IR 05000266/1985004
| ML20126C798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1985 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126C776 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-85-04, 50-266-85-4, 50-301-85-04, 50-301-85-4, NUDOCS 8506140526 | |
| Download: ML20126C798 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-266/85004(DRP); 50-301/85004(ORP)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203 Facility Name:
Point Beach, Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted:
April 1 through June 6, 1985 Inspectors:
R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon Y
Approved By:
I. N. Jackiw, Chief 6///[9G'
Reactor Projects Section 28 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on A?ril 1 through June 6, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-266/85004(DRP);
50-301/85004(DR)))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; refueling activities; surveillance - refueling; independent inspection; IE Circular follow-up; and licensee event report follow-up.
The inspection involved a total of 436 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors including 82 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
"J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - Technical Service W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction
- R. E. Link, Superintendent - EQR R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- F. A. Flentje, Staff Services Supervisor
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (301/84016-01(DRP)) Failure to follow procedures.
The licensee committed to:
Have shift superintendents review operations special order on bus switching, develop a new
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electrical equipment operating instruction, and place into effect the new maintenance work request procedure. All of these actions have been completed.
(Closed) Noncompliance (301/84016-02(DRP)) Failure to follow procedures.
The licensee committed to counsel the personnel involved and provide additional health physics training to all management personnel.
These actions have been completed.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of April and May 1985.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the Unit 1 Containment, the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, i
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fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plant was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the months of April and May 1985, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, and ECC systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
During performance of Procedure OP-3C, Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown, on April 5, 1985, an inadvertent safety injection occurred on Unit 1.
The shutdown was in preparation for the Unit 1 scheduled refueling outage.
At the time of the safety injection, the reactor was shutdown and the licensee was reducing reactor coolant system temperature in step changes at the request of Chemistry while they drew steam generator samples.
During a normal cooldown, safety injection is blocked before primary pressure is reduced below 1765 PSIG which occurs before the low steam line pressure safety injection setpoint of S30 /SIG is reached.
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during this cooldown, primary pressure was being maintained above the safety injection setpoint while reducing temperature for the chemistry samples. When steam line pressure reached 530 PSIG the safety infection occurred.
All systems functioned as required, no water was injected into the reactor coolant system due to primary pressure being above the safety injection pump discharge pressure.
The licensee is preparing a procedure change to prevent recurrence.
4. Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
IT-90 " Inservice Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater Valves" TS-6
" Technical Specification Rod Exercise" TS-28 " Monthly Auxiliary Building Crane Interlocks Checks" On May 15, 1985, at 2:06 P.M., during calibration of containment hydrogen analyzers, an alligator clip jumper came loose and shorted out to ground.
The short caused a voltage perturbation on the yellow instrument bus.
This in turn caused Unit 2 power range channel N44 to fail low.
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reactor protection system interpreted the failure as a dropped rod and
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the turbine was run back from 100% to 80% power.
All systems functioned as designed and the Unit was returned to 100% power after replacing the power range fuses.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
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Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipmeat maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Repair of the Unit 1 torque motor-operator for RHR 856, RHR suction valve from the RWST.
Replacement of Unit l's incore thimble guide tubes.
Inspection of containment snubbers.
Inspection of Unit l's "B" reactor coolant pump.
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Repair of service water supply Valve SW-4006 to Unit 1 Steam Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
Replacement and testing of the discharge check valve on Unit 1 motor-driven Auxiliary Faedwater Pump, P 38A.
The removing of the lagging from the auxiliary feedwater piping in Unit 1 containment.
Inspection of a pressurizer safety valve.
Recharge of a mixed bed (H0H) demineralizer.
Inspection of a component cooling heat exchanger.
One of the individuals involved with the replacement of incore thimble guide tubes set off the portal monitor while exiting the site.
Subsequent frisking of the individual indicated possible contamination of one hand, however, further attempts in the portal monitor with his hand held outside of the detection volume still produced alarms.
The individual was given whole body counts at 4:00 A.M. on May 14, at 1:00 P.M. on May 14 and at 9:00 A.M. on May 15, all of which were positive.
A bioassay sample was taken at 1:00 P.M. on May 15.
The fecal sample showed positive; the urine was less than MDA.
A whole body count taken at 9:00 A.M. on May 16 was negative.
The licensee performed a calibration with a phantom to verify the negative results.
Based on the above analyses and the fact that the other personnel working closely with the above individual indicated no uptakes and the constant air monitoring equipment used to monitor the job showed no increases, it is believed that the individual took in some small particle which eventually became ingested and passed through the digestive system.
Using this scenario the licensee has calculated an intestinal tract exposure of less than 10 mrem for this event.
This item will be reviewed further by Regional Health Physics Inspectors.
This is considered an open item.
(266/85004-01).
6.
Refueling Activities The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; observed six shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained in the refueling areas; and verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
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Fuel sipping identified fuel assemblies M-10, M-16, and M-23 as possible leakers. Visual inspection of fuel assembly M-23 showed that the end plug from one of the fuel rods had come off and that the spring was exposed.
The end plug, however, was still attached to the fuel rod.
There was no visible indication of clad failure during the visual inspection of fuel assemblies M-10 or M-16.
Fuel assembly H-9 was visually inspected for wear from water jetting. It showed indications of fretting corrosion.
These four fuel assemblies have not been reloaded into the core.
Because of indications of water jetting on fuel assembly H-9, which came from core location D-12, the licensee did a visual inspection of the baffle and former assembly for core location D-12.
Review of the video tape indicated that, at about four spots along the inside corner, the gap between the plates was one and one half to two times the specified gap.
The licensee has evaluated the failure of one rodlet and has indicated that this failure would not raise the activity level of the reactor coolant system a significant amount.
A used assembly was loaded into core location D-12.
The baffle was not repaired during this refueling outage.
The inspector will continue to follow this issue.
This is considered an open item.
(266-85004-02)
7.
Surveillance - Refueling The inspector observed refueling outage related surveillance testing on Unit 1 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the test results were adequate.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
WMPT 6.5
"End of Cycle Testing" WMPT 3.1
" Cold and Het Rod Drop Testing" WMPT 9.1
" Rod Control Mechanism Timing, Rod Drop Testing and Rod Position Calibration" ORT #3
" Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC" ORT #31
" Nitrogen Supply to PRT" ORT #15
" Operations Refueling Test Fuel Manipulator and Fuel Transfer System Checkout"
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" Leak Testing of Containment Isolation Valves Instruction and Information" RP - 3B
" Fuel Assembly Sipping" TS-30
"High and Low Head Safety Injection Check Valve Leakage Test" During performance of WMPT 3.1, Cold and Hot Rod Drop Testing, two rods failed to drop to the bottom of the core.
On May 29, 1985, at 2100 during cold, full flow rod drop testing, rod F-12 became stuck about 60 inches from the bottom of the core.
Attempts to move the rod by stepning were unsuccessful.
Analysis of the stepping current traces indicateu that the problem was not with the stepping mechanism.
The licensee decided to proceed with reactor coolant system heatup in order to perfc m an inservice leak test on the system as well as hot rod drop testing.
During a conference call between the ifcensee and Region III, the licensee committed verbally to not attempt any further stepping of rod F-12.
During hot (370 degrees) full flow rod drop testing, rod J-4 became stuck about 99 inches from the bottom of the core.
The licensee returned the unit to cold shutdown.
After returning to cold shutdown the licensee attempted to move rod J-4 by stepping while taking stepping current traces for analysis.
Rod J-4 appeared to move out a couple of steps but then would not move in either direction.
As with rod F-12, analysis of the stepping current traces indicated no problems with the stepping mechanism.
The licensee decided to remove the reactor vessel head to perform further inspections of the stuck rods. Of first consideration was to ensure that the rods were stuck in the upper internals and not in the head.
A special procedure was developed prior to proceeding with the head lift.
Provisions were made to leave the individual rod position indications for the two stuck rods connected during the initial head lift for observation of relative motion which would indicate that the rods were stuck in the upper internals rather than in the head.
The initial lift was to an elevation of one foot.
During this lift relative motion was observed.
Using a remote tool the licensee then tried to free the stuck rods by vibrating the drive shafts.
Rod F-12 did not move during this evolution.
Rod J-4 dropped approximately eight inches and again became stuck.
This is the distance between guide cards in the guide tubes.
Further attempts
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to free the rods by this method were abandoned.
The head was then lifted to an elevation of 10 feet and the F-12 and J-4 drive shafts were secured to the sides of the refueling cavity by ropes to prevent them from putting undue strain on the guide tubes and flexureless inserts when the head was lifted further, thereby removing any lateral support provided by the rod position indicator housings.
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With the reactor head removed, the licensee used the drive shaft latching tool to attempt to free the rods.
The original plan was to try and free the rods and return them to their. full inserted position.
These attempts were unsuccessful.
The alternate plan was to raise the rods until the spider assembly at the top of the control rod was just below the top hat of the guide tube.
These attempts were successful.
After ensuring that the control rods would not drop from that position, the flexureless inserts were removed and the drive shafts were unlatched from the control rods.
Inspection of the flexureless insert removed from the J-4 guide tube disclosed that a piece of the skirt section was missing.
The skirt section is slotted forming eight tabs.
Four of the tabs are in contact with the latching pawls which hold the flexureless insert in place at the top of.the guide tube.
The slots were cut in the skirt during manufacturing to allow for forcable removal of the flexureless inserts in the event of a failure of the internal spring.
The missing tab was one of the four not in contact with the latching pawl. After removal of the guide tube top hats at positions F-12 and J-4, a visual inspection of the control rod spider assemblies was performed.
This inspection provided no further information.
The J-4 and F-12 control rods were then removed out of the top of their guide tubes and a visual inspection of the guide tube internals was performed.
This inspection disclosed the causes of the rods failing to drop into the core.
The missing piece of flexureless insert skirt was found in the J-4 guide tube on a guide tube card corresponding to the elevation at which rod J-4 had stuck.
A flexure pin was found in the F-12 guide tube on a guide tube card corresponding to the elevation at which rod F-12 had stuck.
The licensee plans to remove the upper internals and place it on its stand, remove all flexureless inserts and inspect them for possible damage, inspect the guide tube internals for any other debris, and replace the two rods which stuck with new control rods.
The inspectors will continue to follow these actions.
This is considered an open item.
(266-85004-03).
8.
Independent Inspection During the Unit I refueling outage the licensee replaced the guide tube split pins, removed the guide tube flexures, and installed new flexureless drive shaft guide inserts (donuts) in each of the guide tubes.
The replacement of the split pins was a result of an ultrasonic inspection done in February 1984 which indicated that 67 of the 74 split pins had crack indications in the' shank to collar region.
Tooling for the replacement of split pins on 14 x 14 fuel assembly guide tubes had not been developed at that time.
The licensee performed a safety evaluation to justify continued operation until the required tooling could be developed.
During the replacement, Westinghouse encountered some problems with their remote equipment and there was a sizing problem with the replacement split pins.
These problems were resolved and the job was completed on schedule.
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After completion of the above jobs, Westinghouse did a comprehensive visual inspection via remote video of the upper core plate for debris.
There were no indications of any debris exceeding the requirements of ANSI 45.2.1-1973.
The licensee performed a visual inspection via remote video of the guide tube internals in which debris had been left after the steam generator replacement.
They also inspected some other guide tube internals at random.
Again there were no significant findings.
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and maintenance programs for the station batteries.
All operation and maintenance on the station batteries is being conducted j
in accordance with the licensee's Technical Specifications and the l
Battery Vendor Technical Manual.
Although the licensee's Technical Specifications are much less stringent than Standard Technical Specifications on battery testing, the original station batteries are nearing their estimated end of life (15 years) with no malfunctions or abnormalities in operation.
After closeout of IE Bulletin 79-25: Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems, based on the Licensee's actions in compliance to Westinghouse's service letter TS-E-412, further problems with the replacement relays were encountered.
These problems were described in IE Information Notices 82-02 and 82-54 and dealt with relay coil burnout and improperly cured epoxy filler resin respectively.
The licensee's actions
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with regard to these subsequent problems were discussed in Inspection
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Reports 50-266/81-13, 50-301/81-15; 50-266/81-15, 50-301/81-17;
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50-266/82-24, 50-301/82-22; and 50-266/83-26, 50-301/83-24.
The subsequent problems were resolved by further coil and/or relay replacements furnished by Westinghouse.
The last replacements were completed on June 16, 1983, for Unit 2 and on February 21, 1984, for Unit 1.
No further problems have been encountered with these relays.
This information is provided as verification of acceptable licensee performance as originally committed to in their letter of December 20, 1979, in response to IE Bulletin 79-25 and as requested in Appendix C,
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Proposed Follow-up Items, of NUREG/CR-4004, Closeout of IE Bulletin 79-25: Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems.
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IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
81-13 Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors.
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10.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
266/85-001-00 Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation on Low Steam Line Pressure.
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11. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.
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Exit Interview l
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
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throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the
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inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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