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Results
Other: A01024, Forwards Info Re Five Addl TMI-2 Related Requirements Applying to Operating Reactors Per 800507 Request.Integrated Assessment of Collective Impact of All Requirements Should Be Conducted, A02589, Forwards Addl Info Re safety-related ECCS Tank Outages, Provided Verbally on 821220 in Response to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.17, A03501, Requests Addl Time to Provide Info Re 6-inch Containment Purge & Vent Valve Operability.Info Will Be Provided by 831026, ML19340E921, ML20004B640, ML20008E564, ML20008F134, ML20054E184, ML20076A987, ML20078N847
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MONTHYEARML20076A9871979-04-27027 April 1979 Forwards Proposed Revision to Tech Specs to Allow Unlimited Containment Purges.Revisions Deal W/Containment Isolation Valves Project stage: Other A01024, Forwards Info Re Five Addl TMI-2 Related Requirements Applying to Operating Reactors Per 800507 Request.Integrated Assessment of Collective Impact of All Requirements Should Be Conducted1980-06-10010 June 1980 Forwards Info Re Five Addl TMI-2 Related Requirements Applying to Operating Reactors Per 800507 Request.Integrated Assessment of Collective Impact of All Requirements Should Be Conducted Project stage: Other ML19340E9211980-12-31031 December 1980 Forwards Rept on post-TMI Requirements in Response to NUREG-0737 & NRC Project stage: Other ML20008E5641981-02-27027 February 1981 Provides Justification for Min Containment Pressure Used to Initiate Containment Isolation for Facility,Per NRC 801231 Request Re NUREG-0737.Present Containment Isolation Setpoint Is Adequate & No Reduction in Setpoint Is Warranted Project stage: Other ML20008F1341981-03-0404 March 1981 Forwards ECCS Outage Rept for Facilities for 1980,in Response to NUREG-0737,Item II.K.3.17.No Sys or Tech Spec Mods Are Required Project stage: Other ML20004B6401981-05-20020 May 1981 Advises That No Mods Will Be Made to TMI Action Plan Item II.E.4.2 Re Containment Isolation Dependability.Signals Used for Containment Isolation Are Redundant & Diverse & Adequate to Ensure Safe Operation Project stage: Other A01845, Forwards Info Re NRC Orders Confirming Licensee Commitments on post-TMI Related Issues.Issues Have Been Addressed.If NRC Does Not Allow Util to Reserve Request for Hearing,Ltr Should Be Treated as Hearing Request1981-08-10010 August 1981 Forwards Info Re NRC Orders Confirming Licensee Commitments on post-TMI Related Issues.Issues Have Been Addressed.If NRC Does Not Allow Util to Reserve Request for Hearing,Ltr Should Be Treated as Hearing Request Project stage: Request ML20054E1841982-04-16016 April 1982 Forwards Responses to Generic Ltr 82-05 Re post-TMI Requirements Implementation.Continued Safe Operation Assured W/Existing Implementation Status Project stage: Other A02589, Forwards Addl Info Re safety-related ECCS Tank Outages, Provided Verbally on 821220 in Response to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.171982-12-29029 December 1982 Forwards Addl Info Re safety-related ECCS Tank Outages, Provided Verbally on 821220 in Response to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.17 Project stage: Other A03501, Requests Addl Time to Provide Info Re 6-inch Containment Purge & Vent Valve Operability.Info Will Be Provided by 8310261983-10-12012 October 1983 Requests Addl Time to Provide Info Re 6-inch Containment Purge & Vent Valve Operability.Info Will Be Provided by 831026 Project stage: Other ML20078N8471983-10-27027 October 1983 Forwards Response to NRC 830902 Comments on Unresolved Items Re Containment Purge/Vent Review.No Addl Tech Specs or Equipment Mods Warranted.Operability Requirement Met W/Compliance W/Tmi Item II.E.4.2 Project stage: Other A03992, Requests Informal Appeal Meeting W/Nrc to Review Requested Mod of Hydrogen Purge Valves to Close on High Radiation Signal,Per Generic Ltr 84-08 & NUREG-0737,Item II.E.4.2.71984-05-15015 May 1984 Requests Informal Appeal Meeting W/Nrc to Review Requested Mod of Hydrogen Purge Valves to Close on High Radiation Signal,Per Generic Ltr 84-08 & NUREG-0737,Item II.E.4.2.7 Project stage: Meeting 1981-05-20
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l f,...,,c, UNITED STATES e
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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AUG 2 91979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. Reid, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #4, D0R FROM:
G."Lainas, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, DOR
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE 2 - OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (TAC 10819)
We have prepared the enclosed request for additional infomation. As indicated by the first three questions, we have determined that signifi-cant design changes are necessary. The other questions might also involve design changes. -
It is anticipated that these changes might have a significant impact on the licensee. Therefore, we suggest that this request be discussed with the licensee prior to transmitting the request fomally. We will be glad to participate in a. conference call, if you desire.
A G. Laina, Ch,ef Plant Sy tems Branch Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
As stated
Contact:
J.T. Beard X-28077 cc w/ enclosure:
D. Eisenhut
.J.T. Beard (2)
W. Gamill P. Shemanski B. Grimes V. Panciera G. Lainas W. Russell D. Tondi E. Reeves E. L. Conner M densam 7909270T7(o 1046 272
ENCLOSURE
, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MILLSTONE UNIT 2 0VERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION 1.
We understand that the overriding of the high-radiation safety actuation signal to a purge isolation valve will cause the blocking of the safety injection actuation signal, which should cause isolation of the purge valve. This design feature is not acceptable. Describe (including approprjate electrical schematic diagrams) the design changes you propose' to rectify this deficiency.
2.
The design feature of cycling of the normal control switch for a purge isolation valve to override a safety actuation signal to the valve does not facilitate an acceptable degree of administrative control over the use of the override.
Describe the design changes you propose to rectify this deficiency.
3.
The fact that a safety actuation signal to ESF equipment is overriden must be " annunciated" whenever such an override is active. Valve position (" status") lights are not sufficient.
Describc. the design changes you propose to rectify the present deficiency.
4 4.
Purge valve isolation must be initiated by diverse safety signals.
Specifically, we require that purge isolation be automatically initiated by any of the following: (a) containment high radiation, (b) contain-ment high pressure, and (c) the safety injection actuation signal.
Discuss the type signals which will initiate purge isolation at Millstone 2.
Describe any design changes necessary to achieve full compliance with this requirement.
5.
We require that all the equipment which senses plant conditions and initiates purge isolation be designed and appropriately qualified as Class 1E equipment. Discuss the qualification of all such equipment at Millstone 2.
Describe any changes necessary to achieve full compliance with this requirement.
6.
The overriding of a safety actuation signal to a purge isolation valve must not, by itself, result in the automatic opening of any isolation valve. After considering items 1 and 2, above, discuss the physical factors involving in re-opening a purge isolation valve. Describe any design changes needed to preclude automatic re-opening.
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