ML20134C765
| ML20134C765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1985 |
| From: | Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#385-235 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, OL, NUDOCS 8508160421 | |
| Download: ML20134C765 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA August 12, 1985 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCW ETED USNRC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Glenn Dr. O. Bri James H.ght Carpenter '85 NE 15 A10:12 James L. Kelley, Chairman CFFICE OF SEch i AF 00CXEim3 & SEEW ERANCH In the Matter of
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CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. )
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) AsLBP no. 82-h68-01
) OL Wells Eddleman's Prorosed Findings / Conclusions on Contention 5k7-C-10 and Energency Planning Introduction.
At the outset, I want to re-emphasize my view of the scope of this matter as including the ability and willingness of the emergency management personnel to use the Protection Factor information to protect the health and safety of the publie under 10 CPR 50.47(a)(1).
See, e.g.,
Tr. 7924-26 (including reference to 10 CPR 50.k7(a)(1); ,
Tr. 7928-9 (Usefulness depends on attitude, as well as on the info); l and Tr. 7935-36, etc.
I do not propose to repeat the arguments here, since they're in the record.
I rely on the Board's earlier ruling that such rulings, and i
l rulings on sunmary disposition and other motions, do not become ripe for appeal until a partial initial decision on a subject area (in this l
instance, emergency planning) has is sued. Therefore I have not specifically responded to Applicants' prorosed including of sunmary disposition orders in their proposed findings, since no additional decision on those matters is proposed by daem.
8508160421 850012 !
PDR ADOCK 05000400 I
. h C _I G PDR ;
t But I tske strong exception to the apparent proposal to anprove the Harris plant's licensing, as far as this Board has jurisdiction 1 (see Applicants ' " Conclusions", paragraphs 69-71, 8/1/85 Applicants' oroposed findings at 38-39, and70rder", paragraph 72, following).
There is not a partial initial decision yet on safety matters, nor is it evident all safety matters will be out into the coming partial initial decision; also the safety matter of drug abuse affecting construction quality (CCNC Contention WB-3) is still at issue; further, the emergency planning issue of whether sirens will awaken sleeping persons indoors with windows shut and/or air condit* oners or other noisy appliances on, is still to be litigated. Anplicants have the burden of proof and Maculd not get a license until they have fully carried this burden. (I shall make points below that they have not carried their burden with respect to contention 57-C-10. )
PROPOSED FINDINGS
- 1. NUREG-0654 c.riterion II.J.10.m reqdres emergency response plans to include
" expected local protection afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct and inhala tion exposure. . .".
- 2. Applicants' witness Martin testified that the shelter survey of nonresidential structures was initiated by CP&L. Tr. 8016.
FEMA's witnesses testified they didn't have any information on the EPZ structures other than that presented (in the hearing) by CP&L.
Tr. 8135. Witness Martin directed CP&L's adv' eys of Harris EPZ structures -
- 3. ' Witness Martin testified that " expected protection" as used in NUREG-0654 cisterion II.J.10.m means, founded on specific measurements or calculated measurements. i h h, 4 Witness Martin made no measurements of air infiltration rates of any structures within the EPZ. Tr. 8027. He also did not look for cracks in the wall or foofs, or around windows and doors, in his surveys. Tr. 8051.
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- 5. Changoo in the amount of air moving into a structure )
affect the inhalation exposure dose as well as tha diveet exposure l
- dose to persons inside that structure. (Martin, Tr. 8026) 2 6. The range of air infiltration rates for tynical commercial l
structures range over a factor of 3 (0.5 to 1.5 air changes per houz& I '
Martin, Tr. 8030-33, see at 8034. However, a range of 0.5 to 1 was used in Martin's studies (Tr. 80h1-42).
- 7. Witness Martin agreed that wind speed increases the differen-tial pressure between the inside and outside of buildings, increasing the potential for air infiltration by the cresence of the pressure differential. (Tr. 80h9). He also agreed this is true for all kinds of structures. (Tr. 80149).
8 Witness Myers testified that only Martin's attachment 8 (summary data on protection factors (Ste f
in structurds ) and leloW) page 4 of Martin's attachment 5, would be incoroorated into the NC Emergency aesnonse nlan fo" s-- the thearon Harris clant. P=. A056; see 5.ui-also 8059 abd 811p6113,* 9 l}q 4(i[
i 9. Martin testified that a tycical air change rate, though not l
his o.5-1 air change ner hour rate, is based on a 1 mile ner hour wind. I i
Tr. 8109. Martin further stated he had "no idea" what the average
. wind speed was around the Shearon Harris site.- Tr. 8115.
- 10. The inhalation dose estimates depend on air change rites t which were not measured, and are not specific to typical wind steeds ;
l around the Harris site (evidently -- see Finding 9 above). Findings i 3,4,5,7,9 abo ve. '
11.
The inhalation dose information to be incornorated into the plan (Martin's attachment 5, page 4 only) does not include air infiltration rate data. Tr. 8071. No data on measured, or calculated measurements of, inhatatinuxman infiltration rates and their effect on either inhalation or direct dose or protection factors is goi.ng into the Feath carnlina plan for Harvis amarmency responsa.
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- i 12. The summaries of protection factors to be incorcorated into the NC Emergency Resnonse Plan for the Shearon Harris plant (see Pinding 8, above), collaese data to the voint that the rangas
, given are not typical of the actual structures within the EPZ.
This is evident from a conoarison of the base data (Martin's j Attachments 6 and 7) with the summaries on Attachment 8. See also the admissions -to this effect by Aeolicants ' witnesses (Tr. '
8111-8113; Tr. 8052-53 and Bloh-8105). The school range is not tyoical of either school, unless so wide a range is assumed, as to be useless for assessing expected protection, i.e. k to 25 as representative of one building with 4 (no range) and another with '
a range of 10-25; likewise for inhalation,1.2(no range) : - t for one school and 16 to 5.7 fcr another, so tha t the range is not 4
typical of the 2 buildings, but of neither: a ranFe of 1.2 to 5.7 is not representative of a building that has only 1.P. See Tr.
8112-8113, also 8111. Applicant 3m ' witness aDpeared evasive on this point, but it is obvious from
- l Martin Attachments 6, 7 an d 8 ) . The ranges for buildings are likewise
- biased by the inclusion of the high end ranges of unttoical-structures (see Martin Attach) ment 6, e.g. Allied Coro. ) in ranges on Attachment 8 i 13. Durely fron a urotectirn factor viewcoint, there is reason to nove people to structu"os of higher protection factor if doing so
, will not eroose then to additional radiation dose. Martin, Tr. 800h-5, 8008-9. However, tr.is will not likely be done. Myers, Heard testinony.
14 Witness Myers' description of the factors that affect
- ihhalation dose (Tr. 7937-8) is in fact a description of the factors that affect the protection factor for direct exuosure from nuclides denosited outside a structure. Myers' involvenent in the erotection factor' issue in development of emergency resnonse plans was to bring
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'together people who had knowledge of those ma tters (see Tr. 7912-13).
- 15. None of Mr. Myers' staff were witnesses. However, witness Myers testified he would have to rely on his staff concerning the effect of wind speed on air infiltration into buildings (Tr. 8066-67).
& Tr. 80h8-9) ,
As noted in Finding 5 above (see Tr. 80264, air infiltration can ;
increase both the inhalation dose and the direct exposure dose to persons inside the structures. Yet, the air exchange rates assumed by Mr. Martin will not anpear in the olan (Tr. 8071, Martin and Myers agree),
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- 16. The inhalation dose is critical in ordering sheltering 1
, (Tr. 81h7, FEMA witness Heard) and in-place sheltering assumes (in nuclear plant emergercy resconse olans in the Southeastern region) no movement to higher protection factor structures (Tr. 8151, Heard)
- t and (in all nians witness Heard is aware of) in-place sheltering for "one to two hours at the most" (Heard, Tr. 8151). Thus, in estimating .
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the health effects of in-place sheltering as conceived in the Harris emergency response plans, specific inforcation on infiltration rates assumed is needed. This is particularly so, since witness Heard referred to a "mean of 1.5" inhalation dose protection factor dose when tne actual inhalationffrotection Factors for. most structures
] within the EPZ are generally less, see, e.g. Anplicants' Exhibit 29 at p.51, and Martin Attachnents 6 and 7. The decendence of dose on the infiltration rate means tha t infiltration rate information must be included in the plan, for various wind speeds and different I tynes of s tructures .tynical of thos e wi thin the EPZ, both residential and other s tructures.
- 17. Witness Myers also would rely on his staff concerning whether protection factors of structures within the EPZ fall outside the ranges given in the nian (Tr. 8109). Thus, there is no evidence that the PFs of structures in the EPZ do all fall in these ranges,
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t and the cronosed data for inclusion in the olan, even if connletely presented by tyoical sorts of structures as Finding IP above would Alogically require, are not shown to be connlete. Myers had "no idea"
[r.h %f /s the cercentage of structures in the FPZ' tha t were analyzed for PFs.
18'. Witness Martin testified (prefiled, pp 8-11, see Auplicants' pronosed finding #50, p.30 of 8/1/85 pronosed findings) that there was no direct determination of Protection Factors for churches and small commercial structures. Martin also testified, as noted above, dhat specific measured or calculated neasured erotection factors :
1 are required to meet the requirements of NU#FG-065E II.J.10.m.
See Finding 3 above, Tr. 8060. Thus, the protection factors assumed for chu=ches and small commercial structunea do not ma a t the requirenents of the NUREG-0654 specifications, i.e. criterion II.J.lo.m.
- 19. The protection f actor in Martin Attachment 8 (the data dbat is to be included in the Harris NC Emergency Response Plan) shows a low range of airborne direct exoosure Protection Factors of about 1.2, or less than that orovided for airborne nuclides direct exuosure in a single-story brick house with no basenent. (Mart,in, Tr. 8065).
The protection factor of 5 (Martin attachment 8) for denosited nuclides is less than tha t for a single story brick house with no basement. (ibid. ) Inspection of Martin's attachments 8,6,7 and 5 pNi snow20. tnat tne PF's of nonresidential EPZ structures mostly fall inhd*
FEMA witnesses Heard and Hawkins had testified (prefiled, p.3) that the use of typical residential (home) nrotection factors for single-story brick or frame houses without basements "is conservative" but they admitted on cross-examination (Tr. 81k4) that it is not conservative if the other struc tures prnvide less protection than a brick house with no basement. As noted above, Finding 19, this is true for most EPZ non-residential structures, as insnection of 1 Martin Attachments 8, 6, 7 and 5 will shows The low range of PFs for most such structures are aporoximately 1.2 for airborne exposure and in the range of 5 for deposited nuclide expos ure.
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Witnsss Heard's att:nnt to oxolain this inconsistsney (Tr. 8149-50) only reinforces the conclusion that the use of residential structure PFs in the Harris emergency resconse plan would not be conservative.
The "more substantial structures" (that would have higher PPs, per witness Heard) are not typical of other (nonresidential) structures witnin the liarris EPZ. I staff.
21.
FEMApalso testified that Protection Factors of residential i "and other" structures were in the plan TApplicants ' 9xhibit 29),
but could noint to no such other s tructures (Tr. 8139-hl) and admitted their statement that it includes "other" structu*es was incorrect, Tr. 8140 The erroneous statenent appears to be taken from a too-literal reading of the plan narrative (Tr. 81hG-hl), but the plan contains no PFs of other (non-residential) structuves, Tr. 81hl.
- 22. The inconsistencies cited in Findings 20 (vs.19, and in 20 itself) and 21 above indicate that PENA 's review of the Harris Fnergency Iesponse Plan with resnect to the nrotection factor issue was extrenely cursory and inaccurate. PEMA witnesses testified that they had no information "excent what Anolicants have produced here" (in the hearinEs), Tr. 8135' .
23 FEMAh findings would not be reliable, due to the cursory and inaccurate review noted in Findings 20-22 above. In addition, l
FEMA's finding that adequate protective action "could" be taken, (see Tr. 81h4) is not that required by 10 CFR 50.h7(a)t(1).
- 24. Board examination and other questions revealed that etactLation is the oreferred action in a nuclear accident, see Tr. 8158, and sheltering would only be ordered for a nuff release lasting one to two hours maximum (Tr, 8151). These facts should be made known '
and included in the emergency response nlan. They also show that the ' l use to be made of information in the nlan is an issue the P,oard and witnesses did not stay away from, deseite the Board's limiting the contention and cross-examination to " exclude" those questions. I
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CONCLUSIONS A. 10 CFR 50.h.7(a)(1) requires a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate nrotective actions "can and I
will be taken" in the event of a radiological emergency.
1 However, FEMA 's findin6 in this case was only that such neasures "could" be taken. Thus it would be up to Applicants, assuning FEMA's finding were unrebutted, to carry the burden of proof that suen adequate protective actions can and will be taken.
B. PEMA witnesses gave very brief testinony which nevertheless contained some inaccuracies their witnesses admitted, e.g. that the use of protection factors based on houses as a proxy for the protection factors in other structures was conservative (they conceded on cross examination that it was not conservative) and that protection factors were given in the April 1,1985 energency nian revision for "other" structures (they conceded no other s tructures ' Protection Factors are actually in that revision of the plan). PEMA's findings are evidently based on such a cursory and inaccurate review as to not be reliable.
C. Applicants presented no evidente that effective nrotective action will be taken. Mr. Myers' testinony (prefiled, p.5) sinnly states that the information "will be available to officials who will decide what protective action (that is, .
evacuating or sheltering g
the population) to take in the event of an accident at en Harris plant."
evidently As noted above, Mr. Meyers did not know what an inhalat!on protection factor was (at least, what factors affect it), and would have to rely on his staff (see, e.g. - Tr 7913; Tr. 8066-67) concerning PIw$
thebL kmcu of /Gd meaning 4
and use of protection factor information neplicable to accident , foll-D g Ofi, conditions. None of these staff were presented as witnesses. P
- M Applicants ' witness Martin also tantified es t mensm edfo"p"diculs ted 9qMfanes>s were required to meet NUMD-0651; II.J.lo.m criteria, but he ,
did not measure any air infiltration rates or calculate themf& W U17 J
a O -9 Applicants themselves objected to cuestions about the use of the protection factor information, although some of this information was e1& cited in later Board examination after the objections were sustained. (See, e.g. , Tr. 81h5-81h9, Board examination, and rollowing redirect and recross). See also Finding Ph, above.
It is also evident that the information to be incorporated into the plan is so sumnarized that it is not typical of any structure in the EP2.
For all these reasons (lack of witnesses who demonstrate that adequate protective action can and will be taken, lack of knowledge by witnesses presented, lack of useful information to be placed into the plan for typical structures as required by NU9FG-065h cirterion II.J.10.m, and lack of proof as to the use of the information, which is distinct faron attitudes o* the us ers
-- see, e.g. , Tr. 7928, Judge Kelley's question during argument))
the Anulicants have not carried their burden of nroof with respect to this contentien.
D.
FEMA witnesses stated they had no informat!on on sheltering other than wha t Applicants had produced in the hearing (Tr. 8135).
Therefore the above findings would necessarily apply, and Conclusion C. above would necessarily apply, to PEMA's findings also. This reaffirms and adds basis to our conclusion B. above, and we noecifically conclude that PEMA's findings are inadequate and inadequately sunported to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 47(a)(1) with respect to Contention 57-C-10 ORDER It is, therefore, ordered that no license to operate the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant be issued until the requirements of 10 CPR 50.h7(a)(1) are met, in particular wi th reference to protection factor information included in the emergency response (6 dD plan. )
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLTAR REGU1ATORY CoteCSCICN In the matter of CAROLU.A POWER k LMT C0. Et al l 50-h30 Shearen Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Unit - 1*_ "g.4[ Docket 0.L.
CEftIITICA* EOF SERVICE ,
1 I hereby certify that copies of Wells Ed emb'h P NedFindings/
' onclusiongn
~= Contention 567-C-10 & EmergencyiPlanning:FFIC~ OTqrd n.
. 1.. . .a a 12 HAVE been served this day of August 19$[u ,by deposit in l the US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, upen all parties whose !
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nanes are listed below, except those. whose nane s are mrked with l an asterisk, for whom service was accenplished by 1
1 JudgesSafety Atenic Jays Kelley, and Licensig Glenn Bright Boardand James Carpenter (1 eryy each) '
US Nuclear 9egulatcry Co : .issien 5teve Bryant Washington DC 20555 '
NC Atty Gen'1's Office i
. Box 629 Raleigh NC. 27602 '
George F. Trowbridge (atterney for Applicants)
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ,
1600 M St. NW - IL uthanne G. Miller Washingten, DC 20036 ASL3 Panel s USNRC Washington DC 2055 5 Office of the Executive Legal Directer { Spence W. Perry" De cke ts 50-!,00/401 0.L.
p ? @ C st. SW washington DC 20555 9 Washington DC 2 07140 l Docketing and Service Section (3x) Dan Read Attn Decke ts 50-Lo0/LC1 0.t. CEATE/FLP Office of the Secretary > 1
'Waleigh,yr07 waverosNC 27606 Washington DC, 2055c. Dr. Linda V. Little (E plan or.ly) coy,7nor,s wasta Mst. Bd.
John Runkle 513 Albenarle 31dg.
CCNC Steve Rochlais 325 it, saltabury st*
307 Granville Rd FEI'.A-Suite 700 1Raleigh, NC 27611 Chapel Hill Nc 2751L 137.1 Peachtree St.NE -
Atlanta GA 30309 Bradley W. Jones '
Travi.s Payne Robert Gruber USNRC Region II Exec. Director Edelstein k Payne Public Staff 101 Marietta St.
Blex 12601 Box 991 Atlanta GA 30303 Raleigh NC 27605 '
Raleigh NC 27602 Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by 729 Hunter St. _dh Apex NC 27502 '
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