ML20136H309

Reply to Other Parties Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Eddleman S7-C-3 Re night-time Notification.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20136H309
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/06/1986
From:	Ridgway D CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
References
CON-#186-686 OL, NUDOCS 8601090409
Download: ML20136H309 (35)

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'86 JN1 -8 A10 :30anuary 6, 1986 UNITED STATES OpI NUCLEAR REGULATORYg,AMEIt'IdAdi((y COMMt.SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant) )

APPLICANTS' REPLY TO OTHER PARTIES' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON EDDLEMAN 57-C-3 '

(NIGHT-TIME NOTIFICATION)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Applicants herein submit their reply to: " Attorney General's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Eddleman Contention 57-C-3 (Night-Time Notification)," dated December 16, 1985 (cited hereafter as "NCAG PF [ paragraph number (s)]"); " Wells Eddleman's Proposed Findings and Conclu-sions on Contention 57-C-3 (Nighttime Alerting and Notifica-tion)," dated December 16, 1985 (cited hereafter as "Eddleman PF "); and "NRC Staff / FEMA Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Eddleman Contention 57-C-3 (Nighttime No-tification)," dated December 23, 1985 (cited hereafter as

" Staff / FEMA PF ").

8601090409 860106 PDR ADOCK 05000400 G PDR 3So3

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2. Applicants are largely in agreement with the Staff / FEMA proposed findings. Accordingly, this reply focuses on the NCAG and Eddleman proposed findings. Applicants have not attempted to respond to each proposed finding with which Applicants disagree. Nor is the Board required to address ex-pressly each and every individual finding proposed by every party. See Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1),

'ALAB-740, 18 N.R.C. 343, 367 (1983), citing Public Service Co.

of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 N.R.C. 33, 41 (1977), aff'd, CLI-78-1, 7 N.R.C. 1 (1978), aff'd sub nom. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978). As to matters not raised in this reply, Applicants rely upon but do not repeat " Applicants' Pro-posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Eddleman 57-C-3 (Night-time Notification)," dated December 9, 1985 (cited hereafter as " App. PF "). Applicants' reply is or-ganized generally by subject matter in the same manner as their initial proposed findings.

3. In assessing the North Carolina Attorney General's

("NCAG") proposed findings on this contention, we note that his representatives made no contribution to the development of the evidentiary record. Indeed, they did not even attend the hear-ings except for the telephone conference conducted near the conclusion of the hearings. In addition, the NCAG has no ap-parent expertise in emergency preparedness matters, l

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t particularly the efficacy of public alert and notification sys-tems. An official of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management ("DEM"), the state agency with primary responsibili-ty for emergency preparedness activities concerning nuclear fa-cilities (as well as other natural and technological hazards),

testified in support of the adequacy of the alert and notifica-tion system to notify the public in the Harris EPZ. Keast et al., at 43. Accordingly, the NCAG proposed findings are enti-tied to little weight.

II. FINDNGS OF FACT A. 'THE REGULATORY SCHEME

4. The proposed findings of both Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA included comprehensive reviews of the regulatory requirements governing public alert and notification systems and their application to.the facts of this case. App. PF 5-10; Staff / FEMA PF 7-15. The proposed findings filed by Mr. Eddleman and by the NCAG stand in stark contrast. While both the Eddleman and the NCAG proposed findings recite select regulatory requirements, the proposed findings are devoid of any detailed legal analysis. See generally Eddleman PF 5, 6; NCAG PF 2, 3, 4, 8.a, 9. Moreover, neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG cites any authority which was not addressed in the proposed findings of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA. Cer-tainly there is nothing in the Eddleman or NCAG proposed findings which undermines _the legal analyses advanced by Appli-cants and the NRC Staff / FEMA.

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5. In a December 4, 1985 conference call, the Board noted the possible relevance to this case of the Commission's decision in Final Rule on Emergency Planning, CLI-80-40, 12 N.R.C. 636 (1980). The Board noted the Commission's apparent

" endorsement" of the three-part design objective in NUREG-0654, and invited the parties to address the matter in their proposed findings. Tr. 10220, 10223-24. Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA accepted the Board's invitation. App. PF 6-8; Staff / FEMA PF 11. The NCAG proposed findings do not even ack'nowledge the Board's comments. And, while Mr. Eddleman cited the Commission's decision, he failed to accurately quote the NUREG-0654 design objective endorsed in that decision.

Mr. Eddleman asserted that " capability for providing an alert signal to the population on an area wide basis throughout the EPZ within 15 minutes is required." Eddleman PF 5 (emphasis supplied by Mr. Eddleman). This is simply a paraphrase of only the first of three parts of the NUREG-0654 design objective, which must be read in pari materia. As noted in paragraph 6 of Applicants' proposed findings, the remaining two parts of the design objective provide:

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s b) The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site, c) Special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have re-ceived the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ.

Thus, Mr. Eddleman failed to discuss the Commission's recogni-tion of a distinction between system performance within 5 miles of the plant and system performance outside the 5 mile radius.

Nor did he comment on the Commission's express refusal to specify any precise percentage which must be alerted within 15 minutes in either area. Finally, he nowhere addressed the qualification placed on the design objective -- echoed by the Commission -- which recognizes that the design objective "does not * *

• constitute a guarantee that early notification can be provided for everyone with 100% assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will meet the design objective in all cases." NUREG-0654, at 3-1. Compare Eddleman PF 5 with App. PF 6-7, esp. n.3. The applicable regulatory scheme is thus more flexible than Mr. Eddleman's abbreviated discussion of legal authority would suggest.

6. Indeed, as noted in paragraph 7 of Applicants' pro-posed findings, the Commission expressly declined to specify in the NUREG-0654 design objective a precise percentage from 5 to 10 miles, "to allow planners the flexibility to design the most cost-effective system" to meet the general objective of the

regulations. The Commission further emphasized that, "[i]n its implementation of this part of the rule, the NRC intends to be guided by FEMA's judgment as to what times and systems are feasible." Final Rule on Emergency Planning, CLI-80-40, 12 N.R.C. 636, 638 (1980) (emphasis supplied). These holdings belie Mr. Eddleman's assertions that the Commission's public alert and notification regulations are to be applied without regard to practical consideraticns. Compare Eddleman PF 11.

7. The NCAG attempts to make much of the fact that NUREG-0654 and FEMA-43 provide for the use of daytime ambient background levels in siren system design. NCAG PF 3-4. How-ever, it is beyond cavil that ambient background levels are typically higher during the day than at night. Staff / FEMA PF

43. Similarly, there can be no dispute that sound propagation is generally worse during the day than at night. Keast et al.,

at 11, 24; Lee, at 21. Thus, the import of the NCAG's observa-tion is not readily apparent.

8. The thrust of the NCAG's line of argument seems to be that the regulatory guidance does not expressly address the summer nighttime case. NCAG PF 8.a, 9, 14. Similarly, Mr. Eddleman argues strenuously that the public alert and noti-fication regulations "make no exceptions for nighttime condi-tions." Eddleman PF 6.1/ Quoting Dr. Bassiouni, Mr. Eddleman 1/ Paragraph 8 of Applicants' proposed findings merely sets forth the numerical design critoria established in NUREG-0654 (Continued Next Page) further criticizes the NRC/ FEMA guidance, asserting that be-cause it does not require indoor sound levels to be calculated, it "[does) not address the effectiveness of indoor notifica-tion." Eddleman PF 7. Contrary to the implication of the ref-erenced proposed findings, neither Applicants nor the NRC Staff / FEMA has ever contended that an alert and notification system need not be effective indoors and at night. Indeed, Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA here undertook extensive analyses to demonstrate that the alert and notification system for the Harris plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone will be effective under the summer nighttime conditions postu-lated in Eddleman 57-C-3. These analyses specifically consid-ered attenuation through the walls of a house, as well as all

" factors pertinent to nighttime notification." App. PF 22-32; Staff / FEMA PF 44-74. In short, because the case for the effec-tiveness of the Harris alert and notification system has not rested on the numerical design criteria of NUREG-0654 and (Continued) and further discussed in EEMA-43. Mr. Eddleman attacks Appli-cants' recitation of those criteria, though it is unclear what he disputes -- or could dispute. Eddleman PF 6. Selectively excerpting Mr. Carter's testimony, Mr. Eddleman attempts to im-pugn the development of FEMA-43. Properly read in the context of the Board question posed to him, it is clear that Mr. Carter was simply explaining that FEMA-43 was not intended to present additional guidance beyond the regulations and NUREG-0654, but rather was prepared as an implementation document "that would explain to people how they might comply" with the existing reg-ulations and guidance. Tr. 9916-17 (Carpenter, Carter).

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FEMA-43, the Board need not reach an assessment of that guid-ance. Rather, the Board need only determine whether the compo-nents of the system here at issue, taken together, provide, under summer nighttime conditions:

• *

• the capability to essentially com-plete the initial notification of the pub-lic within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes.

10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.3 (emphasis supplied).

The Board concludes that the system as a whole meets the Com-mission's regulations. Under these circumstances, any dissat-isfaction of Mr. Eddleman or the NCAG with the regulatory guid-ance must be reserved for some other forum.

B. THE ALERT / NOTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR THE HARRIS EPZ

1. Fixed Sirens

9. Neither the North Carolina Attorney General nor Mr. Eddleman seriously challenge the sound propagation models used by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA to predict nighttime coverage of the Harris siren system. Indeed, the North Carolina Attorney General notes that the propagation analyses were " elaborate." NCAG PF 5. Mr. Eddleman complains of the

" lack of field verification at Harris" of the SIREP and OSPM models employed by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA, respec-tively. Eddleman PF 9. However, it is beyond dispute that the models have been field-verified extensively elsewhere. App. PF 23 n.9; Tr. 9473-76, 9632 (Keast); App. PF 26 n.12. There is I

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no evidentiary basis whatsoever for the suggestion that it is

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necessary to r-3 validate such computer models at each and every site. Rather, the record here compels the opposite conclusion.

Tr. 9639-41, 9666-67 (Keast).

10. Apparently based on a review of Applicants' Exhibit 46 (which plots all houses in the EPZ and indicates the night-time siren contours), Mr. Eddleman further complains that

" Applicants have erroneously claimed a part of region 'O' on Applicants' Exhibit 47 is unpopulated." Eddleman PF 9. Be-cause Exhibit 47 is pertinent only to the FEMA-43 analysis of the siren system (Tr. 9433 (Kelley)),2/ Mr. Eddleman's asser-tion is of no moment here.3/ The record is clear that, for purposes of the nighttime notification analyses before this Board, Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA considered all homes in the EPZ (as mapped on Applicants' Exhibit 46) -- including the two houses in the part of region O of concern to Mr. Eddleman. Keast et al., at 12; Lee, at 22-23.

2/ Applicants.did not advance Exhibit 47 as relevant to Eddleman 57-C-3, but agreed to have it identified and marked because it showed certain information more clearly than Appli-cants' Exhibit 46. Exhibit 47 was originally admitted for that limited purpose. Tr. 9426-28. Over Applicants' objections, the Board later admitted Exhibit 47 for general purposes,

" bearing in mind that it is a FEMA-43 daytime map." Tr.

9431-34.

3/ In any event, although not relevant to the Board's inquiry here, Mr. Carter had reviewed region O for FEMA-43 acceptance, and had determined that the two houses of concern to Mr. Eddleman would in fact be covered under the FEMA-43 requirements of 60 dB coverage. Tr. 9915 (Carter). See also j Tr. 9741-43 (Carter).

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11. Noting the probable failure of a siren during the May 1985 exercise at Harris, Mr. Eddleman criticizes the nighttime siren coverage analyses performed by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA because they assume the operation of 100% of the si-rens. Eddleman PF 8. But this is standard practice in de-termining the acoustical coverage of a siren system design.

Tr. 9700 (Carter). Further, there is no evidentiary basis for the implication that siren failure will be a concern once the system is fully installed and operational. See generally, Tr.

9446. In any event, many residences within the EPZ are covered by multiple sirens. Applicants' Ex. 46. Moreover, the mobile alerting system in place within the EPZ covers all residences within the EPZ. Keast et al., at 26. Thus, even assuming a siren were to fail in an emergency (and entirely discounting informal notification processes), the population residing near that siren would not go without notification.

12. The NCAG observes that, to date, there has been no

" controlled field test with follow-up survey to determine actu-al performance of the siren system." NCAG PF 7. But this is not at all unusual for a plant at this stage of licensing. In-deed, licensing boards in other cases have ruled on the adequa-cy of siren systems before those systems have even been installed. As the Appeal Board has pointed out:

[I]nstallation and testing of the siren system is precisely the type of matter for which the Commission believes predictive findings can suffice at this stage.

Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 N.R.C. 1076, 1105 (1983). Moreover, while a day-time test of the siren system (followed by a tele-phone survey of residents) is planned, there is no requirement that such a test be completed prior to the issuance of an oper-ating license. App. PF 8; Staff / FEMA PF 142.

13. Both the NCAG and Mr. Eddleman recite litanies of statistics on the probabilities that different levels of sound would awaken individuals under various conditions. See, e.g.,

NCAG PF 9, 10; Eddleman PF 8, 10. Certain of these assorted statistics are addressed individually below. But these fig-ures, in the abstract, are meaningless. The Board is concerned with the forest, not individual trees. For this purpose, recognizing-that most households are comprised of more than one person, and that there is a broad range of cases represented in i EPZ housing (depending on, e.g., window position, etc.), the relevant figure is the overall percentage of households in the EPZ which would be alerted by the sirens at night. According to Applicants' analyses, approximately 72% of the households would be so alerted.4/ Keast et al., at 9. The proposed 4/ Contrary to Eddleman PF 8, FEMA did not testify that only 64.5% of EPZ households would be alerted by the sirens at (Continued Next Page)

I findings of Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG disclose nothing to un-dermine these analyses.

14. Relying on calculations performed by Mr. Keast on the witness stand at the Board's request, the NCAG asserts that "for a sleeping person in [an] air-conditioned house with closed windows, the probability of arousal from sleep with a siren sound level of 60 dB is essentially zero. With windows open, the probability only increases by an incremental 7-8%."

NCAG PF 9. However, the referenced calculations were in error.

As indicated in the " Affidavit of David N. Keast Correcting Oral Testimony on Eddleman 57-C-3" (served January 2, 1986),

with 60 dB outdoors, windows closed and central air condi-tioning on, the probability of awakening a person is 10%. With windows open, the probability is 27%.

15. Citing pages 9701 and 9702 of the transcript, Eddleman PF 10 asserts that " FEMA witness Carter did not main-tain that 10 dB above ambient indoors would wake people up."

Mr. Eddleman has completely failed to develop the purported im-port of this assertion. Moreover, he has taken Mr. Carter's testimony out of context. A review of the referenced pages of (Continued) night. Rather, FEMA testified that 64.5% of EPZ households would be alerted by the first 3-minute activation of the si-rens. Nehnevajsa, at 14-15. Given the actual activation pat-tern planned for the siren system (a 12-minute operating time),

the percentage of EPZ households alerted by the sirens would significantly exceed 64.5%. See App. PF 29 n.14.

the transcript reveals that, at that point in the hearing, Mr. Carter was simply clarifying that page 7 of his prefiled testimony was a paraphrase of Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654 (which includes the 10 dB above ambient criterion). Tr. 9701-02 (Carter). In any event, it is clear that neither Applicants' awakening analysis nor that of the NRC Staff / FEMA was based upon the "10 dB above ambient criterion. Rather, both analy-ses used detailed " awakening curves." Applicants' Ex. 48 at 21; Kryter, at 25 (Figure 7A). Mr. Eddleman's proposed finding thus has no apparent bearing on the contention here at issue before the Board.

16. Eddleman PF 10 further notes that " FEMA witness Kryter calculated that with a 32 dB fan noise, 10 dB above ambient would only awaken 27 to 29% of the people asleep in the EPZ." And both Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG point to the testi-mony that outdoor sound levels of 90 to 99 dB give a 50% proba-bility of awakening an individual in a house with storm windows closed. Eddleman PF 10; NCAG PF 10. As explained elsewhere in greater detail, such statistics represent specific hypothetical cases, and are.not meaningful in and of themselves.5/ Rather, they are at best suggestive of the types of calculations (per-formed for many specific cases) which underlie the exhaustive 5/ For example, only 18.5 percent of the residences in the Harris EPZ have just one resident. App. PF 29. Consequently, l this statistic cited by Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG is not appli-cable to 81.5 percent of the households.

analyses performed by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA. App.

PF.25-26. 'Neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG contends that some specific case should have been considered in the analyses but

- was not. Similarly, neither Mr. Edel'eman nor the NCAG has sug-gested that Applicants or the NRC Staff / FEMA erred in their calculations for the specific cases, or in their computations consolidating the specific cases into an overall figure repre-senting the percentage of households in the EPZ which would be alerted by the fixed siren system under the conditions postu-lated in Eddleman 57-C-3. Under these circumstances, the iso-lated statistics identified in the Eddleman and NCAG proposed findings need not long detain the Board.

17. Both Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG point to Dr. Bassiouni's challenge to the " awakening curve" on which the NRC Staff / FEMA analysis relied. Eddleman PF 10; NCAG PF 6.

The NCAG failed to even acknowledge Applicants' analysis de-monstrating that the conclusions of the German Study (on which Dr. Bassiouni's challenge is premised) are actually less con-servative than the figures used by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA. App. PF 33-35. In contrast, Mr. Eddleman makes an effort to defuse the German Study, attempting to demonstrate that it is "in reasonable agreement" with the analyses of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA.s/ Eddleman PF 10. This he s/ Contrary to Mr. Eddleman's assertions, the German Study did not involve "3 45-second repetitions" of sound but, rather, 1

(Continued Next Page)

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cannot do.

18. In a feeble attempt to support his assertion that the German Study "is not very inconsistent" with the results of the analyses by Applicants and thb NRC Staff / FEMA, Mr. Eddleman compares the German Study figures for 69% awakening with the Applicants' and the NRC Staff / FEMA figures for 59% awakening.

Eddleman PF 10. However, to make a meaningful comparison, one must compare parallel figures -- i.e., compare the German Study figures for 59% awakening to the corresponding figures of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA for 59% awakening. According to the German Study, a 5 dB decrease in sound level reduces the awakening percentage by 7%. Eddleman Ex. 74 at 17.7/ Thus, a decrease of approximately 7 dB would reduce the probability of awakening by 10%. Given that the German Study states that 60 dB at a sleeper's ear represents a 60% probability of awak-ening, 53 dB at a sleeper's ear would correspond to a 50% prob-ability of awakening. Next, because the other parties' figures referenced in Eddleman PF 10 are for sound levels outside the house, it is necessary to convert the 53 dB to an outdoor sound (Continued) three 15-second repetitions (for a total sound exposure of 45 seconds) with an additional 15 seconds for test subjects to record their responses to the signal. Compare Eddleman PF 10 with App. PF 34 n.22, 7/- All references are to the pagination of the translated version of the German Study.

level.

To make all figures comparable, it is appropriate to use the attenuation value of 26 dB supplied by the Board and used by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA in their "50% awak-ening" computations on the witness stand. Tr. 9564 (Carpenter, Keast); Tr. 9926 (Carpenter, Kryter). The sum of 53 dB and 26 dB is 79 dB. Thus, according to the German Study, 79 dB out-side would represent a 50% probability of awakening -- in marked contrast to the corresponding 90 to 99 dB values under the analyses of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA. These com-putations (above) refute Mr. Eddleman's assertions, and confirm earlier conclusions about the German Study; it is indeed much less conservative than the analyses performed by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA.

19. Mr. Eddleman's efforts to obfuscate the disparity be-tween the German Study and the other parties' analyses are not limited to his attempt (discussed above) to compare 50% awak-ening figures to 60% awakening figures. For example, Mr. Eddleman asserts that "87.5 dB outside (constant level),

correspond [s] to a peak of about 92-95 dB." Eddleman PF 10.

However, he cites no authority for this proposition; nor can he.

There simply is no basis in the record -- or even in fact, for that matter -- for such a conversion. Rather, it would seem to be a gratuitous " rounding" upward of the German Study's figures, in an apparent attempt by Mr. Eddleman to get the

. German Study as close as possible to the 90 to 99 dB range (cited by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA for a 50% probabil-ity of awakening). In any event, even accepting arguendo Mr. Eddleman's generously " rounded" figures of 92-95 dB for 90%

awakening, those figures are still a far cry from the 90 to 99 dB for 50% awakening under the analyses of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA.

20. But Mr. Eddleman is not content to merely round 87.5 dB to 92-95 dB. He next makes reference to a range of "85-100 dB." Eddleman PF 10. Again, he has supplied no citation to the record in support of his figures; indeed, there is no evi-dentiary support for this statistic. Instead, the 85-100 dB range appears to be a figure which Mr. Eddleman has simply con-jured up to envelope the 87.5 figure (which he derived from the German Study for g0% awakening) as well as the 90 to 99 dB range (the figures for 50% awakening to which Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA testified).

21. Mr. Eddleman's comparison of the German Study to the analyses of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA concludes with the assertion that "most of the EPZ * *

• is exposed to sound levels outdoors of less than the 85-100 dB required to give 50%

probability of awakening" a person in a house with closed storm windows. Eddleman PF 10. Of course, the Board is here con-cerned with the sound level coverage of the areas of the EPZ where people reside, not with the coverage of the EPZ as a whole.g/ Moreover, Mr. Eddleman continues to focus on the g/ Casual reference to Applicants' projections indicates that a significant proportion of the residences in the EPZ will be (Continued Next Page) i o

probability of awakening a single individual. The plain fact is that much of the population of the Harris EPZ lives in multi-person households. App. PF 29. Thus, the relevant prob-ability is not that of awakening an individual, but rather that of awakening a household; and, as Mr. Eddleman concedes, the probability of awakening a household is -- by definition --

higher than the pronability of awakening an individual.

Eddleman PF 10. Similarly, Mr. Eddleman continues to focus on a single case (closed storm windows) which is not alone repre-sentative of conditions in the EPZ as a whole. App. PF 25. In any event, for whatever it is worth, as illustrated in para-graph 18 above, the German Study indicates that an outdoor sound level of 79 dB has a 50% probability of awakening an individual; and approximately 75% of the houses in the EPZ are covered by siren sound levels of 79 dB or more. App. Ex. 46; Kcast et al., Attachment 5.

22. Mr. Eddleman singles out the area "near siren 70" on Applicants' Exhibit 46 to illustrate his assertions of " lack of alerting." Eddleman PF 10. However, Mr. Keast testified that his analysis (depicted on Applicants' Exhibit 46; considered only 68 of the 69 relevant sirens, because one had not yet been precisely placed by Applicants at the time he had conducted his (Continued) j l

exposed to a siren sound level of 85 dB or greater. Keast et 1 al., Attachment 5. '

analyses. Keast et al., at 8. Mr. Keast further testified that the additional siren would be added in the southeast cor-ner of the EPZ. Tr. 9422-23, 9575 (Keast); Applicants' Ex. 47 (Region U). This is the area near Siren 70. .In short, Mr. Eddleman has focused on the one. area in the EPZ where a siren will be added.

2. Mobile Alerting

23. Neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG mount any signifi-cant challenges to Applicants' evidence on mobile alerting as an element of the Harris public alert and notification system.

See generally App. PF 37-40. However, while Mr. Eddleman stresses the practical constraints on mobile alerting in rural areas, he conveniently omits any mention of the expected con-tribution of mobile alerting to public alert and notification within 15 minutes. Thus, although the mobile alerting process cannot be completed within 15 minutes, it would be well un-derway within that period. Indeed, because many of the routes commence in populated areas, thirty to forty percent of the households in the EPZ could be covered via route alerting with-in 15 minutes. Compare Eddleman PF 3-4 with App. PF 39.

24. The NCAG expresses skepticism about "the reliability, effectiveness and speed" of mobile alerting," given the fact that there have been no actual field-tests." NCAG PF 12. How-ever, the record is clear that the mobile alerting routes have

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already been planned, with the road mileage for each route mea-sured, and.the route driven and timed. See, e.g., Keast et al., at 26-27. Moreover, DEM -- the State agency charged with protecting the citizenry in all emergencies -- attested to its confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of mobile alerting based on much past experience. The DEM witness, Mr. Joyner, even illustrated his testimony by reference to the successful use of mobile alerting at 2:00 in the morning' in a November 1977 evacuation of Clyde, North Carolina due to a flash flood. App. PF 38. These real-life experiences with mo-bile alerting obviate the need for another " field-test."

3. Informal Notification

25. Both Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG criticize considera-tion of informal notification as a component of an alert and notification system. NCAG PF 8.b, 8.c, 11, 12; Eddleman PF 11,

12. Citing Dr. Bassiouni as his authority, Mr. Eddleman argues that the existing guidance does not recognize informal notifi-cation processes. Indeed, Mr. Eddleman claims that the exist-ing guidance only recognizes alerting by mechanical means --

i.e., "by sirens or some other alerting device." Eddleman PF 11, 12. However, there is nothing whatsoever in the regula-tions to suggest that the means of alerting is limited to me-chanical devices, or that informal notification may not be con-sidered'in evaluating the effectiveness of mechanical systems.

App. PF 5; Staff / FEMA PF 7, 8. Moreover, while it is true that informal notification is not explicitly discussed in NUREG-0654 or FEMA-43, FEMA implicitly recognizes informal notification processes in.its implementation of those guidance documents.

Thus, for example, in evaluating siren test telephone survey results,. FEMA considers a 70% positive response to be accept-able, based on research indicating that direct notification of that magnitude in a real emergency would result in informal no-tification'of the remainder of the population. App. PF 8 n.5; accord, Tr. 9594 (Mileti). Further, the existence and efficacy of informal notification processes have been recognized in Com-mission case law. App. PF 54; Staff / FEMA PF 131, 138. There-fore, contrary to the implication of Mr. Eddleman's proposed finding, the existing regulatory scheme already recognizes informal notification processes.

26. Again citing Dt, Bassiouni, the NCAG characterizes f

i reliance on informal notification as an " inferior safety stan- ,

dard," and argues that a "better alternative than ' informal alerting' is to design a siren system with nighttime alerting ,

as a target."9/ NCAG PF 8.b, 8.c. The basis for this state-ment is not clear. However, the issue presented is not whether 9/ The NCAG's reliance upon Dr. Bassiouni provides little, if any, support for this proposition. The Board has held that Dr.

Bassiouni does not appear to possess expert qualifications in the area of human behavior in emergencies. " Memorandum (Con- '

cerning Denial of Subpoenas for Intervenor Witnesses)," at 7 (December 27, 1985).

some "better" system is available. Rather, the issue is in-stead whether the system actually proposed meets the Commis-sion's regulations. As the licensing board explained in Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-37, 20 N.R.C. 933, 940 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-813, 22 N.R.C. 59 (1985):

We are a body of limited authority with a responsibility to determine if the emergency response planning is in conformi-ty with regulatory standards. Although we recognize Intervenors' " desire that the level of emergency preparedness for those residing near the Catawba Nuclear Station be enhanced to the maximum extent possi-ble," our function is not to require that measures be taken which exceed the Commis-sion's requirements.

Because the system proposed by Applicants here meets the Com-mission's regulations, the suggestion that some purported alternative is "better" is irrelevant.

27. The NCAG characterizes informal notification as

" highly suspect * *

• given the fact that there have been no actual field-tests." NCAG PF 12. This bald assertion flies in the face of the uncontroverted evidence of record in this pro-ceeding, which indicates that disaster research literature is replete with data documenting the operation of informal notifi-cation processes in actual emergencies. App. PF 41, 44; Staff / FEMA PF 88, 105. This experience with informal notifica-tion over a broad range of actual emergencies is far more reli-able than any proposed artificial " field-test."

28.

Mr. Eddleman challenges Dr. Mileti's projection that 80% of persons formally notified would engage in informal noti-fication, asserting that "[t]he evidence does not support such high percentages." In particular, he argues that "[i]n the Mount St. Helens volcano disaster * * *, only 68% of the popu-lation was notified." Eddleman PF 12. Mr. Eddleman has simply missed the point. In the Mount St. Helens disaster, 30% of the population notified an additional 38% of the population -- a multiplier of 126%. Keast et al., at 35-36. It is this figure (126%), not 68%, which is roughly comparable to Dr. Mileti's figure of 80%. Moreover, Mr. Eddleman has failed to distin-guish between facilitated rates of informal notification and natural rates of informal notification. Both examples of informal notification referred to in Mr. Eddleman's proposed finding involve natural informal notification. In contrast, Dr. Mileti's 80% figure is for facilitated informal notifica-tion (based on the inclusion in the EBS message of language en-couraging the public to engage in informal notification). App. i PF 45-46. It is only reasonable to expect that facilitated rates of informal notification will exceed natural rates of informal notification. App. PF 46 n. 26. Finally, Dr. Mileti i

took pains to identify some of the numerous conservatisms in i

his projected rate of facilitated informal notification. App.

PF 47. There is no record evidence whatsoever to discredit his expert testimony.

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29. Mr. Eddleman finally asserts that "even incorporating

' informal alerting,' FEMA concluded that 87.8% of the persons in the EPZ could be alerted within 15 minutes * *

• and Appli-cants'. comparable number is 88%." Eddleman PF 8. However, Mr. Eddleman fails to note that the NRC Staff / FEMA analysis did not reflect the revised EBS message. App.'PF 55. Presumably, had the NRC Staff / FEMA analysis reflected the revised EBS mes-sage, the 87.8% figure would have been significantly higher.

Similarly, Mr. Eddleman neglects to point out that the mobile alerting system was not c,onsidered in the quantitative analysis of either party. That system can be expected to alert some ad-ditional incremental proportion of the population within 15 minutes. App. PF 55.

C. CONCLUSION

30. The proposed findings of Mr. Eddleman and the North Carolina Attorney General have had two principal themes:

-first, their personal skepticisms that the system as a whole will perform as predicted in the analyses conducted by Appli-cants and the NRC Staff / FEMA; and, second, the legal arguments that the Commission's regulations preclude consideration of informal notification as a component of an alert and notifica-tion system and that, even if the overall estimates of Appli-cants and the NRC Staff / FEMA are accurate, such percentages do not meet the Commission's regulations. As to the first point,

.a the Board accords no weight whatsoever to such personal skep-ticisms, absent some factual basis for that skepticism. No ev-idence was adduced at the hearings to undermine the accuracy of the complex analyses performed by Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA; certainly, neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG have pointed to any such evidence in their proposed findings.

31. The second general point advanced by Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG is also void of merit. As discussed above, there is no legal authority precluding consideration of informal notifi-cation as an element of an alert and notification system. In-deed, precedent is to the contrary. See paragraph 25, supra.

Similarly, there is no support for the argument that the over-all estimates of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA for night-time alerting fail to meet the Commission's regulations. The Board is convinced that the regulatory history of the applica-ble provision of the NRC's emergency planning regulations evi-dences a studied intent on the part of the Commission to afford a degree of flexibility -- and to be guided by FEMA's expert judgment -- in the implementation of its alert and notification system requirements. See generally App. PF 5-8, 56. In short, had the Commission intended to require 100% notification within precisely 15 minutes (the standard which Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG seem to be applying, though it is never stated 10/), it 10/ While Mr. Eddleman and the NCAG indicate that the percent-ages determined by' Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA do not tatisfy the regulations, neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG ever

.e specifies what percentage would satisfy the regulations.

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would have done so. In this respect, the Board notes the con-spicuous absence of any contention here that the Harris alert and notification system is somehow deficient relative to other systems in place at operating nuclear power plants across the country. The uncontroverted evidence of record clearly pre-cludes any such contention. Carter, at 17.

32. Mr. Eddleman asserts, in paragraph 2 of his Conclu-sions and Order, that "the Harris system must be upgraded, ei-ther by more sirens, or by means such as the telephone system mentioned in the contention." Where, as here, there has been no demonstration of need for corrective actions, the Board need not substantively address Mr. Eddleman's proposals. However, it is worth noting that there is no record evidence whatsoever to suggest that a telephone system such as that touted by Mr. Eddleman (see, e.g., Eddleman PF 8) has ever actually been implemented on such a large scale, either for public alerting near a nuclear power plant, or -- for that matter -- in any other application.11/

33. Similarly, even though the evidentiary record pro-vides no basis for disputing the testimony of Applicants and the NRC Staff / FEMA on the efficacy of the siren system, the 11/ As Eddleman PF 8 concedes, FEMA's testimony acknowledged only that FEMA-43 postulates the use of such hypothetical sys-tems; no witness ever testified to the real-life feasibility of such a system on a large-scale basis given the current state of the art.

NCAG advocates a nighttime test of the system (NCAG PF 15-16),

apparently in hopes that -- in such a test -- the Applicants' and the'NRC Staff / FEMA analyses would be discredited or that "something may turn up." Cf. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LEP-75-10, 1 N.R.C. 246, 248 (1975). However, like Mr. Eddleman, the NCAG has simply failed to demonstrate a need for any corrective actions. Under these circumstances, the Board need not consider the substantive mer-its of such a test. Nevertheless, the Board is constrained to note the NCAG's wholesale failure to provide any reasoned dis-cussion of the pros and cons of the nighttime siren test which it urges.

34. There are obvious limits on the usefulness of any field test of a siren system, whether conducted during the day or at night. To avoid needlessly alarming EPZ residents,12/ it 12/ There would be very real dangers associated with an unannounced test of a siren system. Such a test would involve the likelihoed of a " cry wolf" effect -- that is, members of the public who have experienced an unannounced test might ig-nore a future siren sounding in a real emergency, on the assumption that it's just another unannounced test. Tr. 9667 (Mileti). Moreover, it seem intuitively clear that, if people do not' recognize a siren test as such, they are likely to tie up public emergency lines (i.e., 911 lines, etc.), precluding the use of those lines for true personal emergencies (police, fire, and ambulance) during the course of the test. See generally Keast et al., at 25-26 (noting "large numbers of irate phone calls to local police departments and other public officials" during inadvertent nighttime activations of sirens near the Indian Point, Pilgrim and Harris plants). There is no indication that these public emergency lines are relied upon for response to t,n emergency at Harris. However, if the sirens (Continued Next Page) r

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is necessary to provide advance notification to the public that a test of the siren system is to be conducted. However, if the public knows in advance that a siren sounding is only a test, they will not engage in informal notification. Thus, no pre-announced test could provide any realistic measure of the informal notification expected in a real emergency. Tr. 9617, 9643, 9654, 9667 (Mileti).

35. Further, while according relatively little weight to such considerations, the Board acknowledges the validity of Dr. Mileti's observation that a public survey associated with any siren system test may be -- in some measure -- an opinion poll-on the licensing of the subject nuclear plant; i.e., there is a very real possiblity that those who oppose the plant will report that they did not hear the sirens (even if they did),

and, presumably, that some who support the plant will respond that they did hear the sirens (evon if they did not). Such skewing is more likely to occur where -- as here -- the issue has been a high profile one. Tr. 9652 (Mileti); Cf. Tr. 9866 (Kelley) (noting, e.g., media coverage of Bassiouni statements).

(Continued) were sounded in the event of a Harris emergency, it is conceiv-able that the public might use those sirens for calls about the accident, limitin, the availability of the lines for immediate personal emergencies. This would be an unfortunate, but proba-bly unavoidable, consequence of sounding the sirens in any ac-tual emergency; but the potential risk is too grave to incur for the sake of a test.

36. A nighttime " awakening" test of the siren system would involve other special problems not associated with simi-lar daytime tests. FEMA's reknowned expert, Dr. Kryter, explained that if people know in advance that they will be awakened during the night, they are initially awakened more ,

easily. Thus, it is important in experiments to " habituate" test subjects (e.g., for seven days) before beginning to record data on the sound levels necessary to produce awakening. Tr.

9933 (Kryter). In this respect, reliance on good experimencal data is superior to a field test of a system. It would be highly impractical to blast the Harris sirens eight nights in a row, with the public survey on the eighth night.

37. A nighttime test and survey would also be seriously disruptive and annoying to the community. Tr. 9616 (Keast);

Tr. 9937 (Kryter). This concern has both legal and practical implications. First, federal Office of Management and Budget

("OMB") approval is required for public surveys such as those conducted in conjunction with siren system tests for nuclear plants. Tr. 9951-52 (Carter). FEMA has never received OMB ap-proval to conduct a telephone survey at night. Indeed, even

~for daytime surveys, OMB has instructed FEMA not to inconve-nience the public any further.than absolutely necessary.

Staff / FEMA PF 141. OMB's concerns about the. intrusiveness of such tests and surveys have a sound foundation in reality. It requires little imagination to envision the disruptive impact

of a siren activation over a 15-minute period in the middle of the night on insomniacs, or on the many families with infants and small children, or on the " graveyard shift" at hospitals, nursing homes, and family care centers where the reduced staff would be called upon to reassure and comfort facility patients and residents.

38. Nor is the only burden attendant to the North Carolina Attorney General's proposal that of the siren test itself. Many members of the public would receive follow-up phone calls as part of the telephone survey associated with the siren test, further disrupting normal nighttime sleep patterns.

Nevertheless, the Board recognizes the importance of conducting the telephone survey promptly.after any test, to preserve the validity of the sample populatien (so that, e.g., the statisti-cal validity of the survey is not destroyed by the dispersion of'the^ population in the morning). Further, there is some de-gree of uncertainty as to whether all people would remember the next day whether they had been awakened by the sirens the pre-vious night. Tr. 9664-66 (Mileti). Accordingly, to be most meaningful, any survey conducted in association with a night-time test would also'have to be conducted at night. Again, it requires little imagination to envision the cumulative impact of a protracted siren blast, followed by a telephone call --

likely to be placed just as the household is settling back to sleep. Moreover, because the efficacy of a siren system at night rests on its ability to awaken households (not individ-uals), telephone interviewers would have to ask any who answer the phone but did not hear the sirens to check with other mem-bers of the household to determine whether they heard the si-rens. This would be quite intrusive.

39. While some may consider disruptions such as these to be de minimus if each individual case is viewed separately, the proper measure of such governmental action is the impact on the affected society as a whole. The Board, like OMB, is quite sensitive to these " costs" in human terms of a nighttime siren test and telephone survey such as that advocated by the NCAG.

Nevertheless, the Board would not hesitate to require a night-time test and survey if the need for such a study had been es-tablished. Here, however, the uncontroverted evidence of record -- by which this Board is bound -- is that the existing body of knowledge provides a basis for drawing reasonable con-clusions from the data presently available in the literature, and that there is therefore no need for a nighttime siren test and telephone survey. Tr. 9616 (Keast).13/

40. Moreover, as noted elsewhere, neither Mr. Eddleman nor the NCAG adduced a scintilla of evidence to dispute the 13/ FEMA's witness, Dr. Kryter, did describe two specific types of laboratory experiments that would, in his view, con-tribute to the body of knowledge on sirens and awakening. Tr.

9938 (Kryter). While the Board does not impose a related license condition, the Board encourages FEMA and the NRC Staff to give serious consideration to the conduct of the experiments Dr. Kryter proposed.

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technical accuracy of the complex analyses performed by Appli-cants and the NRC Staff / FEMA. And the Board will not order a nighttime siren test and survey merely to satisfy the NCAG with the accuracy of Applicants' and the NRC Staff / FEMA analyses --

just as the Board would not consider ordering a " practice evac-uation" of the EPZ to allow an intervenor to verify the accura-cy of an applicant's evacuation time estimate study. Accord-ingly, the Board declines to condition the Harris license on the performance of any corrective actions, and instead con-cludes that the-Harris alert and notification system meets the Commission's regulations, providing "the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone with-in about 15 minutes" (emphasis supplied).

Respectfully submitted, d6 $ M4 Thom'as A. Baxte'r, UP . CV Delissa A. Ridgway SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Richard E. Jones Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-7707 Counsel for Applicants Dated: January 6, 1986

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• January 6/.vl986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '86 JAN -8 A10 :30 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

<ccu c --

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOhRDn7'b f. . .sij6,g ;

BRANCH In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Reply to Other Parties' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Eddleman 57-C-3 (Night-time Notification )" were served this 6th day of January, 1986, by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, to all parties listed on the attached Service List.

Delissa A. Ridgw%y 0

[

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

~

In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN )

MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant) )

SERVICE LIST James L. Kelley, Esquire John D. Runkle, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Conservation Council of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission North Carolina Washington, D.C. 20555 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Glenn O. Bright M. Travis Payne, Esquire .

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Edelstein and Payne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12607 Washington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Dr. James R. Carpenter Dr. Richard D. Wilson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 729 Hunter Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Apex, North Carolina 27502 Washington, D.C. 20555 Charles A. Barth, Esquire Mr. Wells Eddleman Janice E. Moore, Esquire 806 Parker Street Office of Executive Legal Director Durham, NC 27701 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Richard E. Jones, Esquire Office of the Secretary Vice President and Senior Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Carolina Power & Light Company Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. Daniel F. Road, President Dr. Linda W. Little CRANGE Governor's Waste Management Besrd P.O. Box 2151 513 Albemarle Building Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 276'1 .

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t Bradley W. Jones, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P.O. Box 991 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Jo Anne Sanford, Esquire Special Deputy Attorney General P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Joseph Flynn, Esquire FEMA 500 C Street, S.W., Suite 480 Washington, D.C. 20740 Steven Rochlis, Esquire Regional Counsel FEf!A '

1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

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