IR 05000275/1985024
| ML20134H691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1985 |
| From: | Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134H685 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-275-85-24, NUDOCS 8508290113 | |
| Download: ML20134H691 (32) | |
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N4 , - ,s . ,, , . ' _M ' i: ,v... <.. , . - U.S. NUCLEAR REGlW4Y COMMISSION ' ?
r _.. y - ' - a t , o ., ( REGION V' ~ ' t' , , ' ~. ' Report-No. 50-275/85-24 ' ' . 7,< , ,,. ,
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-Docket No.'50-275 - '
,-License No. DPR-80 - , -Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company ?77.Beale Street.
San Francisco, Californis 95106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant '4.
rInspection at: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County, California.
,. Inspection Conducted: June 3-7, 1985, Land discussions held with the licensee by telephone on June 17 and 18, 1985 8/8/!85~ ~ Inspectors: t,. ~. , '~ R. F. Fist, Chief . Dat'e Signed . Emergency Preparedness Section-and Team Leader .T llAwb. GbH. Te @le-
- NW }K . Emergency Preparedness Analyst. Date Signed i .... M 8/
K. M. Prendergast' Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Analyst ' , . Team Members: ! .G. W. Lapinsky, Jr., Engineering Psychologist, NRC / , , E. H. Markee, Jr., Senior Meteorologist., NRC J., M. E. Wangler, Health Physicist, NRC' K. C. McBride, Senior Research Engineer, Battelle Pacific Northwest ' ' Laboratories (PNL) -M. I. Good, Reactor Operations, Comex Corporation A. K. Lopser,-Reactor Operations, Comex Corporation v.
Approved by: M.4 1 8fft/M.5~~ p.
F. A. Wenslawski,VChief - Dafe S6gned
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological l-Protection Branch ' t-L ' 8508290113 850814 ' i t PDR ADOCK 05000275 ' G PDR - ,
. . . .
-. o ; t, j3 , t[[, -2- ' Summary: Inspection on June 3-7 and June 17'and 18, 1985 (Report No. 50-275/85-24)
. ' Areas-Inspected: An announced' appraisal of the Emergency Response Facilities.. (ERFs) was conducted to determine if-the licen'see has successfully implemented ~ the requirements in Supplement I to NUREG 0737 and the regulations..The appraisal' covered the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support-Center (OSC),' Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), as well as instrumentation, . supplies, and equipment for-these facilities. The appraisal involved
- approximately 370-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors and three contractor team
. members. The appraisal was performed using draft Revision 5 of IE Inspection Procedure 82212.
Results: No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
A number of items for improving the licensee's program have been identified in the report.
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I J ' S l r _ -. - , . TABLE OF CONTENTS - , FOR THE DETAILED ERF EVALUATION Page No.
- , 1.0 Technical Support Center........................... I 1.I' Physical Facilities...........................
L.
1.1.1 Design, Location and Structure......
1.1.2-Equipment and. Supplies..............
1.1.3 Communications Systems..............
1.1.4 Power Supplies......................
, I 1.1.5-Conclusion..........................
, ' 1.2.Information-Management........................
' 1.2.1 - Variables and Pa rameters............
- 1.2.2 ERF Data System.....................
- ^ 1.2.3 Emergency Assessment and Response...
~ p System (EARS) 1.2.4 Display Interface...................
- i ' ' 1.2.5 Dose Assessment.....................
, 1.2.5.1 Source Term....................
1.2'.5.2 Meteorology....................
, ' 1.2.5.3 Computerized' Dose Assessment....
1.2.6' Conclusion..........................
U . 1.3 Functional Capability.........................
, 1.3.1 Operations and Control Room Support..
, 1.3.2 Conclusion..........................
2.0x Operational Support: Center.........................
, . I 2.1 Physical Facilities......;.....................
- 2.1.1 Design,-Location and Habitability...
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_ _ _ _____ _-__ _ _ _ ____ ! . , -2-t 2.1.2 Equipment and Supplies..............
2.1.3 Communications......................
2.1.4 Functional Capability...............
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2.1.5 Conclusion..........................
- 3.0 Emergency Operations Facility......................
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F 3.1 Physical Facilities.......................... .'
3.1.1 Design, Location and' Habitability...
3.1.2 Equipment and Supplie's..............
. 3.1.3 .Communicatio'n and Transp'ortation....
.
6 , ,, . 3.1.4 Power Supply............./.......... '22 3.1.5 Conclusion......................'.'...
. 3.2 Information Management.......'.............'...
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, 3.2.1 Variables and Parameters............
3.2.2 Information Spstems.................
. 3.2.3 Dose Assessment.....................
3.2.4 Conclusion..........................
3.3 Functional Capability.........................
3.3.1 Technical and Logistical Support....
3.3.2 Staffing and Capabilities...........
, 3.3.3 Conclusion..........................
4.0 Exit Interview................................
Attachment A - Individuals Contacted Attachment B - Effluent Monitors nd Locations > , p.U
l' , ' . , . ? DETAILED ERF EVALUATION 1.0 Technical Support Center (TSC) 1.1. Physical Facilities 1.1.1 Design, Location and Structure The Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) TSC is located within the plant site protected area at the 104' elevation on the west side of the Unit 2 Turbine building.
Since the Control Rooms (CR) for units 1 and 2 are common, the TSC would serve either unit during an emergency. The TSC is physically located near the CR; however, due to the installation of a temporary barrier, a slightly indirect route is currently being utilized between the two facilities. The only security control point (key card ~ reader) between the CR and the TSC using the normal route is at the entrance to the CR.
There are three of these control points using the indirect route.
It should be noted that the appraisal team experienced difficulties with the card reader system (i.e., some card readers would not accept all key cards).
Licensee personnel disclosed that efforts are underway to replace the card reader system with a new one.
In the meantime, an alternative method such as calling security or (tailgating) could be used to pass security control points in an emergency.
This problem will be alleviated once the temporary barrier is dismantled.
The TSC has been designed to have the same habitability as the CR.
TSC personnel are protected from gamma radiological hazards by concrete shielding that is designed to limit the integrated dose under post accident conditions to 2.5 rem. The shielding consists of 16-24" thick walls, a 12" thick floor, a 20" thick roof and steel bulkhead type doors. Special labyrinths were also installed at each doorway to preclude significant radiation streaming into the TSC. The TSC has also been provided with its own ventilation system that includes high efficiency air particulate (HEPA) and charcoal filtration. Under accident conditions the air supply to the TSC is manually transferred to the CR pcessurization system which maintains the TSC at a positive pressure.
The air supply from the CR room ventilation system including the ductwork, redundant ventilation fans and filter units for the TSC are designed to meet seismic 1 criteria. The fans are powered from the 480 volt vital power supply. The cooling system for the TSC is powered from normal or vital power; however, the system utilizes a normal water supply. The availability of this water , supply during an emergency (i.e.,. loss of offsite power) . p
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4 should:be evaluated. The air. intake to the TSC is & monitored for particulates, iodine and noble gases. Audio '; and visual. alarms have been installed in the TSC to alert K.
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- personnel of adverse' conditions. A check of this alarm
> f system during the appraisal demonstrated its operability.
In addition, each of the rooms within the TSC was observed ~ to have direct-reading ionization chambers-and alarms < < . .' installed. Dedicated portable monitoring equipment consisting of friskers and ionization chambers were ,, ,
available in lockers located in the Command Center and " (' ~ dose assessment area of the TSC.
. . The TSC h'as been designed to the Hosgri seismic criteria, which is substantially more conservative than.the State of ~ California uniform building * code'. The TSC consists of ,- five rooms each encompassing"appt.cimately 625 square I a feet. The total useable space available in each room is , much less"than 625 square feet due to equipment storage ' - space. Thi staff estimates the total useable' space to be approximatelys1500 square feet. This: appears.to be - ,'"l-adequate for the' estimated 15'to'30 people expected to be'
. - in the TSC during'an emergency.,The adequacy of the TSC b size has been verified by the licensee during previous . ,W.' exercises. The. rooms'of the TSC.are aligned in the ' " - following sequence;fCommasd Centdr, Operations Center, , . Dose Assessment / Radiological _ Center, Records, Office, and NRC Office.' This straight-line; configuration,:although not'optimaldis%;dequatefor , The staff recognizes thatirec! performing the TSC function.
i ' l onfigurationywould be a; infeasible at this? time,.butidoesxrecommend that a TSC-
- c fintercom be installed,to" improve traff'ic and' communication
' L flow.
.] v f c , , , ,. - ~ + . > -i / A 1.1.2 Equipment and Supplies ^ ^ ,
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The TSC has been provided with an excellent range of plant records', procedures and drawings. A complete settof plant f>< aperture cards is available in the section of th'e TSC'that~ " is devoted to providing. documentation support.,:Two; card - t'
~ ~ readers are available"to. read aperture cards and make hard , copies. Several dedicated lockers are used to store ' procedures, records and hard copy drawing's. During . - a- ' ' emergencies the TSC Records 0ffice'is" staffed with plant persannel familiar with the document library system.
a n n: ~ ' Documents' are located either manually or by. using the Lf, ~ ' ' computer: locater system. The system is part of the , e b D , - f ' f' ? ~ 'overall PG&E publication systesi, in that it has records of i - _ all publications,. records, and drawings whether they are' stored-.in.the plant,~TSC, EOF, OSC, or the c'orporate ' l_ . office in San. Francisco. The system is linked to the ' , - x 1 central computer in San Francisco via the PG&E microwave {T ' . g link. System access time was adequate during both of the - L _ ,i location-tests posed bp.the NRC inspector. One testL
p demonstrated the. ability of the licensee to locate and' '+" 'M:.., i . >c, .. ' _ , % _< > - E 'u-4 , de ' & , A -.
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produce a seldom used manual that was available in one of the maintenance shops. The other. test involved a manual for a motor operated valve in a safety related system.
This manual was available in the TSC and produced in a i" timely manner. The computer system for the microwave link ., - ' ' was subject to data error a'nd, scatter, in that several entries had to be entered twice'due to character deletion, or extra characters being added which resulted in an error ~ message saying that an invalid entry had been made.
However, this. problem appeared minor in nature and did not introduce an 'nreasonable delay in determining the u location of manuals requested.
Although the contents ofithe publication lockers in the TSC Records Office =are sequentially coded so they can be readily located'within an individual ~ locker, it was suggested.that PG&E consider marking the.outside.of the lockers with the general contents of each locker to facilitate picking'the-correct locker'to start with.
Various radiological-equipment arid supplies are also maintained in lo'ckers within.the TSC. Dose' rate equipment '. provides the capability to monitor TSC do'se rates, radiological' concentrations in air and levels of personnel _ and surface contamination. The appraisal disclosed that the' equipment was in proper calibration and that batteries were in good. working condition. Supplies of direct reading dosimeters up to SR'and a' dosimeter charger were also available in the TSC lockers.'.Should z dosimeter of higher range be required, according to individuals in the TSC, they would be requested from access control in the OSC. A locker in the TSC was also noted to contain 5 self' contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) units and 5 spare tanks along with protective clothing and supplies.
The procedure (EP-EF-5) for maintaining emergency supplies in the TSC,-EOF, and OSC was reviewed. The supplies and' equipment. described for each area were reviewed for adequacy to support the assigned emergency roles of each of the functional spaces. Maintenance / surveillance procedu'res and records, prescribed in the individual.
procedures, were compared with the actual records of inventories conducted by the emergency planning personnel.
Storage location / lockers were inspected and spot checks for accessibility, useability and availability of required supplies were performed. The equipment and supplies in the TSC appeared to be adequate to support the anticipated, < TSC roles. The records indicated the inventory had been performed as scheduled.and that discrepancies noted were ' tracked and corrected.in a timely fashion. ' Spot checks of storage lockers indicated.the inventories accurately , reflected the storage lockers contents.
Storage. areas , were generally clean and orderly.
, _. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .,] w , . / , , , , , r y . a +x " $ = ( As a suggestion for. improvement,uit:is recommended that an - , ~ . inventory sheet, possibly laminated, be attache'd to the - _ " - outside of each locker.to provide a quick reference.as to to the locker's' contents. ' This would also serve to make
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_ , . missing supplies more apparent to anyone viewing the L U- - locker's contents.
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, , ~ , . , . 1.1.3 ' Communication Systems + , ,
' The licensee has provided multiple systems and.
redundancies for transmitting and_ receiving information ' 'between various Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) and offsite agencies during emergencies. The. systems have been described in section 7.2.1 of the licensee's > Emergency Plan-(EP)..The communication systems were ' inspectedLduring this' appraisal andL.during previous
routine. inspections.. Inspection. findings have_been ' _ ' documented in Inspection Report Numbers 50-275/81-33, 50-323/81-19 and 50-275/84-23. The communication s.
capabilities were also examined during the October 30, 1984 emergency preparedness exercise and documented in . Inspection Report No. 50-275/84-29.
In addition.to - , ' ' confirming the' communication capabilities, the appraisal , staff _ verified that tests of the communication systems-have been completed in accordance with emergency procedure , EF-5', Revision 6, " Emergency Equipment, Instruments and-e - i - ' Supplies". Although alternate communications methods.
, , ' a ' exist the telephone system'has been equipped with a-
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- battery and a battery charger to~ ensure continued operation'during a lous of offsite-power. The licensee
, ,2-has experienced some* difficulties involving ~
, . ' - radiocommunications with in-plant fielditeams.- Several '! dead spots" have been ' discovered throughout'the plant.
. , 1' To ensure reliable dommunications; with in-plant emergency e teams, a management. decision has,been made'to designate.
r?" 4' thel telephone-s~ystem as ' the primary method of emergency s - - communication'andiradios as the' backup. A sufficient-numberLof'telephonesfare located:throughout1the plant.
> - , ' ' _ Necessary phone numbers are also 'p'rovided iol theLemergency , - - team'beforeitheir' departure.rRadios will still.be. issued s._ ~[ to' the in pla'ntiemergency teams; :but;only -for backup; -co'amunications' ' " m ) , 1.1.4 ' Power Supplies.
. , _ ' 2h The normal power supply to most TSC loads is manually.
". ~ ' - ' - selectable from Unit 1 or Unit 2 via a manual bus transfer ' - -switch in the switchgear room. Unit busses feeding this~ switch'have; redundant sources of-power. A second manual
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- bus transfer switch selects between the " normal" TSC
?g supply.(Unit Nos. 1 or 2) and the alternate supply. The- " ' Jc-alternate _ supply can be' fed from several sources which finclude-the auxiliary transformer, the 230 KV bus,-or one ' of five diesel generators. Two diesel generators are > y i h [g ' . ..'._ _
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.. , ,,- , , , . T '4 y ' , ' available,for e~ach plant and one cross connect diesel is , ' capable of supplying either plant.
. . , I fInterviews.with plant emergencyfplanning. personnel ' 3, ' -disclosed they had identified computer problems in the' TSC j , , when the diesel generator.s were supplying TSC power.
It - was not. apparent that any~ action was in' progress.or, , le
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' planned'to. solve.this problem.
It:is, recommended that this app'arent. problem'be. investigated, quantified and ,, 'S evaluated < for. appropriate ' action. ~. Power ' conditioning , m - might.be appropriate.
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Also, counting equipment in TSC' counting room appears to ~ .be. powered from a':non vital power source.with no backup - source of power. The. counting room on the 85' level also appears to be. powered from this~same non vital power.
, - Although.the mobile laboratory or Cal Poly might provide a ' secondary backup for counting, mobility could be severely , g-restricted during a major release.
It is recommended that - ^ W
- a backup power source 1for the plant counting equipment be
' considered.
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^ v - 1.1.5 Conclusion .,, s ~ -Based on,the findings in section 1.1, this portion of the licensee',s program meets the requirements of Supplement 1 -- to NUREG-0737. However, the following item requires', ' 'li'ensee. action and will be' classified as an "open" item m-. - . c - ,' which'will be: tracked by the Region.
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. Consider the installation of an intercom system in the TSC to improve the flow of communications.
-(85-24-01) The following items are suggested for. improving the program: , ~ ' _(1) Evaluate the availability.of the water supply to ' the TSC cooling system under emergency , ' - conditions.
, t- .(3) Investigate pruolems observed with the comput'ers ', in the TSC-when the diesels are supplying power.- ' .y.
.In addition, consider the~need for a backup- ' power supply for the counting lab and the backup 1 c - . counting labtin the TSC.
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(3). Consider lab'eling the.outside of lockers in the >
-TSC with their contents to facilitate locating.
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- - needed equipment.
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,x s '- 11.2. Information Management
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, , , v , ' 1 '. 2.1 = Variables and Parameters.
The' licensee has~ installed two' computerized systems to
provide operators and TSC personnel with an emergency.
~ ,, response data acquisition system (ERFDS) to determine _thej ~ safety status of the plant, and a dose assessment system for determining the' potential for actual exposures.to-the , . public-(EARS).
Plant information is providedjto the ERFs ' - by ERFDS. The" operation of this system is described in a
' plant. procedure (OP-B-10).. The major hardware.is located ,
in the TSC and consists'of dual and single Tanberg 3000 . recorders, a Gulton AP-20 label printer, a Compudas,. ',,W computer, a.ADM 31_ video monitor, a line printer, and a - Tektronix CRT and a Tektronix hard copy unit.. During '
power operation the ERFDS system records 451 channels (247 ' analog, 204 digital) of plant variables. About 10- ~ ' channels are preselected as " event" channels.
If the.
_ parameters on any one of the event channels exceed a ' . certain value,;the,ERFDS recording system will- - . automatically' select another tape to captu're.the event.
,,. About two hours 'of pre-event data will be contained on the ejected tapes and five hours of post event data. Any-plant parameter that is processed by the ERFDS system'can - be. read, recorded'and trended on a'real time basis. The trended value can,be recorded for later playback. The.
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- parameters selected-for ERFDS inputs appeared to be
' adequate to-display required variables to support the-i.
~ operation of the response facilities.
A review was conducted of the licensee's submittal on . ' Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Revision-3, variable status- ' and the two systems mentioned above. From this review it: - - ' was determined that the variables available would '4 reasonably support the operation'of the ERFs during the.
< ' range of anticipated emergencies at the plant. The licensee had compiled a matrix showing ~ instrument and.
- N range required, the pla'nt instrumentation proposing.to -, meet the requirement, and?the instrument read out ~ t locations. Exceptions or deviations to the;R.G.'1.97, Revision 3, variables included the following; narrow range . containment-level, accumulator isolation valve position, ~ containment sump temperature and liquid holdup tank volume >' v - levels. However, from the appraisal and the review of the ,;. -? exceptions where parameters are not available~in the TSC,- ' - -it was determined that.this information would be j' reasonably; achievable through dedicated communicators, , , closed circuit television cameras located in the CR'or- , both.
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7 ' . 1.2.2 ERFDS The ERFDS was designed and implemented'to facilitate overall. plant safety status evaluation. ERFDS is . described in the enclosure to the August 2, 1983 letter (PG&E Letter No. DCL-85-183) from J. O. Schuyler, to the NRC (D. G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing) and in the enclosure to the September 4, 1984 letter (PG&E Letter No. DCL-84-299) from J. O. Schuyler, to the NRC (G.
W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3). ERFDS was supplied by Babcock and Wilcox and configured as a distributed computer system. The ERFDS consists of a number of microcomputers each performing a limited function. The primary functions are: data acquisition; data storage; data routing; 'domputations; data reporting; graphic generation and display; and data retrieval.
Specific. microcomputers in the ERFDS which perform the functions just ' listed are. the data handler co'mputers, the SPDS computers [ display computers and recall computers.
The data handler, computer;is a'Zilog Z-80 based unit which ' routes 247 analog (range) and digital (2-state) sensor - data to display and safety parameter; display microcomputers.
One complete data set (digital and analog) is. collected and' stored every se,cond.
- ,7 +,- ,s TheSPDSmic'rocomputers(route'userkselecteddatatoa Motorola 6802 based microcomputed controlled video generator. User-selected plant. safety parameter data sets are video displayed on,IDT 19" color cathode' ray tubes (CRTs) in the CR,ithe TSC and thejE0F. This ' color video ~ . allows rapid evaluation of' plant _ parameters through the display of color coded graphics or color coded status trees (i.e., out of limit sensors or critical status tree paths that are plotted green for normal or red for a critical status). Typical variables which can be selected to review include; reactivity,' reactor core cooling and-heat removal from a primary, system, reactor coolant system integrity, and containment conditions.
The Recall microcomputer systems routinely store sensor data to a Tanberg TDC 3000 cartridge tape unit. One complete sensor set is stored on a tape cartridge every , second. Data is stored sequentially'to one of four 2.5 ' megabyte magnetic tape cartridges. After the last-cartridge is filled with sensor data, storage is directed < to the first' cartridge and data is overwritten on the tape cartridge units. Approximately eight hours of historical data is available at any time. By manually changing cartridges, data storage may also be performed continuously.
A display microcomputer system provides plant sensor information to be printed on a line printer, displayed on r
. .. ... ~ w; ~ L 'j,-' ?.: g j , , - - . , ws e - ' -[ l _ a CRT: terminal, or trend plotted on a Tektronix 4006 , s.
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- graphics. terminal with-hard copy device. For each nuclear.
- - ' " A 1 power plant t. nit (Nos. I and 2) there are 2 SPDS
computers,;2 data' handlers, 1 master receiver, and 2 displays locat.ed in-the TSC, In-addition there are 2'SPDS - , .and 1 display for each unitilocated in the EOF.
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- Data transmissions to the peripherals for the ERF micrc-computers are 9600' baud for TSC dmvices~and 1200 baud for
, EOF devices.. Reliabilit'y,of. the communications ~ using
- serial. link (RS 232C or RS 422) is.not checked'(parity or checksum tested) for all/ cases.
It is recommended that
' = the. licensee develope.a method, for, verification of. datal communication correctness..Thefdata: acquisition sub ' c ,, , system (composed.of output from signal conditioners, signal multiplexers, data handlers:-and master < receivers) " k + . ,provides cl, ass IE isolation. Fiber opticicables were' , ' *, ^ .installe'd betweenxthe remote:multiplexers and i .sub-multiplexers-(those muxes communicating.directly from > ' - . .the master; receivers). This.provides' isolation knd ' ~" prevents electromagnetic lline interference..
, f+ '. , . t Error conditions =in microcomputer sub systems are ,,
~ i '. . displayed _on the front consol'es-of ~each system. Atithe.
~ time of this ERF appraisal information on reliability for < . -ERFDS was n't-available. NUREG 0737' Supplement I requires- ' - o that safety parameter data systems operate reliably.
m NUREG 0696 states that ERF monitoring and reporting ~ - systems should shcw reliability (availability) greater - 'than or equal-to 99%. The licensee needs to evaluate'the
- - ERFDS system to demonstrate its reliability.
'.n n y " - 1.2.3' Emergency Assessment and Response System (EARS) ~ - ,, - , EARS supports the emergency radiological assessment and m ' protective. action recommendation functions assigned to the ~. f TSC."-This computer-based system'is described in the) - " ^ ' . Pacific, Gas-and Electric EARS manual (Rev. 3) dated May 1,. " .. -1985, " Emergency Assessment and Response System (EARS) and y _ . Output Tables Description", by E. C.~Shih. ' EARS consists- - of a.Hewlett Packard Model 1000. CPU. multi-tasking _ computerized system and a HR-9845 micro processor'that serves as an intelligent work station connected to the , ~ i - - HP-1000. The EARS data collection system polls P
-informational data from.the stations, the 62 in plant ' _ radiation monitors and the onsite'and offsite pressurized " ionization chambers. The data is collected every 15 + ' ' minutes, and hourly averaged data is stored into their ' < , respective yearly data bases. The HP-95 work station ~ - * microcomputers provide printed or plotted information either received.from the HP-1000 or manually entered. The ' , s HP-9845 are:UPS supplied and are viewed as critical.
+ ,. 1 components of the EARS system. The Hewlett Packard 1000, '
' is not UPS powered but has an auto restart capability , - ,
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< . after power loss. The EARS system reliability was determined to.be adequate based on discussions with the system manager.
1.2.4 Display Interface The TSC has a variety of display devices. These include , cathode ray tube (CRT) displays, status boards, textual printouts and graphic printouts.
In addition, information can be gathered from the CR by use of a closed circuit television system.
The CRT based systems include a Babcock and Wilcox supplied system for displaying plant operations data and a dose assessment system. The ERFDS system includes 2 major sub-systems, e.g. the Safety Parameter Display System and the Recall System. The 'ERFDS displays are generally p readable and understandable. However the SPDS displays L are very distracting because of the way dynamic data is updated. Each data point is updated at approximately 2 second intervals, however all data is not updated at the same 2 second intervals i.e., updates are not-simultaneous. The resulting effect is distracting, this effect makes specific data difficult to focus on and read.
The licensee should evaluate a method to improve the readability of this display if possible.
In addition, the TSC has no direct control over the SPDS displays, - they are " slaved" to the CR displays.
Since the function of the TSC is to provide a technical overview and augmentation, the staff recommends that the SPDS terminals in the TSC be provided with a control function so the TSC staff will have the' flexibility to call'up any SPDS displays they are interested.in.
By releasing the TSC terminals from the " slave" status the probability of a common mode error-(CR/TSC) may also be reduced.
The TSC contained a number of status'boardh for i-radiological status, plant conditions and sequence of events, as well as a sign ini oard and a large format b telephone list with_the number of key positions and offices. Status boards wereleasy to read for'most work stations and were considered a~dequate.
. The TSC also contains a closed circuit television system for surveillance of CR indicators and annunciators.
It consists of ten pan / tilt / zoom cameras for reading panel indications and 2 wide angle fixed cameras for an overview of the Unit 1 and 2 CRs. The output from this system is very good and should allow the TSC operations staff the ability to follow parameters that may not be displayed on the ERFDS or the SPDS systems. This system could also be utilized to confirm SPDS readings if there was some doubt about the validity of this data.
i
..- , r, ', 10' O . , , , I , The. Emergency Assessment and Response System-(EARS),. ' - z.- provides both CRT.and graphic ~hardcopy displays via ' HP-9845C terminals. ; Displays are easy to identify, read, ~ ' ' and' understand. ' User interaction is facilitated by the , - nse of programmable function keys. No areas of , , - improvement were' identified by the' appraisal staff.. . , $' - 1.2.5 ' Dose Assessment- ' '~ . . ,, - The.doseas's'es'sment'capabili[ ties'intheTSC3an,d'CRare "
- provided through an' int'egrated: computerized system of' _ software and' hardware'(EARS) and:a back'upp manual system.
T EARS:uses a computerizedfenvironmental model to calculate ' ' ' and project radiation-dosesifrom radioactive material , released in gaseous effluents.during an accident. For this calculation source terms, and meteorological ' ' information may be derived from actual monitor readings. + - J ' using an' automatic controller program (EARAUT), or may be' ' keyed manually into the program using a manual controlled , ' program (EARMAN). Doses to the whole body from plume
-
exposure,.to~the thyroid from; inhalation of radioiodines, and from ground shine resulting from the deposition of ' ' , ' " - radioparticulates are available. Doses that result.from ,
. . ingestion.of contaminated food stuffs are not available on EARS. The backup manual method is a hand calculational method that uses dedicated forms ~ to aid in the ' ~# - calculation. Additionally dose calculations may be based - on samples taken by licensee teams in the field which can ' be quickly dispatched. For purposes of evaluating. ,_, ~ monitoring team data, a mobile van' equipped with a Nuclear e m ^ Data-ND-66'NAI and intrinsic GE-LI detectors is available.
- . - ' Also,Lthere are 9 permanent' airborne particulate and - . iodine.e'nvironmental monitors, 35 TLDs a'nd 12 PICS available in the field to measure environmental radiation.
,. ,p 1.2.5.1 Source Term The descriptive variables and calculational 'r - methods used at DCPP are adequate to determine - sourcesterm from potential leakage pathways.
, Additional-source term information and
calculations are described in plant procedures ' EP-RB-9,1" Calculation of Release Rate and a- < < Integrated Release,".and RB-12, "Mid and-High Range Plant Vent Radiation Monitors". Core-damage assessment is described in EP-RB-14, ' , " Core Damage. Assessment Procedure". This- _ procedure allows a calculated comparison of core ' damage based on default source terms for core damage in excess of design-based accidents to- ,. measure data from plant instrumentation.
L ~ The EARS-in the automatic or manual mode is the . primary means for. determining source terms, with h , f 7 A w ' r l-g ; - - l
- +.
. 1; f, ~,j 7 - " _ - . - ' Q . + U g ,= 74, , ,_ _ '3.~, ..
' ,~11,; i ! 6*,, - ' q.
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y - > i " 7, , . . ~. " ,y;>-
- .
' , , _ K 't - ,:N m, the ma'nusl calculation method prescribed in'RB-9- ' y , ' ? '. - - 'used'when'the automatic and manual methods are , t " ~.not available ,,, r , - 'Both EARS'and RB-9 consider 13 mini-scenarios +,- for source term determination.
In RB-9-these.
C scenario's. represent)thevariouspostulated: . , , " accidents that have b'een analyzed in the FSAR,. " - and are addressed i.n a_ series of summary sheets ^ with-both the " design basis" and the " expected" . case variables which were assumed in the'FSAR analysis-being considered.
- ' ' ~ ,. , O " ' The procedure (RB-9) considers three' basic , - , s release paths: (1) Plant Vent,1(2) Steam
- ^ Dump / Safety Release Valves, and-(3) Containment.
. The procedure is sectioned as follows: , ~ (1)- ^ pH ' noble gas and iodine release rate determination.
' / using plant. radiation monitor's (form 69-6920);. (2) noble; gas, iodine and particulate release + ' rate determination for a-steam generator: tube' , rupture'(Form 69-11105); and (3) noble gas and
- , iodine _ release rate-determination based on - - containment high range monitor indication (Form.
- m _ -69-10555).
Various effluent monitors and.. flow meters are ' utilized as inputs to EARS and manual i- ' computations. These are summarized by_ location ,. on Attachment B:to this report.- ' ". " Additionally the Fuel' Handling' Building contains 2 Area Radiation Monitors 5(ARMS), 1.(channel no'. - ,
- 1 58) is for the new fuel, area'and 1 '(channel no.
' ~ 59) is for:the. spent fuel pool area.. Both have re'adouts located in the'CR, but nowhere else.
~ There.is no separate; flow indicator for the fuel ' handling building exhaust flow. ' Exhaust enters. the main plant vent ~where it is monitored for' activity and the total' flow;is measured after mix,ing with other exhaust flows. Specific: exhaust flow from the fuel handling building is -
estimated based on!which of the three building;
- p,
, " vent fans-is in operation, each fan having a . . total rated capacity of 35,750 standard cubic , tw _ feet per minute.
- P, ' - There are 12 pressurized ion chambers _(PICS) ' located onsite and_in the outlying landward " . < m sectors,-locations being keyed to population- , I density. These PICS normally read into EARS.
. In.the event of a problem with EARS, they may be
- ; ' = read _ locally by the field monitoring teams and l." ths information relayed by phone or radio, .. o
- r
- '
A*. - >, , ^ ,,, _ - { - - - a
. _g - - , , , , p'. m - - > - .
- p ;
, , 12'. - - < < , , Wu ' a , ' gn,% ; , e ' ~ 1, ., s - - n -
- Alternatively the PIC input signals' to EARS. can
- " " be: redirected (by wiring. jumpers) to another HP-1000 computer if such'is available. For ' .. 2 computational purposes ~a containment leakage rate of approximately 1.8,cfm (0.1% of total s ~ ', ~ containment free ~ volume for 24 hours) were'- ' ' assumed the first day (FSAR design basis-; ., - _ > A, accident).and reducing to 0.05% of total' containment free volume for 24 hours thereafter.
' '
- Procedures provide for using'the best available
_ ^ information in lieu of default values, should current information be available.
> e t i
- It was.noted'in.pr'ocedure RB-9, Form 69-11105,> ~f'
page 2 of.5, that'the^ equation for converting - '
- -
t,' steam flow in lbs/ hour to cc/sec contains a ~ conversion' factor (3.3) but does not specify the-k pressure-or.jteam density at which the factor-is , - correct..An engineering calculation identified' - ' the factor'as-being the. steam pressure ,> - . corresponding to.the steam?pressur.e relief valve . / v setting. This is also p'rovided in procedure R-2 where 'a; similar' eqiiation is used; Similarly, , ".. , . ' '
- the engineering basis is,not'provided. It is-
.?- - > re' commended' that this press'ure. information be . added,to?the, procedures. The'13' mini scenarios ' < -,,, ? used;in EARS and+in:the summary sheets for s _ . manual calculations also do'notiextend to low - ~ ' - probability, high risk accidents ^such as 100% fuel melt..-It.is recommended thatJthe inclusion s of such a'dditional scenarios.be considered.
It- ~ ~ ' , - is further recommended'that consideration be' . given to hard wiring of PIC input to EARS' Es .."' J^ through a switch which is in turn hard wired to-v . 1 or more HP-1000, computers. This would allow a . ' ^ timely shiftsto a. backup computer for readout in , ~
. the event that the normalaEARS computer is down. c - , ~ It is recognized'that the flexibility to be " "a gained from such a change may be only minimally cost effective.
- ~ > , y, lg ; .q - . Fuel damage assessments are made using EP-RB-14,- ' , , Core Damage:. Assessment; Procedure, as a ' reference. This procedure providesJthe .c6- = b s., methodology to determine the extent of core' > ,~ . N ' \\ damage that may have resulted from an accident.
, .
- The pro ~cedure provides methods ~that divide the-,
+- classification of: fuel damage'into categories of t ,, 1) no. fuel damage, 2) fuel cladding. damage, 3) -
- $
, ' ' fuel overheat, and 4) fuel melt. For the last' three categories the, procedure permits a rough
"# ' ~' . estimate.of= damage as;a proportion of core =radionuclide inventories'that have been released . -c- ~ -to the reactor coolant or containment ' y ' . j _ - 1J \\_ .
- -
- '_. W , . ,
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f
. . ., , ,
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atmosphere. The-preliminary assessment relies 4; - , on plant parameters and containment. parameters > ,
_ to quantify the' damage. The long. term j' ' ' ' l assessment dependsupon the availability of f_ ' coolant and containment air samples. A method > of_ comparing expected versus measured results is < , - _ provided.. ' ' Source terms may also.be determined in:the event- . s ofbuildingeffluentmonitor.failurel#from. grab . sarples of the gaseous effluent' streams.
s Constituent radio'uclide determination of these- -H ,
n ~ _. ' . samples may be performed either in plant or_at.
, , ' the TSC counting lab using an Intrinsic . Germanium, Detector and'a gamma sp'ectrometer.
o , . .This system' identifies' gamma. peaks in the 40 key
- to'2.Mev range with'high resolution) Coupling these radionuclide3concent' rations with the
~ building ventilation flow rates'-the source term , may..,beicomputed. ' i - , , - 1.2.5.2' Meteorology, ~ ' a '#.., ' .The-meteorological information directly'- ~ , accessible to the TSC is either-from _the primary ~ ' or backup meteorological towers. From the primary towerydata is recorded on wind direction- . and' speed at 10 and 76 m'ter levels; vertical e i s temperature difference between-10 and 46 meter 4- =- levels and between 10-and 76 meter levels; sigma ' - , theta at 10 and 76 meter levels; temperature at ' the 10 eeter level;.and-precipitation.near m- _ ground level. On the backup tower, data,is ~; , recorded on wind direction and speed-at 10 and 60 meter levels, vertical; temperature' difference recorded between the 10:and 60 meter' levels; j , sigma _ theta at-the 10'and_60 meter levels; temperature at the 10fmeter level'and. , i precipitation near'~ ground. level. In'the, event' that neither. the primary nor'the backup data are accessible or" operable, a portable: mast with sensors to measure wind direction, wind speed , and; temperature will be placed-in service. - Also ,l . + , _ nearby weather information can;be obtained ' from - t - the-National Weather Service.at either Redwood' ~ , ' City or Los Angeles.
' ' _ Meteorological data acquisition in the TSC is , available from a printer which displays.15' + . minute averages of meteorological data for -
- either.of the towers, primary or backup,
' selected from the CR or from EARS.
, ,
. - + r . i ' .. ,' !D f '
, . ,
m-r---+e e T e-%-= , , ,e----- r- , =s. -, J +,- < -,y 'F
.wv-v- p yre t-y w --1-
- r
-.' y T- -, ,-
.-
, i EARS uses a variable trajectory segmented Gaussian plume model for a ground level release with data based on meteorological measurements at one of the tower locations. The plume model does not incorporate terrain affected air flow regimens but does include temporal variations in plume position. Together the meteorological variables and calculational methods do not provide an adequate characterization of the dispersion of effluents to a distance of at least ten miles from the plant during a southwesterly wind condition. During this condition the model would predict plume transport directly across the mountains northwest of the plants, whereas the actual t.,ansport is likely to be up or down the coast.
The licensee has collected good quality onsite meteorogical data with better than 90% joint recovery of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature gradient with heighth (as a measure of atmospheric stability). However, the licensee has not demonstrated the reliability of the delivery of this data to the ERFs.
1.2.5.3 Computerized Dose Assessment EARS has the capability to estimate and project doses and dose rates at up to 6 fixed distances, plus the end point oftthe plume travel in the direction of plume travel. Additionally calculations will be made at receptor locations programmed in the data file that lie within the . radial distance equivalent to plume travel distance.. EARS will calculate whole body and thyroid doses and dose rates from submersion in a radioactive gas cloud, and-whole body exposure from groun'd deposition of' particulate radionuclides. The-calculations made at ~ receptor locations are compared to plant protective action guides and the appropriate action (e.g., evacuation, sheltering, etc.) and the basis for such actions are written into the record. All releases are appropriately treated as ground level releases. The EARS program is capable of providing calculations within a 15 minute time interval. To aid in determining the extent and range of potential exposure, EARS i . presents the results of the plume travel calculation in the. form of a plume overlay on a computerized map of the plant site for either a ten or a fifty mile radius. To calculate doses, . EARS uses a library of 23 noble gasses, radioiodines, and radioparticulates.
Source terms are provided either by direct effluent J
s - -y ~ , - , ,i , 15: - ' ' '
. - - , ' t, - , ' sa ionitor readings, by specification of one of the
' FSAR des'ign basis type accidents,' or by manual ~ ~ input of source terms. Similarly meteorological ,i, data is<provided by monitors or manual input.
- < ' ,
-,: , ,, . _ > ~ -EARS,has'been;valida'te'd in a two phase program.
^ - Phase! number oneyidentified problems and " p'.Limprovements'that would'be'made to the-EARSprohram.
- ' ' ( ichanges'.4 During;the' appraisal an' independent, ' 'j{ Hpartialvalidationwasperformedon; EARS.
Calculations in EARS. tended.to overestimate m ' , _ whole body. dose's'because of the models used.
~ EARStassumes a semi-infinite.' cloud of gas rather than one of finite' dimensions. EARS ' calculations o'n' thyroid doses is more exact.
- Some differences also exist in the mix of.
' radionuclides between EARS and the appraisal - . validation tool, however, the uncertainty;in ' ' ' ^ - ~ these dose estimates will be appropriately, _ factored into decision making. An independent, comparison of the dispersion portion of the EARS' model to a standard model is being made.
Personnel:in the EOFs' Unified Dose Assessment- . Center (UDAC) have the primary l responsibility . R
- for using field monitoring data to refine previous dose projections. 'This data may also i
~ 1 be used to calculate potential < doses from the ' ingestion of contaminated food stuffs. However, EARS does not compute ingestion doses.
Instead, ' ._, EARS computes exposure to ground deposition.
The. dose rates from' exposure to contaminated - ground can'be used to deploy radiological . _ I . monitoring teams.
It is recommended that'a - , routine be developed and incorporated into EARS < + A c- - to calculate the doses that would be received i from the' ingestion of contaminated foo'd H - ' products.
r . . , 1.2.6 Conclusion , , Based on the findings in.Section 1.2, this portion of the' u M; . licensee's program meets the requirements in Supplement 1 , - ' 'to-NUREG-073). However, the following items require . . licensee action and will be classified as "open'.' items - L ' ' ^ which will be tracked.by the Region.
. _ a) LTheEmergencyResponseFacilityDataSystemshouldbe ' $. ~ ~ ' H evaluated to assure that the SPDS' operates reliably < ' .to meet the-intent of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
~ p - NUREG 0696 states-that Emergency Response Facility l '. monitoring and reporting equipment should show a
.
i jM g^ z
3
- En ri '
7 _. - -- , _ . ' ,
. ' , a reliability greater than or equal'to ninety nine percent.
(85-24-02) b) Provide the TSC SPDS system with a control function.
(85-24-03) c) Verify the reliability (availability) to deliver meteorological data to the ERFs from the onsite meteorological monitoring systems.
(85-24-04) The following items are suggested for improving the program: 1) Develop a method to verify the correctness of data transmissions for the ERF microcomputers.
2) Improve the readability of the SPDS displays by ' minimizing the distractions due to data changes.
3) Modify procedure RB-9 to incorporate the appropriate pressure or steam density basis for-a-steam flow conversion factor from lbs/ hour to cc/sec.
4) Modify EARS to incorporate low probability severe accident source terms and the calculation-for doses received from the ingestion of contaminated food products.
5) Consider'hardwiring the PICS to EARS to ensure a timely shift to backup computers for readout should the normal EARS computer fail.
6) Vertical temperature differences from the primary meteorological tower are determined by subtracting one temperature from the other, rather than the more common practice, which is used on the backup tower, of measuring differences in resistance temperature detector outputs directly and then converting this output to a temperature difference. A justification is needed.to demonstrate conformance of these primary tower measurements with the accuracy criteria contained in RG 1.97, Rev. 3 or a modification to the system should be made.
7) Consider the inclusion of spatial distributions of airflow within 10 miles of the plant in the EARS model.
< .- -
_ "17
. - < s 1.3 Functional Capability-1.3.1 Operations and Control Room Support ' , The. functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by presenting a NRC developed accident scenario to key members of the licensee's staff normally assigned to the facility during an emergency. Licensee personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by describing , their actions and how the equipment and supplies available in the TSC would be used. The evaluation showed that the TSC would be adequately staffed and capable of performing the assigned functions. According to emergency procedure EF-1, Revision 5, " Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center", the TSC is considered ready for activation when staffed to " acceptable minimum levels".
Specific emergency response personnel have not-been identified. The appraisal staff discussed,this matter with the Plant Manager and.were informed.that the TSC would not be formally activated until emergency-response personnel covering all of the major functional areas were present.
It was,also' observed during the walkthroughs that although a dedicate'd'Eommunicator_was used between s the CR and the,TSC,' an open. communications line was not maintained'. A ringdown circuit was used which allows for ~ rapid communications but results in constant ringing of the telephone at both stations. =A review of. exercise ~ ~ comments from the 1984 Emergency Preparedness Exercise indicated that the ringdown circuit'resulted-in 20 to 25 ' ringdowns which posed a distraction both'in the TSC and the CR.
It is recommended ~that an'open line (preferably ~ headsets) be considered to reduce noise level and distractions'during an emergency.
The CR acting as the main switchboard for the station during off hours was also discussed during walkthroughs.
This, according to emergency planning personnel, would continue in an emergency until.the TSC was activated and the offsite calls could be directed to TSC and handled by the Emergency Liaison Coordinator.. Adequate manning by Shift Clerks would prevent licensed operators from being distracted by outside calls during an emergency, however, CR tasking during an emergency should not include handling routine calls from outside the station.
The responsibilities for dose projections / assessments and protective action recommendations are transferred _to the EOF after the interim EOF staff (plant personnel) had been relieved by the long term Corporate Emergency Response Organization (CERP). The TSC recains the responsibility to make offsite notifications, however periodic updates to the county will be made from the EOF after it has been activated.
. N u
-- ,,, c,, - - _ , r4 m+ s . 18-Q, g. _ e y. ' ,
- ,.
- '. The TSC is provided with' a' dediated ring-down line.
' , ' - ~ < - g - -betweenlthe-TSC and the CR, the OSC, and the' EOF.
It.is a
- ~~
designated,' identifiable phone' and -ito use should-assure.
, - , [ - - that adequate-ccumunications:will be maintained.
.. , .3 - '1.3.2 Conclusion ' ' Based on,these findings this portion of the31icensee's x> program meets the' requirements of. supplement'Isto NUREG ' 0737. The following~ items - are suggested <for ' improving the
, , program.
_
. t .Y - 1) Considerusinganop'enline_(preferabihheadsets) between the CR and TSC >to reduce noise: levels and ' ' , p distractions duringan emergency.* ' 2)' Cons'ider Eemoving t6e CR from the' flow'of routine phone calls :(acting as 'a; switchboard) for the ~ station.
. y Lf - .during off hours.
.<2 . m - ' 2.0: Operational Support Center (OSC),- ' , , 2.'1 Physical Facilities _ ' ' - -211.1-Design Loca' tion and Habitability 'The: Operational SupportuCenter (OSC) consists-of the ' , , Chemistry and Radiation. Protection Access ~ Control and.the - . cold machine shop areas,'iiicluding the locker room an'd ' break room, and is located on the plant'85' elevation ' entrance to the Auxillary. Building.' During; normal. work- _ hour emergencies,' requiring OSC activation, personnel'not ~ engaged in the emergency would report to pre-assigned-assembly locations in accordance.with emergency procedure.
G-4, " Personnel Accountability and Assembly". Personnel . , - it designated for immediate response will report to the OSC.
' During off hours personnel would either be~ directed-to - . report to the~OSC or, if not(given'a specific'eme~rgency - ' , response location, would initially report to the Security Building lunch room for further instructions.- .The OSC does=not have any special shielding or ventilation ~ systems for minimizing radiation exposure, consequently,
- personnel in thisiarea may be evacuated under certain-
' conditions. Should evacuation become necessary, personnel required-for emergency response.would,be relocated to a " safe" area such as-the counting area in the TSC where " ' they could perform their emergency functions. Pers'onnel ' not immediately necessary to the emergency response.
function'may be relocated offsite'to other areas such as the PG&E Information Center.
_ The size 1.and layout of the-0SC appeared adequate as an assembly ~ point for plant operation support personnel. The' rn7s.
-_ _ p.
>
. , nearby areas will provide temporary space during accountibility activities. The OSC layout has a designated staging area for operations personnel briefing and. dispatch. Prior to performing their tasks, operation teams would dress up, receive dosimetry at access control and then report to the access control hallway _for a briefing by the OSC Supervisor. The access control hallway contained status boards and plant drawings that showed radiation exposure levels for certain areas of the plant. These drawings would be useful and could provide an emergency team with information on radiation levels that may be encountered, and help with finding the safest route to their objective.
In addition there are numerous other status boards which contain information on emergency team status, plant status, survey results, and personnel location. During a tour of the cold machine shop area, no emergency lighting fixtures were observed. Although there was an adequate supply of flashlights and hand held lanterns available for use in the cold machine shop, it is recommended that the licensee consider the installation of a few well placed DC powered spotlights to provide lighting until hand held lanterns and flashlights can be distributed. The emergency lighting in the access control portion.of the OSC appeared adequate.
2.1.2 Equipment and Supplies The OSC does not maintain separate supply lockers that are reserved solely for emergency use but relies on the proximity to the access control and the cold machine shop ' to provide *n_ecessary~ supplies..The access control portion of the OSC contains an adequate' supply of respiratory protection equipment,' protective clothing, potassium iodide, radiation monitoring instruments, personnel' dosimetry and other supplies available.for emergency use, because ~ the area is normally used for staging area for entry into the radiologically controlled' area of the plant. -The radiological equipment.available provides a capability to measure anticipated dose rates under accident conditions and levels.of contamination as well as collect samplesiof.. airborne activity..First aid and decontamination supplies'are also located in this area.
The cold machine shop houses a tool crib that should be sufficient to support anticipated OSC functions. The hot machine shop has an additional supply of resources that could be accessed in an emergency.
Support supplies, i.e., paper, pencils, markers, flashlights, etc., may be ' more appropriately set aside.in an " emergency use only" locker in the OSC to insure that they are available when needed. Although it is probable that such material can be located in surrounding offices, the initial stages of an emergency when timely response is needed may not be the proper time to dispatch manpower to locate such support supplies.
m-_ _
n- - .. , -
. 2.1.3 Communications The communication systems existing in the OSC have been addressed in Section 1.1.3 above. The_ appraisal staff verified that communication capabilities were as described-in the licensee's Emergency Plan. This appraisal disclosed that. radios will no longer be used as the primary communication link by plant emergency teams. This matter has also been addressed in Section 1.1.3.
2.1.4 Functional Capability The functional capability of the OSC was evaluated by presenting an NRC developed accident. scenario to key members of the licensee's staff normally assigned to the facility during an emergency. Licensee personnel responded to the postulated circumstances by describing the actions that would be taken and demonstrating how equipment and supplies available in the OSC would be used.
From this evaluation it appeared that the OSC would be adequately staffed and capable of performing its assigned function. The ability of the OSC to interface with all onsite activities in performing its function appeared adequate.
However, it was noted during the walkthroughs-and procedural reviews that the staffing necessary to support the declaration of OSC activation was not defined in procedures.
Interviews indicated that at least one OSC Supervisor and an Emergency Maintenance Coordinator felt that the OSC was operational when communications were established, even though the OSC.was not yet capable of providing a maintenance or repair-team to support the emergency.
It is recommended that minimum staffing requirements be determined and'proceduralized to meet the requirement that the OSC be capable of providing support when activated.
In addition, the licensee should consider placing the OSC supervisor in the conference room located upstairs in the cold machine shop. This would relieve the congestion observed in the OSC supervisor's office and provide some space for reviewing plant dravings.
2.1.5-Conclusion Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement 1-to NUREG-0737. However, the following items are suggested for improving the program: 1) Proceduralize minimum staffing requirements for activation of the OSC.
2) Install DC powered emergency lighting in the cold machine shop are,. , , -. . ' " ~. 421 p.
- , ,;r
- ( ' 3) . Set,aside an. area for dedicated emergency support p . supplies.
> p, = 4)' -Station the OSC Supervisor ~in the conference room i , _ ' located upstairs in the cold machine shop.
~ L3.0_'~ Emergency Operations Facility'(EOF)- ' p.
. .. . . . J3.1 Physical Facilities ~
1-f L . .DesignLocationandHabitibiliEy 3.1.1 l.
j, , ' The EOF is a 2 story building of approximately 14,000 ~ . ' . square. feet _co-located with the county Emergency, ' ' y Operations Center.,The' EOF is located 11.7 miles-northeast of' thje Diablo Canyon Power Pla'nt/ '.The -EOF s y occupies the second floor or chat' structure and the county !- y'~ , ~ -Emergency Operation CenteE is' loca,te'd on;the;first floor.,, , L ' The structure was built in accordance with the State ofJ ' ' [1 California unifo'rm building'4 code and'was designed to ' ' <
accommodate 114 Te'ople P The area' design $te'd as.the EOF '
L comprises approximately 3,000 square-feet-of usable space, ' h which appearsito be mor&7th'in'adeq' ate to! accommodate,thec
u 25 to 50 PG&E! staff e'xpectedit'o man,theLEOF.- The layout 'of the EOF appears adequate to" facilitate: communication.
. , , p>-n,^w . and traffic flowl The Recovery; Manager's, office is such.
V ' that he is centrally. located'inLthe EOF to; facilitate t < , [
necessary communication' flow G This centr' ally \\ located - > ' position also provides for good-vidual contact to' improve , the coordination of radiological ~and environmental - " x u assessments for the determination of protective -action. ' ' ' recommendations.. In addition', an open balcony provides the capability for direct visual and voice contact'with-F c;, - the state and county. ' Because the location of the EOF isJ E ,, " '. ~ 11.7 miles ' com,the site, there' are 'no special:. '
requiremen.t for. habitability,or'for'a backup EOF.
p ,. 7; . h ' ' . .. . ' ' - 43.1.2. ~ Equipment and Supplies - - v . The EOF is.more.tha'n adequately equipped,to perform _its 2~ > . ,~ ~
- intended function.
Inventory procedures and methods ate (as described for'the TSC and appear to be adequate to , ' ' (maintain ~ support equipment and supplies for the EOF at
, _ < required levels.' Records and drawings are similar to the
-2 " TSC and are' discussed in Section 1.1.2. ' Backup.
' engineering and technical support-for the TSC and CR'that ' ' ' . would require extensive plant drawings and records,iwould !. n? - be readily available. from the PG&E Corporate offices 'in ~ fi _ s San Francisco. 'Should reactor technical support be.- g - required:inl excess of support available in the TSC, the PG&E Corporate engineering groups would be utilized.
if~ Communication links and hard copy transfer capa_bilities . I e- ' !. ~ exist to transfer ~needed records and-drawings between the'
- Q
'm TSC, EOF'and the Corporate Offices.
. ,. &- i~ .. ' +,,.. [. . ' ~ . . <.. t
-.. Y
. Radiological equipment located at the EOF included, an Eberline E-140 survey meter equipped with an HP-210 probe, an Engler air sampler with a supply of cartridges, and a-(PIC) pressurized ion chamber-located directly outside the building tied into the EARS system. The monitoring equipment was observed to be operable and within calibration. -This equipment should be~ adequate to measure contamination levels and to check the habitability of the EOF.
3.1.3 CommunicationandTranspor$ation The Emergency Operations Facility-utilizes-the same communication systems previously discussed in Section 1.1.3 above. However, notification of tthe Corporate Emergency Response Organization is notl accomplished using the normal emergency response notific' tion system (RANS).
a At the " unusual-event" classification, the individual-designated as the Recovery'Mana'ger is notified via telephone or pager, however, the corporate staff does not ~ respond to the EOF un'til;the " alert" classification.
Transportation options available to the corporate staff include charter plane, company owned planes and automobile.
In addition the licensee has signed contracts with carriers at airports in the Oakland, San Francisco, and Concord areas to charter individuals to the San Luis Obispo Airport.
3.1.4 Power Supply . The EOF has normal and emergency power supplying all vital functions in the building. The first floor of the building is dedicated to county use and serves as the 911 emergency dispatch area, County Sheriff's Watch Commanders-office, County Command and Control Center for non-nuclear emergencies, and other uses. The second floor of the building is the EOF.
In case of a primary power supply failure, the building is equipped with a 100 KW diesel generator with a 1000 gallon (5 day) fuel supply based on full load operation. The diesel ~ fuel tank is located underground with a locked fill connection. The diesel control panel is also locked to prevent tampering. The diesel is equipped with an automatic start and automatic transfer feature which makes manual action on a loss of power unnecessary. lhe diesel start feature is powered from batteries. The building has a separate battery room and an installed uninterruptible power supply which supplies vital equipment in the event of normal and diesel power supply-failures. The systems supplied by the backup batteries and uninterruptible power supply are the 911 Dispatch Center, EARS, ERFDS, and SPDS systems.
All duplex outlets in the EOF are coded as to the power source feeding them. White (Ivory) outlets are normal
fs, o- - i; 23-
- L
. ' . a - , y ' ' , power,? red ~ outlets:will have' diesel backup upon a loss ofL
power, orange outlets.are powered from the'uninterruptible , ? power supply / batteries with a normal building ground,_and
yellow outlets are powered from the uninterruptible power , ~ ' . supply / batteries with'a. separate earth ground. The-latter ' ~ f this; group is used for computer applications to reduce o ' '" _ ..the possibility'of stray signals / spikes causing a loss of.
' data..All equipment in the EOF was checked to verify'it , " " _ was powered from appropriate sources.
Lighting power panels were ' checked to. determine sources of ^ ' power to' overhead lighting. ' The building is split with ~ 'one-half the lighting in any given space being fed from a different power panel. '.NRC inspectors; observed the . de tripping of selected breakers to verify wiring and
emergency lighting to' critical" areas within the EOF.
o-
The diesel' preventive maintenance program and records were ~ ' ' examined. The starting of the diesel was observed. The ' battery room and uninterruptible power supply was
- ^
, inspected. -Adequate spare parts for the uninterruptible.
. - , , .. power supply were on hand _with PG&E'and contractor support.
-available for emergency maintenance. Based on records, -- ' ' < . documentation reviews, and observations, the building ' , fr! ' - power system.and maintenance program appear to be adequate - ' ' ', +to support' a highly. reliable power source during normal. ' At and emergency. operations.
- During walkthrougss~ to determine'which outlets vital
- -
s , equipment was being; supplied'from, it wasEnoted that the particular plugsifrom various, equipment were not marked as g g g, - to which outlets ((red, white';? yellow,; orange)'the_. ' - equipment should be plugged into.
It;was recommended that , equipment be' marked.with,a, tag or a*like color- ' ' ~ i identification to-insure that the? equipment was not ' unplugged and plugged b'ack into the'wrongioutlet, during ievolution's such as cleaningPwhere: janitorial ~ personnel- - <. - might be' unplugging and plugging in va'cuum cleaners ' Lthroughoutfthebuilding'. s ' , ~ + s \\ /3.1.5 Conclusion.
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- Based on the above findings this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements ~of Supplement 1 to NUREG ' 0737.
i - , The.following item is suggested-for improving the program.
i -- _ 1) 1 Consider tagging equipment to indicate which type jy - - ' --(color) of power outlet is used.
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- , 3.2 Information Management-
3.2.1 Variables and Parameters The EOF has the same level of support with respect to RG 1.97 variables'as the TSC with most variables being available except as noted in section l'.2.1 above.
It is also noted that the EOF.SPDS~has more flexibility than the
TSC SPDS in that fixed screens'can be independently selected from the EOF with no' effect on the TSC or CR SPDS screens.
Other information available to support the EOF is essentially.the same as described for the TSC and is adequate to support the EOF function. The communication system and data. transfer methods would allow adequate coordination and interfacing with respect to data transfer.
3.2.2 Information Systems The EOF includes display devices similar to those used in the TSC i.e., ERFDS terminals, EARS terminals, status boards, and textual and graphic computer printouts. The EOF does not contain a closed circuit television system for CR surveillance. The EOF does have some additional hard copy capability not available to the TSC e.g., a panafax copier and several xerographic copiers.
Status boards in the EOF are consistent with those used in the TSC. Site maps and overlays are also consistent with those in the TSC. All are easy to read and understand.
3.2.3 Dose Assessment All of the dose assessment capabilities that are available in the TSC are also available in the EOF through the EARS computer capabilities.
Since personnel in the Unified Dose Assessment Center (which' includes representatives from state and local government agencies) use'the same model that the TSC uses, the licensee's model is.
consistent with that used by offsite authorities. The EOF-will be staffed with both Corporate and National Weather Service meteorologists.
In addition to the capabilities .. at the TSC, radiological services and information are available such as, wind profiles from doppler acoustic sounders, meteorological forecasts, and the capability to make adjustments to EARS dose projections. The UDAC also performs a manual calculation of dose rates for comparison with the results of the-EARS computerized calculation.
This is the only instance of manual data processing expected to be done at the EOF. This cross check should provide some assurance and reliability of results.
The EARS data acquisition and dose projection system plus the availability of additional meteorological data, and the presence of two meteorologists in the EOF, appear to [1
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- provide the maximum' capability,for meteorological ~ evaluations. required for dos'e-assessment and' prote.ctive , ',
- actfon decisionmaking..In addition'the EOF is backed up
- .. . by a staff meteorologist at the PG&E Corporate office.
'
- r
. "4 Suggested. areas for improvementrare the same as'those 7' ' . stated in Section 1.2.
e . s ' - - 3.2.4 ' Conclusion v -. <
..
_ Based'on the above findings, this portion of the 11icensee's. program meets the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
< '3!3 Function Capability
- '
a, .. - 3.3.1 Technical-and Logistical Support ' ' -Offsite vendor contracts to provide. reactor technical support were available. Notification. procedures included ~ , INPO as required notification, which would provide'an ' additional' source of technical support. Support agreements for medical, fire. protection, laboratory, g lodging,. meals, and other logistic issues associated with d responding to both short term and'long term. requirements ! < ' . '. were in place where needed. The extent of the utility !. integration with state and county agencies in the "3 ' . operation of the, EOF and the. response to emergencies.
,- , provides for excellent coordination.and the ability-to . acquire'additionaltsupport-in a' timely' manner. Having:the'
~ EOF asia shared facility with'the county. Sheriff's Department:and 911;dispat'cher located on the11st floor - facilitates the transfer of personnel,' equipment, and __ supplie's-during emergency' conditions.
. 3.3.2 Staffing and Capabilities - .An NRC developed scenario and walkthroughs were used to '
- determine.how the EOF would function during emergency.
~ w . ' ,~ ' . conditions. 'The availability and locations of key, , equipment, procedures, supplies, and other necessary.
" > , -material were pointed out by plant personnel which- . , .' ~ facilitated later discussions between inspectors and; plant
' personne1'in specific' appraisal areas.
Individuals'in the., ., / ' ,, EOF responded to the postulated' circumstances'by '-
a ;. 9 describing.the actions that would be taken and by
' n , demonstrating how-equipment and supplies in the E0F would ( ' ~ ~ ' ~ s ' 'be'used.
The evaluation showed that the EOF would'be' ~ adeguately staffed a'nd capable of pe'rforming:its a'ssigned e s functions. lIn additionJthere appeared to be an excellent!- interface between PG&E and county and state.p'ersonnel:in- < . , .O.F, 'the formulation of airenvironmental _ monitoring' program and ~ ' - ! , protective action decisionmaking.
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< - ... s 3.3.3 - Conclusion Based on the above findings this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
4.0" Exit Interview , - On June 7,1985 an exit interview was held with the licensee for the psrpose of' discussing the preliminary findings.of the appraisal. Those: licensee' personnel ~who attended the meeting have been identified in Attachment A to this report.
In addition to the NRC team leader and the appraisal team,~the' exit interview was attended by Mr. R. Van Neil, -Section Chief, Emergency. Preparedness,. Headquarters, and Mr. M..Mendonca, -Senior Resident Inspector. 'The 41icensee',was informed.that-no'significant, i1 deficiencies or violations of NRC; requirements were identified during appraisal. Th'e ' licensee was ~also informed that ainumber of ?"open items" were identified during the appraisal and these. items would be tracked to
- their final resolution through.the_ normal _ inspection process. The-following items were specifically addressed ~at,the exit interview,
/,. - , ~ i 'The licensee has not evaluated.thefreliability,'of the SPDS system to a.
meet the intent of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.; , , . - . ' b ~. LThe licensee needs to'evalu' ate the model used for_ dose as'sessment and incorporate the results of terrainithat may effect this model.
In addition there' has been no' evaluation p,erformed -on the-reliability of meteorological data., transferred from the base of the > w tower to the CR.
. c.
- The licensee needs to examine their emergency kits. The kits observed in the training building required _two-battery powered air a
' samplers (according to procedure,EF-5);:however, the inspection revealed 1 battery powered air sampler with aidead battery and one other air sampler that was DC powered but without battery.
The NRC team leader also informed the licensee that recommendations for , improving specific areas addressed during the appraisal were identified and would be documented in the appraisal report.
, ~ ~ ~ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ...
. - Attachment A Persons contacted
- R. Thornberry, Plant Manager
- W. Fujimoto, Supervising Nuclear Engineer
'*J. Boots, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Manager
- R. Powers, Senior Chem Radiation Engineer
~
- E. Kendall, Nuclear Generation Engineer
- W. Kelly, Regulatory Compliance
'
- R. Garalli, Senior Systems Analyst
.
- W. Keyworth, Senior Power Production Engineer
,
- C Cox, Emergency Planning Engineer
-
- G. Johnson, Computer Engineering
, ,
- M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager
- T. Martin, Training Manager
- A. Dame, Senior Instructor
- S. Joiner, Emergency Planner
.
- J.
Gilfore, Training Instructor
- T. Mack, Senior Nuclear Engineer C. Meyers, Records Analyst L. Womack, Engineering Manager J. Molden, Operations Training Supervisor f
R. Garacci, Senior Chem and Radiation Protection Systems Analyst L D. Unger, Chem and Rad Protection Engineer R. Fisher, Senior Power Production Engineer (Operations)
R. Nanniga, Senior Power Production Engineer (Maintenance) ' P. Steiner, Nuclear Generation Engineer, Emergency Planning E. Kendle, Nuclear Generation Engineer, Licensing D. Oatley, Senior Engineer-, Nuclear Operations Support n J. Townsend, Assistant Plant Superintendent P. Beckham, Nuclear Generation Engineer P. Steiner,' Emergency Planning Engineer
- R. Thuillier, Meteorologist
- E. Waage, Nuclear Generation Engineer L
P.-Girard, Emergency Planning D. Duke, Engineer,' Nuclear Operations Support H. Shaw, Engineer, Mechanical and Nuclear Tr.5,ineering B. Peterson, I&C Engineer D. Bauer, Electrical Engineer G. Zocker, Electrical Engineer R. Kohout, Emergency Services Superv isor D. Micklush, Maintenance Manager
- W. Ryan, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- Denotes persons present at the exit interview.
s l l s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ ___ -
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Attachment B 1,
' Number:of Monitors Type of Monitors' Monitor Identification Number ^ ^Containmentc-
Area Monitors (low) R02
'
Air Particulate Monitor R11; ' l'
- Radioactive gas Monitor.
R12 '
. Area Radiation Monitor.
R30/31 (Hi Range) -1.
Purge Air.Exh. Flow Monitor FT700 . Plant' Vent-
Radioactive Gas Monitors R14(A/B) h , - 2 Iodine Monitors R24/32 2-Particulate Monitors R28(A/B).
High Radiation Gross Gamma R29
" Monitor . 1-Noble' Gas Monitor 'R33 - 1 ALARA Monitor.
R34 1-Iodine Grab Sample 1and ALARA R35 Monitor
Flow Monitor FM12 Steam System .
Noble Gas Monitors .R-71~, 72, 73,~74 (one each steam line)_ s- ,
Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, RIS' - " l' EAfter Condenser VentLFlow Monitor FIT 55~
Steam. Generator Blowdown Effluent R23 (Monitor) . ' <
Steam Generator Blowdown Flow-FM75 ' Monitor . _ - 1 Steam Generator Blowdown Gross.
'R27.
,.
I'
- Activity Monitor'
. , Miscellaneous ' , 1: Oily Water Seperator Effluent.
R03- ~ ' ' Monitor ' . - - 1: . Liquid Waste Discharge, Effluent R18 ' - Monitor ft 1.
Gas Decay Tank Radiation Gas R22 Monitor: ' '_~
Liquid lRadwaste t'o Discharge-FM243 ~ ~ Tunnel Flow Monitor
CW Pumps Discharge Flow Monitor FM107
OWS' Pressure Pump Suction Flow FM251 Monitor l' Waste. Transfer Pump Discharge .R16 - Monitor 4'
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