack of, can indicate either that a lot of word engineering went into the log to cover something or that maybe the log was or was not ,
generated at the time of the event.
- 3. The inspector should know what is the best way to have the information presented to him and lay it out that way for his review. Many find the more and faster the infonnation is presented the better. The records should always be reviewed in sequence.
Make the best out of what's available. Most times it is more efficient to have a relatively quiet spot (without the licensee looking over the inspector's shoulder), but where the inspector 5-26
can ask key questions of someone who is knowledgeable in the area. For example, in the back of a control room is good for reviewing logs. Then when the inspector comes across an entry like MCIC he can get it explained without carrying it in his notes.
This is a good spot to discuss abbreviations and acronyms in logs. The specific regulatory items required to be in logs are few. These should be presented in readily understood wording. The log is to communicate within the licensee's organization and should be understandable to him. In other words, the inspector may have to learn the licensee's system, but should make sure the licensee understands it. The inspector should ask what an acronym or abbreviation means.
If the licensee has to think about it, or look it up, then the entry is not communicating and the inspector has a basis for having it chcnged.
The inspector should engineer his review to be more efficient.
Use good judgment on how close to examine. 1he review should not be carried to the 'n-th' decimal if operating at half the limit. When reviewing respective data, the limiting case should be found and reviewed critically, then compare the rest of the data to it.
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Return records to the licensee. Do not leave a pile for him to clean up. Make sure he knows the records have been returned. If something is missing or misplaced after an inspector leaves, he will be blamed. It is all right to " pull" records from the file (with pemission), but let the licensee refile. ;
- 4. How many notes to take? This is often a matter to be decided between the inspector and his supervisor. The following i items will provide guidelines on establishing the amount.
- a. The minimum notes taken by the inspector should at least establish the records reviewed. The inspector should take enough notes to be able to write his report >
upon return to the office. This implies that areas he will be discussing in his report will be backed up by more notes than a clear area. The inspector should be critical of the notes he is taking. Too many might be wasting time, too few makes it hard to write a report and justify findings. If the inspector takes large amounts of notes and finds he does not use them, he is ;
probably wasting time during an inspection,
- b. Many inspectors, during a review of records, note the records and dates. Then as items or questions arise the item is noted leaving room for followup notes.
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d Highlighting the open question is helpful so the inspec-tor can get it answered prior to leaving the facility.
- c. Xerox copies of logs or records can save the inspector time. Many licensees are hesitant to allow the inspec-tor to make copies. Usually, if the inspector explains that the copy will not go to the POR unless someone requests his notes under the Freedom of Information Act, the licensee will allow him a copy. The inspector can also point out the efficiency gained by him and the ,
licensee if he does not have to hand copy all the information.
- d. For items of noncompliance, more detailed notes are
(. -
required. Items and references to establish plant conditions and specific details of the items of non-compliance should be recorded.
- e. If administrative support allows, electronic recording devices may be used to take notes. It should be remembered that these notes are not readily reviewable during the inspection, so more significant items should be written f
so the inspector can refer to them during the inspection and at the exit interview.
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E. Establishing the Validity of the Records How does the inspector know the records he is reviewing are valid?
There are a number of approaches to establishing the validity of the records. The best is to observe the record being generated, but this is not practical in most cases. Other methods are dis-cussed below.
- 1. Interviewing. The inspector may choose to conduct interviews.
During the interviews he should establish that the record was generated in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel. He should establish that the individual who generated the record understood what he was doing and was not just filling in blanks. ;
- 2. Procedure review. The inspector may review the procedure to determine that it was technically correct and could really produce the bottom line.
- 3. Data reduction or calculation. The inspector may review the raw data, establishing the basis for the data (calibrations, etc.), and then reduce the data or perform his own calculations.
- 4. Cross checks with other records can also be used to establish validity. Though not as accurate as most test recorders, control room recorders should track tests, for example.
- 5. Sometimes tests, etc., will appear to have been " dry labbed."
They may have been, but there can also be logical explanations 5-30
_ - - . ~ . .
, which can be verified, such as the original was contaminated or the data were collected at more than one location then recopied.
- 6. Probably the best method to establish validity is a com-bination where the inspector compares the administrative and regulatory requirements to the procedure, review, inter-views, and his observations of a portion of the activity.
- 7. Computers are harder to verify as they are typically used for more complex application. The inspector can gain some assurance of validity by using one or more of the following techniques:
- a. Review of the program.
k
- b. Establish the validity of the computer input by calibra-tion records or comparison of plant parameters. ,
- c. Review of licensee's QA program as it relates to program control, etc.
- d. Conducting hand calculations.
- e. Requiring test calculation based upon known input and output.
- f. Re-input of data.
l g. Input of inspector generated data.
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VII. Review of Related QA/QC Activities -
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A. Qualification of Inspectors s
. The licensee's QC inspectors who were involved in inspection or audit of activities inspected in V and VI above must be qualified in accordance with commitments contained in the FSAR. Lacking commitments to the contrary, guidance contained in Regulatory Guides 1.8-(ANSI N18.1), and 1.58 (ANSI N45.2.6) defines acceptable levels of qualification for QA/QC personnel.
To verify the qualifications, records of certification should be available from the senior QA representatives on-site. Barring availability of documentation, the involved inspector should be interviewed by the IE . inspector to assure satisfaction of training and qualification requirements.
B. QA/QC Records of Inspection Activities To support the adequacy of QA/QC inspection and audit requirements, records should be available from the QA organization defining:
. Activity inspected
. Inspection procedure followed
. Observations of the QC inspector
. Resolution of any problems identified by the QC inspector l
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m, QA/QC records may take the fonn of a log book, checklist or completed procedure; but as a minimum they must support any QA/QC sign-off's in the procedures for the work. They should also be sufficient to demonstrate surveillance oil the frequency required by plant or work procedures.
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VIII. Inspection Findings A. Specificity During the inspection, items will often be identified which constitute noncompliance with NRC regulations. Once such an item has been identified, the necessary information must be accumulated (normally while still on-site) to support a written citation. To stand the test of a critical second evaluatior ';y regional management, and ultimately by the licensee, the specifics of the finding are required. In general, these specifics include:
. The NRC Regulation or licensee condition violated
. The licensee's procedures for complying with the Regulation or licensee condition
. The specific observation of the IE inspector which violates the above two requirements.
It is important at this point during the inspection to record exact quotes which will be needed as well as complete reference document identification. Observations by the inspector should define the scope of the area examined as well as the detail of the noncomplying observation. Obtaining these data concurrent with the inspection activity permits their being quoted during the exit interview and facilitates preparation of the notice of violation.
You, as the inspector, must continually evaluate your discoveries against the acceptance criteria established for the inspection and as variances from these criteria (regulations and license conditions) are discovered, they must be recorded and evaluated. No compliance, 5-34
however insignificant it appears to the inspector should go unrecorded; however, action taken should be based on the significance, e.g., violation, infraction or deficiency. In cases of obvious omicsion or oversight, the inspector should attempt to confirm the adequacy of the activity using whatever other objective evidence is available to detennine the safety of the activity. In those cases where it can be confirmed that there is no noncompliance-in-fact, that the item is totally " nit," the finding and the justification for not citing should be included in the Details section of the inspection report and discossed in the Management Interview.
As discussed later (in Chapter 7) any item detected which is an item of noncompliance (or even of concern) should be discussed with the licensee during the course of the inspection. This will permit further action on his part which might develop additional k iowledge which would affect the significance of the item or finding prior to the Exit Interview.
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l r IX. Sumnery i :
A. Prepare for specific inspection planned. ;
- B. Develop own style.
1
! C. Be time conscious - yours and licensee's. !
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! D. Be considerate - Don't badger or dominate licensee.
i E. Develop sufficient infonnation to substantiate findings, i
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X. References A. Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Personnel Selection and Training"
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.58, " Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant j Inspector, Examination, and Testing Personnel" C. ANSI N45.2.6, " Qualifications of Inspection Examination and Testing Personnel for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants"
- 0. ANSI N18.1, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" E. IE Manual, Chapters 0200, 2500 5-37
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l HOW TO DEAL WITH APPARENT FRAUD AND/0R PREVARICATION l i I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES The IE Inspector should develop a good understanding of:
- a. The functions and responsibilities of the Office of Inspector andAuditor(OIA). !
l l b. How OIA and IE interface in the handling of criminal activi-ties. l
- c. The Inspector's responsibility regarding the identification of criminal activities and who the Inspector is to notify l once these activities are identified.
- d. How NRC, via OIA, develops potential criminal cases and I refers them to law enforcement agencies and/or the Depart- ;
l
- nent of Justice, j
- e. Those criminal statutes covering the types of criminal [
activities IE Inspectors are most likely to detect during the performance of routine inspections. ;
- f. Those Violations of the Codes of Federal Regulations which I are punishable as crimes.
i
- g. Specific investigative and interview techniques that should i be used by the IE Inspector in obtaining information on activities that are potentially criminal in nature,
- h. How and when to take signed statements.
- i. Constitutional Warnings.
- j. The extent to which the IE Inspector is expected to develop information on potential criminal activities that he detects and whom he advises. ,
[
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- - - _ . - - - _ - _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ . . - - - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - -_-ms--me-
r I
- k. Functions and jurisdiction of federal and state investigative agencies.
- 1. Production of statements and reports of witnesses (Jencks Act),
- m. Parallel Proceedings (effect of criminal investigations on routineinspectionactivity).
- n. Applicability of the Privacy Act to IE inspection activities.
- o. Confidential Informants.
- p. Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act and Part 21 of 10 CFR.
)
)
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II. INTRODUCTION
- . It is imperative that Inspectors be aware of and be familiar with situations which are apparent violations of laws and relate to the day-to-day activities of the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment. Most potential violations of law pertaining to NRC functions l have been found over the past several years to manifest themselves
! as a result of inspections conducted by IE. IE's Inspectors are the first line of defense in this area and consequently the Inspector must be knowledgeable enough to detect and understand the significance of these matters. In this way, Regional Investigators will be able to pick up on the initial information and further develop the facts for referral to IE:HQ and OIA for analysis and possible criminal-referral. In' order for an Inspector to be knowledgeable in this area, he must have a basic understanding and familiarity with the applicable criminal statutes, regulations, case examples (fact patterns),
investigative procedures, investigative techniques, headquarter's support, investigative agency functions, criminal referral procedures
.and NRC/ law enforcement interfaces. It is the purpose of this training to provide these tools for the Inspector.
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III. DISCUSSION A. Office of Inspector and Auditor
- 1. Delegation of Authority and Functions
- 2. Liaison (Interface) - Criminal Investigative Agencies
- 3. Liaison'(Interface) - IE
- 4. Referral Procedures with Criminal. Investigative Agencies and/or the Department of Justice.
- 1. Delegation of Authority and Functions
- a. Pursuant to the delegation of authority granted by the Connission, the functions of the Office of Inspector and Auditor which relate to IE operations are:
- 1) Conducting investigations and inspections to ascertain
)'
and verify the facts with regard to the integrity of all NRC operations (e.g., possible irregularities or alleged misconduct of NRC employees).
- 2) Conducting followup investigations, where appropriate, on questions raised during initial IE investigations or inspections. -
- 3) Referring any suspected or alleged criminal violations of law to the Department of Justice, after appropriately informing or consulting with the Office of General Counsel, except that referrals requiring prompt field response (including sabotage, terrorism, or theft 6-4
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i of special nuclear matarials), IE makes direct '
referral to the Fede,ra158 urea 20f Investigation or appropriate federal *oh. state law enforcement l agency and thereafter coor'dinates with OIA. '
l
! 4) Maintenance of liaison with the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies in criminal and other invest,igative ma,tters.
- 2. Liaison (Interface) with Crimina'1 Investigative Agencies
,r .
! a. OIA maintains contact with federal and state criminal -
! investigative agencies on a daily basis to follow matters l
which have been referred, davylop contacts and staf
- abreast of the latest developments in te'chniques and intelligence.
- 3. Liaison (Interface) with IE OIA Maintains daily contact with71E in several areas:
l
- a. Matters over which IE has direct referral jurisdictior. ,
(immediateresponse)arecoordinatedwithOIA. The Executive Office for Operations Suppor,t, IE, notifies l
the Assistant Director for Investigations, 0IA, of Ehe Regional referral and any followup action is coordinated i
i- between IE and OIA.
- b. Matters which are developed from IE inspections are re-viewed by IE Headquarters for potential criminality and i
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periodically forwarded to 0IA for a further criminal review. Such matters then may be more fully developed by OIA from a criminal standpoint (as opposed to an IE health and safety aspect) or referred back to IE:HQ or the Region for further development. After a review has been made by 0IA and Executive Office for Operations Support, a final determination is made as to potential criminality by OIA. If a determination is made that the matter should be referred for prosecution, a referral letter is drafted and a referral package (i.e., IE inspection and/or investigation report (s) and OIA inves-tigation report) is attached and forwarded to the Depart- }
ment of Justice or the federal or state investigative agency having jurisdiction.
- c. Allegations made by individual members of the public, organizations (e.g., environmental groups) or employees regarding the integrity or conduct of IE or any other office's employees are referred by IE:HQ or the Chairman for investigation by OIA. The results of such investi-gations are forwarded to the Chairman and Director of the cognizant office. Disciplinary action, if appropriate, is made by components of NRC other than 0IA.
- d. OIA, pursuant to its delegation of authority, is charged with the responsibility of assuring that all agency i
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organizations are operating effectively and efficiently. l l
Consequently, the audit-arm of GIA conducts the day-to- I day internal audit activity of the NRC. Such audits and their resultant conclusions and recommendations are first presented in draft form to the cognizant Office Director and the Executive Director for Operations who make comments and recommendations. Once all matters have been resolved between 0IA and the Office audited, the final audit report is released to the Commission, Executive Director for Operations and cognizant Office Director.
- 4. Referral Procedures with Criminal Investigative Agencies and/or the Department of Justice. '
- a. OIA, after appropriately informing or consulting with the Office of General Counsel, refers suspected or alleged criminal violat.ons to the appropriate federal or state law enforcement agency for final investigation
, or directly to the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, which may refer the matter to the appropriate U.S. Attorney or Federal Bureau of Investigation for investigation under the signature of the Assistant Attorney General.
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B. Referral Procedures to be Followed by IE Inspectors Upon Detection of Apparent Criminal Conduct Unless otherwise modified or supplemented under the individual discussion of the criminal statutes mentioned in the subsequent paragraphs, an Inspector who believes or has reason to believe that he may have detected a possible criminal violation should immediately contact his Regional management and advise of the situation. They will in turn notify IE, HQ (Executive Office for Operations Support) who in turn will notify OIA and they will relay the information to state or federal law enforcement authorities if appropriate.
e C. Types of Federal Criminal Violations to Which an IE Inspector -3 May be Incidentally Exposed
)
- 1. Destruction of War Material, War Premises, or War Utilities (Sabotage) (Title 18 United States Code, Section 2153)
- a. -This section is operative only when the United States is at war or in times of National Emergency declared
,by the President or by the Congress (e.g., Korean Con-flict, Viet Nam, etc.). - As applies to the NRC, any o harm or attempted harm to electric lines, power stations, power plants or any building associated with them is a federal crime. This violation should be distinguished from peace time indu'strial sabotage, union dissension or radical group " sabotage." For example, in the past few years there have been numerous examples of damage
, )
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f, done to nuclear power plants either under construction or in operation (e.g., windings in generator motors at Indian Point 2). These acts would not constitute " war-time" type sabotage, but would be punishable under state criminal codes. These types of acts, although not falling under federal jurisdiction, when detected _by an Inspector should be passed on to Regional management for prompt field response with follow-up notification to the Executive Office for Operations Support which will-notify OIA.
- 2. Espionage (Title 18 United States Code, Sections 792 798)
- a. The above sections deal with various forms c.* espionage, I such as harboring persons, transmitting, delivering or receiving defense information, and photographing of de-fense installations. These federal crimes may occur during war or peace time and the likelihood of detection by an IE Inspector is slight. However, such conduct would most likely manifest itself in the area of unauthor-ized individuals dealing with the sale or receipt of classified information.
- 3. Transportation of Explosives, Radioactive Material or Etiologic Agents (Disease Causing) by a Vehicle For Hire (Title 18 United States Code, Section 832)
- a. This federal statute prohibits the transportation of dangerous substances by common carrier (truck lines, rail lines, etc.) without specific authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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- 4. Unauthorized Handling (Without License) of Special Nuclear Material (Title 42 United States Code, Section 2077; Section 57, Atomic Energy Act)
- 5. Unauthorized Handling (Without License)-of Source Material (Title 42 United States Code, Section 2092; Section 62, Atomic Energy Act)
- 6. Unauthorized Handling (Without License) of Byproduct Material (Title 42 United States Code, Section 2111; Section 81, Atomic Energy Act) ,
- a. Sections 4 - 6 above are federal violations prohibiting the transfer, receipt, delivery, possession, import or export of special nuclear, source or byproduct material without a license issued by the U.S. NRC.
- 7. Unauthorized Handling of Atomic Weapons (Title 42 United States Code, Section 2122; Section 92, Atomic Energy Act)
._} }
- a. This situation would most likely not occur while an Inspector was in the line of his duties, but an Inspector should be aware of this federal criminal statute's existence.
D. Types of Federal Criminal' Violations an IE Ins'pector is More Likely to Encounter
- 1. Theft of Government Property (Title 18 United States Code, Section 641)
The caption is self-explanatory and involves the theft of anything from a Government typewriter to an aircraft part being made under contract for the U.S. Government.
Normally, there is little or no government property at a nuclear plant and thus the direct bearing of such an offense on the IE/NRC ..
function is limited.
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- 2. Willful (Not an Accident) Damage to Government Property (Title 18 United States Code, Section 1361)
The caption is self-explanatory.
- 3. Theft From an Interstate or Foreign Shipment Made by a Common Carrier (Title 18 United States Code, Section 659)
This federal criminal statute makes punishable any taking of any material (whether Government or private property, such as a licensee's) from an interstate or foreign ship-ment made by a common carrier (e.g., truck line, railroad, shipline,etc.). The theft must take place while the material is aboard the conveyance (truck, etc.) or at the common carrier's depot, storage facility, wharf, etc. If the material which is stolen has reached its final destina-tion (e.g., nuclear power plant) and is no longer under the control of the common carrier, the crime would be under the jurisdiction of the state where the material was delivered.
Normally, an Inspector would hear of thefts at a construc-tion site (state jurisdiction), but if material were not received by the constructor or licensee at the site, then the theft would most likely fall under federal jurisdiction.
In the latter case,_the Executive Office for Operations.
Support should be notified.
- 4. Interstate-Transportation of Stolen Property (Title 18 United States Code, Section 2314)
This section is yet another variation on the federal criminal statutes dealing with theft of property (Government or private).
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The transportation by the thief must be interstate to dis-tinguish it from intrastate (state jurisdiction) violations.
Such situations would most likely be encountered by an Inspector at a construction site or at a vendor's facility.
E. Tyms of Federal Criminal Violations an IE Inspector is Much More Li(ely to Encounter
- 1. Riots (Title 18 United States Code, Section 2101)
This section provides that whoever travels in interstate or foreign comerce or uses any facility (. telephone, mail, telegraph, bus, airline, etc.) of interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to incite, organize, encourage or commit an act in furtherance of a riot is punishable under federal law. Although neither OIA or IE has the )
r responsibility for investigating this violation, under the working agreement between 0IA and IE, IE Regional Offices have the responsibility of reporting these matters immediately to local law enforcement agencies and the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Regional .0ffices have the further responsibility of reporting these activities to IE:HQ immediately thereafter (Executive Office for OperationsSupport). It is clear that numerous nuclear power plants either under construction or in operation have been subjected to gatherings of large group of demonstrators (e.g.,Seabrook) in the past few years. It is imperative that NRC, licensees and law enforcement agencies have this type of T
information imediately. j l
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- 2. ' Civil Disorders (Title 18 United States Code, Section 231)
This statute provides that whoever teaches or demonstrates
)
-to any other person the use or making of any firearm, ex-plosive or incendiary capable of causing injury or death and believes such information will be used to further a civil disorder which may in any way obstruct interstate commerce is punishable under federal law. The observations under
. 1. above apply.
< 3. Threatening Communications Transmitted in Interstate Commerce (Extortion) (Title 18 United States Code, Section 875(d))-
This statute provides that any threat to harm or injure the property or reputation (not the person himself) of a person, corporation, etc. for the purpose of extorting money and which 4
threat is tr ansmitted (communicated) in interstate commerce
\
is a federal crime. This statute has clear application in
-3ituations'where threatening communications demanding money are received by a nuclear power plant. Such calls may also constitute a separate state offense. Thus, as explained earlier, the Regional Offices are to transmit such informa-tion immediately and directly to the Federal Bureau of In-vestigation and local law enforcement agencies. The Region r- -
is to then advise IE:HQ (Executive Office for Operations Support).
- 4. Threatening Communications Transmitted by Mail (Extortion)
(Title 18 United States Code, Section 876)
The provisions of this section are identical to 4. above with the exception that the property or reputation to be 1
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, ., ,.w.-.- , , - - - .. , - . - . . - , - - , .,-3. , , . - - . - - . ~ - - , -
il s
threatened can only be that of a person (e.g., NRC confi- l dential information) rather than a person, corporation, etc.
and the threat is transmitted by mail. The manner in which matters of this nature are handled is identical to 4. above.
- 5. Extortion by Officers or Employees of the United States (Title 18 United States Code, Section 872)
Any officer or employee of the United States using his post-tion as a Government employee to extort by fear or intimida-tion money or anything of value is punishable under federal law.
- 6. Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence (Title 18 United States Code, Section 1951) LExtortion/Hobbs Act]
Any individual who in any way or to any degree obstructs, delays or affects connerce (need not be interstate) by robbery or by actual or threatened violence, fear, fear of injury, etc. to a person or to a person's property is punish-able under federal law. This statute, the Hobbs Act, was drafted with racketeering in mind and has been used by federal prosecutors on numerous occasions for extortion schemes conducted on construction sites where shakedowns occur with regularity (e.g., Calvert Cliffs prosecution).
T
)
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f F. Types of Federal Criminal Violations an IE Inspector is Most 4
, Likely to Encounter with the Greatest Degree of Regularity 1
- 1. Bribery of Public Officials FIncludes Offers to Bribel (Title 18 United States Code, Section 201) l -- This penal provision provides essentially:
- . a. OFFER OF BRIBE TO PUBLIC (FEDERAL) 0FFICIAL - It is [
unlawful to'give or offer to give directly or indirectly anything of value to a public official in order to 1
- 1) influence any official act,
- 2) to aid in the commission of a fraud against the United States,
- 3) to influence an officer or official not to do his official duty.
- b. SOLICITATION AND/0R RECEIPT OF BRIBE BY PUBLIC (FEDERAL) 0FFICIAL - It is unlawful for a public official to seek or receive directly or indirectly anything of value in order to s
- 1) be influenced irrthe performance of his official ~ acts, ,
- 2) be influenced to aid in the commission of a fraud against the United States, I
- 3) be influenced not-to do his official duty. r
, In brief,. the statute provides that it is illegal to offer a bribe to federal public officials and it is 1
" illegal for a federal public official to accept a bribe.
6-15 e6w A - --m , - ._._.r,. ,_ , _ - _ _ , _ , . _ - , ,,__,, ,y- ., --,-., _, <y..g - . .
This statute has taken on greater significance in recent years in light of Watergate, the publicity regarding .
nuclear energy and the numerous allegations made by in-dividuals regarding the integrity of all public officials, including IE Inspectors.
Detection of such a violation is relatively uncomplicated.
Normally, the individual contacted (official) will either advise of such an attempt or a third party will advise that such an offer was made or about to be made to an official. In order to fit the definition of " official,"
one need merely be an employee of the United States Government. -
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has jurisdiction over this violation and has responsibility for investigating such matters. However, in order.to report these matters to the Bureau, the basic facts must be given.to Regional management for transmission to IE:HQ (Executive Office for OperationsSupport). The Region should also notify the local office of the FBI. In collecting these preliminary facts after preliminary headquarters notification and receipt by the region of headquarters approval to collect such pre-liminary information, certain steps must be kept in mind.
- 1) Obtain, if possible, a signed statement from the in-dividual(s) (witness) who advised of such an attempt (not from the potential defendant). -
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,- 2) Corroborate testimony of individual (s) with circum-stantial. evidence (e.g., photograph taken by witness, document (s) obtained by witness, etc.)
- 3) Obtain names, addresses, and positions of persons involved.
- Caveat: The FBI has sole investigative jurisdiction, and these steps i.re only employed to obtain preliminary data i which may otherwise be lost if there is a delay between the time the Rr.gion contacts the local office of the FBI and OIA and IE:HQ contacts FBI:HQ and Special Agents of the FBI are assigned to cover the case. (This does not mean that the health and safety aspects of the matter should not be imediately pursued by the Inspector).
1
- 2. Conf 1fets of Interest (Title 18 United States Code, Sections 201 - 209)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has its own code of conduct (10 CFR Part 0) which applies to all NRC employees and makes reference to conflicts of interest. Further, IE has its own even more restrictive code of conduct (Manual Chapter 0235) which applies to all Inspectors and other IE personnel. In addition, there are several federal criminal statutes which address this very complicated and technical legal area.
The conflicts of interest statutes involve five basic pro-scriptions: ,
- a. A public official should not be in the position of acting for the Government where his or her private economic in-terests are involved (18 U. S. C. 208).
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- b. A public official should not receive from any source, other than the Government, any salary, or any contri-bution to or supplementation of salary, as compensation for his or her services as a public official (18 U.S.C.
~
209).
- c. A public official should not, in general, be permitted to depart from his official Government role to assist private entities or persons in their dealings with the Government (18 U.S.C. 203 and 205).
- d. Former public officials should not, within certain narrow limits of time and degree of connection with their former responsibilities once they have left Government, be allowed to assist private entities or persons in their dealings with the Government (18 U.S.C. 207),
- e. Public officials may not use for personal economic gain confidential information acquired in their official ca-pacities.
To determine whether a particular situation constitutes a criminal conflict of interest requires a very sophisticated, in-depth legal analysis. Consequently, any apparent conflicts of interest should be reported to Regional management for transmission to IE:HQ.
/
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l' An Inspector, when he has a question regarding what may con-stitute a possible personal conflict of interest (e.g.,
consulting work) should consult with his Regional management who in turn will consult with the Office of General Counsel (not0 ELD). The Office of General Counsel will then render a legal opinion either approving or disapproving the Inspector's contemplated action and thus controversy will be avoided at a later date.
i It is clear from today's public mood that all federal employees must be cautious when placed in situations which even re-motely suggest a possible conflict of interest and should
- receive agency assistance prior to acting.
- 3. Conspiracy (Title 13 United States Code, Section 371)
The first portion of this federal criminal statute provides that if two or more persons agree (conspire) to commit any offense against the United States (e.g., any of the statutes discussed above or below contained in Title 18 United States Code) they are guilty of a separate crime called conspiracy.
In addition, they can be found guilty of the crime which they agreed (conspired) to commit. Thus, if the facts reported by an IE Inspector constitute any one of the offenses de-scribed in this training material, it also constitutes the separate crime of conspiracy if done by two or more persons.
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- 4. Conspiracy (Title 42 United States Code, Section 2273, Section 223, Atomic Energy Act)
This statute provides that if two or more persons agree (conspire) to violate or if any person attempts to violate any of the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, they (he) may be subject to federal prosecution.
- 5. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (Title 18, United States Code, Section 371)
The second portion of this federal criminal statute provides that if two or more persons agree (conspire) to defraud the w.
United States or any of its agencies (e.g., NRC) in any manner or for any purpose, they may be charged criminally.
The ramifications of this provision are far reaching. Chief Justice Taft in a Supreme Court decision stated:
"To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily the cheat the government out of prop. *y or money, but it a?so means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the government shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud,but only that its legitmate official action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chica:e or ti.e over-reaching of those charged with carrying out the governmental intention."
)
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In a later case, the Supreme Court held:
"The statute (conspiracy) is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, ob-structing, or defeating the lawful function of any depart-ment of government."
This statute has been employed by the Department of Justice and NRC to criminally charge licensees. The Nuclear Engi-neering Company, Inc., a Teledyne Company, was charged in the United States District Court, Reno, Nevada with obstruct-ing, hindering and frustrating the IE inspection program by failing to advise IE Inspectors while at the NECO waste disposal site near Beatty, Nevada that certain items of liquid and solid radioactive waste were being buried uncon- n
~
- tained after unlawful removal from shipping containers. It ;
would seem that such activity would not be prescribed by the conspiracy statute, yet, the legal precedent for the use of its statuta is so all encompassing that any act which frus-trates the efficiency and integrity of any Government program is chargeable as a federal crime. No pecuniary of proprietary loss and no actual impairment of Government activity need be shown.
' 6. Statements or Entries Generally (Willful False Statements or Omissions) (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001)
- This section essentially provides that anyone (including a corporation) who in a matter within the jurisdiction of 6-21
a federal agency knowingly (not a mistake) and willfully (did it purposely) (a) falsifies a material fact or (b) conceals (omits to tell) a material fact or (c) makes a false statement or (d) makes or used a false document know-ing the document to be false may be charged with committing a federal crime.
This section in conjunction with the second part of the conspiracy statute (See E.4.above) is the cornerstone of the Justice Department's fraud against the Government program.
These statutes are used, as in the Nuclear Engineering Com-pany case, to prosecute persons or corporations whose actions have adversely affected a Government agency's legitimate )
function (e.g., inspection program). Potential violations of these sta+.utes will manifest themselves frequently during an Inspector's career. Detection may not be easy since a statement or document may not appear _ to be false on its face, by may only so appear once the Inspector speaks to others or examines.other documents.
It is clear that something may be false yet not chargeable under the criminal statute since the willful element may be missing (e.g., innocent mistake in a log book). Often, the willfulness can only be proven by establishing a clear and consistent pattern of falsehoods which would negate any de-fense of mistake or accident. s
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Another element must as a practical matter be satisfied be-fore a fact pattern could be discerned as chargeable under this section - materiality. It must be determined whether a a statement or document even if shown to be false would have been used and relied upon by a government official (e.g.,
IE Inspector) and have caused such an official to act in one way rather than another. If the Inspector even knowing the truth of the matter would have acted in the same manner as he did, then a crime may not as a practical matter (still a technical violation, such as running a stop sign on a desert island) be charged since the Government program was not even potentially affected. However, certain matters are-so sensitive that a willful false statement, false document or omission may be charged as a crime (even though nothing went wrong) by the Department of Justice in order to advise people or corporations dealing with this component of the Government that no such activity will be tolerated, no matter how inconsequential the effect.
Detection of such matters normally requires careful document study (audit) or alternatively, having a disgruntled employee or citizen point out the problem to a Federal employee.
Innumberable instances occur on a daily Nasis where an Inspector would be exposed to this type of situation. A potential for this type of violation exists any time an Inspector talks with a licensee-employee or reviews records.
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Federal law enforcement agencies have the sole investigative jurisdiction for this criminal violation. However, this type of conduct may also be the basis for an NRC enforcement action, and consequently IE has a legitimate interest in these matters (e.g., the VEPC0 North Anna geological fault case). Thus, in these cases there is a dual or parallel interest and both agencies (Justice and NRC) can and should pursue their interest while being careful that neither ham-pers the other. If Justice takes an interest in a matter of this nature, the Office of Inspector and Auditor would coordinate the efforts of NRC so that any criminal case would not be jeopardized. If resolution of the health and safety issue is paramount and even would jeopardize a criminal case, then the health and safety issue is of course first resolved.
Normally, however, both administrative action and criminal investigation can be successfully pursued as long as common sense guidelines are followed (e.g., NRC does not interview the potential defendant until Justice approval is received, etc.).
Remembering that federal law enforcement agencies have sole jurisdication over investigating these matters criminally, there are several basic investigative steps which should be followed when developing this type of case from an NRC (civil enforcement) viewpoint. /
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- a. Identify the statement, document or omission in question.
- b. Identify to whom and by whom made,
- c. Obtain, if possible, a signed statement from the indivi-dual (s) involved.
- d. Identify and obtain, if possible, the false or fraudulent document (a copy if that is all that is available).
- 7. 10 CFR Violations Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act makes punishable as felonies any violation of certain regulations issued pur-suant to either Section 65 of the Atomic Energy Act or sub-section b., i., or 0 of Section 161 of the Atomic Energy '
Act. Fifty-four separate regulatory provisions in Parts 20, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 50, 55, 70 and 71 are specifically listed in 10 CFR as having been issued under Section 65 or Section 161, b., i., or 0 of the Atomic Energy Act and are therefore punishable as felonies under Section 223 of the Act. A complete listing of these 10 CFR Sections are included in Appendix A. Several case histories are dis-cussed below which show the applicability of these regulations to day-to-day IE inspection operations.
- a. Nuclear Engineering Company (NECO)
As brief7y discussed above, NEC0 was the holder of a license issued by the AEC which allowed the disposal of 6-25
low level _ byproduct, source and special nuclear material by burial in the soil. For a period of several years, two site managers allowed the opening of shipping con-tainers (plywood boxes and large metal " Bennet Buckets").
The contents of these containers were removed and salva-gable items such as tools, milling machines and the con-tainers themselves were distributed to individuals throughout a wide area in the State of Nevada. In addi-tion, liquid radioactive waste which according to the provisions of the license was to be solidified prior to burial was disposed of directly into burial trenches in a liquid state.
~
Clearly, these actions constituted violations of the license conditions and were punishable under the enforce-ment procedures of the NRC. However, since these actions were so aggravated and were repeatedly done over a long period of time, the Office of Inspector and Auditor re-ferred the matter to the Department of Justice for further investigation and prosecution. .
The defendant was charged with two criminal violations oftheAtomicEnergyActbyreasonofitsfailuretocon-fine the possession and use of byproduct material to the locations and purposes authorized in the license as re-quired by 10 CFR 30.34(c).
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" b. Pacific Gas and Electric Company 10 CFR 20.401 provides for the making and maintenance of records showing the radiation exposures of all indi-viduals as required under Section 20.202. In this matter the licensee failed to maintain records of the results of the survey for contamination made in the connection with the receipt of new fuel. In this case, the item of non-compliance was a deficiency. However, under cer-i tain aggravated circumstances (e.g., death of an employee) i Section 20.401 could be used as a vehicle for charging the licensee with a felony, i
- c. Atlantic Research Corporation i This case involved the operations of a radiographic firm, i
The licensee was cited for violation of 10 CFR 34.43(b) which requires that a physical radiation survey be made 4
after each radiographic exposure during a radiographic operation to determine that the sealed source has been 1
returned to its shielded position. This type of activity clearly is fraught with danger and thus if any fatal or
.near fatal over exposures were received, the facts could easily merit a criminal charge.
There are numerous other exapmples where licensees have been cited for items of non-compliance which, if they fall under certain sections of Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal Regu-
-lations listed in Appendix A, may be charged as crimes if the circumstances are aggravated.
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.r I
G. Investigative and Interview Techniques
- 1. General Rules for Investigations
- a. If a matter takes on major significance, then it must be worked completely and fully in order to avoid any holes, loose ends, or criticisms of cover- ups.
- b. All logical leads should and must be followed (e.g.,
all witnesses to a conversation should be interviewed, all relevent documents should be obtained and reviewed).
- c. Prepare a chronology which will help you to understand all facets of the investigation and thus be better able to evaluate the potential of the matter. A chronology is a simple skeletal outline arranged in chronological
}
sequence listing significant dates, places, facts or events which gives a broad overview of the matter. A chronology will aid the Investigator / Inspector in seeing what areas remain to be covered and will place his thoughts in a logical order. It also provides an outline for -
drafting reports.
- d. The Investigator / Inspector should in a significant matter obtain signed statements whenever poss'ible (See H. below).
- e. All records or documents should be maintained for future use in any subsequent proceedings. Records should be put in a logical sequence so they may aid in documenting statements of persons interviewed.
's
)
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,, - ~
i
- f. Be totally familiar with your documents and records as received, for as an investigation develops, they may take on a new dimension and significance.
- g. Regarding records, be sure to receive anything offered; request what is not offered; give a receipt for every-thing received; request when possible originals of re-cords or documents.
- 2. Interview Techniques
- a. Plan fully in advance for an interview. Know what infor-mation it is you seek to obtain and how you plan to ob-tain it (strategy).
- b. For key interviews schedule sufficient time for a full, productive interview, preferably during mid-morning when you are fresh.
- c. Select a site for the interview where the possibility for interruptions are reduced to a minimum,
- d. Utilize the reporters "five W's and H" in order to obtain complete and full answers. Who, did what to who, when, where, why and how?
- e. Start an interviewee talking even if he rambles and then focus him in later,
- f. Be a good listener. It develops a rapport and projects interest and sympathy which encourages truthfulness and cooperation.
r .
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- g. Avoid telephonic interviews if at all possible with persons on critical matters.
- h. On key interviews, attempt to have two interviewers (one lead and one for backup and for a witness) intei'-
view a single person.
- 1. Avoid joint interviews (having two or more persons being interviewed at the same time). Joint interviews have a tendency to result in a single story for several people. Further, it is difficult for the person inter-viewed to "tell it like it is" when a co-worker or
~
supervisor is in the same room. The interviewee should be developing a rapport and confidence in the interviewer
-)
and this can't be done with other interviewees in his presence.
- j. Make every effort ta avoid having to recontact the interviewee unless good judgment and common sense so dictate (e.g., a new development in the matter).
- k. Once the person interviewed is relaxed and talking, control the direction and pace of the interview - don't let yourself be interviewed.
- 1. Ask simple direct questions and avoid the use of esoteric ambiguous language and " chain-type" questions (several questions joined into one).
I 6-30
.- . . _. . . - .. - . ~ . -. .- ..- . . .
- m. Avoid personality conflicts and don't threaten or intimidate the interviewee.
- n. Consider the need for a handwritten interview log de-tailing: i l) Person interviewed
- 2) Identity of Interviewer (s)
- 3) Place, date, time interview began.
- 4) Time advised of rights (if applicable) and ad' visor of rights.
- 5) Time interview concluded.
H. Document Control (Chain of Custody)
- 1. Label all documents as to source and when received. Have the person surrendering the document initial and date it. The Investigator / Inspector should also initial and date the document and give a receipt to the person surrendering the document. Note on a separate sheet of paper under what circumstances the document or records were surrendered (i.e., during an inter-view, voluntarily,etc.). Also note whether originals or copies were obtained. If a copy is surrendered, note who has the original, where it is located, or why the original ,
is no longer in existence.
- 2. Store all documents or records in a safe place.
- 3. If a surrendered document obtained by an IE Investigator /
Inspector is given to other IE personnel, other NRC personnel, K,_ l 6-31 l
l
- u. .
cr to another agency, note to whom given and for what pur-pose. If possible, release duplicates rather than originals.
If releasing originals and transmitting by mail, use certi-fied mail, return receipt requested, deliver to addressee only. If an original is surrendered, note when returned and by whom in order to preserve the " chain of custody."
- 4. Avoid having too many people handle or have control over documents or records which are to be used as evidence.
I. Signed Statements
- 1. Definition - A signed statement is the recording of written or oral testimony from a complainant or subject.
- 2. Types of Signed Statements )
- a. The person interviewed may relate the facts to the Investigator / Inspector who writes down the statement.
If this technique is employed, have the interviewee carefully review the statement, understand it and make any changes before the statement is signed.
- b. The question and answer format. This technique is rarely used except in circumstances where an interview has been taped with the interviewee's consent and it is later transcribed and signed by the witness. The inherent weakness with this taped Q and A format is that there is less time for the answers to be developed 1
6-32
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thoughtfully. Thus contradic'tions and inconsistencies are a part of the transcript and later explanations or ,
corrections may be needed to ir.ake the record clear.
- c. Theintervieweemaydictate,_hestatementtoastenograher j knile the Infestigator/ Inspector is present. This tech -
. nique iseless than ideal since the interviewer has little
]; or no part in shaping the interview into a logical,
'" " orderly and coherent statement which addresses itself to the topic under discussion.
i -d. The interviewee may be supplied a set of questions or i .
points to be covered and then the interviewee then or later draws up the statement. This technique is not recommended in pivotal interviews.
- e. The Investigator / Interviewer discusses the topic with j, 7 ,
the interviewee until the interviewee recalls all details and reviews all pertinent documents. The interviewee' ee then signs the4 statement! after carefully reading what was drafted by the' interviewer. This technique is nor-mally the most effective.
- 3. Incomplete or Superfluous Information 7.lInformationofthissortmaybehelpfultotheoverallcase,
/' but not directly on point. further, it may be information
~ that the interviewee may not.be completely oure of, yet is e.
< 6-33 N
useful in that it supplies potential investigative leads for the Investigator / Inspector. Such information could cause a signed statement to be less valuable for evidentiary I purposes and the Investigator / Inspector should either place this information in his report if it later becomes relevant or leave it in his notes to assist in his general understand-ing of the case or to use as a source for investigative leads.
- 4. Other Guidelines
- a. Use the interviewee's own words as much as possible (lengthy exact quotes are not required,-but rather key phrases).
b.- Allow the interviewee to make corrections if he desires ,
and have him initial each correction and each page of his statement.
- c. An interviewee normally should not be given a copy of his statement. If he will give a signed statement only if he receives a copy, then one should be provided.
- d. If possible, have two persons present during the taking of a signed statement.
- e. Have the statement signed by the person interviewed.
The NRC Investigator (s)/ Inspector (s) present should sign the statement as witnesses to the interviewee's signature. '
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t - 4
- f. Keep an interview log of the time. the interview began and ended, who was present, and where the statement was taken.
- g. If,after the statement is prepared or after the interview '
but prior ~ to its preparation by the Investigator / Inspector, the-interviewee refuses to sign the statement, place the information given (if it is relevant to the report) in the report and note that it was in fact the information
~
given by the witness but that he refused to sign a state-ment containing such information.
- 5. Form of Signed Statements (See Appendix B)
- a. There are numerous. formats for a signed statement. None is particularly' better than another. However, certain tiey lesents are usually contained in the opening or d v ng paragraph'of;all good interviews and signed state-ments. They are:
- 1) The time, the place and date the statement was taken.
- 2) A statement.that the interviewee was advised of the nature of the interview (this need only be told to the interviewee'in general terms).
- 3) A statement that the information was given freely and i- to whom (e.g., Inspectors Smith and Jones).
- 4) A statement that the interview may be used in a sub-sequent proceeding, s
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. - _ _ , - _ - . . . _ . . = , . _ .-
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?
- 5) A statement in the closing paragraph reciting that the declarant has read the above statement of #
pages and it is true and correct.
- 6) A statement (if appropriate) that interviewee was f , advised of the provisions of section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act (See J. below).
J. Applicability of the Privacy Act to IE Inspection and Investigative Activities The Privacy Act has had a tremendous impact on the Federal-Govern-ment. These matters are normally handled by a Privacy Act group within each major component of NRC. There is, however, one pro-vision of the Privacy Act which has a direct and significant bearing on any IE inspection or investipation. This section
}
(Title 5 United States Code, Section 552a(e)(3)) provides:
"Each agency that maintains a system of records shall -- ,
"(3) inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which it uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual --
"(A)_the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of the infor-mation and whether disclosure of such informa-tion is mandatory or voluntary;
"(B) the.pincipal purpose or purposes for which the information is intended to be used;
"(C) the routine uses which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to para-graph (4)(D) of this subsection; and
"(D) the effects on him, if any, of not pro-viding all or any part of the requested infor-mation;" l 6-36
It has not been clearly decided by the courts whether this provision applies to any of all individuals who are inter-viewed by any agency Inspector or Investigator. It is fairly clear, however, that the provision was included in the statute to apply only to information collected about an individual which would be maintained in a file (system of records) which is in fact normally retrieved by that person's name, badge number, or other personal identifier. If Joe Jones of Ace Atomic is interviewed and the information Joe Jones gives about himself and Ace Atomic is filed in a folder labeled Ace Atomic, then this information is not in a system of records pertaining to Joe Jones because the file is not normally accessed by the individuals's name or other personal identifier. Thus this information would not be subject to a successful Privacy Act request. However, records in a file labeled Ace Atomic would be subject to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
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K. Civil Vs. Criminal Investigations (How far should an IE Inspector go in developing facts in a matter which he has detected as being potentially criminal?)
A civil or administrative inspection or investigation becomes a criminal investigation when a clear suspicion arises verified by evidence (not conjecture, a hunch or a unsubstantiated
" gut feeling") that the matter being studied is in fact criminal in nature. At this point or earlier (if the Inspectorisunsureorneedsguidance),theInspectoror Investigator should notify his supervisor or Regional Director of his feelings and basis for such feelings. His supervision l' will in turn notify the Exec utive Office for Operations Support, who in turn will nstify OIA. Then with OIA and IE:HQ guidance (or perhaps an 0IA Investigator will be f
directly assigned to the matter) suspects, if it is deemed appropriate, will be advised of their rights by an OIA and/or an IE Investigator or the matter will be handled directly by a. federal or state law enforcement agency. These types of decisions are only made at the headquarters level with the direct input and advice of the cognizant Regional Directors.
4 How an Investigator or Inspector arrives at the conclusion
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that there is a " clear suspicion" that a criminal violation has 6-38
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- -. -_ - - . - . ...,m,_. . - , , - - - - , . .y-- - ,-. _
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s.
c.
1 occurred is beyond a ' simple explanation. Each situation (fact pattern) is different and while some facts almost immediately point to potential criminality, other times, weeks or months elapse before any criminal potential manifests itself. The conclusion that there is a potential for criminality can best be reached by an Inspector / Investigator if- he is generally fami-liar with the criminal statutes discussed above and has the good sense to seek immediate counsel and guidance from people in the region and headquarters who have experience in this area.
L. Constitutional Warnings
- 1. Generally The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution guar-antees the right to every citizen to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. The sixth amendment provides essentially that the accused shall have the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
- a. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held the Govern-ment cannot use a statement of a defendent secured during custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers un '
less prior to questioning he is warned that:
- 1) He had the right to remain silent.
- 2) Anything he says may be used in a court of law against him.
6-39 '
- 3) He has the right to the presence of an attorney.
- 4) If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be pro-vided.
b) IE Inspectors / Investigators have no power to arrest or
" deprive a person of his free movement and clearly are not law enforcement officers. Therefore, any interviews by IE having criminal overtones are non-custodial. Con-sequently, the strict Miranda rule regarding warnings and waivers is not applicable to administrative inves-tigations or inspections regarding persons not under arrest. However, in pre-restraint interrogations the traditional due process voluntariness standard governs and the following guideline should be followed:
The obligation to warn does not really arise until the interviewee has become the " focus" of a criminal inquiry, a state rarely reached by IE inspections.
Should such an occasion arise, it should suffice to advise the interviewee that (1) he does not have to make any statement, (2) any statement he makes may be used against him, and (3) he is entitled to seek advice of counsel before answering any questions.
In those situations in which NRC is compelled for health and safety reasons to conduct a parallel in-quiry with the FBI, IE need only to be certain 0IA
.\'
h 6-40
a 9 w&
keeps the FBI and the Department of Justice advised of IE plans and responsibilities. As a general pro-position, so long as the IE focus is on public health and safety, and not to make a criminal case, there is really little to be concerned about from the stand-point of jeopardizing a criminal case. Any problems that arise can be handled on a case-by-case basis.
M. Productian of Statements in Criminal Prosecutions and Reports of Witnesses (Jencks Act, Title 18, United States Code, Section 3500)
Title 18 United States Code, Section 3500 provides that in a criminal prosecution brought by the United States, statements made by a Government witness shall be provided to the defense counsel after that witness has testified. If the statement is not provided, the judge may declare a mistrial or strike the witness' testimony. The term statement is very broad and covers more than the type of statements discussed above. These would even include notes not incorporated in a report or signed state-ment; stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording-or transcription of the oral statement of the witness.
Following an interview, each interview (not whole reports) should be put in final form as soon as practicable so that a defense counsel cannot later claim the statement is an inaccurate re-counting of the witness' interview. Care should be taken to 6-41
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)
preserve all statements taken by an Inspector / Investigator and if the matter is subsequently referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, copies of these statements should be forwarded and the originals retained by IE until shortly before trial.
N. Parallel Proceedings Civil and Criminal Investigations conducted simultaneously are covered by the " parallel proceedings" doctrine. In the Kordell case the Food and Drug Administration brought an action ordering the seizure of certain products being sold by the defendents and their companies. Subsequent to civil investigation, an indict-ment was returned charging the principles. Part of the indict-ment was based on the same courses of conduct that caused the ,
initiation of the civil proceeding. The Kordell court stated:
"It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a government agency such as the FDA invariably to choose either to forego recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial."
Thus, it is clearly established that the NRC may continue its legitimate function of protecting the public health and safety by conducting inspections of licensees, and not be frustrating or hampering a potential criminal case. As a practical matter, the Attorney General may request that the agency defer (postpone) any civil enforcement action pending the outcome of a criminal investigation or trial but these arrangements are worked out between OIA and the Department of Justice.
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After the civil case has been initially developed for some time and it is determined by OIA that the matter should be referred as a potential criminal case to the Department of Justice, any other investigation from the civil side should be handled carefully. As a practical matter, the Executive Office for Operations Support and OIA will at this point be following the case closely and a federal investigative agency
- will be involved, so advice will be readily available and should be sought.
O. Confidential Sources The Freedom of Information Act generally provides for the release of any Government record to a requesting individual. There are g nine exceptions to this general rule, one of which provides that
(
investigatory records (both regulatory and criminal investiga-tions) compiled for law enforcement purposes (included in the definition of law enforcement are any violations of 10 CFR Part 0 - 199) need not be released to a requesting member of the public if such records would disclose the identity of a confidential source. Even though the statute further provides that any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be disclosed, investigatory records to the extent they identify a confidential source may be withheld from disclosure (i .e., the identifying portions deleted) .
The Privacy Act generally provides that an individual is entitled to determine what records pertaining to him are collected by a 6-43
t federal agency; entitles him to gain access and copy such records; entitles him to correct any inaccurate information compiled about himself and prevent the improper dissemination of information about the individual.
An agency may exempt certain types of-records from the -above general rules if a notice is published in the Federal Register and thus IE may exempt from disclosure to an individual about whom the record (s) is maintained, investigatory (both regulatory and criminal) material compiled for law enforcement purposes (includes civil penalty cases) if disclosure of such material collected would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that his s
)
identity would be held in confidence.
Thus, information provided by a confidential source can success-fully be withheld under the above discussed circumstances.
The decision as to whether IE should treat an individual as a confidential source is a determination to be made on a case by case basis depending on the circumstances and the information to be provided. It is clear, however, that once a decision has been made to treat an individual (e.g. alleger) as a confidential b
t
)
6-44 i
p - y e-m--- -- - . --- g---- y- .-
, == -.
source that such commitment (promise) be clear and express.
However, the individual should also be made aware that although the promise has been made and that IE will do everything in its power to keep such a promise. As a practical matter in some situations (e.g. the confidential source's testimony is needed in a subsequent proceeding) his identity may be revealed at a later date.
Of course, when drafting an inspection or investigative report the confidential source's name would be deleted. A supplemental page containing the confidential informant's identity is to be maintained on19 in regional files separate from the inspection and/or investigative report which would be placed in the PDR at the appropriate time.
P. Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act and Part 21 Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act and Part 21 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations pertain to require-ments imposed on directors or responsible officers of firms constructing, owning, operating or supplying the components of any facility or activity which is licensed or otherwise regula-ted pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, who obtain information 6-45
indicating that a facility, activity or basic component supplied to such facility or activity contains a defect which could create a substantial safety hazard. The statute and regulations do not provide for criminal penalties and thus are not included in this portion of the training program.
Q. Summary The preceding discussion was designed to give the Inspector a broad overview of the potential criminal violations which may manifest themselves during routine IE operations. If nothing else, remember that a call to an expert in IE or 0IA would be more than sufficient to guarantee that matters of this nature are handled in a professional and expeditious manner.
The comments contained in this training material are of necessity general and thus exceptions and nuances which do exist could not be discussed in detail. Consequently, this information is neither completely exhaustive nor absolutely authoritative in all situations.
R. List of References Title 5 United States Code.
Title 18 United States Code.
Title 42 United States Code.
Chapter 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 0 to Part 199.
6-46
Haninerschmidt v. U.S. , 265 U.S 182 (1924).
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
United States v. Kordell, 397 U.S. 1 (1969).
s G
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_. ___ m
,o APPENDIX A
(
LISTING OF 10 CFR SECTIONS WHICH MAY CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL VIOLATION Section Title 20.401 Records of surveys, radiation monitoring and disposal.
20.402 Reports of thef t or loss of licensed material.
20.403 Notification of incidents.
20.405 Reports of overexposures and excessive levels and concentrations.
20.407 Personnel exposure and monitoring reports.
20.408 Reports of personnel exposure on termination of employment or work.
20.409 Notifications and reports to individuals.
( 30.34 (c)
Terms and conditions of licenses.
Must confine possession and use of byproduct material to locations and use provided in the license.
30.51 Records 30.52 Inspections 31.5 Certain measuring, gauging or controlling devices.
(d)(5) Report of failure or damage to shielding or other failure of a device.
Superseded by 31.5(c)(5) January 15,1975, re-worded.
31.6 General license to install devices generally licensed in 131.5.
(a) (Reserved)PriortoJanuary 15, 1975, related to transfer or installation of any device.
31.11 General license for use of byproduct material for certain in vitro clinical or laboratory testing.
(e) Report of registrant under general license of any changes in information furnished in the Registration Certificate.
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Section Title 32.12 Introduction of byproduct material in exempt concentrations into products or materials, and transfer of ownership or possession:
material transfer reports.
32.16 Certain items containing byproduct material:
reports of import or transfer.
32.20 Manufacture, distribution and transfer of exempt quantities of byproduct material: re-cords and material transfer reports.
32.25 Conditions of licenses, issued under 532.22 (self-luminous products): quality control, labeling and reports of import or transfer.
(c) Report of import or transfer.
32.29 Conditions of licensos issued under 532.26 (Gas and aerosol detectors).
. (c) Report of importation, distribution or trans-fer.
32.52 Byproduct material contained in devices for use under $31.5 (gauging or controlling devices);
requirements for license to manufacture, import or distribute.
32.56 Luminous safety devices for use in aircraft:
material transfer reports.
32.60 Calibration or reference sources containing americium 241; material transfer reports.
32.63 Ice detection devices containing strontium 90; material transfer reports.
33.17 Conditions of specific licenses of broad scope.
(a) Limitation on certain activities.
34.25 Leak testing, repair, tagging, opening, modi-fication and replacement of sealed sources.
(c) Describes limits of leak test and requires re-cords.
34.26 Quarterly inventory--sealed sources, i
6-50 t
r Section Title 34.27 ,
Utilization logs--sealed sources.
34.33 Personnel monitoring control.
(b) Requirements concerning pocket dosimeters and film badges.
34.43 Radiation surveys and survey records.
(d) Keeping of records.
35.31 General license for medical use of certain quan-tities of byproduct material.
(c)(4) Administration to women with confirmed preg-nancy or person under 18. .
(c)(5) Transfer except in unopen container or by administration to a patient.
36.22 Export of certain quantities of tritium and polonium 210.
(c) Filing of Shipper's Export Declaration.
36.24 Export of certain byproduct material to certain Schedule A countries and Poland and Rumania.
(c) Filing of Shipper's Export Declaration.
40.41 ferms and conditions of licenses.
(c) Person shall confine his possession and use of sau ce ,taterial to the location and purposes authorized in the license.
40.23 _
Gener 1 licenses to export.
(e)(3) Filing of Shipper's Export Declaration by those exporting uranium.
40.61 Records--source material.
40.62 Inspection--source material.
40.64 Reports 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
(i) Manipulation of the controls of a facility.
50.70 Inspections 50.71 Maintenance of records, making of reports.
l 6-51 L
4 h
Section Title 55.3 License requirements--operators licenses 70.32 Conditions of licenses.
(a)(6) Not to use special nuclear material to construct an atomic weapon.
70.41, Authorized use of special nuclear material. *
(a) Licensee to confine possession and use of special nuclear material to the locations and purposes authorized in his license.
70.51 Material balance, inventory, and records re-quirements.
I 70.52 Reports of accidental criticality or loss or theft or attempted theft of special nuclear material.
70.53 Material status reports.
70.54 Nuclear material transfer reports. )
70.55 Inspections 71.61 Reports--reduction in effectiveness of packag-ing.
71.62 Records--packaging.
71.63 Inspection and Tests.
110.10 Reports, Foreign Atomic Energy programs.
110.11 Additional information.
Part 150 Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States under Section 274.
T
)
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I APPENDIX B FORMAT FOR SIGNED STATEMENT A
I, , ,
(Name) (Job Title) (Company with which employed) (Address of Company with which emp[oyed) l was contacted by l (Names and Titles) on at at l (Date) (Time Iofwas Day)dvised (Location of the nature l . a where statement is taken) of the inquiry and the provisions of Section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act (if applicable). After being so advised, I voluntarily supplied the following information.
l l
l (Body of Statement) l l l l '
I, , have read the above statement (Name) of pages and it is true and correct. Furthermore, (Number)
I am aware that this statement may be used in a judicial proceeding.
(Signature) (Date)
Witnesses:
I (Signature of First Witness) (Date)
I l
(Title of First Witness)
(Signature of Second Witness) (Date) t (Title of Second Witness) l (Time and Place Statcment is Witnessed) l 6-53 l
7..
APPENDIX C SAMPLE PRIVACY ACT ADVISEMENT (Given only to Person who is the Subject of the Inquiry and if the Information Received is about the Subject and will be Placed in a File Which is Identified by that Persont Name or Other Personal Identifier)
Mr. Jones, I will be asking you some questions regarding Ace Radiographic,
, Inc. and your employment with Ace. Under the provisions of the Privacy Act, I am obligated to advise you of the following before asking you for any information which may result in your talking about yourself.
- a. I am an Inspector / Investigator of the U.S. NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement and as such have been authorized by the Commission and the Atomic Energy Act to conduct investigations / inspections and interviews regarding matters pertaining to licensees of the U.S. NRC.
- b. The principle purpose for which this infonnation is intended to be used is for inclusion in a written report which will be given to my supervisors in IE and the Commission for evaluation. The report maybeusedbyothercomponentsofNRCandmay(will)beplaced in the POR at a later date.
- c. You need not speak to me about yourself if you do not wish to do so.
- d. If you do not wish to speak to me about yourself, I will note this in my report and no adverse action regarding your refusal to talk about your own actions can or will be taken.
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EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION DURING THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS I. Learning Objectives ,
A. Realization of the need for effective communications during the conduct of inspections.
B. Obtain knowledge and guidance of some recommended approaches.
Some 'do's and don' ts ' .
C. Establishment of a base upon which to develop communication techniques.
II. Introduction The subject of this training session is " Effective Communications During the Conduct of an Inspection." First I would like to stress that we will be talking about communications during the inspection. The presentation is composed of three basic segments:
A. Establishment of the need for clear communication.
B. Bracketing how and where and with whom the communication is directed.
C. The major portion of the time will be spent on topics and techniques for communications consideration.
!!!. Detailed Discussion With that introduction I would like to state that effective communication is an absolute "must" if we are to accomplish our inspection objectives.
The communication that I am referring to is composed of many forms includ-ing, but not limited to verbal, facial expressions, gestures, show of emotions, hand signals, listening and observations. Take note that communications is a two way street, a give and take. We must be good 7-1
listeners and observers, not just talkers. We must be understood and ;
we must understand.
Our inspection involvement has a wide-range of diversity requirements.
The reason for this is that we deal with a wide spectrum of people.
We may be dealing in specific details of the operation or systems, with a technician or operator, or we may be dealing with the president of a company aad dealing with a management level decision. On the surface this might not seem like much of a challenge; however, believe me nothing will negate your presence quicker than talking over the head of an individual or wasting a company president's time with' trivia.
EXAMPLE: , ;
- 1. Record Clerk. During an inspection your contact may be with a record clerk on things like document control or drawing control. The !
involvement will require discussions and observations of details which the individual is familiar with. Our comunication should be limited to this area. We should not ask or expect the individual to provide the rationale for an upper management decision. He may not even be aware of the decision. This could be looked upon as a "put me down" and may result in the loss of cooperation. Remember, the individual is probably convinced he is doing a good job, so give j him a chance, hear him out, then make coments regarding his area of 1 involvement. Most people will willingly talk about things of which they are knowledgeable. ;
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i 2. Plant Engineer. The plant engineer is a technically trained individual. As a result, we should feel free to talk on a technical level. If we have adverse comments, we should be
! prepared to discuss a technical basis for our conclusions.
We must be able to convince this individual that our positions are technically sound. ;
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l 3. Plant Superintendent. The plant superintendent is responsi-(
ble for all activities for the plant. As such he is aware of most subjects that we may want to discuss. However, if he doe" not have an immediate, detail response we should not be surprised. He may have delegated the responsibility or just l ,
l has not been involved in the details. We must recognize the l breadth of his area of responsibility. Additionally, we should remember that any adverse consnents made relative to the plant operations will be construed to be a personal matter. Be prepared for a defensive attitude relative to the plant and its personnel .
- 4. Corporate Management. Prior to discussions with corporate management you will probably have previously discussed the details of our concerns with operators, engineers and the
! plant Superintendent. Our contacts at this level should be brief and to the point. These individuals are busy and do not want to be bothered with trivia. Generally speaking, if it 7- 3
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took one hour to discuss the subject with the plant Super-intendent, our presentation to corporate level management should not take more than five minutes. Let them set the pace regarding details of the discussion. They may prefer getting the detail information from their own people. This can be very effective from our viewpoint, especially if the corporate man makes assignments or gives directions while we are still present. A word of caution - Be prepared to talk details at the corporate level - Some Vice Presidents are so inclined.
Now let's discuss some topics and techniques for inspection cor.nunication consideration: ,
A. Recognize Your Strengths and Weaknesses Your strengths can be an aid, or if improperly directed can result in a detriment.
EXAMPLE:
- 1. You are a good salesman. If properly used you can be very effective and will make a sale. However, in our business we must establish credibility for repeat encounters. If we improperly devote our good sales ability we may become marked as smooth talkers that will sell the customer anything, even though we do not believe in the product. You may feel we are not required to " sell." It is true that we are not selling pieces of equipment; however, we are called upon to sell ideas W
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for improvement or convincing the licensees that they are required to do something. If we are trying to convince licensees we must be persuasive and have an established credibility. Good sales ability is important.
- 2. Tendency to be Abrasive Do you have a tendency to rub someone the wrong way? Have you ever known individuals whose outward appearance and actions have met with your displeasure? What is the confidence level of those individuals with you? I believe the answer is relatively obvious. The individuals would be handicapped if they were work-ing with you as a licensee. True we inspectors do not have to be loved, just as a good manager does not have to be liked; however, respected is something else.
- 3. Quick Tempered An uncontrolled temper can be the absolute downfall for us as inspectors . The people we deal with are smart enough to detect a " quick" or " hot" temper. If the temper is not controlled, you may not think straight, say things you do not mean, go beyond the threshold of your authority, or just plain make a fool of yourself.
- 4. Evasive When asked questior we must be prepared with answers. The answers must be backed with reasons, rationale, and conviction.
If we do not know the answer, we should so state and respond with "I do not know but will get the answer." Then we must follow to a conclusion.
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3 If we convey the feeling that we are always evading or avoiding the issue, we will lose the respect of those with whom we deal. They will get the impression "No use asking him because you either get an evasive answer or an incorrect answer."
Recognize your strengths and weakness and use them well.
Remember that what works for one individual may not work for you. _
1 EXAMPLE:
- a. Some people can use offensive actions and get by with it, others cannot.
- b. Some individuals can use an elevated voice level to bring '
about a positive effect, others cannot.
- c. Some people can be effective with a quiet approach. Speak-ing softly and carrying a big stick. Others would be lost in the pile of rubble with this approach.
B. Credibility The examples that we have talked about are linked to credibility.
In all walks of life, including the role of an inspector, the establishment of levels of confidence in your contacts is essential.
Knowing who you can believe and who will tell you anything that comes to mind.
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Most individuals are basically honest but most will avoid the communication of. details that might cast a negative light. We are all self-conscious to some degree and are desirous of protecting our image. We must be ever mindful of this fact when evaluating information received and also must be mindful of this in our responses .
C. Needs of Others We must be ever mindful of the needs of others. We may have all day to inspect and know what we want to do; however, remember and consider the pressures, responsibilities, requirements and goals for the other party. The picture looks a lot different depending on what glasses you are wearing.
EXAMPLE:
Buying a car - The buyer thinks the price is too high and the seller thinks he is giving the car away.
We must learn to appreciate the other party's position. An effective exercise is to imagine yourself to be in his shoes.
D. We Are Labeled As Regulators As such we must not leave an impression that we are "out to get" the licensee. Our prime objective is not giving tickets or issuance of citations, but the enhancement of nuclear safety. Be mindful of the basic fact that the licensee and NRC have a common objective -
safety to the public and plant personnel. This objective should be kept in mind during our dealings. To illustrate this subject let's assume -
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Q.
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- 1. During the ~ initial contact for an inspection we start with a comment, "The last time we were here you gave us some bum ,
dope. As a result we are really going to shake you down, find -
s numerous items of noncompliance, and it will probably end up +
r . ,
% as a civil penalty case." What. do you think' the reaction mig!it '
- - s m be? This is considered to be a ' Don't' approach.
- 2. Instead. -let's lay out the inspection plan, describe the schedule, and identify licensee contacts during the initial e ,
inspection contact Establish mutual understandings at the outset. -
What do you think would'be the resulting accomplishmencs? This
!- ~ is considered to be a proper and accepted approach. ,
E. Learn to Stay Within the Boundaries of Our Inspecticn Responsib'ilities
[ -This necessitates knowing the NRC requirements. This often times presents.a problem because the nature of the English language results ;
in statements that can be construed to be requirements or something for v . i +
l' .' consideration, depending on one's viewpoint. Therefore we:
+ .
- 1. Must be cautious that we do not enforce our personal opinion.
- 2. Know when to stop pressing on an item. We should discuss the n i subjects with the licensu until we understand the other party's view, obtain the licensee's final position, and be prepared to i.
stop pressidg until we' obtain an NRC position.
- 3. Must be prepared to back down. Upon hearing the licensee we :
may become convinced that: his view is correct be'cause we hcd s
,s overlooked a fact. If these conditions do crop 'up we should 7-8 i
,,_m,p.- ,.-~-&.+.-w -+-me- + v'v-~-m'i-
be ready to reverse our position. Another way of express-ing this is - do not swim out in the water so far that you can't swim back. You may drown by your mistake in judgement. Likewise, you will lose your credibility as a swimmer or possessor of good sense.
F. Do Not Entrap the Licensee By this I mean we should not surprise a licensee by hir ng facts or indications identified during the course of the insi ction.
By this I mean the communications should be kept flowi ig throughout the course of the inspection; thereby providing the licensee the maximum opportunity to respond and provide the correct information.
3 A hide-and-seek game will lead to problems, misunderstandings and hard feelings.
Some examples of what I mean:
- 1. Introduction of adverse findings for the first time at the corporate level. How would you feel, as a plant super-intendent or engineer, to 'this sort of treatment? This is considered to be a " Don't" approach.
- 2. The proper approach includes ke-ning the affected parties aware of adverse findings as early as possible. G*ve them time to respond and defend themselves and avoid unnecessary embarrassment.
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G. A Good Tool for Action by the Licensee Convince the licensee he has something to gain by taking action or giving him the opportunity to adopt action as his idea.
Accomplish the mission by convincing, not forcing. A couple of approaches:
- 1. A question like, "Did you ever think of something?".
- 2. Or looks like having controls or calibration of instruments will lead to avoidance of plant outages, as well as assure operations within the Technical Specifications limits.
H. Be Prepared for Licensee's Challenge of Your Views We must back our views with reasons and rationale. Then hear the licensee out. Then attempt to come to an agreement, A
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couple of example approaches:
- 1. State, "I don't care whad you think. The regulation says you must do it." Then threaten with an item of noncom-pliance. What do you think is the chance for attainment of
, a mutual understanding?
- 2. If a disagreement should persist, be prepared to cease discussions and obtain an NRC position before further pursuit.
Avoid a lasting argument.
I. Make Efficient use 'of Time Have a plar, and . don't be adversely distracted. Be mindful that the licensee will attempt to fill your time with idle and unrelated 4 7-10
'ha
matters . Thereby minimizing your available actual inspection hou rs . Topics that frequently are used for this purpose include but is not limited to: the weather, athletics , and.
politics.
J. Be Aware of the Licensee's Attempts to Control the Inspection If you are not careful, the licensee will be selecting the sample to be observed by tactics like:
- 1. You don't want to go there because it is a radiation zone.
Be mindful that he may be leading you away from adverse findings.
- 2. or, " Joe is the expert and he won't be here today." A delay tactic.
IV. Summary Clear communications is a must if we hope to attain an effective inspection. Finding problems is only part of the objective. The attainment of corrective action for a mcre safe condition is the real objective. To accomplish our mission is a challenge and we must be aware of such things as:
A. Recognizing our strengths and weaknesses and putting them to use.
B. Establishment of our creditability, which comes with performance.
C. Being mindful of the needs and views of others.
D. We are regulators and the natural tendency is that "we are out to get someone."
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E. We must recognize the boundaries of our authority and work within those boundaries.
F. There is a need for each of us to develop our tools for the attainment of licensee action.
G. We will be challenged by the licensee.
H. We must make efficient use of our time.
Communications is an area where everyone can continue to improve through practice, study and observation. Make full use of your experiences, analyze the results, and learn by the observation of approaches practiced by others. You will have to find the approach that is best suited to you as an individual.
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7-12 T P-
INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOWUP 0F ALLEGATIONS I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES The purpose of this course is to discuss non-criminal investigation activity, describing each step of the process and various factors which have a bearing on it. At the conclusion of the course, attendees should know:
A. The difference between an investigation and an inspection.
B. The purpose of an investigation.
C. How to handle contacts with allegers.
D. How to. handle contacts with licensees during an investigation.
E. How to conduct interviews.
F. How to obtain signed statements.
G. How -to interact with the investigator during an investigation.
H. -How to handle communications with other interested parties;-
such as other state and federal agencies, news media, and unions.
II. INTRODUCTION It is intended that at the conclusion of this course, attendees will have a good working knowledge of non-criminal investigation activity which will enable them to function effectively as a participant in an investigation and to be able to perform an investigation themselves if required.
At some time or other every inspector can expect to be called upon to participate in an investigation either as a technical partner with an investigator or as a member of an investigation team. Although l
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inspectors are not normally assigned to perform investigations by themselves, circumstances do arise in which this can and does occur.
To function effectively in an investigation, it is important that the inspector gain some insight concerning the above mentioned items.
A factor that should be kept in mi'd is that in most instances an investigation involves a subject of significance and is a high visibility activity. An investigation frequently attracts the inter-est not only of the top management of the licensee and of NRC,'but also the news media and in some instances, Members of Congress.
Further, an investigation frequently results in significant enforce-ment action.
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III. DETAILED DISCUSSION A. Role of Inspectors in Investigations o The kind and number of personnel utilized in performing an inves-tigation is largely dependent upon the significance and scope of the subject to be investigated. When the matter is complex, and/or there is a high degree of urgency attached to it, a team approach is used. Specific circumstances dictate the kinds and numbers of personnel involved.
Most investigations are conducted by a two-man team, an investi-gator and an inspector having a technical background appropriate for the matter to be investigated. While the investigator usually i
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has the lead responsibility, this is not always the case. This matter should be resolved before the investigation is initiated.
The individual having lead responsibility usually acts as the spokesman for the team, makes any decisions concerning the direction of the investigation and writes the report or at least the major portions of it.
Regardless of who is assigned lead responsibility, the two partic-ipants should work as partners, both of whom share the responsi-bility for gathering the information. The inspector should not regard his role as largely a passive one of merely being on hand to provide technical assistance upon request. The quality of the investigation depends largely upon the ability of the two members of the team to work together, complementing each other's efforts. While there are exceptions, it is generally best for the two to stay together while gathering information rather than splitting the ground to be covered and each going his own way.
With rant exceptions, interviews should be conducted as a team.
This subject will be discussed in more detail later in the course.
While the two-man approach is the normal and preferred one, cir-cumstances do arise phich require an individual to conduct an investigation alone.'*This may be due to a shortage of available manpower or the matter to be investigated may appear to be uncom-plicated and/or of relatively lesser significance. Appearances, however, can be deceiving and the inspector should not be lulled 8-3
into taking a relaxed or casual approach. A matter that appears at the outset to have little potential significance may turn out to be of major importance. This course hopefully will provide sufficient knowledge of the investigative activity to enable an inspector to perform an adequate investigation, using his inspec-tion skills, if he is ever called upon to do so.
B. Objectives of Investigations
- An investigation can be defined as an activity conducted as a result of an incident, accident, reportable occurrence, allega-tion or complaint reported by a licensee or others which involves licensable materials or activities. to gather, correlate and evaluate information indepth for the purpose of establishing the )
cause, nature, extent, and circumstances of a condition or an occurrence.
An investigation differs from an inspection in that it is not a scheduled activity but is a response to an outside stimulus.
It focuses on a specific matter and examines it in detail. The goal of an investigation is to obtain all pertinent information available regarding a specific subject or event. Investigations are conducted to determine what happened, to identify causes, to determine compliance or noncompliance, and to provide the infor-mation necessary to evaluate the significance of the matter. In some instances the results of an investigation may identify the
-)
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need for a change in NRC regulations or policy. The term inves-tigation does not carry with it the implication of criminality, wrongdoing or dishonesty. A given investigation may, however, involve these matters.
Investigations fall into two broad categories, those involving incidents or unusual events and those involving allegations or complaints. Most incidents involve possible or actual radiation exposure of personnel. There are, however, other unusual events or incidents that require investigation. For instance, the loss of a use of a facility, the loss of licensed material, or unusual operating events.
C. Initiating the Investigation
- 1. Triggering Mechanisms There are a variety of triggering mechanisms for an investiga-tion. Some of these are reports of incidents or unusual occurrences received from the licensee, infonnation obtained during the course of an inspection, requests from other parts of the NRC or contacts from various outside parties. "Outside-parties" includes Members of Congress, other Government agencies, concerned citizens, unions, licensee competitors, current or former employees of the licensee, or licensee contractors. These contacts may be made in person, by tele-phone or in writing. In ,some instances, anonymous letters l are received.
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Every complaint or allegation received, regardless of the source or the avenue of communication involved, must be evaluated and documented. There are instances wherein the complaint or allegation obviously has no substance and it comes from an individual suffering from a mental disorder.
Even in those cases, at least a memo to the files should be prepared dccumenting the contact, the general content of any communications and the basis for the conclusion that' the matter need not be pursued further.
These contacts provide varying amounts of information. Some-times the initial information is sufficient to determine that -
an investigation must be initiated. It is, however, frequently necessary to obtain additional infonnation, usually by tele-phone, so that the matter may be evaluated to determine whether an investigation is appropriate.
- 2. File Review If time permits, that is if it is not necessary to depart for the licensee's facilities as soon as possible, the licensee's file should be reviewed to become familiar with the nature of these licensed activities or that portion of it which is involved in the matter to be investigated. This should include a review of pertinent manuals, procedures, licensed conditions or other related consnitments to the NRC. It is also worth-while to review available information concerning his facilities
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and equipment, the organizational structure, and to identify personnel occupying key positions in the organization.
During this review it is usually helpful to mark key pieces of infomation with a paperclip or to make a note of these items. Time permitting, it is useful to discuss the licensee's operation with the inspector who has some familiarity with it if you are not.
If this review cannot be performed before leaving the office, some review may be accomplished while enroute to the facility.
A tentative plan of action should be formulated before the investigation is begun. Decisions must be made as to the sequence to be followed in examining equipment, reviewing records, making independent measurements, conducting reenact-ments, and conducting interviews. Regarding interviews, some thought should be given as to whom should be interviewed and in what order they should be conducted.
These plans must be tentative since the circumstances pre-valling when you arrive to begin the investigation may require you to alter your plan. Also, the information as it is acquired may prompt you to alter your plan. You should remain flexible since changes in plans are more often the rule than the exception.
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Informal notes or check lists are a helpful means of assuring that despite unexpected changes in plans, no segment of the investigation is overlooked or forgotten. Such check lists can also be added to as your investigation proceeds.
It hardly needs mentioning, but your plans for conducting the investigation will be influenced by directions you receive from your supervisors and possibly IE Headquarters personnel.
Such directions may be received before the investigation is undertaken or at some point or points during the course of-it.
- 3. Scheduling and Notifications .,
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- a. State Organizations ,/
Other actions must be taken before the investigation is begun. Except for those investigations involving reactor licensees, notification must be given to the state in which the activity to be investigated is conducted. This provides the state the opportunity to have a representa-tive present during the investigation. In situations involving the need to perform radiation surveys at locations other than the licensee's premises, such as in private homes or public facilities, a representative of the state health department should not only be present but should take the lead. Such efforts are preferably t
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made under the authority of the state. With that impor-tant exception, accompanying state personnel are only observers and not active participants. Most such per-sonnel are aware of this role. It may, however, be necessary to remind them of it. To avoid embarassment, it is good practice to meet the state representative beforehand and at that time tactfully cover this point with him.
For cases involving the investigation of allegations, the states are normally not notified before the inter-view with the alleger is accomplished.
- b. Contacts with Allegers Investigations of allegations, almost without exception, should be prefaced by an interview with the alleger. If the allegations are received by telephone, the conversa-tion should be limited to obtaining sufficient informa-tion to determine that an investigation should be con-ducted. Arrangements should then be made for a meeting to discuss the allegations in more detail. If the alle-gations are received in writing, the telephone contact with the alleger should be limited as much as possible to making arrangements for an interview. It is prefer-able for all contacts with the allegers to be made by the investigator. This is preferred because investigators are accustomed to such contacts while this is not a regular activity of an inspector.
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- 'c. Notification of Licensee The next step involves the notification of the licensee.
Investigations are usually conducted on an announced basis. In many cases it is a report from the licensee that is the basis for conducting the investigation. It is usually desirable to advise the licensee when an in-vestigation will be initiated as a means of assuring the availability of personnel and equipment that may be essential to .the investigation.
Regarding investigations of allegations, the licensee, in fairness, should be informed that allegations have been made (without being specific) and that an investi-gation will be initiated. Any questions the licensee may have will be discussed upon arrival at the facility.
In some instances, specifically when it is desirable to observe the licensee's day-to-day mode of operation to detemine the validity of an allegation, efforts should be made to observe his operations-on-an-unannounced basis.
For example, it may be alleged that a radiographer is performing field radiography at a given location in an unsafe manner. To avoid prejudicing the investigation's outcome, efforts should be made to observe these oper-ations without the radiographer being aware that he is being observed.
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D. Interviews with Allegers As indicated earlier, regardless of the avenue and content of the initial contact, allegers should be interviewed before the inves-tigation has been undertaken. In arranging the interview, care should be exercised to avoid drawing attention to the contact with the alleger. If he is a licensee employee, avoid contacting him at work. In most cases the individual is employed and inter-views are therefore usually conducted in the evening at the indi-vidual's residence. Other arrangements may be preferable, such as conducting the interview in your motel room.
- 1. Question of Confidentiality '
During the interview, the subject of confidentiality, that is, protecting the identity of the alleger, should be discussed.
and he should be asked to express his position regarding anony-mity. If the alleger requests anonymity, he should be informed that it is NRC policy not to devulge his identity to the licensee either during the investigation or in your report. It should
- also be pointed out to the alleger that the nature of his alle-
.gations may provide the licensee a basis for guessing his identity.
He should be assured, however, that we will not confirm any quesses made by the licensee. He should also be made aware that, if the results of the investigation are sicnificant and a hearing or court case should ensue, it may not be possible to maintain his anonymity.
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If a formal allegation is made within the provisions of Part 19, the question of confidentiality does not arise.
- 2. Explanation of NRC's. Position If the alleger is not familiar with the NRC he should be infomed of the agency's mission and that Inspection and Enforcement is interested in assuring that licensees are operating safely and in accordance with our regulations.
In addition to performing inspections for this purpose, we also use information provided by allegers to identify problems and to take action to assure they are corrected.
It should be impressed upon the alleger that we cannot become a participant in any dispute between the licensee and other parties such as an employee, a union or_ competi-tors. We, are only interested in determining whether the licensee's activities are in compliance with our require-ments and the infomation provided to us will be used for only that purpose.
- 3. Identification of Specific Allegations The primary purpose of the interview is to obtain as much specific infomation as possible concerning instances of noncompliance. Specific names, dates, times and places are important aids in subsequent efforts to substantiate alleged noncompliance. Any tangible evidence of noncom-pliance can be accepted, such as copies of records or correspondence, as long as they are not the licensee's .
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property. For example, an original record taken from the licensee's files should not be accepted from the alleger but a copy of that record can be accepted.
- 4. Response to Alleger's Concerns Allegers will usually include in their allegations matters which are not appropriate for investigation by NRC. Some concerns, while perhaps legitimate, may not be within NRC's jurisdiction. Others, while relating to matters under our jurisdiction, would not constitute noncompliance if substan-tiated. Therefore, even if substantiated, we would not be in a position to take enforcement action. Allegers frequently express concern about conditions which are acceptable to us and are permitted by our regulations. These things should be dis-cussed and NRC's position regarding them explained to the alleger so that his concerns are relieved or he recognizes that these are not matters we should pursue. Some allegations may by their nature be all but impossible to substantiate.
If that is the case, the alleger should be so informed. The alleger should have a reasonably clear understandin*g of what the investigation will attempt to accomplish. This will go a long way toward precluding a subsequent charge of whitewash or an expression of disatisfaction with NRC's efforts.
Near the conclusion of the interview, the information obtained from the alleger should be ;ummarized with him and an under-standing should be reached with him as to the specific 8-13
allegations which he has made which will be investigated.
Efforts should be made to limit the allegations to those items which, if substantiated, will result in enforcement action.
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The alleger should be advised that he will be informed of the investigation findings when the work is completed.
The interviewer should project an image of sincerity and interest. He should be businesslike but somewhat informal and he should be amicable without becoming friendly.
E. . Conducting the Investigation
- 1. Initial Management Discussion Nonnally the first step in an investigation is an initial meeting with management. If the investigation involves an incident, the licensee management will normally provide a general overview of what has occurred. If the investiga-tion relates to allegations, the initial contact with manage-ment is to again inform them that allegations have been received and the general, but not specific, nature of the allegations is provided them. During this meeting, licensee management should be infonned of the purpose of the inves-tigation and be provided with a general outline of how you plan to proceed.
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The licensee should be' advised that your purpose is to obtain complete infomation concerning the matter to be investigated and that in the course of gathering this information,:if items of noncompliance are identified, that they will be noted. For those investigations involving the exposure of personnel, the licensee should be advised that the NRC is interested in determining the circumstances in which the exposure was received and to perfom an independent evaluation of the amount of the exposure. If it appears likely that the personnel exposure or exposures are significant,the licensee should be informed that there is some likelihood that the NRC will enoaoe the services of an NRC Medical Consultant.
The information should be obtained as to whether the licensee has provided any medical attention to the exposed personnel.
For those investigations involving allegations, the licensee should be informed that 'the NRC is not concerned about the source of the allegations but as to whether there is sub-stance _to the infomation provided by the alleger. Usually e
the licensee will attempt to determine the identity of the alleger. He should be informed that identity of the alleger is unimportant but that our interest is directed toward determining whether there is substance to the allegations.
The licensee should be advised that it is NRC policy not to 8-15
divulge the identity of an alleger. Sometimes the ' .ensee will state they know, or they are reasonably sure, who the alleger is. Care should be exercised that no confirmation is afforded the licensee.
In those instances in which an allegation is received under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 19, that is a worker or worker's representative who believes a violation exists or has occurred with regard to radiological working conditions in which the worker is engaged, we must provide a copy of the notice to the licensee. Allegers, however, in most instances, bring their allegations to the NRC and request confidentiality.
In those instances, the specific allegations should not be ))
provided to the licensee at the beginning of the investigation in order to avoid the possibility of the claim being made subsequently that the results of the investigation were prejudiced because the licensee had the opportunity to effect changes in those areas before they could be examined by the NRC.
- 2. Conducting Interviews It has been a matter of long-standing policy and practice that interviews with personne-1 are private. It is, however, the prerogative of the person being interviewed to have one other individual of his choice oresent durina his interview.
In most instances the ouestion will not arise but if the individual makes this request, it should be granted.
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In most instances arrangements to interview personnel priva-tely can be made tactfully or by making a casual request for such an arrangement of the licensee. Occasionally, how-ever, licensee management may object. The licensee should be informed that it is NRC policy,and experience has shown it is a practical approach to interviewing. If the licensee chooses to make an issue of the matter, contact your Regional Office to inform them of the problem before proceeding further with the investigation.
Interviews may be conducted in a variety of settings and need not take on a formal atmosphere. It is generally preferable to interview an employee at or near his wcrk station. People are more-relaxed and comfortable in familiar surroundings.
Attempt to create a comfortable, relaxed and informal atmos-phere. Avoid taking a position at a desk or table directly opposite the interviewee. If available, offer the inter-viewee a cigarette, coffee or a coke. The first part of the interview should be used to establish rapport, that is, an amicable relationship. He may enter the interview tense, suspicous, fearful, or defensive. These feelings should be defused as much as possible. This has added significance when interviewing exposed personnel. It may be necessary to allay any undue concern the indi'.idual may have about the effect of the exposure on his physical well being. This 8-17
of course must be done carefully, pointing out that you are speaking as a layman and not as a physician.
You should tell the interviewee who you are, what the NRC is and its purpose. The relationship NRC has with the
. licensee and the interviewee should be explained, that is, any problems we identify will be taken up with the licensee and no action is directed toward the individua'l. One excep-tion to this would be a reactor operator since he is sepa-rately licensed by the NRC. In interview of overexposures of individuals, they should be informed that you are inter-ested in their welfare.
2)
It is preferable for one member of the team, usually the investigator, to conduct the interview while the other indi-vidual listens and takes notes. The second member should resist the temptation to break in with questions but should note any questions that occur to him and any areas he thinks should be further explored as the interview progresses.
When the interviewing member has completed his interview, the second member can then take over and pursue those matters he has noted. If necessary, the first member can follow up with further questions or terminate the interview. This approach permits the first interviewer to maintain control of the interview and continuity in his line of inquiry. It also enables the second individual to identify the areas )
possibly overlooked or not fully explored.
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b i:1 E
In conducting interviews, it is generally desirable to !
encourage the-interviewee to discuss the subject matter
- j. rather than to merely answer direct questions. As much as possible, questions should be phrased so that they will not elicit a mere yes or no response. This will not only produce more information but it will also avoid
- creating an atmosphere of interrogation or cross examina-tion.
Inconsistencies in the information provided by the inter- ,
L viewee or discrepancies between his statements and other ,
information' previously obtained, should be brought up but
/ . no't in a manner that impugns his honesty or integrity.
Individuals being interviewed sometimes make careless or inaccurate statements. If they are in regard to a i significant matter, that area should be brought up again later in the interview to obtain accurate information.
If it appears you may be misinterpreting something the interviewee has said, describe your understanding of what he has said so that he can clarify the matter if ,
y necessary. At the conclusion of the interview it is good practice to summarize your understanding of the j main pieces of information he has provided. Give him
!. an opportunity to add any information he feels is,per-
- tinent and to ask you questions he may have. Las tly ,
thank him for his assistance as you conclude the interview.
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l .. . . - - . . . , . _ . _ _ , . . - - - , , , .
- 3. Record and Procedure Review In most investigations records are an important source of information and may also provide tangible evidence of non-compliance. Any single record should be examined for completeness. They may also provide leads to other sources of infonnation to be pursued. Information obtained from records may form the basis for matters to be explored during interviews. Records may also aid in corroborating information obtained orally, or, on the other hand, indicate apparent discrepancies in information provided by licensee personnel which may need to be resolved.
)
Frequently, one record is dependent upon another or has some relationship with other records. Checking one record with another is a means of checking their validity and also may reveal discrepancies that require resolution.
Effort should be made to resolve discrepancies through inter-views with personnel. If the matter is not resolved and is significant, it should be brought to the attention of licensee management so that they have an opportunity to explain or comment upon it.
Copies of significant records should be obtained. They may either serve to docu:nent noncompliance or may provide evidence that an allegation is unfounded. .
_)
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- 4. Observations
- a. Independent Measurements Investigations may involve the need to make radiation surveys, obtain smears or samples of materials. Normally the technical member of the team takes the lead in these activities with the investigator assisting him.
- b. Reenactments In incidents involving personnel exposures, reenactments are usually performed. The reenactments are usually per-formed after the individuals involved have described the event during their interviews. There is no objection to the presence of licensee management personnel during reenactments, s
Ideally, reenactments should be conducted at the actual scene of the incident using similar equipment but, of course, without the use of actual radioactive material.
It may,however, not be possible to use the same equip-ment or to perform the reenactments at the actual scene of the incident. In those instances efforts should be made to mock up these circumstances as closely as possible.
The individuals involved are requested to perform the same actions as they did when the incident occurred.
Times and distances are then measured to obtain a basis
./
8-21
for calculating their exposures. The process or segments of it may have to be repeated several times to obtain the desired data. It is not unusual for the individual to recall some significant piece of information while per-fonning these reenactments which they had not recalled during their interview.
The individuals should be encouraged to ignore the fact that they are being observed and perform as they did when the incident occurred. Taking photographs at key points during the reenactment may be of value in des-cribing the incident and evaluating exposures. Drawings and sketches depicting the physical surroundings may also be useful.
- c. Examination of Equipment and Facilities Some investigations may also involve the examination of equipment or facilities to determine the cause of a mal-function or, conversely, to assure that it is functioning properly. Again photographs, sketches or drawings may be of value. As indicated earlier, it may be appropriate to observe licensee personnel performing operations pertinent to the . matter under investigation.
)
s 8-22
- 5. Signed Statements No specific guidance has been issued as to when signed statements should be obtained. Generally, however, signed statements are obtained when the circumstances are such that conflicting information may be anticipated from indi-viduals who are to be interviewed. They are also appro-priate in cases involving matters of a high degree of I
significance and the findings will depend primarily upon information obtained from people and not from records and other tangible form.
If a signed statement is to be obtained, it is preferable to interview the individual to obtain the information needed. At the end of the interview, the individual is then asked if he is willing to sign a statement containing the significant information he provided. Signed statements must be obtained on a voluntary basis. If the individual refuses to provide one, that fact should be contained in the report.
The mechanics of obtaining a signed statement may vary. The individual may wish to prepare a statement in his own words, have it typed, sign it, and give it to you. He may request and be permitted the assistance of a lawyer or another indi-vidual. He may include in the statement anything he wants 8-23 A
s j' -
14 1
c,
)
to but you should indicate the specific points that you wish s
to be addressed in the statement. The statement need not be a literary masterpiece. The main objective is that it con- '
tains the information needed. It need not be lengthy to serve this purpose.
Usually the investigator writes or types the statement, com-posing it with the individual agreeing with what is included sentence by sentence. When the statement is completed, the-individual should be requested to read it before signing
., and dating it. Any changes he wishes to make should be dis-cussed with him. He snould initial next to any changes made
/^
and also place his initials in the lower right hand corner of each page except the signature page.
The suggested format for signed statements is shown in Attach-ment A. .
It has been normal practice to provide the individual a copy, of the statement he has made. When the statement is hand-kl.
t 3 L
\
written it may b'e dhsirable to have it transcribed upon t
your return to the office. A copy of both the handwritten and typed form of the statement can then be forwarded to him.
When a statement is included in an investigation report as l
- an exhibit, identification symbols are substituted for the c,
8-24
/
s h
m names of any individuals, including the individual providing the statement. The original statement and a' typed transcript are maintained in the Regional office.
- 16. Management Closeout A meeting is normally held with licensee manaaement at the conclusion of the investigation at which time the findings are provided the licensee. These meetings for th'e most part are similar to inspection closeout meetings. If the inves-tigation involved allegations, the specific allegations are stated and the findings are discussed. Any items of noncom-pliance identified during the investigation are stated.
- 7. Followup With Allegers Following completion of an investigation of allegations, it is good practice to contac.t the alleger by telephone to inform him of the findings in a suninary fashion. Review your commitment to furnish him a copy of your report and thank him for his interest and cooperation.
The letter transmitting a copy to the alleger is not placed in the Public Document Room.
F. Documentation
'The format for investigation reports is currently somewhat flexi-ble. The cover page is similar to an inspection report but the subject of the investigation is usually stated in one sentence beneath the name and location of the licensee.
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- o. i The first heading in the report itself is " Reason for Investi-gation". This is followed by one or two sentences stating what
. triggered the investigation. This is followed by a section i " Summary of Facts" which is just that. Included at the end of
- this section is a listing of the items of noncompliance identified or a statement that no items of noncompliance were identified.
Each item of noncompliance should be followed by a reference to the paragraph (s) in the Details wherever the basis for the item of noncompliance is set forth.
Beginning with a new page is the heading " Details". Under that t
heading is the remainder of the report subdivided by subheadings.
Thc first subheading is " Introduction". This section contains )
all of the information known before any field work was initiated.
The rest of the information may be arranged under subject sub-headings or by chronological development of the information. The Details 'section of reports dealing with allegations may consist of the introduction, the statement of each allegation followed by a description of the findings regarding it, ar.d a management meeting section at the end.
Investigation reports should not contain any opinions, evaluations or conclusions of_ the investigator except that the items of non-compliance are in a sense conclusions. Also, in reports on per-sonnel overexposures, a dose calculation section contains the results of NRC calculations based on the data obtained during the investigation.
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.~
Any personal opinions, observations or reconnendations for changes in NRC regulations, policies or practices you have as a result of an investigation should be set forth in a memorandum.
Copies.of records, correspondence, sketches, drawirgs, signed statements, and photographs are attached to the report as exhibits.
While there are exceptions, reports usually do not contain the names of individuals except licensee management personnel with whom the closecut meeting is held. In lieu of names, personnel are identified as Individual A, B, C, etc. An individual's job title may be used. This may be pertinent in that it gives per-spective to the information or actions attributed to him.
G. Other Considerations
- 1. Liaison with Other Agencies Investigations frequently involve contacts with other govern-mental agencies. Contacts with State fiealth Departments have been discussed earlier. Contacts may also be necessary with other governmental agencies-such as the Department of Transportation, ERDA, EPA, FDA, and the FBI. These contacts may involve working with them, obtaining information from them, or briefing them on the information obtained during your investigation.
- 2. Interim Internal Communications During the course of investigations, the Regional Office needs to be kept abreast of developments. The Regional Office may, 8-27
- c. _
')
in turn, be required to brief IE Headquarters. The Regional '
Office and/or IE Headquarters may provide guidance or instruc-tion as the investigation progresses. For these reasons, freqLent telephone contacts with the Regional Office may be necessa ry. /
- 3. News Media Contacts It is not unusual for the news media to become interested in the matter under investigation and to request an interview with the investigating team. Responses to press inquiries should be forthright and sincere. A discussion of preliminary findings or the expression of ' opinions on the outcome of the investigation, however, should be avoided. )
News media personnel usually.want to know the status of the investigation, what action the NRC may take, when the inves-tigation will be concluded and when the results will be made available to the public.
IV.
SUMMARY
While investigations have much in common with inspections, there are distinct differences. They usually have high visibility and they examine a specific matter. Each investigation is unique and you must remain flexible in your approach. Circumstances over which you have little or no control may have a significant impact on the course that the investigation -takes. It is important that personnel conducting 8-28
an investigation work together as a team, each individual being equally concerned that all pertinent information is obtained.
Be alert to discrepancies or conflicting information and try to resol.ve them. Maintain objectivity, especially when investigating allegations. It is just as important to gather information and evidence that ' demonstrates an allegation is untrue as it is to sub-stantiate an allegation. The information obtained should provide anyone who reads the report assurance that the matter was thoroughly examined. The results of your efforts may be of interest to a variety of people and should satisfy all of them.
~
In conducting interviews encourage the cooperation of the interviewee by creating a comfortable atmosphere. Work toward getting the indi-vidual to engage in a discussion rather than merely to respond to questions.
Be sensitive to the rights, interests and feelings of those with whom you have contact.
Project an attitude of fairness and sincerity at all times.
Keep in mind that whatever you say and do is done as a representative of NRC and not as an individual and will be looked at in that light by others.
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V. ' REFERENCES
. A. Memorandum from J. G. Davis to R'egional Directors, Identifying -
Individuals in Reports of Investigations, May 23, 1975.
B .- Draft Manual Chapter 1360, Use of Medical Consultants, distributed by memo dated May 13,1977.
-C. Code 900, Pages 7-10.
/
4 4
'I M
1
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, - .,- . , . - ,. _ , . - - . . , . -, - . . - - _ . . , - ,., =.
ATTACHfiENT A FORMAT FOR SIGNED STATEMENT
-I, , ,
(Name) (Job Title) (Company with which employed) (Address of Company with which emp[oyed) was contacted by (Names and Titles) on at at (Date)
(Time Iofwas Day)dvised (Location of the nature
. a where statement is taken) of the inquiry and the provisions of Section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act (if applicable). After being so advised, I voluntarily supplied the following information.
(Body of Statement)
I, , have read the above statement (Name) of pages and it is true and correct. Furthermore.
(Number)
I am aware that this statement may be used in a judicial-proceeding.
(Signature) (Date)
Witnesses:
(Signature of First Witness) (Date)
(Title of First Witness)
(Signature of Second Witness) (Date)
(Title of Second Witness)
(Time and Place Statement is Witnessed) 1 8-31 j l
1
.)
IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE LEGAL COMMITMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION I. Learnina Obiectives After completing this course, the student should:
- 1. Understand what constitutes a Regulatory Requirement and the relation-ship to an Item of Noncompliance and a Notice of Violation.
- 2. Understand what constitutes a Licensee Comunitment and the relationship to a Deviation and the Notice of Deviation.
- 3. Understand the kinds of licenses (Permits) issued by the Conunission in the performance of its duties.
- 4. Understand the enforcement actions (sanctions) used by the Commission to insure that licensees comply with Commission requirements, and know how to select the proper sanction.
- 5. Know how to write an item of noncompliance in the proper format, which 4
contains or includes all essential elements and which is technically and legally accurate.
- 6. Know what type of supporting information needs to be included in the Inspection Report in order to properly support a citation.
- 7. Understand the terminology used in the NRC Enforcement Program.
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l II. Introduction
.This course is designed to put into perspective the wide spectrum of re-quirements and cousaitments placed on NRC licensees, including those holding Limited Work Authorizations and Construction Permits, as well as Facility and Materials Licenses. We difference between a requirement and a commitment
.will be explained. Among the requirements and commitments discussed will be those. included in the application for a license (including the Safety Analysis Report) Limited Work Authorizations, Construction Permits Facility and Materials Licenses, Codes and Standards, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Rules and Regulations, Quality Assurance Plans, Security Plans, and licensee re-sponses to IE Bulletins, IE Circulars, and enforcement actions.
The hierarchy of regulatory requirements will be explained and guidance given on the selection of the appropriate requirement from the hierarchy, and when )
more than one requirement is applicable.
The writing of a citation, both an Item of Non-Complaince and a Deviation, will be discussed with emphasis on the proper language, format and legal contdderations to maximize both technical and legal accuracy. Common pitfalls will be presented.
Enforcement Sanctions and other tools will be discussed, including the Notice of Violation, Order, Civil Penalty, Inunediate Action Letter, Enforcement
, Conferences, and Bulletins and Circulars. The selection of the proper sanction t-and escalation of enforcement action will be explained. Severity categories l
, will be discussed and selection of the proper category will be explained.
p.
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k
--m, III. Detailed Discussion f
A. Definitions A knowledge and understanding of the terminology is required before a mean-ingful description of the NRC Enforcement Program can be set forth. Se following definitions are, for the most paet, taken from IE Manual Chapter
~ 0800 and the Code of Federal Regulations.
- 1. Regulatory Requirements Regulatory requirements are directions (or prohibitions) imposed on a licensee or other person which are legally binding -- th'ose which are 4
enforceable in the courts. Regulatory Requirements of concern to the NRC normally are those contained in the Atomic Energy Act, NRC Rules and Regulations, Orders, and Licenses and permits issued pursuant to a
the Act.
- 2. Licensee Commitment Wrough various written or recorded means applicants and licensees some-times promise that certain equipment, procedures, guides, codes or
, standards, controls or actions will be installed or implemented. Such a promise is a licensee comunitment. Wey are not a regulatory require-ment and are not enforceable and cannot be used as the basis for an item of noncompliance. %ey can, however, be used as the basis for a deviation and the licensee can be asked (but not required) to respond.
- Licensee comunitments can be transformed into a regulatory requirement by incorporation into a license (or permit) as license (or permit) !
condition, or by changing the technical specifications. At such time they become legally enforceable and can be used as the basis for an T
item of noncompliance.
i 9-3
- , , _ _ , ,m...,,m,,_, _ . _ , _.__,,_m, -- . _ ,, _. .,_._ --. _ . _ . . , _ - - . . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , - , , - - _ ,. -
s
- 3. Acceptable Items-An acceptable item is a matter or situation r:~ involving an item of noncompliance, failure to meet a license conunitment, deviation, or an unresolved item. It is also an item which meets inspection criteria.
- 4. -Item of Noncomplisnee An item of noncompliance is a situation wherein a licensee fails to com-ply with a regulatory requirement. Items of noncompliance have been categorized into three severity levels: violations, infractions and deficiencies. Wese categories are described in a letter to all licensees, dated December 31, 1974.
- 5. Deviation A deviation is a situation wherein a licensee 1) fails to meet commit-ments to the Commission, 2) fails to meet provisions of applicable Regulatory Guides, or 3) fails to comply with codes, standards or gener-ally accepted practices in the industry which have safety or security significance, and such situation does not constitute an item of noncompliance.
- 6.- Unresolved Items An unresolved item-is a matter about which more information is required in order to determine whether it is an acceptable item, an item of non-compliance, or a failure to meet a licensee coanniement (deviation).
- 7. Notice of Violation A Notice of Violation is a written notice to a licensee required by 10 CFR 2.201, of apparent items of noncompliance (violations, infractions, or deficiencies). We Notice of Violation may itself be the enforcement sanction or it may be issued in conjunction with a civil penalty action or an order.
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.----.-e,m--+- , ~ - , -mw. - - - - , ~ ---
- 8. Violation A violation is an item of noncompliance of the most severe category. It
} is defined by numerous examples in IE Manual Chapter 0800 and includes I
such things as 1) exposure of an individual in excess of 10 CFR 20.403 (b),
- 2) radiation levels in unrestricted areas which exceed 50 times the regu-1 story limits, 3) release of radioactive materials in amounts which exceed 50 times the regulatory limits, 4) failure to provide a safety function when required, 5) exceeding a safety limit, and 6) all security
-barriers or-controls removed or inoperative and there is free access to a vital area.
- 9. Infraction An Infraction is an item of noncompliance less severe than a Violation and is defined by numerous examples in IE Manual Chapter 0800. It in-( cludes such things as 1) exposure of an individual beyond permissible Itmits but less than the values in 10 CFR 20.403, 2) release of radio-active materials in concentrations or rates which exceed limits, but in amounts less than permissible limits, 3) exceeding a limiting condition for operation, 4) safety system settings less conservative than limiting safety system settings, and 5) security degraded or impaired by a re-quired barrier not being functional, but a redundant system operative.
- 10. Deficiency A deficiency is an item of noncompliance in which the threat to the health, safety, or interest of the public, or the common defense and security is remote, and no undue expenditure of time and resources to 4
Laplement corrective action is required. Deficiencies include such items as noncompliance with records, posting, or labeling requirements which are not serious enough to amount to infractions.
f l
9-5
( .
~ , - . -,
- 11. Limited Work Authorization
- A Limited Work Authorization is the approval given to an applicant for a Construction Permit to conduct certain site preparation and installation of certain structural foundations, as specified in 10 CFR 50.10. An LWA-1 permits site preparation and other installa-tions not subject to the provisions of Appendix B. An LWA-2 per-mits structural foundations for structures, systems and components which are subject to the provisions of Appendix B.
LWAs are discussed in 10 CFR 50.10.
- 12. Construetion Permit A Construction Permit is the approval given to an applicant to con-struct a facility. -)
- 13. License A license is the written authorization by the consnission for a person or legal entity to conduct specified activities using licensed materials.
Licenses are issued in accordance with parts of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
- 14. NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Circulars IE Circulars provide a means for timely dissemination of safety related information to licensees and construction permit holders. The Circular provides 1) a method to coamminicate to licensees safety related cir-cumstances of a lower threshold than that of Bulletins, 2) more timely conusunications, and 3) a means of obtaining uniform information from 9-6
i'
-licensees to determine whether a safety related situation exists.
he main d'.fferences between a Bulletin and a Circular are the significance of the circumstances and the urgency of the need for corrective action.
The key portions of a Circular are 1) a description of the circum-stances on which the circular.is based, and 2) a description of the
- ' action requested of the licensee.
Circulars are described in detail in IE Manual Chapter 1126.
- 15. Bulletins A Bulletin is a communication issued to a class of licensees requesting specific actions as a result of safety related equipment design inade-
!: quacies, defect, operating inadequa'cies, malfunctions or failures of a generic nature.
- 16. Inmediate Action Letter Inmediate Action Letters are issued by the Regional Director with Head-l quarters concurrence for a licensee to inspect, report and make conunit-I ments to implement specified controls or remedial actions as a result t
- of safety, safeguards, or security related condicitons at the licensee's i
facility. If the licensee does not take the specified action, the NRC may issue en order to make the proposed action a requirement of the license. We IAL is also used to confirm verbal conniemer.ts by
- licensees.
i 9-7
. . ~ . _ _- _ . _ _ _ . . . . _ , - . . .._______...,,_--,_,_,_.,..--,s_ . . _ _ - . _ . . - , . . . - - _ , _ _ , . .
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)
- 17. USNRC Regulatory Guides Regulatory G ides are issued to describe and make available to the public methods acceptable to the NRC Staff of implementing specific points of the Commiscions' regulations to delineate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problema or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory Guides are not sub-stitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required.
Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
- 18. Physical Security Plan Each applicant for a production or utilization facility must submit )
as part of his application a Physical Security Plan. The plan must address' vital equipment, vital areas, isolation zones, tests, inspec-tions, and other means to demonstrate how the licensee plans to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.
Physical Security Plans are discussed in 10 CFR 50.34.
- 19. Notice of Deviation A Notice of Deviation is a written notice to a licensee of apparent deviations. The Notice of Deviation is most generally incorporated into the text of an enforcement letter, and while the licensee is asked to respond, reference is,not made to 10 CFR 2.201 as in the case of a Notice of violation.
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. . _ . . .- .- ~ - - - _
. . ~ . . - - ._. - .. . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ -
i i
- 3. Regulatory Requirements
. The Regulatory Requirements imposed upon a licensee include:
- 1. The Atomic Energy Act;
- 2. The Code of Federal Regulations;
- 3. Orders Issued by the Commission; and
- 4. Conditions of the License,
- i. There are many things which by themselves are not a regulatory
, requirement, but which become~ one because of incorporation into a license as~one of the conditions of that license.
For example, Regulatory Guide 1.16, having to do with re-
- porting, is not in itself a legally binding requirement.
However, if a license includes the provision that the licensee i
must comply with the provisions in Regulatory Guide 1.16, then that Guide does become a legal binding requirement as L
far as that particular licensee is concerned. In such a case 4
all of the provisions of the Regulatory Guide which say that i.
the licensee "smat" or "shall" are in fact legal binding requirements All other provisions of the Guide which say that the licensee "should" or "may" are not requirements. ,
4 Licenses are issued as stipulated in various parts of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
i 4
9-9
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--,,+v >na n ,n+.e,, . .,n,- en.~~~--...----,.---,~,-+---,,-.-,,--s-,,---,,. ,-,--,,,,,-,,-,n--,,e--------..-.,---,-em --,-,--n~ , - - -r
-~ . . - . _ . . - - - . . -. --. .
By-Product Materials licenses are issued under 10CFR Part 30.
By-product material is,with minor exceptions, material'that was made radioactive in the process of producing or using-in some manner special nuclear material. A By-Product Materials license is usually issued for some specific purpose such as utilizing the material to perform tasks such as radiography or storing the material such as burial of wastes.
Source Materials licenses are issued under 10CFR Part 40.
Source material is uranium or thorium in any form including ores. In~the case of ores the ora must be greater than
.05 percent by weight. This license is generally issued for ,
such things as mining the ore or shipping the ore.
Special Nuclear Materials licenses are issued under 10CFR Part 70. Special nuclear material is plutonium or uranium 233 and 235 and any other uranium enriched with uranium 233 or uranium 235. This license is generally issued for ship-ment or storage of the material. ,
Facilities licenses are issued under 10CFR Part 50. These licenses provide for the licensing of production and utiliza-tion facilities. Production f acilities are (1) nuclear reactor designed to produce plutonium or uranium 233 1
L 9-10
._. .....- . . _ , . . . , _ _ . _ _ - - . , _ _ - , , , , ,...,..._r ,. . . _ . . , - - , . _ _ _ . - . , . , . ~ . - , , - . _ . - - , - . .
i l
(2) facilities designed to separate isotopes of uranium of plutonium, and (3) facilities designed for the processing of special irradiated nuclear material. Utilization facilities are nuclear reactors other than those designed to produce plutonium or U233. This, of course, includes commercial nuclear powered generating stations. A license issued under 10 CFR Part 50 is generally issued to construct or to operate a production or utilization facility.
?
9-11
.w For an applicant for a production or utilization facility,
, such as a Nuclear Power Station, the first authorization which he may receive is a Limited Work Authorization. (LWA)
An LWA-1 authorizes site preparation activities which are i
not safety related. Sere is no basis for enforcement --
no basis for issuing a Notice of Violation for failing to comply with the provisions of the LWA-1. We LWA-1 may be withdrawn or suspended by issuing the proper Order, but there is no legal binding requirement for the applicant to comply with the LWA-1. issued based on the We LWA-1 is )
information supplied by the applicant in his application for a Construction Permit, however, .and therefore the applicant is, committed to the statements made in his application. Sus 4
a deviation may exist, and the applicant may be notified of i this. His response to such notification would at least in
~
part be the basis for any subsequent action to suspend or withdraw the LWA-1.
. %e next authorization which may be issued prior to the issu-ance of a Construction Permit is the LWA-2. This authorization permits additional site preparation including foundations i
,) \
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f
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for safety related equipment and buildings. In this regard
, the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, apply. In his '
application the applicant was required to describe his program (his Quality Assurance Program) to assure that the i
- applicable requirements of Appendix B will be satisfied.
If these requirements are found not being satisfied, then citations may be made against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
- The next authorization or permit which may be issued, and which in most cases is the first to be issued, is the con-
.struction permit. The construction permit constitutes au-thorization to the applicant to proceed with construction but does not constitute Commission approval of the safety of any design feature unless such approvals are requested by the licensee and are incorporated into the permit. The Construction Permit is subject to the limitation that an operating licenso will not be issued until the Final Safety Analysis Report is submitted.
Upon completion of the facility, subject to necessary testing, i the Cosmiission will, in the absence of good cause to the con-trary, issue an operating license. Prior to so doing, the j Coimaission must find that 1) the construction is complete and
- in compliance with the construction permit and all applicable l
i 9-13
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rules and regulations, 2) the facility will operate in con-formity with the application and all applicable rules and regulations, 3) there tw reasonable assurance that the activities authorised by the operating license can be per-formed safely, 4) the applicant is technically and finan-cially qualified, 5) the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 140, having to do with financial protection requirements and indemnity agreements are satisfied, and 6) that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
C. Inspection Results (Inspection Findings)
USNRC inspection of a licensed activity normally results in
- 1) the identification of an item (s) of noncompliance, 2) the identification of a Deviation, 3) a finding that the matter is acceptable, or 4) determination that the matter is unresolved.
In the latter case additional infonnation is needed in order to properly classify the matter as one of the other three . cases.
In determining whether licensees activities are fully in comp 11-ance with regulations, it is necessary to know what regulations are applicable. These change as different permits / licenses are issued.
.s 9-14
D. Licensee Commitments A licensee commaitment is a written or recorded promise by a licensee concerning equipment, procedures, guides, or con- ,
trols or actions to be implemented. These include the written commarts and statements made by the licensee in applications for licenses or permits, hearing records, preliminary safety analysis reports, final safety analysis reports, letters and reports to IE and NRR. These couanit-ments or promises, however, are not legally binding require-ments. The licensee has the opportunity and the legal authority to change these commitments at any time. For in-stance he may say in his application for a construction permit that he plans to do something in such and such a manner. He may subsequently deliberately make a change and notify the Commission of this change in plans and his inten-tion to do whatever it was in a different manner. If this involves a design change, it must of course be a design change which the licensee is permitted to make. In some cases these licensee commitments are translated into regu-latory requirements by being incorporated into the license.
For instance, in the case of materials licenses it is not uncommon for one of the licensed conditions to be a 9-15
m . __ .. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ . _ _ . __ - .. _. .
i statement that he must perform his licensed activities in i
accordance with the statements made in his application and letters which have been identified by date. In this case the licensee mast get a license amendment in order to not do the things which he stated he would do in his application or in those letters. If a licensee fails to comply with the comitment,_ a Notice of Violation cannot be issued since the commitment is not a legal binding requirement. He may -
be notified of a deviacion for failing to meet his commitments, however. In this case, if the notice of deviation does not result in the licensee meeting his commitment, then in order to require this, it will be necessary to issue a license .)
change incorporating the commitment into his license, or if health and safety conditions can justify such action, an order may be issued to the licensee.
t E. General Structure of Noncompliance
. Noncompliance, defined previously, has three levels of severity.
The three levels of severity are, violation, infraction, and deficiency. An explanation of these categories and a number of examples of each are contained in a letter which was sent to all licensees on December 31, 1974. A copy of this letter is included as part of the course materials.
9-16
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.m F. Action Levels Action levels relate to the management level within the Com-
- mission which initiates enforcement action. Action level number 1 refers to enforcement taken at the level of the Regional Office. Generally speaking, t.he enforcement action i
taken at the Regional Office consists of a letter to a licensee enclosing a Notice of Violation and requiring the response specified in 10CFR 2.201.
Action level 2 is defined as an enforcement conference wherein a member of Regional management meets with licensee management s
to discuss the licensee's enforcement history or inmediate concerns which the Region has, or it is a Notice of Violation sent to the licensee by Headquarters.
i 1
Action level number 3 is the imposition of a civil penalty.
This is of course done from e..adquarters, normally on the basis of a reconsendation from the Region, and the submittal of a civil penalty package to Headquarters by the Region in which the licensee is located.
Action level number 4 is also a Headquarters action. It takes the form of an Order to Cease and Desist, Suspend, Modify L'
or Revoke a License. Again, this action is torma117 only taken on the basis of a reconmendation from the Region, and the i submittal to Headquarters of a package containing the t
l proposed Order and the necessary backup information, 9-17 I
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G. Processing Inspection Results If the inspection results consist only of acceptable items, then there is no processing required except for documentation of inspection by means of the inspection report, the sending of the inspection report to the licensee for proprietary review, and the subsequent internal and external distribution of the report and this letter.
If there are noncompliances, then the customary processing for action level number 1 is to transmit to the licensee a Notice of Violation containing citation for each of the item.t of noncompliance, and the inspection report itself. If the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation is acceptable, then a simple acknowledgement letter to the licensee completes the documentstion. If the licensee's response is unacceptable then normally an attempt is made to obtain additional response from the licensee which will be acceptable. If this is not successful, then escalation of the enforcement action to action level number 2, an enforcement conference, would be the normal approach. There may be cases when the licensee's re-sponse is acceptable, but because of the number of items of noncompliance where the gravity of the situation, an enforce-ment conference is felt to be necessary in order to emphasize 9-18
- ^3 to the licensee the concerns of the Regional Office.
An enforcement conference est be attended by a member of management at the Section Chief level or higher. The Regional Director may attend or he may decide to contact the appropriate level of licensee management by telephone or both. The enforcement conference e st be documented using an inspection report and appropriate letter to the licensee transmitting the report to him, and of course the normal internal and external distribution. In certain in-stances it may be desirable to have the enforcement con-ference attended by higher manegement, such as the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
A,s mentioned previously, a Notice of Violation from Head-quarters may also be the appropriate enforcement action at action level number 2. In this case the inspection report will normally be transmitted to the licenses from the Regional Office even though the enforcement letter and the Notice of Violation were sent to the licensee from Headquarters.
I If neither the Notice of Violation from Headquarters nor the enforcement conference produces the appropriate licensee response, the enforcement action may be escalated to action 9-19
level number 3, the imposition of a civil monetary penalty.
For enforcement action at action level number 3, the Regional Office will prepare a Proposed Civil Penalty Package and transmit it.to Headquarters. This package will include a proposed letter to the licensee, a proposed Notice of Violation, a Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, a draft press release, and in some cases an enforcement history.
Following review by Headquarters the lett~er to the ifcensee and its attachments is tailed to the licensee frn Headquarters.
In the event that the licensee response to the Proposed Impost- -)
tion of Civil Penalties and the Notice of Violation is un-acceptable, then the enforcement action is escalated to action level number 4, the issuance of an appropriate Order. In this case the Regional Office prepares a package for transmittal to Headquarters consisting of the Proposed Order and the neces-sary supporting information. After review by Headquarters, including legal review, the Order is issued to the licensee.
It is not necessary that action at any level higher than action level number 1 be preceded by enforcement actions at the lower levels. This of ten is the case, however situations occur 9-20
\
4 s
which are event oriented, and are of such magnitude that a '
civil penalty is levied on a licensee withovt having had <
. - r.
action at action level n d er 1 or 2. Epwever, if enforcement action at action level number 3 is based on s' chronic history of poor performance, then it would be entirely appropriate and
.i. customary for the record to show previous enforcement action at action levels 1 and 2.- Additionally, inspection resalts may reveal a condition which requires inunadiate action to protect. the health and. fafety ci the public. In this case it would be appropfiate to issue en iranadiate cease and desist order. ,
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As ' defined previously, a Deviation is an instance where a licensee fails to meet a commitment or an appropriate code, standard, guide, or generally accepted industry practice.
The Notice of Deviation is issued to the licensee. The licensee-is asked to respond although the 10CFR 20.201 language is not used in the notice to the licensee. If his response is adequate and correction takes place, the matter is satisfactorily resolved. If the response is inadequate, then a decision must be made about what is to be done. Assuming that the matter is of sufficient signi-ficance to warrant additional action then it would be '
)
appropriate to:
- 1. Hold an enforcement conference,
- 2. Send a letter to the licensee from Headquarters, or
. 3. Refer the matter to licensing for study.
This latt r action may result in a letter to the licensee or the matter may be dropped. If the desired corrective action still has not been achieved at this point and the matter is of such significance as to warrant additional
~
action, then an order may be issued to the licensee or his license may be modified to include the desired action as a regulatory requirement.
s
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9-22
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t i H. Enforcement Actions Available to the Commission
- 1. General '. ,
The formal enforcement actions available to the conumis-
, sinn in dhe exercise of its regulatory responsibilities may be divided into three basic types; Notice of 3 ,
Violation, Civil Penilties, and Orders.
i
- 2. Criteria for' Notices of Violation Generally a Notice of Violation may be considered suffi-i cient enforcement action in those cases where: a) items of noncompliance are readily correctible; b) items of noncompliance are not repetitive or numerous, and do not constitute an inanediate or serious threat to health and safety; c) there is no indication that appropriate cor-rective action will not be taken.
- 3. Criteria for Imposing civil Penalties Civil penalties may be the appropriate enforcement action in cases or situations which meet one or more of the fol-lowing criteria: a) esses of noncompliance with the same basic requirements which were brought to the attention of the licensee previously; b) cases of noncompliance in
, which the licensee fails to carry out corrective action in a timely manner; c) cases involving deliberate failure to comply with requirements; d) cases involving a chronic 9-23 m - <- --
history of noncompliance; e) cases where significant matters were not reported as required; f) cases involv-ing items of noncompliance in a violation category; g) cases where an item of noncompliance resulted in or contributed to the cause or the seriousness of an accident or incident; h) cases where an order for immediate but temporary suspension or other action is issued, but additional emphasis is deemed necessary to assure future compliance; i) cases where the nature and number of items of noncompliance demonstrate that the licensee is not conducting licensed activity with adequate ,
concern for health and safety.
- 4. - Criteria for Issuing Specific Types of Orders a) An order to cease and desist is ordinarily issued when a person is conducting unauthorized activities and has been notified of the need for authorization but fails, to terminate the activity.
b) An order for innediate suspension of the license or a portion thereof is ordinarily issued as necessary to remove an innediate threat to health and safety.
c) An order for the modification of a license is ordin-arily issued as an enforcement sanction when it is determined that a licensee's operation or activities must be limited or modified to protect health and safety.
9-24
-__. ~; - -
4.
d) An order revoking the license may be issued when
- 1) Licensee's performance shows he is not quali-fied to perform activities
- 2) Civil penalty proves to be ineffective ,
- 3) Licensee refuses to correct items of noncompliance
- 4) The licensee does not respond to a Notice of Violation
- 5) Licensee's response to a Notice of Violation indicates inability or unwillingness to maintain compliar.ce with requirements
- 6) Material false statement is made e) A denial of an application for license renewal may be used in lieu of an Order for Revocation where license renewal is pending or the expiration of the license is inucinent.
4 t
9-25
I. Procedures for Determining the Proper Enforcement Sanction (Note: The following information is extracted from IE Manual Chapter 0800.)
- 1. Identify each item of noncompliance and determine its
. basic category (Violation, Infraction, or Deficiency).
- 2. Determine from the licensee's history of noncompliance whether there are any repetitive items.
- 3. Determine from the following table the action points for each item of noncompliance:
Violation --
100 action points Infraction -- 10 action points T
Deficiency -- 2 action points '
- 4. For a repeated or uncorrected item of noncompliance with the same basic requirement, increase the action points successively by a factor of two each time it occurs.
For example, when an infraction of the basic require.
ment occurs the second time, the points will be two times ten equals twenty action points; and the third 1
occurrence will be two times the second occurrence or two times twenty equals forty action points.
A repeat item of noncompliance is (1) failure to comply I-l with the same basic requirement that was brought to the l -
attention of the licensee in a Notice of Violation 9-26
4 -
c following a previous inspection, or (2) for violations a reportable incident involving the failure to comply with the same basic requirement which occurred more than once during the period covered by the inspection.
- 5. When a total of 100 action points or more result from the items of noncompliance identified during an inspec-tion or investigation, and the items of noncompliance include one or more violations of repetitive infractions or deficiencies, the Regional Office staff will review the case to determine whether a civil penalty or Show Cause Order is warranted or appropriate.
Violations are those items of noncompliance which may result in conditions which have significant ecusequences.
Such items of noncompliance have 100 action points and may be the basis for a civil penalty.
As a general rule the civil penalties are imposed for. items of noncompliance which do not represent an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public, and orders are issued in those cases where there is an innediate threat. Specific mitigating conditions or circumstarces will be documented for those cases where civil penalties 9-27
. t
J or such orders are not issued for Violations or cases having 100 or more action points.
- 6. Escalated enforcement action involving a history of noncompliance should be preceded by one or more enforcement conferences. An enforcement conference is a mechanism whereby NRC management can emphasize their concerns to licensee's management and can be very effective when held at the level of Regional Directors and Corporation Presidents. -
By proper use of the enforcement 7, conference and good consnunication with the licensee, it often is possible to avoid the need for enforcement 1
action being escalated to the civil penalty or order stage. In cases which are more event oriented, it is not necessary to have had an enforcement conference prior to escalating the enforcement action. For example, a licensee which has an acceptable compliance history but experiences some event such as the overexposure of a number of people during. a refueling outage, may be a candidate for a civil penalty without the normal progres-sion of previous Notice of Violation followed by order more' enforcement conferences.
\
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9-28
- 7. Since one of the basic parameters for a civil penalty is items of noncompliance which represent a significant threat (but not innediate) to the health and safety of the public, the basis for this sanction generally are items of noncompliance in the violation and infraction category. Civil penalties based exclusively on defi-ciencies would be difficult to justify and their use in this manner, although not excluded, is highly unlikely. Each item of noncompliance will carry a monetary penalty.
- 8. A Notice of Violation issued by Headquarters is an appropriate sanction when there is a situation involving
(
items of noncompliance with a total of 100 action points or more, but the case does not appear to warrant a civil penalty. The determination as to which sanction will be used is based on whether the licensee has been duly notified of the probability of such sanctions in previous correspondence, whether there have been in previous enforcement conferences, and on such judgment factors as the severity of the items of noncompliance, the nature and number of such items, the licensee's past performance, frequency of noncompliance, length of time the items of noncompliance have existed, and the 9-29
licensee's stated intentions of performance in correcting these items of noncompliance promptly.
- 9. Although the previous considerations or guidelines for selecting the proper sanction for a specific enforcement situation, the Regional Director may reconsnend any enforcement action available to the Conumission if the rationale is provided to support such reconunendation.
)
4 l
9-30
J. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins An Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin is a consuunication which may be issued to a class of licensees requesting specific actions as the result of safety related equipment design inadequacies, defects, operating inadequacies, mal-functions, or failures that have occurred at similar facili-ties or during similar operations which have generic significance. The Bulletin will specify that the licensees inspect and correct the inadequacies and respond to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement with the corrective action taken or planned, and the date when the action was
(, or will be completed. An Order to Suspend or Modify a License may be issued if the response to the Bulletin is not prompt and acceptable.
t 9-31
4 K. Inspection and Enforcement Imediate Action Letters An Inunediate Action Letter is a form of communication to a d'
specific licensee in those cases where the licensee, because of an actual or potential incident or occurrence involving the threat to the health and safety or interest of the public, agrees voluntarily to cease operations or take other action. An Isunediate Action Letter will be preceded by a phone
{ call to the licensee wherein the agreed upon actions are j discussed and the letter, sent to the licensee subsequent to this phone conversation, will list the actions agreed to in
! the telephone conversation, and reference that telephone
)
conversation. The letter will also contain a paragraph which asks the licensee to respond by telphone and in writing within twenty-four hours if the understandings expressed in the letter differ from the understandings held by the licensee based upon his view of the referenced telephone conversation. If the licensee did not implement the corrected action stated as l
being agreed upon in the Imediate Action Letter, the Commis-sion may then issue and Order to Modify the License so that the~ desired actions become legal binding requirements, or an Order may be issued to suspend the license in whole or part until corrective measures are implemented.
4 1 I
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9-32
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L. Writing a Citation
- 1. Specific Guidance for All Citations A citation is the wrLtten description of an item of non-compliance. Citations are made for items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements and contains four key elements.
A citation identifies the regulatory requirement with which the licensee failed to comply, specifies numbers or values obtained when limits were exceeded, states the date where period when the noncompliance occurred, and identifies the location where the noncompliance occurred. Generally, a citation is made against a specific requirement of the regulations, the technical specifications, licensed condi-tions, or licensee's conunitments and procedures which have been made a specific condition of the construction permit or license.
- 2. Format A "two part" citation is the preferred format. The first part identifies the appropriate regulatory requirement, and the second or " Contrary" part specifies what was or was not dona. For example:
9-33
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- 1. 10 CFR 34.43(b) requires a physical radiation survey after each radiographic exposure to determine that the sealed source has returned to its shielded
, condition. <
P Contrary to the above, on April 15, 1976, a physical radiation survey was not made after each radiographic exposure at your field site at Logan International i Airport to determine that the sealed source had re-turned to its shielded condition.
Sometimes it is necessary to identify a " trail" leading to a regulatory requirement when reference is made to
)
items, which by themselves, are not regulatory requirements.
For example:
- 1. Condition 2 of your license requires that licensed material be possessed and used in accordance with statements, representations and procedures contained in your application dated January 28, 1974, as cmended by letters dated November 10, 1975, December 28, 1975, and February 2, 1976.
Your letter dated December 28, 1975, states that pro-cedures will be prepared for specified activities including the pickup of packages or radioactive waste at NRC licensees. ,
9-34
- __ __. _. _. 2 ____
m Procedure I.C. 10, " Parcel Survey and Pickup," dated March 17, 1976, prepared pursuant to the above, re-quires that all packages picked up at NRC licensees be 4
smeared and the smear counted using a G.M. survey meter with an end window probe.
Contrary to the above, as of May 10, 1977, you have failed to smear the surface of all packages picked up at NRC licensees.
or Contrary to the above, on March 31, 1977, three packages of radioactive waste were picked up from the ABC Laboratory, Incorporated, an NRC licensee, without the required smear of the surface being done.
or contrary to the above, on June 3,1976, the smears from six packages picked up from the Wagner Hospital, an NRC licensee, were not counted.
- 3. Citations Against 10CFR50 and Appendices
- During the construction period, citations may be made for noncompliance with 10CFR50, particularly 50.55 and Appendix B, and other regulatory requirements or specific conditions of the construction permit. The specific details of the QA l
9-35 ;
1 l
_. _ _ _ _ . _ . . ~ . _ _
4' T 1 plan submitted by the applicant as part of its SAR is not normally a legal binding requirement and citations
- made in the QA area must refer to a legal requirement such as the criteria in Appendix B, 10CFR50. Whenever 3
practical, related provisions in the SAR and the imple-menting procedures will be referenced as well as the appropriate criteria from Appendix B. For example:
- 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II states in part:
". . . The applicant shall regularly review the status and adequacy of the quality assurance program.. Man-agement of other organizations participating in the quality assurance program shall regularly review the status and adequacy of that part of the quality assur-ance program which they are executing."
i' The accepted quality Assurance Program (FSAR Section F.4), Section F.4.0 states in part: "The requirements in the Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Manual
- were established to comply with the requirements of i
L Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, 1
l.
Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."
I.
l 9-36
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s The Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Manual .
4 (NUQAM), Volume II, Revision 2 dated June 17, 1975, Section 1.4.2.10 states: "NUSCO Operations Quality Assurance Manager - The NUSCO Operations Quality Assurance Manager, reporting to the Superintendent of Nuclear Production is responsible for checking, audit-ing, inspecting and otherwise verifying proper per-formance of quality related activities associated with operation, maintenance and refueling of nuclear power plants.
Contrary to the above, the NUSCO Operations Quality Assurance Manager (0QAM) did not regularly review the
, status and adequacy of the audit portion of the quality assurance program in that:
- a. on March 8, 1977, the OQAM stated that audits A60003 and A60008 had not been performed and that the rec-ords for audit A60023 could not be located to verify its status;
- b. on March 9,1977, the 0QAM stated that audit A60023 had not been conducted explaining why no records could be located; 9-37
e
. c. on March 10, 1977, the OQAM stated that audits A60003, A60008 and A60023 had been conducted f
but no reports had been issued; and,
- d. on March 11, 1977, the OQAM stated that he was not regularly reviewing the status and adequacy of that portion of the quality assurance program 4
which he was executing.
In the same manner citations may be made against other requirements in the Appendices of Part 50, and wherever practical, the related provisions of the SAR will be referenced.
'\.
Af ter an operating license has been issued citations may still be made against Part 50, Appendix B, referencing the appropriate section of the SAR, as is described in the previous paragraph relating to the construction period.
Technical specifications frequently include much the same
! administrator and managerial control plans as the QA plan, however, and when a matter of noncompliance is covered both by the technical specifications and Appendix B of 2 .
Part 50, the citation should be made against the most specific requirement, which normally will be the technical specifications.
t 9-38
4 4
After an operating license is issued any commitment or statement of the PSAR will be superseded by any specific
- statement or reference to the same manner in the FSAR, except for a construction matter that is continuing after the issuance of the operating license. In this case the PSAR will continue to be the controlling docu-ment.
In those instances where the licensee's QA plan does not meet the provision of regulatory guides (e.g., guide
~1.28-QA Progran Requirements (Design and Construction),
and Guide 1.33-QA Program Requirements (Operations))
the matter is referred to Headquarters for resolution with NRR prior to issuance of a Notice of Violation. If the QA
, plan does not cover some areas of Appendix B where if it is deficient in its description of the program requirement, noncompliance will not be cited to the licensee for such
! matters, but they too will be referred to Headquarters l
for resolution.
- 4. When Not to Make Citations Citations for noncompliance are not made against the bases of the technical specifications, regulatory guides, codes, standards, IE Manual Chapters, provisional instructions, i
9-39 u --- +my+q-- - +pW -
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temporary instructions or other internal guides or in-structions, unless these documents have been made into a regulatory requirement by virtue of having been incorporated into a license or technical specification.
In those instances wherein a licensee has identified items of noncompliance during normal audits of his operations or through other management control systems, in some situations the citation also will not be made.
Citations will be issued for all items of noncompliance in the violation category and for other items of non-compliance which resulted in an actual event or occurrence such as personnel exposures or material releases which exceeded regulatory limits. Citations will be issued for all items of noncompliance which were not reported as required or which were not properly corrected according to an adopted schedule. Citations will not be issued for other infractions and deficiencies which were identified by the licenseee, and for which adequate corrective action was taken and documented, and where necessary such items were properly reported. These items will not appear in the Notice of Violation and the Notice will not make reference to them. Such items will not be referred to
. .J 9-40
O as items of noncompliance, and will not be recited as such in the inspection report. In this case the report details will include a sununary information state, ment referencing the fact that the licensee had conducted some audits and identified a number of items needing corrective action and that corrective action had been e
accomplished or instituted.
Ordinarily duplicate citations are not made for the same basic item of noncompliance even though the licensee may not technically comply with two or more requirements; for example, if a licensee is cited for not making surveys, the second citation will not be issued for failure to keep records of the surveys which not made. There are, however, situations when there is more than one item of noncompliance associated with a single incident. For example, a licensee may be cited for exceeding certain specified limits and may also be cited for failure to make report of the in-cident itself.
Ordinarily a citation is not issued for the licer.see's failure to make a complete report, but additional information necessary to complete the report is requested of the licensee.
9-41
Changes from SAR commitments under Part 50 that have been subject to prior evaluation and approval by the licensee are considered to be design changes and are not items of noncompliance, unless these changes are design changes which the licensee is not authorized to make.
In a similar anner, construction defects or defective or inadequate parts, are not matters of noncompliance if such defects or inadequacies are identified and cor-rected at the stage of planned examination under the QA program. An instance of exceeding a limited condition for operation is not considered to be an-item of noncom-pliance when there are specified alternate actions and the licensee takes these actions within the designated time period.
Variations or drifting from properly established cali-brated and set points is not an item of noncompliance if such variations are within the allowable instrumenta-tion drift and orror bands.
A requirement for a safety systems settings under certain conditions involving equipment failure may be treated as a ibniting condition for operation where redundancy is j
9-42
specified. For example, reactor safety systems settings that are found to be outside the limiting safety systems settings but which do not reduce the system redundancy below the requirements of the technical specifications, and which are corrected as specified in the requirements, ordinarily are not items of noncompliance. Also, indi-vidual channels which are found to be inoperative but which do not result in a degradation of system redundancy to the extent that the specified minimum degree of re-dundancy cannot be satisfied by some action on the part of the licensee generally are not items of noncompliance pre.vided the necessary actions are taken promptly.
It may be stated generally that noncompliance with the technical specification safety limit, limiting safety systems settings, or limiting condition for operation, is deemed to occur when a technical specification limit is exceeded and the licensee fails to take the corrective action specified by the technical specifications.
Citations will be issued for such matters as personnel
- exposures to radiation doses in excess of ILnits, release of materials and concentrations which exceed regulatory 9-43
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limits, a breach in security, where loss of SNM above specified limits even though the item of noncompliance resulted from equipment failure. In susanary, with respect to equipment failures, citations are not issued when equipment failure is beyond the control of the licensee or its properly implemented QA program and/or the licensee instituted proper action and followed the appropriate licensee requirements. Citations are issued for items of noncompliance which result from equipment failure (such as material release), items of noncompliance with the QA requirements which resulted in or failed to preclude equipment failure, items of noncompliance with -
a OA requirement or faf. lure to have required equipment for mitigating cons =g:.ences of occurrences, or items of noncompliance involving the licensee's failure to follow specified requirements subsequent to equipment failure.
9-44
m, V. References A. The Act B. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations C. IE Manual Chapter 0800
- D. December 31, 1974 letter to all licensees E. Codes F. Standards G. USNRC Regulatory Guides
- H. DF0 memo to Regional Directors, dated April 14, 1977, Citations Against criteria of Appendix B, Part 50 r
- Denotes item included with course materials.
9-45
~
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC HEARINGS by LAWRENCE BRENNER, ESQ.
f4RC STAFF HEARING ATTORNEY I. LEARNINGOBJECTIVE(
A. 'The Nature of the Public Hearing Process.
B. The Relationship of Staff Witnesses with NRC Lawyers Involved in the Hearing.
i C. Preparation of Direct Testimony.
D. The " Dos" and " Don'ts" When Giving Testimony at the Hearing.
II. INTRODUCTION A. The following discussion is an attempt to set forth practical matters which I believe prospective NRC Staff expert witnesses should know about their role in the public hearing process. The -
discussion is a generally applicable one. As such, it may be varied by an individual case attorney because of matters peculiar to a particular case.
l B. It is perhaps the chief task of trial counsel in a complicated administrative proceeding, such as an NRC proceeding, to produce a written evidentiary record in which appear, as clearly as possible, the facts that lead to the result believed to be the correct one by the NRC Technical Staff who advise Staff counsel and who' serve as expert witnesses in the hearing. This cannot be done effectively unless a prospective Staff witness understands 10-1 3
- - - _ - .~ -- - --. . _
certain matters about the nature of the hearing process, the relationship with an NRC hearing attorney, the preparation of testimony, and practical " dos" and " don'ts" at the hearing.
If the case-is not clearly and supportably presented, the pre-siding Licensing Board or an appeal panel is not likely to bc persuaded that the position supported by the Staff is the reasonable one for it to adopt in its decision, no matter how technically correct a Staff expert's position is.
III. DETAILED DISCUSSION A. The Nature of the Public Hearina Process
- 1. The public hearing is conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). The Board is composed of two technical experts and onc lawyer, who acts as Chairman of the Board for the hearing.
- 2. The NRC " Rules of Practice" (10 C.F.R. Part 2) permit persons whose interest may be affected by the proceeding to intervene as parties in accordance with the requirements of the regulations, which include a requirement to specify " contentions" or issues. (Personswhowish only to make a statement of their views concerning the project may be permitted to make " limited appearances". Persons making limited appearances do not have the rights of parties). In addition, interested States have a right to fully participate without being required 10-2
I to set forth contentions. The utility seeking to construct (CP proceeding), to operate (0L proceeding), or to continue to construct @ operate ("show cause" or " suspension" proceeding) the commercial nuclear power plant, and the NRC Staff are also parties to the proceeding. It is important to reinember that although the Staff has special review responsibilities in advance of the hearing, at the hearing we are on an equal footing with the other parties before the Board, and have no greater pro-cedural or substantive rights.
- 3. Construction permit hearings are mandatory. They can be
" uncontested" where there are no parties opposed to the grant-ing of a construction permit. More often than not, they are heavily contested, as are all other types of hearings involv-ing licenses for comercial nuclear power plants.
- 4. The hearings are adjudicatory in nature. The direct testimony, along with the professional qualifications of the expert witness, is almost always written and served in advance of the hearing.
However, the prefiled testimony is not admitted into evidence until the hearing, at which time it is subject to objections to admission made by other parties or the Board. The witness is then available for questions on cross-examination by the other parties and the Board. After cross-examination, the witness' attorney may ask him questions on redirect examination on matters raised by the cross-examination. If there is redirect examination, 10-3
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the other parties have a right to recross-examination, and so on (and sometimes on and on). -In addition, a witness may be asked (
byhisatt$rneytoprepare,additionaltestimonyinresponseto ,
p n the-testimony presented by]other witnesses. This is rebuttal testimony.' There is flexibility as to whet:ter rebuttal testinony is written or ' oral' (in the form of responses to questioos posed by the witness' ai!torney), and.as to the proper time in the hearing when it ma be presented.
- 5. All testimony is taken under oath or affirmdtion. Oral testimony is recorded by a court reporter on either a tape recorder or a stenotype machine, and typed up the same day as part of the .
daily transcript.
Prepared written testimony and professional
-)
}
qualifications statement: are usually physically bound into the transcript "as if read" ar:d therefore become rea,dily accessible -
as part of the transcript, or they may be referenced in the' transcript as exhibits admitted into evidence. It is common,.for voluminous documents which a party desires to admit into evidence to be referenced as exhibits (e.g., PSARs). The differences are merely mechanical. All of the above methods have the legal effect of making the evidence part of the record of the proceeding.
(Note: Admitted evidence is subject to motions to strike made during or after direct and cross-examination. Strickei portions are considered to be deleted from the record, although they are not physically removed.)
T 10-4
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- 6. After the evidentiary portion of the hearing is completed, the parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in the form of an initial decision that the party would like to see the Board issue. The proposed findings assemble the evidence by referencing the record to support the facts and the conclusions
-of law which the party believes . flow from those facts.
- 7. The Licensing Board considers all of the admitted evidence and the
. proposed findings of. fact and conclusions of law f,iled by the parties, and issues an initial decision. An initial decision is subject to review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB) and ultimately on a discretionary basis by the Commission ;itself. This appellate review by the ASLAB and the 2
Commission may be upon their own motion or upon the filing of an appeal by a party. When a decision becomes the " final agency action". either.because there was 7.0 appellate review by the ASLAB or Commission or their decision on review has been issued, I' a party may elect to appeal. the decision to a U.- S. Circuit Court of Appeals (either the District of Columbia Circuit or the Circuit where the power plant is sited). From there, the U. S. Supreme
. Court may grant a petition to review the decision of the Circuit Court.
- 8. The Relationship of Staff Witnesses with NRC Lawyers Involved in the Hearing.
- 1. The relationship is one of mutual dependence on the otner's i expertise. The attorney must learn as much as possible of L
10-5 4
the technical subject matter as soon as possible. Likewise, the expert witness must learn about the legal context of the subject matter, the procedural and strategic aspects of the hearing, and the positions of the other parties. There should be a continuous process of educating each other.
~
- 2. The.many discussions and drafts of testimcoy which are necessary are sometimes frustrating to both the attorney and the witness, but the extensive necessary interaction pays off in many tangible ways. If your attorney asks you hard, even hostile questions, you are in a better position to pre-
- pare direct testimony which will support your conclusions in the face of hostile cross-examination and/or rebuttal testimony. )
s at the hearing. You will also be going through the process of learning to respond to possible cross-examination. If it appears to zou that your attorney has no right to challenge your expert opinion, you should remember that conclusions v
'- which can only be supporteti by " judgment" will be of=little orpousetotheBoard. Whatisrequiredisaclearsupporting s
i,
" basis" for your opinion. It is sometimes difficult for an expert witness to go.back and expressly set out the'very basic step ,by-step reasoning process which by now hary become part of his expert judgment, but this must be done to be persuasive.
i
, 10-6 s 3
o
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- 3. Your testimony has to be understandable to an informed layman.
The process of interacting with your attorney should have the effect of simplifying your testimony so that all members of the Board, the Appeal Board, the Commission, and reviewing courts can understand it. The Board is not likely to make findings of fact in its decision which it does not understand.
Of course, the task of simplifying complex subjects without becoming misleading or leaving out important knowledge is not an easy one.
- 4. Your attorney needs your assistance in preparing his cross-examination of other parties in advance of the hearing. In addition, the more he knows of the subject matter, the better he can represent you' when you are being cross-examined. He can make proper objections as to why questions are vague, irrelevant, contain mischaracterizations of the testimony, etc., based on arguments related to the nature and substance of the testimony. Bare legal objections such as " irrelevant",
without a substantive explanation by the lawyer, are not likely to carry as much weight with the Board. Furthermore, if your attorney understands the subject matter, he will ba in a position to ask you redirect questions which assist better in clarifying-the record after cross-examination.
^
- 5. It is unethical for an attorray to tell a witness what to say. However, it is proper, and a part of his duty, for 10-7
the attorney to participate completely in the preparation of what is said in the testimony (e.g., see next paragraph).
It is also a lawyer's duty to explain to prospective witnesses the legal implications of their testimony and to prepare witnesses by posing questions which may be asked at the hearing.
- 6. Your attorney can help you structure your testimony to assure that your expert analysis is put in a form proper for. the hearing. He can assist by familiarizing you with: (1) the findings which will have to be covered based on previous cases dealing with similar issues, (2) the aspects of the issue which will be most heavily focused on by the Board and the parties, (3) whether the Board is likely to have questions not yet identified which go beyond the scope of the contention, and (4) any discovery or prior rulings in this proceeding which bears on your issue.
- 7. If you h.ve not testified before, it would be very useful if you could attend a hearing (on any subject) for at least one day. Even if you have testified before, you should arrive at the hearing early on the day before you have to testify in order to observe the hearing. Each hearing has its own particular dynamics which a witness should observe before
's i
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taking the stand. Of course, if witnesses for other parties are scheduled to testify on your issue before or after you, it is essential for you to be there to assist your attorney in his cross-examination.
- 8. At any stage of the preparation or hearing process, if there is something you do not understand about the hearing, ask your attorney. No question is too simplistic to ask. Likewise, your attorney should feel canfortable asking you what may seem like simplistic questions. It is important that neither the attorney nor the witness discourage communication with each other.
- 9. Make sure you inform your attorney of all relevant information, expert opinions, theories, correspondence, etc. of which you have knowledge. This is especially important if the informa-tion does not appear to support your expert opinions and conclusians.
- 10. If you believe that the Staff position is wrong, or that you cannot support it, you should inform your supervisors and attorney at the earliest possible time. Under no circumstances will you be asked to testify in support of a position which 10-9
)
l you personally feel is wrong. The first duty of any witness is to tell the truth.
C. Preparation of Direct Testimony
- 1. The direct testimony of an expert witness consists of four parts: (1) his qualifications as an expert, (2) the data from which he fashions his opinion, (3) the process or reasoning by which he progresses from the data to his con-clusion or opinion, and (4) the conclusion or opinion itself.
- 2. In the ordinary course the qualifications of an expert are demonstrated by: (1) his practical experience in fields )
related to his expertise, (2) his education, (3) his acceptance as an expert on the subject by other tribunals before which he has testified, (4) his membership in professional societies, (5) his authorship of papers or books on the subject of his expertise, and (6) honors or other recognitions by colleagues or by the public. Of course, all of these indicia of qualifica-tions may not exist in a particular expert; a graduate engineer may later become an expert in some other field, or an expert may never have testified before. Generally speaking, the nore qualified an individual is with respect to those categories, the more weight will be given his expert conclusions. It 10-10
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should also be noted that in combination with these " paper" 4
qualifications, the cogency of the substantive analysis presented by the witness is a prime factor in demonstrating his expertise.
- 3. The professional qualifications statement should contain inforraation on each of the above matters which show the qualifications of the witness. Those matters most directly ,
related to the witness' expertise with respect to the parti-
- cular testimony being given should be presented in greater detail than other matters which are also part of the general 3
professional background of the witness. It is for this reason that a qualifications statement prepared for another proceeding may have to be modified and updated. For example, in a pro-ceeding involving the QA program implementation at X reactor, the inspector who is preparing testimony should detail that he has conducted X number of inspections at X reactor in a certain time period.
- 4. There is no'special format for a professional qualifications statement.~ It is preferable that it be on as few pages as possible, ideally one (not counting an attached listing of publications .if the list is extensive). Therefore, I prefer 10-11
. _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . ~.
Dl that the professional qualifications statement be single spaced. It should be simply headed PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF JOHN DOE (or DR. JOHN DOE to slip in one of the possible qualifications early in the statement). The caption (case name heading) of the proceeding need not be given.
- 5. I prefer that the statement be written in the first person.
A good way to begin is, for example, "I am a senior reactor inspector with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II (Atlanta, Georgia), U.S.N.R.C.". Then describe your duties, especially as related to the testimony you are going to present. )
- 6. 'It is usually better to continue in a second paragraph with other professional experience, in reverse chronological order.
I prefer to avoid a list format unless the list is a long one.
Indications of length of time for each position is necessary -
usually this is most conveniently given by approximate beginning and ending dates.
- 7. The next paragraph should identify proceedings in which you have testified as an expert on the same or similar subjects.
Include a concise identification of the subject of the prior testimony if it is somewhat different.
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'm
- 8. The next paragraph should give your education in reverse-chronological order, giving graduate schools and colleges '
attended, degrees received, and any special training (e.g. , ,
Oak Ridge school, courses taken at schools in the military).
Again, avoid a list format unless it is extensive.
4
- 9. The next to last matters that should be covered are to identify the professional societies to which you belong and any honors which you have received. You can include any professional licenses at this point if they were not already noted in the description of your professional experience.
- 10. The last matter would be a listing of papers or books you have authored. This can be an attachment to your qualifications statenent if the list is extensive.
'11. In formal legal procedure, the professional qualifications statement is moved into evidence ahead of the substantive I
testimony. At that point, a process known as "voir dire",
i.e. "to speak the truth", may take place. This is where the witness is questioned on his qualifications as an expert by the parties or the Board. Proposed expert testimony may be disallowed where the voir dire shows the witness lacks the 10-13 4-
~ ,.- - . _ - ..,.,. .--.-- -...- ... --
5
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requisite expert qualifications. In the alternative, the results- of the voir dire may strongly affect the. relative weight which a Board gives to contradictory testimony by.
1 different witnesses.
- 12. In common,. somewhat more informal practice, the qualifications .
statement is admitted into evidence at the same time as the rest of the testimony. However, the admission is subject to
-a motion to strike (remove) the testimony from evidence on the grounds that the cross-examination shows that the witness lacks the' requisite expert qualifications. Under this less formal -
procedure, the cross-examiner may normally ask his voir dire ')
)- type questions at any point during his overall questioning.
- 13. The mechanics of moving prepared written testimony into evi-dance is generally as follows (with minor variations where
.there are multiple documents, several witnesses sponsoring
- the same document, or referenced exhibits)
- Your attorney identifies the documents by heading and number of pages and asks if you have a copy before you. You are then asked:
Q. Was.this document prepared by you or-under
- - your supervision?
Q. Do you have any corrections (or clarifications or updates as the case may be) to this' document?
10-14 i-
s (Make sure you have told your attorney well in advance of the day you take the stand if you have any changes).
Q. As corrected,-is this document true and correct to the best of your knowledge?
Q. Do you adopt this document as your testimony in this proceeding?
Your attorney will then request the Board to admit your testiraony
- into evidence and bind it into the transcript as if read.
- 14. It is not unconmon for your attorney to then ask you to briefly summarize your testimony for the benefit of the members of the public and the preJs who may be present. You will have been asked to prepare this brief summary in advance, with your attorney's assistance.
- 15. It is difficult to offer meaningful general guidance in the preparation of the written direct :;bstantive testimony. It is usually prepared in narrative form by Staff witnesses, althougS Question and Answer form is sometimes useful. Points (2), (3) and (4) in paragraph C.1 above, must be covered. Your attorney should be working very closely with you in structuring the testimony, depending on the dictates of the particular proceeding.
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- 16. The Board will not be interested or impressed by mere conclusory opinions in your testimony. They are interested in the material you use, and will be impressed by the reasoning you follow. The Staff, the same as any party, has to expressly set forth the detailed bases in its testimony to support its reasoning and conclusions drawn from that reasoning.
- 17. Opinions and conclusions of experts are important. Where they are unfavorable to the cross-examiner, three courses are open to the examiner: (1) drop the matter, (2) inquire into the process by which the expert reached the conclusion, or (3) !
affirmatively put on counter expert testimony. A Staff witness should be prepared for a cross-examining attorney to elect the second option.
- 18. A Staff expert witness should, prior to hearing, review his opinions and conclusions and be knowledgeable in the actual steps he went through to arrive at such conclusions. He must know the basic data from which his analysis and conclusions were derived. This is important. It is quite acceptable for a cross-examiner to ask, " Describe the process you went through to arrive at such an opinion and set forth the assump-tions, facts, methodology and calculations used in t. hat process",
etc.
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- 19. If the testimony is more than just a few pages, the conclu-sion and a summary of the bases for the conclusion should be given at the beginning. The testimony should be double-spaced, and each page (after the first page) should be numbered. Subheadings are normally very useful if the testi-mony is in narrative form.
D. The " Dos" and " Don'ts" When Giving Testimony at the Hearing
- 1. Tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
- 2. Testimony is recorded. Give loud and clear audible answers so that the reporter may record them. Do not respond with head nods.
- 3. Relax and set your own pace. Take sufficient time to fully understand the question and to formulate a responsive answer before you begin to answer. You are entitled to think before you answer -- but this coes not include a right to stall.
- 4. Listen carefully to the question and answer the question that is asked. This is very important and is usually a most difficult principle for a witness to follow. This principle requires that the witness listen, understand the question.
10-17
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-think before answering and then answer truthfully. Do not answer a question you want asked -- answer the question that is asked.
- 5. If you recall the question, but do not understand the question, simply say that you do not understand the question. Do not rephrase the question and pose it aloud to yourself. Be pre-pared to answer the follow-up question of "What don't you understand about the question?"
- 6. If you do not hear all of the question, or even think that-you may have missed some of it, request that it be read back. ')
The Board will then ask the court reporter to read it back, or the attorney will offer to repeat it or at times rephrase it. Do not rephrase the question and pose it aloud to yourself.
- 7. If the question is ambiguous to you, ask for clarification.
However, do not fence or argue with the examining counsel. If the answer has any untoward implications, it is for your counsel to straighten out on redirect examination. Too often witnesses try to out-guess the attorneys and make answers that sound good to them (the witnesses). This should be avoided.
10-18
- 8. - Do not volunteer information gratuitously. This is an important matter which many witnesses fail to appreciate.
It is the duty of the examiner properly to ask questions which will elicit information he desires. At the same time, do not give half answers and do not omit important facts. A witness should be cooperative and truthful but he should not try to anticipate what is on the examiners mind or what is behind his questions. A short answer, solely to the question is most desirable.
- 9. If you do not know the answer to a question, say so. Do not
( guess.
- 10. Do not snap back answers instantly when being cross-examined.
Your attorney may wish to object to the question. Give him time to hear and analyze the question and to object if he feels necessary. After an objection is made, do not answer unless and until the Board overrules the objection and directs you to answer.
- 11. Listen carefully to all objections made by your attorney, even though objections are directed to the Board.
10-19
- 12. Be serious, courteous and respectful to Board members and the attorneys of all parties. Avoid " cute" answers and wisecracks.
The hearing process is a serious matter and merits dignity.
Do not argue. The decision to argue is for your attorney.
- 13. Remember to watch your demeanor off the stand also. Remain serious. Do not discuss your testimony with any persons other than representatives of the NRC Staff. Avoid all conversations with members of the Board, and absolutely do not say anything that even remotely has anything to do with the substance of the case to a member of the Board.
- 14. A witness may be asked if he discussed or prepared his testimony, or discussed prospective cross-examination, with NRC attorneys.
The answer should be'"yes". Do not be afraid to answer "yes" if that is the case. This is an entirely appropriate prepara-tion procedure.
- 15. You may be asked if a specific matter was discussed with other NRC personnel. Often the truthful answer to this question is "yes". This is not surprising, regardless of how the cross-examiner might pretend to react to a "yes" answer.
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i l 16. Do not accept the invitation of a questioner to simply agree or. disagree with his statement until you are sure you under-stand the statement.
i
! 17. If a question can be answered directly in a concise manner, s ^
but you believe a further explanation is required to avoid 1
j ,
a misleading answer, subdivide your answer accordingly, beginning with the concise direct answer. (E.g. .
"Yes, but
! I'd like to explain my answer."). Then immediately go into.
I.
the explanation if no one interrupts you.
L , 18. If a questioner interrupts your answer, calmly and in a non-l' i' combative voice state that you had not finished your previous
- answer or that you were about to explain your previous answer.
l-l (Wait for the interruption to end before doing this).
l l
- 19. Do not answer a question in such a way as to evoke more l questions. Example: "Is that a problem?" snswer: "That is i
i one of the problems." This then leads to the question "What are the other problems and discuss them." This whole matter L is obviated if the witness would have answered that question "yes".
s 10-21 .
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- 20. Almost all of NRC's witnesses will be experts in some technical field. They may be experts by academic training, work experience, or both. As experts they are pennitted to rely on work they have performed, their education, their experience and on data prepared by others (who are qualified experts) which they have reviewed and relied on. While testifying, it is permissible to refer to notes, papers, etc. However, be aware that the questioner is entitled to examine these notes and papers.
Bring all your references with you'to the hearing.
- 21. An expert witness may be asked whether additional research would be useful in a particular area. Most scientists ady)cate research, and of course, NRC is engaged in research. ,
Therefore, often the answer is "yes" with an explanation that enough information is now available to support your conclusions, if in fact this is your expert opinion.
- 22. You may be asked "have you made a study or analysis." Often the answer should be "yes". It is for the cross-examiner to develop by his interrogation the size, scope, and depth of that study or analysis. The words " study or analysis" do not automatically imply a long, complicated or extensive amount of work.
10-22
- 23. There is no possible substitute for knowledge of the subject matter. Neither your attorney nor anyone else can help. You must know what you are talking about. Sometimes a question may be better answered by another Staff witness scheduled to testify. If this is the case, say so.
- 24. If, while you are still on the stand, you realize that you inadvertently gave an incorrect or misleading answer, ask for permission to correct it. If you are off the stand, inform your attorney.
- 25. Do not ask for permission to confer with anyone, including your attorney, while you are responding to questions. (Note:
There is an exception in cases where there is a panel of witnesses. Conferences among witnesses testifying jointly on a panel normally are permitted. This is particularly useful where questions cross closely related, but different, fields of expertise.)
IV.
SUMMARY
A. The public hearings involve a highly contested adjudicatory format in which a witness' conclusions and opinicns will be severely challenged. It is important for a witness to set forth an analysis a
10-23
of complex technical questions in clear and understandable form.
The bases supporting the expert conclusions must also be clearly and fully described in the testimony so that they will become part of the evidentiary record. Ultimately, the goal is that the Staff witness' conclusions and supporting bases be the ones that are adopted in the Board's decision.
B. The relationship between a Staff lawyer and witness is one of mutual dependence on the other's expertise. The lawyer must learn as much as possible of the technical subject matter to be fully effective. The expert witness must learn the legal, pro-cedural and strategic aspects of the subject matter in the context of the particular hearing. Continuous communication and mutual education should be encouraged by the attitudes of the lawyer and expert witness to each other.
C. The direct testimony of an expert witness consists of four parts:
(1) his qualifications as an expert, (2) the data from which he fashions his opinion, (3) the process or reasoning by which he progresses from the data to his conclusion or opinion, and (4) the conclusion or opinion itself.
D. A witness must demonstrate appropriate qualifications in a subject area to be permitted to present expert testimony. Generally, the 10-24
__ __ =. .. - - -. . .-
L
,m testimony of a witness who possesses the better indicia of expert qualifications will be given the greater weight. The cogency and quality of a witness' substantive testimony is interrelated with the weight which will be given to his views because of his expert qualifications. Bare conclusory opinions based on " judgment" '
are not very persuasive.
E. Make sure you fully hear and understand the question and formulate e
a responsive answer before you begin to answer.
F. Maintain a proper demeanor on and off the stand. Do not argue with opposing parties. When off the stand, do not discuss matters related to the sub' stance of the case with other parties in the
~
absence of your attorney. Avoid all conversations with members of the Board.
G. Tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
H. By the time you prepare your testimony and then present it at the I
hearing, there is no substitute for a complete and thorough knowledge of the subject matter. You must know what you are talking about. If you do, and therefore can be confident, the " Dos and Don'ts"' when giving testimony will become more natural for you to follow.
s i 10-25
-V. REFERENCES A. " Trial by Agency", E. Barrett Prettyman (Virginia Law Review Association, 1959); especially Part III, pp. 19-42. (58 pages -
available at NRC Bethesda Law Library).
B. "The Rule of Reason - A New Approach to Corporate Litigation",
Milton R. Wessel (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,1976); especially
.pp. 69-78, 190-207 (221 pages - available at NRC Bethesda Law Library).
C. Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 2 (The Comission's " Rules of Practice"). This is a reasonably accurate sumary of 10 C.F.R. Part 2. For greater detail, refer to 10 C.F.R. Part 2 itself.
I wish to thank Charles A. Barth, Esq. of the NRC legal Staff for his collection of advice to prospective witnesses in an unpublished document entitled " Witness Preparation". I have extensively relied on Mr. Barth's paper for parts of this presentation.
)
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9 HANDLING OF SAFETY RELATED MATTERS NOT COVERED BY-REQUIREMENTS OR COMMITMENTS I. Learning Objectives
-The objective of.this section of the Inspection Techniques Training Course is to provide the inspector with the " tools" for handling-those concerns or situations which do not fit into the more generalized routine of' determining compliance with NRC requirements or. commitments.
To accomplish this objective, the chapter will discuss what is important (safety-related) and how the safety related concern is identified, resolved and documented.
The techniques and guidance emphasized in this section are those which the individual inspector needs to acquire in order to properly identify, clasrify and communicate safety related concerns. Those methods and procedures which are the responsibility of higher supervision or other NRC organizations are presented only as necessary _
to place the inspectors role in the proper perspective, nowever, these are neither emphasized or discussed in detail.
II. Introduction While conducting inspections, NRC inspectors will often be con-fronted with questionable situations which cannot be answered by reference to license conditions, applicable regulations or licensee 11-1
I commitments. It is imperative that the inspec. tor address these - ,
questions. They cannot be. ignored simply because there are no specific references. The f4RC inspection system provides methods for resolving these items; however, since-the items do not con-
- veniently pigeon-hole themselves into classifications which point to a specific governing rule, these methods tend to be more subjective and they require' greater skill on the part of the inspector in technical and human relations areas.
On the technical side, it is important for the inspector to "know when he doesn't know" or simply to know when outside assistance is required from knowledgeable sources. This is also one of the primary reasons the i4RC provides its inspectors with courses in ,
\
such subjects as reactor technology, operating practice, construction techniques and nondestructive examination.
In.the area of human relations it is most expedient to draw the licensee into the concern and encourage him to be part of the solution. It is a mistake to allow the licensee to sit on the l
sidelines until something is dropped on him. Also, the inspector must learn how to work with other organizations within the NRC to
- obtain assistance in the resolution of his problem.
p 11-2 f.
l=
l The purpose of this discussion is to explain and illustrate how an l-l inspector should approach this subject, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is corrective action which will rectify the immediate situation, provide assurance that the situation will not recur and I
to identify potential generic concerns for broader corrective action.
As we go into the details of how an inspector might handle problems,
, he should bear in mind the following considerations related to his responsibilities, authority, limitations and interfaces:
l
(
A. Inspector Responsibility Stated simply, the inspector is responsible for taking the
- appropriate action on any safety related item which comes to the inspector's attention. The action may well be the re-ferring of the item to other persons or organizations that are more directly involved or the action may mean that he himself must resolve the itam if it belongs in his immediate arcs of i
concern. However, either way, it is the responsibility of any inspector to resolve or channel safety related concerns to a point of resolution.
I I
11-3 l
- 8. Authority In contacts with licensees the authority granted the inspector by the Atomic Energy Act, the Reorganization Act, and NRC regulations is sufficient to enable the inspector to define the problem and once defined, permits the inspector and other NRC organizations to achieve resolution if it proves to be a valid concern. The inspector's authority for unrestricted access to records, personnel and areas has been well established.
Frequently licensees will question the authority of an in-spector to examine areas which are outside NRC regulatory requirements. However, it should be kept in mind that the inspector cannot be certain that uncontrolled safety related work is not being done under the guise of non-safety related work unless he occasionally looks into these other areas.
Often such examinations give rise to questions concerning a possible safety related activity that should be covered by NRC requirements or licensee commitments. An example is the possible relationship between structures which are not built to seismic standards but whose failure may result in safety related equipment failure.
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11-4
C. Limitations The primary objective of the NRC regulatory activity is to protect the health and safety of the public from any deleterious -
effects resulting from the peaceful use of fissionable materials or from the use of radioactive byproduct materials. It should be clearly understood that for purposes of this discussion, the term " safety related" embraces security, safeguards, radiological protection, and to a lesser extent the environment, in addition to the more narrow definition of " safety related" for nuclear reactors which is given in 10 CFR Part 50 Introduction to Appendix B. The Introduction to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B defines
" safety related" as " structures, systems or components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public." This introduction goes on further to state that the activities of concern include designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storirg, cleaning, erecting, installing, inspecting, testing, operating, maintaining, repairing, refueling and modifying.
For reactor facilities the Appendix B definition is made more precise in Chapter 3 of the SAR which lists structures or components which are " safety related". Items or activities 11-5
which are concerned with the functioning of such " safety related" components must also be considered " safety related."
The construction inspector should bear in mind that numerous changes are made during the course of project design that may add or subtract from this listing. Needless to say, the control of such changes is critical to the' entire project effort. V In many instances the authority or limitationi of the NRC cannot be determined until a situation is examined. For instance, if an NRC inspector became aware of the possible J
presence of hazardous levels of radioactive material in a public park, an examination of the matter would be initiated ,
based u,oon that concern even though a question may exist regarding the applicability of NRC authority. ,
s - ,
s 1i Rathqr,than placing limitations on inspectors, NRC Einagement encourages greater independent effort by inspectors as evidenced by a special module for independent inspection effort at reactor facilities and establishment of a goal for percentage of onsite time on'this module.
Consider yourselves encouraged and even challenged to identify those concerns which are not adequately addressed in our vgulatoryprocess. Preventativeregulatoryeffoiti~sbetter than reactive. '
- 3 A e
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11-6 s
i
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l D. Correction of Safety Related Concerns 1 Normally the development of a specific position on a matter is sufficient motivation for a licensee to take corrective action.
In extreme cases, HQ may have to request that NRR modify a license in order to provide for the requisite action. Instances
, when it has been necessary to go to the extreme of modifying a construction permit or operating license in order to obtain correction of a safety related concern, are so rare that they are almost non-existent. However, in other areas of regulation l such as materials licenses they do happen, although they are l
l by no means routine.
l Instances when reactor operating licenses are changed as a result of concerns tend to be generic in nature and arise because of a. recurring problem at different facilities. For instance, an equipment test frequency may be changed when a particular component demonstrates that it does not have sufficient reliability. IE Bulletins are also used to generate the necessary generic corrective action. The more usual case of handling a safety related matter not covered by NRC require-ments/ commitments is that in which the licensee is convinced that the inspector has a valid concern and corrects the situation without further action on the part of the NRC.
11-7 l
ii One good example (wnen corrective action was required of a large number of licensees by issuance of IE bulletins) wa's 'the i genericconcernaboutme$surementofvalvewallthicknesses.
In this instance, IE personnel found that most licensees.had no way of assuring .that required valve wall thickness was actually provided. The required corrective action extended to all types of valves above a certain size including /those installed in operating plants.
The following detailed discussion will emphasize the identi-fication of items and the relationship-between the inspector and licensee since it is primarily in these areas that the inspector will often,be working without specific guidance from ~)
ti ,s his supervision or incre senior inspectors. Thus it is in these areas that techniques of inspection must be learned and polished.
III. Detailed Discussion f I J
A.
Observation l
- 1. Sources The identification of a safety related matter not covered by NRC requirements or licensee commitments normally arises during the course of an NRC inspection by the )
11-8
inspector finding a concern and then being unable to identify a requirement or commitment which can be referred to for a resolution of the concern. In this regard, the NRC inspection manual may often lead the inspector to make an observation that a particular activity is not being " properly" covered. However, on attempting to find a requirement or commitment of the licensee to cover the item in the manual, the inspector will often find that no requirement or commitment exists. In most of these instances, the item is in the inspection manual simply as a reminder to the inspector to examine the matter at his
[ facility. This examination may or may not reveal something of concern to the inspector. The inspector shall not enforce the requirements of the manual since these are requirements on the inspector not the licensee.
One common source of safety rel&ted matters not covered by NRC requirements are the licensee's records. For instance, the examination of log books or nonconformance reports can sometimes reveal a matter that is safety related. Changes in plant design, particularly the changes that are made after the plant receives an operating 11-9
license are another source. In this case the inspector must assure that items which change plant design have been adequately reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
In general when the inspector is looking at any reports of tne licensee, he must be alert to potential items of concern.that do not fit into the normal guidelines.
During construction, a change in construction practice or techniques can cause a problem; during operation, the changes in radiation controls required as the plant ages can require new or different approaches to plant operation.
)
The inspector should look carefully at anything that the licensee, his vendors or contractors identify as pro-prietary. The NRC recognizes the rights of any organi-zation to identify and maintain proprietary information and we will take the necessary measures to safeguard information so identified. However there may be instances, when the identification of information as proprietary has resulted in the absence of the necessary controls or where supplementary controls are necessary to maintain the required assurance of quality. For instance the process of utilizing molten metal to effect a mechanical J
11-10
connection between the ends of.two reinforcing bars and a common sleeve (cadweld) is considered proprietary.
Knowledge of the controls over the manufacturing of the powder used to make the bond are restrictea to the manufacturer. Consequently, the NRC has established rather rigorous sampling for strength of the cadweld bond by tensile tests throughout the course of construction.
One of the reasons for this rigorous testing is that the usual controls over material composition are not available.
Other sources of information that may reveal safety related concerns not covered by requirements may be allegations or simply discussions with personnel at the site. The inspector should make a point during each inspection of approaching an operator, craftsman, radiation monitor or inspector. These approaches should be low key and generally without the inspector being accompanied by a member of supervision, particularly supervision in the man's own organization. A few guidelines a good inspector will follow:
- a. Don't ask the worker's name except incidentally at the end of the conversation. If a craftsman thinks he is being specifically quoted he is less likely to speak out on an item of concern.
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- b. Do be friendly and informal but don't B.S.
- c. Do identify yourself as a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Don't assume that the initials "NRC" on your hard hat have meaning or significance to the individual.
- d. Keep note taking to a minimum. Bring notes up to snuff after you have left the man's presence.
- e. Be certain to observe, by question if it is not obvious, the person's craft.
,1
- f. Be direct in your questions. Don't ask about others and their activities, ask about what he or she is doing. For inst'ance how is the welding gap in the
, liner plate corrected? How does one assure adequate coverage for his contamination smears? What consti-tutes an out-of-limit reading? Is there a specific procedure to follow?, etc.
- g. Don't be afraid of simple questions or questions which probe the man's knowledge whether or not you already have the answers for the questions.
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i l
- h. Avoid questions which lead the worker to a specific answer. For instance don't say "Do you always use preheat on this type of weld?" but rather "How do you know when the weld is to be preheated?"
- 1. Be businesslike. When you are done thank the indi-
~
vidual and leave.
J. Don't let the expansive talker monopolize your time.
Approach and draw out those individuals who seem to avoid you.
- k. If a worker has a problem, tell the person you will evaluate it. Above all, don't promise that it will be corrected since it may turn out that the individual was not properly informed about the process or operation involved.
~In construction work and to some lesser extent during reactor operation, one of the principal sources of matters which are not coveref by requirements, will simply come from observations by the inspector as he -
tours the plant or examines records. Also by simply raising the question of'how the licensee knows that a 11-13
l system is performing or will perform its intended function or how the licensee knows that a component meets its specifications, one will often uncover " soft spots" in
. operating or construction programs.
E lieedless to say, many of the sources discussed above result in findings which can be resolved by reference to requirements or commitments. However, these sources are also the usual source of concerns which are not covered by requirements or committments. The discussion with working people is very important in this regard since they are the ones who will often be cognizant of some changes in construction techniques or operating practice that have resulted in a loss of management control.
- 2. Licensee Action Once an inspector has identified a concern that he considers to be possibly safety related, his next course of action is to determine whether the licensee is aware t
of the problem.
j 11-14
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Usually this can be determined by questioning whether or not it was:
- a. .The subject of a discrepancy or nonconformance report.
- b. Part of a special management report or QA audit.
- c. Incorporated as part of a larger problem that was being addressed by the licensee.
If it is determined that the item is under consideration,
- the relevant documentation should be examined to determine satisfactory resolution and corrective action. If the item is repetitious of a problem that has previously been addressed (and this is often the case), the inspector should examine the records to determine if he is in agreement. In any event, do not accept the explanation that this subject has already been reviewed by anoth'er NRC inspector unless you have specific reason to believe that it has been adequately addressed.
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i In those cases where the licensee readily takes correc-tive action without the inspector going beyond the licensee-inspector interface, the generic implication of the matter should be considered by the inspector. If it is a significant concern and subsequent examination indicates tilat the concern may exist at other plants, it is the responsibility of the inspector to obtain necessary data on the nature of the item and then assure that the matter is adequately documented and called to the attention of his supervisor. The placing of the item in an inspection
> . report does not nonaally flag the item sufficiently to assure action. See documentation below.
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Alternately if it is found that the licensee has not taken action on an item of concern, the inspector must
~
then address whether or not there is an answer in existing rules or commitments. A quick rundown of the following will provide an initial judgement regarding whether the question needs to be addressed outside the scope of normal requirements.
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Licensed Facilities
. Technical Specifications
. Regulations
. Commitments of FSAR
. License Conditions Facilities Under Construction
. Conditions of CP
. Regulations
. Commitments of PSAR
- Byproduct Licenses
. License Conditions
. Regulations In examining these references the inspector should avoid utilizing instructions, procedures or specifications that do not relate to a specific commitment or requirement.
For instance, the licensee may have committed himself to a particular design review procedure for engineers in the 11-17
T I
corporate office; if the inspector has found that field design of pipe hangers is not being properly controlled, it is illogical to resort to those corporate office procedures to force correction. Such action will only set back the process of achieving correction by injecting another issue, namely whether or not the corporate office procedures should apply to the second tier design effort in the field. .It is far better to treat the item as one not covered by commitments. Another similar item is trying to enforce a commitment which is not applicable to the particular product, stage of work, contractor or ,
location. The inspector should also avoid vague references- )
to Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 since this may result in resistance by the licensee because it may appear to be arbitrary and capricious regulation. In summary, if a specific commitment or requirement cannot be found, the inspector.should address the item as one which is not covered, rather than trying to " force-fit" some other requirement to the situation.
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w B. Identification and Initial Evaluation
- 1. Inspectors Functions and Responsibility Having arrived at a determination that an item of concern
.was not addressed by the licensee or his contractors and having determined that it is not covered by some existing requirement or regulation, the next order of activity by the inspector is to determine if the item is actually within those activities regulated by 'the NRC. This is normally one of the more difficult areas, since items which are clearly safety related are already defined as
'such. The inspector should start by considering:
- a. Whether the product has a function which supports a safety related system or otherwise affects radiological health and safety, security or safeguards.
- b. Whether the concern is at variance with accepted "
practice, codes or standards.
- c. Whether the concern has been previously addressed at another facility (generic issue) '
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- d. Whether an activity of concern could significantly effect the performance of a safety related system.
- e. Why the licensee believes the item or activity is not safety related.
Often the item will need to be carried as an open question until the necessary contacts can be completed, and the necessary study done from references. Normally when references to other sources are required it is most expedient to carry the question open rather then spend a large amount of site inspection time pouriag over referenc.is.
However, there may be occasions when a quick answer is
}
needed. One case involved a quest' ion on the angular tolerance between rebars when joined in a cadweld sleeve.
Since concrete placement was scheduled within a couple days, the item could not be carried open. The following morning a call was placed to the technical assistance branch in IE. They made some further inquiries; it was '
soon determined that the concern had been previously_
addressed in tests which had been reported and reviewed by the NRC,. The item was closed except for documenting the coverage of the item in or.e sentence of the inspection report.
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- 2. Definition of Concern It is necessary for the inspector to have concerns well defined before leaving the site. Let's look at some aspects of this since it is imperative that the inspector have a basis for discussing the problem with supervisors, specialists in IE, or other inspectors. The problem cannot be placed in proper perspective regarding urgency of solution, need for outside assistance or time frame for resolution unless it is properly defined.
- a. Know what item you are talking about. A discussion of "the pipe in the tunnel at -15' level" is meaningless.
What pipe? What is its function? Where is it routed? Is it carbon or stainless?, etc.
- b. Know what controls the licensee or his contractors have in effect. Don't get-caught in the situation of finding that you are spending your time on a meaningless item because you have not asked the right question. Remember that licensee personnel
' ~
will almost never volunteer information. You must ask the right questions.
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- c. Address your questions to a knowledgeable-source.
Be sure the individual to whom you are talking has responsibility in the area of cor.cern. If the individual is responsible and still comes up with the wrong answers, you have another problem to be addressed.
- d. Don't nitpick or be devious. State your concern directly.
- e. Be persistent, be patient and above all be calm.
Never raise your voice or use strong language. If additional tira is required in order to eval'. ate - )
your proulem siRply call your supervisor and explain.
Do not be boxed into a time frame dictated by an inspection plan, airline schedule or little Patsy's birthday party which you told your spouse you would be back for.
- f. Be sure you have discussed the concern with the licensee at the exit interview and obtained his position on the matter. See discussion with licensee L
+
below.
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- 3. Evaluating the Significance If an item cannot be resolved at the site and the inspector
. believes it is a valid concern, the open item is then addressed when the inspector returns to the office. The
, first contact is the inspector's supervisor who can provide guidance on how to seek technical assistance that is not available in the region. The inspector should take the time to thoroughly review SAR commitments, technical specifications or other license conditions, regulatory guides and regulations. In any event, remember that many of the problems encountered by the inspector -
have been tossed around before and often simple inquiries to more senior inspectors will produce the proper source or reference which will resolve the question.
In examining the SAR to determine whether or not something is safety related, include the listing of safety related items in Section 3 of the SAR in your review. This listing has been examined by NRR in granting the operating license or construction permit, and as such, provides a key to the importance of the function of each item listed from a safety standpoint. The inspector in referring to 11-23
this listing should bear in mind that the listing is tentative in the PSAR and design changes that take place during construction can affect the listing. Also, the listing in the PSAR is somewhat generalized and further definition may be needed by reference to specs or drawings.
It is not unusual that all the questioning and research in the office will only result in defining a specific line of investigation during the next site visit.
C. Discussion with Licensee When the iten is to be carried open in order to address the ,
/
question of whether or not it is a valid concern, solicit the licensee's position on the question and repeat your understanding of that position at the exit interview. In the vast majority of cases the licensee will voluntarily address the question and agree to provide further information. However, the inspector must be cognizant of certain things-in his dis-cussions of any concern with the licensee.
,)
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._-,,w - - -- -
- 1. "Ratcheting" "Ratcheting" is the imposition of new requirements on the licensee by adopting or applying standards of quality or performance which were not intended by existing rules or regulations. Here we are talking about those things which are " nice to have" but are not really required in the interests of protecting the health and safety of the public. The inspector can readily ratchet licensees by insisting upon correction of minor or pseudo deficien-cies. Much of the ratcheting acanes about simply because the majority of licensees will take action on a concern just to keep the inspector happy, providing the costs involved are not significant.
Some ground rules to be observed:
- a. Don't Insist on a Specific-Corrective Action for Your Problem Remember, it is the licensee's job to manage. The inspector's job is to identify whether or not a problem exist. and whether or not it has been adequately corrected if it did exist.
11-25
I' b. Don't Try to Impose the Scandards of Other Projects on the Licensee Remember that the licensee is obligated to meet his own program and rules. Simply because another plant adopts the practice of checking on concrete curing once every two hours during the weekend doesn't mean that every licensee should adopt this practice.
- c. Adopt the Attitude of Finding Things Right The inspector who approaches his job as a scalp collector or traffic ticket writer, will soon find himself with an uncooperative licensee. The basic attitude must be that you are at the site to assure that things are being done right. An uncooperative licensee makes the handling of items for which there is no specific rule very difficult. However, if the licensee is convinced that the inspector's basic concern is plant safety, he will normally cooperate readily in the correction of any problem.
11-26
W l
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- 2. Assaring Safety In the above discussion on ratcheting, the student might wonder about drawing the line between safety related concerns and ratcheting. Needless to say, if a decision is to be made on a questionable position, it is to be made in favor of that course of action which assures safety. However, by thoroughly examining each question, by obtaining the maximum amount of information, and by obtaining knowledgeable technical assistance the decision usually becomes easy and the number of instances where a decision must be made in the grey zone between "ratcheting" and' a valid concern for safety are few and far between.
As noted earlier, a well investigated case will seldom require the inspector to force the licensee into com-pliance, particularly if the licensee is involved in the examination of the problem. At the exit interview the inspector should specifically ask the licensee what his position on any concern is. Remember the licensee can only take one of three positions:
11-27
- a. It will be corrected, in which case the problem is solved.
- b. He will not correct it, which is seldom the case since it would be an untenable position to take without the licensee first having determined that he is on very firm technical ground.
- c. The problem will be studied to determine whether he believes the inspector has a valid concern and if so, what the licensee proposes to do about it.
In the latter case the licensee involves himself in the examination of the concern.
D. Resolution of Concerns within NRC The general philosophy of communication within the NRC on problems of the type we are discussing is best described in the words of former Chairman Anders:
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"The Commission regards open and free communications within and between all levels of our staff as a fundamental element of our regulatory process. Vigorous staff debate and exchange of views among peers and in the management chain produce better decisions and are essential for confidence in the judgments we reach. Interchange contributes strength to decision-making as confrontation with new information and approaches results in the testing and possible modification of views."
During the same testimony from which the above quote was taken, Anders clarifies,the result of this decision making process by noting that differences of opinion will arise in this decision making process and that there are differences between stating a point of view and having that view prevail.
Nonetheless, the d'ecision making process is enhanced by exploring various points of view.
When the inspector returns to his office and has briefed his supervisor regarding an unresolved concern that is not covered by~ existing ~ requirements or commitments, he must next address the formal documentation of any concerns.
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. _ - . -- _=. - . .
=
E. Documentation of Concerns In the documentation of concerns, the proper course of action
. is dependent upon the level of " safety" significance, and the urgency with regard to the timing of related activities. The identification of the appropriate IE Division, NRC Office or possibly other agency to transmit the concern to is dependent upon classification of the concern by functional area. The inspector's supervisor will provide guidance and should concur in the course of action taken.
proper resolution will be facilitated by correct assessment of ,
the significance and by correct assignment of the functional area. However, since the inspector was unable to identify an applicable regulatory requirement the identification of safety significance is likely to be subjective.
- 1. Categorize by Significance i
Appropriate actions for identified concerns may be readily grouped into immediate concerns, potential concerns, and generic concerns.
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11-30 w n - e
- a. Immediate Safety related concerns which have either a high probability or large magnitude effect, or a special time constraint should be classified as immediate.
The earlier example of the cadweld splice was initially an immediate concern.
Immediate concerns which were sustained by NRC management would normally be handled in one of the following ways:
(1) Order In the event taat the licensee failed to respond or to further assure that adequate corrective e
actions are being taken, an order may be issued by the NRC. Provisions exist in 10 CFR 40.81 and 50.110 for obtaining an injunction or other court order from a Federal District Court if the licensee remained uncooperative following issuance of an order. The four types of orders are discussed in MC 0800-16:
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(a) Cease and desist (b) License suspension (c) Modification of license (d) Revocation of license (2) Immediate Action Letter This formality may be used to solicit or confirm a licer.see commitment and may precede an order.
Initiation of an order or immediate action letter would necessitate issuance of a Preliminary Notification in accordance with MC 1120.
- b. Potential Significance The majority of concerns which are not covered by regulatory requirements will fit this category.
These matters may be handled by:
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d'%
(1) Action Request Memo .
A memorandum from Section Chief or Branch Chief to the appropriate IE Division for review and action. The memorandum should clearly state
, the concern but should not tie the Division down to a specific response. Generally dis-cussions with appropriate Division personnel will have been held so that the memorandum serves to formalize the earlier discussions.
t Discussions may also have been held with cognizant personnel in another NRC office such as NRR or NMSS. These discussions are encouraged but are necessarily informal and should not require significant outlay of manpower by the contacted office without a formal contact thru the appropriate IE Division. In matters of imediate concern the formal contact may come after work has been initiated.
(2) Information or' Transmittal Memo For matters of lesser significance a transmittal memorandum for- the inspection report or an 11-33
nR ,
m ,
T
- s )
information memo may be used to focus atten-tion, transmit information or opinion or request action,
- c. Generic It is the responsibility of the inspector who identified the concern and his supervisor to consider possible generic aspects of the concern. -
The classification of generic adds another dimension
'since other licensees or permit holders must be notified of the problem in a timely manner. Primary mechanisms of notification include:
(1) Licensing Generic Letter (2) IE Bulletin (MC 1126)
(3) IE Circular (MC 0600/5)
J 11-34
It is unacceptable to " bury" a concern in the details of an inspection report and expect someone else to assume responsi-bility. If you found it, it's your responsibility until ap'propriate action is initiated. Failure to document a valid concern is totally unacceptable. The temptation to work out -
some verbal arrangement with a licensee for correction of a safety related concern should be avoided'no matter how responsible and conscientious the licensee may seem to be.
- 2. Categorize by Function Obviously in addition to classifying a concern by its (U significance, the inspector must determine the functional area or discipline involved in order to obtain appropriate response. It should be. clearly understood that if an inspector finds a concern which lies outside his normal discipline he must act upon it. This is not to say that reactor inspectors should examine personnel dosimetry practice as a matter of routine. However, if a reactor inspector were to run across a practice at a facility which is likely to lead to overexposure, he certainly should identify the concern. It is generally easy to identify the proper discipline or IE Division involved, but in some instances the concern may extend to other 11-35
3 i agencies such as OSHA, the-FBI, EPA, or a state agency.
In those cases where a legitimate concern is identified and reviewed by regional supervision, the appropricce agency should be notified by telephone with a merorandum to the IE:X00S indicating the details of the contact.
Certainly the inspector should tell the licensee that he is identifying a matter to another agency. An example of ,
a matter which should be transferred would be a situation in which demineralizer regeneration waste chemicals at a power reactor facility were leaching into the soil from a leaking non-radioactive chemical waste neutralizing tank. This matter would be transmitted to the appropriate state environmental agency following a determination that the NRC had no jurisdication via the Environmental Technical Specifications.
The contacts for other agencies are listed in the Emergency Plan for each region.
- 3. Followup Actions After identification, classi'ication and initiation of the appropriate level of review, each identified item must be actively followed up to assure closure. Several tracking systems exist to facilitate this function, j 11-36
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- a. NRC Followup (1) AITS
, The Action Item Tracking System (AITS) is merely a computer system which identified the initiator, the subject, due date, milestones,
~
and status.
(2) Regional Followup Items which do not warrant entering on the AITS
(
_\ should be entered on a system for regional followup such as an outstanding inspection items list which is maintained in some fashion for each reactor license.
(3) Unresolved Item Identification of items for which there is no
, apparent regulatory requirement or an " Unresolved Item" by the definition of MC 0800, may be 11-37
4 questionable. This category does, however, )
direct licensee attention to a matter. A conscious effort must be made to separate out those matters of concern for which there is no specific regulatory requirement so as. not to abuse the " Unresolved Item" category. The 0800 definition is a ". . . . matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an item of noncompliance or a failure to meet a-commitment" (deviations).
- b. Licensee Followup i
e As stated earlier, it is important that the licensee be drawn into the concern and continue.to work with the NRC representatives fcr a solution. The inspector should periodically check with the licensee following initial problem identification to maintain the licensee's awareness of the problem and to keep the NRC current on progress which the licensee may have made. Do not take a " head in the sand" attitude between inspections.
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- c. Inspector's Viewpoint The inspector has two very strong opposing forces to cope with following identification of a concern at a specific facility. The first is a desire to obtain a rapid resolution plus a natural pride in the identification of a concern. The opposing force is the evaluation of the technical importance of the concern especially when compared with other problems which the NRC is managing at a given time. More plainly, the inspector must be careful that his pride or ego are not the forcing functions rather than the true technical concern. When one considers ,
the expanse of technical knowledge required in the design, construction, test, and operation of a modern nuclear plant, no one individual should be expected to have all the right answers. The inspector must also consider the priority of his specific problem compared with other problems under review.
Nonetheless, it remains the inspectors problem and his responsibility until appropriate action is ini tiated. The inspector must keep an "open mind" regarding the concern and if it is shown technically 11-39
I that there is no safety problem, then the inspector should drop the issue. If immediate supervision is not responsive to a technical concern, the inspector is encouraged to pursue the technical issue up the chain of command (see instruction on dissent) until resolved; providing of course, that he genuinely believes he has a valid concern.
F. Workshop Application A series of problems has been compiled for evaluation. You are instructed to play the role of the inspector who identified the concern. Based upon what is provided plus your_own knowledge, !
you are to outline a plan of action beginning with discussions with the licensee and ending with a draft of the action which you consider wctranted.
- 1. Assignment to Small Groups Work in small groups as assigned by the instructor.
Discuss the problems among the group and add whatever assumptions you believe necessary. Problems have been prepared in the following areas:
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- a. Reactor operations
- b. Reactor construction
- c. Safeguards
- d. Security
- e. Radiation Protection (Reactors)
- f. Emergency Planning
- g. Radiation Protection (Byproduct Materials)
- h. Environmental ,
- 1. Other agencies
- 2. Problem Solution Each group shall present their solution to the class through a spokesman, for class discussion and comparison with the school solution.
11-41 L:
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1 IV. . Summary A. Steps for Evaluation The steps for evaluation following identification include discussion with licensee; discussion with IE supervision; discussion with IE and possibly other NRC offices; classi-fication as to importance and function; preparation of appropriate documentation and followup.
B. Inspection Responsibility The inspector remains the eyes, ears, and image of the l1RC. )
It is through the inspector that the NRC preceives performance of a licensee and it is often the inspector that the licensee
+
and public identify as the NRC.
The responsibility of the inspector is to protect the health and safety of the public from radiological effects of licensed activities. This includes maintaining security, safeguards and protecting the environment as related to those activities.
i
)
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f g C. Importance of Findings In addition to assuring that licensee conditions and rules and regulations are met, it is vital that considerations related to health, safety, safeguards, envir'onment and security which are not clearly defined are properly identified and acted upon. It is for this very reason that IE inspectors are -
highly qualified professionals rather than bookkeepers or junior technicians.
,- D. Feedback In reviewing the material in this chapter you will note a
(. continuous feedback mechanism in operation throughout the inspection process. This " closing of the loop" which assures that a safety related item is resolved and that all appropriate NRC organizations are aware of the problem, is particulary important where a safety concern is identified in areas not covered by requirenents.
V. References a 4 A. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 161 B. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Section 206
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C. Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Paragraphs 50.70,-30.63, 40.81, 50.110, 70.71, 71.64. 73.80, Part 50, Appendix B D. IE Manual, Chapters 0800-16, 1120, 0600/5, and 1126 E. AITS Instructions e
9
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FOLLOWP OF A MAJOR INCIDENT (Regional Incident Response Team)
I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES Upon completion of the training session, the inspector should have:
A. Obtained a working knowledge of the fundamentals of onsite incident response including the req,uirements of NRC MC 0502 and II MC 1300.
B. Obtained an understanding of the actual problems encountered during the onsite response to a major incident, the Browns Ferry fire of March 1975.
In accomplishing the above, it is intended that the inspector should have:
A. Obtained extensive knowledge of the details surrounding -
a major incident.
B. Developed an appreciation for the complexities and far reaching effects of certain types of incidents.
C. Learned some of the lessons regarding incident response logistics.
E. Developed a feel for the value of good investigating and evaluation techniques, and good communications.
12-1
II. INTRODUCTION ,
v 2
A. Purpose The purpose of this session is to train an inspector so that he can' effectively lead and/or participate in-a Regional Immediate t
Response Team,(RIRT) following an incident at a nuclear power plant. The requirements of IE MC 1300, " Incident Response Action" and Inspection Procedure 93700B, " Inspector Dispatched to the-Site" will be covered. The initial response to the Browns Ferry Fire of March 1975 will be described, including lessons learned which can be applied to future incident response.
B. Background Incident response is an extremely important part of IE responsi-bility, but there have been so few major incidents that
)
experience in this area has been difficult to obtain. Since the Browns Ferry incident, MC 1300 has been written and NRC MC 0502, "NRC Incident Response Plan" is currently being drafted. NRC MC 0502 establishes the responsibilities for all NRC offices including IE.
MC 1300 establishes policy and procedures for responding to -
incidents. It states that, " inspectors will be sent to the scene of incidents, when appropriate, to assure that actions are beins taken to protect people , propertv, and the environment , and to safeguard licensed fac"lities and material." It describes OIE responsibilities in coordinating incident response actions with other office of NRC.
12-2 Kg - .
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4 Each IE Region has an emergency response plan which establishes regional responsibilities. The RIRT will be dispatched to the site lor all Level,1 incidents (actual or imminent serious threat) and for most Level 2 incidents (potential threat, or an. event i
which has or could have adverse effects).
The inspector shculd familiarize himself with the above documents as well as tue others listed in the reference section.
III; REGIONAL RESPONSE A. Expedite Expedite is defined as meaning, "to do with quick efficiency."
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Incident response must be carried out quickly and efficiently.
The facts gathered must be accurate, safety assessment must be accurate and quick, and the information gathered must be communicated effectively and quickly. >
, 1. Notification.
The regional emergency response plan (ERP) dictates the manner in which regionally based inspectors will be notified by the licensee of incidents. During off-norec.1 office hours this is usually through an answering service - duty officer arrangement. A project inspector may be notified directly by the licensee and *he future resident inspectors will be notified directly by the licensee. In any case, those who 12-3
^
, s 0-receive the initial licensee incident. notification must strive to get as much information as possible. Distinction must be made between factual information and supposition.
IE Appendix 1310 should be followed in obtaining as much information 'as possible during the initial telephone 4
contact.
I t ~
i MC'1300-067b. requires the Regional Director to initiate Damediate actions to. respond to incidents without waiting for direction from Headquarters. . MC 1300-067e . states that he
' will " designate inspectors and organize . incident response teams . . ." The regional director makes his decisions )
based on information obtained in the initial telephone notification and this information must be as accurate as possible.
Following the initiation of the Browns Ferry file at 12:35 p.m.
CDT on March 22, 1975, the RII answering service was contacted at-4:07 p.m., the RII duty officer was contacted at 4:12 p.m.,
and the project inspector made contact with the site at 4:40 p.m. (all times are CDT). The inspector was told that t}
a serious condition existed at the site. A cable tray fire in a penetration into the Unit i reactor building had been in progress since about 1:00 p.m. CDT. Unit 1 had experienced the loss of control power to many important components 12-4
including the emergency core cooling system, and Unit 2 had been affected to a lesser degree. Both units had been safely shut down, depressurized and adequate core cooling provided.
There was no evidence of any radiological release to the environment.
- 2. RIRT Selection As mentioned previously in MC 1300-067e, the regional director is responsible for designating menbers of and organizing the RIRT. MC 1310-03 details the regional director's responsibilities in selecting and organizing the RIRT. The ERP details the process for the team selection. In order to expeditiously collectand evaluate information, it is necessary that team members collectively possess the following skills and qualifica-
. tions:
- a. Detailed knowledge of the plant systems, plant personnel and their organizational responsibilities, and itegrated plant operation. .
- b. Technical expertise dictated by the type of incident.
- c. Knowledge of the basic principles of reactor safety.
necessary to make immediate evaluation of plant conditions and licensee actions.
- d. Knowledge of the regulatory process and NRC incident response plans.
An R1RT would be expected to consist of three-five members, including the resident inspector, and/or the project inspector.
12-5
The RIRT expertise will be supplemented by the various HQ teams described in NRC MC 0502 and IE MC 1300. MC 1310-032 authorizes.the regional director to use consultants where necessary to provide needed expertise.
The Browns Ferry RIRT consisted of three reactor inspectors who had greater than 60 man years of-experience in the safety analysis, construction, testing and operation of nuclear plants and who were also very knowledgeable and familiar with the Browns Ferry plant, its design, site conditions and plant personnel. All three had inspected extensively at Browns Ferry for several years, and the project inspector was a member of the team. Two members were operations inspectors and the third was a construction inspector.
- 3. RIR: Organization MC 1310-033 states that the regional director is responsible for organizing the RIRT. One of the team members should be selected as the team leader. All communications to and from the site including directives to the licensee should be through the team leader. .The team members should routinely report their findings to the team leader along with any v recommendations and evaluations.
On the Browns Ferry RIRT the operations inspectors were directed to concentrate on the operations problems during and .
)
following-the fire; verify adequacy-of core cooling; identify 12-6 /
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I s /
any existing hazards to the health and safety of the public and plant employees; and evaluate potential damage to the nucisar steam supply system. The construction inspector was directed tc develop an understanding of why the fire
, affected the control power resulting in the loss of redundant, diverse safety systems, and evaluate the extent of the damages to the power and control wiring. All inspectors were to obtain as much information as possible concerning the cause of the fire and the effects of the fire on plant personnel and plant systems. The project inspecto acted as the princiole contact with the Plant Superintendent, RII and HQ. . . ,
e
- 4. KIRT Methods The team should use every available method for gathering accurateinhormationincluding:
- a. Observation of conditions during the event.
- b. Observation of licensee's activities in mitagating the consequences of the event.
- c. Observation of iicensee's activities in brouble shooting and restoring lost or damaged equipment.
- d. Examination of plant recorder charts.
- e. Examination of the plant process computer output.
- f. Examination of sequence of events recorder output.
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- g. Interview plant personnel involved in events leading up to the incident, and involved in activities during and following the incident. ,
- h. Examine plant logs and other records. (If licensee took statements from key people these should be reviewed.)'
In obtaining the above information, the RIRT should keep the following in. mind:
- a. Do not compromise' safety by hindering the licensee during the incident and during critical times of plant recovery.
- f. . b. Gather as much information as possible by personal s
.' d observation and examination of records.
- c. Your primary purpose is to gather information, evaluate and communicate - not act as a consultant to the licensee.
- d. Determination of noncompliance is not a primary concern ,
1 of the RIRT.
- e. The RIRT has a legal right to all information needed to protect the health and safety of the public - do not allow the licensee to keep you from the required information.
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- f. Work at differentiating between actual known facts and hearsay and conjecture. Facts should be corroborated from more than one source. Even a recorder chart is not always telling the truth.
- g. When communicating information about the incident, plainly differentiate between corroborated facts, f hearsay, supposition, assumptions, etc.
- h. Encourage the licensee to take written depostions and tape recordings from key individuals as soon as i possible.
- 1. Personally talk to key individuals as soon as possible.
As time following the incident lengthens and the individuals involved talk to one another it will become more and more difficult for eye witnesses to differentiate between what they experienced and what their coworkers told them about their experiences.
It is imperative that the RIRT have freedom to expeditiously talk with whomever they desire and to personally tour and observe activities anywhere in the plant, as long as this does not compromise the safety of the plant, employees and the public. Plant security and radiation protection " red. tape" must not prevent the RIRT from quickly gathering pertinent information. , ,
12-9 i l
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2 At Browns Ferry the RIRT had complete freedom to talk with anyone and to go anywhere in the plant without licensee escort, and to make copies of any records pertaining to the incid ent. The Plant Superintendent asked that the RIRT brief him at least daily on what they were learning about the incident, and to let him know which of the plant records i
were being reproduced and kept by the RIRT.
The RIRT arrived at Browns Ferry at 12:15 a.m. CDT on March 23, 1975. At that time the fire had been extinguished i
I for several hours and most activities devoted to the recovery I
- of plant systems had been temporary halted. The team met j i
j immediately with the Plant Superintendent, who had been at
)
1 the plant since shortly af ter the fire began and had i
directed the fire fighting and plant recovery operations, and with the Quality Assurance Supervisor who was coordinating I the collection of facts pertinent to the cause of the fire
! and its effect on the plant system. In addition to these 1
two individuals, the primary sources of information about
{ the event were:
- a. Unit 1 and 2 reactor operators stationed at the console t
during the incident.
4 i b. Workmen involved in the activities that started the fire and in the initial fire fighting activities.
- c. Primary system pressure, reactor water level, and steam
)
flow recorder charts.
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- d. Statements of key individuals obtained by TVA immediately after the fire was extinguished on March 22, 1975.
i e. RIRT tours of Units 1 and 2.
i i f. Unit 1 sequence of events recorder tape output.
- g. Plant logs.
Organization which will be activiated for Level I and II
) incidents.
The NRC Incident Response Organization is organized into five i operating levels: policy, decision making, implementation, 1
support and advisory. The Commission provides general policy j
which determines the overall course of action NRC takes in response to incidents. The Executive Management Team (DfT)
I transforms policy into specific guidance for the response
! organization and askes major decisions affecting NRC's
{ response actions. The Incident Response Action Coordination Team (IRACT) Laplements ENT decisions by directing activities I
of the IRACT Support Staff. It provides information to EMT, l
identifies problem areas, and develops alternative courses of
'l action. IRACT notifies appropriate offices and agencies and i
- keeps them informed. The Information Assessment Team (IAT) performs the intelligence function for the organization providing both background information and maintaining liaison ,
l during incidents with the intelligence community.
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4 1
- a. EMT (1) Transforms general policy into specific guidance for response organization.
(2) Makes major decisions affecting NRC's response actions.
j (3) Coordinates joint NRC offices activiteis related to i
the incident.
l (4) Coordinates policy with other agencies and resolves l conflicts, i
) (5) Specifies general content and approves final test i
of public information releases. )
- b. IRACT (1) Assures notification of the incident is disseminated rwiftly within the Commission.
1 (2) Assures that appropriate federal agencies and l-
) departments are notified in a timely manner of the incident and receive periodic status reports.
l (3) Performs actions required by IRACT Implementing a
Procedures in order to carry out information, evaluation,
?
1 assistance, direction, and coordination functions.
(4) In the event the incident is of extended duration and other priority business of the NRC requires the l
- attention of the Commission or EMT, assures they are i
-')
l kept informed of the incident.
I i 12-12
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i j (5) Directs the actions of the IRACT Support Staff in 4 F j order to implement EMT decisions or Item b. 3. !
i
< above.
}' (6) During the response identifies significant problems i
t areas, develops alternative solutions, and presents .
to ENT for decision.
f j c. IRACT Support Staff
} Detailed actions to be taken by the IRACT Support Staff are incident-specific; thest is, they depend on the type of incident. However, all actions will be directed j toward fulfuilling one of four objectives: gathering or
- providing information, evaluating response, assisting j where appropriate, or directing where necessary. In addition, there are ce tain general areas of responsibility r
or function that would be performed by IRACT Support l 4
St>.ff independent of incident type as outlined below:
l (1) NRR Staff j (a) Evaluates corrective action proposed by reactor licensees in response to incident.
(b) Reviews early reports of incidents to identify J
a safety or safeguards related problems associated i
- with the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and the materials and activities I
j associated therewith.
i 12-13 4 i i
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- .. .-. - - - . _ . = _ . . - ..
1 (c) Determines if followup evaluation is necessary.
1 (d) Determines if immediate changes or improvements are needed in regulatory requirements.
(e) Performs safety evaluations of reactor facilities subsequent to an incident, during repair, test 1
and startup.
(2) NMSS Staff (a) Implements procedures required by NRC HQ j
l Safeguards Contingency Plan.
}
(b) Evaluates corrective actions proposed by =aterials and fuel cycle facility licensees in response to i
') ,
incidents.
! (c) Reviews early reports of incidents to identify problems associated with the processing, transport I
and handling of nuclear materials.
(d) Determines if additional safety or safeguards ;
evaluation may be needed.
(e) Determines if immediate changes or improvements are needed in regulatory requirements.
(f) Performs safety and safeguards evaluation subsequent to an incident; during any repair. test, or startup i
of fuel cycle or materials facilities.
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(3) OIE Staff 1-i (a) Assures that personnel are dispatched to nonitor a \
2 licensee activities and assure compliance with [
i j licensee emergency plans and procedures.
I 1
(b) Gathers information concerning the incident in i i
1 order to perform independent evaluation of l readiological effects of the incident to assess licensee compliance with plans and procedures. i
, (c) Performs inspection and investigatory functions i r
i l
in the field required to assure the health and t j
safety of the public and provide information ,
requested by EMI or IRACT necessary for i
j decisions.
j (4) OSP Staff (a) Identify affected state and local authorities 1
l and state capabilities.
I i l
1 (b) Evaluate state actions and advise IRACT of
{
! alternatives available based on performance :
levels of state and local authorities.
i
- (5) PA Staff I
{ (a) Assist IRACT in infotsation activities relating i i !
i to incidents.
t (b) Review public statements and press releases regarding incidents at NRC licensed facilities i
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h and in coordination with the Office of International Programs inform the State Department of those having international implications.
(6) Director, Of fice of Congressional Af f airs Expedites congressional notification of incidents and provides updated status reports to Congress as necessary.
- d. Operations Staff (1) Operates and maintains NRC Operations Center through implementation of operational procedures developed in accordance with 0502-052f.
(2) Provides appropriate assistance to EMI. !RACT, IAT, and IRACT Support Staff as directed by Operations Officer,
- e. IAT (1) Notifed of all threats and security / safeguards-related matters.
(2) Perform the intelligence function for the organization.
(3) Advise EMT and IRACT hased on information gathered.
(4) Maintain liaison with intelligence community.
The RIRT will communicate their findings to the Region and to the OIE staff. The RIRT shall request assistance through the Region to the OIE staff and/or directly to the 01E staff.
Lamediately following or during an incident when time is of the 12-16
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i j essense, the RIRT should talk directly to the OIE staff.
Following the Browns Ferry fire, the HQ NRC Emergency Control l Center (ECC) was activated. For approximately the first I
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the RIRT arrvied at the site the RIRT communicated directly with both HQ and the Region. Following t that period comununications betwesen HQ and the RIRT were j usually through the Region. OIE management and an NRR I
technical expert visited the site on March 24 and 25, 1975,
]
1 j and were available to the RIRT for advice and consultation.
i B. Investimate f i e
! The RIRT can not adequately assess the risk to the health and safety of the public until the following are known:
j - Damage to plant.
i j - Injuries to people.
I
'; - Release of radioactivity.
1 t i Once enough information is known to evaluate the immediate risk to I
{ the public, the investigation may be stopped to make this evaluation and then returned to later. In addition to guidance j discussed in this paper IP 937005 and IE Appendix 1310 should be ;
1 ;
j used by the RIRT as guidance in determining what information should
[ be gathered.
i
{ 1. Damage to Plant.
i i The RIRT must determine to.what degree the following have l
- have been damaged, and/or made inoperable, and/or systes l i
! perforrance been degraded:
1 i f 12-17 !
i r f
1 I
i
! i F
l I
.}
i i
! - Fuel Element Cladding t 1
1 - Primary Coolant Pressure Boundary
- Prbaary Containment
]
- Engineered Safety Systems i
Emergency Core Cooling s
l Containment Pressure Control !
I i j Fission Product Control j l Auxiliary Power l l
- Reactor and System Control Circuits i l
- - Reactivity Control fi - Process and Nuclear Instrumentation ),
l i
- Offsite Power i
i - Ultimate Heat Sink l
l - Site Security Control i
1 l
- Control Room j - Other i
t, Alternate Sources of Coolant (non ECCS) t i
Flood Protection Devices f Fire Protection d
Seismic and Vibration Supports i s
i Structural Supports 3 i
1, ,
o
'/ i I '
I.
I. 12-18 i ,
_ . _ . _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . _ , . . _ . _ _ . . ~ . _ _ . . - _ - . _ _ _ . . , _ , _ _ _ _ . . . _ _._. _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _.,_,. __ _ _ -
1 Since the Browns Ferry fire occurred in instrument and control penetrations leading into the cable spreading roce, the most significant damage resulted in the loss of control pcVer to the l engineeerad safety systems and the loss of reliable instrument and control indication in the control room.
Since the Yarway reactor level indicators appeared to renain workable throughout the incident and many different persons were observing these indicators, it was confirned that the reactor fuel renained covered throughout the incident and therefore should not be damaged. Due to the loss of control power to the 480V reactor and shutdown MOV boards, auxiliary power was not available and the only pumps available for adding coolant to the reactor were those normally powered by offsite power (condensate punps, control rod drive punp.
RERSV pumps, etc.). The primary coolant pressure boundary and the primary containment were not damaged as a result of the incident.
i
- 2. Injuries to People.
The guidance in IE Appendix 1310, Part 1, Enclosure 2, should be followed:
The number of people involved, and the extent of their injuries; names and employers.
Actions taken by the licensee to care for injured persons.
Actions taken by the licensee to preclude further injuries to people.
12-19
T If radiation exposures occur, the following should be determined:
Names, dates of birth, places of birth, sex, and social security numbers.
Names and address of employer, position title of exposed persons, area of facility (or other area) where the individual was working (or at) during exposure, summary of clinically descarnible ef fects, if any.
Approximate dates and times during which exposure was accumulat ed .
Type of radiation involved (alpha, beta, ga=ma, etc.)
description of source and, where applicalbe, the chemical and physical form.
Total estimated radiation does in ram.
Procedures used for convering units of measure to j values of rem dose.
Manner in which personnel radiation does measurements were made (film badge, TLD, dosimeter, survey instru-ments, etc.).
! Extent to which accumulated dose (or dose commitment) has exceeded permissible values.
Portion of the body exposed (whole-body, extremity, etc.).
l Tor internal exposures, the following should be determined:
Estimated body burden in microcuries by nuclide and isotope of interest in critical organ (s), in terms oft an average over one year, and the peak value.
Estimated dose ceamit=ent.
The biological assay procedure used in estimating the internal deposition, including the type of instrumentation.
Description of the conditious and circumstances leading to the exposure, incuding the probable mode of entry into the body.
Employee work restrictions or other operating or )
administrative restrictions imposed as a direct result or consequence of the incident.
12-20
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Any other pertinent bicassay and survey data and any interpretation of the data and information as the inspector has been able tomake.
There were no personnel injuries other than minor smoke inhalation, and no radiation exposures as a result of the Browns Ferry fire. .
- 3. Release of Radioactivity.
IE Appendix 1310 Part 1, Enclosure 2, provides the following guidance concerning information to be gathered in the case of a release of radioactivity:
I Form and content of the release; liquid, solid, gas, or mixture; and noble gas, iodines, parti-culates, or mixture.
Curie quantity of radioactivity that was released, and the release race and duration of release.
, Point (s) of release from the facility or other location of incident, and the ares (s) where the activity was dispersed.
Meterorological conditions at the time of releases vind direction, vind speed, and atmospheric conditions.
Onsite and offsite consequences: hazards to people and property.
Procedures and instrumentation used to determine release races, dose races, concentratoins, etc., and by whose were determinations made.
There was no release of radioactivity as a result of the Browns Terry Fire.
4 Cause of the Incident.
The following infor:ation should be gathered:
System involved in the incident.
Component or personnel action that was proximate cause of the incident.
Circumstances of discovery of the incident.
12 21
i 1
4
\
If, once the incident was initiated, licensee actions sade things worse or expanded the effects of the initial incident.
this should also be identified. It was determined f rom Browns Ferry =anagement, and from interviews with those who started the fire, that the Browns ' Terry fire originated in a cable spreading room and the reactor building. The fire progressed through the penetration into the reactor building and down several cable trays for 20-30 feet. The fire started when a worker laak tested the penetration using a lighted candle which accidently ignited polyurethane foam material that had been used to temporarily seal the penetra-tion. Air being pulled through the penetration caused a blow torch effect igniting the cable insulation. The fire lasted for approximately seven hours.
C. Evaluate There will be times when the RIRT must make on the spot evaluations, I
however, they should always make use of regional and HQ expertise.
t
' The RIRT does not stand alone -- they have expert help available.
- 1. Immediate Risk to Public's Health and Safety.
The Lamediate risk to the public's health and safety outside of the plant exclusion boundary will be insignificant p;ovided there is no release of radioactivity. As long as rne of the three primary barriers to fission product release remains intact, this risk is minimized. The safety of those within the plant during the incident is determined by the type of incident. )
12 22
At Browns Ferry there was no immediate threat to the health and safety of the public, however, the potential threat was very serious and vill be discussed later. The t= mediate threat to the employees was that associated with fire fighting: smoke inhalation, lack of oxygen, burns, electrical shock, ecc.
- 2. Potential Risk to Public's Health and Safety.
The RIRT will devote much of its time to evaluating the potential risk resulting from a degraded plant during and following an incident. All potential occurrences and their possible effects on the degraded plant must be evaluated, and steps taken to protect against them.
At Browns Ferry, inorder for the potential risk to be minimized the reactor core had to be maintained subcritical, sources of reactor makeup water had to be maintained, and ways of relieving reactor pressure had to be maintained,
- s. Natural Phenomena j Nuclear plants are designed to withstand earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes , etc. The RIRT following an incident must evaluate the degraded plant's ability to withstand these natural phenomena, and where deficiencies are noted, point these out to the licensee and NRC management.
12-23
For instance, a fire in a plant could conceivably damage water tight doors needed for flood protection; structural supperts, snubbers, and restraints required to withstand earthquakes ; etc.
During and immediately following the fire at Browns Ferry, any event that resulted in a loss-of-of fsite power would have resulted in a loss of coolant makeup to the reactor vessel and could have eventually resulted l in uncovering the reactor core. Other thaa the fact that Unit 1 could not have withstood a loss-of-offsite power, which had a relatively high probability if an ,
earthquake or tornado occurred, the incident did not compromise the degraded plant's ability to withstand significant natural phenomena. The licensee performed a i
study to determine what was required and how long it would take to back feed the condensate pumps with auxiliary power if offatte power was lost. They also wrote a procedure for doing this.
- b. Incipient System or Component Failure The RIRT must determine the possibility for additional system and/or component failure during and following the incident. The incident could have degraded other systems and components to the degree that their failure is Lusinant. Where the RIRT looks for damaged or degraded )
l 12-24 P
i 4
- equipment depends upon the type of incident and the
- 1 affected area. In most instances an inspection tour
(
of the plant will be required to identify this equipment. ;
{ The Browns Ferry fire occurred in an area where that equipment exposed to the fire was primarily instrument and control cables. Several hours after the fire 1
started, but during the fire, control air was lost to the Unit i relief valves, and this was actributed to the l
fire, r i
. c. Trouble Shooting and Plant Restoration. '
During and inusediately following an incident it may be necessary to try to restore inoperable systems and equipment in an attempt to improve reliability and
- safety. There are times when imeediate decisions must i
be made to try to restore a lost system by qualified i
I knowledgeable people without taking the desired time to review or discuss the situation with others. However, there are also times when uncoordinated trouble shooting and attempts at system restoration can be self defeating.
- The RIRT must encourage the licensee to organize their
! i j attempts at trouble shooting and system restoration.
i' After minimum systes and equipment requirements are i met, time should be taken to procede with trouble shooting I
and restoration of backup systems and equipment in a careful orderly menner.
12-25 l
1
While fighting the Browns Ferry fire there were times when the reactor vessel was isolated, reactor pressure was increasing, reactor water level was decreasing and there were no operable high pressure systems for injecting coolant into the reactor vessel. Attempts at system restoration were fruitless. Fortunately, the licensee still had manual control of some relief valves and was able to depressurize the reactor vessel by opening the relief valves and depressurizing to < 350 psig at which point the condensate pumps were able to pump condensate into the reactorvessel and maintain coolant level above the core. Later, the ability to operate relief valves manually was lost, reactor pressure increased, and makeup could not be added until the relief valve operability was restored. Throughout the approximate seven hours of fighting the fire, attempts were made to restore CS, HPCI, RCIC, RHR (S.D. cooling and torus cooling modes), and to open isolation valves without success. Trouble shooting and system restoration was made extremely difficult because: control room indications of system status were erroneous due to instrument and control wiring damage; system status could only be determined by dispatching operators into the plant where they had extreme difficulty in the dense smoke finding the equipment and determing its status before exhausting their air supply.
12-26
J Even after the fire was "out" the condition of the instrument and control circuitry was such that system restoration was difficult; RHR torus cooling was not
]6 restored until approximately five and one-half hours .
- after the fire was "out;" and RHR shutdown cooling was i not restored until approximately eight and one-half hours 4
after the fire was "out."
There was concern that trouble shooting activities, l to determine axisting system conditions and to restore i
systema to operation, could result in inadvertently J
q losing an operating system, withdrawing control rods, i
i starting a system which was not wanted, or pbysical injuries to people in the plant. An example cf an j actual problem actributed to trouble shooting activites I
rather than direct fire damages, was an instance the day j , after the fire when the Unit 1 operator noticed that the '
2
) reactor water level started decreasing. It was found that all of the CAD scram valves had opened causing loss
- of reactor water which was greater than the CRD hydraulic ,
1 pump makeup (the only makaup provided at that time).
i l Subsequently, it was found that during trouble shooting 4
l of the electrical supply system, the DC control power was shorted to the controls for the air compressor
! supplying air to the scram valve solenoids. This resulted i
i in unloading the compressor and loss of air to the solenoids which were designed to " fail safe" and open the scram valves 1
- on loss of air.
i 12-27 l
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T, To alleviate these concerns, the licensee began keeping QA records on March 23, 1975, of all temporary cable runs, jumpers and lif ted leads. All work other than that necessary to maintain existing plant conditions, was eventually stopped until a formal program for preparation of procedures and safety reviews was developed for I trouble shooting, repair, and uaintenance of the plant
! systems, i
To prevent accidental CRD withdrawal, the insert /vithdraw solenoid for each CRD was disarmed. Also, after SRM readout was restored, an SRM non-coincident scram was I I established at 105 CPS.
l d. Operator Error, i
Following a major incident the Technical Specifications.
- r l operating procedures, emergency procedures, etc. , may not
- be applicable to the damaged plant. The RIRT must work
, with the licensee to establish temporary operating limits, action statements, surveillance requirements, and reporting requirements. These agreements should be 4
communicated to the Region and HQ who will provide i technical assistance in establishing longer term require-ments. The RIRT should review the above procedues and provide any comments to the licensee. Also, to minimize
) <
/
l 12-28
F I operator error the licensee should brief each new shift
- on the condition of the damaged plant, and review any new operating requirements with them.
At Browns Ferry, following the fire, those few systems 4
which were operable and necessary for maintaining safe j shutdown were being operated in an unconventional manner, e.g., they could not be operated or monitored in the usual manner from the control room; very few instrument indications were known to be reliable; existing normal and abnormal operating procedures were ,
meaningless as f ar as providing guidance to the operators.
Because of this, temporary operating procedures were j written for the systems as they existed. An emergency procedure was written describing how the condensate pump q motors could be fed with auxiliary power if a loss-of-offsite power occurred.
i i
! Technical Specifications were meaningless for the fire 1
] damaged Unit 1, and temporary limits and action statements
- had to be developed. The response team asked the licensee l
1 i
- to establish special requirements that he would follow to make sure that the fire damaged plant remained in a saf e condition. In addition to disarming the CRD's and
instructions to the operators 12-29
. . . _ , . . _ _ . , . .-. ._,, . . . . _ . . . , _ _ . , . . , , . ___y,.,,,_m .,y_, , _ . _ . , . . , , , _ _ , , , . , . . - . . , . , _ , __,__,7-. -, ~-,,. , ,_
s
)
(1) Requiring reactor water level monitoring and initiating corrective action if the level dropped I
to -100 inches on the Yarway indicator in the control room.
(2) Forbidding shutdown of RHR shutdown cooling without plant management approval.
4 (3) Suspending normal surveillance tests since they
.i could challenge the operability of the few operable systems.
1 I
The response team requested assistance from NRC management j in evaluating licensee actions and the safety of the damaged
! plants, and, most importantly, establishing Technical Specification requirements for the existing plant conditions.
- D. Communicate
- 1. NRC Communications by RIRT with the Region and HQ will be in
! accordance with NRC MC 0502, IE MC 1300 and the Regional
- Emergency Response Plant (RERP). In Region III a Base Team in the regional office is the point of contact with the site team and all communications to and from the site will be
{ through the Base Team. It is recommended that periodically the RIRT talk directly with HQ with the Regional Base Team's
~
cognizance so that nothing is lost in communicating vital information.
.]
) 12-30
Following the Brewns Ferry incident, in order to coordinate and minimize the i= pact of numerous requests for infor=stion from outside of RII, all requests for information were coordinated and communicated to and from the RIRT by the RII Reactor Operations Branch Chief. The information gathered at the site was communicated to the Branch Chief on a prescheduled basis, who in turn, relayed the information to the HQ Incident Management Center. Headquarters requests for information were likewise referred back to the onsite team. Early in the response, the RIRT also communicated directly with HQ with the Re51on's cognizance of the infor=ation communicated.
- 2. Licensee The RIRT cust communicate NRC concerns, requests for information, immediate action statements, etc. , with the licensee. The RIRT leader shall be the point of contact with the highest ranked member of plant management onsite (preferably the plant manager).
If disagreements arise which the RIRT leader can not resolve with plant management, this should be immediately referred to the regional base team for action.
At Browns Ferry there was a free flow of information between the response team and plant personnel. The team had the freedom to talk with anyone, review any plant records, observe any activities, and were provided special badges so that they were permitted to go anywhere on the site te gather information. The Plant Superintendent asked that he be 1 2 - 31 l l
~
\
briefed each day on the information gathered. The Quality Assurance Supervisor was the TVA focal point for collecting and analyzing plant data, and interviewing and obtaining statements from TVA employees. The plant management responsed quickly to requests by the RIRT that operating limits and procedures be established CRD's be disarmed, etc.
- 3. Federal, State and Local Agencies The RIRT shall devote all 1:s energies to investigating, evaluating and communicating information related to health and safety. The RIRT is not responsible for notifying all of the federal, state and local agencies. The Regional Base Team has the responsibility for properly notifying the state, EPA, OSHA, DOT, FAA, FBI, etc., as appropriate for type of incident.
Following the Browns Ferry incident, these contacts were made by the RII office 4 Public and Press The RIRT has no responsibility in the issuing of press releases and making of ficial statements to the public and press. The latest draft of NRC MC 0502, Appendix 1, E.2.c.
states that the HQ Executive Management Team (Etfr) " specifies general content and approves final text of public information rel eas es . " If the RIRT is contacted by the press or public 12-32
they should be referred to the Regional Public Affairs Officer.
If the public or press still wants statements, the RIRT should respond to specific questions with substantiated facts -- not opinion or conjecture -- do not theorize from incomplete or uncertain evidence. If opinion must be expressed, identify it as your personal opinion, not an NRC position.
The RII public information office OPIO) arrived at Browns Ferry on March 23, 1977. He toured the plant, was briefed by the response taan and in turn, handled communications with the press and public. The response team was not directly contacted by the press or public.
P 12-33
X
) .
IV. PREPARATION AND TRAINING FOR RIRT PARTICIPATION It is believed that this lecture is just a preliminary effort in training an inspector for participation in a RIRT following a
{
major reactor incident. There are many other things that the individual and the NRC can do to improve our ability to respond to c major incident. These are discussed in the following para-graphs and are by no means the last word on the subj ect.
! A. Individual Preparation The inspector should familiarize himself with the SAR with the following chapters being especially useful in preparing for incident response: ,
Chapter 6 - Engineer Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Controls Chapter 8 - Electric Power i
Chapter 15 - Accident Analysis The bases for Section II and III of the Technical Specifications also contain valuable informatoin useful in incident response.
It would be profitable for the inspector to study and familiarize himself with WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), " Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Comunerical Nuclear Power i'
Plants," October 1975. All of the appendices to WASH 1400 i
l 1 2- 34
n f
contain useful information, but the following are especially helpful in providing the inspector with information helpful in incident safety assessment:
! Appendix III, Failure Data Appendix IV, Common Mode Failure Appendix V, Quantitative Results of Accident Sequences f Appendix IX, Safety Design Rationale fer Nuclear Power Plants Appendix X, Design Adequacy
, B. NRC Preparation.
Considerable work is in progress in HQ finalizing NRC MC 0502, j "NRC Incident Response Plan" and redrafting II MC 1300, " Incident Response Actions." This work is primarily directed towards HQ I activities and organization for incident management and control.
The authors believe that work could be done to aid the RIRT in its onsite responsibilities. Ior instance, generic contingency i plans should be prepared for different types of incidents at operating BWR's and FWR's. For each incident the contingency plan would provide the inspector with guidance relative to areas in which the investigating efforts should be concentrated, absolute minimum system requirements, emergency operating limits and requirements, etc. To the authors knowledge there is no work I of this type being done. These contingency plans would also I
serve as a valuable training aid for inspectors.
i i 12-35 I
i
- n V. REFERENCES The following documents are pertinent to this topic and will provide the inspector with additional background material:
A. Investigation Report 259/75-1, " Browns Ferry Fire" B. II Manual Chapter MC 1300 (All Appendices), " Incident Response Actions," 12/11/75 C. Manual Chapter MC 1120, " Notification of Incident, or Occurrences" D. Regional Emergency Response Plan 4
E. NRC MC 0502, "NRC Incident Response Plan," Redraft 8/8/77 I F. WASH 1400 (NUREG-75/014), " Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment 4
of Accident Risks in U.S. Commerical Nuclear Power Plants," 10/75 1
j i
t.
1 12-36
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4 Z
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- n,, _
PERSONAL CONDUCT OF IE INSPECTORS I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES A. To be Made Aware of and Understand:
- 1. The more important parts of Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 0, Code of Federal Regulations, Titled Conduct of Employees.
- 2. The individuals responsibilities as required by the Conduct of Employees Regulations.
- 3. The conflict of interest restrictions and the avoidance of conflict of interest situations.
- 4. The restrictions imposed on personal financial interests and corporate stock ownerships.
- 5. The restrictions regarding the negotiation for future employ-ment and the acceptance of additional employment.
- 6. The IE management policies regarding IE employee conduct during official dealings with the licensee, as required by IE Manual Chapter 0235.
- 7. The Legal and management Policy restrictions regarding:
- a. Acceptance of gifts, favors, entertainment or other gratuities.
II. INTRODUCTION ,
An employee of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) is subjected to certain restrictions and requirements that are imposed on the employee in the areas of
," Conduct" and " Conflicts of Interest".
E
- I 13-1
(
. ._= _ ._ ._ - - - -- - .
The Atomic Energy Act and the personnel policy of the United States i Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that the character, associations, and loyalty of its employees be of high order. Employees conduct and self-discipline, both on and off the job, must measure up to the highest standards.
The maintenance of these unusually high standards of honesty, i ntecri ty ,
imoartiality and conduct by NRC employees is essential to assure proper performance of the NRC business and the maintenance of confidence by the general public in the dealings of the NRC. The avoidance of misconduct and conflicts of interest on the part of NRC employees, through informed judgement, is indispensable to the maintenance of these standards.
)
The Nuclear Regulatory Comision strongly supports the stringent conflict of interest requirements as a means to increase public trust in government. As an example, the NRC conflict of interest regulations are among the most comprehensive of all federal agencies. Considerable time
]
and effort is devoted to enforcing these regulations and the General Counsel reviews each " Confidential" Statement of Employment and Financial Interest submitted by each employee. The Comission and its Office Directors are also involved in this review.
Employees of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement are not only required to be in compliance with the legal restrictions imposed as a condition of employment but must comply with further restrictions that are required as a part of (IE) management policy.
\
. .)
13-2
l IE inspectors will probably have more contact with the public than I most other NRC employees. Therefore, the image made by the inspector in the areas of " Employee Conduct" and " Conflicts of Interest" will in many cases be the image that will be imparted for all of NRC.
All employees should be aware that violation of parts of the regula-tion can subject them to legal and/or disciplinary actions. Therefore, it is important that employees fully know and understand what is re-1 quired of them in the area of personal conduct.
III. PURPOSE OF THE " CONDUCT OF EMPLOYEE" PROGRAM A. To meet the Code of Federal Regulation requirement that each employee be made aware of the provisions and content of Part 0, at the time of initial employment and periodically thereafter.
B. To inform the employee of the availability of counseling and how and where to obtain these services.
C. To protect the interests of the public and the employee by establishing the principles, practices, and standards governing conduct.
D. To assure that the imposed requirements of the regulations will be observed by the employee and administered by m&nagement in a con-sistent' manner within the spirit and the letter of the applicable statutes and policies.
13-3
IV. BACKGROUND ,
3 A. Executive Order,11222
- 1. In a message to Congress on April 27, 1962, on ethical conduct in the Government, the President of the United States said:
"No responsibility of Government is more fundamental than the responsibility of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior by those who conduct the public business. There can i
be no dissent from the principle that all officials must act with unswerving integrity, absolute impartiality, and complete devotion to the public interest. This principle must be followed j not only in reality but in appearance. For the basis of effective Government is public confidence, and that confidence is endangered )
, when ethical standards falter or appear to falter....."
"The ultimate answer to ethical problems in Governments is honest people in a good ethical environment. No web of statute or regulation, however intricately conceived, can hope to deal with the myriad of possible challenges to a man's integrity or his devotion to the public interest. Nevertheless, formal regulation is required - regulation which can lay down clear guidelines of policy, punish venality and double dealing, and set a general ethical tone for the conduct of public business."
- 2. On May 8, 1965 the President of the United States issued executive order 11222, in which is prescribed, " Standards for the Ethical Conduct" for government officers and employees. It also provided ,
)
1 13-4
i for the reporting of employment and financial interests of employees in certain government positions and authorized the E
heads of agencies to issue appropriate agency regulations. In issuing regulations the agency heads were further directed to provide exceptions, as may be appropriate, to individual employees dependent on the duties and responsibilities of their work. However, agencies were also authorized to further restrict certain employee transactions as viewed in relation to the special circumstances of the agencies mission, i.e., stock i ownership restrictions, etc.
The exective order is the authority for the issuance of the regulations and it provides the legal basis for Employee Conduct i
and/or Conflicts of Interest derived from 10 CFR, Part 0.
- 8. Congressional Resolution on the " Code of Ethics for Government Service"
- 1. The following is a resolution adopted by Congress:
" Resolved by the House of Representatives (The Senate Concurring),
that it is the sense of the Congress that the following Code of Ethics should be adhered to by all Government Employees, including office holders:
Any person in Government service should:
- a. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or Government department.
13-5
\
- b. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal Regulations of the United States and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.
- c. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his duties his earnest effort and best thought.
- d. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.
- e. Never discriminate unfairly by dispensing of special favors or priviledges to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept, for himself or his family; favors or i benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the perfonnance of his )
governmental duties.
- f. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a government employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty.
- g. Engage in no business with the Government, either directly ,
or indirectly, which is inconsistent with the conscientious perfonnance of his government duties.
- h. Never use any infonnation coming to him confidentially in ,
the performance of Government duties as a means of making a private profit.
- 1. Expose corruption wherever discovered. !
- j. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office . )
is a public trust.
13-6
_ . -. _ . _ . . - ? -
V _ -. .. . , . . . . - .
1 I
l V. DISCUSSION A. Introduction
- 1. In addition to the standards addressed in Section IV, there are certain laws and regulations that govern employee conduct.
Some of the areas covered are: Receiving compensation from sources other than Government; political activity; use of appropriated funds; outside employment; acceptance of fees; gifts, and accomrrodations; indebtness, gambling on NRC property; scandalous conduct, and conflicts of interest. Also NRC employees (including spouse, minor child; or any other member of the immediate household) are precluded from owning any Stocks, bonds or other securities of any corporation (s) whose activities are closely related to the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities.
Specific rules, regulations and procedures are covered in detail in NRC Chapters 4122 and 4124. Employees should read and under-stand these provisions.
B. Basis for Conduct of Employees
- 1. The legal basis for employee conduct is derived from the regu-lation 10 CFR Part 0 as authorized by the Presidential Executive Order.
An employee should be aware that violations of the statutes applicable to the Federal Regulation is breaking the law and subjects the employee to the criminal sanctions authorized by law. Fines of up to $10,000 and prison terms of up to 2 years may be imposed on individuals that are in violation.
13-7
-. . . . =_ , - _ - - _ - . -
4 N
The nature and complexity of the criminal statutes is such that it is difficult to deal with all the individual employee problems that may result with regard to employee conduct or conflict of interest. Therefore, many of these problems are
. best approached by the individual, using infonned judgement, f
on an individual case basis.
- 2. The Office of. Inspection and Enforcement Policy restrictions are established by Manual Chapter (MC-0235).
The MC-0235, as a matter of policy, imposes further restrictions on the employee of IE in addition to the legal requirements of the Code of Federal Regulation. It also provides a standard of Conduct for IE representatives that must be followed while )
representing the NRC during an inspection, investigation or meetings. The MC further supplements and emphasizes various parts of the Employee Conduct Regulation and in some cases, as
, a matter of policy, neaates some of the leaal exceptions pro-vided in sub-parts of 10 CFR Part 0. The policy requirements established by MC-0235 apply only to employees of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, i 3. In the order of necessity and good management practices an employee may be subject to "Other Rules" of conduct that are imposed by Regional Directors, Branch Chief, Supervisors, etc.
The authorization for these "Other Rules" and " Policy" restric-tions are established by the executive order which allows agencies I 13-8 i
i
to further restrict certain employee transactions, in the light of special circumstances that affect the agencies mission. However, management cannot make the basic document less restrictive.
C. Individuals (Legal) Responsibilities
- 1. One of the major responsibilities of an employee is to comply with the statutes, rules, and standards of conduct that have been established. More importantly the employee should know and recognize that violations of any statutes or instructions, that have been mandated, may subject them to disciplinary actions and/or other penalties prescribed by law. Therefore,
/ if employees have any doubt that an action they have taken
\
may be violation it is their responsibility to consult the applicable statutes or seek guidance from the immediate super-i visor or counsel. To be in compliance is the individuals responsibility.
- 2. .Also, an NRC employee shall be guided by the Code of Ethics as resolved by Congress and avoid situations which reauire or annear to recuire the balancing of private interests against official duties.
- 3. Employees must be attentive to the high standards of integrity expected in all their activities, personal or official and
" Conduct" themselves in a manner to create and maintain resoect for the NRC and the U.S. Government.
i 13-9
. = _ . . . . . - . . - _ _ _ -
i 4
4
- a. Some things that should be considered, by an inspector conducting activities on behalf of the NRC and IE, to create and maintain respect for the NRC are:
i
- 1) Having a good knowledge and understanding of the i
facilities, regulations and licensing requirements
- of those we regulate.
- 2) Avoiding arrogance and abuse of power by placing yourself in a licensee management position and demanding your personal methods and/or procedures j be followed by the licensee.
- 3) Being mindful of appearance and language.
} D. Individual Responsibilities As A Matter of Policy
)
- 1. Management policy requires that while acting as a representative i
of NRC, the IE inspector should conduct entrance / exit interviews and discussions in a business-like manner and control personal '
- activities so as to be fully capable of performing duties during business hours. During official dealings, with parties we regulate, the employee is expected to be objective in obtaining facts and in the decisions or conclusions he draws from these facts.
.i a
j By their actions IE employees should demonstrate that as Federal J
! employees they are dedicated to give the public full value of
, their services, i.e., by putting in a full day - not coming to work late or leaving early except for legitimate purposes.
4
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b 13-10 1
J l
, E. Conflicts of Interest
- 1. The most important reason for establishing " Standards of 4
Conduct", is to avoid the possibility of a Conflict of Interest problem on the part of a Government employee. A conflict of interest situation may arise when an employee's private interests raises a reasonable question of conflict with his public duties and responsibilities. As an inspector and employee of IE, the most probable area that may get you inte a conflict of interest situation would be in the economic form.
To avoid Conflict of Interest situations employees of NRC cannot have financial interests that conflict or appear to conflict with their duties and responsibilities or participate in financial transactions as a result of relying on information obtained through Government employnent.
The regulations are of concern to the employee whether the breach of the regulation is Real or Apparent. Real conflict is self-explanatory and is an obvious violation of the regu-lations.
Examples: a. An inspector, for special considerations, accepts gifts from persons he deals with on behalf of NRC.
- b. An employee does not submit the required financial interest statements prescribed by the executive order and/or agency regulations.
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-. - ..- - _--_ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ -. - . _ - _ _ =. . - - _ . . _ _ -
I An employee maintains or obtains ownership of c.
restricted stock and does not divest as required by the regulations. !
i Apparent conflict is a situation in which an inspector may 3
easily become involved during inspection activities.
Examples: a. A licensee may provide for the private use of the employee and/or their irmiediate family, I the use of a hunting lodge or other recreational facilities, activities, etc. The purpose of the offered facilities may be purely social, however, the aooarent conflict is evident.
I b. Simple personal favors may lead to apparent conflict - A licensee staff member who offers !
the use of a boat, etc., for your private use may only be a gesture of friendliness but may well be construed as an annarent conflict.
- 2. During routine daily contacts with a licensee apparent conflict allegations may be made over simple actions by the inspector, !
such as going to lunch or otherwise socializing with the i licensee, or acceptaing transportation or small minor gifts from people the NRC has dealings with.
- 3. When letters or phone calls of allegations involving conflict ,
i
- are received by IE management, the allegations are referred to the :
1 Office of Inspector and Auditor. The situation is checked into l i
l and if appropriate disciplinary action may be taken whether i
l substantiated or not the allegation can be embarrassing to the i
i inspector involved.
13-12 0_--. _- . . - - - . - - . . - , - - _ - - . - . _-. ._ - - - ._ - -- - -
_ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . . _ - - - _ _ . _ _ __
1 1
F. Receipt of Gifts, Entertainment and Favors
- 1. Outside of the legal exceptions provided for in the sub-parts l
3 of conduct of employee regulations,10 CFR Part 0, an NRC employee cannot accept anything of monetary value from persons who:
- a. Have financial, contractural or other business with the '
NRC.
- b. Conduct operations or activities regulated by NRC.
j 2. Legal exceptions to the acceptance of gifts, entertainment, ,
j favors, etc. are provided and authorized as being appropriate
! in view of NRC's mandate. Exceptions are provided under 4
those circumstances where the motivating factors indicate it is of a personal or family relationship rather than a business function. Legally acceptance of food and refreshment of nominal value on infrequent occasions is acceptable.
- 3. IE oolicy regarding the acceptance of food and refreshment
- of nominal value on infrequent occasions is more strinaent; 4
However, due to the unique relationship IE Inspectors have on 4
a " day-to-day" basis with those we regulate IE employees must 5
j avoid any situation that may appear to influence their decisions.
i l Management policy therefore states, employees should avoid the
)
acceptance of anything. The bases for the policy is that critics of the NRC and intervenors will be quick to point out any real ;
or apparent conflict, no matter how small.
i h
4 13-13 :
I l
i
- T ,
j l Although employees of IE are expected to avoid acceptance of favors or other prohibited conduct, at times unavoidable situations do .arise that may prove to be overly embarassing.
] In such cases employees are required to document the situation and transmit this information in a memorandum to their immediate i supervisor.
1 j 4. NRC regulations and IE policy regarding conflicts of interests l i
! do not apply to any civic, professional and fraternal organi-
, zations . Acceptance of meals or other hospitality at speaking 4 engagements before such groups is permissible.
I
- 5. The IE employee should know and understand that with regard to l the regulations and policies governing conduct and conflicts 2
)i of interest, IE management is very serious. They require a L
- serious and dedicated effort by employees and management will
! take whatever action is necessary in the form of legal or l disciplinary sanctions, if a violation of the code occurs.
i L 1
G. Friendships (Policy) l 2 1. As an employee of IE, inspectors are required to adhere to certain standards regarding relationships with personnel that are employed by companies licensed and regulated by the NRC. l t
This requirement can create an awkward situation at times. !
l Friendships that have been established over lifetimes may
{ involve family ties, Godparent relationships, close and dear I friends, etc.
1 \
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I' 13-14 j
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2
- 2. Management policy instructions are not intended to prohibit the continuation of friendships and other normal social acitivities. To avoid embarrassment or false allegations to the individuals involved and the NRC, any unusual social relationship that constitutes a real or apparent conflict of interest, the employee shall make it known to the imediate supervisor.
- 3. Employees are also required to refrain from any business activity or trip that is or appears to be primarily a means to continue the friendship or social activity and to dis-qualify themselves from representing the NRC to a friend authorized to speak for licensee management.
- 4. Any attempt on the part of persons that NRC has official dealings with to improperly or illegally influence an inspector to alter the course of an NRC decision or action.
should be reported immediately through line management to the Director of IE.
H. Restrictions Against Owning Certain Stocks
- 1. On December 19, 1973 the Atomic Energy Comission amended Part 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations to prohibit, effective July 1,1974, any AEC Regulatory Employee, the employee's spouse, minor children, or other members of the immediate household from owning any stock, bonds, or other securities of any company whose activities are closely related 13-15 I
4 to the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities.
This amendment was carried over and adopted to the present ,
} Nuclear Regulatory Comission, rules and regulations. The !
i
)
! type of companies that are covered by these restrictions are:
- a. Any publicly or privately owned utility company engaged
, in the generation,. distribution or sale of electric energy, I or parent company of such a company, i j b. Any company manufacturing or selling nuclear power or test ;
reactors. ,
- c. Any architectural - engineering company primarily engaged in the design or construction of nuclear power or test j reactor facilities. ,
- d. Any company whose business consists substantially of )
j serving as a consultant to companies engaged in activities l .
! licensed or regulated by the NRC.
1 2. As an employee, you and members of your immediate family must divest yourselves of any stocks, bonds, and securities in any i of the above listed companies within 30 days of employment with the NRC.
i Also, as an employee of NRC, any of the above type stocks, j bonds and securities that are acquired through gift, inheritance j or other similarily involuntary manner must be disposed of as l soon as possible.
I l At present this restriction applies to you as an inspector and to all employees of the NRC. It simply means the employee or ,
f 13-16
__....___._.__.1._.. - - _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ . . . - _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ . _
any member of the immediate household cannot hold any_ type of financial interest in the restricted companies.
- 3. This requirement of paragraph .735-29 of Part 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations should not be confused with paragraph
.735-21 which applies to any other employee that may not be covered by paragraph .735-29.
In view of extenuating circumstances, a procedure does exist within the NRC to allow an employee to request an exemption from the restrictions defined in paragraph .735-29 of Part 0.
However, an employee should not expect to be granted an exemption unless very unusual circumstances are involved and it can be determined that the divestiture of the stocks, bonds or securities is definitely inequitable. Financial loss is not considered an acceptable reason for granting an exemption.
Of the many cases presented to the Commission requesting waiver of the paragraph 29 restrictions, only a small percentage meet the test.
Example when a waiver may be granted:
- a. When an employee does not have immediate access to a person concerned. Such as, when the whereabouts of a member of the immediate household that has ownership of restricted stock is unknown to the employee,
- b. Through previous employment, an employee may be eligible to gain ownership of restricted stocks, bonds or securities to be issued at some future date. The employee is eligible to acquire such securities, but upon receipt of the securities they must be disposed of in a reasonable time.
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I. Future Employment (Restrictions) i 1. While representing the NRC to a prospective employer on any matter in which the employer has a financial interest, dis-cussions for employment are prohibited by the employee. This restriction does not prevent an employee from seeking employ-
- ment with organizations that have dealings with the NRC.
Employees, however, cannot perform their job functions, as 1
representatives of NRC, with the prospective employer during employment discussions. In either case, if the employee initiates employment negotiation or if approached by the licensee,'the employee must seek relief from inspection responsibility to the potential employer.
)
3 2. Management policy regarding future employment, requires the '
- supervisor to relieve the employee of conflicting assignments as early as practicable.
J. Acceptance of Outside Employment t 1. Some restrictions are imposed on HRC employees if they desire to obtain additional income or decide to accept additional outside employment. These restrictions are identified in appropriate paragraphs of Part 0 of the Code of Federal Regu-lations. The restrictions are of such a nature that normally they do not impose hardships on employees. However, the employee should know that when employed by the NRC you cannot:
- a. Accept outside employment which impairs the mental or physical capacity to perform the job. >
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1 a
- b. Accept fees for public lectures, appearances, or publication of books and articles if the activity is performed as part of official duties and/or the information was prepared or presented during official working hours.
- c. Accept any fee, compensation, gift payment or expense, or anything of monetary value in circumstances in which acceptance may result in, or create the apperance of con-flicts of interest.
- d. Accept employment with or do consulting services for any
- company or organization that is closely related to any activity licensed or regulated by the NRC.
- e. Employees are permitted and encouraged to teach, lecture and write within the provisions of the law, the executive j order 11222 and regulations.
- 2. Management policy imposes no further restrictions on outside employment than those applied by the Code of Federal Regulations.
K. Employees acting in claims, contracts or other matters involving the Government.
j 1. Generally, a government employee cannot act as a representative for any person or organization presenting claims, contracts or I
other particular matters in which the Government has any interest.
- 2. Exceptions are provided whereby government employees may act as attorney or agent for a person who is subject to disciplinary, loyalty or other administrative procedings. Providing the action is not in conflict with the performance of their normal I duties and is provided without compensation.
13-19 I
, . - , . - . - - - . - , . -.n-. , , - - - . ,
i 6
, 3. If an employee is appointed legal executor, administrator, trustee, etc. to an estate proceding involving the Government, 1
the employee may act as agent or attorney for his immediate family members or other persons, witn or without convensation.
However, the employee cannot participate in areas of contest which are substantially part of his normal government responsi-
, bilities.
- 4. Employees should be aware how easily they may become involved 1 in improperly giving advice on claims, contracts and other j matters dealing with the Government. Example:
- a. It could involve simple situations like preparing income tax forms for individuals personally or as part of outside i employment.
4 The employee should seek counsel if doubtful of the propriety j in representing persons in dealings with the Government.
L. Receiving Salary from Other Sources
- 1. NRC employees are prohibited from receiving any compensation for services performed as a part of their normal duties, except as may be paid by the treasury of state, county or municipal governments.
- 2. Employees may participate in any welfare or benefit plan they are eligible for through previous employment. Among them are l
pension plans, retirement plans, life and health insurance,
, profit sharing and stoc'k bonuses, etc. There are no restric-
- tions that apply to participation in the various plans, except s
.]
t 13-20
l those prohibitions provided by Paragraph 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations dealing with ownership of certain stocks and securities.
- 3. Employees are cautioned that if they are eligible for any previous employment benefits, they may lose the benefits j (pensions, etc.) if unaware of restrictions imposed by the conpany.
l There have been cases where a person's pension has been l jeopardized, when a person takes adverse action against the company. This is a situation that inspectors may readily find themselves in during the normal inspection activity. For example, if its necessary to initiate litigation against the -
company, as part of the inspection dutics, you may lose your vested rights in the benefit plans of tne company.
]
If loss of pension or other benefits may occur, the inspector ,
5 may seek relief, from supervision, of his responsibilities.
l M. Employee Counseling
- 1. As required by Part 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations j counseling services is available to every employee. Any questions on MC 0235 or 10 CFR Part 0 you may receive guidance j from supervision.
For individual special cases as to the language, intent, definitions, prohibitions mandated by MC 0235 and 10 CFR :
Part 0 the employee should consult the NRC Official Counselor.
13-21 i
~
- . . , _ _ - . - . ~ , _ - , , . _ . - . - _ , , _ . - - _ . - - .- , , _ . , - - . . , , _ - _ , _ - , . , . . . . . - . _ , - .
N. Other Restrictions
- 1. In the previous sections certain statutes and requirements
! were discussed regarding employee conduct. As a Government employee, there are other rules and statutory laws that are pertinent to conduct and ethical behavior. Some of the I prohibitions are listed below. The remaining may be found ,
in 10 CFR Part 0, Paragraph .735-30. Employees of NRC are obligated to acquaint themselves with these additional statutory provisions as a condition of employment.
- a. Prohibitions against disclosure of confidential informa-tion (18 USC 1905).
- b. Prohibitionsagainst prescribed political activities j
,)
(See NRC Manual Chapter 4122). >
l
- c. Prohibitions against bribery of public officials (18 USC 21).
- r. . Prohibitions against misuu of a Government vehicle.
- e. Prohibitions against fraud or false statements in Govern-
) ment matters (18 USC 1001).
i l f. Prohibitions against mutilating or destroying public 4
records (18 USC 2071).
i
! g. Prohibitions against unauthorized use of documents to claims from or by the Government (18 USC 258).
l h. Prohibitions against making false entries in official i records.
I a
- f I
13-22 i
,-wm-.-y.,-- p ., ew, e ay,-, -ew w=+r.-p--+7-m+ gn - a-sca - - - -- ---,*y 9 ,my=.e- --97-.. y,.--fa *y' eig7>1Wt - -me-* **g- -v--++-q"V--e*-=r-' *'4"'"P' - - ww.w,w*---V
__ . - - .- =. . - - -
- 2. Among the above listed USC (U.S. Code) prohibitions the one most frequently violated by government employees is the misuse of government vehicles. Specific references to the prohibi-tions involving government vehicles may be found in (31 USC 638 a(c)) and NRC manual chapter 5142. Inspectors and other employees of IE are frequent users of government vehicles and should know and understand the contents of the applicable codes and manuals. In general the prohibitions require that l government vehicles not be used for other than the intended I purpose; that is to provide transportation for the official 1
use of government employees only. For the employees of IE this prohibition implies that government vehicles only be
! used, to and from a site, for the purpose of attending an inspection, investigation, meeting or other official dealings i
with a licensee. An example of how misuse of a government vehicle may easily occur is; when an employee has permission to keep a government vehicle at home and drives his/her child 2
to school each morning - even though the school is on his/her
! normal route. Conversely, while in travel status use of a government vehicle is permitted to attend church.
j There have been numerous incidents that have occurred and been reported regarding misuse of government vehicles within the Office of Inspection & Enforcement. Some of the incidents 13-23
i N
) .
were the result of inspectors being caught directly by super-vision others thru allegations made by members of the public.
Examples of vehicle misuse by an inspector and other IE employees are:
- a. An inspector was found by supervision to have used a government vehicle to go fishing at a lake adjacent to an inspection site.
- b. On a hot day returning from an inspection two inspectors were reported, by a member of the public, to have parked a car in front of a local tavern,
- c. Employees of IE where known to privately use a government car for grocery shopping. -,
- d. Use of a government vehicle to provide transportation to and from places of entertainment have been reported.
The incidents may appear to be trivial however, IE employees should be aware that they are typical of vehicle usage viola-tions. Technically while in travel status, if a restaurant is available to the employee at or within walking distance of the place of lodging use of a government vehicle to obtain a i
meal at other restaurant facilities may be construed as misuse ,
of a government vehicle.
Employees are cautioned that supervisory action for vehicle misuse cases vary in accordance with the severity of the vio-i i lation, i.e. whether it is of a criminal nature and violation .
13-24
_._ . . _ - . . _ _ - . . _ ,. -- . _1 . . _ __ .
l of the U.S. Codes or requires other administrative dici-plinary action. In either case even a verbal or written reprimand involving vehicle misuse, may be an embarrass-ment to the individual involved.
O. Employee Participation in Political Activities
- 1. Every employee of NRC should acquaint themselves with NRC Manual Chapter 4122, entitled " Political Activity". Detailed explanation is provided for those political activities which are permitted in the exercise of the individuals rights as a citizen, and those that are prohibited under applicable law and regulations.
The following information is provided to gain a general under-standing of the political activities which are permitted and those which are prohibited.
- 2. As an employee of NRC, you may not:
- a. Use your official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the results of an election.
- b. Take an activo part in political management or in a political campaign except as permitted by law or regulation.
- c. Serve as an officer of a political party, a member of a national, state, or local committee of a political party, an officer or a member of a committee of a partisan political club, or be a candidate for any of these positions,
- d. Become involved in organizing or reorganizing a political party organization or political club.
13-25 w
)
- e. Get involved directly or indirectly with soliciting, receiving, collecting, handling, disbursing, or accounting for assessments, contributions, or other funds for a partisan political purpose or in connection with a partisan election.
- f. Organize, sell tickets to, seek support for, or actively participate in a fund-raising activity of a political l party or political club.
- g. Take an active part in managing the political campaign of a candidate for public office or political party office.
- h. Be a candidate for, or campaign for, an elective public office.
- i. Take an active part in an organized solicitation of votes
- in support of or in opposition to a candidate for public office or political party office.
- j. Act as recorder, watcher, challenger, or similar officer at the polls on behalf of a political party or candidate
' in a partisan election.
- k. Drive voters to the polls on behalf of a political party
. o$ a candidate in a partisan election. ,
- 1. Endorse or oppose a' candidate in.a parti a election in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature,,
i or similar material.
- m. Serve as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political
~ party convention. w
)
i t
13-26 ,
l .
i
- n. Address a State or national convention or caucus, or a rally
- or similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a candidate for public or political party office, or on a partisan political question.
- o. Initiate or circulate a nominating petition for a candidate in a partisan election.
- 3. As an employee of NRC, you may:
- a. Vote as you choose and express your opinions on political subjects and candidates.
- b. Display political pictures, stickers, badges, or buttons.
- c. Participate in the nonpartisan activities of a civic, com-munity, social, labor, or professional organization, or of
(
a similar organization.
- d. Attend political conventions, rallies, fund-raising functions, or other political gatherings.
- e. Sign a political petition as an individual citizen.
~
- f. Make a financial contribution to a political party organi-
, zation.
- g. Take an active part as an independent candidate in a partisan election.
- h. Take an active part as a candidate or in support of a candi-4 date in a nonpartisan election.
4 1. Be politically active in connection with a question which 1
is not specifically identified with a political party, I
4 13-27
d such as a constitutional amendment, referendum, approval ofamunicipf1 ordinance or any other question or issue of a similar character.
- j. Serve as an election judge or clerk, or in a similar posi-tion to perform nonpartisan' duties as prescribed by State or Local Law. ,
VI.
SUMMARY
As specified in the Executive Order and Associated NRC Regulations, i NRC employees conduct and self-discipline, both on and off the job, must measure up to the highest standards. These high standards are i essential to the performance of the NRC mandate and the maintenance of public confidence in the dealings of the NRC. Employees are charged with the responsibility to know, understand and comply with the applicable codes and statute's defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10,' Part 0 and that they are subject to the legal and disciplinary sanctions that can 'be imposed if the codes are violated. The Nuclear Regulat'ory Connission members strongly support the stringent " Conflict of Interest" requirements. '
Employees of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement are ,further required to comply with the restrictions imposed as a matter of IE management policy and are fully expected to abide by the policy requirements . The NRC and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement take great organizational, pride in being a fair, firm re'gulatory
, organization regarding employee conduct. The Office of Inspection 13-28 i
n .:
and Enforcement expects strict ethical behavior on the part of its inspectors. It has a tendency to look down on an inspector who would diminish the organizational pride for even minor gifts or favors, such as a cup of coffee or lunch. Policy implicitly states that an IE employee will accept nothing, from persons we deal with, no matter what the circumstances.
Employees who have doubts or need clarification on any action in which they are involved should seek guidance from supervision or the official NRC Counsel.
VII. REFERENCES
/ 1. Executive Order,11222, Prescribing Standards of Ethical Conduct
\ for Government Officers and Employees. Dated May 8, 1965. Approved by NRC, Appendix 4124, April 1,1976.
- 2. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Rules and Regulations",
Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations - Energy, Titled Conduct of Employees.
- 3. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 0200 -
MC 0235, Titled Conduct of Employee.
)
13-29
e-e.
E w
z U
h FREEDOM OF'INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE INSPECTOR I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES A. To understand which records are subject to a Freedom of Infonnation Act (F0IA) and Privacy Act request.
B. To understand rationale upon which information may be withheld from disclosure under the nine F0IA exemptions.
C. To understand procedures for processing F0IA requests for classified, proprietary and other exempted records.
II. INTRODUCTION 4
A. .The Freedom of Information Act (F0IA) (5 U.S.C. 552) directs dis-closure to "any person" without regard to the purpose or need of i the individual requesting the agency record information unless non-disclosure can be justified under one or more of the Act's nine exenptions. The Act was passed by the Congress in 1966 and amended in 1974 and 1976. -
B. The notes taken, memoranda and reports prepared by, and documents obtained from licensees are subject to the provisions of the F0IA.
In addition, inspectors who maintain personal information on indivi-duals are subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act. Therefore, inspectors must be aware of the provisions of these laws so that they j
know the basis for withholding records from public disclosure and
! when the provisions of the Privacy Act are applicable to records they may maintain on individuals.
14-1 t
_ . _ , . - . _ - . . . , , _ . . ._.4-... - , _ . . . - - . . _ , , . _ . - _
t III. DISCUSSION A. What is a Record Under the Freedom of Information Act?
! 1. A record, to be subject to a F0IA request, must be an " agency record" (See 10 CFR 9.3a(b) for definition of record). All l records are " Agency records" unless they are " personal records."
i To be considered personal records, the records (1) must not '
have been circulated or used by anyone other than the individual x
! author, (2) are not required to be retained by NRC regulations l or procedures, and (3) are discarded or retained at the author's i
sole discretion (Porter County Chapter of Isaak Walton League of America v Atomic Energy Commission, 380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind.
l 1974)). T j ..)
l The legal position of NRC is that inspector's notes made during an inspection are personal notes if they are used only to refresh
! the inspector's memory and are not shown to any one else or filled with agency records. However, inspector corments on official NRC forms used as a check list during an inspection would be an agency '
, record.
- 2. Only agency records relevant to the subject of the FOIA request i which are in the possession of the NRC on the date the F0IA re-quest is received, are considered subject to the request.
s 14-2
,.%-- , , , , , - --e,, r-. - - ,,-r, e -- -
. - . , w---- _ - - - ..w-,-- - - ~ , , ,- - ~ , , - , -
E B. F0IA EXEtiPTIONS j 1. EXEMPTION 1: Records "specifically authorized under criteria
- established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the in-terest of national defense or foreign policy and which are pro-i perly classified pursuant to such Executive Order";
- a. Only information which has been properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 11652 can be withheld as Exemption 1 material.
l Under Executive Order 11652, only an authorized classifying j official who classifies in accordance with the criteria esta-
! blished under the Executive Order can properly classify a record.
} k b. Periodically, flRC of.fices will identify records which have t.
j not been properly classified but which are thought to contain l classified information. A recent example of this is with re-spect to safeguards information. In these instances, because 4
, there is usually not sufficient time to conduct a classifica-
.l tion review, the requester is notified that the records are l .being withheld pursuant to Exemption 1, pending classification i
j review.
1 I
- c. Subsequent to the initial' denial of the records pursuant to Exemption 1, the Division of Security conducts a declassifica-
- tion review of the documents. Upon completion of that review, i
non-classified material is released to the requester unless i
it is withholdable under another F0IA exemption.
i 14-3
- . . . . , . . . , . . . , , , _ _ . _, . . - . _ . . . . _ _ , , . . . _ . . . - - . _ - . _ - . _ _ . - _ _ - . . , - , _ . . . _ ~ , _ _ . . , _ . , -
- 2. EXEMPTION 2: Records "related solely to the internal personnel +
rules and practices of an agency";
- a. In the case of the Department of the Air Force vs. Rose, the Supreme Court restricted the use of this exemption to internal matters such as parking lot assignments and space requirements which do not significantly affect the public.
Under the present construction, Exemption 2 is of little practical use to NRC or any other federal agency.
- 3. EXEMPTION 3: Records "specifically exempted from disclosure by ,
) statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that '
i such statute (1) required that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (2) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers l to particular types of matters to be withheld."
4
- a. The NRC utilizes this exemption as authority to withhol'd re-I stricted data as required by 5 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act as amended (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165). No other use of the 4
exemption has been made by NRC.
- 4. EXEMPTION 4: Records containing " trade secrets and commercial or ,
financial infonnation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;"
1 14-4
.= . . . _ . - .. _ . - -
l
- a. To withhold information under this exemption the infoma-tion must be a trade secret or comercial or financial in-formation. Under the test set forth in the case of National 4
Parks and Conservation Ass'n vs. Morton disclosure of the in-
! formation must result in substantial harm to the competitive
, position of the owner or harm the government's ability to obtain infomation in the future. This information is frequently re-ferred to in the NRC as " proprietary information." Exemption 4 i
will be used to withhold licensee proprietary information if the licensee's proprietary claim has been sustained by affida-vit filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790. However, if information identified as proprietary was not submitted under 10 CFR 2.790, 4
('
for example, information in an inspection report, the infoma-tion will be denied purs'uant to Exemption 4 in NRC's initial response, and the Division of Rules and Records will request that the originating company justify its proprietary claim in 1
writing. If the company indicates the information is not pro-prietary, or fails to justify its proprietary claim, the in-formation will be released to the requester.
- b. 10 CFR 2.790(d) states that detailed physical security plans and material accounting procedures are considered proprietary ,
4 infomation. Accordingly, this information is withheld pur-
- suant to F0IA Exemption 4. In this situation, we do not ask 1
14-5 l-3
__.- , , _ , _.,..._.,.m _ . . . _ _ . _
- N i the licensee to justify the claim or furnish additional information since the NRC can make the determination on its own.
- 5. EXEMPTION 5: " inter-aaency or intra-agency memorandum or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than a agency in litigation with the agency."
- a. Generally, the fifth exemption is designed to protect an agency's deliberative process; i.e. , the process by which an agency reaches a decision. Congress felt that it was necessary to protect that process in order to encourage the full, frank and candid exchange of opinions needed for good
}
decision making.
- b. Exemption 5 only applies to predecisional advice, opinions, and recommendations. Any factual information in a predeci-sional record must be segregated and released to the public unless it is withholdable under another F0IA exemption. One of the exceptions to this rule are facts contained in drafts or coments on drafts. However, in instances where a record is indicated as a " draft" but a final decision was made, or is contemplated, that draft is considered the final document and facts must be segregated from advice, opinions, and recom-mendations.
14-6
4 t
- c. The records must have originated within the NRC or another d
federal agency to be considered inter-agency or intra-agency records. Records originated by or received from, or sent to the Congress, the courts and state governments of licensees are not inter-agency records.
- d. Similarly, information received from an individual outside of the government and then incorporated in a " memo to files" or l other document is not withholdable under Exemption 5. Contractor
. or consultant documents, however, may fall under this exemption.
It depends on the function the contractor is performing for the I
NRC. Generally, if the contractor is working as an integrcl part of the agency and performing an agency function, the -
contractor's records are considered intra-agency records. For
]
instance, if a contractor is writing a chapter for inclusion in an NRC report, f.ts records will be considered intra-aaency records and Exemption 5 is applicable. On the ottier hand, if the contractor is doing an independent study, etc., and making 3
a report to the NRC, the contractor's records would not be intra-agency records and Exemption 5 would not apply.
- e. Investigations and Inspections reports are not generally covered by this exemption. Neither are expert opinions and conclusions covered by this exemption.
- f. The Attorney General has recently circulated a memorandum which states that the Justice Department will not defend
. 14-7
~
- , . - - - --,,n-- ... . , . ~ - - . . . - . , , - - - - - - - , . - . - -. :,, ,--,,-,,,,..,, n~ , . . , , , -
h I
l l
4 federal agencies in court for withholding information, even if exempt under F0IA unless demonstrable harm to the agency 4
can be shown. This " demonstrable harm" test mainly impacts 1
- Exemption 5 material .
- 6. EXEMPTION 6
- Records which are " personnel and medical files and 7
similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
- a. The use of this exemption requires a balancing of the invasion i of personal privacy that would result from disclosure against i
_ the public interest that would be served by disclosure.
} '
s l b. NRC does withhold under this exemption, the names of persons )
i
- and personal information such as exposure to radiation records.
I,
, c. We do not withhold an NRC employee's name, title, grade, salary,
~
1 present and past position titles and duty station.
i' i
- 7. EXEMPTION 7: Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement i
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would: 1) interfere with enforcement proceedings; 2) deprive a 1 '
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; I 1
- 3) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- 4) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the i
case of a record compiled the course.of a criminal investigation,
^
- or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence p 14-8
)
. . _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ , . _ . - . _ _ . , , _ . , _ _ , _ _ . - . , . _ _ _ ~ _ - . . - _ . . _ _ , . . - _ . . ._
} -
l
- i 4
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential' source; 5) disclose investigative techniques and
{ procedures; or 6) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
i l a. For records to come within this exemption, they must be 4
j " investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes."
J j Law enforcement purposes includes both criminal and civil j enforcement actions. Therefore, records created in I&E in-vestigations of alleged violations at licensee facilities l
would be covered by this exemption. Records created during a routine inspection are not covered by this exemption. How-ever, if the routine inspection does reveal violation for which enforcement action is contemplated, the exemption would cover records created with respect to that enforcement action.
- b. Exemptions 7 (1) and (2) are only applicable during the period I
j the enforcement proceeding is pending. Once enforcement action
!- is taken or the case closed exemptions 7 (1) and (2) are no i
longer applicable.
t l
l c. The guidance provided in the discussion in Exemption 6 is
- applicable, j d. Note should be made that Exemption 7 (3) does not require a j " clearly" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. There i
have, however, been no cases on what the distinction is, if any.
14-9
. . . .- . _ _ _ . = - _ _ - _ _ __ _ . _ .
l 1
T l e. Exemption 7 (4) permits the withholding of a confidential i
s source and other infomation identifying a confidential source. It is important for inspectors to know if the source providing information considers his identity confidential,
- All records identifying a confidential source should indicate such in the document. The names of persons contacted during I routine inspections are not confidential sources and cannot be deleted from inspection reports because, by its nature, ,
the inspection is not for a " law enforcement purpose."
- f. Exemption 7 (5) may occasionally be used by IE. Special procedures developed for specific investigations could be T
l withheld under 7 (5) if disclosure would allow a lawbreaker l
to avoid detection. IE Inspection requirements contained in the IE flanual. are also withheld from disclosure where the re-quirements would constitute " law enforcement material"; that
].
is, if disclosure "would significantly impede enforcement
[of the law] or would have the sole effect of enabling viola-
[ torstoescapedetection"(Hawkesvs. IRS,507F2d481(6th l l Cir 1974)] or "would tend to defeat the purpose of inducing maximum voluntary compliance by revealing classes or types !
of violations which must be left undetected or unremedied be-cause of limited resources." [ Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F2d 639 (5thCir.1973)].
14-10 e
- g. NRC thus far has not utilized Exemption 7 (6). However, FBI routinely uses Exemption 7 (6) to withhold the identity of its agents.
- 8. EXEMPTION 8: This exemption covers records "which relate to information gathered by agencies having supervision over financial institutions."
- a. This exemption is not available to NRC. >
- 9. EXEMPTION 9: " geological and geophysical information and data, 4
including maps, concerning well. . ."
^
- a. NRC has used this exemption only once.
C. SpECIAL PROBLEMS
- 1. Segregation Requirements
- a. The FOIA requires that only the information specifically ex-empted from disclosure be withheld. Non-exempt information in a document must be segregated and this applies to records withheld under all exemptions. In the case of classified material, the Division of Security conducts a line by line declassification review. Staff of the office originating a document has the responsibility to identify and segregate the specific proprietary information,'predecisional advice, opinions, and recommendations, privacy information, and other exempt information which is to be withheld from disclosure. The 14-11
I practice is to bracket in pencil on the text of a copy of l the document, those portions which are to be withheld and
- i indicate in the margin next to the bracketed iten, the ;
! applicable F0IA exemption.
I i 2. Licensee Documents l a. Security plans - these plans are considered proprietary by 10 CFR 2.790(d) and are withheld from disclosure pursuant to j Exemption 4. However, non-exempt portions must b'e segregated.
1
- b. Inventory Discrepancy Records - These records are now considered classified confidential for six months, or longer if cause I
exists,and if actually classified are withheld from disclosure
)
J pursuant to Exemption 1.
i
- c. Operational procedures, pre-operational testing pror.edures, emergency safety procedures, test results, license internal memoranda, and license letters to licensee contractor. Gener-ally, these types of documents will be disclosed to the public.
i 4
However, in certain cases, the infomation in the documents may be exempted from disclosure; e.g. proprietary information.
i
- d. Correspondence between NRC and licensees - This correspondence is disclosed unless it contains proprietary information.
- e. Records or infomation received from licensee representatives cannot be considered " inter- or intra agency memoranda" to which Exemption 5 is applicable.
14-12
I e
- f. Inspection reports and draft inspection reports - Inspec-tion reports are generally released except for proprietary information contained in the reports. Draft of inspection reports are withheld as drafts pursuant to Exemption 5.
D. SPECIAL PRIVACY ACT ISSUES FOR INSPECTORS:
- 1. The Privacy Act requires that every federal agency maintaining a system of records on individuals must publish annually in the Federal Register, a notice which describes the records. To con-stitute a system of records, the documents must normally be re-trieved by reference to a person's name or other identifying par-ticular in the normal course of business. It is not enough that the records are retrievable by reference to an individual's name if the records are not normally accessible in that manner. Thus, a Branch reading file, or other chronological file that is not l
- accessed by name is not a system of records under the Privacy Act.
- 2. As noted previously, uncirculated personal notes are not " agency records." However, if " personal" records are maintained in the same file as, or commingled with agency records, there is a pre-sumption that they are agency records. Also the term " file" as used in the preceding sentence is not limited to the traditional meaning of that word. A randon, stack of agency, as opposed to
" personal," records maintained by a supervisor of any other NRC 14-13
l I
employee in a drawer or file cabinet constitutes a system of records if the documents within the stack are in fact normally retrieved by the use of an individual's name or other identify-ing particular; i.e., a manual search of the stack for notes or records relating to an employee "X" would be sufficient to make the stack a system of records if that is how the stack is normally accessed.
- 3. The Privacy Act provides no exemption for predecisional material contained in a system of records. Therefore, proposed personnel actions in a system of records cannot be withheld.
- 4. Inspectors will find detailed guidance on the Privacy Act in Manual Chapter-0204 - Privacy Act.
IV. SuffiARY .
A. Properly classified infomation and proprietary information which has been justified as such are withheld from public disclosure. Re-stricted data is withheld under Exemption 3. Only advice, opinions, and recommendations in predecisional documents may be withheld unless the documents are drafts or is a legal work product; then the facts in the document may be withheld. If disclosure of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, it may be withheld. Also, investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes may be withheld if they meet the conditions set forth in Exemption 7.
14-14
m
\
B. All information in a document not exempted from disclosure must be disclosed. Therefore, when non-exempt information is in the same document as exempt information, the non-exempt material must be segregated.
C. A group of records normally retrieved by an individual's name or other identifying particular constitutes a system of records which must be noticed in the Federal Register.
D. Personal records are such, only when they (1) have not been circulated nor used by anyone other than the individual's author, (2) are not required to be retained by NRC's regulations or procedures, and
- 3) are discarded or retained at the author's sole discretion.
V. REFERENCES A. The Freedom of Info,mation Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 B. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a C. Public Records, 10 CFR, Part 9 D. Manual Chapter 0211, Public Records E. llanual Chapter 0204, Privacy Act 14-15
I i
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- - er-
J 4
i 4
4 EVALUATIGH OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS i
i
! I. Learning Objective
} To familiarize the inspector with basic performance indicators i
l which will enable him to evaluate, on a uniform basis, the 1
l effectiveness of licensee management during design, construction and operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Facilities.
- II, Introduction i
l This presentation is addressed specifically to Nuclear Power Plants; however, the general principles involved and many of i the specific areas discussed will apply to fuel facilities and l materials licensees.
i A. Basic Program Commitments / Requirements of Management
]
4
- 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion I establishes the l applicant or licensee as responsible for execution l of the quality assurance program, for both operating ,
I plants and those under construction.
1 I
- 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11 requires the applicant / licensee to periodically review the status
- and adequacy of the quality assurance program.
i
)
I
! 15-1
. _ . _ ~ _ _ _ __ _ .__
- 3. Section 6.0 of the Technical Specifications for )
4 operating power plants assigns responsibility for overall facility operation to the Plant Superintendent.
- 4. The PSAR, FSAR and the licnesee's fiRR-approved Quality Assurance Program also establish management responsibilities for proper construction and operation of each fluclear Power Plant or Fuel Facility.
1 For the purpose of this course, the QA program is considered to be the all-encompassing program for fulfilling these legal commitments. This is indicated in the introduction to 10 CFR 50, 1
Appendix B:
"As used in this appendix, ' quality assurance' comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service."
- 8. Basic Functions of !!anacement The basic functions of any management organization may be defined in several ways. One way of breaking down these basic functions is as follows:
- 1. Delegation - lianagement must ensure that responsibility for all necessary activities is assigned to qualified 1
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i subordinates. This should be done in writing. Ideally, i
each subordinate should be able to find,in one location, i
a listing of all activities for which he is responsible.
! 2. Review and Follow-up - Management must continually 1
review the performance of delegated responsibilities.
This can be done in a number of ways:
d i
- a. Personal observation
- b. Feedback from subordinates (as required by management)
! c. Audit programs
- d. Management follow-up system
- e. Committee reccanendations 1
1
- 3. Decision _ Making - Based upon the elements listed above
- under " Review and Follow-up," management makes decisions i
regarding alternative methods, objectives, and schedules, j Decision making also includes the establishment of policy and guidance as needed by subordinates to ef fectively j discharge their assigned responsibilities.
l 1.
C. Illustration of_ Heed
, The inspector may be required during design, construction or operation of a Nuclear Power Plant or Fuel Reprocessing Plant to evaluate management perfarnance with specific attention 15-3 l
4 directed at identifying root causes for poor performance. This evaluation may take one of the following forns:
- 1. An intensified evaluation following a period of observed
!l poor performance by the licensee. .
- 2. Long-term evaluation of licensee management by the inspector during the course of the regular inspection
- program. [
]
- 3. A trend analysis based upon comparisor. of known statistics
! about a particular facility with established norms. This should also be weighed by the inspector's subjective
]
appraisal.
- 4. A comparative study of licensee performance. IE l'anagement j is currently evaluating methods for comparatively ranking l
operating facilities by using information available from :
1 i the flRC's computerized managemer.c information systems.
- 1
! 5 An example of need for intensified evaluation of manat;enent performance is an operating facility at which the following i
j events occurred during a period of about six manths:
I .
r I
- Significant fuel damage tias caused by impropar novament ,
of control rods.
i o
15-4 i
Two adjacent control rods were completely withdrawn during refueling (contrary to Tec.hnical Specificatiens) (with never fuel, inadvertent criticality could have resulted).
Both diesel-generators were inadvertently out of service for over twenty-four hours during power operation.
A through-wall leak was discovered in a core spray pipe weld which had been very recently examined by ultrasonic means and found acceptable.
A roll of duct tape thrown to a worker in the reactor vessel was lost into the vessel and could not be relocated.
A construction facility required utility management attention to
(
the constructor's QA/QC program as brought out by the following observed difficulties:
Excessive number of repetitive deficiency reports.
Lack of cooperation between construction and quality assurance personnel.
Lack of communication and cooperation between the utility QA group and the QA contractor. QA contractor and constructor were from the same company and QA people were not aggressively pursuing quality assurance.
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Inability of utility management to diagnose cause
]
and reluctance of the management to take action when advised of difficulties.
Situations such as the ones described call for perceptive examination to determine where manageir.ent control is inadequate. Inspector attention can then be concentrated in identified weak areas. The threshold at which any weak area is definable and can be attributed to ineffective management prompts a need for an IE meeting with the Licensee corporate management. Examples include:
Identification of inadequate management backup which renders the QA/QC groups impotent.
Indifferent management attitude toward 0A which manifests itself in poor problem definition, improper notification and resolution and inadequate corrective action and follow up.
Conflicts of interest including management's reluctance to take prop & corrective action when faced with additional cost or delay of schedule.
]
l 15-6 l
III. Detailed Discussion i
A. Description of Typical Licensee Organizational Structures (Emphasize management roles)
- 1. Operating Reactor Plant Section 6.0 of the Technical Specifications assigns overall responsibility for facility operation to the Plant Superintendent (actual title may vary). Precise organizational structures will vary; however, Figure III-l shows a typical facility organization, ifote: Dashed lines on this figure indicate common variations.
Most operating plant organizations have many things in comon, since each utility must establish its organizational structure within criteria established by t:RR. Posi tion titles, reporting relationships, and division of responsi-bilities will vary somewhat. The Technical Specifications
- and FSAR for each plant define the organization and responsi-i bilities related to safety of f;uclear Plant operation. The following discussion applies to the typical operating plant organization shown in Figure III-1. For addi tional infor-mation, refer to AtiS! fil8.1-1976 and Standard Technical Specifications.
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- a. The Plant Superintendent is the individual assigned
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responsibility for overall safe operation of the fluclear Plant.
- b. An Assistant Superintendent may be assigned as shown, or may report directly to the Plant Superintendent without having direct line responsibility for plant operation. Some plants, particularly single-unit sites, may not have an Assistant Superintendent.
- c. The Operations Supervisor, responsible for day-to-day operation of the plant, always possesses e Senior Reactor Operator license.
- d. The Technical Supervisor carries responsibility for most technical and engineering activitics performed at the site. This normally includes engineering evaluation of operational and maintenance problems, ini.tiation of facility changes, oversight of the surveillance program (including performance or supervision of more complex tests), and fuel cycle management. Wide variations in the size and capabili-ties of the onsite technical support group will be j
seen, depending upon the size, capability, and proximity of the offsite technical support from other segments t
-)
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of the licensee's organization. In some utilities such as those with only one nuclear site, the bulk of such activity may occur at the site. Some other licensees provide strong technical support fro:n offsite organizations and keep onsite technical support to a minimum.
- e. The Instrument & Controls Supervisor (sometimes called Instrument Engineer) may be found to report to either the Technical Supervisor or the Maintenance Engineer.
He normally has responsibility for the portions of the surveillance program which are related to instrumentation, and for the operability and accuracy of all plant instruments.
- f. A Quality Control Supervisor is normally assigned, reporting to the Plant Superintendent or, at some facilities, to the Technical Supervisor. This position normally has responsibility for day-to-day quality-related activities such as inspection of maintenance hold points and review of purchase documents for proper quality requirements. At some sites this position may report to an offsite individual.
.,. g. An onsite QA Engineer may be assigned, reporting to an offsite manager. If so assigned, the QA Engineer normally holds responsibility for accomplishing a significant portion of the audit program, in ordar to 15-9
raaintain a level of independence, he does not nornally S i
'1
- review or approve plant activities on a routine basis. l l 2. Reactor Plant Under Construction Organization for a ' facility under construction is less '
standardized, and will' vary largely depending upon whether architectural / engineering work, construction and quality control functions are performed by the applicant / utility or by the contractors. Figure III-2 presents a very general representation of the organizational structure l
- forafac$lityunderconstruction.
It should be pointed out that the construction organization presented is that of a utility which contracts out all activities, but retains a surveillance function through its own QA organization. Utilities at the other end of the spectrum, sbch as TVA, Duke and Commonwealth Edison, 1
perform their own A-E and construction activities and furnish their own QC and vendor inspection groups with QA organizations assuming a much broader role.
Whichever is the case, the inspector must be thoroughly familiar with the specific organizations of concern.
.B. Principal Management Support System
- The following are principal support systems utilized 'by manage-ment to assure orderly execution'of the QA program and proper control of safety related activities. These support systems !
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_ _ _. - ,_ . _ _ . _ _ - - . _ . , _ - , . _ .._.._,.,_.__.-_...--_._..-m_
l l
are integral elements of the QA program.
- 1. Audi ts Audits are required by the QA program for operating and construction facilities. Technical Specifications include audit requirements for operating reactors. The licensee 7 and principal contractors responsible for design, construction and operation of a Nuclear Power Plant are required to conduct comprehensive planned and periodic audits to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program and to determine the effectiveness of the program.
, Internal audits provide feedback to management on the effectiveness of the QA program as required by Criteria I and II. The audit program can become something which is done only to satisfy requirements, or it can be used by management as an effective tool in the identification of areas which require attention. Approved procedures are
! necessary to establish criteria for the conduct and documen-l tation of audits and for required corrective actions.
Audits must be performed in accordance with these approved procedures or checklists. An effective program will provide uncomplicated methods of (1) concisely describing each significant audit finding, (2) assigning each finding l
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which requires action for a specific individual for followup, (3) documenting the audit results and corrective actions com-pleted in response to the audit findings, and (4) proper notification to management and NRC (when required).
ANSI N45.2.12 contains requirements for auditing of quality assurance programs for Nuclear Power Plants. ANSI N45.2.23 will contain requirements for qualification of quality assurance program audit personnel for nuclear facilities.
- 2. Review Committees
- a. QA Review Committee - used in some construction organization- to provide comprehensive review of QA activities.
- b. Company Nuclear Review and Audit Committee (actual title may vary) - for operating facilities, provides independent review and audit of activities related to nuclear safety. They report to and advise the Vice President-Operations (title ray vary) regarding their areas of responsibili ty.
The responsibilities assigned to this committee by the Standard Technical Specifications are shown in Figures III-3 and -4, The Company Nuclear Review and Audit Group is intended to provide continued overview of nuclear plant operation on an independent basis. l l
l l
15-12 1
. . - - - - . . -. - -. . . ~ . . . - -
4 4
Most of the reviews performed by this group are ,
, after-the fact; that is, the reviews are per-formed after the related activity has occurred.
Exceptions are items 2 and 3, which require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, and which would be reviewed by CNRAG before submission to NRC. The CNRAG normally has no vested authority other than to take ;
recommendations to the corporate level executive to which it reports.
l-j The audit responsibilities of the CNRAG may be fulfilled by the CNRAG members themselves, by out- ;
side consultants, or by other competent individuals within the licensee's organization. Some licensees maintain the CNRAG audit program completely separate from QA and other audits, while some ccmbine audit programs in varying degrees. Whatever the case, the CNRAG retains responsibility for overview and review of those audit responsibilities assigned to it by the Technical Specifications to assure that they are ;
accomplished.
- c. Facility Review Group - for operating facilities, functions to advise the Plant Superintendent of all matters related to nuclear safety.
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(
The Facility Review Group's normal review res'ponsibil- ~'
ities are shown on Figure III-5. It is composed of those individuals who have the principal responsibility for the various plant activities. The review provided by the FRG is therefore less independent in nature than that provided by the Cf4 RAG. The FRG also meets more
, frequently - depending upon the operating status of i
the facility. Several meetings per month may be re-quired for the group to fulfill its review responsibil-
. i ties . It is not unusual for the FRG to meet on short notice to review an operational problem which Fas occurred and evaluate immediate corrective actions to be taken. As can be seen from Figure III-5, the FRG has broad responsibilities for review of activities
, which are involved with day-to-day plant operation.
In addition to required approval of procedures and other plant activities, the FRG functions as advisor to the Plant Superintendent, who is the chairman. l When used effectively, the FRG can play a very dominant role in facility operation, thereby providing invaluable support to the Plant Superintendent.
- 3. Deviation or fionconformance Reports j Provide for the documentation, review, and timely resolution of discrepant activities, materials, or equipment.
15-14 l
i
l
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I Deviation or nonconformance reports afford licensee ;
management a performance indicator of the organization during design, construction or operation of a Nuclear Power Plant or a Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
These reports, including resolution and follow up, afford inanagement an effective tool with which to evaluate the status and adequacy of the quality assurance program.
i Such data when collectively prepared, compared and analyzed i will identify weaknesses in his program. The licensee may
) elect to perform his own trend analysis based on his own deviation and noncomformance reports.
Some facilities use nonconformance reports to document all discrepant conditions, such as design, construction or QA deficiencies, unusual plant operating events, and equipment problems. Other facilities use a separate method of l documenting problems, sometimes called a " Deviation Report" (Figure III-6). Whichever the case, the system should provide management with a method of documenting each discrepant condition which is observed, assigning responsi -
bility for taking necessary corrective actions, assuring that licensee management and NRC are notified if appropriate, and documenting completed corrective ac'tfons.
Deviation or nonconformance reports documenting conditions
- reportable to the NRC should contain provisions to fulfill
- j. 15-15
~
t QA program requirements for corrective actions and i
reporting. Such provisions, if internally completed as
- part of the " Loop Closing" for correction of discrepant
- problems, will assure an adequate response to the NRC.
4 Action Item Follow Up Sy: tem >
During design, construction or operation, a Nuclear Power ,
Plant will have a large number of tasks in various stages i
of review or accomplishment. These may include (1) l comitments made to NRC; (2) actions being taken in response to identified noncompliance; (3) corrective actions in response to events which have occurred in connection 4 with plant design, construction or operation; (4) actions requested by flRC (e.g. , IE Bulletin responses or answers to correspondence from flRR); (5) corrective actions related to internal audit findings; (6) licensee management requests; ,
(7) vendor-identified equipment problems; and (3) other items of various types. If management does not have an effective method of assigning responsibility and completion dates for
- such items and providing follow up until they are completed, it is likely -that some of them will be overlooked or will not be completed within the appropriate tirre frame.
l Many facilities use a follow up system administered by the L administrative assistant or other member of the plant staff.
i
)
15-16
_ . , _.---._m_. --.,4. , .y, - - , -
y _._g- , - - - - . < - - . . . . + -- .# -,.. . - -.. . -.-_.-,- , . , ,.-.,
This system should provide management a method for (1) identifying required actions; (2) assigning specific responsibility and complotion date for each item; (3) monitoring status and; (4) documenting completion.
A follow up form used by one facility is shown in Figure III-7. The effective use of such a system can relieve management of many missed commitments or overdue actions, and will also require much less direct manage-ment involvement in following up on the resolution of individual items.
C. Measurement of Manacement Effectiveness s
- 1. Key Indicators for Evaluation The following are key indicators which will provide a valid basis for the evaluation of licensee management effectiveness. Each of these areas must be evaluated; a simple "yes" or "no" answer will not suffice. The intent is not to present an inspection plan, but to identify significant aspects of management performance which should be borne in mind during the conduct of the regular inspection program.
. Responsibilities
- 1) Are responsibilities of management and subordinates clearly defined?
15-17 y g n -
7-,
- , , , , --~py--- -,,- g--- a -a,-
Experience has shown that any complex operation -
fucntions more smoothly when responsibilities 4
I for all related activities are assigned to specific individuals. In order to assure satisfactory accomplishment of an activity, the activity must be specifically assigned to an individual as a respons ibili ty. The licensee's internal manage-ment controls should therefore assure that specific responsibility (e.g., by job title) is assigned for each identified aspect or function of facility activi ty.
To assure clarity, particularly as personnel changes occur within the organization, such assignment of i
responsibilities should always be done in writing.
Unless a division of responsibility is obvious or is specified, responsibility for each item or area of activity should be assigned to only one individual.
Authority commensurate with the responsibility must always be given an individual, otherwise the individual lacks power to fulfill assigned responsibili ty.
l When verifying or evaluating the assignment of responsibilities during an inspection, the inspector should start with the basic or underlying require-ments, such as the Technical Specifications, Quality' .
~
15-18
- Assurance program, FSAR, or other governing l
document, and assure that fulfillment is assured by specific assignment of responsibility to an individual in implementing documents such L
as Administrative Procedures.
Although not a Regulatory requirement and not available at all facilities, a compilation of each individual's responsibilities in one document is very helpful. A particular individual in the facility organization maybe assigned responsibility for a large number of varied activities by various unrelated administrative procedures, QA procedures, and the like. Unless the individual can turn to l one location and find a listing of all his responsi-bilities, he may not be aware of them at all times.
This is particularly true when an individual is assigned to a new position. Such a compilation also permits the individual-to periodically review his responsibilities and evaluate his performance in relation to them.
- 2) .Do management and subordinates appear to completely understand their responsibilities?
15-19 I
.-. . . - . - = - - _ - - _ -
. -- = . .____ __ . --
To determine whether individuals in responsible positions understand their responsibilities, )
there are bvo approaches which may be used. One is to interview the individual and ascertain from the discussion whether he understands specific responsibilities which the inspector has preselected.
The other approach is to review the fulfillment of the individual's responsibilities. If a function for which the individual is responsible is being accomplished regularly and proficiently, the inspector should be able to assume that he has an appropriate understanding of this responsibility.
- 3) Are subordinates held accountable for assigned 1
responsibili ties?
The need for accountability will vary widely depending upon the type of activity involved and the amount of individual responsibility demonstrated by subordinates (little accountability may be re-quired for a well motivated individual). In general, however, when management has delegated a particular responsibility in writing to a subordinate, and when the subordinate appears to understand the responsi-bility, it still cannot always be assumed that the k
15-20
1 required action will proceed automatically. An i
effective manager will be aware of the progress or status of the required action, and will call the subordinate to task if the responsibility is not being fulfilled effectively. If the inspector observes situations wherein management appears to
, condone or ignore sloppy or ineffective fulfillment i
j of responsibilities, more significant problems should be suspected.
- 4) Are interfacing activities betweeh different organizational divisions clearly defined?
In any organization involving operation of con-struction of a complex and sophisticated facility, many areas of interface will exist between different groups and organizations involved in the various aspects of the . activities. For example, design
- matters may involve several different groups within the licensee's organization as well as vendor, constructor, and nuclear steam system supplier groups.
! Complex organizations increase departmental inter-I facing problems. Where complexity of organization is necessary, it is essential that interfacing duties are clearly outlined. Procedures'which define boundaries of authority and responsibility -
- i. 15-21 1
-m_, p ,.- ~ ___ _ _ _ , - - _
-3,_ .. m -,, ,. . _ . . , _ , , ._.m .,m . _. - _ , . , _ - , - . ,.m , ,,
reduce administrative problems. When specific interdepartmental responsibilities are realistic, confusion and redundancy are minimized and efficiency is increased.
- b. Management Attitude
- 1) Does management take the initiative regarding safety issues or wait for expression of NRC concern?
Effective management will react responsibly to identified safety concerns, and will initiate corrective actions without waiting for an expression of concern by NRC. In such cases significant safety matters may frequently be found to have been largely corrected when the inspector first learns of the problem. On the other hand, if the inspector learns of valid safety concerns some time after their initial identification and finds that unjustified delay in corrective actions is occurring, a need for stronger management is indicated. An effective manager will not try to use tne NRC as an excuse to initiate corrective action - that is, he will not give subordinates the impression that "We're only doing this because the NRC says we have to,"
but will assign tasks to subordinates on his own .
)
ini tia tive.
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. .- --- _. . - - -= . _. . - - . - . .- - -- . _ - .
- 2) Does management support the QA/QC program (as r
evidenced by the facility's image of. the QA/QC organization)? '
I If licensee management is giving proper support !
i and recognition to the QA/QC program this will 4
be manifested in respect for QA/QC by those I
- performing quality-related activities. The reasons for this include the following: (1) management support will evidence itself in the assignment of well-qualified individuals to the 1 QA/QC effort; (2) management attitude will add I credence and support to QA/QC inspector findings i
l by requiring responsible corrective actions; and (3) management will convey to subordinates an attitude that the QA/QC program is not a hindrance i
but a tool to determine, control, and document the i
proper quality level of the job, whether it be i
construction or operation of a nuclear facility.
l 3) Does (corporate) management provide or make available necessary materials and qualified
- personnel?
1 i Effective corporate and facility management will i
recognize valid needs for personnel and materjals to support the QA/QC program. If the QA/QC program i
- 15-23
-_ . . _ _ - _ _ . _ , . . ~ _ . , _ . . - . _ _ _ . . _ , _ _ . , . _ _ . _ . . . - , _ . _, , . _ _ . . . . - . _.. .. _ _ _ _ _ ., _.- _., _ _.,
! is ineffective because of untrained or unqualified
]
personnel assigned to the program, or because sufficient personnel have not been assigned and adequate consultant services are not made available,
! management is either unaware of the situation (poor feedback) or is not evidencing an appropriate attitude toward quality-related activities.
4 Situations have been observed wherein site per-sonnel were aware of personnel shortages in tne QA/QC organization but could not obtain additional
- support from corporate management. Addi tional l support in problem diagnosis and solving and design change review may be in the form of i
j consulting services or utilization of special engineering staffs. Similar situations can occur with respect to material support - e.g. , inadequate facilities for the conduct of required training programs. The inspector should be alert for such situations, but must also be careful to avoid fighting the site's battles with the corporate
- office on a regular basis, since this could detract ,
4 from his effectiveness.
T
- 4) Is ranagement responsive to NRC concerns and noncomoliance items?
i j
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, Management responsiveness to NRC concerns and noncompliance items can best be judged by reviewing the thoroughness of actions taken in response to expressed concerns. Effective manage-ment will take prompt and thorough actions to correct identified problems. These actions will not be directed at correcting symptoms but will treat the root causes of the problem, not only in i the area identified, but in other closely related areas. For example, proper treatment of a valve operator problem would include not only correcting the observed malfunction and testing for proper operability, but also checking for possible similar problens with other valves of the same type, unless the problem is clearly related to only the one component. Similarly, actions related to identified quality control problens should aim not only at correcting the specific problem, but also at determining whether a weakness in the QA program permitted the problem to occur in the first place.
- 5) Does management require timely and thorough corrective actions for CDil's or Reportable Occurrences?
Actions in this area are somewhat related to those discussed in the previous paragraph. The key d
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1-T
')
question again is whether corrective actions are directed only at the symptoms or at the particular problem observed, or whether the root causes of the resportable occurrences are being treated to prevent recurrence. If a diesel-gener-ator fails to start three times during a short period of time, on if frequent cases of poor welding are observed, one would suspect that corrective actions are not being directed at the root causes.
- 6) Does management require compliance with approved procedures?
It is imperative in the operation or construction of a nuclear facility that management insist upon compliance with approved procedures. A poor attitude with respect to procedure compliance at the lower echelons is usually indicative of inadequate concern or attention to this point by licensee management.
Two other factors can also prove detrimental to the general facility attitude- toward procedures. One factor is excessive detail in procedures which makes their precise execution difficult under some condi tions . Procedures must, of course, be
)
15-26
I l
l sufficiently specific to assure that the desired
, action is accomplished in the desired manner; the inspector should be alert, however, for unnecessary 4
details . The other factor which proves detrimental to procedure compliance is undue difficulty in obtaining approval for a temporary change to an approved procedure when valid reasons exist. If well-written procedures are provided and a reasonable and effective system is established to provide for !
temporary changes when needed, procedural compliance will normally follow if an appropriate management attitude is demonstrated.
- c. Awareness - Communications
- 1) Is management kept adequately informed by subordinates (good management will require this)?
An effective manager will require subordinates to keep him informed on problems, actions being
, taken to correct them, and the status of other current issues and activities.
3
- 2) Is management aware of current issues and problems?
An effective manager will be aware of key issues of current intere:;t or importance. While he
, 15-27
. _ _ _ , - . . , n_.------._ _ _ _ ,
i l
l would not normally be expected to be familiar
)
with the details of all activities, he should be aware of the status of important issues and should know to whom the responsibility for detailed follow-through has been assigned. He will maintain his awareness of current activities by requiring subordinates to keep him informed, but will also supplement this by making personal on-the-job observations a part of his routine. The management support systems described in section III.B.
if used effectively, will also help to increase management awareness of current activities.
- 3) Ar:> subordinates adequately informed by management?
In order to allow subordinates to function effectively, a manager must exercise as much care in communicating downward as he expects from subordinates in their feedback to him.
These downward communications, which in some cases should be in writing, may be sub-divided as follows:
Objectives - The manager is the one who establishes objectives for the subordinate to meet. Obviously, the subordinate will
)
15-28
be able to meet objectives only when they are established and communicated to him.
Pol 1cy - Policy generally refers to approved methods and procedures for accomplishing the defined objectives. Subordinates should be allowed as much personal freedom and initiative as possible within the scope of established policies.
Specific information - This refers to general information received by management, whether from subordinates, higher management positions, or outside organizations. It is imperative that the manager keep his. subordinates informed 1
on information he receives related to their i
responsibilities, just as it is important for subordinates to provide him the proper
- feedback described in c.1) above.
I d. Overall Management Performance
- 1) Is an adequate indoctrination and training program provided? Is it current?
Indoctrination and training are important to any organization; this becomes even more important when complex and sophisticated operations like 15-29
. - , _ , - _ - . _ m. . -- _ - _ - - - . _.-__.-
r
i those involved in a nuclear plant are concerned.
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An effective management organization will recognize ,
the value of good training programs and will pro-vide them with necessary support in the way of
, qualified training personnel, facilities, and administrative support. A training program conducted in cramped, uncomfortable, or poorly lighted spaces will naturally be less effective than could otherwise be expected. Another significant aspect of management support for training is that of requiring participation by those who are to be trained. In most organizations the training personnel do not have direct control of those to whom their training services are being provided, and in the absence of strong management support, production or operational activities will frequently take precedence over training activities.
Some of the types of training provided at a nuclear i
power facility are:
Quality assurance program training -- No purpose is served by the . careful writing and approval of QA procedures if all personneI who use the procedures are not familiar with their requirements. This applies to those who perform quality-related activities as well
)
i h
15-30
- . . -=-. . - . - .- . __ .--
as to the QA/QC personnel who inspect or l review their work.
Licensed operator training -- Most licensees will begin training prospective reactor
. operators at least two years before the '
expected fuel loading date. This is a pro-
! gram which normally includes all areas related to reactor plant operation, time at a nuclear
- power plant simulator, and perhaps some time at another nuclear facility. The intent is to prepare the prospective operators for NRC operator licensing exams. After licensing, ,
j all licensed operators are required by 10 CFR 55' J
to participate in a continuing training program ,
j which provides a review of related information
< over a period of not more than two years. The i
program also includes an annual examination, i
annual evaluation of each operator by management, and continuing review of significant operating problems and changes in facility procedures f and design.
Other operator training -- Although not required :
to take NRC license exams, plant auxiliary i
15-31 a
I
-- - - + , - . - -e- . ..-- - ym... . - , - - -
operators must be knowledgeable in their
]
jobs if the plant is operate smoothly and effectively.
QA/QC inspection personnel -- These personnel who perform audit, surveillance and inspection functions must be properly trained and indoc-trinated in accordance with the applicable program prior to the start of construction activi ties . Inspectors, auditors, etc. must be qualified and certified in accordance with applicable codes.
Craft skills -- Those performing maintenance, repair, or construction activities must be trained on a continuing basis to assure that sufficient qualified personnel are maintained to perform all necessary types of work. As in the other training areas, personnel changes and turnovar must be kept in mind.
l Other job-related training -- Training must be provided to all categories on a continuing basis to assure that personnel stay current and proficient in their own areas of work, whether it be administrative, engineering, 15-32
supervisory, or technical. Almost all employees will appreciate and participate actively in a training program if it is effectively presented and includes infor-mation which will enhance performance of .
the job.
Radiation Protection Training -- for an operating plant, all persons who work at the facility should be provided some degree of train 1ng in radiation protection. The intensity of this training will vary with the type of work performed - administrative personnel will of course require less training than operating or maintenance personnel.
Special training may be in order during periods when a particular job calls for
)
working in unusually high radiation areas i
l or areas which require respiratory protection.
l 4
- 2) Is management overburdened with detail?
4 l Management must give first attention to overall 1
4 execution of the principal mission, whether it be j safe operation or quality construction of the
! nuclear facility. It must be concerned with j establishing the objectives, policies, and l 15-33
1 b
constructive atmosphere which will provide for effective completion of assignments by subordinates, l Although an effective manager will give frequent attention to detail in various areas in order to I
monitor progress and effectiveness, he will not do this to the point of neglecting important issues i
i or stifling the initiative of subordinates. Manage-ment will more effectively fulfill its objectives if ample authority is delegated to each subordinate to make all decisions of which the inidividual is 1
capable in light of his experience, knowledge, and i responsibili ties. '
- 3) Does management make adequate independent .
4 observations? )
As just discussed, management must not become
- preoccupied in details to the point of neglecting J
important aspects of its overall program. In order l to have first-hand knowledge of how activities are I
i progressing, however, an effective manager will 4
include some on-the-job observations in his standard
- routine. This precludes his complete reliance upon i
the evaluations and interpretations of others to 3
keep him informed as to the, status and progress of I
activi ties. Subordinates will also be more attentive l 15-34 l
l
- . . _ - .. _ . = .- - . - _ _ . -. .. - . - - -
to significant activities if their superior makes a habit of personally observing their
, progress.
1 4) Is their visibility to subordinate working personnel adequate?
In the course of personally observing activities i in progress, management will be seen by those who are doing the work. This imparts to those doing the work a feeling that management is aware of
, their efforts and interested in their welfare. Any person will give better performance when he feels that his work is being noticed and appreciated. .
Occasional on-the-job presence also provides opportunity for informal feedback to management on the progrest of the job, special problems i experienced, and occupational conditions which cay i i
j affect work performance.
- 5) Do the QA Committee, Facility Review Group and/or
- Company fluclear Review and Audit Group function
- effectively (as measured against their assigned l responsibilities)?
- These comittees are constituted to (1) relieve l! management of many review details for which it would otherwise be responsible and (2) give l
l 15-35
.. ~. - - . , - -. . - . ..-.- .-_ - - . . _ . , - , - . . - - . . . - , - , . . . . - - - , - ., , - . -
. - . . --_ , _- . = - - . .
i-a management the advantage of a diverse assortment of backgrounds, experience, and expertise possessed by those composing the committees. A manager who recognizes the usefulness of the committees will 1
assign significant activities to them for review j and give strong weight to their recommendations.
Although Technical Specifications give fairly specific review requirements for the Facility Review Group and the Company Nuclear Review and Audit Group, ,
i significant variations can be seen in the thoroughness of review and the strength of the role the committees assume relative to the nuclear facility. The QA
! Committee is less rigidly defired, and its effective-i j ness can vary more widely depending largely upon the i )
! management support it receives and the emphasis given to its findings.
l 6) Does the licensee maintain a good relationship
^[
' with the press? How does their public image
- rate?
j Electric uti.lities are in the forefront of news.
1 I coverage in this age of increasing energy demand j and escalating costs. Most utilities today realize l that an open and forthright posture in' dealing with l .e-
)
15-36 i
l-l l
. , _ . = ._. . _ _ . . . - _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ . - . - _ , , _ _ _ _ . .
i ,
the public and the press prove beneficial in the long run by building a reputation of credibility.
- A management organization which has close ties with l the news media normally is one which is proud of its performance and has little reason not to be candid.
3 1 1 4
. 2. Trend Analysis 4
h-Trend analysis involves the evaluation of a licensee's performance by comparing statistical data for the facility
]
with the same data for a number of other facilities.
For comparative purposes, the most meaningful data ;
is that derived from identical deficiencies at other j j-f
(
facilities in the same stage of operation or construction. ,
l Although results of such comparisons may not represent overall trends for a facility, significant variations from average may be symptomatic of poor performance.
It is recommended that project inspectors perform j an occasional trend analysis .for their facilities to
[ look for trends which are indicative of poor performance.
Parameters which may be evaluated are as follows:
1 4
i
- a. CDR's/LER' l
- 1) Based on months of construction or operation, how does frequency compare with the average?
4 ,
I
}
l 4 15-37
_J---..-,._,-.---,.-_--,--.-
Frequency of occurrence is meaningful on both )
ends of the scale. A low frequency may indicate inability or reluctance to identify or intent to
" play down" discrepant activities.
t
$ 2) Is final report frequently late, inadequate?
Frequent inadequacy of response or tardiness in reporting reflects the utility's attitude. The evaluating engineer or other responsible individual i
is,not correctly motivated or informed. The problem evaluation function may be incorrectly assigned.
4.
4,
- 3) If repetitiveness exists, what does.it indicate?
x
)
- Repetitiveness.is an indication of inability to -
i 4 correct substandard activities or situations. Or, it could indicate reluctance to terminate a process in order to take corrective measures. Exploration i of root cause may reveal poor communications, lack of cooperation, poor management, etc.
II
, b. Enforcement History 1
- 1) Based on mandays of. inspection..how does frequency
- compare with average?
4
\
.15-381
Comparison of like data derived from comparable l
facilities produces a yardstick for measurement j- of performance in this area. Such data, properly j weighted to offset or define any abnormalities, is j a useful tool in revealing trends which are indicative <
of poor performance.
i
- 2) Is the licensee responsive?
Lack of responsiveness may be indicative of the utility being poorly informed in regard to reporting requirements. However, once reporting requirements have been clearly explained to the utility, the thoroughness with which a utility responds is directly related to management effectiveness.
] 3) Are enforcement items of a repetitive nature?
Repetitiveness of enforcement action denotes ineffectiveness of proper corrective action. The recurrence of incidents is manifested in an impotent -
OA program or organization. Effectiveness in corrective action is-directly related to a determined management i
to stand behind a QA organization. '
l i
15-39 l l
E 9
- c. Unresolved Items
) ;
- 1) Based on mandays of inspection, how does the frequency compare with the average?
r t
I Unresolved items represent incompleteness and/or lack of follow through required by QC. Organizational weaknesses should be explored.
- 2) Are responses timely? Are the unresolved items I
carried over for an excessive period of time?
Untimely response, which is not justified by the 4
nature of the activity, should be prime items for i
i escalation to Deviation or Item of Noncompliance j
l categories. Inspectors should emphasize timely corrective of unresolved items and possibility of l escalation which can result from improper resolution 4
of these items.
- 3) Are unresolved items repetitive or frequently escalated?
Unresolved items of repetitive nature or which are frequently escalated demonstrate ineffective t
management or lack of management involvement.
I i
l l
,. 1
, )
! 15-40 l
l
~ -
,, , , ---yi
.r 7TV - 4' -1' --W-" - -n* * *
- W *~ T f h7'W*'"-'---W- 'w-W-"" V"
~ . . . - . .
3.
~
I
- d. Operating Plant Performance Parameters (availability, load factor, effluent releases, personnel exposure history)
Low plant availability may be indicative of manage-ment inability to maintain the facility in peak l
operating condition through inattention to operating parameters or ineffective utilization of outage time to overhaul substandard systems or components.
Frequent personnel overexposure is indicative of inadequate controls directly related to poor management.
- . e, Inspector's Evaluation Subjective appraisal of available information must be used to adjust statistical data which can otherwise j be misleading. Conversely, the responsible inspector must interpret data to identify inadequate of ineffective
~
]
management. By' examination of these indicators, the
$ Principal Inspector must determine the threshold at which I&E will meet with utility corporate management i to discuss management performance. Factors which may be included in this evaluation are:
i i
15-41
+ +-, - e~- a- t-r , - ., - .--.-p. w ,.-.+ ., f , , .w, y >-w- < =w - ew - we- av,c-wny-- -
ve - --, w- ~ +
"N
?
- 1) Response to Enforcement Action (timeliness, thoroughness)
- 2) Effectiveness of corrective actions (CDN's, Reportable occurrences)
- 3. Comparative Licensee Performance Evaluation IE management is currently exploring possible methods of comparatively evaluating performance of operating 1
reactor faciltiies, based upon statistical information available from the NRC's computerized management infor-mation systems.
IV. Summary Licensee management effectivesness may be evaluated by a systematic examination of basic performance indicators. Investigation on a uniform basis should identify root causes of poor performance.
Inspector attention can then be concentrated in these identified weak areas. Licensee management evaluations may be augmented by the use of trend analysis techniques.
V. References A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B' 4
B. Standard Technical Specifications, Section 6.0 i
I 15-42
. , , . _ . . _ , , . . _ . - - , , , - - , . ~ _ ~ _ . . , _ . , -
i l
)
i C. PSAR/FSAR D. Licensee Quality Assurance Procrams 1
l 15-43 1
l , -- .- - , _ _ _ - _ _ _
1 I
TYPICAL FACILITY ORGANIZATI0ft 4 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Facility Plant Off-Site
- jQW Superintendent Man er l
l I
- p_ - _. -
I Assistant 3 I I Superintendent I I L J g l
l l l ~~----_3 (J---- ,
i I I I l t 1 y,
I
,. - .L___ ,
i i Quality I Quality I m Adm Operations Maintenance Technical Control 8 8 Assistant Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor 't_AssuranceE,n,qi_n e,ey, _,j Mechanical Quality i Clerical Shift -
Maintenance - Nuclear Control Staff ,
Supervisors Foreman Engineers Staff Electrical -
m Licensed .- Maintenance Plant g Goerators 8 Foreman Engineers ,
A I 8
~
' Indicates 1 7 Non-Licensed l- Instrument --
Chemistry- - - - ~ ' Common
~
Operators & Controls Rad Prot. Variations i Sonervisor Froi naer j
i I
TYPICAL ORGANIZATION - REACTOR CONSTRJJCTION PRESIDENT
- SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT POWER
, PRODUCTION MANAGER i i, QA ftVCLEAR PROJECT QA ,
- MArtsirn MAtlAGER -
T D PROJ. QA ENGR.
ENGINEERING SITE GENERAb 0FFICE EllG SPECIALISTE STAFF GA ENGINEERS QA ENGINEERS & CONSULTANTS
- r ,
3 II _
I l C0ftSTRUCTION A-E NSSS VENDOR M0fogfy)((y0R
,i I r i i i i Es 15 PROJECT QA PROJECT QA CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION MANAGER MANAGER MAtlAGER MANAGER SUPERINTENDENT 0A MANAGER
~
~
fu e
I
1 i COMPANY NUCLEAR REVIEW AND AUDIT GROUP - REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES:
- 1. SAFETY EVALUATIONS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50.59 FOR FACILITY CHANGES, PROCEDURE CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS.
I
- 2. PR0e0 SED 50.59 CHANGES WHICH INVOLVE UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS.
- 3. PROPOSED CHANGES TO IECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
4.. N0bCOMPLIANCE.
[ 5.
6.
SIGNIFICANT OPERATING ABNORMALITIES.
EVENTS REQUIRING 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO NRC.
4
- 7. UNANTICIPATED DESIGN DEFICIENCIES.
- 8. FACILITY REVIEW GROUP REPORTS AND MEETING MINUTES.
4 1
a -
COMPANY NUCLEAR REVIEW AND AUDIT GROUP - AUDIT RESPONSIBILITIES (WITH REQUIRED FREQUENCY):
2
< 1. CONFORMANCE OF OPERATION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (12 MONTHS).
! 2. PERFORMANCE AND TRAINING OF FACILITY STAFF (12 MONTHS).
l 3. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR OPERATING PROBLEMS (6 MONTHS).
- 4. EFFECTIVENESS OF QUALITY ASSU..ANCE PROGRAM (24 MONTHS).
a .
- 5. FACILITY. EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (24 MONTHS).
, _I.
! 6. FACILITY SECURITY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (24 MONTHS).
- 7. OTHER AREAS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE BY THE VICE PRESIDENT - OPERATIONS.
i i
i C m
l I:
1 l
4
FACILITY REVIEW GROUP MEMBERSHIP:
PLANT SUPERINTENDENT (CHAIRMAN) (ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT) 9PERATIONS SUPERVISOR TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR INSTRUMENT & CONTROLS SUPERVISOR PLANT NUCLEAR ENGINEER CHEMISTRY / RAD PROTECTION ENGINEER FACILITY REVIEW GROUP - REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES:
i
- 1. PROCEDURES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SAFETY.
[ 2. PROPOSED TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS.
l 3. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
fl . PROPOSED PLANT MODIFICATIONS.
- 5. NONCOMPLIANCE.
- 6. EVENTS REQUIRING 211 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO NRC.
- 7. FACILITY OPERATION (TO DETECT POSSIBLE SAFETY PROBLEMS).
- 8. SECURITY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES.
i 3 9. EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES.
5 1 10. OTHER MATTERS AS REQUESTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMPANY NUCLEAR REVIEW AND AUDIT GROUP.
DEVIATION REPORT DV A NO.
STA UNIT YEAR NO.
D- - - -
ART ilit TLE OF DEvlAT40N OCCU PAf D DATE It MC SY5ftM AFFECTED PLAN 1 CONDlIlONS Il 5I A NG MODf Pwn f wwT)
C
, TOAD (Mwt) Vf5 NO OtiCRiPi40N OF tvlNT DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE
-OTHER APPLICABLE INFORMATION EQUIPMENT YE5 OR NO. wt NO.
FAILUlt! C NO fES*CNsistt surrevison DATE ART 2 l OPERATING ENGINEERS COMMENTS TYPE OF DEVIATION SAFETY-EVENT OF POTENTI AL TECH SPEC NON REPCRTABLE ANf4UAL RELATEO REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE PLIBLIC INTEREST VIOLATION OCCURRENCE REPORTING *R I S S'J EC 14 CAY 30 DAY REPORTABLE CCCURRENCE ACTION ITEM NO. PROMPT ON SITE NOTIFICATION NUMBER g, , T6TLE DATE TIM TITLE CATE TIM 24 HOUR NRC NOTIFICATION PROMPT OFF SITE NOTIFICATICN TPH REGION DATE TIME T I TL E DATE TIM TGJ REGION & EOL CATE TIME TITLE DATE TIM REVIEW AND COMPLETED -
ACCEPTANCE BY ST2.710N JEviEn AS REOulRED DATE
. RESOLUTION APPROVEC AND 15-55 Ftr.URE Il!-6 AUTHOR 12E3 FOR CI STRI BUTION STAllCN S UP t o t N1.%t N T DAff