ML20136B309
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,8 MEMO TO:
J. L. Crews, Director, Division of Resident, Reactor Projects.
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and Engineering Inspection FROM:
T. W. Bishop, Chief, Reactor Construction Projects Branch
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SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT "QUADREX REPORT" AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
~j CURRENT DIABLO CANYON REVERIFICATION During our phone conversation with Mr. De Young on March 16, 1982 it was recomended that we look at thi South Texas P'roject 6TPT "Quadrex Report" in reference to the Diablo Canyon reverification program.. I have reviewed the 104 page executive sumary of the Quadrex Report and discussed the subject with Mr. Madsen of NRC RIV and Mr. Sells of NRR (STP Project Manager).
As backgrcund informdtion, in January 1981. Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P) initiated a technical review of portions of the engineering 1
design work performed by Brown and Root, for the South Texas Project.
The purpose of this review was to determine the overall technical adequacy of the STP design. Quadrex was. asked to assist HL&P in this review in the following areas: Civil / Structural; Computer Programs and Codes: Electrical /
Instrumentation and Control; Geotechnic; HVAC; Mechanical; Nuclear Analysis; Piping and Supports / Stress and Special Stress; and Radiological Control.
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i The Quadrex review took about two months and resulted in over 300 questions /
findings. Quadrex consolidated many of these questions / findings into 17 "most serious" and " serious" generic findings. These findings are sumarized on attachment 1.
Houston Lighting & Power Cor:pany, when providing these findings to the ASLB in September 1981, characterized the Quadrex conclusf6ns with the following statement:
"The Quadrex review was undertaken at the direction of HL&P executive management in order to provide a third partly review of the STP engineering status.
It was not an audit pursuant to our QA program. Thus, the report contains many iubjective opinions which are largely unsupported by the underlying technical data...."
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As you are aware. HL&P has selected Bechtel to replace Brown & Root at ?
STP.
In discussing the current status of the Quadrex report with RIV, l
Mr. Madsen pointed out that Bechtel has reviewed the report, met with both Quadrex and Brown & Root, and generated a Task Force Report on March 15, 1982 to address the Quadrex conclusions. Mr. Madsen is mailing us a copy of the Bechtel Task Force Report.
It appears that Bechtel may conclude f6/A-$4. '
that a large amount (perhaps 2/3) of the 300 Quadrex questions / findings e
"would turn out OK".
Bechtel has reported that only five of the 300 itens 3
are potentially reportable under 50.55(e). The Bechtel Task Force Report sets priorities for addressing the Quadrex findings.
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'teno to 'J. L. Crews
.' MAR 19 Bd2 became aware of the Guadrex Report in Ju1In reviewing rst provided to the hearing board and was se%y 1981.The report was subsequently have submitted an additional 22 contentions based upon the Quad d on all parties..The intervenors and the ASLB has asked that the phase 2 hearings address rex Report reviews, handling, and ' disposition) of the Quadrex Report.
In February eneration, 1982 RIV initiated an investigation as wl. ether HL&P purposef the quadrex Report from the NRC (the report was generated in M e
the NRC resident inspector did not " find out" about the report un and 1981). There has been no enforcement actions (yet) resulting from the uy report.
Region IV's current actions, in addition to the investigation include assigning a special STP review team (with one individu assigned to Quadrex followup), and examination of the Bechtel pr ecifically NRR has taken the position that this primarily a regional item
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In reference to our use of the Quadrex report Rechtel's Task Force ReportPGtE's design reverification consul
, along with of design problens that have, occurred within the industry.se that useful reference material in conducting the Diablo Canyon reverif This may be any NRC.precedences with respect to enforcement l
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' T. U. Bishop, Chief
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Reactor Construction Projects Branch cc:
R. H. Engelken B. H. Faulkenberry D. M. Sternberg P. J. Morrill
~J. H. Eckhardt i--
(Info cc route to Construction Branch) 1 i
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Guadrex Corporation Deview of South Texas Project Desian
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_ Generic Findings _
"Most Serious Generic Findings"
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1.
Brown & Root (B&R) did not provide for effective integration and overview of the design process (activities lack consistency and'coordi. nation between engineering discipline).
2.
Engineering data is not consistently reviewed, frequency of calculation
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errors is high, and vendor reports (on design) are not always properly reviewed.
3.
Written guidance to designers is not adequate to address plant operating modes and environmental conditions which should be considered.
4 Improper designation of safety-related designs as nonsafety-related.
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No written guidance to conduct failure mode and effect analysis, and no evidence that the single failure criterion was satisfied.
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flo system to effectively track and assure compliance with FSAR comitments.
7.
Poor development of design bases (including design margins) and design interfaces.
8.
Reliability requirements are not established for some equipment.
9.
Weakness and errors exist in the nuclear related analysis of design.
10 Weaknesses in the design verification program (unti rely; no qualifications for the design verifier; poor documentation).
" Serious Generic Findings"
- 11. Design criteria do not consider certain plant operation criteria i
(maintenance access; minimum performance requirements; consideration of degraded operation).
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- 12. Plant symmetry was not a major. objective of design.
- 13. Valve opening and closing rates were not adequately specified.-
- 14. Access provisions (for maintenance, inspection, test, ALARA) are inadequate.
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Preoperational test requirements and test provisions were nok' systematically considered in design.
16 Local environmental temperatures were not considered for maintenance.
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'(resulting in too many supports). Abnormally low seismic values were findings, subdivided as follows:The above " generic findings" are supported by o l
30 Civil / Structural questions / findings 12 Computer Code questions / findings 29 Electrical / Instrumentation questions / findings l
28 HVAC questions / findings I
70 Mechanical / pipe rupture questions / findings 34-Mechanical / Nuclear Analysis questions / findings 41 Piping / Support questior.'
'ndings 38 Radiological questions /t
'7gs 22 ISI/ Maintenance questio-f i
AttacFment 1
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