ML20138N075

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118 & 58 to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,respectively

ML20138N075
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/11/1985
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20138N072	List: ML20138N067 ML20138N075
References
TAC-42603, TAC-42604, TAC-51984, TAC-51985, TAC-53476, TAC-53477, TAC-59543, TAC-59544, NUDOCS 8512230350
Download: ML20138N075 (2)

Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 118 AND 58 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. OPR-57 AND NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION HUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2 00CKETS NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366 1.0 Introduction By letter dated June 15, 1983, as supplemented and modified by(GPC) requested letters dated September 1, 1983, and August 20, 1985 Georgia Power Company certain additions to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications pertaining to operation and leak rate testing of the containment purge system isolation valves. The requested changes also reflect the design modifications which incorporate fast acting excess flow isolation dampers into the standby gas treatment system (SGTS).

2.0 Evaluation t

The addition of the fast acting dampers to the SGTS was proposed to assure that no functional damage to the SGTS would result in the event of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) while purging the containment and therefore permit the removal of the restriction imposed on the amount of time that the 18" purge and vent isolation valves could be opened for inerting, deinerting and pressure control in Operational Modes 1 through 3.

The eicess flow isolation dampers will isolate the common 18" vent line from the torus and drywell before it ties into the SGTS filter train suction when it senses a small percentage of DBA-LOCA flow. These isolation dampers have been installed on Unit 2 and will be installed on Unit i during the refueling outage scheduled for November 1985.

By our letter to 'CPC dated January 16, 1984, we informed GPC of the acceptability of the proposed design modification and the associated removal of the time restriction on opening the purge and vent isolation valves during Modes 1, 2 and 3 for inerting, deinerting and pressure control.

Prior to actually removing the restriction on the time limit, it is necessary to add Technical Specifications requiring operability and surveillance of the excess flow isolatiin dampers. GPC's August 20, 1985, submittal proposed Technical Specifica ions that will require cycling and visual inspection of parts for deformation, free operation of linkage and position indication during each refueling outage.

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d 4.This submittal also proposed a Limiting Condition for Operation to allow both

. Unit 2 SGTS trains to be temporarily inoperable to allow surveillance testing of the Unit 2 dampers provided both SGTS trains associated with Unit 1 are operable and Unit 2 is in Operational Condition 4 or 5.

The Unit 1 Technical Specifications will continue to require both units' SGTSs to be operable when the unit is in Operational Modes 1 through 3.

Both the June 15, 1983, and the August 20, 1985, submittals proposed a Technical Specification that requires the replacement of the resilient seats every 18 months to preclude seat deterioration. This procedure was found to be acceptable by the NRC staff in lieu of the increased test frequency in a letter dated January 16, 1984, from J. Stolz to J. Beckham.

Based on our review as discussed above, we conclude that the Technical Specification changes requested by letter dated June 15, 1983, as supplemented and modified by letters dated September 1,1983, and August 20, 1985, are acceptable.

3.0' Environmental Consideration These amend.nents involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and i

changes in surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public. comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these anendments.

4.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) public (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 11, 1985 Principal Contributor:

M. Fields and F. Eltawila.

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