ML20212J838

Pilot Program:Nrc Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual.Public Protective Actions - Predetermined Criteria and Initial Actions

ML20212J838
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/28/1987
From:	Giitter J, Hively L, Martin J, Mckenna T, Chris Miller, Sharpe R, Watkins R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
References
NUREG-1210, NUREG-1210-V04, NUREG-1210-V4, NUDOCS 8703090147
Download: ML20212J838 (117)

Text

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5 NUREG-1210 Vol. 4 Pilot Progra_m: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual Public Protective Actions - Predetermined Criteria and initial Actions

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Office of Inspection and Enforcement J. A. Martin, Jr., T. J. McKenna, C. W. Miller, L. M. Hively, R. W. Sharpe, J. G. Glitter, R. M. Watkins p** "*%,

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NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.

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e NUREG-1210 Vol. 4

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Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual Public Protective Actions - Predetermined Criteria and initial Actions Manuscript Completed: October 1986 Date Published: February 1987 J. A. Martin, Jr., T. J. McKenna, C. W. Miller *, L. M. Hively*,

R. W. Sharpe*, J. G. Giitter, R. M. Watkins*

' Oak Ridge National Laboratory Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 p, ....

% f/

FOREWORD Over the past few years the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), Division cf Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, has undertaken a program to upgrade the NRC capabilities to respond to severe reactor accidents. As part of this effort, basic training sessions have been presented by IE staff to all rssponse personnel (Headquarters and regions). Through the process of providing this training a standard student text has evolved.

This pilot training manual has been written to fill the need for a general text en NRC response to reactor accidents. The manual is intended to be the foundation for a course for all NRC response personnel.

This set of manuals is not licensing guidance. Rather, it is designed to pre-sent to NRC personnel the best understanding of response planning for a serious reactor accident.

These draft manuals are intended to change over time as NRC staff continues to gain experience. Suggestions are requested and should be sent to the Incident Response Branch.

M h -

Edward . Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i

PREFAG Public Protective Actions--Predetermined Criteria and Initial Actions is the fourth in a series of volumes that collectively summarise the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) emergency resonse during severe power reactor accidents and provide necessary background information. This volume reviews pubile protective action criteria and obj ectives, their bases and implementation, and.the expected public response. Other volumes in the series are:

• Volume 1 -- Overview and S--- -rv of Ma ior Points t

• Volume 2 -- Severe Emactor Accident Overview

• Volume 3 -- Resnonne of Licenses and State and Local Officials

• Volume 5 -- U. S. Nuc l e a r Re aula t ory Ca==lasion Rannonne Each volume serves, respectively, as the text for a course of instruction in a series of courses for NRC response personnel. These materials do A21 Provide guidance or license requirements for NRC licensees. T%e volumes have been organized into these training modules to accommodate the scheduling and duty needs of participating NRC staff. Each volume is accompanied by an appendix of slides that can be used to present this material. The slides are called out in the text.

4 iii i

a. _-. . _ . . . . . - .. _ . _ - - , - _ . _ - - . . _ . , - - -- . - - - , - . ,.-___ ,._,,--

00fGENTS PREFAG . . ............................. 111 LIST OF FIGURES ........................... v11 LIST OF TABLES . ........................... ix LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS FOR VOLUBES 1-5 . . . . . . .. . . . xi

1. OBJECTIVES . ........................... 1

2. FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC PROIECTIVE ACTION OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 NATURE OF THE IBREAT . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2 BASIC RADIATION PR&TECTION OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 PRINCIPAL SOURG OF RADIATION DOSE CAUSING EARLY HEALTH EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. POTENTIAL PROTECTIVE ACTIONS . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1 EVACUATION ......................... 17 3.2 SHELTERING ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.3 IMPROVISED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.4 USE OF POTASSIUM IODIDE (KI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.5 OfrHER PR&rECTIVE ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

' 3.6 DIRECTION OF PROTECTIVE ACTION COVERAGE , . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.7 BASES FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4. SEVERE ACCIDENT PRO 1ECTIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.1 SEVERE ACCIDENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2 BASIC GUIDANG . ................. . . . . . 32 l 4.3 BENEFITS OF SEVERE ACCIDENT PR&rECTIVE ACTION GUIDANG .............. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5. IMPLEMENTATION . .... ................. . . . . 43 5.1 ENTRAPMENT SENARIOS .................... 43 5.2 PUBLIC RESPONSE . ...................... 43 5.3 EVACUATION RISES . ..................... 46 5.4 PUBLIC BEHAVIOR DURING EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.5 ROLE OF THE NUEEAR REGULATORY CDMMISSION . . . . . . . . . . 51

6. MAJOR POINTS . ..... ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 l APPENDIX A. SLIDES RELATING TO VOLUME 4 0F THE SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL . . . . . . . 55 l

V

LIST OF FIGURES I

Finnre la1R 2.1 Dose calculations for severe LWR sealdent scenarios (example from NUREG-1062) .. .............. 10 4

2.2 General relationship of dose rate and distance for a ground-level atmospheric release ............. 15 3.1 Percent of thyroid blocking afforded by 100 mg of I stableiodineasafunctionoftimeofggginistration I . .. ..... 26 before or af ter a 1 pCi slag intake of

==d 4.1 Flow chart of the Criteria for Frenaration Evaluation of Radiolonical R==rmancy Esanonne Plans and Prenaredness in Sunnart of Nuclear Power Plants j

.... . .. ................ 34 in NUREG-0654

................ 35 4.2 Typical keyhole . .. ...

4.3 Conditional probabilities of various numbers of acute fatalities, assuming the largest reactor accident, early evacuation of small areas, and a slow relocation from highly contaminated areas . .............. 40 5.1 Number of people within 1 and 5 miles of 111 nuclear power plants, actual or proposed in 1979 . . . . . . . . . . 47 i

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, _ . . _ - - _ - , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _ . - , , . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ . . . _ _ _ _ ,__,_m,.. ..__ _

)

LIST OF TABLES East f Inhh t

2.1 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Food and Drug

, 6 Administration (FDA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) ....

2.2 Average individual risk of early fatality vs distance

........... 13 from the reactor for a PWR 1A release 3.1 Factors by which radionuclide exposure may be reduced by sheltering for different types of shelters and 21 pathways of exposure . ...................

3.2 Respiratory protection provided by common household and personal items against aerosols of 1- to 5 pa particle size . ..... ................. 24 Summary of NUREG-0654 protective action guidance . ..... 33 4.1 4.2 EPA's recommended protective actions to reduce whole body and thyroid dose from exposure to a gaseous plume . .. 38 Examples of large-scale evacuations ............ 44 5.1 1

Public response to nuclear-related incidents . ....... 49 5.2 I

t I

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' LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISNS FOR VOLUES 1-5 ALARA As low as reasonably achievable AMS Aerial Measurements System (s)

ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ASC Administrative Support Coordinator AST Administrative Support Team BT Base Team (NRC Regional Of fice) l j BWR Boiling Water Reactor CDPA Civil Defense Preparedness Agency CFA Cognizant Federal Agency CFR Code of Federal Regulations CL Congressional Liaison CRD Control rod drive CRDES Control rod drive hydraulic system CSF Critical Safety Function DBA Design Basis Accident DOC Department of Commerce, U.S.

DOD Department of Defense. U.S.

DOE Department of Energy. U.S.

DOI Department of Interior, U.S.

DUT Department of Transportation, U.S.

DSO Director of Site Operations i

EAL Emergency Action Level ECCS Emergency Core Coo 11ag System EDO Executive Director of Operations l

ENS Emergency Notification System EO Emergency Officer EOF Emergency Operations Facility E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.

EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERC Emergency Response Coordinator

! BAN Emergency Response Manager ERO Emergency Response Organisation ERT Emergency Response Team (FEMA organisation)

ESF Engineered Safety Feature EST Emergency Support Tess (FEMA organisation)

ET NRC Executive Team ETA Estimated time of arrival FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation i

FDA Food and Drug Administration U.S.

FEMA Federal Emergency . Management Agency FRC Federal Response Center FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FRNAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center FRNAP Federal Radiological Nonitoring and Assessment Plan FTS Federal Telephone System GLC Government Liaison Coordinator l

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GLN G1vernment Liaison Namager GLO Government Liaisoa Offloor GLT Government Liaison Team BBS Bealth and Human Services, U.S. Department of 500 NRC Headquarters Operations Officer EPCI High pressure coolant injection RPCS High pressure core spray EPN Bealth Physics Network BR NRC Headquarters EUD Fossing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of IE NRC Office of Inspection and Reforcement ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection IDAS Interactive Dose Assessment System IRB Incidence Response Branch IRC Regional NRC Incident Response Center IEDAN Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Model JIC Joint Information Center LC Liaison Coordinator LNO Liaison Officer LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low pressure coolant inj ection LPCS Low pressure core spray LT Liaison Team LWR Light Water Reactor NCS 1:stional Communication System NNSS NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NWS National Weather Service OC Operations Center OSC Operations Support Center (site)

PA Public Affairs PAC Public Affairs Coordinator PAG Protective Action Guides PAN Public Affairs Manager PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post-accident Sampling Systems PAT Public Affairs Team PNC Protective Neasures Coordinator PMN Protective Neasures Manager PNT Protective Measures Team P-T Pre s sure-Tempe ra ture PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RA Regional Administrator RAT Radiologics! Assistance Team RBE Relative biological effectiveness RCIC Reactor core isolation cooling RCT Response Coordination Team RDO Regional Duty Officer R.G. Regulatory Guide RHR Residual heat removal RI Resident Inspector xii i

RM Reso:rso Ma 033r

30 NBC Regional Office RSC Reactor Safety Coordinator

RSM Reactor Safety Manager RST Reactor Safety Team SC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SFO Senior FRMA Official SGC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SGT Safeguards Team SI International System (of meassroment)

SLC Standby liquid control SM Safeguards / Security Manager SO Status Officer i ST Site Team STL Site Team Leader 1LD Thermolastaescent dosimeter TMI-2 Three Mile Island-Unit 2 TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WHO World Health Organisation i

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors wish to express their appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by the following people: Suzan R. Morris, Ursula F.

Strong, and Malinda M. Hutchinson, for word processing and coordination; and Larry H. Wyrick and the staff of the ORNL Graphic Arts Department for preparing illustrations and view graphs.

l xv I

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l 1. OBJECTIVES l

l Slides 1 and 2 l

Following completion of this section, the student should be able to e describe the contributions to dose by various pathways of espostre, e describe the basic radiation protection objectives for emergency response, e describe the initial protective actions ' warranted for severe core damage accidents, e describe the role and efficacy of other protective actions, 6 describe the relationship of protective action guides (PAGs) and emergency action levels (EALs),

e describe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) severe acoident protective guidance and its basis, e describe why evacuation recommendations should not ha delaved for fear of manic, and e describe NRC's role la the early implementation of predetermined protective actions.

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2. FUlekiElfrAL PUBLIC pt0PIECTIVE ACTION OBJECTIVES 2.1 NATURE OF 1EE TEREAT Slides 3 and 4

, In rany ways, the risk from a radioactive plume is slailar to that from any hasardous cloud. The population should avoid being immersed in the hasardous cloud, breathing from the hasardous d

cloud, and entering areas contaminated by the cloud's passage.

Obviously, the major difference is that a plume released as a result of a major reactor assident will be radioactive and not hasardous la other ways (e.g., flammable, corrosive).

I Generally, a major release from a avolear power plant can be viewed.as a cloud (called the plume) of radioactive gases, aerosol "

l particles (smoke), and water vapor (mist). The plume could be very hot and rise as it leaves the plant (e.g., as steam rises), as was the ease for the Chernobyl accident. If this is the case, the 1 population close to the plant may be spared many of the consequenosa as the plume passes overhead. The plume could be l

i released costlaucusly over a long period, or it could be released

) as a very short puff. As the radioactive plume (cloud) moves away  ;

from the reactor site, radiomative particles or aerosols will l'

settle out (on the ground, trees, people, etc.). This is called i ground contaminatloa.

1 l

, 1 l Slide 5 l l As emplained la Vol. 2, the radiation received by a person is  !

1

called "do se. " A person can receive a dose from a plume la three ,

ways, usually called pathways. First, dose can be received j

l .

esterna11y from the radiation given of f by the passing plume or the  !

l deposited contaminatloa. This type of dose is called cloud or ground sklae. [

Dose can also be received from actually contactims a plume (e.g., by inhaling the radioactive matorist in the plumes this is e salled the inhalation dose). Inhaled material, in addition to ,

I directly providing a dose, contalas certain elements that i

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consentrate la particular organs (e.g., langs or thyroid) and thus bosome a spoolal threat to those organs. Coatest with a plume com also result la sostaalaation of a person (clothias, skin).

Finally, dose saa be received from eating or drinking ,

sostaminated food or water. This is called the lagostion dose. As in the ease of inhaled material, ingested material can concentrate in various organs.

Slide 6 The two organs that receive special attention la protective action considerations are the whole body and the thyroid.

Buf ficiently high doses to the whole body are considered to be fatal, so whole body dose levels are used to estimate early deaths and injuries. Whole body dose is received as a result of shine from the passing plume, shine from gronad contamination caused by the passing plume, and inhalation of the plume.

Thyroid dose is important because inhalation or lagostion of small naounts of radiolodine een result la damage or destruction of the thyroid. Nowever, antike whole body dose, the dose to the thyroid will act be fatal la most cases.

Nilk always resolves special attention because radioactive iodine and sosium een be concentrated la the n!!k of cows that est contaminated food or grass. The iodine la the m!!k can them be further concentrated in the consumer's thyroid.

2.2 BASIC RADIATION PR0frECTION OBJECTIVES Slide 7 Any protective actions taken in response to a severe nuclear accident should have the following objectivest i

1. to avoid (prevent) doses sufflaient to cause early severe health ef fects (lajuries or deaths) that would be seen at whole body doses above 100 rem;

._ _____ _ IL

5

2. to AadBAA doses above those limits established by the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of 1 Nealth and Human Services (ENS) Food and Drug Administration I

(FDA) protective notica seides; and

3. to anatrol total long-term ef fects (e.g., total seneers).

These objectives do not share equal status. They are listed in decreaslag order of importamoe. Even within the first objective, one must distinguish between early fatality (death within about 60 days) and other less serious injuries (e.g., vomiting, malaise, and t!.yroid ablation (complete loss of function)).

Obylously, the first protective actions should be directed toward meeting the first objective by keeping the whole body dose from the passing plane (skine and inhalation) and resulting ground cortamination below levels that could result la early deaths or injn les.

Slide 8  ;

The Enystonmental Protection Agency and Food and Drug Adelaistration protective action guides pertain to the second of the radiation protection objectives (i.e., reduce doses) rather than the first objective (i.e., avoid early fatalities and serious inj urie s ) .

The protective action guide limits were established at levels at which no early health ef fects would be espected (see Table 2.1), ,

even for such sensitive populations as pregnant women s.td children.

Slide 9 At the lower end of the scale would be protective actions to control the total number of long-term cancers.

For radiation protection purposes it is assumed that, no matter how low the dose, some percentage of the population w!!!

eventually suffer from cancer because of the radiation esposure.

The result is that consequence models project that most osacers i

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l Table 2.1. Environmental Proteetlos Aseney (EPA) and Food and Drus Administration (PDA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs)

PDA PAGs for Organ IPA PAGs for plume esposure" (rea) food and asglaultural prodsets (rea)

Whole body (bone) 1-3 0.5-5 Thyroid 3-25 1.5-15 Other body orsens 1-3 0.5-5 "At a lower projected dose, protective actions should be considered; at a higher projected dese, protective actions would be warranted.

b At a lower projected dose, use of greaans land should be restricteds at a higher projected dose, sontaminated milk should be impounded.

n L

7 westd oeest more than 50 n!!es from the plant. This is the result of a great number of people receiving a very low dose. Thus, as a practical matter, emergency-phase protective actions available to redsee these ef fects are very few. In the early time frame of a response, sheltering to long distanees, where convenient, might be

, advised--mash as for an air pollution alert.

2.3 PRINCIPAL SOURG OF RADIATION DOSE CAUSING EARLY MEALTE RFFECTS 1

i Slide 10 Only a 2AE2 severe resetor aseident involving sore damage and i sentainment failure could result in early death or injury. To esamine consequences of such a severe seeident, a representative 4

aseident will be discussed in detail. This aceldent is not based l on a speelfie sequense but lastead includes charseteristics of many I severe seeidents.

Aseident senditions that sould result in a release to the atmosphere (estled a PWR 4 in WA5N-1400) were selected. This release sneludes about 60% of the noble gases and 3% to 10% of the lodine and easium la the reactor core. This type of release sould result from a sore melt followed by a containment fa!!ure af ter sorse mechanism has removed a large fraction of the lodine, easium.

I and of.her songaseous fission from the containment atmosphere. This

, sould include operation of containment sprays for a short period 4 before the sontainment f ailure or could be the result of the sostainment holding for suffielent time (several hours) to allow J

the songaseous fission prodnets to settle out. This is not the largest assident that has been postulated. Aseidents that involve ecre melt followed by a fast containment failure that does not allow for removal of the nongaseous fission prodnets sould result '

la much larger doses /sonsequences off site. These accidents are considered very unilhely but are also the type requiring prompt and j effective protective actions to prevent health ef fects of f site. ,

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Slide 11 [

For this esemple and other severe sooidents, there would be numerome indicators in the control room of core desage/selt (e.g.,

sore temperature readings). The emergency action levels that indleste core damage would be eseeeded, which would lead to the elassifloation of a General Emergency. At this point, the sontrol room staf f would know that the plant was beyond design because, if the system had operated as designed, core damage would have been prevented.

1 This example case assumes a estastrophic fatture of the containment. The release from this type of failure represents the greatest of f-site risk because a large part of the radioactive material in the containment atmosphere will be released in a short period (a puf f release,1 to 2 hr). A puff release could espose people near the plant to sost of the plume shine and inhalation dose in about an hour or so af ter the release.

l Catastrophic containment failures could result from hydrogen i emplosions, overpressurisattor., isolation valve failure, or some fatture that allows containment bypass. There may be some indicators in the control room that containment conditions may result in a failure. None of these provide warning prior to the containment failure, and thus they cannot be used to prediet when '

sontainment will fall.

Therefore, in the esemple case and for most severe sealdents, the control room staf f w!!! know (1) that the core is damaged and

! (2) that a large amount of fission'prodnets in the containment atmosphere could be released if the containment fails, llowever, i they w!!! not be able to predict when the containment will fait (or even if it will fall). As discussed in Vols. 2 and 3 for most i aseidents studied, at least several hours would elapse between sore l

damage and containment fallers, thus allowing time to take ,

{ protective actions before a release (if they are started upon l

detootton of core damage). j t

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Slide 12 The major sourse of early lajury- and death prodseing dose for the most severe aseidental releases would be the shine (samma rays) from the passing aloud and ensuing ground contaalaation and doses from inhaled material. This esa be seen from Fig. 2.1, which shows the relative sostribution of various pathways to whole-body dose as a feastion of distance for this aceldent.  ;

Figure 2.1 shows whole-body and thyroid dose vs distance and l time for varicus pathways. These doses were salestated for as (

average day for this aseident; thus, the answers (dose projections) l sould be somewhat higher or lower dependias on the actual weather i at the time (see NUREG-1042)'

l The top ristet figure shown the contributions to the 24-kr whole body dose. The inhalation pathway would contribute the least j to projected whole body doses the cloud shine dose would be I sublethat, but the additional 24-kr ground shine contribution would lead to projected doses la essess of the early injury threshold l (100 ren) out to 7 m!!ss or so and the early fatality threshold

! (200 ree) out to about 3 m!!as.

i In this esemple, the early doses (eloud shine and lahalation) are act suf fleient to cause early injuries, but they do esseed

. Environmental Protection Agency whole body protective satica guides '

aut to about 10 m!!ss. Aceldents have been postulated (no matter

! how unlikely) that could cause early injuries close to the plant resulting from plume shine and inkstation. This shows the leportance of early protective nations. For an accident of this j type lavolving a puff release of a few (1 to 2) hours' duration,

! the population close to the p1 sat must take setions before or

, shortly af ter the start of the release to avoid a major portion of the dose from the plume shine and inhalation. Actions taken after f

the puff's passage are ef fective only la reducing dose from ground contamination.

i

• See Appendia A of Vol.1, 'illbilography for Volumes 1-5."

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10 PWR e4 CASE 4 STASILITY CLASS: D RAIN: NO WihD SPEED: 6 mph SHELTERING: NONE WHOLE BODY DOSE 4 24 hr 10 i , 103 , ,

A 7 day O CLOUD SHINE D 24 hout A GROUND SHINE 103 ~

0 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> O WHAMD 102 . ,

102 . _

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100 -

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r 10 ' ' 10-' I I 100 10' 102 103 100 101 102 103 DISTANCE (miles) DISTANCE (miles)

THYR 010 DOSE I 4 4 24 hr .

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A 7 day O CLOUD SHINE 103 - 0 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - 103 - A GROUND SHINE -

0 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> O INHALED

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100 . -

100 . -

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100 10' 102 103 100 10' 102 903 1

l DIST ANCE (mites) DISTANCE (miles) l Fig. 2.1. Dose calculations for severs LWR accident

scenarios (example from NtfREG-1062).

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Most of the total dose laeresse between 4 hr and 7 days (shows

la the tcp lef t figure) results from ground sostamination deposited  ;

by the paaeing plume. Thia skowa the importanoe of around  :

cont amina tion. In this example, the direct dose from the plume is not suffieleat to result la early deaths or injuries; but if people remain os contaminated ground, their dose will build until, at i about 6 kr, the dose could result la injuries and, at 12 kr, eause death. Obviously, af ter a major release, areas of substantial i ground contaalaation must be identified, and the population must be evacuated.

From the bottra figures, it can be seen that projected thyroid doses are controlled by inhalation doses, with the ground sad cloud shine contribution lacreasing the dose only marginally within 24

kr. Thyroid ablation would occur at thyroid doses above about 1000 j rom. This also would not be espected beyond about 3 alles for this l accident.

j Whole-body dose (not thyroid dose) would be the most important dose for most accidents in terms of early fatalities and '.njuries.

It is also clear that the thyroid dose sould arise predomlaantly from Inhalation.

f Although the ingestion pathways can be of concern at considerable distances from the release point (e.g., 50 miles or more), this concern is not discussed in this section. This section discusses only those actions that must be taken early la en accident to protect the population at greatest risk. Ingestlos dose is not considered a major contribution to early health effects. For the ingestion pathway, the early protection actions are designed to alaimize subsequent contamination of milk or other foods (e.g., remove cows from pasture sad put them on stored foods). The specific actions and criteria for vegetables are addressed by the Food and Drug Administration protective action guides.

Another point to be made from the curves involves the plume esposure emergency planning zone (EPZ). Nrny think that the public risk stops at the boundary of the emergen planning zone. But, it is clear that this accident would result .. doses in escess of the

-= _ _ _ .- - . . - . . _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ -. _

12 Environmental Protection Agency whole body (5 rea) and thyroid (25 rea) doses; at these levels, evacuation would be appropriate beyond the plume emergency planning zone.

Slides 13 and 14 As indicated, this is not the worst accident that has been postulated. The worst accident has the same general j characteristics discussed here but with one exception. The release

, would be much larger and could result in early deaths or lajuries near the plant. Table 2.2 shows the risk of receiving a lethal dose for one of the worst accidents postulated (PWR 1 from WASH 1400). While this accident results in releases somewhat larger (e.g., 20n to 50%) than some now consider possible, enemination of its consequences will be useful. Table 2.2 shows the rirk of early i

deaths for various distances and times af ter the release before the evacuation begins (overlap time). For example, a 5-kr overlap time

means that people did not start to move (evacuate) natil 5 he af ter the start of the release, while a negative 1-kr overlap time means the evacuation started 1 kr before the release. At the bottom of the table are shown the risks for long periods of shelter or normal activity. This table clearly shows three things:

t

1. Evacuation must begin before or shortly after a release to l

reduce risk substantially.

2. Novement of even short distances (e.g., 3 miles) results in i substantial reduction la risk.

3. Shelter close to the plant for long periods may not be an effective protective action.

This illustrates that protective actions must first concentrate on j the area near the plant.

13 1

1 Table 2.2. Average ladividsel risk of early fatality vs distance from the reactor for a FWR 1A release Release overlap Distance from the reactor period (ties elapsed (elles) af ter release before .

novement begins) (br) O to 1 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 3.5  !

1 5.0 0.11 0.04 0.01 6110-3 3.0 0.09 0.03 7110-3 3110-3 1.0 0.09 0.03 0.01 7110-3 0.75 0.09 0.03 0.01 7110-3  :

0.5 0.12 0.04 0.01 5X10-3 0.25 0.09 0.02 4X10-3 1X10-3 0 0.01 1X10-3 a a 1

-0.5 a a a a

-1.0 e a a a Poor Shelterina for 12 hr 0.11 0.05 0.01 9110-3 Best Shelterina for 6 hr 0.07 0.02 4X10-3 2110-3 No rannonne for 24 hr 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.02 "V la ses are less than 10-3 Source: NUEEG/CR-2925.

l

-- - , . , - - , , - -- . + - - - , - . - . - - - , - -

14 Slides 15 and 16 In this ease, these settons would be directed toward preventing early deaths in the area within 2 to 3 alles of the plant. This basio coneopt applies to all reactor aseidents because of the natural drop in plane concentration, and therefore dose, at larger distances. Figure 2.2 shows the relative dose seduction for average weather conditions. Obviously, the greatest redsetions oeest within the first 2 to 3 miles. Therefore, independent of the size of the release, the greatest need for protective actions most likely will be within 2 to 3 miles of the plaat. For large i

releases, these actions will be to prevent early deaths and, for lesser releases, to keep doses below Havironmental Protection Assasy protective action guides. These conclusions are confirmed l

by Table 2.2.

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! 3. p01Mff!AL pBOFECTIVE ACTIONS Slide 17 r 1

Once a deelsion has been made that a protective action is warranted the type of protective action to be taken amat be i

seleeted. Again, the initial, early protective actions to be resoamended to the pub 11e under a given set of emergemey conditions should be determined in advanas (predetermined) if at all possible. 1 Nowever, adjustments to peoplanned actions may be required at times if speelfle local conditions warrant. Four potentist emergency  ;

actions will be discussed in Beets. 3.1 through 3.4 8 (1)  !

l t evnemation, (2) sheltering. (3) improvised respiratory protection, 4 and (4) use of potassium iodide (EI) as a thyroid-blocking agent i for radiolodine. [

j 3.1 WACUATION l i Slide 18 l As discussed earlier, for the AAAA severe aseidents, {

i 1 j evaamation near the plant (within 2 to 3 miles) may be the only .

1 option that een result in avoidance of early health ef fects#

l sheltering alone may not be en effective emergency response near i f the plant. Early evaamation of the area near the plant has several  !

benefits in terms of publie safety:

I 1. Shine dose from all or at least part of the enternal plume een  ;

) be avoided (if the evacuation begins before or shortly af ter l l th. r.1.as.). l i

)

j 2. Shine dose from contaminated ground and other surf aces een be avoided.

) 3. Inhalation of contaalnated air can be avoided.

)

1  :

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- . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . , . . _ _ - ~ _ _________.-.._.__._._____.-_,_..____.__!

18 i

4. The highest-risk areas womid have been eleared early, thereby alleviatlas the major desiston-makias tasks for emergesey response teses.

j In oomtrast, sheltering only redsees esposures (and only moderately la a small forehouse); it does set avoid them. Consequently, i i amorgency planners amat centisse to be coseersed about people la '

-I shelters.

At eertain times, evnesation may set be praetteet. For j esemple, if as les store is la progress, major transportation  !

] arteries are blocked, or a major popsistion senter is involved,  !

ordering an evassation may reestt la estrapment of perseas outside, j

] where they any be more vatnerable than la their orignaal loestions.  ;

Nowever, predetermined eveesaties resoamendations sheste be easeelled only if entrapeent senditions are going to delay evassation for many hours. The emergency response orgaminaties should always motivate people to evassate areas near the plant if L at all possible--for eense, of oostse (General Emergency). If I

early eveemation is sleply not possible, emergency personnel shesid L acatter for grosed sostselsation following a release, if any, and l motivate people to leave any areas fosed to sostala large amosats j j of oostamination (i.e. , " hot spots") . Nest likely, it will not be t 4

i mesessary for people to move very far free such heavily j eentaminated areas to reduce significantly their esposure from this j pathway. [

3 j Slide 19

! A soneers esists that, ones a release of materiet from a  !

f j severe remotor aseident starts, an eveemation should not be

[

! resoamended because the evaeuses may run lato or be overtakes by l the plume. For areas meer the plant, this should be of alataal l l

esseers. Shelterlag in most hemes ses reduce a person's dose by no 4 I

! more than about a factor of 2, while doubling the distance between j t

i the esposed person and the sourse of the esposera reduees the dose  !

1 l

by a festor of 4. Therefore, it is ett11 better for people to move

! out of areas near the plant (2 to 3 miles) if at all possible, evea

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i

19 if the release of radioactivity has already started. The only exception to this, as noted previously, is under severe entrapment conditions (e.g., a snow or ice storm because a car is not as good a shelter as a house).

However, severe entrapment problems are expected to be rare at l

l

( most reactor sites in the United States and especially rare in conj unction with a General Emergency. At most U.S. nuclear reactor sites, fewer than 300 people live within the first 2 to 3 miles around the plant. Within this distance there are few facilities such as hospitals that would require special attention in the event of an evacuation order. At a few reactor sites, however, all these conditions are not met. The emergency planner (and responder) must recognize that evacuation would be more difficult at these latter sites, and contingency plans must be prepared and decisions made accordingly in the planning process. It must always be remembered, though, that (1) for All sites, early evacuation of nearby areas would be most beneficial and (2) for the most sovere accidents, early evacuation would be the only protective action available to achieve basic radiation protection obj ectives near the plant.

3.2 SHELTERING Slide 20 Early sheltering appears to be an appropriate protective action measure

1. for areas where the risk of exceeding the doses required for early severe health ef fects is relatively low,

2. for lesser events (e.g., Site Area Emergencies) where a major release is not expected,

3. if severe entrapment problems are likely to occur if an evacuation is attempted, i

20

4. at long distances, where the threat of early fatality and injury is very remote (i.e., beyond the emergency planning zone), or

5. where a large population density makes entrapment outside very likely.

Numerous studies indicate that, beyond 2 to 3 miles of the plant under severe accident conditions, sheltering followed by post-release monitoring and relocation from " hot spots" would be as effective as evacuation in meeting the basic protective action obj ec tives. This may not be true under certain meteorological conditions, such as if the radioactive plume passes through rainfall or if severe inversion conditions trap and confine the plume near the ground. Such conditions cannot be predicted with any useful degree of accuracy, and monitoring results (af ter a release) must be relied upon to determine when later evacuation at distances greater than 2 to 3 miles from the plant would be warranted.

Slide 21 Table 3.1 shows some factors that may be used to indicate the l relative amount by which an exposure is reduced for various pathways as a result of sheltering in three different types of structures. These sheltering factors should be used for comparison purposes only, not for predictive purposes. They should be used to determine only the type of structure to recommend if a choice of structures is available. For cloud and ground shine, small farmhouses provide very little protection; but if a farnhouse has a basement, protection can be improved. Large concrete structures can provide a great deal of protection. Most likely, the (

4 uncertainties inherent in the early dose projection calculation will be far greater than the uncertainties in the listed sheltering factors.

21 Table 3.1. Factors by which radionuclide exposure may be reduced by sheltering for different types of shelters and pathways of exposure Type Clond Ground Inhalation of shelter shine shine exposure Small, frame building Without basement 1 2 2a With basement 3 5-10 3*

Multiple-story, concrete structure 5 10 5

" Puff release only.

t

22 The inhalation protection provided will depend on the duration of the material in the area outside and on the " ope nne s s " or ventilation rate of the building. Small dwellings with closed windows and doors ventilate at a rate of about one air turnover per hour. For a 1-hr puff, a protection factor of about 3 (two-thirds reduction in dose commitment rate) can be achieved in a small dwelling. For longer releases (plumes), the protection factor would be lower (assuming that the wind does not shif t). For perspective, all major (life-threatening) releases resulting from core melt accidents would be 0- to 2-hr puffs. Less-severe (in quantity) releases could last much longer. Thus, the immediate shelter option would be most beneficial for reducing inhalation dose. However, inhalation dose is only a part of the whole body dose.

In summary, enclosed structures can offer protection from the inhalation pathway. The amount of protection depends en the

" tightness" of the structure and the duration of the contamination in the surrounding air.

3.3 IMPROVISED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION Slide 22 This action reduces RAll the inhalation exposure, not the exposure to cloud shine or the exposure to contaminated ground and other surfaces. However, it does reduce the dose to all organs (e.g., lungs) via the inhalation pathway and not just the dose to a single organ, as is the case with II tablets, which reduce only the radiolodine dose to the thyroid. This could be important under some conditions where lung dose rather than whole-body dose could be more important in terms of health ef fects.

Since, for most severe accidents, inhalation dose is not most important, improvised respiratory protection, such as placing a towel over the mouth and nose, is a secondary protective action (i.e., it may be recommended in conjunction with evacuation or shelter). However, implementation of improvised respiratory protection should never delay implementation of other protective

23 actions such as sheltering or evacuation.

Slide 23 To provide further perspective on this topic, Table 3.2 shows I

the results of experiments conducted using different types of improvised respiratory protection. Military personnel used various household items as protection and measured their efficiency in removing particles. Some results were remarkable; for example, a bath towel had an efficiency of 74% to 85%.

More recent experiments show that an ef ficiency of 90% can be achieved by using a sargeon's or painter's mask.

The use of a loose-fitting towel over the nose and mouth should reduce the inhalation exposure from small particulates by a factor of about 2 to 5. Babies can be lightly wrapped in blankets, such as they are for protection from wind and cold. Use of a tight-fitting heavy towel is expected to reduce particulate inhalation by about a factor of 10. Note, however, that exposure 4

received through inhalation of gases is B21 reduced by either of these techniques. Basically, improvised respiratory protection could be used as a secondary protective action to provide some relatively unknown, nontrivial level of additional protection.

3.4 USE OF POTASSIUM IODIDE (KI) 1 Slide 24 It must be understood that use of the thyroid-blocking agent KI is not an adequate substitute for prompt evacuation or sheltering by the general population near a plant in response to a severe accident (General Emergency). Ingestion of KI will serve only to help reduce the dose to the thyroid caused by intake of radioiodine. The primary risk to the population from a severe accident is whole body dose, not the radiolodine dose to the thyroid. The Food and Drug Administration has recommended that KI be administered for projected doses >25 rem thyroid.

,___g___

24 Table 3.2. Respiratory protection provided by common household and personal items assinst aerosols of 1- to 5 pa particle size Geometric Number of mean effi-thicknesses ciency (%)

Handkerchief, man's cotton 16 94.2 Toilet paper 3 91.4 Handkerchief, man's cotton 8 88.9 Handkerchief, man's cotton Crumpled 88.1 Bath towel, turkish 2 85 .1 Bath towel, turkish 1 73.9 Bed sheet, muslin 1 72.0 Bath towel, turkish (wet) 1 70.2 Shirt, cotton (wet) 1 65.9 Shirt, cotton 2 65.5 Handkerchief, woman's cotton (wet) 4 63.0 Handkerchief, man's cotton (wet) 1 62.6 Dress material, cotton (wet) 1 56.3 Handkerchief, woman's cotton 4 55.5 Slip rayon 1 50.0 Dress material, cotton 1 47.6 Shirt, cotton l 1 34.6 Handkerchief, man's cotton 1 27.5

" Resistance obtained when checked immediately af ter hand wringing. This resistance began to decrease after about 1 min when the material started to dry.

l

. ( . ____ _ _ . - - _ _ . - - - _ _ - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- ~~~

25 I

To be effective, KI must be taken just before or shortly af ter exposure to radiciodine (within 1 to 2 hr). Thus, to be potentially effective, it must be readily available (Martin, 1985a). Taking the recommended dosage of KI (130 mg) Just before or at the time of exposure could block more than 90% of radioactive iodine uptake by the thyroid (see Fig. 3.1) . A 130-as dose of KI  ;

will deliver about 100 mg of stable iodine. If taken approximately 3 to 4 hr af ter acute exposure, only about 20% blocking could occur in some persons. Note that a small percentage of people could react adversely to KI, but the risk of a severe reaction is very small.

Slide 25 The NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommend predistribution of KI to predesignated emergency workers, site personnel, and institutionalized individuals who might find it difficult to evacuate during an emergency. FEMA has stated the federal position that predistribution of KI to the general public should not be required for a state or local emergency plan to be acceptable (FDA, 1978).

3.5 OTHER PROTEGIVE AGIONS Other protective actions such as decontamination of evacuees, slik contamination control, and reservoir (water) protection should also be part of the emergency response. These actions are not discussed here because their implementation girly in an event (0 to 4 hr) would not be crucial to their ef fectiveness.

3.6 DIREGION OF PRMEGIVE AGION COVERAGE s

S10de 26 T1e final question is in what direction protective action should be taken. Past practice has been to plan to initiate protective action only in a " downwind" direction. This appears to be a reasonable planning strategy because it would greatly limit

100%

90 \

80 70 60 50 40 l 30 20

10 l I I I l l I l l l 40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 TIME AFTER INTAKE OF 131 1 (hr)

Fig. 3.1. Percent of thyroid blocking afforded by 100 mg* of stable

" * ** * " #* '" ' #* # * * * * ' * "I lodineas$3k"I.

intake of 130 mg of II.

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l 27 j the populations affected. The problem is that it would be difficult if not impossible in the early time frame to predict the 1

l magnitude and timing of a major release and where " downwind" would i

be at the time of a release. More over, " downwind" implies that an

(

actual major release is underway. Emergency plans that call for ,

awaiting a major release provide little, if any, risk reduction potential for the public. Therefore, the initial, enriv, erecautionary evacuation near the niant should be effected in all directions.

3.7 BASES FOR PRUfEGIVE AWION I

Slide 27 As discussed in Vol. 2, radiation doses in excess of Environmental Protection Agency protective action guides can occur 4

as a result of the release of radionuclide material in the reactor coolant system or spent fuel storage pool. Protective action guides are well below doses that could result in early severe inj ury or fatality. Releases resulting in observable early hesith effects (injuries and deaths) or high individual risks (very high j

radiation doses) off site can occur only as a result of severe core desage coupled with early containment failure, either of which could occur first.

Slides 28 and 29 As discussed earlier, considerable research on severe accidents has been conducted to consider a great variety of conditions. This research has arrived at three basic conclusions concerning the effectiveness of early protective actions for wreventing early health ef fects for very severe accidents and xeeping doses below protective action guides for less-severe core melt accidents:

1. To be most effective, protective actions (shelter or l

evacuation) must be taken before or immediately upon a major release to the atmosphere.

4 l _ __ _ _

28

2. For core melt accidents, people should immediately evacuate areas near the plant (e.g., 2- to 3-n11e radius) and remain in shelter elsewhere in the early time frame.

3. Following a major release, the dose from ground contamination l may become very important in a few hours (e.g., 4 hr),

requiring immediate radiological monitoring to locate hot 1 i

spots (e.g.,1 R/hr or greater) caused by ground contamination.

4. Protective actions may be required beyond 10 miles.

The first conclusion is intuitively obvious. Moreover, a maj or, severe release would be very intense initially with the major portion of the radioactive material being released soon (e.g., 0.5 to 2 hr) af ter the start of the release; therefore, protective actions must be taken enriv where at all possible to be effective in avoiding or reducing this early dose.

The basis for the second conclusion is informed judgment, which takes into account three considerations. As discussed earlier, risk decreases rapidly up to a distance of about 2 to 3 miles and decreases more slowly thereaf ter. Thus, in the avant of a core melt accident sequence, early evacuation of the first 2 to 3 miles would markedly reduce individual risks (i.e., the payoffs would be greatest within this distance). Second, the population within this distance is small (at many sites, a few hundred people), and there are normally few impediments to immediate evacuation of the area. Indeed, this area encompasses the low-i population zone around most reactor sites. Third, the individual risk of early deaths or injuries for the most severe accident is, in most cases, confined to this area.

The basis for the third conclusion is also intuitively obv ious. In the event of an actual major release, anyone found in shelter in an area of high ground-level contamination (e.g., >1 R/hr) would be asked to leave--whether or not an emergency plan calls for it. The predetermined level of 1 R/hr conforms to the i a .. _ _ - - . -. .- - - . - - - -

29 Environmental Protection Agency protective action guide of 1 to 5 rems projected whole-body dose. As noted earlier, evacuation at lower dose rates could be recommended on an ad hoc basis; but for a very severe accident, the 1-R/hr level may be suitable as an initial predetermined " trip" level. The basis for the last conclusion is obvious from the discussion of severe accidents in Sect. 3.2, which showed doses in excess of Environmental Protection Agency protective action guides beyond 10 miles.

i l

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4. SEVERE ACCIDENT PROTECTIVE ACTION 4.1 SEVERE ACCIDENT STRATEGY l

Slide 30 Any severe reactor accident (core damage accident) protective I action strategy should attempt to address the basic conclusions, listed in Sect. 3.7, concerning ef fective protective actions to avoid early health effects.

The first conclusion requires that action be taken before or i shortly after a release. As discussed in Vol. 2, this is one of the primary objectives for establishing emergency action levels that result in detection of core damage, declaration of a General Emergency, and recommendation of protective actions. As discussed earlier, core damage is required for a severe release, and control room indicators of core damage should be numerous. However, once core damage exists, the timing and size of a release cannot be proj ec te d. The best way to ensure that actions are started before a release is to laitiate them as soon as core damage is detected. l If the decision to take action awaits a dose projection (if possible) or fleid monitoring results, obviously the population

close to the plant could be exposed to a large part of a puf f release.

For most core damage incidents, protective actions may not be necessary because a major release is not expected (e.g., the Three Mile Island accident). However, core damage accidents are expected to occur only a few times at most, and the results of not taking i

! immediate protective actions could be tragic.

! The second and third conclusions in Sect. 3.7, calling for evacuation near the plant and monitoring af ter a major release, l have been incorporated directly into NRC's guidance. The guidance i

addresses the second protective action objective (reducing dose above Environmental Protection Agency protective action guide

} 1evels) by directing adjustment of early actions based on j assessment against the protective action guides. It is important

{ to note that this is done after the initial actions are taken to I

31

~ ^

32 protect against the possibility of early health ef fects near the plant.

i 1 4.2 BASIC GUIDANG Slides 31 and 32 The specific NRC guidance from NUREG 0654 for General

Emergency protective actions is summarized in Table 4.1 and shown in detail in Fig. 4.1. The diagram in Fig. 4.1 was sent to licensees in Information Notice 83-28. Several points concerning Fig. 4.1 should be discussed. Initial scoping of an emergency is to be based on plant observables* (emergency action levels) nredetermined to identify the plant conditions referred to in the diagram (e.g., 20% cladding failure, fission products in I

containment, or containment status). Early in an accident sequence, enough time would not be available to calculate the relationship between some instrument readings and a plant condition. Core damage is defined (Fig. 4.1, Note 2) as release of 20% of the gap activity from the core (see Vol. 2). This level of

! core damage (release) was chosen because it is well beyond that expected for any accident if safety systems operate as planned; I moreover, the in plant consequences should be readily observable (e.g., high core temperature or highly elevated in plant dose rates in water and/or air).

Slide 33 The criteria also call for evacuation in what is called a keyhole, that is, in all directions close to the plant and in the downwind direction farther away (e.g., a 2-mile radius and 5 miles

, dcwnwind). This ensures that people at greatest risk would evacuate early in the event of a General Emergency. Figure 4.2 shows a typical keyhole evacuation area. Note that the actual

• Pretective action guides, being projected doses, are not observables; thas, they cannot be acceptable bases for protective action decisions lu real time. Emergency action levels form the desired (required) bases.

^ -

33 l Table 4.1. Summary of NUREG-0654 protective action guidance l

Emergency class / Predetermined plant condition protective action Notification of an Unusual Event None Alert None Site Area Emergency None General Emergency First nrioritva General emergency declared Those near the plant should take shelter (Get people inside to receive further instructions)

Catastrophic containment Evacuate areas near the site b

failure 39.1 imminent Catastrophic containment Evacuate areas near the f ailure imminent b plant that can be evacuated before ')nff" arrivals others should take shelter Second nriority Dose projections vs Extend protective action area EPA PAGs (as necessary) if this will not interfere with immediate actions near the plant Followine a release Locate highly contaminated Promptly evacuate highly areas contaminated areas "Whenever possible, these actions should be taken before a release, based on core and containment status (EALs).

b Catastrophic failure consists of the release of a major portion of the radioactive materials in the containment over a short time (e. g. , I hr) (i.e. , a ')nf f" release) . Most experts believe that this type of containment failure is unlikely. Containment performance would be very difficult to predict during the early phases of a core melt accident.

- h

34 t,ae t. 0*S 9518e13 THE FOLLOWiNG ACTIONS wiLL SE SAS40 0N PRE 0tTERWiNE0 08 SERVABLE INSTRUMENTATION ANO PLANT ST ATU5 INOiCATOR8 tf ALW CONTA4NED IN TME EWERGENCY PLAN AND TMAT HAVE SEEN REVIEWED tv 0FFliTE Of f ectALS MonEVER. RESPONSIBLE OFFSiTE OFFICIALS MUST OECIDE ON THE FI A$lBILITV 0F BMPLEMENTING TME PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AT YME TIME OF TME ACCIDENT.

CONTASL R004 ST A87 OETECT GENEaAL EVERGENCV AECOUMENO SME LTE R 2 MILE RADIUS E M8tE5 00WhesNO CONTiNut

• I D ASSE15WINT

't NO SUBSTANTIAL COAEDAMAGE EPA PAGs IN PA0GRES$ 0A yet No PnOJECTE D PA0JECTE D TO GE

• IACTUALOS EActE080F P0f tNTIAL FOR 20% FutL CAMAGEl

'i25 LARGE FIS$10st PRODUCT YII gn g INVE NTOR V IN CONT A#NUE NYF iMORfTMAN RECOMMEis0 GAPI P40TECTivt ACTIONS im ACCORDANCE WsTM EPA PAGs RE COMutNO IMuiNENT SMELTE R #0m IWMINE NT P80JECTE D A8EASTMAT PROJECTE D CONT AiNut NT CANNOTet

v,g CONTAINutNT F AILUAE ANO EVACUATED F A+ LORE OR SEFORE Ptyys CORE DAwAGE On at LE ASE aELE4sg An aev At. U DEA *Av7 EVACU4rg VNDE AW AY *l33

'#2; OTut RS 'tinents f2 5 WILEll 40 NO REC 0YMEND atCOMugND EV ACvATiON 08 iV ACuAT 60N OF I Mill R AOtul 6 UtLE MADful l uiLES Donne #NO 10 4*LES DOWNWSND

• sinet 'I11:4p EOuACE APFtNDtB l.NvREG($$4 FEWA 9E91 REW l

'lli $1Tual.QN3 pt0giatNG yacfNT ACTA 0N tv 0FFilTE OFFICIALS ISASE D ON CON 140L R00m imosCAf ons. NO DOLE P#0 JECT 10N5 #Ecuine Dt

. IlMimuTE DECilr0NWAEING ACTsvaTiON OF ALEnfiNG sysitu ANo Est utssAGE

• t21 ACTUAL 04 P80stCTED atLE Ast 08 2n CAP P Row Cone On toss or PMvliCAL CONTROL 08 THE PLANT 70 iNTRucE85

'i35 'fuf f

• RELE A$8 (AATE MUCM GAE ATG A TMAN DEllGNE D LE AR M ATEl

• 'el FOR ALL EVACUATIONS t=ELTE4 THE AtwaNDE A 07 TwE PLuwt epi A40 PaouPTLY RELOCATE YME POPULAft0N Aff ECTE0 5v ANY GeouN0 CONTAueNATION f 0LLomNG PLuwt PallAGE

• ile CONCEN1m ATE ON Evacuation 08 AaE AS NE An twt PLANT re,. wav EE Tivt T0 EVACUATE IUtLE # ADau$ ANO NOT Tat t UtLE R A0iula Fig. 4.1. Flow chart of the Criteria for Prenaration and Evaluation of Radioloalcal Emeraency Resnonse Plans and Frenaredness in Sannort of Nuclear Power Plants in NUREG-0654 (Information Notice 83-28).

n .~

35 ORNL DWG 8518902 s

f \

/ \

' \

/ \

/

/ ZONE \

/ \

B-1 g l

\

/ \ s j s ZONE

's '

Is B-2 s

'~s \

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's s I

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\ EVACUATION

\

ZONE A

/

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(" DOWNWIND" HAS MEANING ON LY DURING A RELEASE, NOT BEFORE)

Fig. 4.2. Typical keyhole. j t

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36 e

evacuation zone boundaries aru preplanned based on local conditions (e.g., ros.ds, population density, and total population).

1 i- Slide 34 This guidance indicates that people close to the plant should not evacuate if imminent catastrophic containment failure that could release large fractions of the radioactive material in a puff i~ ((1 hr) is likely. The goal is to shelter people inside their homes as the puff release moves by. [This is effective only for l puff releases (short duration).] For a long-duration release, most of the release and accompanying dose can be avoided by early

, evacuation. Therefore, ef fective application requires that the duration of the release be known (predictable), which probably would not be the caso early la a severe accident sequence.

In most cases, puff releases would be the result of containment failures that were (1) unpredictable (e.g., bypass accidents or explosions) or (2) the result of overpressurizatloa.

2 Currently, containments are not estimated to fall until pressures j two or three times the design pressure are reached. These

! pressures should not be reached for many hours following the start of a cortained core melt accident. Overpressurization failures would be far from imminent (followlag detection of core damage),

allowing considerable time for precautionary evacuation of areas i

near the plant. In addition, the exact timing of a failure due to overpressurization would not be predictable.

Consequently, this part of the criteria appears to be applicable only for those situations who're the timing of a puff

! release is certain. An example would be the controlled venting of the containment by the licensee. Therefore, for protective action implementation in general, it should be assumed that the containment will agi fall catastrophically and result in a puff release. Prudence dictates that, if core melt is indicated, people meer the plant should evacuate, if at all possible, as a i precautionary measure.

1 I

37 i

l Slide 35 l Following implementation of laitial, early protective action recommendations near the plant, dose projections and field monitoring should be performed. Dose projections will be used to determine if protective actions should be expanded according to the Bavironmental Protection Agency protective action guides shown la Table 2.1. As is also discussed in Vol. 2, great uncertalaties are associated with dose projection. Therefore, dose projections should be very suspect. As soon as possible af ter a release, field monitorlag data should be the preferred basis for expanding initisi protective actions.

j Slide 36 Table 4.2 summarizes Environmental Protection Agency recommended protective action criteria, planned actions, and contingency options. Several items in this table are especially important. First, for projected doses above 5 rem whole body or 25 ren thyroid, mandatory evacuation is recommended--but shelterias

would be a fallback position for situations where evacuation is act i

immediately possible. Even for a projected dose of 1 rem whole body or 5 ren thyroid, evacuation would be preferred. Second, I below a projected dose of 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid, ng I

planned (i.e., predetermined) protective action would be warranted.

However, ad hoc decisions are provided for on a case-by-case basis (see footnotes to Table 4.2).

f 4.3 BENEFITS OF SEVERE ACCIDENT PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDANG i Slide 37 Declaration of a General Emergency (severe core daange) should j

result in the following minimally acceptable coquence of initial j protective actions l 4 immediate precautionary evacuation, where possible, of areas l near the site; I

l L n

Table 4.2. EPA's recommended protective actions to reduce whole-body and thyroid dose from exposure to a gaseous plane Projected Dose (rea)

Thole body Thyroid Recommended actions

• Comments Poomlation

<1 (5 No planned protective actions Previously recommended State may issas an advisory to seek shelter and protective actions may await farther lastractions be considered or ,

Moaltor environmental radiation levels termina ted l a

1 to <5 5 to (25 Seek shelter as a minimum If constraints exist, ,

Consider evacuation. Evacuate unless constraints special consideration  ;

make it impractical should be given for  ;

Nomitor environmental radiation levels evacuation of children Control access and pregnant women 5 and above 25 and above Conduct mandatory evacuation Seeking shelter would be i Nonitor environmental radiation levels and adjust sa alternative if ,

area for mandatory evacuation based on these levels evacuation were not t Control access immediately possible +

Emermency team workers i

25 125 Control exposure of emergency team members to these Although respirators and l except for lifesaving missions. (Appropriate stable iodine shon1d be controls for emergency workers include time used where effective to ,

limitations, respirators, and stable iodine.) control- dose to [

emergency team workers,  !

75 Control exposure of emergency team members perfornias thyroid dose may not be lifesaving missions to this level. (Control _ of time a limiting factor for of exposure vill be most effective.) lifesaving missions "These actions are recommended for planning purposes. Protective action decisions at the time of the ,

incident must take existing conditions into consideration. t At the time of the incident, officials may haplement low-impact protective actions la keeping with the principle of maintaining radistica exposures as low as reasonably achievable.

4 I

39 e immediate sheltering elsewhere; and j e 11 a major release occurs, relocation from sheltered areas in l which high dose rates are evident, as determined by radiological monitoring teams. (Dose rates in excess of 1 R/hr would be considered high.)

To examine the effectiveness of these actions for a very severe accident, a calculation was made assuming the greatest accidental release (i.e., source term) currently considered possible. It was further assumed that people within 1, 2, or 3 alles of a site would leave at a speed of 10 miles /hr, starting 0.5 hr Allar the beginning of the release (i.e., a somewhat pessimistic time delay after initiation of the release). People outside these early evacuation radii were presumed to seek shelter in basements of homes. People in shelters within 10 miles were relocated af ter 4 hr of exposure to ground contamination (in addition to the puff);

people farther than 10 miles were relocated af ter 8 hr of exposure 1

to ground contamination (also in addition to the puf f).

l These relocation times were used as estimates of the time that might be required for monitoring teams to locate hot spots and warn and motivate the people and for people to leave. The CRAC2 computer code was used to perform the calculations for s typical 800-NW(e) reactor at a site in the northeastern United States.

Actual population distributions were used. These are idealized assumptions, but the results are indicative of the potential benefits of the predetermined protective action scheme.

As shown by the 1/r1 .5 dose-vs-distance curve in Fig. 2.2, risk decreases rapidly within the first few alles of a potentist atmospheric release point. Results of the previously described calculations bear out this observation, as displayed in Fig. 4.3.

This figure displays the conditional risk of an early fatality for l early (0.5 he af ter start of the release) evacuation radii of 1, 2, and 3 miles and 24 hr of normal activity (no protective actions).

, The specific dose / risk projections from this type of calculations are not very meaningful; but when used to compare various options,

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assuming the largest reactor accident, early evacuation of small areas, and a slow relocation from highly contaminated areas.

1 41 they are useful. In this case, they show a reduction of a factor of 10,000 in the possibility of early fatalities when there is early evacuation of the area near the plant. The risk of an early ,

1 fatality was greatly reduced by using the 3-mile evacuation radius  !

assumption. Although zero fatslities were calculated for the 3-alle early evacuation case, this in no way represents a prediction for the.noted assumptions. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of the recommended 2- to 3-alle early evacuation / shelter / relocation scheme are evident from this example.

This also indicates the importance of monitoring to locate ground contamination and for the sheltered population to relocate from hot spots quickly. In this case the people were (in essence) assumed to evacuate if the ground contamination was 1 R/hr (about 100,000 times the normal background dose rate).

Slide 38 The basic conclusions are that, even for the worst possible accident, virtually all early fatalities can be prevented if the area near the plant (2 to 3 miles) is evacuated before or shortly after a release and if prompt monitoring is conducted to locate ground contamination that would result in expeditions relocation of people sheltered elsewhere.

i

5. IMPLENENTATION 5.1 ENTRAPMENT SCENARIOS Slide 39 Objections to the predetermined protective action scheme can be raised. Indeed, it is not perfect. There is no guarantee that all persons would receive low exposures, given their respective

particular situations at all times. Many scenarios can be readily conceptualized for which the predetermined action scheme would not be the best (or even an available) response. However, coincidences j of core melt and major impediments to immediate evacuation of small areas by most people should be extremely rare. Expedient shelter of some sort is always available.

Entrapment scenarios are simple to postulate. Patent entrapment scenarios can be postulated (e.g., conditions resulting from a maj or earthquake). For the most part, such scenarios are entrapment by definition; by postulate, there is no way out. Under these conditions, local officials must use common sense in providing the best shelter and/or evacuation possible.

5.2 PUBLIC RESPONSE Slide 40 Objections have been raised to evacuation because of fears of panic or injuries during the evacuation. Evacuations of up to a

. few thousand people from areas up to about several square alles are not uncommon. Examples of evacuations of record are presented in Table 5.1. Evacuations of significant size occur about every week to ten days in the United States. (Keep a mental note every time you hear of an evacuation.)

43

a 44 Table 5.1. Examples of large-scale evacuations Number of Date pe ople Place Incident evacuated l

6/30/78 3,000 Destrehan, La. Rail car gas leak (styrene gas) 6/21/78 600,000 Salonika, Greece Earthquake 5/15/78 1,0 00 Nacogdoches, Tex. Chemical explosion; train wreck 4/26/78 1,500 Bowling Green, Ky. Tank car containing poisonous gas ruptured 4/8/78 1,5 00 Brownson, Neb. 30-car derailment; tank car exploded (phosphorous) 4/6/78 2,000 Pineville, Ky. Liquid propane tank car leak 4/1/78 2,5 00 Eingsburg, Ind. Chemical plant fire; toxic f umes 3/15/78 2,000 Steubenville, Ohio Chemical plant explosion; toxic chlorine fumes 3/8/78 1,2 00 Vicksburg, Miss. Insecticide tank at chemical plant exploded 3/2/78 200 Galax, Va. 1,600 gal liquified propane spill 2/27/78 250 Youngstown, Fla. Ruptured railway car; chlorine gas; wind shift noted 2/27/78 2,000 Waverly, Tenn. Doralled tank car explosion; volatile propane 1/28/78 500 Dama scus, Ark.

4 1/17/78 52 Pond Eddy, Pa. Leak 11,000-gal from acetaldehyde fuel tank (NO,4) sp ill 12/29/77 800 Goldonna, La. Chemical freight train crash 11/29/77 1,0 00 Norfolk, Neb. Tank car carrying propane gas ruptured 11/28/77 771 Battle Creek, Neb. Propane gas leak from tank car 11/8/77 1,000 Marion, Iowa Tank car carrying propane gas ruptured 10/15/77 600 St. Marys, Kan. Toxic fumes; unknown origin 10/13/77 800 Chattanooga, Tenn. Gas fumes; elementary school l 10/8/77 2,0 00 Midland, Mich. Poisonous chlorine gas leak l from chemical plant 10/4/77 160 Kansas City, No. Elementary school; carbon monoxide leak 9/19/77 2,600 Berryville, Ark. Fire at a fertilizer warehouse; ammonia and nitric acid 9/5/77 2,000 Watseka, Ill. Railroad car derailed; ethylene oxide '

7/13/77 5,2 00 Rockwood Tenn. Chemical truck wreck 5/17/77 2,0 00 International Rail car leaked chlorine gas Falls, Minn.

I

45 Table 5.1. (continued)

Number of Date pe ople Place Incident evacasted 12/11/76 10,000 Baton Rouge, La. Chlorine gas leak at chemical plant 5/29/76 500 Centerville, Ill. Toxic fumes release; two tank cars; chlorosnifonic acid ,

and sulfuric acid 5/16/76 1,0 00 Glen Ellyn, Ill. Tank car leaking toxic ammonia fumes 4/13/76 3,800s Dwight, Ill. Truck leaking liquid bromine

" Included evacuation of 209 severely retarded and handicapped children, only nine of whom could walk, and another 92 elderly patients from a differ-eat center. Total time consumed by the evacuation was 2 hr, and little con-fusion was noted. Public officials complained about the lack of resources.

4

46 5.3 EVACUATION RISKS T

Slide 41 For perspective, the historical fatality risk of about 1/500,000 per person during evacuations may be compared to the conditional risk of an early fatality given a core-melt accident sequence. This cannot be done exactly. According to results of a limited naaber (i.e., about 15) of probabilistic risk analyses, roughly 1% to 10% of core melt accidents might result in a massive lethal release of radioactivity.

The evacuation risk of about 1/500,000 per person can be roughly compared to the 1/10 to 1/100 risk of a fatality given a core melt accident. Although this says nothing definitive about

! the risk for any particular core melt accident, it does indicate strongly that, on the average, it would be far less risky for an ladividual to leave the vicinity of a core melt accident than to i stay--that is, evacuation would be the less risky alternative in the event of a core melt. Remember that, on a predetermined basis, an evacuation should not be recommended unless a core melt accident sequence is 3ctua11v under way.

Slide 42 It must also be remembered that few people live close to most nuclear power reactors. Figure 5.1, adapted from Demomranhic Statistics Pertainina to Nuclear Power Ranctor Sites (NUREG-0348),'

illustrates the number of people within 1 and 5 miles of 111 nuclear power plant sites (actual or proposed in 1979). Evidently, evacuations of everyone within a circular area of radius somewhere between 1 and 5 miles of these sites would be below the 10,000-person figure. At most sites, in fact, fewer than 300 people live within 2 miles of the site.

• See Appendix A of Vol.1, ' Sib 11ography for Volume s 1-5. "  ;

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1 Fig. 5.1. Number of people within 1 and 5 miles of 111 auclear power plants, l actual or proposed in 1979.

l

_ - - - . - - . ~ - . -

48 5.4 PUBLIC BEHAVIOR DURING EM! AGENCIES Slide 43 No suelear accidents with severe off-site consequences have occurred in the United States. Other types of events have occurred that may indicate how people would respond to a nuclear accident. j 1

i Objections to citias public behavior darias sonnaclear emergencies for purposes of radiological emergency planalag can and have been empressed, and the matter has been studied. More to the point, suetear-related emergenotes have occurred for which public behavior can be compared to that for monanclear emergencies.

The Environmental Protection Agency report Evaamation Elaka--

, An Analvals found no reason to espect that people will react differently to a nuclear accident than they would to a flood, fire.

or similar emergeasy.

Opinion, of course, is subject to scrutiny la the light of fact. Although the data base is limited, several nuclear-related l incidents lavolving public response have occurred and can be compared to the moanuelear esperience. Some of these incidents l

(emoluding weapons-related Ameidents) are presented in Table 5.2. l l

The sooident that appears to be of the greatest relevance is

j. .Three Nile Island (TMI). The accident at 'IllI's Unit 2 occurred at 7:00 a.m. on March 28, 1979. By 8:00 a.m., the national television networks were broadcasting the news. A small percentage of the local population lef t the area during the first two days. On the l tL):4 day (Friday), the governor of Pennsylvania recommended the eveonation of ch!!dres sad pregnant women. By the end of the r weekend, about half of the population within 20 alles had lef t the

1. ~

area. Througacut this time, the people were subjected to intense stress and (to them) conflictims opiatoms and advice. Despite these senditions, the evacuations that occurred were orderly.

Some observers have stated that the evacuations represented panic. Conversely, it could be argued that the pubile's behavior '

was perfectly maderstandable considering the intense pressures to wklok they were subjected (e.g., various authorities expressed diametrically opposed pe sitions, and some authorities even reversed l

l l

_ ___.._.___,_.._,_.___.____.--_i_____. _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _- _____.J

49 i

I aJ n

Table 5.2. Public responso;.to nnclear-related incidents

s. Date Location Incident Public reaction 1957 Windscale, Accident at a graphite reactor Typical, no panic England caused the release of 20,000 Ci of radiolodine 1977 Ft. St. Vrain, Erroneous reports of a release Normal, no panic Colo. of 20 C1/sse from a nuclear despite blizzard gq power reactor conditions 4

(';T g

19 _,, Rocky Flats, Colo, Major fire at pintonium plant ' Normal, no panic or widespread a '"

flight i

1980 Crystal River 20,000 gal of primary water was Normal, no panic Plant, Fla. spilled into the containment or widespread flight

, 1979 sThree Mile Nuclear power plant accident Half of popula-T Island, Pa. . tion within 30 E s l '-

miles evacuated within 5 days 1982 Rochester, Primary } coolant released to the Normal, no panic M'. Y . atmosphere from R. E. Ginna or widespread

's , nuclear power plant flight 1981 Iadisa reint. Power, transformer exploded when Small-scale

N.Y. lightning struck a nuclear evacuation power station l

e

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P l

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50 their own positicas during the course of the alcident). In fact, if the current protective action guidance had been in place at the time of the accident, evacuation of the area near the plant would have been recommended.

Slide 44 l 1

Although fear and trauma are common in disaster situations, l widespread panic (irrationai behavior caused by stress) is uncommon to nonexistent. In fact, disaster victims often react with initiative, sometimes insisting on acting on their own against the expressed advice of public authorities. (Authorities might call this panic.) Furthermore, contrary to general assumptions, local organizations have generally proven themselves able to cope with I

! emergencies rather than to be overwhelmed by them. Most disasters L

, have not led to widespread antisocial behavior such as looting, nor r

! do disasters destroy the morale of the communities involved. In l

[ many cases, the result of a disaster, over time, is an increase in 1

i the collective morale of the community.

During an evacuation, it can be expected that a smell part of the population will not follow recommendations (e.g., evacuation) and that another group will evacuate on their own even if no shelter is recommended. However, most people will react calmly and normally to authoritative directions during an emergency. In media accounts of an evacuation, typically reporters will note with surprise that, instead of panicking, people helped each other.

Although measures were taken to prevent looting, most often no looting was observed.

Slide 45 In essence, the keys to a successful protective action strategy are early warning, clear instructions, and strong motivation provided to the audience by an authority figure such as a local newscaster, police chief, mayor, or governor.

Some fear and trauma should be expected in response to an -

e.acuation order, but fears by authorities of widespread panic l

51 should not be an impediment to ordering an evacuation if grave cause exists.

l 5.5 RG.E OF 11tE NUQ EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Slide 46 In cooperation with local officials, most licensees have developed site-specific criteria for recommending protective actions to the public according to the previously discussed concepts. Normally the NRC would not be part of the enriv predetermined protective action decision process. Licensees are required to report these events to off-site officials within 15 min and then immediately to the NRC (within 1 hr). It is expected to take an additional hour af ter notification for the NRC response

! organizations to be activated and be prepared to comment on protective action recommendations. Calling the NRC to confirm a preplanned protective action would only delay protective action

! implementation. Thus, the NRC staff may have little influence over early response actions, except by virtue of emergency niannina appraisals.

t 4

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6. NaJOR POINTS Slide 47 e Protective actions have not been predetermined for less than core melt accidents.

4 For core melt accidents, protective actions must be planned to be taken based on plant emergency action levels, preferably before a release. Projected dose is secondary to EALs as a basis for protective actions.

e Under most conditions, if core melt is indicated, people near the plant (2 to 3 alles) should be notified and motivated to leave immediately where at all possible.

• For core melt accidents, protective actions near the plant should be taken in all directions.

• For severe accidental releases to the atmosphere, the maj or threat is from the passing cloud, but ground contamination may dominate the dose :n a few hours, especially where such releases intercept rainfall.

• At exceedingly low probability levels, protective action may be required even beyond 10 alles.

• Although core damage will be easy to detect, the future course of such an accident and containment response will be difficult to predict during a severe accident.

• The predetermined evacuation / shelter / relocation protective action scheme for a General Emergency can be demonstrated to provide significant risk reduction potential.

53

54 4 In the event of a core melt accident, off-site officials should implement early, initial protective actions without calling the NRC.

• Evacuations are not uncommon.

• Evacuations by up to a few thousand people have historically been a low-risk activity. I

• Most people will react calmly and normally during an emergency evacuation.

• An evacuation order should not be delayed for fear of panic.

1

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I 4

4 1

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Appeodix A SLIDES RELATING 10 VOLUIE 4 0F THE SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL t I

i 55 I

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l APPENDIX A i

SLIDES RELATING TO SEVERE REACTOR ,

ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL:

PUBLIC PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - PREDETERMINED e CRITERIA AND INITIAL ACTIONS VOL.4 NUREG/CR-3955 ORNL/TM-9271/V4 Slide 1 '

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l I

i i

OBJECTIVES l

)

• Describe

- Basic radiation protection objectives for emergency response g - Initial protective actions warranted for severs core damage accidents j) - Role and efficacy of other protective actions

[ - Relationship of PAGs and EALs L - Contributions to dose by various pathways of exposure ,

I - NRC severe accident guidance and its applications ' '

l - Why evacuation recommendations should not be delayed for fear of l panic or risk due to evacuation l - NRC's role in the early implementation of predetermined protective f actions

! t i

1 j

Slide 2 1

i

NATURE OF THE THREAT l

• Major release in the form of a plume or cloud I

- Radioactive gases l - Radioactive particulates

- Radioactive aerosols i

• Plume may be

! - Prolonged

- Very short (puff) l

j

• Plume deposits radioactive particles on the ground and people l

(ground contamination) i l

• Risk from the plume

! - Same as from other hazardous clouds l - Avoid immersion and inhalation

! - Not hazardous in other ways l

l Slide 3

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60 EXAMPLES OF PLUME TYPES

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. PROTECTIVE ACTION CRITERIA l

Source Consequences Organ of Dose of High Dose i 1 l Whole body Cloud shine Death Ground shine injuries e Inhalation Thyroid inhalation injuries Ingestion Slide 6

a s

BASIC RADIATION PROTECTION OBJECTIVES

• Avoid or prevent early health effects doses

- Injuries > 100 rem whole body

- Deaths > 200 rem whole body

• Reduce doses above EPA and HHS PAGs

- Whole body > 0.5 rem

- Thyroid > 1.5 rem

• Controllong-term health effects cancers

- No minimum dose level Slide 7

EPA AND FDA PAGs FDA PAGs for

~

EPA PAGs for Food and Agricultural Organ Plume Exposure (rem) Products (rem)

Whole body (bone) 1-5 0.5-5 Thyroid 5-25 1.5-15  :

Other body organs 1-5 0.5-5 Slide 8

l 65 AREA MOST AFFECTED (POPULATION AND CANCERS)

IS BEYOND 50 MILES

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10 miles 50 miles

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• INDIVIDUAL DOSE = POPULATION AFFECTED AND PROJECTED CANCERS DISTANCE FROM RELEASE Slide 9 3 1

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! SEVERE ACCIDENT EXAMPLE l (PWR 4) i

• Major release m

l

• Not largest possible 1

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• Core melt I

• Containment failure

!

• Reduction of iodine / cesium before release

- Holdu;y l - Containment spray l Puff release (1 to 2 hr)

I l Slide 10

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,s EALs ARE USED TO CLASSIFY ACCIDENTS AND RECOMMEND ACTIONS EQUIPMENT OR HUMAN FAILURE (START OF ACCIDENT) 1I FAILURE OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED -

~

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TO PROTECT THE CORE (EALs) EXCEEDED 1I CORE DAMAGE AND FISSION CLASSIFICATION AS PRODUCT BAR RIER GENERALEMERGENCY FAILURES U

'~ II PREDETERMINED RELEASE (IF ANY) PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION lf AD HOC PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONS Slide 11 l 1

l

68 EXAMPLE FROM NUREG-1062, DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR SEVERE LWR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS PWR #4 CASE 4 i STABILITY CLASS: D RAIN: NO WIND SPEED: 6 mph SHELTERING: NONE WHOLE BODY DOSE 10 4 i i A 7 day O 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 10 3 - -

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Slide 12 i t

69 EXAMPLE FROM NUREG-1062, DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR SEVERE LWR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS PWR #4 CASE 4 STABILITY CLASS: D RAIN: NO WIND SPEED: 6 mph SHELTERING: NONE WHOLE BODY DOSE 24 hr 103 i i O CLOUD SHINE A GROUND SHINE O INHALED 102 _ _

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70 EXAMPLE FROM NUREG-1062, DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR SEVERE LWR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS PWR #4 CASE 4 STABILITY CLASS: D RAIN: NO WIND SPEED: 6 mph SHELTERING: NONE THYROID DOSE 10 4  ;

i o 7-day i

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Slide 12 (Continued)

I __ 1

l 71 EXAMPLE FROM NUREG-1062, DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR SEVERE LWR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS PWR #4 CASE 4 STABILITY CLASS: D RAIN: NO WIND SPEED: 6 mph SHELTERING: NONE THYROID DOSE 24 hr 10 4 l l O CLOUD SHINE 103 _ 6 GROUND SHINE _

O INHALED 10 2 _ _

8 a 101 - -

10 0 _ _

I l 10-1 -

100 101 10 2 103 DISTANCE (miles)

Slide 12 (Continued)

l I

COMPARISON OF EVACUATION VS SHELTER FOR REDUCING l EARLY FATALITY RISK FOR THE WORST ACCIDENT I

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i Slide 13 i

i CONCLUSIONS OF WORST-ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

• Evacuation must begin before or shortly after a release to reduce risk

• Movement of short distances is effective e

• Shelter near the plant for long periods is not effective Slide 14 1

I 1

j 4

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l l

l INDEPENDENT OF RELEASE SIZE

• Greatest need for protective actions: 2 to 3 miles from plant l

• Large release: actions to prevent early health effects y

• Smaller release: actions to keep doses below PAGs Slide 15 4 l 4

i

GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF DOSE RATE AND DISTANCE FOR AN ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE I I I I

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i POTENTIAL PUBLIC PROTECTIVE ACTIONS <

l i

• Evacuation i

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• Sheltering 1

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• Improvised respiratory protection l

• Use of thyroid-blocking agents for radioiodides (potassium iodide) !

i

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! Slide 17 I

t

i EVACUATION

• For severe accidents, evacuation may be the only option to prevent l

l early health effects i

i a Benefits of early evacuation Avoid shine dose from plume - or at least part of it -

Avoid shine dose from ground and other surfaces l Avoidinhalation of contaminated air ,

t ,

i Ingh-risk areas are cleared early

• Relieves response teams of major decision-making tasks  ::

• Planners can direct more attention to those farther from plant

• Early evacuation not practical if entrapment is likely Major snow storm in progress _

l All roads i locked .

Very high population density Special sihrations (surge y, ,isi!s holding dangerous prisoners)

Slide 18 .

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.1 SHELTERING iS APPROPRIATE FOR y

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• Areas in which the risk of exceeding doses required for early health .

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effects is relatively low' -

• Lesser events such as a site emergency  !

Major release is not expected People should be ready to evacuate,quickly if conditions 1 deteriorate

• Instances where severe entrapment problems are likely to occur if early evacuation is attempted

• At very great distances Slide 20 1

f

DOSE REDUCTION FACTORS FOR VARIOUS SHELTERS (FOR COMPARISON ONLY)

Cloud Ground inhalation Type of Shelter Shine Shine Exposure Small frame building Without basement 1 2 2 '

With basement 3 5 to 10 3 Multiple-story concrete 5 10 5 structure Slide 21 1

1 lMPROVISED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION

• Improvised respiratory protection is a secondary protective action

- May be recommendeo in. conjunction with

• Sheltering

• Evacuation

- Reduces inhalation exposure only (up to one-third of total whole-body dose) =

- Loose-fitting towel over nose and mouth reduces inhalation dose from particulates by factor of 2

- Tight-fitting towel may reduce dose by factor of 10 .

- No reduction for gas inhalation dose l Slide 22 l

l 1

l t

1

o RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROVIDED BY COMMON HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL ITEMS AGAINST PARTICLES Number of Efficiency Thicknesses (%)

Toilet paper 3 91.4 Handkerchief, man's cotton Crumpled 88.1 g Bath towel, turkish 1 73.9 Bed sheet, muslin 1 72.0 Handkerchief, man's cotton 1 27.5 Slide 23

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l USE OF K1 i

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• Reduces only thyroid dose resulting from radioactive iodine

• it is not an adequate substitute for evacuation or other protective actions

• For a major accident, thyroid dose is not the primary source of risk ,

l

• K1 is recommended by NRC for .

- Emergency workers

- Site personnel

- Individuals who cannot evacuate promptly

• KI must be promptly available to be potentially effective Slide 25

i

! WHY PROTECTIVE ACTIONS SHOULD NOT BE RECOMMENDED FOR ONLY THE DOWNWIND

! DIRECTION NEAR THE PLANT i

• It would be impossible to predict downwind

. direction when

- Release takes place l - Evacuation starts a

• Greatest risk is near the plant Slide 26 l

l

BASES FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION

• To exceed EPA PAGs, a release must occur from l - Reactor coolant system l - Spent fuel storage pool

• Releases resulting in early health effects can occur only as a result of

- Severe core damage l - Early containment failure

• Predicting containment performance is difficult l

Slide 27 .

l l

l .

MOST EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

! FOR SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENTS i

• Actions taken before or immediately upon release

• Evacuation near the plant (2 to 3 miles) and shelter out to 5

about 10 miles ,

i

• After the release, evacuation of " hot spots" ,

l

• Protective actions may be required beyond 10 miles l

I l Slide 28 i

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l EARLY PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR CORE MELT ACCIDENTS l

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EARLY EVACUATION

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BASIC PROTECTIVE ACTION OBJECTIVES OF THE SEVERE (CORE DAMAGE) ACCIDENT STRATEGY

• Avoid early health effects

- Take actions before the release on the basis of plant conditions

- Evacuate near the plant for a core melt

- Evacuate " hot spots"

• Reduce dose above PAGs

- Adjust initial actions for PAGs l Slide 30

l NRC SEVERE ACCIDENT GUIDANCE

• Take action before the release based on plant conditions

• For core damage, evacuate for 2 to 5 miles in all directions and shelter elsewhere -

• Don't evacuate in the event of a controlled release (venting) 8 before possible evacuation

• Evacuate " hot spots" i

Slide 31 l

1 1

3 1

91 l

l FLOW CHART FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE PROTECTIVE DECISIONS CONTROL ROOM STAF F DETECT GENERAL EMERGENCY f

RECOMME ND SHELTER 2 MILE RADIUS 5 MILES DOWNWIND CONTINUE ASSESSMENT ir NO SUBSTANTIAL CORE DAMAGE EPA PAGs P OGW OR NO PROJECTED YES PROJECTE D TO BE (ACTU AL OR fr POTENTIAL FOR 20% FUE L DAM AGE)

LARGE FISSION

• gg PRODUCT y g" ,r INVENTORY IN CONTAINMENT?

(MORE THAN RECOMMEND GAPI PROTECTIVE ACTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EPA PAGs ir ip RECOMMEND SHELTER FOR IMMINENT (MMINENT ARE AS THAT PROJECTED PROJECTED CANNOTBE CONTAINMENT CONTAINME NT YES EVACU ATE D YFS F AILURE AND FAILURE OR

• SEFORE PtvME RE LE ASE CORE DAMAGE OR AR R E VA L.

RELEASE UNDERWAY?

EVACUATE UNDERWAY OTHERS (2 5 MILES)

NO NO ir ip RECOMMEND RECOMMEND EVACUATION OF EV ACUATION OF 5 MILE RADIUS 2 MILE RADIUS to MILES DOWNWIND 5 MILE S DOWNWIND 1r 1r SOU R CE : APPENDIX 1, NUREG 0654 F EM A REP 1. REV 1 Slide 32

(

92 TYPICAL KEYHOLE o

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(" DOWNWIND" HAS MEANING ONLY DURING A RELEASE, NOT BEFORE) l Slide 33

l i

i PUFF RELEASES l

• Unpredictable

- Bypass

- Explosions

- Isolation failures

- Overpressurization

• 2 to 3 times design pressure l

• Takes hours (time to evacuate)

• Predictable

- Venting to mitigate accident Slide 34

3 DOSE PROJECTIONS

• Adjust initial protective actions

- According to EPA PAGs

• Give way to field monitoring Siide 35 l

EPA RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Projected Dose (Rems) Recommended Actions Whole Body Thyroid for the Population

<1 <5 No planned actions Monitor the environment 1 to <5 5 to <25 Shelter, as a minimum a Consider evacuation Monitor the environment l

Control access '

I 5 and 25 and Mandatory evacuation above above Monitor the environment Control access i

Slide 36  ;

PROBABILITIES OF FATALITIES, ASSUMING LARGEST l REACTOR ACCIDENT AND EARLY EVACUATION l 100 _

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t Z NO ACTION _

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5 10-5 l 1 lillllI I IIIllll! l IlIllll! I l I lllll!  ! I I IllII 100 101 102 103 104 105 NUMBER OF ACUTE FATALITIES '

NOTE: LARGE UNCERTAINTIES Slide 37

CONCLUSION

• Virtually all early fatalities can be prevented for the worst possible accident if Area near the plant is evacuated before or very shortly after the release, followed by Prompt monitoring (within 4 hr) to locate " hot" spots requiring further evacuation Slide 38

i i-l l

l l

i

! ENTRAPMENT IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF SUCH l EVENTS AS SNOW AND EARTHQUAKE j

1 I

i

• Local officials will make decisions based on local conditions

)

• Best shelter or evacuation possible i

j

• Emergency plans do not guarantee protection under all conceivable :

i Circumstances i

l j Slide 39 i

l l l

l i

EXAtrLES OF LARGE-SCALE EVACUATIONS (6 MONTHS IN 1978)

Number of People Date Evacuated Place incident 6/30/78 3,000 Destrehan, LA Rail car gas leak (styrene gas) 6/21/78 600,000 Salomka, Greece Earthquake 5/15/78 1,000 Nacogdoches,TX Chemical explosion; train wreck 4/26/78 1,500 Bowling Green, KY Tank car containing poisonous gas ruptured 4/8/78 1,500 Brownson, NB 30-car derailment; tank car exploded (phosphorous) 4/6/78 2,000 Pineville, KY Liquid propane tank car leak 3 4/1/78 2,500 Kingsburg, IN Chemical plant fire; tox'c fumes 3/15/78 2,000 Steubenville, OH Chemical plant explosion; toxic chlorine fumes 3/8/78 1,200 Vk:ksburg, MS Insecticide tank at chemical plant exploded 3/2/78 200 Galax, VA 1,600-gal liquified propane spill 2/27/78 250 Youngstown, FL Ruptured railway car; chlorine gas; wind shift noted 2/27/78 2,000 Waverly, TN Derailed tank car explosion; volatile propane l 1/28/78 500 Damascus, AR Leak from fuel tank (NO4 ,

' 1/17/78 52 Pond Eddy, PA 11,000-gal acetaldehyde spill Slide 40

RADIOLOGICAL RISK VS EVACUATION RISK l

(

• Historical fatality risk for evacuation is about 1 in 500,000 l

Estimated fatality nsk for core melt accident is roughly 1 in 10 to 1

in 100 Less risk to leave the vicinity of a core melt accident early s For a typical reactor site, population within a 1- to 5-mile radius is i

much less than 10,000, so fatality risk is very low for evacuations 1

within this distance 4

l Slide 41 1

b __ _ - _ _ _ . .- _ __ ----

r NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHIN 1 AND 5 MILES OF 111 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, ACTUAL OR PROPOSED IN 1979 m -

@g 40 -

I$ 30 -

3g 1000 PEOPLE / mile 2 2g 20 -

E 10 - -

E$ o P - i i - ,--r, r, og 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 (THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE)

@*N

$ YEA A 2000 PROJECTED POPULATION WITHIN 5 MILES AT 111 NUCLEAR PLANT SITES hh 70 - - U

[3 60 -

50 -

, 3m 40 -

Ih 30 -

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$i 20 -

$ 10 -

E o V _ N . _ _ . . . - -

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 (HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE)

YEAR 2000 PROJECTED POPULATION WITHIN 1 MILE AT 111 NUCLEAR PLANT SITES

• 1000 PEOPLE / mile 2 (DURING LIFETIME GUIDELINE) VALUE USED; ALL SITE POPULATION DATA NORMAllZED TO YEAR 2000 BY ESTIMATING PROJECTED POPULATION INCREASES.

Slide 42

WOULD EVACUATION BEHAVIOR BE DIFFERENT IF THE THREAT WERE RADIATION?

=

• No reason exists to suspect that people will react differently than they would for a flood, fire, etc.

• Risk of injury or death due to a nuclear-related is evacuation should not be any higher than for other types of emergencies Slide 43 P

l i

f RESPONSE OF PEOPLE TO EVACUATION t 1

l l

• Widespread panic uncommon and spotty; may be nonexistent f

• Disaster victims react with initiative ,

• Some people insist on acting on their own

• Local organizations have generally been able to cope with 5 emergencies

• Most disasters have not led to antisocial behavior (e.g., looting) n

• Disasters do not destroy community morale i

• Some people will not follow recommendations

• Most people react calmly and normally to authoritative directions

\

Slide 44

l l

l KEYS TO A SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE H

i

• Early warning

• Clear instructions

• Provided by recognized authority figures E

! Police, firefighters, mayor

) Broadcast news media 1

i l

Slide 45 R- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

b NRC NOT PART OF EARLY PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION PROCESS

• NRC response organization not available for an hour or more

• NRC does not know plant as well as licensee or off-site officials U

• Early protective actions must be implemented without a call to the NRC first L

f t

Slide 46 ^

i i

1

- =

h- e - , y

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I MAJOR POINTS .-- y j

• Protective actions are not warranted for less than core melt accidents j

'l

• For core melt accidents, protective actions must be planned to be taken ~ l m based on plant EALs, preferab!y before a release. Projected dose is ~

secondary

~

• Under most conditions, if core melt is indicated, people near the plant should be notified and motivated to leave immediately where at all s possible .

• For core melt accidents, protective actions near the plant should be taken in all directions '

• For severe accidental releases to the atmosphere, the major threat is

^

from the passing cloud, but ground contamination may dominate the dose I in a few hours, especially where such releases intercept rainfall Slide 47 P - .. .__

7,

, MAJOR POINTS (Continued) l

• At exceedingly low probability levels, protective action may be required even beyond 10 miles

• Although core damage will be easy to detect, the future course of such an accident and containment' response _

will be difficuit to predict during a severe accident g

• The predetermined evacuation / shelter / relocation protective action scheme for a General Emergency can be demonstrated-to provide significant risk reduction potential -

Slide 47 (Continued)

~

s e -_ _____

MAJOR POINTS (Continued)

• In the event of a core melt accident, off-site officials should implement early, initial protective actions without calling the NRC first

• Evacuations are not uncommon

• Evacuations by up to a few thousand people have historically been a low-risk activity s

• Most people will react calmly and normally during an emergency evacuation

• An evacuation order should not be delayed for fear of panic Slide 47 (Continued)

ORNL/TM-9271/V4 NUREG-1210/V4 INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 1-26. C. W. Miller

27. Laboratory Records, ORNL-RC EIIERNAL DISTRIBUTION

28. Office of Assistant Manager for Energy Research and Development, DOE-ORO, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 29-30. Office of Scientific and Technical Information, DOE-ORO, Oak Ridge, 7N 37831

109

U S. =UCLEJJ E EiUL4.Toav CoMMis$lON i. AE,0.,T muwsEx ,/epase ey T,0C, adW ve, dwe, a ears seaC POaN 338 In tal BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-1210 E" 'E'-

SEE CSTaQCTaoNS ON THE aEVla5E Vol. 4

2. VITLE ANo SUSTITLE 3 LE AVE BLANK Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual [ a oa'< aeroar co='u'<o Public Protective Actions -- Predetermined Criteria /

"o*'" ^a and Initial Actions / l

• auvaoaist

\ Qttober 1986 J.A. Martin, Jr., h.J. McKenna, C.W. Miller, L.M. Hively, /

• o^'e am'oan55vio R.W. Sharpe, J.G. Gfdtter, R.M. Watkins

\ /

/ February * "

l 1987 1e _Foa.iuoo.a.=u.iio==4. .~o iu~o.oo.Lis,,~~.,1 ,C , y .raoaCmas=moa=u~T~uuna Division of Emergency eparedness and Engineering Response ' "~ oa ca^~' au*aa OfficeofInspectionandMnforcement ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C' ission /

Washinoton. DC 20555  ; /

io s,o~soni=o oaa.~a*Tio= =... . o uniuno aso ess ,, . < c , ii. Tveno,aeroaf 4

Same as 7 above. 7 . ,.aioo Cov.a.o ,, , ,

t u su,,uoi~T.av nofi.

y 2

13 de ST. ACT <200 worWs er dess, .

This is one in a series of volumes tha olfectively provide for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) emergency re a nse personnel the necessary background information for an adequate response to s ere reactor accidents. The volumes in the series are: ,

o Volume 1 -- Overview and Summary of Mtjo )oints o Volume 2 -- Severe Reactor Accident Overvik o Volume 3 -- Response of Licensee andfState h1d Local Officials

o. Volume 4 -- Public Protective Action' s -- Prebtermined Criteria and Initial Actions o Volume 5 -- U.S. Nuclear RegulatorykCommissio) Response Each volume serves, respectively,heastext p? for ; course of instruction in a series of courses for NRC response personne},. These mater als do not provide guidance or license requirements for NRC licenseps or state or Itcal response organizations.

Each volume is accompanied by an apphndix of slides tbt can be used to present this material. The slides are callp out in the text.)

is DoCuMtNT Analysis - . Et yvvoaOS/DESCRIPfoFeS i f

\

is avantagiLiiv

$TATEMENT protective actions react,oraccidents criteria implementation Unlimited energency response trairing , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

< TMe gere,

. ici~minas,o, = i~oso Tia s \ Unclassified

,Two report, Unclassified 17 NyMSER oF , AGES 18 ,a tCE

UNITED STATES . 1- .n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Post *ama* Paso WASHINGTON, D.C. 20656 g,*ge.,

OFFICIAL BUSINESS F-PENA 6TY FOR PRNATE USE,4300

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