ML20135G103

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Memorandum & Order Admitting Contentions 3,4,5,6,7,8 & 10 & Rejecting 1,2 & 9 of Ctr for Nuclear Responsibility,Inc & J Lorion 850307 Amended Petition Re Proposed Amends to Expand Spent Fuel Pool Storage Capability.Served on 850917
ML20135G103
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/16/1985
From: Cole R, Lazo R, Luebke E
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY, LORION, J.
References
CON-#385-520 84-504-07-LA, 84-504-7-LA, OLA-2, NUDOCS 8509180158
Download: ML20135G103 (23)


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 88cv70 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION usQc ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

'55' ggp p P2:y Before Administrative Judges: ,. ,

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Dr. Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole OfRVLD Sgp J y gd-Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-2 50-251-OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ASLBP No. 84-504-07 LA (Turkey Point Plant, (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)

Units 3 & 4) )

) September 16, 1985 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER I

Florida Power & Light Company (" Licensee") is licensed to possess, use and operate Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, two pressurized water nuclear reactors located in Dade County, Florida. On June 7, 1984, pursuant to 10 CFR 5 2.105(a)(4)(1), the NRC published in the Federal Register a notice of consideration of the issuance of amendments to the facility licenses and offered the opportunity for hearing on the amendments. 49 Fed. Reg. 23715. The amendments would allow the expansion of the spent fuel pool storage capacity. Fursuant to that notice, the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. (" Center") and Joette Lorion (collectively referred to herein as " Petitioners") filed a timely request for hearing on July 9,1984.

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By Order of February 7,1985 (unpublished), th'e Licensing Board in this proceeding scheduled a prehearing conference for March 27, 1985 and set February 25, 1985 as the deadline to file a supplement to the intervention petition. On March 7, 1985, Petitioners filed an amended petition to intervene, which included ten contentions, and a motion to permit the late filing addressing the five factors for late intervention set forth in 10 CFR 9 2.714(a)(1). Amended Petition to Intervene (Amended Petition); Motion to File Not in Accordance With the Board But in Accordance With the Rule (Motion). The Amended Petition (a) supplements the original petition by offering additional information on the interest of the Center, (b) supplements the original petition to intervene by proffering proposed contentions for litigation and (c) requests that the license amendments be revoked.1 Licensee and the NRC Staff (" Staff") filed responses to the Amended Petition on March 21, 1985.

II In their responses to the original petition for leave to intervene, both the Licensee and the Staff agreed that Ms. Lorion appears to possess standing to intervene in her individual capacity. They each 1

Pursuant to 10 CFR 6 50.91(a)(4), the Staff made a final no significant hazards determination and issued the contested amendments on November 21, 1984.

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noted that the Center had not demonstrated any right to intervene on its own behalf. However, the Staff believed that the Center had adequately established derivative standing through the interest of at least one member. As noted above, the Center attempted to rectify any deficiency by offering additional inforw.ation on its interest in its Amended Petition.

The issue of the Center's standing to intervene was laid to rest during the Prehearing Conference on March 27, 1985, when the Licensee, following an oral statement by a member of the public present in the hearing room confirming that he was a member of the Center and had authorized the Center to represent him in this proceeding, withdrew its objection on the basis of that representation. Thereupon, the Licensing Board ruled that Ms. Lorion and the Center had established standing to intervene. Tr. 13.

III The Petitioners were directed to file a supplement to their July 9, 1984 intervention petition by February 25, 1985. However, Petitioners failed to file their supplemental petition by that date. After the deadline had passed and in a conference call between the Board and parties on March 6, 1985, the Board directed Petitioners to file a supplement by March 7,1985 and provide justification for the late filing. On March 7,1985, ten days after the date prescribed in the

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Order, Petitioners filed their Amended Petition and a Motion which requested that their filing date be extended to March 7,1985.

A late intervention petitioner must address the five factors specified in 10 CFR 5 2.714(a) and " affirmatively demonstrate that on

! balance, they favor his tardy admission into the proceeding." Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-615, 12 NRC 350, 352 (1980); see N clear Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4,1 NRC 273, 275 (1975). These factors are:

(1) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.

(ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.

(iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.

(iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties.

(v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.

The Commission has emphasized that licensing boards are expected to demand compliance with the lateness requirements of 10 CFR 5 2.714. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5, 13NRC361,364(1981). The burden is on the petitioner to oemonstrate that a balancing of these five factors is in his favor.

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In Licensee's opinion factors (i) and (iii) predominate and should weigh against admission of the late filed contentions. Staff asserts ,.

that the first and third factors weigh slightly against Petitioners, but

-conclude that on balance, the five factors to be considered weigh slightly in favor of pennitting late intervention.

1. Good Cause - Factor (1)

Petitioners assert that there is good cause for late filing because as a pro se litigant, their representative, Ms. Lorion, followed the time for filing set forth in 10 CFR 6 2.714(b) and "the vicarious advice of counsel." Motion at 2. Ms. Lorion also asserts that due to deadline and time constraints as a " researcher, writer, and motner," she missed the February 25 deadline and was unable to file before March 7,1985.

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The reasons proffered by Petitioners constitute, at best, only a minimally acceptable claim of good cause for the failure to file by February 25, 1985. Pursuant to 10 CFR Q 2.711(a), licensing boards are expressly empowered to extend or shorten the time periods provided in the rules. Allens Creek, ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7, 13 (1980); Allens Creek, 1

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ALA8-565, 10 NRC 521, 523'(1979).2 Even as pro g litigants,

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Petitioners shou'1d be expected to comply with the procedural requirements of the regulations as well as Board ordered filing dates.

It was Ms. Lorion's inability to meet the deadline, as well as her erroneous conclusion as to the filing due date, which gave rise to the brief delay occasioned here. While,it is understandable that Ms. Lorion

-may have been confused about'her filing deadline and erroneously relied on the " vicarious advice of counsel" and her own reading of the rules, her failure to meet the Board's filing date, although innocent, is not totally excusable. If Petitioners were uncertain as to whether the Board schedule for the supplemental petition superseded the minimum time period permissible in Section 2.714(b) (no later than 15 days before the prehearing conference) and were unable to comply with the Board's schedule, it was incumbent on Petitioners to seek,-in advance, an extension of-time for filing from the Board, or seek clarification of its filing deadline from the Board. Because Petitioners have made a questio_nable showing as to good cause for the delay in filing their contentions, the first factor weighs slightly against intervention.3 2

In Allens Creek, ALAB-574, the Appeal Board upheld the denial of intervention to a pro se litigant who filed his contentions 11 days late and had read neither tee board's order directing the filing of

-contentions nor the Rules of Practice, but-relied on advice of friends that he was entitled to file fifteen days prior to the first prehearing conference. 11 NRC at 13.

3 See, eg., Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey (Point Nuclear FootnoteContinued)

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'2. Availability of Other Means Whereby Petitioners' Interest Will Be Protected and Representation by Existing Parties - Factors (ii-) and (iv)

The second factor to be considered is whether other means are available to protect Petitioners' interest. .This factor weighs in favor of granting the Amended Petition because there appear to be no means other than participating in the NRC licensing proceeding for Turkey Point which would enable Petitioners to pursue their interests. .

Similarly, the fourth factor (the extent to which petitioner's interest will be represented by. existing parties) also favors Petitioners. There is no other party who might directly represent the interest of Petitioners. However, the Appeal Board has observed that the availability of other means whereby a petitioner can protect its interest and the extent to which other parties will represent that interest are properly accorded relatively less weight than the other three factors in Section 2.714(a). South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.

(Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895 (1981).

(Footnote Continued)

Generating Station, Units 3 and 4), LBP-79-21,10 NRC 183,190 (1979)

(Board-did not demand that the early performance of a pro se petitioner who had not shown good cause for its late filing adhere rigTdly to the rules and did not weigh this factor as heavily as it otherwise might ,

have).

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3. Development of Sound Record - Factor (iii)

The third factor, the extent to which petitioner can assist in developing a sound record, also weighs against permitting late intervention. Petitioners must affirmatively demonstrate that they have special expertise which would aid in the development of a sound record to prevail on this factor. See Summer, 13 NRC at 892-93; Cincinnati Gas

& Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14,11 NRC 570,576(1980). When a petitioner addresses this factor "it should set out with as mt.ch particularity as possible the precise issues it plans to cover, identify its prospective witnesses, and summarize their proposed testimony. Vague assertions regarding [a] petitioner's ability or resources ... are insufficient." Mississippi Power & Light Co.

(Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982) (citations omitted).

In the instant case, Petitioners assert that their participation, "through research and expert testimony, will assist in developing a sound record ...." Motion at 3. This vague and unsupported assertion does net establish that Petitioners possess any special expertise or could assist in any manner in developing the record. Nor does the statement indicate that Petitioners have retained qualified experts who would aid in the development of a sound record since the substance of their testimony has not been summarized. Thus, petitioners have failed to meet their burden with regard to this factor.

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4. Delay and Broadening of Issues - Factor (v)

Finally, the fifth factor, the extent to which a petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding, does not significantly weigh against the Amended Petition. In this amendment proceeding where a hearing is not mandatory and would not be held were the Board to deny intervention, it is indisputable that participation by l

Petitioners, the only intervenor, will broaden the issues because absent Petitioners' intervention, there would be no issues for hearing.

However, the delay which can be attributed directly to the tardiness of the petition is to be taken into account in applying this factor. West Valley, CLI-75-4, 1 NRC at 276; Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631, 650 & n.25 (1975). Because Petitioners' ten-day delay in filing the contentions was brief and, in fact, had no effect on the timing of the prehearing conference (in part through the efforts of the other parties) or on other progress in this proceeding, the Board does not believe this factor weighs against intervention.

In sum, the first and third factor weigh slightly against Petitioners. Whiletheremaynotbeanyotherforum(secondfactor)or party (fourth factor) which might afford protection to Petitioners' interest and these factors are accorded relatively less weight than the others, petitioners' innocent, though mistaken, failure to adhere to the Board deadline has not resulted in any delay to the proceeding. On

l 10 balance, the factors to be considered under 10 CFR 5 2.714 weigh slightly in favor of permitting late intervention. Accordingly, the Board finds that the Petition'ers, if they have proffered at least one admissible contention, should prevail under the five-factor balancing test for late intervention and be admitted as a party to this '

proceeding. Petitioners motion to extend the time for filing the Amended Petition to March 7,1985, is granted.

IV The Amended Petition filed on March 7,1985, includes ten proposed contentions numbered 1 through 10, which Petitioners desire to litigate.

The full text of these ten contentions is set forth in the Appendix, attached hereto.

In its March 21, 1985 response to the Amended Petition Licensee argues that each of the proposed contentions raised by Petitioners is objectionable for lack of specificity or basis or for other reasons and that consequently, Petitioners' request to intervene should De denied.

The Staff's response filed on the same day asserts that proposed Contentions 1, 2 and 9 are inadmissible and should be rejected.

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However, in the view of the Staff, proposed Contentions 3,4,5,6,7,8 and 10 raise matters within the scope of the proceeding, are supported with adequate bases, and should be admitted for litigation.

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11 In recognition of the fact that Petitioners cannot be required to have anticipated in the contentions themselves the possible arguments their opponents might raise as grounds for dismissing them, the Board at the prehearing conference on March 27, 1985 heard oral argument on the question of admissibility of the proposed contentions and provided Ms. Lorion, the proponent of the contentions, the opportunity to be

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heard in response to the objections which had been filed by Licensee and Staff. Tr. 19-73. Our ruling on each of the contentions set forth below has taken into consideration all of the pleadings which have been filed together with the arguments and comments received during the prehearing conference.

I Proposed Contentions Petitioners' Contention 1 seeks to litigate the validity of the Staff's "no significant hazards consideration" determination and contends that a public hearing must be held prior to the issuance of the spent fuel pool license amendments for the two Turkey Point units. For the reasons fully set forth in Licensee's and Staff's March 21, 1985 Responses, the Board finds that this contention is not admissible for litigation. It is not relevant to any issues properly before the Board i and does not raise an issue as to which the Board may take effective action or provide an effective remedy.

12 Contention 2 alleges that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared because expansion of the spent fuel pool constitutes "a major Federal action." However, Petitioners do not provide any arguable basis within the scope of this proceeding for concluding that the expansion will cause significant environmental impact. Petitioners assertion that there is a need to examine the effects of permanent waste disposal is clearly outside the scope of the current amendment.

Further, Petitioners offer no basis for challenging the Commission's analysis of alternatives and conclusion that the environmental impact of expanded onside fuel storage is negligible. Contention 2 is rejected for lack of adequate basis.

The Board admits Contention 3 but limits it to the basis asserted by Petitioners. The contention alleges that the calculation of radiological consequences resulting from a cask drop accident do not comply with Standard Review Plan criteria or Regulatory Guide 1.25 and thus the doses may exceed Part 100 criteria and ALARA. The reference to the ALARA principle is inappropriate because ALARA generally applies to routine operation, not accidents. However, Petitioners may properly allege that the release limits in Parts 20 and 50 will be exceeded in 1 the event of an accident. As a basis for the contention, Petitioners state that the calculations are not adequately conservative because of the radial peaking factor used.

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13' Contention 4 alleges that the Licensee has not provided a site '

specific analysis of a spent fuel pool boiling event which demonstrates .

that onsite and offsite dose limits will not be exceeded. Licensee and Staff both note that the contention is based partly on Petitioners' misapprehension of the methodology used to analyze a spent fuel pool boiling event (the alleged use of a calculation performed for the Limerick plant). However, the contention raises an issue within the scope of the proceeding, is adequately specific and is supported by a minimally sufficient basis. It is accepted provided that personnel and offsite dose limits are specified as those in Parts 20 and 100 and litigation is limited to the factual basis provided.

Contention 5 asserts that rerack design is not safe because of the potential for lift-off during seismic events. Petitioners claim that the matter involves an unreviewed safety question demanding a safety analysis of all seismic and hurricane conditions which could cause damage to fuel rods and thereby create a criticality accident. The contention appears to pose a litigable issue. The Board agrees with the Staff that the issue, however, is not whether the potential for lift-off during a seismic event is an unreviewed safety question, but whether there is a deficiency in the current rack design and a necessity for a

14 restriction on loading to prevent potential lift-off.4 Petitioners assertion'that hurricane conditions will impact the storage racks demonstrates no nexus between hurricane loads and the instant rerack and must be rejected as a basis for Contention 5. Accordingly, the contention is admitted provided it is limited to whether the fuel can be stored safely in view of the potential for lift-off during seismic

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Petitioners' Contention 6 asserts that the analysis performed by the Licensee and the Staff of the effect of increased heat and radiation from the expanded storage capacity and long-term storage on materials integrity is inadequate. The contention is reasonably specific and is supported by an adequate statement of basis. It is admitted provided that the reference to "long-term storage" is limited to the storage I

period authorized by the amendments.

4 Under 10 CFR 6 50.59, the decision as to whether a matter constitutes an unreviewed safety question rests with the Licensee in the first instance. The Licensee currently has administrative controls in place which prevent the occurrence of lift-off by not loading the overhanging rows while the remainder of the racks are empty. As a result, as indicated in a letter from the Staff to Licensee, the conclusions of the Staff's safety evaluation have not been affected.

Letter to J.W. Williams, FPL, from D.G. Mcdonald, NRC, February 26, 1985. A copy of this letter was transmitted to the board and parties by letter of Staff counsel, dated February 28, 1985.

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Contention 7 asserts Licensee's practices during the reracking will not meet ALARA requirements and the limits of Part 20. Petitioners allege that the Licensee's estimate of occupational exposure are higher than the Staff estimate of 40-50 person rem and much higher than those experienced at other plants. The contention is adequately specific and is supported by a minimally sufficient basis. Accordingly, it is admitted as limited to the basis offered.

In Contention 8 Petitioners state that the high density storage design of the fuel racks will increase heat loads and water temperatures such that a loss-of-cooling accident may occur. It is alleged that the reduction in time to boiling may cause major releases to the environment. The temperatures mentioned by Petitioners are within the design basis of the spent fuel storage pool. However, the contention raises an issue within the scope of the proceeding and meets the requirements for admission for litigation. Therefore, Contention 8 is admitted provided it is limited to the basis offered.

Contention 9 alleges that the effects of a hurricane, tornado or other natural disasters, on the spent fuel storage facility or its contents have not been analyzed. This proposed contention is outside the scope of the proceeding. The effect of wind, tornado and hurricane flooding on the fuel storage building was evaluated at the operating license stage. Safety Evaluation, March 15, 1972, Section 5.0. No nexus between the arrangement of the contents of the fuel storage

16 building and the impact of winds, flooding, and airborne missiles is shown. Nor is any basis offered for reevaluating the effects of l hurricanes and tornadoes because of these amendments to the operating l

licenses. Consequently, Contention 9 is rejected for lack of basis.

1 Contention 10 alleges that the increased storage capacity will not meet ANSI NI6.1-1975, " Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors," and will increase the probability for a criticality accident contrary to GDC 62 (Prevention of I

criticality in fuel storage and handling). As a basis for the contention, Petitioners state that added storage of failed fuel and fuel with increased enrichment will increase the probability that the fuel will go critical and cause a major criticality accident with releases in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 criteria. With the exception of the reference to failed fuel causing criticality, the contention raises an issue within the scope of the proceeding, is adequately specific and is supported by a minimally sufficient basis. The Petitioners' concern that failed fuel will cause criticality must be rejected since there is no nexus or relationship between the license amendments in question, the storage of failed fuel and increased likelihood of criticality.

Accordingly, the contention is admitted provided that the references to failed fuel causing criticality is deleted in both the contention and basis, and the contention is limited to whether added storage of fuel and more highly enriched fuel will cause a criticality accident.

17 ORDER For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is this 16th day of September,1985 ORDERED

1. That Contentions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of Petitioners' Amended Petition dated March 7, 1985, are admitted; and
2. That Contentions 1, 2 and 9 of Petitioners' Amended Petition dated March 7, 1985, are rejected.

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD QAfx. La Dr. Rdb~ert M. Lazo, Ch N g ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 11p.x .

Dr. Richard F. Cole ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE g, _n Y, -

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^$b Ur. Emmeth A. Luebke ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 16th day of September, 1985.

APPENDIX .

Proposed Contention 1 That the expansion of the spent fuel pool at the Turkey Point facility is a significant hazards consideration and requires that a public hearing be held before issuance of the license amendments.

Bases for Contention a) The expansion of the spent fuel pool at the Turkey Point facility increases the possibility of a criticality and loss of cooling water accident, involves a significant reduction in the margin of safety of the spent fuel pool, and creates the possibility of a new and different kind of accident occurring, which would cause the pool to lose its structural integrity.

b) The Commission has traditionally held, in a series of case law, that expansion of the spent fuel facility involves a significant hazards consideration. As noted by Commissioner Asselstine, during an exchange with Senator Mitchell in Congress in

'1983 and quoted in a letter of March 15, 1983 from Senators, Simpson, Hart, and Mitchell to Palladino. Mr. Asselstine is quoted as saying:

This is correct, Senator. The Commission has never been able to categorize the spent fuel storage as a no significant hazard consideration.

c) Congress clearly intended the spent fuel pool expansion be considered a ne significant hazards consideration. During a meeting in Congress on House u111 4255, a Mr. Ottinger was quoted  ;

as saying:

If the gentlemen will yield, the expansion of spent l fuel pools and the reracking of the spent fuel pools are clearly matters which raise significant hazards consideration ... (127 Cong. Record H 8156)

The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reiterated this understanding on its report on S. 1207-l The Committee anticipates, for example, that consistent with prior practice, the Commission's standards would not permit a "no significant hazards consideration determination" for license amendments to permit reracking of spent fuel pools." S. Rep.97-113, p. 15.

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Thus, the legislative history behind PL 97-415 clearly contemplates that reracking is an example of licensing amendments involving a significant hazards consideration.

Proposed Contention 2

, Expansion of the spent fuel pool at Turkey Point constitutes a major Federal action and requires that the Commission prepare an environmental impact statement in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") and 10 C.F.R. Part 51.

Bases for Contention The proposed expansion and reracking of the spent fuel pool at l Turkey Point increases both the possibility and probability of an occurrence of a release of radiation or radioactive materials into the environnent, both as a result of normal operation and in the event that there is a total or partial loss of coolant from the spent fuel pool. The licensee and staff must also address the following:

a) as a result of the expansion there will be an increased amount of spent fuel stored at the Turkey Point plant. There is the possibility that this site could become a permanent waste disposal facility. The Licensee and Staff have not looked at long term, perpetual maintenance of these wastes, or I calculated the costs associated with such in both monetary losses and 1csses of land use. l b) There has not been alternate on site storage methods and alternatives to the expansions, including alternatives, such as derating, which would reduce the amount of spent fuel produced.

Proposed Contention 3 That the calculation of radiological consequences resulting from a cask drop accident are not conservative, and the radiation releases in such an accident will not be ALARA, and will not meet with the 10 CFP

[ sic]Part100 criteria.

Bases for Contention The Florida Power and Light Company did not comply with the conservative assumption for a cask drop accident that are specified in the Standard Review Plan 15.7.5 (5) and Regulatory Guide 125

[ sic) (5), in that they used a 1.0 radial peaking factor, rather

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3 than a 1.65 factor. Thus, the potential offsite dose ~using the more conservative calculations could cause FPL to exceed the 10 CFP *

[ sic] Part 100 criterion.

Proposed Contention 4 That FPL has not provided a site specific radiological analysis of a spent fuel boiling event that proves that offsite dose limits and personal exposure limits will not be exceeded in allowing the pool to boil with makeup water from only seismic Category 1 sources.

Bases for Contention FPL used calculation performed for the Limerick plant to prove that they would not exceed radiological limits in a spent fuel pool boiling accident. FPL should not be allowed to extrapolate Limerick's study for their own, because there are many differences between the two plants which could be critical. For example, the saturation noble gas and iodine inventories could be greater for the Turkey Point plant as a result of fuel failure and increased enrichment; more than 1% of the fuel rods may be defective at Turkey Point because of the asme fuel failure; and the gap activity of noble gases, such as krypton 85, and fission products, such as radioactive iodine may also be greater for Turkey Point.

Proposed Contention 5

That the main safety function of the spent fuel pool, which is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a safe configuration through all environmental and abnornal loadings, may not be met as a result of a recently brought to light unreviewed safety question involved in the current rerack design that allows racks whose outer rows overhang the support pads in the spent fuel pool. Thus, the amendments should be revoked.

Bases for Contention In a February 1,1985 letter from Williams, FPL, to Varga, NRC, which describes the potential for rack lift off under seismic event conditions [ sic]. This is clearly an unreviewed safety question that demands a safety analysis of all seismic and hurricane conditions and their potential impact on the racks in question before the license amendments are issued, because of the potential 3 to increase the possibility of an accident previously evaluate

[ sic], or to create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident caused by loss of structural-integrity. If integrity is lost, the damaged fuel rods could cause a criticality accident.

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4 Proposed Contention 6 The Licensee and Staff have not adequately considered or analyzed materials deterioration or failure in materials integrity resulting from the increased generation and haat and radioactivity, as a result of increased capacity and long term storage, in the spent fuel pool.

Bases for Contention The spent fuel facility at Turkey Point was originally designed to store a lesser amount of fuel for a short period of time. Some of the problems that have not been analyzed properly are:

(a) deterioration of fuel cladding as a result of increased exposure and decay heat and radiation levels during extended periods of pool storage.

(b) loss of materials integrity of storage rack and pool liner as a result of exposure to higher levels of radiation over longer periods.

(c) deterioration of concrete pool structure as a result of exposure to increased heat over extended periods of time.

Proposed Contention 7 That there is no assurance that the health and safety of the workers will be protected during spent fuel pool expansion, and that the NRC estimates of between 80-130 rem /persen person rem will not meet ALARA requirements, in particular those in 10 C.F.R. Part 20.

Bases for Contention FPL's estimates of between 80-130 rem / person are much higher than the NRC's estimate for reracking of 40-50 person / rem [ sic], and much higher than experience at other nuclear. plants. Thus, there

[ sic] estimates are not ALARA.

Proposed Contention 8 That the high density design of the fuel racks will cause higher heat loads and increase in water temperature which could cause a loss-of-cooling accident in the spent fuel pool, which could in turn cause a major release of radioactivity to the environment. And, that the decrease in the time that it takes the spent fuel to reach its boiling point in such an accident, both increases the probability of

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5 accident'spreviouslyevaluatedandincrease[ sic]thechancesaccidents not previously evaluated.

Bases for Contention a) The NRC has stated in numerous documents that the water in spent fuel pools should normally be kept below 122 degrees F. The present temperature of the water at Turkey Point is estimated to be 127 degrees F. After the reracking, the temperature of the water could rise to 141 degrees on a normal basis, and could reach 180 degrees F. with a full core load added. In addition, the time for the spent fuel boiling point to be reached in a loss of cooling accident will go from.15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Four hours is clearly not enough time to take action to prevent a major accident in the spent fuel pool from occurring. Thus, the increase in heat and radioactivity resulting from increases [ sic] density will result in an increase in the probability of a major spent fuel pool meltdown occurring.

b) There is also the possibility that a delay in the make up emergency water, could cause the zirconium cladding on the fuel rods to heat up to such higher temperatures that any attempt at later cooling by injecting water back into the pool could hasten the heat up, because water reacts chemically with heated zirconium to produce heat and possible explosions. Thus, the zirconium cladding could catch on fire, especially in a high density design, and create an accident not previously evaluated.

Proposed Contention 9 Licensee has not analyzed the effect that a hurricane or tornado could have on the spent fuel storage facility or its contents, and that j the SER neglects certain accidents that could be caused by such natural l disasters. >

Bases for Contention The Turkey Point sight is in an area of potential hurricane and tornado activity. Accidents externally initiated by such events should be analyzed, including:

a) the possibility that a tornado driven or hurricane wind driven missile could damage the spent fuel racks.

b) the possibility that a tical wave caused by a hurricane could i cause the radioactivity in the spent fuel pool to be washed I into the surrounding environment. l

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Proposed Contention 10 That the increase of the spent fuel pool capacity, which includes fuel-reds-wh4ek-have-experieneed-fuel-failure-and fuel rods that are more highly enriched, will cause the requirements of ANSI NI6-1975 [ sic]

not to be mec and will increase the probability that a criticality accident wi'.I occur in the spent fuel pool and will exceed 10 C.F.R. Part 50, A;.62 criterion.

Bases for Contention The incresse in the number of fuel rods stored and the fact that many of them may-have-experieneed-fwel-failure-er may be more highly enriched and have more reactivity will increase the chances that the fuel pool will go critical, and cause.a major criticality accident, and perhaps explosion, that will release large amounts of radioactivity to the environment in excess of the 10 C.F.R.100 criteria, t

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