ML20137N837

Forwards Response to Issues Re Classification Scheme of Emergency Action Levels

ML20137N837
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/29/1997
From:	Mccollum W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TAC-M96519, TAC-M96520, NUDOCS 9704090066
Download: ML20137N837 (154)

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. March'29,.1997 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention':' Document Control Desk Washington,.DC 20555

Subject:

Catawht. Nuclear-Station.

Docket, Nos. 50-413, 50-414

. License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52 Classification Scheme of Emergency Action Levels

'(NRC TAC M96519 and M96520)

'Ref.: Emergency Plan Change Submittal dated August 29, 1996 Attached is our response to the issues regarding our Emergency Plan submittal as requested in your January ',4 1997, letter.

Please_ contact Gary Mitchell at (803) 831-3235 if there are any questions on this information.

Yours truly,

- 1 W. R. McCollum t

/

WRM/GLM )

Attachments: / / /

1) Responses to Issues 1-17 from January 14, 1997, letter

2) Revised Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-0,07, Rev. 2 Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels in the Catawba EAL Submittal

3) Revised Catawba Emergency Plan Section D pages uth

-Revision Marks

'4) Revised Catawba Emergency Plan Section D pages without Revision Marks

5) Revised Catawba Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01

• Classification of Emergency"

, 6) Selected'Pages'from Critical Safety / unction Status Trees  !

Procedure EP/1/A5000/F-0 I

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'9704090066 970329 ff PDR .ADOCK 050004 r.

5.nnnMonn. < 1

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XC:

l L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator USNRC, Region II (2 copies)

P. S. Tam, Project Manager USNRC, ONRR

- R.-J.

Freudenberger, Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

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ATTACHMENT 1 l l

Responses to Issues 1-17 from January 14,1997 Letter J

4 Attachment 1 Deletion of EAL 4.1.N.4 During our review of the NUMARC EAL package following the Request for Additional Information, a problem was discovered with EAL 4.1.N.4.

This EAL is being deleted for the following reasons. The containment process radiation monitors (EMF-38, -39, and -40) serve to provide early indication of reactor coolant (NC) leaks in containment to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments. These monitors alarm on small NC leaks in and below the Unusual Event (IC 4.2.U.4) range.- Also, these monitors automaticelly isolate on a safety injection. For these reasons, it is not appropriate to use these monitors as an indication of a loss of the reactor coolant system barrier.

The reactor building monitors (EMF-53A and -53B) used for the Fuel Clad EAL 4.1.F.3 are not able to indicate clearly the lower levels of

- activity in containment resulting from a leak of reactor coolant with normal activity levels. Thus, this EAL will be omitted and other indication will be used to determine a potential loss or loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.

Issue 1 At the time of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) submittal, the Emergency Plan for Catawba Nuclear Site did not require on-shift dose assessment. Duke Power, in a letter dated January 15, 1997, has '

committed to augmenting the capability for on-shift dose assessment using effluent release information and real-time meteorology by August 4

1, 1997. Procedure RP/0/B/1009/26, "On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections" will provide guidance for on-shift offsite dose

! assessment. Duke Power will not implement NUMARC/NESP-007 EALs prior to this date. Catawba EALs 4.3.U.1-1, 4.3.U.1-2, 4.3.A.1-1, and 4.3.A.1-2 have been revised to match the NUMARC/NESP-007 guidance.

The Unusual Event and Alert EALs have been revised to indicate the event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes (Unusual Event) or 15 minutes (Alert).

Issue 2 Catawba EAL 4.3.A.2-2 actually corresponds to NUMARC EAL AA2.2. The Catawba EAL which corresponds to NUMARC EAL AA.2.4 is 4.3.A.2-3. The cross reference document.in the original submittal was incorrect.

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Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, Duke Power did not wish for personnel to remain in the area to observe that irradiated fuel was uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as quickly as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room. This statement has been added to the basis for EAL 4.3.A.2-2.

Also, EAL 4.3.A.2-2 has been reworded to clarify that it applies to any irradiated fuel.

Issue 3 Catawba EAL 4.3.A.3-1 has been revised to read:

4.3.A.3-1 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

1 The previous EAL 4.3.A.3-2 has been renumbered to EAL 4.3.A.3-3.

The phrase " valid indication" is used instead of a radiation nanitor l reading for the CAS and SAS because these areas have no area monitors. 1 The CAS and the SAS have replaced the PAP. The CAS and SAS are the l security alarm stations which are continuously occupied. The following sentence has been added to the basis for this EAL.

"The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require  ;

continuous occupancy. The value of 15mR/hr is derived from  ;

the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for  :

expected occupancy times."

Issue 4 It was decided to eliminate the 5 R/Hr value and use normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE for EAL 4.3.A.3-2. This decision was made after research of the basis for EAL 4.3.A.3-2 and discussions with Radiation Protection Personnel.

Catawba EAL 4.3.A.3-2 has been renumbered to 4.3.A.3-3 and revised to read as follows:

EAL 4.3.A.3-3 Radiation Levels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

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The basis'for this as follows: U E

" Radiation levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be performed without exceeding 5 Rem per year TEDE will impede l

access due to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or Planned Emergency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a.significant radiological problem that warrants additional  :

resources to assess and mitigate." ]

Issue 5 The following is the derivation for the monitor thresholds for EAL 4.3.S.1-1 and EAL 4.3.G.1-1 i

The NUMARC EAL document, NUMARC/NESP-007, gives several methods for initiating a particular Emergency Action Level. These  :

methods include using Radiation Monitor (EMF) trigger. values and using site boundary dose rate values that have either been calculated or actually measured. The Raddose-V model uses the site boundary dose method for identifying the EAL based on effluent releases and real-time meteorology.

The gaseous effluent Selected Licensee Commitment and Technical Specification are based on limiting gaseous activity release rates to a site boundary total body dose rate of 500 mrem / year

(= 0.05 mrem / hour). [

The 0.05 mrem /hr Tech Spec site boundary dose rate forms the basis of the NUMARC EALs for gas releases, since each of the four EALs are initiated from multiples of that dose rate, i.e.:

Unusual Event: 2

• 0.05 = 0.10 mrem /hr (2 60 minutes)

Alert: 200

• 0.05 = 10 mrem /hr (2 15 minutes) site Area amargency: 100 mrem /hr whole body (2000

• 0.05) 500 mrem /hr thyroid" (2 15 minutes)

General Emergency: 1000 mrem /hr whole body (20000

• 0.05) 5000 mrem /hr thyroid *

(2 15 minutes)

• Used in the site boundary dose method only.

Therefore, the first step in coming up with the EAL EMF trigger values is to calculate the Tech Spec release rate and then prorate multiples of that release rate to get the monitor readings for each EAL.

. I.

I. calculate the Tech spec Release Rate (pCi/sec Xe-133 eq.)

From page C-5 of the ODCM the release rate limit equation for noble gases is as follows:

K

• X/Q

• Q < 500 mrem /yr where:

K = the total body dose factor due to gamma emissions,

= 2.06E+02 mrem /yr per pCi/m3 for Xe-133 I

X/Q = the highest calculated annual average relative concentration for any area at or beyond the unrestricted ,

area boundary for ground level releases

= 3.51E-05 sec/m 3 0 = pCi/sec Xe-133 eq. release rate Substituting the values into the setpoint equation gives a release rate of 6.915E+04 pCi/sec Xe-133 equivalent.

II. Calculate the EAL EMF Trigger Values Reference data from HP/0/B/1000/10:

Monitor Range Correlation Factor (cpm /pci/ml Xe-133eq.)

EMF 36(L) 102 - 10 7 2.7E+07 EMF 36(H) 101 - 10 8 4.3E+03 Average Unit Vent Flow Rate: 1.9E+05 cfm Factor to convert pCi/sec to cpm:

1. (pCi/sec) *CF(cpm / Ci/ml) *60 sec/m*3.531E-05 cf /ml+1.9E+05 cfm =

1. (pCi/sec)

• CF(cpm /pCi/ml)

• 1.115E-08

, . Unusual Event ,

EMF 36(L) = 2*6.915E+04 pCi/sec*2.7E+07 cpm /pCi/ml*1.115E-08

= 4.16E+04 cpm Alert EMF 36(L) = 200*6.915E+04 Ci/sec*2.7E+07 cpm /pCi/ml*1.115E = 4.16E+06 cpm

Site Area amargency EMF 36(H) = 2000*6.915E+04 Ci/sec*4.3E+03 cpm /pci/ml*1.115E-08

. = 6.63E+03 cpm General Emergency EMF 36(H) = 20000*6.915E+04pCi/sec*4.3E+03 cpm /pCi/ml*1.115E-08

= 6.63E+04 cpm The EALs and notes have been revised to indicate that the EMF readings are sustained for greater than or equal to 15 minutes, like the Alert, ,

rather than being based upon a 60 minute release duration. The EMF 3 readings are based on dose rates, as described above.

Issue 6 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix has been corrected to show that a Containment radiation monitor 53A or 53B reading of > 117 R/hr represents a LOSS of the fuel clad barrier.

Issue 7 Initiating condition 4.6.U.1 has been reworded to say 1

" Fire Within the Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection OR Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary"

. The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) has been added to the list of areas for EALs 4.6.U.1-1 and 4.6.A.1-1.

Issue 8 EAL 4.7.A.1-2 has been revised to include a list of areas similar to EAL 4.7.A.1-3.

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. The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) has been added to the list of areas for both EALs 4.7.A.1-2 and 4.7.A.1-3.

_ Issue 9 EAL 4.7.A.1-1 has been revised to read as follows:

Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on 1AD-4, B/8 This identifies the instrumentation used to determine if OBE is exceeded.

Issue 10 Defueled is not a defined operating mode per Technical Specifications.

The unit is considered to be in "No Mode" when the core is defueled.

Duke Power has reviewed the Operating Mode applicability of the NUMARC EALs and has made changes as follows:

1) EAL 4.2.U.3-1 applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 only, as the Technical Specification only applies in these modes.

. 2) EAL 4.5.U.1-1 has been split into two EALs. In Modes 1-4, both diesel generators must start and load for the unit to be in an Unusual Event. In Modes 5, 6, and No Mode (Defueled), only one diesel generator is required. These events would escalate to an Alert if a diesel failed via EAL 4.5.A.2-1 in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, and EAL 4.5.A.1-1 in Modes 5, 6, and No Mode (Defueled).

3) EALs 4.6.A.1-1 and 4.6.A.2-1 have been recombined into EAL 4.6.A.1-1. This revised EAL 4.6.A.1-1 applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, except that doghouses are an area of interest only in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. A new EAL 4.6.A.2-1 has been written specifically for No Mode (Defueled). This EAL focuses on Spent Fuel Pool cooling and supporting systems.(as per NUMARC/NESP-007 IC HA2)

The Definition / Acronyms Enclosure 4.8 of RP/0/A/5000/01 has been revised to include " Operability Mode Applicability" per page 5-1 of the NUMARC/NESP-007 DOCUMENT Revision 2. This definition refers to ALL es meaning " Modes 1 through 6" and includes "No j Mode" (defueled).

Issue 11 EAL 4.7.A.3-1 has been revised to read:

Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5500/17 I

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IDLL 4.7.S.1-1 part a has been revised to read:

a .. Control. Room evacuation has been initiated per i AP/1(2)/A/5500/17 Issue 12  ;

EAL 4.4.A.1-1 part,a, 4.4.S.1-1 part a and 4.4.G.1-1 part a have l

'been revised to read:  ;

a. . Valid reactor trip signal received or required and

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automatic reactor trip was not successful l Issue 13 .

- EAL 4.4. A'.2-1 has been revised to read  ;

. 4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (.N D) and/or i Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC) l 1

i AND One of the following:  ;

e Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below  :

200 F .

• Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature rise to >180 F e

5 Issue 14 EAL 4.5.S.2-1 part a has been revised to delete the term

" Unplanned".

Issue 15  !

The order of EALs 4.4.S.2-1 through 4.4'.S.2-3 have been revised '

to put them in the same priority as the critical safety function status trees (suberiticality, core cooling, and heat sink). ,

r Duke Power does not agree with NRC'S interpretation of the NUMARC {

4 guidance for this issue. The basis in NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 i (IC SS4) indicates that "This EAL addresses complete loss of functions' required for hot shutdown" and=that "there is an

, actual major failure of'a system intended for protection of the public." The-Critical Safety Function red paths (see attachment -

6) indicate a loss of function needed to protect a Fission Product Barrier, not necessarily the loss of the Fission Product Barrier itself. The NUMARC document does not explain this.EAL'as '[

being aLprecursor to' Fission Product Barrier challenges.

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This EAL is applicable in Modes'1-4. The heat' sink in these  ;

' modes is steam' generator cooling. The Heat-Sink CSF-Red adequately addresses ultimate heat sink concerns.

Issue 16 EAL 4.2.S.1-1 part a has been revised to read: ,

Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems.

i Also, part d has been revised for clarity to read: ,

Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the i following Critical Safety Functions:

i e .subcriticality e core cooling

• heat sink

• containment 3

-Issue 17 1 r

EAL 4.5.G.1-1 part b has been revised to provide specific SSF .

success criteria and now reads Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump seal injection OR CA supply to Steam Generators The first sentence in the second paragraph of the Basis for this EAL has been revised to read i The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary feedwater ,

supply to the steam generators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. '

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ATTACHMENT 2 Revised Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels in Catawba 'EAL' Submittal l 4

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Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category A AUl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.1-1 and -2 AUl/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U. -3 and -4 AU1/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors AUl/4 Deleted -- Catawba does not have automatic real time dose assessment AU2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-1 AU2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-2 AU2/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have dry fuel storage AU2/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-3 AAl/l Abnormrl Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-1 and -2 AA1/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-3 and -4 AAl/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors AA1/4 Deleted -- Catawba does not have automatic real time dose assessment AA2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-1 AA2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-2 AA2/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-3 AA2/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-3 AA3/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-1 and -2 AA3/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-3 ASl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-1 ASl/2 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors AS1/3 Abnormal Rad Levels /Rndiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-2 ASI/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-3 AGl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-1 AGl/2 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perirneter monitors AGl/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-2 AGI/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-3 l 1

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Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category F FPB Fuel /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.1 FPB Fuel /2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.2 FPB Fuel /3 Deleted -- Core exit thermocouples are monitored as part of Critical Safety Function (CSF) status. If the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is done per F/0," Critical Safety Function Status" and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /4 Deleted -- Reactor Vessel level is monitored as part of CSF status. If the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is done per F/0," Critical Safety Function Status" and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.3 FPB Fuel /6 Deleted -- Catawba does not believe additional indications are needed to determine Fuel Clad Barrier status. Air sampling (PAGS) results are not used, as containment monitors can be used to determine Fuel Clad 3 status.

FPB Fueln Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.4 FPB RCS/l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.1 FPB RCS/2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.2 FPB RCS/3 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.3 Note: The classification procedure does not provide site specific criteria that a steam generator is ruptured.

Duke Power's philosophy is that diagnostic information of this type  :

belongs in the Emergency Operating Procedures. Once the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director determines that a steam generator is ruptured, the classification procedure can be used to determine the correct classification.

FPB RCS/4 DELETED Containment Radiation Monitors (4.1.N.4) Containment process monitors alarm at too low a leak rate for NCS barrier loss and auto-isolate on safety injection. Reactor Building monitors cannot indicate clearly activity levels from loss of coolant with normal activity.

FPB RCS/5 Deleted -- Catawba does not believe additional indications are needed to determine Reactor Coolant System Barrier status. Air sampling (PAGS) results are not used, as containment monitors can be used to determine Reactor Coolant System Barrier status.

?PS RCS/6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.5 Ft u Containment /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.1 FPB Containment /2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.2 FPB Containment /3 Fissien Product Barrier 4.1.C.3 FPB Containment /4 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.4 ,

FPB Containment /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.5 l i

Catawba Nuclear Site ,

Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal -

FPB Containment /6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.6 Core exit thermocouples are monitored as part of CSF status. If the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is done per F/0," Critical Safety Function Status" and will be used to classify.

4 FPB Containmentn Deleted -- no additional indications needed FPB Containment /8 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.7 P

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Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition'of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category H HU1/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-1 and -2 HU1/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7 U.1-3 HUl/3 Deleted -- Catawba considers this redundant to Emergency Director Judgement HU1/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-4 HUl/5 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 HUl/6 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-5 HUln Deleted -- Catawba believes no additional items are needed based on current EAL experience HU2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-1 HU3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.2-1 HU3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.2-2 HU4/1 Fire and Security 4.6.U.2-1 HU4/2 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 and -3 HU5/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.3-1 HA1/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7 A.1-1 HAl/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-2 HA1/3 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/5 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7. A.1-3 HAl/6 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1n Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.1-1 and 4.-6.A.2-1 HA3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.2-1 HA3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7 A.2-2 HA4/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.3-1 HA4/2 Deleted -- Catawba believes no others Security Event EALs necessary based on current EAL experience HAS/l Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.3-1 HA6/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.4-1 HSl/l Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-1 HSI/2 Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-2 and -3 HS2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.1-1 HS3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.2-1 HGl/l Fire and Security 4.6.G.1-1 HG1/2 Fire and Security 4.6.G.1-2 HG2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.G.1-1 4

1 Catawba Nuclear Site i Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal 1

i NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number ' l Recognition Category S \

SUl/l Loss of Power 4.5.U.1-1 l

SU2/1 System Malfunc' tan 4.2.U.1-1 SU3/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.2-1 i SU4/1 Deleted -- Catawba has no failed fuel monitor. Reactor coolant sampling is used to determine N1 clad degradation.

4. SU4/2 System Malfunction 4.2.U.3 Aeolies in Modes 1-5 only because the Technical Specification aoolies only in these modes.

SU5/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.4-1, -2, and -3 SU6/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.5-1 and -2 SU7/1 Loss of Power 4.5.U.2-1 SA1/1 Loss of Power 4.5.A.1-1 SA2/1 Loss of Shutdow n Function 4.4. A.1-1 SA3/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.A.2-1 S \4/1 System Malfunction 4.2.A.1-1 1 AS/l Loss of Power 4.5.A.2-1

. SSl/l Loss of Power 4.5.S.1-1 SS2/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.1-1 SS3/1 Loss of Power 4.5.S.2-1 SS4/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.2-1, -2, and -3 l

. SS5/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.3-1, -2, and -3  :

SS6/1 System Malfunction 4.2.S.1-1 l SGl/l Loss of Power 4.5.G.1-1 l SG2/1 and 2 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.G.1-1 4

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ENCLOSURE 4.1 Catawba Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Use EALs to deterrnine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for ali 3 barriers. Classify accolding to the table below.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT loss situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Unusual Event II - 3 Points) Alert (4 - 6 Points) site Area Emeroency f7 General Emeroency (11 - 13 Points)

- 10 Poletts)

. Any Potential Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of the . Loss of both NCS . Loss of alt three bamers NCS and Fuel Clad

. Any Loss of Containment . Any Potentral Loss or Loss of Fuet . Potential Loss of . Loss of any two bamers and the Potential Loss of the Ctad both NCS and Fuel third barrier Clad

. Potenial Loss of either the NCS or Fuel Clad and Loss of anyadditional barrier CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) LOSS -

(4 Point (s))

1. CritcalSafety Funcaon Samous 1.CrincalSafety Functon Simhrs 1.CriticalSafetyFmctonf es

• CaramnFeft4tED e Nct appbcable e NCs ktegrey-Red

• Nat apptcable

• Core Coahng- e Core CoatqRed orange

. Hem sr*wd

. Hem sr*4ted

2. Conteirasent CorHH901 L.fCS Leah Rate 2. Prenant Coolant Acevity Lsvel e Certamert Pmssure > 15

• Rapid unex;2amed decrease m

• r eleakneeengte e GREATER THAN avadable

• Nat a@hcable o Coolant Actiwty GREATER THAN 300pO/o:

Ps'G contanment pressure lagoweg s specty of onei%nyng purry enahme capaaty as Dolie Equivalert toene (DEI) b131 runal merease me nannelcW rnode rdcated by a bss of NCs

• H2 ancereance > 9% - e letdown salaisi sotxxiokng

• Corsarrert pressue or styrp e Cartanment pressure greater lews!r!Mponse not consstert man 3 psig meless than tme we LOCA constions tus rac ct NS ano a VXCARF cperanng

ENCLOSURE 4.1 Catawba Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARFIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

1 Contamment ImamILm Yahes Stuhan ARar Contanment ladallen 1 SG TideIhgl Mfg 1ConInugenes RedissianIAsdostog AshdIds8

• Nca apacable

• Catarvnent solaban s

• Pnmery4o Secondaryleak ram

• h2ason fiat a SG a Rupued

• Contenmentrasatonmondor rumgilene and a release pam esteeds te capacey d one and has a hon 4solable 53 A or 538 resong 3117 Rhr fromccritammers easts chargng pump e te normal seandary kelaut chagngmode welesdown sciated

• hecabanhataSG' sn4nured and a prdunged release d corsamrated secondary cocias e amenng hrn te afteded SG to me ernwarnent LEGJissandacLEdnashese We Primary-to Secondary Lanhage 4.Centainment Raesson lionRoving LIngruency Coordinnantf0F mrertor Judesment

• mlamicatie

• Release W secondary sak to

• Not W

• Not ,Nipbcable

• Any condson, WAm$ng reb &ty to monsor te kwer, tat in te @non atmosphere um pnmary e d te Emergency CoordnamvEOF Dreca mdk:ams LDSS or secondary kakage GREATER POTENTIAL LOSS d to fueldad bamos.

THAN Tedt Spec alocable

s. S.gnAcant Radioacave inventory in Cantainment

• Contarrant Rai Mmmor

• Not ap$ cable

• Any mnetort edudog retdity to monect te bamer, tat m te gnon EMF 53A or 539 d te Emegency Coordnaw EOF Dredor tutcates LOSS or Readng 4 mme smce POTENTIAL LOSS d the NCS bamer.

shut @ert

> 470 FWr 0 0 0.5hr

> 170 fWr 0 0 5 2 hr

> 125 H,hr 0 2 -4 hr

> 90P.hr 0 4 8 hr

> 53 Mr 0 > 8 hr

6. Core CooEng

• Crncochng REDpamis

• Not apptcable ruscatedlor>15 nrt

7. Emergency Coordinator EOF Drector Julosment

• Any condeurs exAssng reb &ty a monaar me bamer, eat m eu waan i d to Emergency CoordnanEOF Dreca indcates LOSS or POTENTLAL LOSS d the contamment barner.

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.I Inability to Reach Required 4.2.A.I Unplanned Loss of Most or 4.2.S.I Inability to Monitor a Shutdown Within All Safety System Significant Transient in Technical Specification Annunciation or Indication Progress Limits in Control Room With Either-(1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators ,

Unavailable 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater'Ihan 15 Minutes 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant (NCS)

System Leakage 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.I Any Unplanned Release of 4.3.A.I Any Unplanned Release of 4.3.S.I Boundary Dose Resulting 4.3.G.I Boundary Dose Resulting Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an ActualorImminent from an Actual or Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Release of Radioactivity Imminent Release of Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Exceeds 100 mrem'EDE Radioactivity that Exceeds Two Emes the SLC Limits 200 Times the SLC Limits or 500 mrem CDE Adult 1000 mrem BIDE or 5000 for 60 hlinutes or Longer for 15 Minutes or Longer Hyroid for the Actual mrem CDE Adult Ryroid or Projected Duration of the forthe ActualorProjected Release Duration of the Release 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation or Airborne Fuel or Loss of Water Concentration Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncavering ofIrradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility nat Impedes Operation of Systems

• Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.A.I Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.I Failure of Reactor Protection 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Ree: tor Protection System System Instrumentation to Protection System to Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Trip and hianual Trip was Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection NOT Successful and 'fhere Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been is Indication of an Extreme System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and hianual Trip Challenge to the Ability to Exceeded and h1anual Trip Was NOT Successful Cool the Core Was Successful 4.4.A.2 Inability to hiaintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function in Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or hiaintain Hot Shutdown 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That lias or Will Uncover Fuel in the

• Reactor Vessel

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER

. UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to 4.5.A.I Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.S.I Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC . (Offsite and Onsite) AC Than 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Shutdown or Refueling power source for greater Mode for Greater than 15 than 15 minutes such that Minutes an additional single failure could result in station blackout

Catowba Ncclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.I Fire Within Protected Area 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.I Security Event in a Plant 4.6.G,1 Security Event Resulting in Boundary Not Extinguished the Operability of Plant Vital Area Loss Of Ability to Reach Within 15 Minutes of Safety Systems Required to and Maintain Cold Detection or Explosion Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown Within Protected Area Shutdown Boundary 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting Which Indicates a Potential the Operability of Plant Degradation in the Level of Safety Systems Required to Safety of the Plant Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area l

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L Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.I Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.I Natural and Destructise 4.7.S.I Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.I Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Which in the Judgement of

{ Protected Area Plant Vital Area Plant Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing i Flammable Gases Deemed Flammab!c Gases Within a  %~nich in the Judgement of Detrimental to Safe Facility Structure Which the Emergency Operation of the Plant Jeopardizes Operation of CoordinatorEOF Director Systems Required to Warrant Declaration of Site Maintain Safe Operations Area Emergency or to Establish or Maintain 1

Cold Shutdown 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Which in the Judgement of Has Been Initiated the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing l Which in the Judgement of 1 the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert

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ATTACHMENT 3 Revised Catawba Emergency Plan Section "D"

. Pages WITH Revision Marks h i 1

Catawb2 Nuclear Site J

A tube rupture with an unisolable secondary line fault is' generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. In conjunction

- with containment barrier loss #4, this condition will result in the declaration of a Site Arca Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

Secondary radiauon increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling System. Determination of the " uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed i

breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. These conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers.

4.1.N.5 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the NCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

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D-8

Catawb2 Nuclear Site FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (F.1 or F. 2 or F. 3 or F. 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

'4.1.F.1 Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ult.imate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication ofloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

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l 4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level  !

The value of 300 Ci/cc I131 equivalent coolant activity is well above that expected ,

for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount l of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is  !

considered lost.  !

There is no equivalent " Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring A reading of 117 R/hr on EMF-53A or 53B is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the I maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). This EAL indicates a loss of ~

both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: If EMF-53A and EMF-53B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/06," Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

D-9

4 Catawba Nuclear Site ,

i SYSTEM MALFUNCTION l UNUSUAL EVENT-4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation. -

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: . Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.3-1 Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. This EAL applies in Modes 1,2,3,4, and 5 only because the Technical Specification applies only in these modes.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, Oh92, SU4 l

D 13

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM Nf ALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems.

AND

b. A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the following Critical Safety Functions:

e suberiticality e core cooling a heat sink  ;

e containment l

I HASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to  !

monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the I control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the pubhc. l I

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D-18

i Catawba Nuclear Site l

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.1-1 A valid Trip 2 alarm on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 for 2 60 minutes or d

willlikely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/14. l 4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 21.08E+04 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/25.  ;

4.3.U.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times St.C 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure. I l

4.3 U.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for 2 60 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this time period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points) on the applicable package.

l Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

1 D-20 )

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Catawba Nuclear Site Unplanned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes.

The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/14 " Radiation e Protection Actions Following An Uncontrolled Release of Liquid Radioactive Material" to quantify a release.

Monitor setpoints are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 3

(ODCM) using annual average meteorology dispersion coefficient of 3.51E-5 sec/m . Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/25, " Emergency Response Off-Site Dose Projections" te quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-OO7, REV. 2,01/92, AU1 4

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ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: )

4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 of 21.2E+05 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/14. l l

4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 21.08E+06 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release l with procedure HP/0/B/1009/25.  ;

1 4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 215 I minutes as determined by RP procedure.

4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this time period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

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Catawba Nuclear Site 4

It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as 1 soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes. l 1

The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year tots! body.

The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/14, " Radiation Protection Actions Following An Uncontrolled Release of Liquid Radioactive Material" to quantify a release.

Monitor setpoints are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) using annual average meteorology dispersion coefficient of 3.51E-5 sec/m'. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/25, " Emergency Response Off-Site Dose Projections" to i quantify a release. l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, AAI a

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Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering ofIrradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.21 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. ' Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge 1 EMF-15 2 EMF-4

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation 1 EMF-42 2 EMF-42

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge j IEMF-17 1 2 EMF-2

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39 4.3.A.2 2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level < 95 % after initiation of NC system make-up AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel AND KF-122 cannot be closed.

D-25 1

J Catawba Nuclear Site l

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BASIS: j

- This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage. There is time available to take 3 corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation,if appropriate, would occur via ,

Abnormal Rad Level / Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director

Judgment.

EAL 2: Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, personnel should not remain in the area to observe that irradiated fuel is uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as quickly i

, as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 0182, AA2 a

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Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increnpa in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.3 I Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (S AS).

4.3.A.3-3 Radiation levels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to )

maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Radiation l levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be performed without exceeding 5 Rem per year TEDE will l impede access due to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or Planned Emergency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a significant radiological problem that warrants additional resources to assess and mitigate.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require continuous occupancy. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy

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times.

REFERENCE:

NUhfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2,01/92, AA3 l

D-27

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.3.S.1 Houndary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2: 6.63E +03 cpm sustained for

>l5 minutes.

4.3.S.12 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

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4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007. REV. 2, 01/92, ASI D-28

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Catawba Nuclear Site

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ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resultiro from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Excee .' f.000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actu-( , 'ojected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2: 6.63E +04 cpm sustained for 215 minutes.

4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.G.13 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid ,

at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore. these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team i calculations are available. I NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15

. minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

i BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 0H92. AGI D-29

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ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the controi room is successful and reactor power is  !

less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator (s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor suberitical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 0182, SA2 D-30 i

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)  ;

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC) l AND  !

One of the following: )

. Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 F. l

• Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature rise to >l80 F j BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U tube draining, NCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop  ;

condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within  ;

an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, " Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That )

Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUbfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA3 D-31

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not succe:,sful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Subcriticality CSF-RED.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC,its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS2 D-32

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EME.RGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OFL2ATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

! 4.4.S.2 1 Subcriticality CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-2 Core Cooling CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-3 Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, SS4 D-33

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND 1 1

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

• Core Cooling CSF-RED e Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor suberitical have been unsuccessful and, as a resuk, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition.

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 45 1 LOSS OF POWER 1

UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes. j l

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-1 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) l The following conditions exist: i

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Both emergency diesel generators are supplying power to their respective essential busses.

4.5.U.12 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

The following conditions exist: l

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. One emergency diesel generator is supplying power to its respective essential bus.

D-37

Catawba Nuclear Site 4

BASIS:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Unusual Event, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Alert EAL. The event will escalate to an Alert in these modes if both essential busses are lost. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU1 I

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LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 Mot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.21 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of both unit related busses: EB A and EBD both < 112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs. Fift.cen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARCMESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS3 j

D-43 i

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of AM sOffsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump seal injection OR CA supply to steam generators.

1 AND

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

1 I

• Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOTlikely.

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises c!! plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and containment.

The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

D-44  ;

Catawba Nuclear Site l

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS  ;

i UNUSUAL EVENT I 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of l Detection or Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary. l 1

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1 1 Fire in any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse )

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

. Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

. Doghouses i

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Turbine Building

. Service Building l

. Interim Radwaste Building 4.6.U.12 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area )

boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment.

BASIS:

EAL 1: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized I by heat and light. Sources of <.moke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical l equipment do not constitute files Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat arc observed. This evcludes such items as fires within l

administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of )

no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious. 1 l

l D-46

Catawba Nuclear Site EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the protected area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of

. evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

1 Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, " Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HUl & HU2 1

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Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling) f EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. CAS

. SAS

. FWST

. Doghouses (Applies In Mode 1,2,3,4 only)

AND

b. One of the following:

• Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

D-49

i Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.21 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Spent Fuel Pool

. Auxiliary Building

. RN Pumphouse AND

b. One of the following:

. Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded performance. l e Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment supporting Spent Fuel Pool cooling. i Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy )

this condition. l I

BASIS: I 1

In a Defueled condition, the plant safety systems of interest are those that support Spent Fuel Pool inventory and cooling.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially impans significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

D-51

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l FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS l SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4

4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.1-1 Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS

. SAS 4.6.S.I-2 Security confirmed bomb discovered / exploded in a vital area.

4.6.S.13 Security confirmed sabotage in a plant vital area.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, HS1 D-54

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.1-1 Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on I AD-4,B/8 4.7.A.12 Tornado or high winds:

Tornado striking plant structures within the vital area: ,

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building  !

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)  !

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)  ;

. Doghouses

)

Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

OR sustained winds 2 74 mph for > 15 minutes.

1 4.7.A.1-3 Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle crashes or other catastrophic events causing visible stmetural damage on any of the following plant structures:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

. Doghouses Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

D-GO

l Catawba Nuclear Site j i

NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS ]

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

P 4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for above EALs:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building i . Diesel Generator Rooms

. RN Pumphouse

. Control Room

. SSF

. CAS

. SAS BASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant stmeture affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems / components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA3 i D-02

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Catawb2 Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS l AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT l l

4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated. l l

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

BASIS:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain NCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HAS l

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l Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY l 611'E AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation Has Bun Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be  !

Established. l l

All OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY:

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the ASP or the SSF within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control area , has not been accomplished. This failure l

to transfer control would be evidenced by deterioratin ; reactor coolant system or steam generator

~

parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the determination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump i seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer l in the necessary time. j Escalation of this event,if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HS2 l

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ATTACHMENT 4 Revised Catawba Emergency Plan Section "D" Pages WITHOUT Revision Marks 9

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Catawba Nuclear Site D. - EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM l Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an alternative methodology for the development of Emergency Action Levels. Catawba Nuclear Site will use the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergeny action levels.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categcries for classification of )

emergency events.

l D.l.a UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of this class is to provide notification of the emergency to the station ,

I staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.I.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are 1 expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. ,

The purpose of this class is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to:

1. Activate the ensite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-1 DI

Catawba Nuclear Site D.l.c. ' SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed fo:r protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency is to:

1. Activate the offsite response centers

~

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site ,

areas are at derv stations should the situation become more serious.

i

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities

- Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are p provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.I.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY -

Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public

2. Provide continuous assessment of information from onsite and offsite measurements

~ 3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential

releases

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities j

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-2

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D.2.- INITIATING CONDITIONS ~  !

l The initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the B ASIS document beginning on page D-4. A classification .

procedure (RP/0/A/5000/01) will be used to classify events as they occur.-  :

Specific response procedures are in place which delineate the required response -

during the appropriate classification.

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Catawba Nudear Site ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs: (C. I or C. 2 or C. 3 or C. 4 or C. 5 or C. 6 or C. 7)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is

- satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

4.1.C.1 Critical Safety Function Status Containment - RED indicates containment conditions which may challenge the containment integrity. Therefore this condition represents a potentialloss of the containment barrier.

There.is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.2 Containment Conditions Containment pressure above 15 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

A containment hydrogen concentration of 9 volume percent is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At some initial containment pressures, this pressure rise may exceed the capacity of the containment. Therefore, this level of hydrogen in the containment represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Containment heat removal systems are actuated at the high-high containment pressure setpoint of 3 psig. At least one train of Containment Spray (NS) and one Containment Air (VX) Return Fan (CARF) should be actuated at that time (the CARF with a 10 minute delay). A failure to actuate the design basis heat removal capability or assure proper containment mixing icpresents a degradation in the control of the D-4

Catawba Nuclear Site containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Thus, sump level or containment pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity, or some other containment pressure boundary failure.

4.1.C.3 Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Actuation Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment atmosphere to be released from containment is a loss of the containment barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.4 Steam Generator (SG) Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage Secondary side releases to atmosphere include those from the condenser air ejector, SG Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), atmospheric dump valves, faulted steam lines, and main steam safety valves. Steam releases, in combination with primary to l secondary leakage, constitute a bypass of the containment and, therefore, a loss of the corninment barrier.

The appropriate classification can be determined in combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.5 Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment These values indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of NCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less D-5

.~ - - , . ~ _ - - - . - - . . . - . .. _ - . - _ _ . -. - - .. . --, ..

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Catawba Nuclear Site l

't han 20% This amount of activity in containment,if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.  ;

i By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General '

Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and NCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be 3 recommended. j There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item. j NOTE: If EMF-53A and EMF-53B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from -

procedure HP/0/B/1009/06, " Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within  :

the Reactor Building." j i

4.1.C.6 Core Cooling l Core Cooling - RED for greater than 15 minutes in this potential loss EAL represents .  :

imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to reactor vessel failure and -

an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment  ;

challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an  ;

unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.  ;

i Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function I restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a l significant fraction of the cote damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of i containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to l provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent  !

within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be, i

ineffective.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

t 4.1.C.7 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency l Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be j incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director 1

_ judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost, D-6 .

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (NCS) BARRIER EALs: (N.1 or N. 2 or N. 3 or N.4 or N.5) l The NCS Barrier includes the NCS primary side and its connections up to and including the 1

pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

4.1.N.1 Critical Safety Function Status NCS Integrity - RED indicates NCS pressure and temperature conditions which may challenge the Reactor Vessel integrity. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potentialloss of the NCS Barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.2 NCS Leak Ren Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the NCS by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. Ifletdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the NCS barrier is considered lost.

4.1.N.3 SG Tube Rupture Sinall Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. !f letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

D-7

1 Catawba Nuclear Site l

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A tube rupture with an unisolable secondary line fault is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. In conjunction with containment barrier loss #4, this condition will result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. I Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling l System. Determination of the " uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG ,

should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCS that '

l - does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed  !

breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. These conditions represents a loss of  ;

j the NCS and containment fission product barriers.

i.  !

4.1.N.5 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment i

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency

- Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the NCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be .;

i  ;

incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

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Catawba Nuclear Site FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (F.1 or F. 2 or F. 3 or F. 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

4.1.F.1 Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme cha!!enge. Either of these conditions indicate a potentialloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication ofloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

, 4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level The value of 300 Ci/cc Il31 equivalent coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

There is no equivalent " Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring A reading of 117 R/hr on EMF-53A or 53B is a value which ir:dicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity ir.dicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this mgeitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). This EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: If EMF-53A and EMF-53B are unavailable. readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/06," Alternative Method for determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

D-9

Catawba Nuclear M -

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4.1.F.4 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, BASIS INFORMATION FOR TABLE 4 1

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D-10 4

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 l SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.1 1 Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdowa mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition.

In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU2 D-1.1

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

HASIS:

This initiating Condition (IC) and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. " Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Quantification of "most" is arbitrary; however. this .

judgment is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, SUJ D-12

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.31 Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. This EAL applies in Modes 1,2,3,4, and 5 only because the Technical Specification applies only in these modes.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU4 D-13

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l Catawbc Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I I

UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

i OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation) ]

Mode 2 (Startup) i 1

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.41 Unidentified leakage 210 gpm 4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage 210 gpm i

i 4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage 2 25 gpm BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a l result. is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for l the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room  !

indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g.,

mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of .

identified leakage in compariron to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of I this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, " Inability to Maintain Plant j in Cold Shutdown "

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, SU5 l

l D-14

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.5-I Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5 2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

l BASIS:

1 The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications .

capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of l offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the l condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

l This EAL is intended to be used ody ..en extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

REFERENCE:

NUMARCMESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU6 1

D 15

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l Catawba Nuclear Site i

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION j ALERT 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non Alarming Indicators Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager / Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Either of the following:

• A significant plant transient is in progress.

• Loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

HASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary; however, this judgment is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift Manager / Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

D 16 l

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Refer to Operations Procedure OP/l(2)/A/6700/03," Operating with OAC Out of Service."'  !

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS mjections, or j thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater. j i

Significant indication is available from the OAC. Loss of the OAC in conjunction with the loss 1 of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters. i Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and l defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation. l This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA4 l

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Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.S.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems.

AND

b. A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the following Critical Safety Functions:

e subcriticality e core cooling

• heat sink

. containment BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.  ;

l D-18

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f Catawba Nuclear Site i

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.  ;

1

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP 007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS6 i l

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Latawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 AHNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.1-1 A valid Trip 2 alarm on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/14.

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 21.08E+04 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may  ;

l have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/25.

l 4.3.U.13 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure. ,

1 1

4.3.U.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for 2 60 minutes as l determined by RP procedure.  !

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this time period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

D-20

Catawba Nuclear Site Unphnned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes.

The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. Radiation Protection will use lip /0/B/1009/14, " Radiation Protection Actions Following An Uncontrolled Release of Liquid Radioactive Material" to quantify a release.

Monitor setpoints are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) using annual average meteorology dispersion coefficient of 3.51E-5 sec/m'. Radiation Protection will use lip /0/B/1009/25, " Emergency Response Off-Site Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

i

REFERENCE:

NUhfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, AUL 4

s D-21

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.21 Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor ,

refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area radiation monitor (EMF) reading increases by a factor of 1000 over normal levels.

HASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary; thus, impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of esents via EALs I and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff. A  :

threshold value of 6 inches is used to allow time for mitigating actions to successfully l

terminate the inventory loss. Credit should not be taken for inventory additions to maintain i level above the 6 inch threshold. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a I precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. This EAL escalates to an Alert if the increases impair safe operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AU2 I

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D 22 l l

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Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 of 21.2E+05 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/14.

4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 2 08E+061 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/25.

4.3.A.13 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this time period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste j release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that i exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, mximum discharge flow, alarm set points) on the applicable package, j Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct. ,

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

D 23 0:

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4 Catawba Nuclear Site It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.  ;

' The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body, i The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED l AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401,  ;

! Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/14, " Radiation l

Protection Actions Following An Uncontrolled Release of Liquid Radioactive Material" to l quantify a release. .

l

Monitor setpoints are based on the methodology of the .te Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) using annual average meteorology dispersion coefficient of 3.51E-5 sec/m'. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/25, " Emergency Response Off-Site Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OlN2, AAl >

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l ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT l ALERT  !

l 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will i Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-15 2 EMF-4

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation IEMF-42 2 EMF-42 4

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-17 2 EMF-2

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors IEMF-39 2 EMF-39 4.3.A.2 2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level < 95 % after initiation of NC system make-up AND l Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or l reactor vessel AND ,

l KF-122 cannot be closed.  !

D-25 1

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Catawba Nuclear Site l

l BASIS: '

l This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage. There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via

~

Abnormal Rad Level / Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment.

EAL 2: Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, personnel should not remain in -

the area to observe that irradiated fuel is uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as quickly as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room. ,

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2,01/92, AA2 l

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I Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT f

4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.31 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3 2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (S AS).

4.3.A.3 3 Radiation levels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perfctm a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Radiation levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be performed without exceeding 5 Rem per year TEDE will impede access due to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or Planned Emergency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a significant radiological problem that warrants additional resources to assess and mitigate.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require continuous occupancy. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP 007, REV. 2,01/92, AA3 D-27

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2 6.63E +03 cpm sustained for 215 minutes.

4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.S.13 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team l calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

i BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confimled to be correct.

The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, Oh92. ASI D-28

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLU'JJT GENERAL, EMERGENCY 4.3.G.1 Ik,undary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the' Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36112 6.63E +04 cpm sustained for 215 minutes.

4.3.G.12 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 l mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

I NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, j site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose  !

assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 l minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

IIASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been contmned to be correct.

The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUhfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 01/92, AGI D-29

Catawba Nuclear Site i l

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ,

ALERT 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing.

HASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator (s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-30

Cataw ba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC)

AND One of the following:

. Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 F.

. Unccntrolled reactor coolant tempera +ure rise to >180 F BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, NCS leve' differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequen:es that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, " Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel." or by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA3 7

d D-31

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

)

BASIS:

l Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Subcriticality CSF-RED.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC,its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency l Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. OU92, SS2 l

D 32

1 l Catawba Nuclear Site l

, LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standhy)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.2-1 Subcriticality CSF-RED 4.4.S.2 2 Core Cooling CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-3 Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS4 i

D-33 -

4 Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.3-I a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3 2 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range level less than 11% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-3 a. l iailure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND 4

b. Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

HASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage may be imminent due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via radiological effluent IC.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SSS D-34

1 1

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

• Core Cooling CSF-RED e Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition.

I

\

l D-35

caA-+..,wc,_.'m A a.4ai.m.Ad J 4 :.h-+d. e.++ s,me a,a,y_. .

Catawba Nuclear Site J

' Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by i design from at least one steam generator, an extreme chdienge should be considered to exist.

This equates to a Heat Sink-RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges occurs during or following a time that the reactor has not l been brought below the power associated with the safety system design, core damage may be l

- imminent. For this reason, thp, General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.  !

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SG2 I

l I

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l 2

4 1

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D-36 f

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-1 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Both emergency diesel generators are supplying power to their respective essential busses.

4.5.U.12 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. One emergency diesel generator is supplying power to its respective essential bus.

D-37 l

i

, Catawba Nuclear Site 4 e BASIS: i Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be .

classified as an Unusual Event, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower  !

temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to ,

j that specified for the Alert EAL. The event will escalate to an Alert in these modes if both

essential busses are lost. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

t

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SUI m

s 4 . ,

4 i

i i

i 4

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D-38 r

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling iviode for Greater than 15 hiinutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.21 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related busses: EBA and EBD both < 112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both < 109 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

" Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert is via

" Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 01/92, SU7 l

I D-39

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Residual Heat. Removal (RHR), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency,if appropriate,is by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, sal D-40

l I

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING h! ODE APPLICABILITY: 51 ode 1 (Power Operation)

Afode 2 (Startup)

Afode 3 (Hot Standby) hiode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.21 The following condition exists:

AC power capability has been degraded to one essential bus powered from a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of:

SATA SATB ATC ATD D/G A D/G B HASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, " Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its essential busses. Another -

related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from the unit main generator, or the loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from offsite l power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area l Emergency in accordance with IC," Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OlN2, SAS 1

D-41

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RilR, ECCS, Containment Ileat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity; thus, this event can escalate  ;

to a General Emergency. l l

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, " Prolonged I Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SSI I

4 D-42

r _ .

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING 310DE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.2 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of both unit related busses: EB A and EBD both < 112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

HASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a General Emergene; would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS3 D-43

1 Catawba Nuclear Site l

l LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY J

4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All(Offsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.G.1 1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump seal injection OR CA supply to steam generators. ,

AND  ;

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

• Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOTlikely.

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission l Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

I Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR. ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and containment.

The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition fc 7 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is function 5g as intended.

D-44

l Catawba Nuclear Site l

Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one essential bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event j could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be ,

degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

l. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss <

or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT? '

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator / EOF Directorjudgment as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

REFERENCE.: NUMARC/NESP-007. REV. 2, 01/92, SGI .

A I

i D 45 j l

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of ,

Detection or Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1 1 Fire in any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Fac!!ity (SSF)

. Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

. Doghouses

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Turbine Building

. Service Building

. Interim Radwaste Building 4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment.

BASIS:

EAL !: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC I

applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious.

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D-46 i

Catawba Nuclear Site EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment ,

within the protected area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, " Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP 007, REV. 2, 01/92, HU1 & HU2 r

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j D-47

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF1 EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.2 Connrmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.U.2-I Security confirmed bomb device discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas.

4.6.U.2 2 Hostage situation / extortion 4.6.U.2 3 A violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled area.

BASIS:

The above situations represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

A civil disturbance is to be considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant propeny.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP 007, REV. 2, 0H92, HU4 l

D-48

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT ,

4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

~

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

~

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

1 4.6.A.1 1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms ,

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. CAS

. SAS l

. FWST

. Doghouses (Applies In Mode 1,2,3,4 only)

AND

b. One of the following:

• Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance f

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

D-49

Catawba Nuclear Site i BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near- l by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a j lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. j l

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of l the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or l

Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HA2 i

D-50

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Spent Fuel Pool

. Auxiliary Building

. RN Pumphouse AND

b. One of the following:

. Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded performance. I l

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or '

equipment supporting Spent Fuel Pool cooling. l 1

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy  :

l this condition.

BASIS:

In a Defueled condition, the plant safety systems ofinterest are those that support Spent Fuel Poolinventory and cooling.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent J structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be l considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

D-51  !

l

Catawba Nuclear Site The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or  ;

damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA2 D 52

Citawba Nuclear Site FIRF1 EXPLOSION AND SECURTTY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY. ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.3-1 Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile force.

i

- BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. A civil disturbance which penetrates the protected area boundary can be considered a hostile force. Intnision into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency, i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 0182, HA4 I

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Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.11 Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS

. SAS 4.6.S.I 2 Security confirmed bomb discovered / exploded in a vital area.

4.6.S.1-3 Security confirmed sabotage in a plant vital area.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area.

REFERENCE:

NUAfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HSI D 54

Catawba Nuclear Site i FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Loss Of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold l Shutdown. l OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.G.1 1 Loss of physical control of the control room due to security event.

4.6.G.1-2 Loss of physical control of the SSF and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) due to security event.

BASIS:

This IC encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of vital area required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HG1 4

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

! 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " strong motion accelerograph".

4.7.U.12 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " Peak shock annunciator".

4.7.U.13 Report by plant personnel of tomado striking within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.15 Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

HASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EALs 1&2: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored " Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a " felt eanhquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthciuake based on a consensus of control room operators. and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentation occurs.

EAL 3: A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

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- EAL 4: Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, helicopter, or train crash that may potentially

damage plant structures'containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown _of the plant.-

if the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Alert.

i j EAL 5: Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause 3

observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen  ;

j cooling) to the plant environs. ' Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately 4

classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related

- equipment. Escalc. tion of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the

' missiles generated by the failure or by the radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the Radiological ICs or Fission Product Barrier ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, HUl

. NOTE: NUMARC EAL #5 moved to Fire / Security Recognition Category  ;

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Catawba Nuclear Site i NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZ ARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect safe operation of the plant.

4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.).

Gases within the owner controlled area that are below life threatening or flammable concentratior.< do not meet this EAL.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, HU3 l

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Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unwu;! Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.U.3-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

HASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HUS i

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NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY l

ALERT 4.7.A.1 Natural n d Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.1-1 Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on I AD-4,B/8 4.7.A.12 Tornado or high winds:

Tornado striking plant structures within the vital area: i

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

. Doghouses

. Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) i OR sustained winds 2 74 mph for > 15 minutes.

4.7.A.13 Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle crashes or other catastrophic events causing visible structural damage on any of the following plant structures:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building  ;

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

. Doghouses ,

. Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

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. BASIS:

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~ EAL 1: Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude (> OBE) can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 2: Based on the available instrumentation ( 90 mph maximum range) and the FSAR design basis, which is 95 mph - Wind loads of this magnitude (74 mph hurricane force winds) are

, approaching speeds that could cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 3: This EAL is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from 4

uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. This list of areas includes areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing

- safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of

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the plant. ,

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01R2, HAl t

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Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for above EALs:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. RN Pumphouse

. Control Room

. SSF

. CAS

. SAS BASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems / components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA3 D-62

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

. 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.31 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

HASIS:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain NCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HAS 1

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NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS l AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY  !

ALERT

,- 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.41 Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the ,

Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUbfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA6 I

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Catawbo Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the ASP or the SSF within 15 minutes.

HASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure l to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the j detennination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump  !

seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer I in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event,if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation,

. Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Efiluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgment l I

ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HS2 I

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Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I

SITE AREA EMERGENCY  :

4.7.S.2 Other Conditioins Er.isting Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4 4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinatu-/ EOF Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but i

that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditicas exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP 007, REV. 2, Oh92, HS3 j i

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I Cataw ba % clear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL Eh1ERGENCY 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING 510DE APPLICABILITY: All Eh1ERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate:

. Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment 4 OR e Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guideline levels outside the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

REFERENCE:

nub 1 ARC /NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HG2 I

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i Revised Catawba Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01, ,

" Classification of Emergency" 4

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RP/0/A/5000/01

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' CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE l-CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY 1.0 - SYMPTOMS

- 1.1 - Notification of Unusual Event 4

1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential

degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

i 1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or ,

monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety.

)

systems occurs.

a 1.2 Alert ,

l.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or ,

potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency

1.3.1 ' Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

1.4 General Emergency l.4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. ,

1.4.2 Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective 4 Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the ,

immediate site area.

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RP/0/A/5000/01 Page 2 of 2

. 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 Determine operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response of the event. ,

2.2 If the plant was in Mode 1-4 and a valid condition affects fission product barriers, then proceed to Enclosure 4.1.

2.3 If the condition does not affect fission product barriers, then review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.

2.4 ~ Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Actiw Levels listed, then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

2.5 Implement the applicable Emergency Response Procedure (RP) for that classification and continue with subsequent steps of this procedure.

. Notification of Unusual Event RP/0/A/5000/02 Alert RP/0/A/5000/03 Site Area Emergency RP/0/A/5000/04 General Emergency RP/0/A/5000/05 3.0 SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To escalate, de-escalate, or terminate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosures 4.1 through 4.7.

3.2 Refer to enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declaration Guidelines, as needed.

4.0 ENCLOSURES 4

4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 Systems Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power 4.6 Fires / Explosions and Security Events 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Afrecting Plant Safety 4.8 Definitions / Acronyms 4.9 Emergency Declaration Guidelines

RPAWA/5000/01 Enclosure 4.1

- Page 1 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table below.

Note 1: This table is on't applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT Loss Situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

unusual Event it - 3 Points) Alert f4 - 6 Points) See Area Emoroency (7-10 Points) Generet Emeroency (11 - 13 Points)

. Any Potential Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of the . Loss of both NCS and Fuel Ctad . Lossof a!!threebamers NCS j . Any Loss of Contarnment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of F Jet . Potential Loss of both NCS and Fuel . Loss of any two bamers and the

Ctad Clad Potential Loss of the third bamer

. Potenial Loss of either the NCS or Fuel Clad and Loss of any addibonal i

NOTE: Take highest points for each barrier and add together in chart below. Do not take more than one number for each barrier. *Not applicables" are included in this table as place holders only, and no points are assigned.

Containmerit TOTAL POINTS NCS 1-3 Unusual Event 4-6 Alert Fuel Clad 7-10 Site Area Emergency 11-13 GeneralEmergency Total Points

RP/0/A/5000m1 Enclosure 4.1 Paio 2 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAlfedENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS -(1 LOSS -(3 Ponts) POTENTIAL LOSS -(4 LOSS-(5 Ponts) POTENTIAL LOSS-(4 LOSS-(5 Points)

Point) Points) Points)

L Cak:d Salsty Function Stamas 1. CrtucalSasser Facion Stamas 1.CdecalSafety Funchen Samass e Casarrwe#Eo e Ncs as,6caue e NCS heytyM e e Mcs appacate Cae CodrqQwge o Cae CoobngM e Heat Seteed e Heat Ss* Bed 2 ContasunserCondienes INCS Last Rate 2.f%narrCoelant Actmertaal e Corsarmert Possure > 15

• Rapd unenciamed decease m o LWhledexecdng te e GREATER THAN avadable e Nct mym e Codant Ac3vey GREATER PSG ccreamment pessure Idbang capacey d me charyng pung spakaup capacsy as secased THAN 300 pCute Dose rutal mcrease e te ramaldwyng enode by a bss d NCS sutxroing Egsvalent lodne (DEQ k131 e H2 concertraton > 9% eshletdown adaled.

• Catenmers pesame or msm o Certarwomt pesswo greaser levelrespcrse rux c:msaters than 3 peg se lessihan one wah LOCA conchoora tus iron d NS and a VX<. ARF W

1 SG Tidie Rusture 1 Containment Radetke Ifonitoring Actamaan e Nct aspecable e Cantamrnent satanonis e PmSecondaryleak rate e Mw that a SG e e Nc2 appbcable o Contaninert radalen monilor exmp6ete and a reinase pem exeeds the capaaty of one Rupeered andhas a Non- 53A cr 538 seadng >117 Riv korn contammers euss chargng purg a te normg MaNa seCQndgry Ine taut chanpg enode mthleicmen solate:1

• becanon that a SG s RM and a pedonged re6 ease d enntarnemed secondary coola1r is occumng tom to anected SG to to ennenmera mm 4. Contabunant Radahon leonnoring 4. Emergency Coonlinatorf0F Dooctor Judesment e Ncs appbcatse o Release d seanda'y ade m o Not asyncade

• Nat appicable e Any cadhon educhng inat@y m monnor to bemer, tot m em opruan d aimosgeme we pammy a em Emergency CoorenaxTOF Drecer mantes LOSS or POTENTW.

secondary leakage GREATER LOSS d to FuelQad bemer THAN Tech Epec anonable END

--s - - - - -- - - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ - - - - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - . _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - -

RP/0/A/5000M1 Enclosure 4.1 Page 3 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points)

(1 Point) (4 Points) (4 Points)

- 5. Emmyncy CowenaWEOF Dkocaw W e Catanmat Rai Mmmy e Not apptcek Any conden exadng mater b num te bama.We e te opncn d to EMF 53A or 52 Emergency CoadnatcTOF Drecar edcams LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS d neaang e ame sexe to Ncs bamn.

inunowt

>470 R4r 4 0-0$ hr ENQ

>170 Rtr 0 0 5-2 tr

>?25 Rtw e 2-4 tr

> 90 Rhr 9 4-8 hr

> 53 Rtr 8 > 8 hr

6. Core Cocima e Corecochng REDpama e Not apphcable recated kw > 15 eun.

7. Emeruancy coordesear KOF Director ' '

• Ary conesun rdudng natsy a monen tie bamer, that in to opnan d tw Emergercy QxxdnalorEOF Drects indcases a LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS d to Cantamment bamer.

END

o CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/AniO0041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 -

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 1 o(2 -

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGEPICY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Inaderty to Reech Required Shutdown 1. Unplanned Loss of Mest or All Safety 1. Inahiitty to Monitor a Significant WitNa Technical Specification Litruts. System Annunciation or Indicehon in Transient in Progress.

Control Room With Either:

OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4 (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 or e Plant is not brought to required operating (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming e The foRowing condstions exist mode within Techrocal Specifications LCO Indicators Unavailable Action Statemes A Time. Loss of most (>50%)

OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4 annunciators associated with safety

2. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety systems.

System Annunciation or Indication in e The following w disvis exist the Control Room for Greater Then AND 15 Minutes. Unplanned loss of most (>50%)

annunciators associated with safety A significant plant transient is in OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 systems for greater than 15 minutes. progress.

. The following conditions exist AND AND Unplanned loss of most (>50%) In the openson of the Operations Shift Loss of the OAC.

annunciators associated with safety ManagerEmergency systems for greater than 15 minutes. Coordinator! EOF Director, the loss of AND' the annunciators or indicators AND requires additional personnel inability to provide manual ire >;iva 9 (beyond normal shift wipuimid) to of any of the foHowm3 Crrbcal Safety In the opinion of the Operahons Shift safety operate the unit. Functions:

ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of AND e subcriticality

^

the annunciators or indicators e core cooling requires additional personnel EITHER of the following: e heat sink (beyond normal shift wipura:6t) to e containment safely operate the unit.

• A significant plant transient is in progress.

3. ' Fuel Clad Degradation. E!E

= Loss of the OAC, OPERATtNG MODE: 1,2,3,4,5

• Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than the END Techrucal Speofication attowat4e limit.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPf0fA/500041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 2 of'2

- UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE N NY GEERAL ESERGENCY .

4. Reactor Coolant System (NCS)

Leekage.

OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4 e Unsdenbfied leakage 210 gpm e- Pressure boundary leakage z 10 gpm e idenbfiedleakage225 gpm

5. Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Commumcations.

OPERATING MODE: ALL e Loss of all onsite communicabons capatality (intemal pxme system. PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the abihty to perfonn routine operabons.

• Loss of all offsate communications capability (Selective Signaling. NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system. commercial phone system) affectog the abihty to communicate with offsite authorites.

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPAWA500041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS # RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 1 of.3 UftUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AfEA ENY GE8ERAL ENY

1. Any Unplanned Rotones of c--= or 1. Any Unplanned Reisese of Geseous or 1. Boundary Does Roeuning from 1. Boundary Dooo Resuhing trem Liquid Pashametively to the Environment IJquid P% to the en ActualorInuninent Release an Actual or Inuninent Rolesee that Ezeeees Two Times the SLC Limsts Environment that Exceede 200 Times of M Exceeds 100 of PM that 8=emasen for 50 beinutes or Longer. the SLC limits for 15 BAenutes or mRom TEDE or 500 mRom COE 1000 adtem TEDE or 5000 mRom Longer. -

Adult Thyroidforthe Actuoior COE Adult Thyrohl for the Actual f OPERATW4G R$00E. AU. Projected Duration of the or Projected Duremon of the OPERAT20G RAODE: ALL Rolesee. Reisees.

• A valid Tnp 2 alarm on radiaton monsor EMF-49L or EMF-57 for160 trunutes or . A valid irWtrahnq on fartahnn mondor EMF- OPERATSIG B000E: ALL OPERATN0G B000E: ALL

{ wm hkoty contnue1or160 trunutes which 49L or EMF-57 of a 1.2E+05 cpm for115 i

wxhcates hat the release may have trunutes or wm hkely conhnue for 115 msnutes . A waaid irwheahno on radiakon . A walks indcahon on radiaton j exceeded the iruheeng condston and whidi indcates that me release may have monitor EMF-36H 2 6.G3E +03 monsor EMF-36H 2 6.63E +04 wyhesa== the need to menace the raAansa exceeded the iruteeng conditon and mdecates cpm sustaened for 215 rrunutes. cpm sustaned for215 mmutes.

wem procedure HPM1009t14. the need to assess me raian=a with procedure HPW1009/14.

• Dose assessment team . Dose assessment team

. A valid wdicahon on radiabon rnorutor calcidahans ndcate dose calculabons indicato dose I

EMF-3c4. of g 1.08E+04 cpm for a 60 . A walki irv%cahnq on radtabon mondor EMF- consequences greater than 100 consequences greater than 1000 runutes or we hkely conhnue for160 J6L of a 1.08E+06 cpm for1 15 m:nutes or mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE i minutes wts:h indscates mat the release wm hkely contnue for 215 rrunutes which Adult Thyroid at the site Adult Thyrood at me eine j may have exceeded me inesahng condeson arvernema met the release may have exceeded boundary i .___y.

and indcsles me need to assess the the irubahng condibon and irwhcmane he need l release with procedure HPW1009/25. to assess the reisese with procedure . Analysis of field survey results or . Analysis of field survey results or HPM1000/25 field survey samples swscana= field survey samples indcates

.. Gaseous efeuent being re ===ad n exceeds dose consequences greater man dose consequences greater than two twnes SLC 16.11-1 for g 60 rrunutes . natanus ofnuent being released exceeds 200 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mRom 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem

as determined by Rattahno Protecton twnes the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 215 CDE Adult Thyrood at me eine CDE Adult Thyrood at me eles boundary (RP) procedure. mmutes as determened by RP procedure. boundary e t irpri ettuent being released exceeds two e Liquid efeuent being released exceeds 200 Note 1

These EMF readings are caicidated Note 1: These EMF readogs are calculated times SLC 16.11-6 for a 60 mmutes as ~ times the level os SLC 16.11-6 for a 15 based on average annual meteorology, site based on average annual meteorology, sne detemuned by RP procedure. msnutes as detemuned by RP procedure. boundary dose rate, and design unit vent boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculabons by the dose flow rate. Calculasons by the dose Note: Note: ==== ment team use actual meteorology. - assessment team use actual meteorology, tf the munitor reading is sustaened for the time if the morutor reading is sustained for the tune release duration, and unit vent flow rate. release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

J penod indicated in the EAL and the required period indicated in the EAL and me required Therefore, these EMF readogs should not be Therefore, these EMF readmgs should not be assessments (procedere calculabons) cannot assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be used il dose assessment team calculatons used if dose assessment team calculatons be cynpleted wittun ttus bme penod, completed within this tme penod, declaration must are available. are available dect. ration must be made based on the waiid be made based on the valid radiabon monitor rarnat on morutor reading. reading.

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPAWA500041.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS - Enclosure 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 2 of.3 -

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA ENY GE9ERAL Em

2. Uneapoceed increcee in Plant Radiation - 2. Maior Damage to irradiated Fuel or Note 2- Note 2:

or Airborne Concentration. Loss of Water Level that Has or Witt if dose wi.-it team rahdahnns cannot if dose assessment team cahdamons cannot Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated be waii- 3 in 15 mmunes, then valid be completed in 15 nunutes, then valid '

OPERATDIG MODE. ALL' Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel montor readogs should be used for monrtor readogs should be used for emergency ria=4 cation. emergency classecation.

. e. Irdcanon of tmcontrolled water level OPERATING MODE. ALL decrease of greater than 6 mehes in the glg reactor refuehng cavity with all irradiated e An 6_ ,_ _ _J valid tnp 18 alarm on any E!E feel assembbes remasnog covered by of the logowing radebon morators

• water.

Spent Fuel Buddog Refueling Bddge e Uncontrotled water level decrease of 1 EMF-15 greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool 2 EMF-4 and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuei assemblies remaning covered by Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation

- water. . 1 EMF-42 >

2 EMF-42 e . Unplanned welid area EMF reading ,

increases by a factor of 1000 over normal Reactor Building Refueling Bridge levets. 1 EMF-17 2 EMF-2 EflD Containment Noble Gas Mondor 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39

• Plant peu..id report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel  ;

pool, or fuel transfer canal has or wit exceed makeup caparity such hat any  ;

trradeted fuel will become uncovered.

1

.__ _ ._. .- . _ - _ - _. . . . - . ~ - - - . - - --. . , ,_. .-. _ _ _ - = - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - . _ _ _.

. . . _ _ _ _ . . ._. . _. _ .m . _ _ .

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPAWA/500GNn EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 3 o(3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREAENY GENERAL EbERGENCY e NC system wide range tevel <95 % ~

after initation of NC system rnake-up ASW Any irradiated fuel assembly not cafmhie of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel ASW i

KF-122 cannot be closed.

3. Reisees of Radioactive Meterlei or increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That impedes Operation of Systems Required to RAsintain Sofo Operations or to Estatdish or beeintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING BAODE: ALL s

• Valid reedmg on EMF-12 greater than 15 mRMr in the Control Room.

. Valid indicebon of radiation levels greater than 15 mRMrin the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

e Radiationlevels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain sale operatons or to establish or mantam cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

fdE

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/AMiO0041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 '

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS Page 1 of 2 MUAL MM ALERT SITE AREA ERJERGENCY gel 6AL EMRGENCY END

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1.- Failure of the Reactor Protection instrumentation to Complete or initiate lastrumentation to Complete or Initiate System to C--_ - ,-- _ an Automatic Trip an Automatic Reector Trip Once a an Automehc Reactor Trip Once a and Manuel Trip was NOT Successful Reactor Protection System Setpoint Reector Protechon System Seqxdnt and There is ind'est6cn of an Extreme Has Been Exceeded and Manuel Trip Has Been Exceeded and ManuelTrip Challenge to the AIWity to Cool the WAS Successful WAS NOT Successful. Core.

OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3 OPERATING MODE: 1 OPERATING MODE. 1

. The followog cordtons exist . The following constions exist . The folkwng contttions exist Valid reactor trip signal received Velid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip s;gnal received or or required and automatic reactor recerved or required and automatic required and automatic reactor tnp was not sua:essful- reactor trip was not successful. trip was not successful.

AND AND AND Manual reactor trip from the control Manual reactor trip from the control Manual reactor tnp from the control roomis successful and reactor room was not successfulin reducing room was npt successfulin reducing power is less than 5% and reactor power toless than 5% and reactor power to less than 5% and decreasmg decreasing. decreasmg_

2. Complete Loss of Function Needed to AND Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

EITHER of the following cordtions OPERATING MODE: 1.2,3,4 exist

. Subcriticality CSF-RED = Core Cooling CSF-RED 2

. Core Cooling CSF-RED = Heat Sink CSF-RED

. Heat Sink CSF-RED E l

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/OfA/5000f01 e EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 '

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT AlgRT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GEvERAL EMAGENCY

2. Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold 3. ' Loss of Water Loweiin the Reactor

~

Shutdown. Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vesset OPERATING MODE. 5. 6 -

OPERATING MODE: 5,6

. Totalloss of:

ResKlual Heat Removal (ND) andor . Failure of heat sink causes loss of .

Nuclear Service Water (RN) anWor cold shutdown w ali,uGw.

, Component Coohng (KC)

^#

[ AND -

Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Oneof thefollowwi9: Indication System (RVLIS)

. Inabdity to maintain reactor coolant decreasing af*erinitiation of NC temperature below 200*F-system makeup.

. Uncontrolled reactor coolant

. Failure of tieat sink causesloss of temperature nse to >180*F cold shutdown conditions.

END AND Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range levelless than 11% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown cordtions.

AND Either train ultrasonec level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

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I CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/500041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.5 ~

LOSS OF POWER Page 1 of 2 USUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL ESERGENCY

1. Loss of All Offsho Power to 1. Loss of AR Offene Power and Loss 1. Loss of AN Offsite Power and Loss 1. N.x% Loss of All(Offsite and Essential Busses for Groeter Than of All Onsete AC Power to of AllM AC Powerto Onsite) AC Power.

15 Minutes. Essential Buseos During Cold Essentiel Busses. . -

Shutdown Or RefueHng Mode. OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 5,6, No Mode . Prolongedlossof alloffsiteand

. The followmg cordtions exist . Loss of all offsite and onsite AC onsite AC power as indicated by-

+ Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by-Loss of offsite power to essential power as indicated by- Loss of power on essenhal buses buses ETA and ETB for greater than Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 15 minutes. Loss of power on essentia! buses ETA and ETB. minutes.

ETA and ETB.

AND AND AND AND Both ei: wwicy diesel generator are Failure to restore power to at least Staney Shutdown Facility (SSF) supplying power to their respective Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes. fails to supply NC pump seal essental busses. one essential bus within 15 minutes. inpocton OR CA supply to steam

2. Loss of AH Vital DC Power. generators.

OPERATING MODE: 5,6 No Mode 2. AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 ADO e The fonowing condibons exist for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure e The foelowing conditions exist At least one of the following Loss of offsite power to essential could result in station blackout. condibons exist buses ETA and ETB for greater than Loss of both unit related busses 15 minutes. OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 EBA amd EBD both <112 VDC, and . Restorationof atleastone EBB and EBC both <109 VDC. essenbal bus within 4 AND e The following corxhtion exists: hours is NOTiikely.

One emergency diesel generator is AC power capability has been AND = Indcation of continuing supplying power to its respechve degraded to one essential bus degradation of core cooling essential bus. powered from a single power source Failure to restore power to at least based on Fission Product for > 15 min, due to the loss of all but one required DC bus within 15 Bamer nvidiudi v.

one of: minutes from the time of loss. .

SATA SATB E8!E ATC ATD EtE D/G A D/G B -

END

. CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPAWAMiO0tWO1 '

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.5 '

LOSS OF POWER . Page 2 of 2 USUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA ERIERGENCY GENERAL ENY ^

2. U. ,-__--.; Loss of Reeutrod DC Power During Cold Shutdown or

.. "_--:4 teode for Groeter then 15 Minutes.

OPERATING RAODE: 5,6

= The fodounng cordtons exist '

Unplanned loss of both unit related busses: EBA amd EBD both <112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 rninutes frorn the time of loss.

EE

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPMA/500041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.6 -

FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 1 of 2 -

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EIAERGENCY GENERAL E40ERGENCY

1. Fire Within Protected Area Boundary 1. Fire or Explosion Affecting the 1. Security Event in a Plant Vitaf Aree.. 1. Security Event M ~ ; in Loss Of Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Operability of Plant Safety Systems Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Detection or E=na=laa Within the Required to Establish or Maintain Safe OPERATING MODE: ALL Shutdown.

Protected Area Boundary Shutdown.

• Intrusa inb any of the fonowing pia it OPERATING MODE. ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4,5,6 .weas by a hostile force:

Reactor Buindog

• Loss of phys: cal control of the control

• Fire in any of the follomng areas not . The follomng conditions exist

• Auxikary Building roorn due to secunty event extingurshed mthin 15 rrunutes of control

• Diesel Generator Rooms room notification or venication of a Fire or explosion in any of the follomng

• Control Room o Loss of physical control of the SSF and control room fire alarm. areas: = RN Pump House ASP due to security event

• SSF

• Reactor Building

• Reactor Building

• Doghouses EM

+ Auxiliary Building

• Auxiliary Buiking

• CAS

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• Diesel Generator Rooms . SAS

• Control Room

• Control Room

• RN Pump House

• RN Pump House e Secunty confirmed bomb

+ SSF

• SSF discovered / exploded in a vital area.

• CAS

• CAS

= SAS = SAS = Security confirmed sabotage in a plant

• Doghouses

• FWST vital area.

• FWST

• Doghouses (Applies in

- Turtine Burkhng Modes 1,2. 3,4 Only) EM

+ Service Bidg.

.* Interirn Radwaste Bldg. AND

! e Report by plant personnel of an One of the folloung-unantopated explosion ethin protected area bouridary resulting in visible . Affected safety system damage to permanent strtcture or parameter indications show equipment. degraded performance j

= Plant personnel repo:t visible damage to permanent l structures or equipment within l the specified area.

l, Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE ' RPAWA/5000f01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS . Er h 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Ptiip 2 of 2 ~ . <

U80 USUAL EVENT MERT SITE AREA ENY - GEff.RAL EN

~ 2. Contwmed Secur#y Event Which 1 Nw h i indcates a Potential Degradetion in the .

g Lowl M Sefer of the NL Required to F%D or B R$aintain Sale Shutdown.

OPERATING RIODE: All m OPERATING A00DE: No RAode '

-. Secunty wm,in-u bomb device discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas. . The following conditions exist '

Fire or owpaa.% in any of the folloung areas: ,

e A violent civil disturbance wthin the

• Spent Fuel Pool owner controued area. . Auxdiary Budding END-I AND  ;

i One of the following:

. Spent Fuel Poollevel and/or temperature show degraded I performance

. Plant pawa=l report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment supportng Spent Fuel ,

Pool Cootng.

3. Security Event in a Plant Protected i Area.

OPERATING RAODE. ALL ,

e intrusion into plant Protected Aree by a I

hosble force.

5

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPMA/500001 4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 - '

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 1 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EIAERGENCY GENERAL DIERGENCY  ;

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena 1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena 1. Control Room Evacuation Has Been 1. Other Conditions Emieting Which in Affecting the Protected Area. Affectmg the Plant Vital Area. Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be the Judgment of the Emergency FetahMahed. CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant - -

OPERATING 4000E. ALL OPERATING 8000E. ALL Declaration of General r_--- m.;y.

OPERATING ABODEL ALL

• Tremor felt and valed alarm on the " strong . Valid WE E=W Alarm on 1 AD4.BS OPERATING BAODE. ALL motion accelerograph". . The followng condrhons exist-

. Tomado or high unds: . Other conditions exist which in the 6

= Tremor felt and vahd alarm on the

• Peak Control room evacuation has been Judgment of the Emergency shock annunciator

• Tomado sinking plant structures wthin initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5000/17 CoordinatorEOF Director indicate:

the vital area e Report by plant personnel of tomado AND (1) Actual or imrrunent substantial core stniung wthan protected area boundary. . Reactor Building degradation wth potential for loss of

. Auxiliary Building Control of the plant cannot be containment.

• Vehicle crash mto pla.it structures or . FWST estabhshed from the ASP or the systems within protected area boundary . Diesel Generator Rooms SSF within 15 rninutes. OR

. Control Room i e Reoort of turtune failure resulting in casmg . RN Pumphouse 2. Other Conditions Existing Which in (2) Potentialforuncontrolled ,

penetration or damage to turbine or . SSF the Judgment of the Emergency radionuclide releases. These generator seals. . Doghouses CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant releases can reasorably be expected

. CAS Declaration of Site Area Emergency. to exceed Environmental Protection +

2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases . SAS Agency Protectwe Action Guideline  ;

Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation OPERATING BAODE: ALL levels outsade the site boundary of the Plant. OR i Sustained winds 2 74 rnph for > 15 . Other condrbons exist which in the E!E '

• OPERATING RAODE: ALL minutes. Judgment of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director indicate actual i e Report or detection of toxic or flammatde or likely major failures of plant functions

! gases that could enter wthin the site area needed for protection of the public.

boundary in amounts that can affect safe l

coeration of the olant. E!g i

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_ _ ._ ___.._.___m_________ . _ _ _ _ ____ ___ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/OfA/500001 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 .

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS . Page 2 of 3 p AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EaAERGD8CY GENERAL EMERGENCY

. Report by Local, County or State Officials for potentia: evacuation of sde personnel . Turtune fadure generated missdes. vehicle based on offsite event crashes or other catastrophic events, r causing visable structural damage on any of

3. Other Conditions Existing Which in the the followmg plant structures:

Judgment of the Emergency CoordinatoriEOF Derector Warrant . Rea %.Buddog Decieration of an Unusual Event. . AuxAary Buddog

. FWST OPERATING MODE. ALL e Diesei Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. Other conditons exist which in the

• RN Pump House Mgment of the Emergency . SSF Coordnator/ EOF Director indicate a . Doghouses potentW degradaten of the level of safety . CAS of the plant. . SAS END 2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Estabiish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE. ALL

. Report or de*ection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that wHl be life threateruna to plant personnet

CATAWBA NUCLEAR 3lTE - RP/OfA/5000/01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 '

, NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS - Page 3 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

. Report or detecton of flamrnable gases withm a Facihty Structure 6n concentrations thatwil:affectthe safe operabon of the plant

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Baikkng

+ Diesel Generator Rooms

• RN Pump House

. Control Room

. SSF

+ CAS e SAS

3. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE. ALL

= Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)fA5500/17

4. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OT".9ATING MODE. ALL

• Other w.4&n 5 exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased morntoring of plant functions is warranted.

END

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RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 1 of 4 DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMS ALERT- Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plam. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

ALL (As relates to Operating Mode Applicability) - Modes 1,2,3,4,5,6 and No Mode (Defueled).

BOMB- A fused explosive device CARF- Containment Air Return Fan CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

EPA PAG - Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for exposure to a release of radioactive material.

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent stmetures, systems or components.

EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.

FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities cf smoke and heat are observed.

FUNCTIONAL - A component is fully capable of meeting its design function. It would I be declared INOPERADLE if unable to meet Technical Specifications.

1 GENERAL EMERGENCY- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective I action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

IIOSTAGE - A person or object held as leverage against the site to ensure demands will i be met by the site, llOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals present in a PROTECTED AREA without authorization that may have or have threatened to use force in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 2 of 4 IMMINENT - Expected to occur within 1-3 hours.

INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges / panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INOPERABLE - A component does not meet Technical Specifications. The component may be functional, capable of meeting its design.

INTRUSION / INTRUDER - Suspected hostile individual present in a PROTECTED AREA without authorization.

LOSS - A component is INOPERABLE and not FUNCTIONAL.

PROLONGED - A duration beyond normal limits, defined as " greater than 15 minutes" or as determined by the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator.

PROTECTED AREA - Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security

~

perimeter fence.

RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

S ABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power. (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective i action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary. l SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the protected area, in which Duke Power Company has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments l

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 3 of 4 SECURITY EVENT - A security related emergency situation for which prompt response by the Security Force,immediate action by plant personnel, and/or assistance from offsite agencies may be required to apprehend intruders and mitigate the effects of or prevent radiological sabotage.

SUSTAINED - A duration of time long enough to confirm that the CSF is valid (not momentary).

TERMINATION - Exiting the emergency condition.

TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE) - The sum of external dose exposure to radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine).

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPl.ANNED.

UNUSUAL EVENT- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1 ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or  ;

redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt .

related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definiti~ t " . need for timely assessment.

- VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, r

rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

~ - . ._. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . .

1 RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 4 of 4 VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment important for nuclear safety. Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been authorized to be in that area. .

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RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.9 Page 1 of 2 EMERGENCY DECLARATION GUIDELINES THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS TO BE USED BY THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR IN ASSESSING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. j

• The Emergency Coordinator shall review ali applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification. -

)

• The BASIS Document (located in Section D of the Catawba Nuclear Site Emergency Plan)is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

• If an event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, the event with the higher classification will be classified on the emergency notification form. Information relating to the problem on the other unit will be captured on the emergency notification form.

If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the

.e classification can be made, the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the <

time the event occurred.

• The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at (Mode 1-4) hot shutdown or higher. An event that is recognized at cold shutdown or lower (Mode 5 or 6) shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix. Reference would be made to the additional enclosures that provide emergency action levels for specific events (e.g. severe weather, fire, security).

• If a transient event should occur, the following guidance is provided.

1. Some emergency action levels specify a specific duration. For these EALs, the classification is made when the Emergency Coordinator assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e. condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration clapses), whichever is sooner.

2. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower Severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g. as a result of routine log or record review) and the condition no longer exists, an emergency shall NOT be declared. Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow-up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier l believed.

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-< , , , w - ,, ~ J ,. - . .. ,, . ., , _ . . . _ . .L

I RP/0/A/5000/01

Enclosure 4.9 Page 2 of 2

4. If an emergency classification was watranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification, the Emergency Coordinator must

! i consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g. Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the 1 on shift personnel via activation of the Emergency Response Organization. The following are applicable:

!~

a. For UNUSUAL EVENTS, the condition shall be reported. The event may  ;

be terminated in the same notification or in a follow-up notification.

b. For ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, and GENERAL

EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization e.ctivated.

1

DETERMINATION OF " EVENT TIME" (TIME THE 15 MINUTE CLOCK STARTS)

1. If plant conditions require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), increased emphasis shall be given to evaluation of plant conditions for determination of EAL(s) when "kickout" of the diagnostic procedure occurs. " Event  :

Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined.  !

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4

2. If plant conditions do not require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip ,

or Safety injection), and conditions of a specific EAL are met, the " Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s)is determined,

3. The time the eunt is classified shall be entered on the initial emergency notification form.

I 1

MOMENTARY ENTRY INTO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION I~

If, while in an emergency classification, the specified EALs of a higher classification are met

momentarily, and in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator are not likely to recur, the entry into the higher classification must be acknowledged. Acknowledgment is performed as follows

j If this condition occurs prior to the ittitial not'fication to the emergency response organization and off site agencies, the hiilial message should note that the site is

l. currently in the lower classification, but had momentarily met the criteria for the  :

higher classification. It should also be noted that plant conditions have improved and stabilized to the point that the criteria for the higher classification are not expected to be repeated.

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! ATrACHMENT 6 Selected pages from the " Critical Safty Function Status Tree"

, Procedure EP/1A/5000/F-0 1

d A

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t ._ , _

f CVC f/VFtTYUl'/((!DAI oaf &

1 CNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NO.

EP/1/A/5000/F-0 2 of 10 Subcriticality - Page 1 of 1 Retype #3 I

i 1

CSF SAT t

- i GO TO FR-S .I

_pREACTOR TRir REQUIREG GOTO FR S .1 N0 pm LEss THAN 5%

1 GO TO 00000  !

o FR.S .2 i

O O 1 O i N0 O t sun uno \

OR NEGAT1VE gg $UR MORE NEGATIVE N0

.N .u oru gg CSFSAT N0 St ENERGlZED YES GOTO 8 ra.S .2 O

O O

O N0 SR SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE 1

CSF SAT l

f [AlWlHWlON ONbf CNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NO. '

I EP/1/A/5000/F-0 3 of 10 1 Core Cooling - Page 1 of 1 Retype #3 l

GO TO

! FR-C.1 i

GOTO l FR C .I ItEACTOR VESSEL

. LOWER RANGE LEVEL GREATER THAN 41%

j

, GOTO CORE EXIT TCs LESS THAN

} 700*F

{}

__ , CORE Exrt Tcs GO TO LESS THAN 000*F YES FR{ .2 REACTOR VESSEL

, LOWER RANGE LEVEL GREATER THAN 41%

i

AT LEAST ONE I

NC PUMP DN 0010 YES 000 FR-C .3 GO TO l FR-C.2 TSUK # d BASED ON COR E REACTOR VESSEL D7 GREATER THAN g'

EXIT TTs GREATER 0 REWRED FOR PUMP THAN0*F J COMBINATION

, (REFER TO TABLE) i i

GO TO l 000 i FR-C.3 l

J CSFSAT l 1

1 I

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f-(f7C f]Vfd/Qfiff-M CIU ChJl l 1 I

CNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NO, EP/1/N5000/F-0 Heat Sink - Page 1 of 1 5 Of 10 Retype #3 i

GOTO FR-il .1 l

i TOT AL FEEDW ATE R FLOW TO S/Os GREATER THAN 450 GPM hh i

N4 LEVELIN AT  %

-> [E,^8' 4y,NETHAN 0000000000000000000000 ll%(29% ACo YES O O

4 O

O O

l PRESSURE IN ALL GO TO ii S/Go LESS THAN 0000000000000000

'" '5' O FR-il .3 YES O O

O O

i- O N/R LEVEL IN ALL N0 co70

w. tEss THAN 0000000000

, n% O FR H.4 YES O O

^

O O

O PRES $UREIN ALL We LESS THAN 0000 @ TO ll?S P510 y[3 O FR-11.5 O

O O

O

! N/R LEVELIN Ali.

S/Gs GREATER THAN t1% (29% ACQ g i

f i

_ __ CSFSAT

- - , , - w -

fCh {Al(W W1/f~D 1 W OYlY l

CNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NO.

EP/1/A/5000/F-0 8 of 10 Containment - Page 1 of 1 Retype #3 l

l GO TO I FR Z.I l

C[$$,"f'"' S -

GO TO

-> LESS THAN FR-Z .1

, n rso YES I

N0 Eissttr**' - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - ~ - - -

0070

IE55 0 THAN FR-Z .2 YES CONTAINMENT EL h 0000000000000 gg S Mlr FR-Z .3 is.s ri YES O O

O O

O O

O CONTAINMENT

$sSNN 00000 35 MIR Vrc O FR Z .4 (EMF $3A or $38) ILJ O O

O O

O O

O  !

CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN h

LESS THAN 05% hh

- CSF SAT a___