ML20212J665

Pilot Program:Nrc Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual.Response of Licensee and State and Local Officials

ML20212J665
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/28/1987
From:	Giitter J, Hively L, Mckenna T, Chris Miller, Sakenas C, Sharpe R, Watkins R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
References
NUREG-1210, NUREG-1210-V03, NUREG-1210-V3, NUDOCS 8703090090
Download: ML20212J665 (101)

Text

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NUR5G-1210 Vol. 3 Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual Response of Licensee and State and Local Officials U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement C. A. Sakenas, T. J. McKenna, C. W. Miller, L. M. Hively, R. W. Sharpe, J. G. Giitter, R. M. Watkins p*%,,

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!?R 388:8 "o22e 1210 R PDR

s NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555

2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082

3. The National Technical information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu-ment Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.

The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and N RC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances.

Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federai Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non NRC conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.

Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, Washington, DC 20555.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for reference use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute,1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.

NUREG-1210 Vol. 3 Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual Response of Licensee and State and Local Officials Manuscript Completed: July 1986 Date Published: February 1987 C. A. Sakenas, T._ J. McKenna, C. W. Miller *, L. M. Hively*,

R. W. sharpe*, J. G. Glitter, R. M. Watkins*

' Oak Ridge National Laboratory Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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%.....)

FOREWORD Over the past few years the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, has undertaken a program to upgrade the NRC capabilities to respond to severe reactor accidents.

As part of this effort, basic training sessions have been presented by IE staff to all response personnel (Headquarters and regions).

Through the process of providing this training a standard student text has evolved.

This pilot training manual has been written to fill the need for a general text on NRC response to reactor accidents. The manual is intended to be the foundation for a course for all NRC response personnel.

This set of manuals is not licensing guidance.

Rather, it is designed to pre-sent to NRC personnel the best understanding of response planning for a serious reactor accident.

These draft manuals are intended to change over time as NRC staff continues to gain experience.

Suggestions are requested and should be sent to the Incident Response Branch.

M h

Edward. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i

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PREFACE Reasonne of Licensee med State

==d Local Officials is the third in a series of volumes that collectively summarise the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) emergency response during severe power reactor accidents. This volume describes in general terms the planned response of the licensee and state and local officials during a severe accident. Other volumes in the series and the subjects they address are:

• Volume 1 -- Overview

==d B - -rv of Maior Pointa e Volume 2 - Severs Reactor Accident Overview e Volume 4 -- Pah11e Protective Actions--Predetermined Criteria and Initial Actions i

e Volume 5 - U.S. Naclear Ranulatory P - lanlon Reasonne Each volume serves, respectively, as the text for a course of instruction in a series of courses for NRC response personnel. These materials do agi provide guidance or license requirements for IRC licensees. The volumes have been organized into these training modules to accommodate the scheduling and duty needs of participating NRC staff.

Each volume is accompanied by an appendix of slides that can be used to l

present this material. The slides are called out in the text.

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CONTENTS PREFACE................................111 LIST OF FIGURES............................. Yli LIST OF TABLES.

Im LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISNS FOR VOLUES 1-5............ mi 1.

LICENSEE RESPONSE PLANS AND PROGDURES.

1 1.1 OBJECTIVES.

1 1.2 PREPLANNING RBQUIRENENTS.

2 1.2.1 Basis for Licensee Plans.

2 1.2.2 Najor Requirements.

3 1.3 ROLES IN AN ENERGENCY.

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1. 3.1 Role of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

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1.3.2 Responsibilities of Licensee.

4 1.3.3 Responsibilities of State and Local Agencies.

5 1.4 PREPLANNING AREA (ENERGENCY PLANNING ZONES).

5 1.4.1 Plume Exposure Pathway.

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1.4.2 Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone........

8 1.5 EERGENCY OPERATING PROGDURES.

9 1.6 CDRE ODNDITION ASSESSMENT.

11 1.7 ENERGENCY Q,ASSIFICATION SYSTEN.

11 1.7.1 Eme rg e ncy Ac t i o n Le ve l s................. 13 i

1.7.2 Emergency Class Descriptions.

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1.7.2.1 Unusual Event.

20 1.7.2.2 Alert.

20 1.7.2.3 Site Area Emergency.

23 1.7.2.4 General Emergency..

24 1.7.2.5 Protective Action Recommendations.

24 1.8 ENERGENCY RESPONSE MNMRS AND ORGANIZATIONS.......

25 1.8.1 Control Room.

25 1.8.2 Technical Support Center................ 26 i

1.8.3 Operations Support Center................ 26 i

1.8.4 Emergency Operations Facility.

27 1.8.5 Flow of Authority and Responsibility.

27 1.9 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSNENT CAPABILITIES.

28 1.9.1 Increased Effluent Monitor Coverage and Range.

28 1.9.2 Postaccident Sampling.

29 1.9.3 Samp11ag and Analysis of Plant Effluents.

29 1.9.4 Field Monitoring.

30 1.10 NAJOR POINTS.

30 2.

RESPONSE OF STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.

33 2.1 OBJECTIVES.

33 2.2 ENERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.

33 2.3 DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

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2.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND NOTIFICATION OF PUBLIC.

34 2.5 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES.

35 2.6 DOSE PROJECTIONS AND FIELD NDNITORING.

37 2.7 LOCATION OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

38 2.8 MAJOR POINTS.

38 APPENDII A.

SLIDES RELATING TO VOLUME 3 0F THE SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL..... 41 i

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1 LIST OF FIGURES Eisata East 1.1 Relationship of thermocouple temperature to cladding 12 failure............................

1.2 Pressurized water reactor (PWR) event tree for emergency 15 classification........................

1.3 Bolling water reactor (BWR) event tree for emergency 16 classification.

1.4 Typical relationship among critical safety functions (CSFs),

fission product barriers, and classes of emergency.

18 2.1 Flow chart showing steps from detection of an event in the control room to notification of the public.

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LIST OF TABLES

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1.1 Sample initiating condition and examples of accompanying 14 Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

1.2 Example of timing for boillng water reactor (BWR) general 19 emergency sequences.

21 1.3 Emergency class descriptions.

22 1.4 Emergency class response.

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LIST OF ACRONYNS AND INITIALISNS FOR VM.UIES 1-5 ALARA As low as reasonably achievable AMS Aerial Neasurements System (s)

ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ASC Administrative Support Coordinator AST Administrative Support Team BT Base Team (NRC Regional Of fice)

BWR Bolling Water Reactor CDPA Civil Defense Preparedness Agency CFA Cognizant Federal Agency CPR Code of Federal Regulations CL Congreesional Liaison CED Control rod drive CEDES Control rod drive hydraulic system CSF Critical Safety Function DBA Design Basis Accident j

DOC Department of Commerce, U.S.

i D0D Department of Defense, U.S.

I DOE Department of Energy, U.S.

DOI Department of Interior, U.S.

DOT Department of Transportation, U.S.

DSO Director of Site Operations EAL Emergency Action Level e

ECCS Emergency Core Coollag System EDO Executive Director of Operations ENS Emergency Notification System EO Emergency Officer EOF Emergency Operations Facility i

i E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.

EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute 1

EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERC Emergency Response Coordinator j

ERN Emergency Response Manager ERO Emergency Response Organisation ERT Emergency Response Team (FEMA organtantion)

ESF Engineered Safety Feature 4

EST Emergency Support Team (FEMA organization)

ET NRC Executive Team ETA Estimated time of arrival FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FDA Food and Drug Administration, U.S.

I FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency i

FRC Federal Response Center j

FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FRNAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center j

FRNAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan FTS Federal Telephone System GLC Government Liaison Coordinator f

GLN Government Liaison Manager xi l

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GLO Government Liaison Officer GLT Government Liaison Team HHS Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of B00 NRC Headquarters Operations Officer HPCI High pressure coolant injection HPCS High pressure core spray EPN Health Physics Network HQ NRC Headquarters HUD Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection IDAS Interactive Dose Assessment System IRB Incidence Response Branch IRC Regional NRC Incident Response Center IRDAN Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Model JIC Joint Information Center LC Liaison Coordinator LNO Liaison Officer LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low-pressure coolant inj ec tion LPCS Low pressure core spray UT Liaison Team LWR Light Water Reactor NCS National Communication System i

NNSS NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NWS National Weather Service j

OC Operations Center OSC Operations Support Center (site)

PA Public Affairs PAC Public Affairs coordinator PAG Protective Action Guides PAN Public Affairs Manager PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post-accident Sampling Systems PAT Public Affairs Team PNC Protective Measures coordinator PNN Protective Measures Manager PWT Protective Measures Team P-T Pressure-Temperature PWR Pressurized Water Reactor j

RA Regional Administrator RAT Radiological Assistance Team RBE Relative biological effectiveness l

RCIC Reactor core isolation cooling RCT Response Coordination Team RDO Regional Duty Officer R.G.

Regulatory Guide RHR Residual heat removal RI Resident Inspector xii J

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RN Resource Manager R0 Regional Office RSC Reactor Safety Coordinator RSM Reactor Safety Manager RST Reactor Safety Team SC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SFO Senior FEMA Official SGC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SGT Safeguards Team SI International System (of measurement)

SLC Standby liquid control SN Safeguards / Security Nanager SO Status Officer ST Site Team STL Site Team Leader TLD Thorsoluminescent dosimeter TMI-2 Three Nile Island--Unit 2 TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WBO World Health Organization e

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS s

The authors wish to express their appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by the following people: Susan R. Morris.

Ursula F. Strong, and Malinda M. Hutchinson, for word processing and coordination; and Larry H. Wyrick and the staff of the ORNL Graphic Arts Department for preparing illustrations and view graphs.

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LIGNSEE RESPONSE PLANS AND PROCEDURES Slides 1 and 2 4

1.1 OBJECTIVES Following completion of this section, the student should be able to describe:

e the responsibilities of the licensee during an accident; 4 what preparations have been made in the pinne Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and describe a typical Emergency Planning Zone boundary; e the four classea of emergencies, and, in general, the action taken by the licensee and off-site officials for each; i

e how events are classified and the basis for these classification systems [ emergency action levels (EALs)];

e the function cf the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) during

)

an event and how responsibility flows from one to the l

other; and 6 the licensee's accident assessment monitoring and dose asse ssment capabilities.

To understand many of the concepts discussed in this votnme, the student must first understand the concepts discussed 5

in Vol. 2.

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2 1.2 PREPLANNING REQUIRRMRWIS 1.2.1 Basis for Licensee Plans Included in Vol. 1 of this document is a bibilography of material that the student should consult for more information on licensee requirements. More specifically, Slide 3 1.

NUREG 0396,

• NUREG 1131,* and Informa tion Notice 83-28 discuss the foundation for the current emergency i

preparedness concepts; 2.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Pt. 50.47 and Appendix E contain the basic requirements for emergency preparedness; 3.

NUREG 0654 [ Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.101, rev. 2]'

contains the criteria to be used in developing and I

assessing an emergency plans and 4.

NUREG 0737, Supp. l' clarifies the requirements for the i

emergency organization and emergency centers.

Licensees have developed plans and procedures for emergency response JA accordance with the above criteria. These are available at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Headquarters (90) and regional offices for each operating l

reactor, and they should be consulted in the event of an emergency.

• See Vol.1, Appendix A, "Bibilography for Volumes 1-5. "

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3 1.2.2 Maior Raaniraments Slide 4 The emergency preparedness requirements for licensees are entensive.

Bowever, this discussion will be limited to only those requirements that affect the NRC's role of monitoring protective actions, sneh as event detection and classifloation.

Emergency Planning Zones, radiological monitoring and dose a s se s sment, and emergency organizations and response centers.

1.3 RG28 IN AN E85!EGENCY Slide 5 4

1.3.1 Rola of the U.S. Nnelaar Raanlatory ra--laalan i

i Since the Three Nile Island--Unit 2 (TNI-2) incident, entensive improvements la emergency planning and preparedness have been accomplished at nuclear power plants and in areas near the plants (up to about 10 alles). There have been improvements in the development of (1) emergency operating procedures (EOPs) used to direct operators' response. (2) Emergency Action Levels j

to help operators recognize the severity of an event.

(3) enhanced procedures for recommending prompt protective actions, and (4) improved accident assessment capabilities.

It i

is important that the NRC response personnel understand that entensive preplanning has been completed to assist la early decision making. They must also understand that their role j

should be one of monitoring the licensee's actions and providing i

assistance to the licensee.

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1.3.2 Reasonsibilities of Licensee Slide 6 In the event of an emergency, the licensee has two primary f unc tions : (1) control the event and (2) notify off-site officials and, where appropriate, recommend protective actions off site. The licensee's first priority, then, is to protect the core by ensuring that the following crucial safety functions are maintained by 1.

making the core suboritical and keeping it there, 2.

keeping the water flowing through the core, 3.

keeping the core covered with water, 4.

providing makeup for water boiled off, and 5.

removing decay heat from the core to an outside heat sink.

The 1Acensee must also take action to prevent or reduce off-site consequences by 1.

maintaining reactor containment and the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems, 2.

contro111ag radionuclide releases, and 3.

recommending appropriate protective actions to off-site officials.

l Licensees have developed Emergency Operating Procedures for use by the control room staff in responding to energency conditions.

j These Emergency Operating Procedue are discussed later.

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5 In parallel with attempts to correct the problem, the licensee must notify off-site of ficials of emergency declaration promptly (within 15 min).

The licensee recommends initial protective actions to off-site officists because the licensee is the only ama who would have a true and an early understanding of core and containment conditions. Furthermore, if an actual off-site radionuclide release occurs, the licensee is responsible for monitoring that release to ensure that actions recommended off site are appropriate (i.e., that initisi protective action recommendations / decisions continue to be valid based on current, actual monitoring data). Volume 4 contalis a discussion of protective action concepts and guidance for licensees.

1.3. 3 Reasonsibilitian of State and Local Amamelen Slide 7 State and local agencies are charged with protecting the public from the off-site consequences that might result from a power plant accident. These organizations have the ultimate responsibility for notifying the public to take protective actions in the event of a severe accident.

State and local officials base their decisions on the reccomendations of the licensee. The licenses cannot order an evacuation surrounding the plants the licenses can only make such a recommendation to the appropriate off-site officials. Those officials must make the decision to notify the public to implement any protective actions.

1.4 PREPLANNING AREA (ENER0ENCY P!,ANNING ZONES)

Specific plume and ingestion Emergency Pisaning Zones have l

been established around each nuclear reactor plant site. These Emergency Planning Zones were established so that the public can be notified to implement appropriate protective actions in an n

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efficient and a timely manner in the event of a real usergency.

1.4.1 Plama Ramonare Pathmaw h

Slide 8 The plume esposure Emergemey Plassing Zone is an area approximately 10 n!!es la redlys around the power plant. The sine (about a 10-m!!e radies) of the plume esposure Emergency

' Planning Zone was based primarily on the following considerations.

4 Projected doses from the traditional design basis accidents would not escoed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels outside the some.

6 Projected doses from most oore melt sequences would not esseed Protective Action Guide upper levels ontside the some.

e For the worst case core melt seguemees, immediate life-threatening doses would generally not occur outside the some.

(For most analysed severe socidents, life-threatening doses are limited to within 2 to 3 miles of the site.)

e Detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for espansion of response efforts la the event that this proved necessary.

It is unlikely that any immediate protective actions would be required beyond the plume esposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. This area is of suf fielent sine for actions within this i

some to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or death) la the event of a worst case core melt sooident. This Emergency Planning Zone is that area i

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7 requiring possible immediate action in the event of an accident to reduce risk to the public.

Slides 9 and 10 The boundaries of the plume Emergency Planning Zone take into account local features (e.g., roads, rivers, or features, such as a peninsula, that extend the some beyond 10 miles).

This is the area for which extensive preparations have been accomplished, such as:

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provisions for prompt decision making on protective actions for the public by all responsible partless 2.

development of evacuation plans; 3.

provisions for informing the public of emergency plans and procedures (i.e., a public education program);

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provisions for promptly (within 15 min of the time that state and local officists are notified) alerting and informing the public of the actions to be taken (e.g.,

stren system and radio messages);

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provisions for maintaining 24-hr communication between the licenses and state and local officists 6.

provisions for radiological monitoring in the event of an of f-site radioactivity releases and I

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provisions for activating and maintaining energency i

l operations tenters.

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1.4.2 Impantion Pathmar Emerpanew Plammina Zone Slide 12 The lagostion pathway Emergency Planalag Zone is the area L

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!a which plans esist for protecting the public from the consumption of food contaminated with radioactive material and 4

for wklok there is considerable time (hours to days) for notion to redsee risks. Thus, the level of preparation is much less in this Emergency Planning Zone them it is la the plume esposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. Also, the preparations that are made for this Emergency Planning Zone are typton11y effected at the state level rather than at the local level.

In this Emergency Planalas Zone, the concern is for the interdiction of foodstuffs rather than the avoidance of esposure to the plume itself. The area of this Emergency Planning Zone generally encompasses a 50-mile radius around the plant site.

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The eine of the ingestion esposure Emergency Planning Zone (about 50 n!!es la radius, whlek also includes the 10-mile F

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radius plume esposure Emergency Planning Zone) was selected for i

the following reasons.

Slide 13 I

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e The downwind range within wklah contamination will i

i generally not esseed the Protective Action Guides is l

limited to about $0 miles from a power plant beesuse of

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vind shif ts during the release and travel periods.

L 6 There may be conversion of atmospherlo lodine (i.e., lodine suspended in the atmosphere for long time periods) to l

ehemical forms that do not readily enter the ingestion l

l pathway.

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9 6 Much of any particulate material la a radioactive plume westd have been deposited on the grossd within about 50 miles of the facility.

i e The likelihood of exceedlag ingestlos pathway Protective Action Guide levels at 50 alles is comparable to the likelihood of exceeding plume esposure pathway Protective Action Guide levels at 10 miles, i

I Except for the most severe sooidents, immediate action is not critical for food and agricultural produce because of the additional time involved when compared to the time frame assoolated with the plume esposure Emergency Plasming Zone.

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j Preplammed actions for this Emergency Plamaing Zone ordlaarily l

w!!! be implemented by local agencies spon the directica of state asemoles.

Protective actions for this Emergency Planales Zone would i

generally imelade removal of grazing salmals to stored feed and restriction of product consumption and water usage.

1.5 E8ERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE 8 Slide 14 l

1 Prior to the incidents at Three Nile Island, the procedures la the control room to correct a problem were essentially

" event-oriented." They described the steps which the operator i

should take given the occurrence of certain preselected.

l pressalysed events. These procedures were typloally limited to i

transient events or loss-of-coolant events followed by suesessful operstlos of all safety systems designed to respond to these events.

Much of the post-Three Nile Island emergency procedures activity has been devoted to the development of "funetton-oriented" or " symptom-oriented" procedures to replace (or at least sigaf fisantly augment) the event-speelfic procedures.

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The basic assumption underlylag these alternate approaches is that there is a limited set of critical safety functions (CSFs), wkleh, if seeceeafally performed outomatically or through manual action, result in a " safe" condition for the plant. Thus, the basic design goal of the plant safety systems and the ultimate goal of all operator actions is to ensure the performasse of these critical functions. The procedures relate critical safety functions performance to specific plant / control f

room lastruments.- It is leportant to acto that, la general, the Emergency Operating Procedures address actions that lead up to but do not include actions to be taken af ter core damage.

Therefore, the operators may not have procedures to help then

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once the core has been damaged.

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i The s'ttractiveness of this " critical feastions" concept evolves from the implication that the operator need only monitor a relatively few pleses of information to ascertala the safety of the plant. While there are a limited number of critiest functions (or parameters) which indicate the performance of l

these fanations, there are virtually as mallaited number of s

l events (with a wide variety of symptoes) that can effect the j,

performance of these fanations. The operator een carry out his l

duties by focusint on these critical fumations without regard to f,

the speelfio events that have occurred. The technical guidelines along wkleh individual plant Emergency Operating I

Procedures have been developed should be reviewed by the Rosetor Safety Team (RST) at the start of an event. This w!!! provide i

j valuable insight into the question of "why is the operator doing l

that?"

In many cases, the answer is "bessese the Emergemey Operating Prosedere calls for it. "

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11 1.6 CORE CONDITION ASSESSMENT Slide 16 As a result of shortcomings identified in the Three Mile Island accident, licensees have installed additional instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, developed core condition assessment procedures, and conducted training on core condition assessment.

Slide 17 i

Licensees have also developed procedures to assess the extent of core damage as discussed in Vol. 2.

These procedures indicate the relationship of various plant instruments (e.g.,

containment monitor, water level, or thermocouple readings) and the extent of core damage. These relationships must be used with caution and be considered only gross indicators of the extent of core damage. Figure 1.1 is an example of the relationship of thermocouple temperature to cladding f ailure.

1.7 EIERGENCY (LASSIFICATION SYSTEM Four class of emergencies--Unusutl Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency--have been established by NRC regulations. The specific class of emergency that is declared is based on conditions that trigger the Emergency Action Levels discussed below. Typically, licensees have established specific Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures (EPIPs) for each emergency class that are to be implemented by the control room staff. The importance of correct classification cannot be overly emphasized. The event classification initiates all appropriate actions for that class. Both over-and underreaction could have serious adverse consequences. The specific classification p ocedures (i.e., Emergency Action Levels) for a given nuclear power plant are located in the

12 PERCENT OF FUEL RODS WITH RUPTURED CLADDING vs MAXIMUM CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE WHEN THE PRESSURE USE CURVE LABELED IS WITH TEMPERATURE

< 100 psia 1200 F

< 1200 psia 1500 F

< 1650 psia 1800 F 100 o

h 1200 F Q 80

[j CLADDING RUPTURE o

TEMPERATURE E

E3 60 x

I 1500 F E

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@ 40 l

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1800 F O

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o 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 MAXIMUM CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE (*F)

I Fig. 1.1.

Relationship of thermocouple temperature to cladding fallare.

13 Region Incident Response Centers (IRCs) and the Headquarters Operations Center.

1.7.1 Emermancy Act ion Levels Slide 18 As discussed in Vol. 2, licensees have established Emergency Action Levels based on control room instrument readings (e.g.,1000 R/hr contaminant monitor reading or 2000?F thermocouple) that indicate the scope of an emergency. NRC guidance requires that Emergency Action Levels be established for a full range of events from situations that indicate just a potential problem to actual core damage (General Emergency).

The Emergency Action Levels are extremely important because they are used as trigger levels for the declaration of emergencies and initiation of predetermined activities that lead to immediate, early actions (e.g., activation of organization, notifications, and protective actions).

Slide 19 Each licensee's emergency action plan contains a list of Emergency Action Levels which are used by the operators in assessing the level of response needed. Most licensees have established their Emergency Action Levels for each of the 60 example initiating conditions provided in NUREG 0654.* In many cases, this results in a very long list of diagnostic

' control room parameters, as can be seen from the sample shown in Table 1.1.

Some licensees have streamlined this approach by using flow charts and other visual aids. Figures 1.2 and 1.3**

show the NUREG 0654 example initiating conditions and their relationships to basic plant conditions and event classes.

• See Vol. 1 Appendix A,

" Bibliography for Volumes 1-5."

• • Figures developed by John Hickman, NRC.

14 Table 1.1.

Sample initiating condition and examples of accompanying Emergency Action Levels (EALs)

Initiating condition Emergency Action Levels No. 1 Known loss of coolant Low reactor water level accident (LOCA) greater

(-134 in.) on level / pressure than makeup pump recorder 1B21-R623B, panel capacity 1H12-P601 or High drywell pressure (+1.8 lb) on pressure indicators CM010 and/or CN021, panel IPM06J with Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel as indicated on fuel zone level indicator IB21-R6210. panel 1H13-P601 (-150 in.

+50 in, range with "0" corresponding to top of active fuel), following a time delay of 3 min 4

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17 Some licensees have developed Emergency Action Levels based on the status of the following critical safety functions:

1.

keeping the core subcritical, 2.

keeping the core cool, 3.

keeping the core covered, 4.

keeping the integrity of the containment, and i

5.

controlling any release, and how these functions relate to the status of the fission product barriers (primary system, cladding, and containment).

Slide 20 Figure 1.4 shows a typical relationship between critical safety functions and classifications.

Slide 21 Table 1.2 shows several examples of the timing of some boiling water reactor (BWR) core damage accidents; these examples illustrate that core damage could occur within a few minutes or many hours. These are only examples to show what might be typical of the timing during an event and to demonstrate how the ability to take early action based on the exceeding of Emergency Action Levels could provide sufficient time to implement protective act *ons.

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r FALURE TO MANTAN TE FALUFIE TO MANTAN TE FAILURE TO MANTAN THE FOLLOWNG CRTICAL SAFETY FOLLOWING CFWTICAL SAFETY FOLLOWNG CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS.

FUNCTIONS:

FUNCTION.

- REACTMTY CONTROL

- HEACTOR COOLANT NVENTORY

- CONTAINMENT NTEGRITY

- FIEACTOR CORE COOLNG

- PRIMARY HEAT EMOVAL

- EACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY

- M NTEN 1 r 1 t i r RESULTS N LOSS OF RESULTS N LOSS OF RESULTS N LOSS OF OR CHALLENGE TO OR CHALLENGE TO OR CHALLENGE TO FUEL CLADONG REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM gmm FISSION PRODUCT FISSION PRODUCT PRODUCT BARF:lER BARRIER BARRIER H

cc 1 F LOSS OF OR CHALLENGE TO ONE FISSION TWO FISSION THREE FISSION PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT BARRER BARRIERS BARRIERS 1 f 1 r 1 r i

ALERT j

EMERGENCY EhERGENCY 9

Fig. 1.4.

Typical relationship among critical safety functions (CSFs), fission product barriers, and classe s of emergency.

19 Table 1.2.

Example of timing for boiling water reactor (BWR) general emergency sequences Timing of event (hr) b C

TV" TQUV AE SJ 2

Unusual Event 0.017 Alert 0.333 0.17 Site Area 1

0.5 Emergency General Emergency 1 to 0.17 0.17 3+

(protective ac-3 tions recommended)

Core damage 18 1

0.17 29 Containment failure

• Leak 16 3

0.25 Maj or 21 5

3 20

• Reactor shutdown followed by loss of decay heat removal.

Reactor shutdown followed by loss of ability to provide coolant water.

1. Large loss of coolant and failure of system to replace water.

Small loss of coolant and loss of long-term heat removs1.

' Assuming isolation.

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4 20

^

1.7.2 Emeraency Class Descrintions Slides 22 and 23 Each respective class summarized in Table 1.3 requires specific initial actions. The initial actions appropriate for each class are summarized in Table 1.4 and discussed in more detail in the following sections.

1. 7. 2.1 Unusual Event Slide 24 The rationale for establishing notification of an " Unusual Even t " as an emergency class is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events that cculd possibly lead to more serious conditions.

.The purpose of off-site notification is to 1.

ensure that the first step in any response later found to be necessary has been carried out, 2.

bring the operating staff to a state of readiness, 3.

provide systematic handling of unusual events information and decision making, and 4.

control rumors.

l l

1.7.2.2 Alert l

l-Slide 25 l

l Events are in progress or have occurred that involve an i

actual or potential, substantial degradation of the level of safety at the plant. Any radiological releases are expected to

21 Table 1.3.

Emergency class descriptions Classa Core status Radiation Unusual Event No threat to irradiated No release above fuel technical specifications (or annual limits)

Alert Actual _(or potential for)

Release is small fraction substantial degradation of safety of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) beyond the site boundary Site Area Major failures of functions needed Release is less than Emergency for public protection EPA PAGs beyond the site boundary General Actual or imminent core Dose may exceed Emergency degradation EPA PAGs

" Classifications are based on plant instrument levels (i.e., Emergency Action Levels).

22 Table 1.4.

Emergency class response Classa Plant action Local and state agency action Unusual Event Provide notification Be aware Alert Mob 111:e plant resources Stand by*

Man centers (help for control room)

Activate Technical Support Center (TSC)

Site Area Emergency Full mobilization Mobilize None ssential site Man emergency centers personnel evacuate and dispatch Monitoring Team Activate TSC, Operations Inform public--activate Support Center, and warning system Emergency Operations Facility Take protective actions in accordance with Dispa tch Monitoring Team Protective Action Guides or on an ad hoc basis Provide dose assessments General Emergency Full mob 111:stion Recommend predetermined Recommend predetermined protective actions to the protective actions (within public based on plant 15 min) after declaring conditions emergency Precautionary evacuation (2 to 5 miles) i "The NRC will typically begia staf fing its response centers at the Alert level and may be expected to go to " standby" or " initial activation."

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23 be limited to amall fractions of - the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides.

The purpose of an Alert is to 1.

ensure that the on-site Technical Support Center is activated so that licensee emergency personnel are readily available to respond, 2.

provide off-site authorities with information on the current status of the event, and 3.

provide assistance to the control room staff.

1.7.2.3 Site Area R==rmancy Slide 26 Events are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guide exposure levels, except possibly near the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency declaration is to 1.

ensure that all emergency response centers are manned, 2.

ensure that radiological monitoring teams are dispatched.

3.

ensure that personnel required to aid in the evacuation of near-site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious, 4.

Provide consultation with off-site authorities, A

24 5.

provide updates for the public through off-site authorities, and 6.

ensure that nonessential personnel are evacuated.

1.7.2.4 General R==raency Slide 27 Events are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or faminent substantial core degradation or molting. Risks of exceeding Environmental Protection Agency Protection Action Guide exposure levels in more than the immediate area are considerably elevated. This is a very special case. A General Emergency indicates that plant conditions are well beyond design and early protective actions are warranted.

The purpose of the General Emergency declaration is to i

1.

initiate credetermined protective action notification to the public and J

2.

bring the full available resources of government and ladustry to bear on the situation.

t A summary of emergency classification actions for the three major classes is presented in Table 1.3.

1.7.2.5 Protective Action Rec =

ndations i

Slide 28 i

As discussed earlier, within 15 min of identifying a situation requiring urgent action (General Emergency), the l

licensee BR11 reconmend protective actions to off-site l

officials. For situations requiring urgent actions, recommended protective actions should have been predetermined based on i

25 1

discussions with off-site officials. It is important to realize that they have been developed by the licensee and off-site officials considering plant and local conditions. The basic concepts for public protective action recommendations during severe accidents are discussed in Vol. 4.

It is important to note that the specific applications of these concepts are site-spec ific. For example, one plan may call for initial evacuation out to 5 alles, while another ct11s for initial evacuation out to 3 miles, but the basic concept of prompt evacuation of the area near the plant for a General Emergency is met.

No predetermined actions are established for site area and lesser events. The specific actions for these lessor events would be based on projected plant conditions, off-site projections, and monitoring conducted at the time.

i 1.8 ENERGENCY. RESPONSE ENTERS AND ORGANIZATIONS 1.8.1 Control Room o

Slide 29 Authority to take action in the event of an emergency anni reside in the plant control room until the Technical Support Center or the Emergency Operations Facility is activated. This includes the authority to declare emergencies, to notify off-site officials within 15 min of event declaration, and to provide any appropriate protective action recommendations. The NRC must be notified af ter the appropriate state and local officials are notified and no later than 1 hr after declaring the emergency.

Upon declaration of an emergency, most sites designate an ta-site Emergency Director, who is in charge of the plant's tosel response. During night and week-end hours, this typically is the Shif t Supervisor. Once the appropriate augmentation staff arrive following declaration of an emergency, this responsibility (and title) normally transfers to the Technical j

n

26 1

Support Center and then to the Emergency Operations Facility.

1.8.2 Technical Sannert Center Slide 30 E

There were indications from the events at Three Mile Island that numerous personnel in the control room acted to congest and confuse the reactor operators' control room activities.

Review of this accident also shows that there existed a lack of reliable technical data and other records on which to base l

accident recovery decisions. As a result, today licensees are required to establish Technical Support Centers whose staff have access to plant technical information and who are responsible for engineering support of reactor operations during an i

. accident. Personnel la the Technical Support Center must be i

]

able both to assist the control room when needed and to diagnose and mitigate an event. Until the Emergency Operations Facility l

1s activated, the Technical Support Center will also perform the l

functions of the Emergency Operations Facility. The Technical I

Support Cceter is located close to the control room inside a protected and shielded area to allow fast access for face-to-face discussions with control room personnel.

1.8.3 Doerations Sunnort Cantar Slide 31 The establishment of an Operations Support Center (OSC) was introduced to help relieve the influx of shif t/ operational l

support personnel in the control room. The function of the Operations Support Center is to provide a place to which shift personnel report to receive further instructions from the operations staf f.

The Operations Support Center can be a locker room with reliable communications capability to supervisory and decision-making personnel.

27 i

1.8.4 R=armancy Onorations Facility Slide 32 Once activated, the Emergency Operations Facility eventually has primary responsibility for the licensee's response to a severe accident situation. The Emergency Operations Facility is an off-site facility. NRC guidance indicates that it should be 10 to 20 alles from the site, but some may be very close to the site (with bardening/ shielding or a backup), and cthers may be far away.

Slide 33 The Emergency Operations Facility is generally where protective action recommendations will be formulated and where the Emergency Director will be located. Space will also be provided for state and local agencies. The Emergency Operations Facility will provide for coordination of on-site actions with those off site, and for carrying out all off-site actions by the licensee (e.g., monitoring, sampling, and dose assessment).

1.8.5 Flow of Authority and Resoonsib111tv Slide 34 i

The responsibility and authority for licensee actions during a severe nuclear power plant accident start in the control room and then flow out as people arrive to man the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.

The licensee will typically start transferring functions /

responsibilities / authorities out of the control room as soon as possible so that control room personnel can concentrste on bringing the situation under control. The times when the transfers occur generally require 30 min to staff the Technical Support Center and 1 hr to staf f the Emergency a

28 Operations Facility. Then NRC staff begin trying to contact licensee personnel, the NRC staf f must be aware of how long the accident has been under way to determine where taoir contacts should be made. The Emergency Network System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) lines can be used to determine where the appropriate licensee representative is located.

1.9 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES Slide 35 Licensees have established the following capabilities to quantify any radiological release from the core or to the environment:

1.

lacreased effluent monitor coverage and range, t

l 2.

postaccident sampling of primary coolant and the containment atmosphere, l

3.

sampling and analysis of plant effluents, and 4.

field monitoring.

The role and usefulness of radiological assessment capabilities are discussed in Vol. 2.

l 1.9.1 Increased Effinent Monitor Coverare and Ranma Slide 36 During the Three Mile Island accident, several of the radiation monitors designed to assess releases were off scale and some pathways were not monitored. As a result. licensees have been required to install monitors on expected release pathways such as building exhausts, condenser exhausts, off gas x

29 systems, pressurized water reactor steam system valve discharges, and redwaste buildings and storage buildings.

In addition, requirements for the' range of the instrumentation have been established at a level so that the instruments should stay on scale daring the full course of an 7

accident (e.g., 10 R/hr for the containment monitor). The probability of monitor bypass or malfunction in accident environments (as discussed in Vol. 2) must not be ruled out.

r 1.9.2 Postaccident Samnlina Slide 37

l As a result of lessons learned from Three Mile Island and other experiences, licensees have been required to install postaccident sampling and analysis facilities with the i

capability to quantify within 3 hr radionuclide indicators of the degree of core damage (e.g., noble gases, cesium, and lodine) (these indicate cladding f ailure) and nonvolatile j

isotopes (these indicate fuel melting). In addition, chemical l

analysis must also be established to quantify hydrogen levels in l

the containment atmosphere and boron concentrations in the primary coolant. These systems must allow sampling with exposure of less than 5 rem (whole body) under accident conditions.

l 1.9.3 Sa==11am and Analysis of Plant Effluents Because iodine gaseous effluent monitors for accident conditions are not considered to be practical, licensees have installed the capability for effluent sampling of radiolodine under accident conditions without excess (5 rem whole-body) exposures. These samples are designed to quantify the. iodine and other non-noble gas releases from the plant by monitored pathways. Since these samples are taken af ter the release, they will be useful in characterizing a major release once it is o

30 unde rway.

1.9.4 Field Monitorina As discussed in Vol. 2, field monitoring and samp11ag provide the only direct measurements of off-site doses.

Typically, the licensees have made provisions to monitor the site boundary shortly after a release.

Additional field-monitoring teams in the plume Emergency Planning Zone will be deployed in about an hour. The difficulties associated with fleid monitoring are discussed in Vol. 2.

However, monitoring does provide a true indication of off-site doses and should i

replace dose projections as soon ai sufficient results are available.

1.10 MAJOR POINTS i

i Slide 38 i

The major points covered in this section are summarized as follows.

s l

e The licensee and state and local officials are responsible for taking immediate actions-An1 the NRC. The NRC shon1d interfere only if there is a serious lack of appropriate action. In suchia case, the NRC should attempt to determine the reason for a problem.

$ When prompt protective action is dictated by plant conditions in a serious accident, it is not appropriate to call NRC for concurrence in that action prior to initiating impleme nta tion.

e The pinne Emergency Planning Zone is the area for which eatensive preplanning has been done. The actual shape and area of the Emergency Planning Zone (about 10 miles in l

_3.

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31 3

radius) are site specific.

4 Licensees have in place Emergency Operating Procedures that will direct their response to correct a problem with the plant.

4 Specific immediate appropriate actions are preplanned for each class of accidents.

• Licensees have in place instrua4rtation, procedures, and i

training for detection of inadequate core cooling and core damage.

• Accidents are classified based on observeable initiating conditions (Emergency Action Levels).

• The General Emergency class should initiate recommendation and subsequent implementation of predetermined protective actions off site.

4 The licensee authority and responsibility for taking actions on site (e.g., notifying and making recommendations to off-site of ficials) will initially be in the control room, but as other personnel arrive, authority and responsibility for certain actions will move to the l

Technical Support Center (accident assessment) and l

Emergency Operations Facility (dose proj ection and of f-site coordination).

• As a result of lessons learned from Three Mile Island, licensees have installed and improved effluent monitoring and postaccident sampling capabilities.

L, _ _ _ _ _

I 2.

RESPONSE OF STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS a

2.1 GBJECTIVES Slide 39 Following completion of this section, the student should be able to i

e state where the responsibility for protective action decisions resides, 6 describe the provisions for and timing of public notification of the plume Emergency Planning Zone.(EPZ) population, e describe the criteria that should be used in making decisions and how the criteria are adjusted to local conditions.

e describe the role and shortcomings of evacuation time estimates, f

• describe state and local radiological monitoring l

capabilities, and 6 state why it is A21 acceptable for protective action to be based solely on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and dose projections.

2.2 ElERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS States and local agencies have formulated written emergency response plans in response to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requirements. These documents (1) describe the procedures that 33 h

34 state and local officials will follow in the event of a nuclear power plant emergency and (2) list the responsibilities of each state and local agency involved.

2.3 DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY Slide 40 Since the authority to implement public protective actions may reside with local or state officials, the 'NRC must determine who has this authority before making any recommendations. This information is available la the appropriate state and local emergency plans.

2.4 PRUTECTIVE ACTIONS AND NUTIFICATION OF PUBLIC Slide 41 The licenses must notify off-site state and local organizations responsible for implementing protective actions

.- within 15 min of the declaration of an emergency. This permits off-site officials to make prompt protective action decisions and to (1) provide an alerting signal (e.g., a siren) and (2) follow the signal by a message via the local radio station as to what actions the public should take.

State and local officials have predetermined the criteria that they will use to make protective action decisions. These criteria should have been coordinated with the recommendations made to local agencies by the licensee. Any protective action decisions should be based on actual plant conditions (see Sect. 1.7).

In most cases, the specifio protective action criteria for General Emergencies have been developed af ter consideration of plant and local conditions. For example, the areas planned to be evacuated may be confined to a valley around the site, or the specific evacuation sector boundaries may be determined by local roads. This delineation is done so that the local population M.

3 35 i

f can understand the evacuation instructions.

Current guidance (see Vol. 4) calls for prompt off-site protective actions on detection of actual or imminent core damage (before dose assessment). However, many local and state agencies may rely primarily on projected dose. If this is the case, the need for decisions based on core conditions should be j

discussed by the licenses with state and local officials.

Slide 42 I

A flow chart showing the typical steps from detection of an event in the power plant control room (CR) to notification of the public is shown in Fig. 2.1.

Note that the off-site i

officials generally make decisions based on licensee recommendations, which are, in turn, based on criteria discussed j

and agreed to in advance.

Bowever, only off-site authorities i

know what off-site conditions actually exist at the time the event is occurring (e.g., ice storm, blocked highway, bridge i

l out, etc.) that might alter implementation of the licensee's recommendation.

2.5 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Slide 43 Licensees were required to develop evacuation time estimates for the full-plume Emergency Planning Zone (10-n11e radius). These estimates were based on various models and must be used with caution. These models have not been validated against evacuations and may be subject to great uncertainties.

Often, the evacuation time estimates are dominated by assumptions of how long it will take to notify people and for them to get ready to leave.

Sometimes it is assumed that it will take an hour or more for preevacuation preparation. Actual experience has shown, however, that, if people are told and motivated to "go now," most will follow instructions, and most L

36 EVENT DETECTED BY CONTROL ROOM STAFF

, r EVENT IS CLASSIFED, AND EMERGENCY IS DECLARED

, r OFF SITE OFFICIALS NOTIFED ABOUT RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROTECTIVE ACTION o

OFF-SITE OFFCIALS DECIDE ON ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN 1 r SIRENS SOUND, AND THE PUBLIC TUNES TO LOCAL RADIO STATION 4

o RADIO MESSAGE ADVISES TO EVACUATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE i r INDIVIDUALS LEAVE HOMES Fig. 2.1.

Flow chart showing steps from detection of an event in the control room to notification of the public.

A r

37 t

will evacuate very fast. Except for specist cases where there is a large population near the site (i.e., Zion and Indian Polat) or where there is some special population (e.g., hospital patients), the area near the site should be able to be evacuated I

in 1 kr or less. Because of the NBC's sitias criteria, there is I

a limited population (<300 people) within 2 miles of most sites.

In these cases, the capacity of the local roads will be great enough so as not to delay an evacuation.

2.6 DOSE PROJECTIONS AND FIELD IONITORING Slide 44 Dose projection models used by off-site officials are generally siellar to those used by the licensee and have the same limitations as other dose models. The only source of release estimates (source term) is from the licensee.

Therefore, while off-site officials osa confirm (check) licensee i

transport calculations, they must rely on the licensee's release (source term) estimates. Because of the complex processes lavolved in a core melt scenario, the source term (release) estimate w!!! provide the greatest source of uncertalaty early la en event. The degree of off-site monitoring capabilities j

varies markedly from excellent to marginal, depending on the state's emphasis os developlag am ladopendent capability.

In some situations, off-site officials rely on the lleensee or the responding federal agencies [e.g., U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Protection Agency, and NEC] for monitoring information.

_3 x

4 38 2.7 LOCATION OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY Slide 45 During the initial phase of the event, the specific location of the local off-site officials with the authority and responsibility to take action varies. The communications system i

between the licensee and of f-site of ficials should accommodate this need. This is very site-and/or state-specific.

In some cases, there are duty officers and 24-kr manned centers, and in others there are local police stations. Once the local emergency organlaation has been activated, it will establish a local Operations Center.

It should be noted that at some sites there are several (2 to 20) local governments within the plume Emergency Planalag Zone and that each might have a center.

At the state level, there are typically two levels of activity of interest: (1) an organisatica that is responsible for conducting technical assessments (e.g., dose assessment) of the situation and (2) decision makers (e.g., governor). These fanations may be performed at two separate locations (centers).

The NRC must coordinate its contact with off-site of ficials to i

avoid considerable confusion resulting from carrying out discussions with both groups.

(See Vol. 5 for a discussion of the interf aces with these two levels of state response.) The i

licensee or state emergency plans should be consulted to determine the specific emergency organization's locations.

l 2.8 NAJOR POINTS i

I l

Slide 46 11e major points covered la this section are sommarised as follows.

l 1

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_. _ _ _ ~. - - _

39 6 The of f-site of ficials responsible for taking protective t

actions must be identified early in an event for the appropriate NRC interface.

6 State and local dose projection methods are, in most cases, similar to the methods used by the licensee and NRC and have the same relative uncertainty.

I' 6 Provisions exist in the vicinity of all reactor sites for Promptly notifying the public living within the plume Emergency Planning Zone.

l 6 Evacuation time estimates should be used with great caution. Often they apply to the full Emergency Planning

~ ' Zone rather than to the nearby low-population zone.

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f SLIDES RELATING TO VM,UNE 3 0F THE SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL i

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1 APPENDIX A SLIDES RELATING TO SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL:

e RESPONSE OF LICENSEE AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS VOL.3 NUREG-1210 ORNL/TM-9271/V3 Slide 1

OBJECTIVES

• Describe the responsibilities of the licensee during an accident i

• Describe what preparations have been made in the plume emergency planning zone (EPZ) and describe a typical EPZ boundary i

• Describe the four classes of emergencies and, in general, the action taken by the licensee and off-site officials for each

• Describe how events are classified and the basis for these classification systems [ Emergency Action Levels (EALs)]

• Describe the function of the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) during an event and how responsibility flows from one to the other 1

j

• Describe the licensee's accident assessment monitoring and dose assessment capabilities 1

i Slide 2 1

l l

REGULATORY BASES FOR LICENSEE PLANS

• NUREG 0396

• NUREG 1131

• Information Notice 83-28

• 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E O

• NUREG 0654 (Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 2)

• NUREG 0737, Supplement 1 Slide 3 l

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING NRC'S ROLE OF MONITORING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

• Event detection and classification

• Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)

Radiological monitoring and dose assessment a

Emergency organizations and response centers Slide 4 l

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l RESPONSIBILITIES OF LICENSEES i

i Control the accident

- Protect the core

- Control the release g

Notify off-site officials within 15 min of emergency declaration and, if necessary, recommend protective actions Slide 6

RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

• Protect the public from the off-site consequences of an accident

• Decide when to notify the public

• Decide what protective measures for the public are needed (e.g.,

sheltering or evacuation)

• Notify the public in the event of a severe accident Slide 7

l l

i BASES FOR SIZE OF PLUME EXPOSURE EPZs l

l Projected doses from design basis accidents and from most core-melt sequences would not exceed upper-level Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) within l

zone E

Immediate life-threatening doses for the worst-case core melt sequences would not occur outside this zone Plume EPZ provides a basis for expansion of response efforts if necessary L

i l

Slide 8 l

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51 EXAMPLE OF A PLUME EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (BOUNDARIES AND EVACUATION ROUTES ARE DETERMINED BY ROADS)

TO A15d5T ANCE CENTER R 138 maeol k CENTER [ tis mdest i

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TO Astilf ANCf TO ASS,ISTANCE

@ FIRST AfD STATION cf Nita I2 i7 mani es% gR g LtTTF AS DFNOTF A At A (V ACU ATION 10NES H 3 **'a' Slide 9

52 EXAMPLE OF A PLUME EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (BOUNDARIES ARE DETERMINED BY NATURAL FEATURES) esp p

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= VA AI BOUNDARY SCALE IN MILf 5 ZONE BOUNDARY ROMAN NUMER ALS DENOTE ARE A EVACUATION ZONES Slide 10

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OFF-SITE PLANS FOR THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY ADDRESS l

l l

• Prompt decision making by off-site officials concerning protective actions for the public

• Development of evacuation plans

• Means to inform the public of emergency plans and procedures

• Means for promptly alerting and informing the public of actions to

)

take (e.g., siren system and radio messages) i i

l

• Means of maintaining 24-hr communication between licensee and off-site officials

• Provisions for radiological monitoring

]

= Provisions for activating and maintaining emergency operations j

centers O

i Slide 11 l

INGESTION PATHWAY EPZ

• Approximately 50-mile radius

• Concern is with interdiction of foodstuffs g

• More time is available for responders to take action

• Decisions on actions to take are usually made at the state level Slide 12 1

I

i I

BASES FOR SIZE OF INGESTION PATHWAY EPZs i

• Downwind range where contamination will generally not exceed EPA I

PAGs within zone lodine may be converted into forms not readily available for e

a incorporation into foodstuffs I

i

• Virtually all particulates would be deposited within 50 miles l

l i

i i

l Slide 13 1

k

i i

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES

• Before TMI-2, control room procedures for analyzing problems were limited to certain predetermined events

• After TMI-2, licensees were required to prepare symptom-oriented procedures

• Limits analysis to a few critical safety functions (CSFs), which result in " safe" conditions for the plant

• Actions are based on plant / control room instrument readings

• Procedures generally do not address actions to be taken after core damage Slide 14 I

i I

57 cRPL oWG 86 rees EXAMPLE OF IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO ASSESS SAFETY FUNCTIONS Safety Function Criteria immediate Actione if not - - - - - - --

+

g

" a) Manua#y trip the reactor

)

l I

m_____.

l b) Open the Rx trip breakers a) Reactivity control

l a) Rx PWR decreasing l

OR AND i

7*

c)(Deenergize the CEA motor l

b)(Negative startup rate) l generator)

AND l

OR I4 c) No more than one CEA l

, d)(Plant specific methods) j Bottom light not lit l

AND l

l

-e. e) If more than 1 CEA not inserted.

Bwated por toch spec l

borate the plant in accordance l

l l

with technical specjhcaticns I

l

' a) Main turbine tripped if b a)not l

AND Trip the turbine l

b) Generator output breaker l 6 b) Open generator output breakers b)(Maintenance of vital-*-l open auxikaries) l4 AND c)(Station loads transferred

& c) Transfer loads offsite or g

offsite) verify diesel started ---- -.-

l y d)(Plant specenc)------

I AND

-e=

l

, d)(Plant specific)

I I

a)(35)in. < PZR LVL < (246)in. !If not - - - - - - - - -e-c) RCS inventory control - o-AND l

a) Venfy proper operation of PLCS l

RCS > (20*F) subcooled l

OR I

l b)Il pressurizer pressure Cauton l

decreases to (1600 PSA),

Do not run RCPS if pressurizer pressure l

(or N contaw possa rease o PSG vwh is < (1300) PSA fogowing an SAS until l

g,

RCP restart criteria are met l

l i

i l

l N mt d) RCS pressure control-e-l a) {l700) PSA < PZR press l

a) Venty proper operation of PPCS OR l

< (2360) PSA l

b)If preneurizer preneure g

decreases to (1600 PSA),

l l

(or if containment pressure l

l increaeos to 4 PSIG), vwify that an SlAS has been === -*-

g l

Initiated. If not, manuaNy i

I ote SS ope,aiion----

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l l

Slide 15

CORE CONDITION ASSESSMENT

• Instrumentation to detect and assess inadequate core cooling and damage

• Procedures

• Operator training i

Slide 16

59 THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE vs CORE DAMAGE PERCENT OF FUEL RODS WITH RUPTURED CLADDING vs MAXIMUM CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE WHEN THE PRESSURE USE CURVE LABELED IS WITH TEMPERATURE

< 100 psia 1200* F

< 1200 psia 1500 F

< 1650 psia 1800 F 100 1200 F g

o 80 CLADDING RUPTURE TEMPERATURE o

E E

$ 60 x

h 1500 F s

a

@ 40 da I

1800* F O

Z 20 u

Fu a.

l l

l l

l o

1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 MAXIMUM CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE (*F)

Slide 17

I l

i i

l j

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i

j

• Measurable / observable control room instrument readings (e.g.,1000 l

R/hr containment monitor, 2000 F thermocouple) i

• Trigger level for declaration of emergencies, activation of emergency organization, and protective action decisions

\\

• Each licensee plan contains EALs i

• Most EALs are based on NUREG 0654 guidance j

• To deal with the many parameters of concern, many licensees use i

4 flow charts and visual aids i

i Slide 18 f

l i

SAMPLE EALs FOR ONE INITIATING CONDITION j

Initiating Condition i

No.1 EALs Known loss of coolant Low reactor water level i

I accident greater

(-134 in.) on level / pressure than makeup pump recorder 1B21-R6238, panel I

j capacity 1H12-P601 l

OR High drywell pressure (+ 1.8 lb)

,~

on pressure indicators CM010 and/or CM021, panel 1PM06J WITH Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel as j

indicated on fuel zone level indicator 1B21-R6210, panel 1H13-P601 (-150 in.

I

+50 in. range with "0" corresponding to top of active fuel), following a time delay of 3 min Slide 19 m

o cmewG em TYPICAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS, FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS, AND CLASSES OF EMERGENCY FALUE TO MANTAN TE FALUE TO MANTAN TE FALUE TO MANTAN THE FOLLOWING CRTICAL SAFETY FOLLOWNG CRTICAL SAFETY FOLLOWNG CRTICAL SAFETY nNCT=

n.C1=

ru-E

- REACTMTY CONTROL

- NACTOR COOLANT NVENTORY

- CONTANMENT NTEGRTY

- REACTOR CORE COOLNG

- PRNARY HEAT EMOVAL

- EACTm COOu m NvENTmY

- aCS = E= nv i t i f I f EsuLTS N LOSS OF REsULTS N LOSS OF RERTS N LOSS OF OR CHALLENGE TO OR CHALLENGE TO OR m TO FUEL CLADDING MACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CONT N F M nsscM eROouCT nSsoN PROouCr

- on,,,

uR,ER uRReR I f LOSS OF OR CHALLENGE TO f

me nssoN

- nselm

-E nssoN ll PRODUCT PRODUCT PRODUCT I

BAMIER BANERS BANERS 4

1 r 1 r i t sne AREA OeE.L

^'rar EMERGooY EMERoENCY Slide 20

63 EXAMPLE OF TIMING FOR BOILING WATER REACTOR GENERAL EMERGENCY SEQUENCES Timing of Event (hr) 6 d

TW8 TOUV AE SJ 2

Unusual Event 0.017 Alert 0.333 0.17 Site Area Emergency 1

0.5 General Emergency 1 to 0.17 0.17 3+

(protective actions 3

recommended)

Core Damage 18 1

0.17 29 Containment Failure

• Leak 16 3

0.25 Major 21 5

3 20 aReactor shutdown followed by loss of decay heat removal.

bReactor shutdown followed by loss of ability to provide coolant water.

CLarge loss of coolant and failure of system to replace water.

dSmall loss of coolant and loss of long-term heat removal.

' Assuming isolation.

Slide 21 2

9

EMERGENCY CLASS DESCRIPTIONS a

Class Core Status Radiation Unusual Event No threat to No release above irradiated fuel technical specifications (or annual limits)

Alert Actual (or potential Release is small for) substantial fraction of EPA degradation of safety PAGs beyond the site boundary Site Area Major failures of Release is less Emergency functions needed than EPA PAGs for public protection beyond the site boundary General Actual or imminent Dose may exceed Emergency core degradation EPA PAGs aClassifications are based on plant 'mstrument levels 0.e.,

EALs).

Slide 22 L_

65 i

EMERGENCY CLASS RESPONSE Local and State Class Plant Action Agency Action Unusual Event Provide notification Be aware Alert Mobilize plant resources Stand by*

Man centers (help for control room)

Activate Technical Support Center (TSC)

Site Area Full mobilization Mobilize Emergency Nonessential site Man emergency centers personnel evacuate and dispatch monitoring team Activate TSC, Operations Inform public - activate Support Center, and warning system Emergency Operations Facility Take protective actions in accordance with PAGs or on an ad hoc Dispatch Monitoring Team basis Provide dose assessments General Emergency Full mobilization Recommend predetermined Recommend predetermined protectiva actions to the protective actions (within public based on 15 min) after declaring plant conditions emergency Precautionary evacuation (2 to 5 miles)

• The NRC will typically activate its response centers at the Alert level.

Slide 23 S

n

LMASUAL EVENT a Purpose is to

1. Ensure that the first step in any response later found to be necessary has been carried out

2. Bring the operating staff to a state of readiness

3. Provide systematic handing of urusus=I events information and decision making

4. Control rumors Slide 24 F

i ALERT

• Purpose is to

1. Ensure that the on-site TSC is activated so that licensee emergency personnel are readily availahia to respond 2.

Provide off-site authorities with 'mformation on the current status S

of the event

3. Provide assistance to the control room staff I

l l

Slide 25

SITE AREA ERERGENCY

= Purpose is to

1. Ensure that aR emergency response centers are manned 2.

Ensure that radiological monitoring teams are dispatched 3.

Ensure that personnel required for evacuation of near-site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious

4. Provide consultation with off-site authorities

5. Provide updates for the public through off-site authorities 6.

Evacuate nonessential plant personnel Slide 26

+

9

(

GBERAL ERERGENCY

• Purpose is to 1.

Initiate predetermined protective action notification of the public g

2.

Bring the full available resources of government and industry to bear on the situation Slide 27

- =,

hr F

~

s

~

"-s

^

' PROTECTIVE ACTION-RECOMMENDATIONS

• Licensees are required to make a PAR within 15 min of declaring a l

general emergency.

• Protective actions have been preplanned and are generally site-g specific l

• No predstermined actions are e-stablished for the other emergency classes

~

Slide 28 a_

CONTROL ROOM

• Control room is the initial emergency response center

• Control room personnel have 24-hr authority and responsibility to declare an emergency and to recommend protective actions

• Shift supervisor is routinely designated as the emergency director

• During night and weekend hours, it may take up to 1 hr before augmentation arrives Slide 29

TECHNICAL. SUPPORT CENTER

• Licensees are required to maintain a TSC for assisting the control room staff in diagnosing plant conditions

• The TSC is located close enough to the control room to allow fast access

• The TSC is shielded and has sufficient protection equipment to a

enable plant staff to work under accident conditions Slide 30

OPERATIONS SUPPORT ' CENTER Used by shift personnel (e.g., operators and health physics technicians) for supporting the emergency response Keeps excess people out of the control room I

li i

Slide 31 i

i EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Off-site facility for interacting with state and local officials Located within 10 to 20 miles of the site t

Space is provided for off-site officials Licensee will generally formulate PARS and monitor environmental monitoring teams from the EOF 1

l Slide 32

RELATIVE LOCAT10NS OF LICENSEE CENTERS TECMCAL SUMRT CENTER SITE B3UNDARY g

- _S _

g*

=

~

w SUPPORT NTER EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACitJTY

- TOTAL UCENSEE RESPONSE

- NTERFAN WITH OFFGTE OFFICIALS

- OFF-SITE MOMTORNG

- PROTECTNE ACTION DECISION MAKNG Slide 33

l l

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY Initially all responsibility is in the control room All activities that can be moved should be transferred to the TSC as soon as it is staffed Usually within 1 hr the EOF will assume responsibility for protective l

action decision making and total licensee response Locate the appropriate NRC interface over the Emergency Notification System or the Health Physics Network Slide 34

RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES

• Increased effluent monitor coverage and range

• Postaccident sampling a

• Effluent sampling

• Field monitoring Slide 35

l EFFLUENT MONITOR l

On expected release pathways On scale for course of accident Slide 36

REQUIREMENTS FOR POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING

• 3-hr analysis

• Indications of the degree of core damage

• Containment atmosphere (hydrogen)

• Primary coolant (boron and chlorides)

Slide 37

MAJOR POINTS

• The licensee and state and local officials are responsible for taking immediate actions - not the NRC. The NRC should interfere only if there is a serious lack of appropriate action.

In such a case, the NRC should attempt to. determine the reason for a problem

• When prompt action is required, NRC concurrence is not appropriate prior to implementation a

• The plume EPZ is the area for which extensive preplanning has been done. The actual shape and area of the EPZ (about.10 miles in radius) are site specific l

l

• Licensees have in place EOPs that will direct the response to l

correct a problem with the plant l

j

• Specific immediate appropriate actions are preplanned for each class of accidents l

l Slide 38 i

l

MAJOR POINTS (CONTINUED)

Licensees have in place instrumentation, procedures, and training for detection of inadequate core cooling and core damage Accidents are classified based on observables (EALs) l j

1 Declaration of a general emergency should initiate recommendation of predetermined protective actions off site j

The licensee authority and responsibility for taking actions on site will initially be in the control room, but as other personnel arrive, i

authority and responsibility will move to the TSC (plant l

assessment) or EOF (dose assessment and off-site coordination)

As a result of lessons learned from TMI-2, licensees have installed and improved effluent monitoring and postaccident sampling capabilities i

Slide 38 (Continued)

I t

h i

r OBJECTIVES

• State where the responsibility for protective action decisions resides

• Describe provisions for and timing of public notification of the plume EPZ population

• Describe criteria that should be used in making decisions and how the criteria are adjusted to local conditions a

• Describe the. role and shortcomings of evacuation time estimates l

• Describe state and local radiological monitoring capabilities

• State why it is not acceptable for protective action to be based solely on EPA PAGs and dose projections Slide 39 i

I i

l 1

r l

DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY l

• Determine who has authority 5

• Information should be available in emergency plans l

l i

i Slide 40

PUBLIC NOTIFICATION Off-site officials are promptly notified by the licensee to enable them to make prompt protective action decisions Once a decision is made, the public will be promptly alerted and advised as to what protective actions to take l

Slide 41

85 EVENT FLOW CHART EVENT DETECTED BY CONTROL FIOOM STAFF

, r EVENT IS CLASSIFED, AND EMERGENCY IS DECLARED i r OFF-SITE OFFICIALS NOTIFED ABOUT RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROTECTIVE ACTON

, r OFF-SITE OFFICIALS DECOE ON ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN 1 r SIRENS SOUND, AND THE PUBUC TUNES TO LOCAL RADIO STATON

, r RADO MESSAGE ADVISES TO EVACUATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

, r INDMDUALS LEAVE HOMES f

Slide 42 Q

L l

l 1

i i

l EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Licensees have developed estimates using models that have not i

been tested and thus must be used with caution l

l Because of NRC siting criteria, population within 2 miles of most sites is limited, so evacuation of the area near the plant would g

involve little delay Except for a few cases, the area near the site could be evacuated in 1 hr or less i

l l

Slide 43 l

l

l l

DOSE PROJECTIONS AND FIELD MONITORING Off-site officials must rely on the licensee for release estimates in performing dose projections Some states have excellent field monitoring capabilities; others rely on licensee or other (i.e., Federal) agencies m

Slide 44 l

l t

LOCATION OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY A licensee's communication of an emergency with off-site officials is frequently via local or state police m

Off-site officials will generally staff one emergency operations center but may have many - one for each town States frequently have two levels of interest: technical and decision-making. The NRC contact must recognize the role of each level Slide 45 f

i MAJOR POINTS l

l The off-site officials responsible for taking protective actions must t

l be identified Not all state / local plans calls for taking actions based on plant conditions (i.e., before an actual release occurs)

State and local dose projection methods are, in most cases, similar to the methods used by the licensee and NRC (i.e., very uncertain)

In the vicinity of all reactor sites, provisions exist for promptly notifying the public living within the plume EPZ Evacuation time estimates should be used with great caution.

Often they apply to the full EPZ rather than to the nearby low-population zone Slide 46 1

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NUREG-1210 E"/#

BIBLIOGRAPHIC CATA SHEET VOI* 3 us N TRucT.oN oN T,.. ainRu

3. TITLE Amo sueliTLE 3 LEAVE BLANK Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident e

Response Training Manual

/

Response of Licensee and State and Local Officials

. oATa Re,oRi co,uno l

uAR

.oNT.

July 1986

. AuT omis.

• ^ " " ' ' " ' ' " ' ' "

C.A. Sakenas, T.J. McKenna, C.W. Miller, L.M. Hively, R.W. Sharpe, J.G. Giiter, R.M. Watkins l

February 1987 7 PERFORMING ORGANi2 ATIoN N AME ANo MelLING Acomg33,,,ce, sele Cess, S PROJECT,T A5sUWORK UNIT NUMBER j

Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response

[

e

• N oa GaANT Nuena Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear RegulatorysCommission

/

Washington, DC 20555

10. SPONSOR.N 3 oRGANI24TeoN NAME ANO MA.LINGeooREss,,acf, sele case, e

tia TvtE OF REPORT i

X

/

g Same as 7. above.

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J t2 SUPPLEMENT ARv NOTES j

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13 La$TR ACT,200 weres or fees, 4,

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ectively provide for the U.S. Nuclear This is one in a series of volumes that col [ hse personnel the necessary background Regulatory Comission (NRC) emergency reigo information for an adequate response to sfere reactor accidents. The volumes in the series are:

na 3 $

Volume 1 -- Overview and Summary of Sjor oints o

o Volume 2 -- Severe Reactor Accident,0verview o Volume 3 -- Response of Licensee and State ahi Local Officials o Volume 4 -- Public Protective Actidns -- PrecVtermined Criteria and Initial Actions o Volume 5 -- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'tResponse

./

b Each volume serves, respectively, h the text for ahcourse of instruction-in a series of courses for NRC response personnel. These mater 1 1s do not provide guidance or license requirements for NRC licensees or state or lo 1 response organizations.

Each volume is accompanied by angippendix of slides th t can be used to present this material. The slides are called out in the text.

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emergency response e

severe power reactor' accident licensee and state and local' officials Unlimited

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