ML20138R294

Proposed Findings & Conclusions Re Contention 57-c-3 Concerning Nighttime Alerting & Notification.Plant Siren Sys Must Be Upgraded W/Addl Sirens or Telephone Sys to Notify Persons within 5 Miles of Facility.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20138R294
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	12/16/1985
From:	Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W.
To:
References
CON-#485-624 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, L, OL, NUDOCS 8512310157
Download: ML20138R294 (8)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Core"n NUCIEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION B +:

December 16, 1985 BEP0HE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

\ Glenn Dr. O. Bri James H.ght crf:

Carpenter CWu;w i A b James L. Kelley, Chairman *ANCH -

In the Matter of CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. )

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Unit 1) ) ASLBP No. 82-1468-01

-) OL Wells Eddleman's Proposed Findings and Conclusions on Contention 57-e-3 (Nighttime Alerting and Notification)

Under extension of time approved by the Board and all Parties, (See Tr. 10225, 10,210), Wells Eddleman, Intervenor, files these proposed i

i Findings of Fact, Conclusions of LN and Proposed Order on Contention 57-C=3 (Nighttime Alerting and Notification).

l FINDINGS OF PACT

1. Contention 57-C-3 as originally admitted reads:

The plan does not have provisions for notification at night, e.g. in the hours between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m. when most people living near the plant would normally be asleep. Nor does the plan

' assure that they would be timely awakened to take sheltering action, as e.g. ob a summer night when many might have windows open or air conditioners on. The plan should urovide automatic phone-dialing equipment to transmit an emergency message to all households in the EPZ for Harris, asking people to alert their j phoneless neighbors.

l 2. In denying Applicants 8 motion for sunmary disposition (which was suonorted by various affidavits including one by I

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Dr. M. Reada Bassiouni, acoustic consultant to CP&L), the Board

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, directed the Applicants and Staff to address these questions:

(A) "whether the sirens can wake up virtually all the people sleeping in the EPZ between 1 and 6 a.m., particularly those with windows closed and air conditioners running," and (B) "'whether the presently-planned means of back-up mobile notification could and should be augmented to meet the 'about' 15-minute standard in Appendix E, if necessary."'

3. FEMA testimony did not address the second question (B) above.

Applicants did not directly address augmentation of the system, but in effect their testimony is that it cannot be effectively augmented.

(Keast et al., at 27, following Tr. 9365; it may take all of 15 minutes for (emergency) vehicles to travel to the rural areas to be alerted.

This is one of the obvious practical constraints on the ability to restructure mobile alerting routes to target rural areas for coverage within 15 minutes. Joyner, Tr. 9583; accord, Anplicants ' Finding 39 and Fn.23, pp 32 and 33 of Apolicants' proposed findings).

4 In any event, mobile alerting is not relied upon at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant as part of the primary notification system. (FEMA witness Carter, Tr. 9701; accord, Applicants Fn.P4, p.32 of their proposed findings. ) The siren system at Harris is )

I the primary notification system.

5. The NRC requires that the notification system provide both an alert signal and an instructional message to the population within the 10-mile EPZ within 15 minutes. CLI-80-40, 12 NRC 636 at 638.

Both FEMA and NRC " insist" on this design requirement. Ibid. .

The NRC goes on to cite its rulemaking justification of the 15-minute j notice requirement:

In determining what d1at (public notification) requirement should be, a line must be drawn somewhere, and the Commission

- 4 believes that providing as much time as practicable for the taking of protective action is in the interest of the public health and safety. The Sommission recognizes that this requirement may present a significant financial impact and that the technical basis for this requirement is not without dispute. ... However, the essential rationale bdhind emergency planning is to provide additional assurance for the public protection even during . . .

an unexpected event. The 15-minute notification capability ~

requirement is wholly consistent with that rationale.

45 PR 55407, quoted at 12 NRC 639.

The Commission concluded, "This rationale is unaltered by petitioners' filings with the Commission", and let the regulations stand.

Notification must cover essentially 100% of the EPZ within areas up to 15 minutes. NUREG-0654 at 3-3, reg 5 miles from the plant. For the full EPZ, capability for providing an alert signal to the population on and area wide basis throughout the EPZ within 15 minutes is required.

NUREG-0654 at 3-3, emphasis added (Cf. Applicants ' Finding 6 at p.7 for quotations / cites).

6, Contrary to Applicants' proposed Finding 8, it is clear that FEMA-k3 was not designed with any reference to "what's required to alert the neople in the EPZ" or af ter any assessment of "the validity i

of the requirements" or even considering "the question of nighttime /

early mourning alert

• ng of people." FwvA witness Carter, principal author of FEMA-43 (cf. Auplicants ' propoced Finding 14, p.12) Tr. 9916-9917 upon Board examination.

It is clear, however, that the requirements of 10 CPR 50.h7(a)(1) to assure that effective protective action can and will be taken, the requirements of 10 CPR 50 Appendix E, IV. D. 3 and the above-cited requirement of NUREG-0654 apply at all times of the day or night.

They make no exceptions for nighttime conditions and they require effectiveness.

7. Motions by the Attorney General of North Carolina and by Intervenor Eddleman to subcoena CP&L consultant Dr. M. Reada Bassiouni were sumnarily denied by the Board, and the Board's rationale for that

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-h-denial .is not available to the parties at the time of filinF these findings. However, the Board did admit,as if sworn,a statement by Dr. Bassiouni in which he strongly criticizes FEMA's testimony and concluded "the (F24A) guidlines address outdoor notification.

1 A 10 dB differential between the siren sound level and ambient l background level outdoors does not necessarily guarantee a 10 dB )

1 differential indoors. In order for a siren system design to  ;

incorporate indoor alerting, different requirements must be met.

"The relevant siren level is that which has already been attenuated through the walls of the house. Since the guidelines do not require indoor siren sound levels or ambients to be calculated, they do not address the effectiveness of indoor notification."' (Tr. 9879, Eddleman Exhibit 73 at 7, correcting transcription errors).

j 8. Applicants' attempts to a tress the credentials of the witnesses I

(proposed findings 14, 18, 21, 15-17, 19,20) add force to the weakness of their case. Those witnesses testified for Auplicants that only 69%

of persons aslepp in the EPZ would be awakened by the sirens, and for FEMA that only 64.5% would be. (On this last, cf. Applicants ' proposed i finding 49. The FEMA witnesses conceded that a single phone call to each household in the EPZ would alert over 90% of the population who have telenhones (Tr. 9763), and that simultaneous-calling phone systems

, that can ring 1000 numbers (or more) at once are referenced in FEMA-43 section E.16 (Tr. 9760-61)

However, even incorporating " informal alerting", PEMA concluded that 87.8% of the persons in the EPZ could be alerted within 15 minutes (Applicants' Finding $1, p.k2) and Applicants' comparable number is 88%

(Applicants ' Finding 46 at p.38)

All these witnesses assume that 100% of the sirens work when activated (See, e.g., Tr. 9700). However, this is not conservative and Applicants' counsel Ridgway indicated to the hearing that a siren

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Shearon Harris in May 1985, but the comoany had no way to verify that it did or did not work.

9. There are numerous lesser problems with the data of FEMA and the Applicants, e.g. lack of field verification at Harris of the Applicants' (HMM) SI9EP and PEMA's OSPM models (See, e.g. Tr. 9729, 9479-80). (Dr. Bassiouni. made such measurements, Tr. 9875-76; Eddleman Exhibit 73 at 4, but his data is not in evidence.); Anolicants have erroneously claimed a part of region 'O' on Anolicants' Exhibit 47 is unpopulated;etc. Dr. Bassiouni translated as study from German (Eddleman Exh 74) contrary to their footnote 19 on nage 28, pron findings)

10. However, these are less significant weaknesses than those given in Finding 8 and those given here: FEMA witness Carter did not maintain that 10dB above ambient indoors would wake people up (Tr. 9701-9702). FEMA witness Kryter calculated that with a 3?dB fan noise, 10 dB above ambient would only awaken 27 to 29% of the people asleep in the EPZ (Tr. 9705, see also 9702-5). Outdoor sound levels of 90 to 99 dB are required for a 50% urobability of waking people up.

Tr. 9927. This is not very inconsistent with Dr. Bassiouni's German study where 3 45-second repetitions of a 60-dB sound in a bedroom awakened 60% of German air-raid nrotection students of all adult ages.

(Eddleman Exh 74 at 7-8 for repetition; Bassiouni at Tr. 9877, Eddleman Exh 73 at 5.) The German study of sirens includes attenuation of 10-15 dB. However, if we use Dr. Kryter's 27 5dB for closed storm windows (Tr. 9908, e.g. ),

i the German study requires 87.5 dB outside (constant level), corresponding l to a peak of about 92-95 d3 for 60% awakening, in reasonable agreement i

! with the testimony of the witnesses who appeared at the hearing.

Even for a 3-person household, 50% probability of awakening any indivimuul gives only 67.5% for a household exposed to 85-100 dB outside, based on these data.

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l Applicants' Exhibit 46 (EPZ Nighttime Sound Level Map) makes it glaringly clear that most of the EPZ, whether within 5 miles of the Harris plant, or within 10 miles but beyond 5 miles, is exposed to sound levels outdoors of less than ;he 85-100 dB required to give 50% probability of awakening a person sleeping indoors in a house without background noise but which has closed storm windows.

This lack of alerting, shown most strikingly near siren 70  !

but evident at many othe3 sites, is simply unacceptable, j

11. Applicants' case is further weakened by the very document (Applicants ' Exhibit $4, " Prompt Notification of 100% of Peonle in the EPZ" by Dr. -Bassiouni, from Power Engineering September 1983 pp 47-49. There Dr. Bassiouni states, "It is difficult to guarantee 100% notification by ourely nhysical tieans under ar.y circumstances ...

even when specially designed alert systems are installed within the

{ 10-mile EPZ, it is essential to take into consideration some complex -

physical and sociological factors and capitalize on them.

"Neither the NRC's NU9EG-065h guidelines nor the Fedeval Fmergency Management Agency's evaluation guide trovide for consideration of these factors." (emphasis added).

l The Board notes that informal alerting as mentioned in the hearing is not controllable like a siren or telephone system, and is not part ,

of the primary alerting system or notificaticn gystem under NRC or FEMA 1

regulations or guidance. '

Dr. Bassiouni continues - (Applicants ' Exh. 54) " Existing federal guidelines assume that peoole will be alerted only by sirens or some other alerting device. If, however, any of the people in the EPZ i 4

are indoors at the time of the alert, it may be difficult for them I to hear the siren signal-because of substantial sound attentation through_ building structures, and competit$on from sounds inside I the structures."

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Finally, it is worth noting that Dr. Bassiouni in this article advocates reliance on informal alerting and other mechanisms not included in NRC and FEMA notification system requirements as a means of saving money for utilities (compare the first and last naragranha of the article). The NRC under the Atomic Energy Act is concerned with requiring what is necessary for the oublic health and safety, not with reducing or weighing the costs of necessary equipment and systems.

12. Informal alerting has weaknesses in practice, too. In the Mount St. Helens volcano disaster cited by Applicants ' witness Mileti, only 68% of the conulation was notified; in the flood he cites, only a little over half of those formally notified engaged in informal notification. Nevertheless, he assumes that 80% of persons formally notified will engage in informal notification. (cf. Anplicants '

uroposed Finding 46.) The evidence does not suonort such high nercentages.

And, as noted above, informal alerting is outside the scope of notification means required by the NRC and PEMA rules.

CONCLUSIONS and 0%ER

1. FEMA's findings on emergency planning issues are a rebuttable presumption (10 CFR 50.47). In this case, both FEMA 's evidence and that of the Applicants and Dr. Bassiouni rebuts the idea that the Harris siren system is adequate for night-time alerting of people asleep indoors.

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2. Therefore the Harris siren system nust be upgraded, eithee by more sirens, or by means such as the telephone system mentioned in the contention, to nrovide a design capable of notifying 100% of persons within 5 miles of the plant, within 15 minutes, and to notify essentially all of the persons within the 5-to-10 mile ring containing the rest of the E5Z in time for them to receive a guidance message from the Emergency Broadcast System within about 15 minutes of activation of the notification system. It is clear that back-up alerting alone cannot do this.

It is so ordered.

l VNITED STATES OF AMERICA

' NUCLFAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION i

In the matter of CAROLIKA F0WER k LIGHT CO. It )al. Docket 1

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Unit 1- )

50-1400 j 0.L i CIRIIFICATEOF SERVICE I hereby certif that copies of Wells Eddleman's Pro and Conclusfons on dontention 57-C . 3 (Niguuurme Mercius) who oz posed Pin f

Wells _Eddleman's oblections to D a Engineering article, EAVE been served this _16 day of December 1985 , by deposit in i

i the U5 kil, first-class postage prepaid, upon all parties whose name are listed beloh, except those whose names are parked with i

an asterisk, for whom service was accomplished by i

Atomic Safety and Licenaire BoardJudges James Kelley, G US Nuclear Megulatory Conmission Washington DC 20555 1 i George F. Trowbridge (attorney for Applicants) i Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge j 1600 M St. NW IL uthanne G. Miller Washington, DC 20036 ASLB Panel USNRC Washington DC 2055 5

) Office of the Executive Legal Director  !

Attn Docke ts 50-400/401 0 L. [ spence W. Perry plM Wa ngton DC 20555 C [Washing cst.s *on DC c

20740 Docketing and Service Section (3x) Dan Read  !

Attn Decke ts 50-h00/hC10.L. CEA!E/TLP Office of the Secretary .

Waleigh,yr07 NC Waveros.

2760'6 a r4 ton DC 20555 ** LI"d* ' Littl*

John Runkle (E plan only) Governor's" Waste Ngt. Bd. ~

CCNC Steve Rochlais 513 Albenarle Biog, 307 Granville Rd FEi%-Suite 700 325 N. Salisbutw St' Chapel Hill Nc 2751k 137.1 Peachtree St.NE Raleigh, NC 27611 i

Atlanta GA 30309 Bradle7 W. Jones

'Travi a Fayne Robert Gruber USNRC Region II Edelstein & Payne Exec. Director Blox 12601 Public Staff 101 Marietta St.  !

Raleigh NC 27605 Box 991 Atlanta GA 30303 I Ral*ish NC 27602 '

Richard Wilson, M.D.  !

729 Eunter St. Certified by Apex NC 27502 h i

Karen E. Long & Jo Anne Sanford Attorney General's Office Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 '

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