ML20138N067

Amends 118 & 58 to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,respectively, Revising Tech Specs to Eliminate Time Restriction on Opening Purge & Vent Isolation Valves During Operating Modes 1,2 & 3

ML20138N067
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/11/1985
From:	Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	City of Dalton, GA, Georgia Power Co, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, Oglethorpe Power Corp
Shared Package
ML20138N072	List: ML20138N067 ML20138N075
References
DPR-57-A-118, NPF-05-A-058, TAC 42603, TAC 42604, TAC 51984, TAC 51985, TAC 53476, TAC 53477, TAC 59543, TAC 59544 NUDOCS 8512230348
Download: ML20138N067 (23)

Text

. /pa nog'o UNITED STATES g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 J

GEORGTA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.118 License No. OPR-57 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al.,

(the licensee) dated June 15, 1983, as supplemented and modified by letters dated September 1,1983, and August 20, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Connission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

^

8512230348 851211 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P

PDR M

• Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.118, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCi. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ hy w

Daniel R. Muller, Director BWR Project Directorate #2 Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:

Changes to'the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 11, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 118 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET N0. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3.7-10a 3.7-10a 3.7-10b 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-11a 3.7-11a 3.7-34 3.7-34 3.7-34a 3.7-34a 3.7-34b yFF ~

3.7.A.7 Primary Containment 4.7.A.7 Primary Containment Purge System Purge System a.

When primary containment is a.

In addition to the requirements required, all drywell and of Specification 4.7.D, each suppression chamber 18 inch purge drywell and suppression chamber supply and exhaust isolation 18 inch purge supply and valves shall be operable and in exhaust isolation valve shall the fully closed position except be verified to be closed at when required for inerting, de-least monthly, inerting, or pressure control.

b.

Each refueling outage each

• b.

Each drywell and suppression drywell and suppression chamber chamber 18 inch purge supply and 18 inch purge supply )nd exhaust isolation valve shall have exhaust isolation valve with a a leakage rate as specified in resilient material seat shall 4.7.A.2.

be demonstrated operable by having its valve seat replaced c.

The drywell and suppression and verifying that the leakage chamber 18 inch excess flow rate is within its limit.

isolation dampars shall be operable at all times when the c.

At least once per 2 years the Unit 1 primary containment dampers wit 1 be visually integrity is required and the 18 inspected and cycifd to verify inch isolation valve (s) to the the dampers have nc damage drywell or suppression chamber are which renders the'n incapable of performing their design open.

function.

If these requirements cannot be met, close the drywell and suppression chamber 18 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valve (s) or otherwise isolate the penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or fulfill the requirements of Specification 3.7.A.8.

8. Shutdown Requirements If Specification 3.7.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be brought to Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and shall be in the Cold Shutdown condition within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.7-10a Amendment flo. JE, 55,97,19$, 118 S

B. Stan& y Gas Treatment System B. Stan&y Gas Treatment System

1. Doerability Requirements

1. Surveillance When System Operable 1 and 1 of 2 in thit 2) of the four l 1.a A minimum of three (2 of 2 in thit At least once per operatire cycle, not indegndent stan&y gas treatment to exceed 18 months, the '/ollowing system trains shall be operable at conditions shall be demonstrated:

all times when Unit 1 secondary containment integrity is required.

a.

Pressure drop across the combined E PA filters and charcoal absorber With one of the thit I stan&y gas bank is less than 6 inches of treatment systems inoperable, for water at the system design flow any reason, Unit I reactor rate (+105 -0%).

operation and fuel handling and/or handling of casks in the vicinity b.

Operability of inlet heater at of the spent fuel pools is rated power when tested in permissible for a period of seven accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

(7) days provided that all active components in the remaining c.

Air oistribution is uniform within operable standby gas treatment 20% across the filter trr.in when systems in each unit (minimum of 1 tested in,accordance with in Unit 1 and 1 in thit 2) shall be N510-1975.

demonstrated to be operable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and daily thereafter.

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Amendment No.

118 E

8. Standby Gas Treatment System B. Standby Gas Treat snt System

1. Operability Requirements (Cont'd)

1. Surveillance When System Operable (Cont'd)

If the inoperable Unit 1 standby gas treatment system is not made fully

d. Automatic initiation of each train of operable within the seven (7) day.

the Unit 1 and Unit 2 standby gas period, the Unit I reactor shall be.

treatment systems.

shutdown and placed in the cold shutdown condition within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and

e. Manual operability of the bypass Unit 1 or Unit fuel handling valve for filter. cooling.

operations shall be terminated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Unit I reactor operation and Unit 1 or Unit 2 fuel handling shall not be allowed if both of the Unit 1 standby gas treatment systems are inoperable or if both of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment systems are inoperable except as allowed by 3.7.B.l.b.

1.b With both Unit 2 SGTS inoperable for

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surveillance of the Unit 2 primary containment excess flow isolation

dampers, Unit I reactor operation is permissible for a period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if the following conditions are met:

(1) Maintain at least 1/4" H O vacuum 2

in Unit 1 secondary containment by using normal ventilation and Unit 1 SGTS as necessary (2) Assure operability of both Unit 1 SGTS filter trains (3) Assure Unit 2 SGTS valves to refueling floor cannot be opened (4) Allow no fuel movement in Units 1 or 2 (5) Unit 2 secondary containment integrity is intact except for Unit 2 SGTS operability requirements.

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1.c If the requirements of 3.7.B.1.b cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be brought to Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and shall be in Cold Shutdown.within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.7-11 Y

Amendment No. 22, #5, 57, )$, JPp. 118

3.7.B.2 Performance Recvirements

2. Filter Testino a.

The results of the in-place DOP and

a. The tests and analysis shall be halogenated hydro-carbon tests at performed at least once per design flows on MPA filters and operating cycle, not to exceed 18 charcoal absorber banks shall show months, or after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of 995 DOP removal and 995 halogenated system operation, or following hydrocarbon removal when tested in painting, fire or chemical release accordance with ANSI N510-1975, in any ventilation zone l

b.

The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show 90% of

b. DOP testing shall be performed radioactive methyl iodine removal after each complete or partial when tested in accordance with replacement of the HEPA filter bank ROT-M16-lT (8000, 95% R.H.).

or after any structural maintenance on the system housing, c.

Fans shall be shown to operate within +105 -05 design flow when

c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing tested in accordance with ANSI shall be performed after each N510-1975.

complete or partial replacement of the charcoal absorber' bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.

d. Each circuit shall be operated with the heaters on at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month.

Amendment No.118 3.7-11a e

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.A.7 Primary Containment Purge System The purge system is designed to perform two basic functions:

pressure control and inert /de-inert the primary containment.

Under normal operations the purge system is used to maintain containment pressure less than two psig.

Post LOCA, the purge system, through the 2 inch bypass lines, is also used to reduce containment pressure. The 18 inch lines are the primary means of reducing'. the oxygen concentration inside containment before long term power operations to less than 4%

in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.A.5.

Conversely, it 'i s also the path for restoring oxygen concentration to life sustaining levels.before drywell entry.

The system is hard-piped to the Standby Gas Treatment System; therefore, any entrained radioactivity will be reduced before being released to the environment through the main stack.

The use of the drywell and suppression chamber purge' lines is not limited since the 18" valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guideline of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

The design of the 18" purge supply ano exhaust isolation valves meets the requirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4,

" Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations.

Replacement of the 18" valve resilient seats on a cyclic basis will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops.

The 0.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to the B and C tests.

Surveillance testing of the excess flow isolation dampers is recomended by the vendor to verify that, the blades pivot freely and no other damage is evident.

Industry practice does not require testing for closure under simulated flow conditions for " tornado" type dampers.

3.7.A.8 Shutdown Requirements l

l Bases for shutdown reouirements are discussed above in conjunction with the individual requirements for primary containment integrity.

B. Standby Gas Treatment System The standby gas treatment systems are designed to filter and exhaust the Unit 1 secondary containment atmosphere to the off-gas stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from these areas to the environs.

3.7-34 Amendment No. 55, 77, 118

CONTAIPMENT SYSTEMS BASES FOR LIMITING COPOITION FCR OPERATION B. Stan@y Gas Treatment System (Continued)

The thit 1 stan@y gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon receipt. of a high radiation signal from either the Unit 1 or thit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the Lhit 1 reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal from the thit 1 primary containment isolation system.

The mit 2 stan@y gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start, to assist the thit 1 fans to exhaust the thit 1 secondary containment atmosphere upon receipt of a high radiation signal from either the thit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the thit I reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal from the thit 1 primary containment isolation system.

In addition, the systems may also be started manually, from the Main Control Room.

In the case of the thit 1 stan@y gas treatment system,' upon receipt of any of the isolation signals, both fans stalt, isolation drempers open and each fan draws air from the isolated thit 1 scondary containment.

In the case of the thit 2 stanty gas treatment system, upon ' receipt of an isolation signal from the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system, reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or the thit 1 or thit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors, both fans start, fan supply and discharge dampers open, and the fans draw air from the isolated mit 1 secondary containment.

Once the SGTS systems have been initiated automatically, the operator may place any one of the thit 1 and thit 2 trains in the stan@y mode provided the remaining train in each unit is operable.

Should a failure occur in the remaining operating trains, resulting in aiI flow reduction below a preset value, the stanty systems will restart automatically.

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As a minimum for operation, one of the two thit 1 st.andby gas treatment trains and one of the two Unit 2 standby gas treatment trains is required to. achieve the design differential pressure, given the design building infiltration rate. Chee this design differential pressure is achieved, any leakage past the secondary containment boundary shall be inleakage.

A detailed discussion of the stanty gas treatment systems may be found in Section 5.3.3.3 of the thit 1 FSAR, and in Section 6.2.3 of the lhlt 2 FSAR.

Any one of the four filter trains has sufficient a'dsorption capacity to provide for :leanup of the thit 1 secondary containment atmosphere following containment isolation. Any one of the four available Amendment No. 55, 118

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS, BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION B. Standby Gas Treatment System (Continued) standby gas treatment trains may be considered an installed spare.

Therefore, with one of the standby gas treatment trains in each unit inoperable, there is no imediate threat to the Unit 1 containment system performance, and reactor operation or fuel handling operations may continue while repairs are being made.

Should either or both of the remaining standby gas treatment trains be found to be inoperable, the L%it 1 plant should be placed in a condition that does not require a standby gas treatment system.

An exception can be taken for a brief period to both trains of Unit 2 SGTS being available when Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown and Unit 1 is operating.

This exemption is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a DBA LOCA on Unit 1 during the brief period that Unit 2 SGTS remained inoperable.

In addition, Unit 2 SGTS would be in a condition such that it could be restored quickly to assist' in the mitigation of the LOCA, if required.

Inspection of the excess flow isolation dampers will not affect bait 1 SGTS availability, if the Unit I refueling floor equipment hatch cover is not in place, since the Unit 1 SGTS flow path, during drawdown comes from the Unit 1 refueling floor or reactor building which is one comon air volume in Unii; 1.

If the damper is removed during SGTS drawdown demand, the suction will remain from this same common air volume.

High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers.

The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential elease of radioiodine to the environment.

Bypass lokage for the charcoal adsorbers and particulate removal efficiency for HEPA filters are determined by halogenated hydrocarbon and DOP respectively.

The laboratory carbon sample test results indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency for expected accident conditions.

Operation of the fans significantly different from' the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the performances are as specified, the calculated doses would be less than the guidelines stated in 10 CFR 100 for the accident analyzed.

3.7.C. Secondary Containment The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident.

The refueling area of the reactor building includes the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling floor volumes.

Therefore, the reactor building provides secondary containment during Unit 1

reactor operation when the drywell is sealed and in service; and provides primary containment when the Unit 1 and/or Unit 2 reactor is shutdown and its respective drywell is open, as during refueling.

Amendment No. 118 3.7-34b

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'o UNITED STATES

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 0GLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 58 License No. NPF-5 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al.,

(the licensee) dated June 15, 1983, as supplemented and modified by letters dated September 1, 1983, and August 20, 1985, complies with the standards and requirerrents of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 0.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordir. gly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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• Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 58, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

F R THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f,/

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Daniel R. Muller, Director BWR Project Directorate #2 Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 11, 1985 T

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 58 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Insert 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-46 3/4 6-47 3/4 9-10 3/4 9-10 3/4 9-10a B 3/4 6-6 B 3/4 6-6 B 3/4 6-7 1

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3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

_ LIMITING CONDITIO!i FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.

ACTION:

WithoutPRIMARYCONTAINMENTINfEGRITY,restorePRIMARYCONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQlIIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

At least once per 31 days by verifying that; a.

l 1.

All penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, and 2.

All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 I Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automa*1c valves which are located inside the containment, and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

I HATCH - UNIT 2 3/46-1 l

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3/4.6 CDFmDNENT SYSTENS SURW:IIIJGCE PEQiHREMENTS (Continued)

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By verifying each containment airlock CPERABLE per Specification b.

3.6.1.3.

suppression chamber CPERABLE per Specification

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c.

By verifying the 3.6.2.1.

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Amendant No.

58 3/4 6-2 HmG - 12ET 2

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.5.1 The drywell and suppression chamber 18 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with:

Each valve closed except for purge system operation for inerting, a.

deinerting and pressure control.

b.

A leakage rate such that the provisions of Specification 3.6.1.2 are met.,

e.b APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With an 18 inch drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and/or a.

exhaust isolation valve (s) inoperable or open for other than inerting, deinerting or. pressure, control, close the open 18 inch valve (s) or otherwise isolate the' penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.6.6.5.1 The primary containment purge system shall' be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In addition to the requirements of. Specification 3.6.3, at least once per 31 days, when not PURGING and VENTING, by verifying that each 18 inch drywell and suppression chamber valve is closed.

b.

At least once per 18 months by replacing the valve seat of each 18 inch drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valve having a resilient matertal seat and verifying that the leakage rate is within its limit.

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HATCH - UNIT 2 i

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

- PRI!MRY CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM L

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.5.2 - The drywell and su;;ression chamber 18 inch fast acting excess flow isolation dampers.shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

i t.

With an 18 inch drywell and suppression chamber excess flow isolation damper inoperable, close the open 18 inch drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves or otherwise isolate the penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN L

within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.6.6.5.2 The-primary containment purge system excess flow, isolation Edampers:shall be demonstrated capable of performing their design function by:

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- a.

At.least once per operating cycle, the dampers will be visually

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inspected and cycled to verify the dampers have no damage which

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renders them incapable of performing their design function.

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TABLE 3.9.5.2-1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAMPERS ISOLATION TIME DAMPER FUNCTION (Seconds) 1.

Refueling Floor Nomal (Supply) Ventilation 4.2 Dampers (2T41 - F003 A and B) 2.

Refueling floor Homal (Exhaust) Ventilation 4.2 Dampers (2T41 - F023 A and B)

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HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 9-9 g.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS I

STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM' i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.,9.5,;3. Two Hatch-Unit 2 independent standby gas treatment subsystems and two Hatch-Unit 1 independent - standby gas treatment subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 5 and *.

ACTION:

a. sWith one. of the above required standby gas treatment subsystems inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE. status within 30 days, or:

1..

Suspend all irradiated fuel and spent fuel shipping cask handling in the Hatch - Unit 1 secondary containment, ano 2.

-In CONDITION 5,

suspend Hatch Unit 2 CORE' ALTERATIONS and operations that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

b. ~ With two or more of the above required standby gas treatment subsystems inoperable:

1.

Suspend all irradiated fuel and spent fuel shipping cask handling in the Hatch - Unit 1 secondary containment, and 2.

In CONDITION 5,

suspend Hatch Unit 2 CORE ALTERATIONS and operations that could reduce the SMUTDOWN MARGIN.

c..Both Unit 2 independent trains of standby gas treatment may be i

inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during Unit 1 reactor operation for surveillance of the Unit 2 primary containment excess flow isolation dampers if the l

following conditions are met:

1.

Using Unit 1 standby gas treatment system and normal ventilation, maintain at least 1/4" H O vacuum in Unit 1 secondary containment 2

2.

Assure operability of both Unit 1 SGTS filter trains 3.

Assure Unit 2 OCTS valves to the refueling floor cannot be opened 4.

Allow no fuel movement in Units 1 or 2 When irradiated fuel or the spent fuel shipping cask.is being handled in the Hatch - Unit 1 secondary containment.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 9-10 Amendment No. 58 NO O*'h e

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REFLELING OPERATIONS LIMITING C0tOIT10N FCR OPERATION (Cont.!nued)

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5.

Unit 2 secondary containment integrity is intact except for thit 2 stan&y gas treataent system operability requirements If any of the above conditions cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be brought to Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and shall be in Cold Shutdoe within the following

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24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

d.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

g SLRVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.9.5.3.1 Each of the above required Hatch - thit 2 stan&y gas treatment subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.6.1.1.

4.9.5.3.2 Each of the above required Hatch - thit 1 standby gas treatment subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Hatch Onit 1 Technical Specifications.

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HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 9-10a Amendment No. 58

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.4 VACUUH RELIEF Vacum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell and between the reactor building and suppression chamber. ' This systes will maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.

The vacuisa breakers between the suppression chamber and the drywell must not be inoperable in the open position since this would allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are an adequate number of valves to provide some redundance so that operation may continue with no more than three~ vacuum breakers inoperable in the closed position.

Each set of vacuum breakers between the reactor building and the suppression chamber provides 100% relief, so operation may continue with one valve out-of-service for 7 days.

3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release The reactor of radioactive material which may result from an accident.

building provides secondary containnent during normal operation when the When the reactor is shutdown or during drywell is sealed and in service.

refueling the drywell may be open and the reactor building then becomes the primary containment.

Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches and dampers, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity tf the secondary containment. Only one closed damper in each penetration line is required to maintain the integrity of the secondary containment.

3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the containment iodine filter trains ensures sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting LOCA.

site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage'.

The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consist-ent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.

HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-5 t

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CDNTADEDTP SYSTEMS BASES CONTADNENT ADOSPHERE Ct2TTROL (Continued) l The @ERABILITY cf the systems required for the detection and control of hycrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hyt.rogen concentration within contairunent below its Flarnable limit durirg post-IOCA conditions.

Either recombiner is,apahle of contro111rg the expected hydrogeri generation associated with:

(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. Se hydrogen mixirg system is provided to ensure adequate mixirs of the containment atmosphere following a IOCA. mis mixirs action wil'.. prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flaninable limit.

l The requirement for the primary containment atmosphere oxygen i

correntration to be less than 4% by volume is beirg added for fire protection considerations.

21s is being done in lieu of the installation of sprinkler for the recirculation pumps inside the drywell.,,

3/4.6.6.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEH The primary containment purge system is designed to' perform two basic furetions: pressure control and inert /de-iaert the primary contairunent.

Under normal operations the purge system is used to maintain containment pressure less than two psig.

Post ICCA, the purge system, through the 2 inch bypass lines, is also used to reduce containment pressure. Se 18 inch lines are the primary means of reducirs the oxygen concentratica inside containment before larg term power operations to less than 4% in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.6.4.

Conversely, it is also the path for restoring oxygen concentration to life sustaining levels before drywell entry.

The system is hard-piped to the Standby Gas Treatrcent System; therefore, any entrained radioactivity will be reduced before beirg released to the environment through the main stack.

Se use of the' drywell and suppression chamber purge lines is not limited since the 18" valves will close durirg a IDCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guideline of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purgiry operations. Se design of the 18" purge supply and exbaust isolation valves meets tne requirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4, "Contairanent Purging During Normal Plant Operations."

Replacement of the 18" valve resilient seats on a cyclic basis will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. %e O.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by' the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

HATCH-UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 29, 58 i

v CONTAI! MENT SYSTEMS sAsrs PRIMARY CONTAIMENT PLRGE SYSTEM (Continued)

An exception can be. taken for a brief period to both trains of Unit 1 SGTS being available when Lhit 1 is in Cold Shutdown and Unit 2 is operating. This exemption is based on the low probability of the occurrence

- of a DEA LOCA on Lhit 2 during the brief period that tkilt 1 SGTS remained inoperable.

In addition, Lhit 1 SGTS would be in a condition such that it could be restored auickly to assist in the mitigation of the LOCA, if required.

An exception can 6e taken for a brief period to both trains of thit 2 SGTS being available when Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown and Unit 1 is operating. This exemption is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a DBA LOCA on Unit 1 during the brief period that Unit 2 SGTS remained inoperable.

In addition, Lhit 2 SGTS would be in a condition cuch that it could be restored quickly to assist in the mitigation of the LOCA, if required.

Surveillance testing of the excess flow isolation dampers is recommended by the vendor to verify that the blades pivot freely and no other damage is evident.

In&stry practice does not require testing for closure under simulated flow conditions for " tornado" type dampers.

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HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-7 Amendment flo. 58

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