ML20134B478
| ML20134B478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Haddam Neck, 05000231 File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1993 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bateman W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134B481 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-298 NUDOCS 9312080275 | |
| Download: ML20134B478 (41) | |
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- UNITED STATES i t )
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l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
- WASHINoToN. D.C. 205800001 November 24, 1993 1
MEMORANDUM FOR: William H. Bateman, Chief Regional Operations Staff Office of the Executive Director ,
l for Operations j 1
FROM: John F. Stolz, Director Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR THE DECEMBER 9, 1993 C0tMIUi10N i I
BRIEFING BY NORTHEAST UTILITIES OFFICIALS -
SEABROOK, AND MILLSTONE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 l l
Enclosure 1 is background material for the December 9,1993, Commission briefing by Northeast Utilities (NU). As requested, we are supplementing the l
material presented in our previous briefing package dated November 3,1993. i l
The material contains slides to be presented by NU and staff views as appropriate. Each section identifies NU's material and staff material related to the subject. Enclosure 2 contains updated profiles for B. M. Fox, J. F.
Opeka, and T. C. Feigenbaum.
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John . Stolz, Director PrJJect Directorate
%fvision of ReactorI-4 Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
! 1. Briefing Package
- 2. Updated Profiles
! cc w/ enclosures: i T. Murley A. De Agazio L. T. Doerflein, RI l F. Miraglia D. Jaffe W. Dean, OEDO L. J. Callan A. Wang W. Russell J. Andersen S. Varga G. Vissing J. Calvo V. Rooney ia \
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[Qslaot03]3 y& 4pp
i EXCLOSURE1 l
I l MATERIAL RELATING TO THE l DECEMBER 9,1993, COMMISSION.
l BRIEFING NORTHEAST UTILITIES i SEABROOK AND MILLSTONE UNITS 1,2, AND 3 l
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l'HOPOSED AGENDA i
COMMISSION MEETING WITH NORTHEAST UTILITIES DECEMBER 9.1993 (PROJECTED TIME - 10 MINUTES PER " BULLET")
o SAFETY PERSPECTIVE VS. COST B. M. Fox '
L o LESSON'S LEARNED FROM PERFORMANCE ISSUES J. F. Opekm/T. C. Felgenbaum MILISTONE 1 - LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION MILLS'IUNE 2 - LETDOWN VALVE AND PLANT TRIPS MILLSTONE 3 - SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM SEABROOK - PLANT TRIPS o PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM J. F. Opeka OVERALL PROGRESS VERIFICATION / VALIDATION o REORGANIZATION J. F. Opeka PERSONNEL CHANGES ENGINEERING INTEGRATION o EMPIDYEE CONCERNS J. F. Opeka o BUDGET (O&M AND CAPITAL COSTS / TRENDS) J. F. Opeka o NORTHEAST UTILITIES ELECTRICAL DEMAND FOR THE B. M. Fox NEXT 10 YEARS AND PLANS TO MEET THIS DEMAND i (PLANT CLOSINGS, ETC.)
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SAFETY 1%61'ECi1VE O NOT ADDRESSED IN THE NOVEMBER 3,1993, BRIEFING PACKAGE O FIRST PAGE IS NORTHEAST UTILITIES' PRESENTATION SLIDE O THE NEXT DOCUMENT IS THE CORPORATE POLICY (J. OPEKA)
O THE LAST DOCUMENT IS A PRESENTATION BY B.M. FOX TO AN INPO MEETING ON NOVEMBER 4,1993 i
SAFETY PERSPECTIVE tr>
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- We have always believed that safety is the only number 1 priority; l
our communication regarding the relationshb between safety and economic issues has not always been clear g
The 2-CH-442 event was caused, in part, by not clearly
,ye communicating this relationship ,
s Safety and. economic performance are not competing goals, they are E linked and dependent
? l Conservative decision making willlead to better economic
- performance
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- This message is being sent via many channels, and is belag 5 practiced:
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Executive Vice President moming meeting focus Operability determination process changes l Revisions to the Management Incentive Program H -
B. M. Fox speech to industry CEOs g -
Multi media communication throughout the Nuclear Group J,
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g=g= y_ September 10, 1993 @
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JF0-93-G-231 g
}- W-l TO: les Groep Vice Presidents, Directors, Managers, and Supervisors
{ PRON: . Ope
- (Ext.5323) ,
l SSJECTs Millstone Unit No. 2 Indenandant Review Team Results i-Most of you are no doubt aware of mcent events at Millstone Unit No. 2 which indicate a negative trend in overall N111 stone Unit No. 2 performance. These events include multiple instances of valve mispositioning, preventable automatic reactor trips, 4 actuation of the reactor protection system while shutdown, and a reactor coolant system i 4
leak from an unisolable valve in the letdown system. This valve had been the subject I of ongoing maintenance activity over several months to repair a leak. The leak rate l increased significantly when one of the body to-bonnet studs broke. This one event is ,
, particularly serious because the potential existed for an unisolable loss of coolant !
l accident if additional studs had failed. l
} In response to these events, I commissioned an Independent Review Team (IRT), chaired i by Eric DeBarba, to assess, independent of the Millstone Unit No. 2 organt.--tion, this i event and whether the basis for continued operation of N111 stone Unit No. 2 is sound,
- and also to develop recommendations to improve performance. The review focused on the
! appropriateness of management actions, root cause evaluations, and corrective actions j to determine their appropriateness.
1- The IRT presented the results of their assessment to the nuclear group vice presidents j and directors and Millstone Unit No. 2 managers on Friday, September 3,1993, and has
- since completed its report. The report is being sent today to the NRC. The j transmittal letter and report are attached to this memorandum, i-
! The IRT found ti,e basis for continued operation of Millstone Unit No. I to be sound ,
i given the actions taken to date. However, the IRT also found deficiencies in several i j areas, including operational philosophy, management oversight, and root cause l j determinations. were developed by the IRT and are included in the report. These Recommended actions, immedia recommendations are l' taplemented.
The seriousness with which I take these events and the report cannot be overstated.
3 I am giving this report wide distribution. Each of j carefully and take to heart the lessons we must lear.you should n as an read thisfrom organization materjal this i event. Each of you also should discuss these lessons with your subordinates
! and management. I encourage you to discuss openly the IRT's assessment, and I peers, expect that you will bring any questions you may have to the attention of your management.
Mathing is more important than the safe, conservative operation of our nuclear units.
The events which have occurred at Millstone Unit No. 2 indicate that this philosophy has not, at all times, guided our actions. Let me be very clear: WE WILL DPERATE DUR NUCLEAR UNITS SAFELY OR NOT AT ALL. 00R STAMARDS OF PERFORMANCE MUST BE CONSISTcdT WITH TNIS PHILOSOPHY.
cc: T. C. Feigenbaum emmus
BERNARD M. FOX PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER l NORTHEAST UTILITIES i
INPO CEO CONFERENCE INPO OFFICES l ATLANTA, GEORGIA NOVEMBER 4,1993 i
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There's no question that the subject of this plenary session " Actions to improve Economic Performance anri Results"-is critical to the entire nuclear-power industry.
The electric utility industry is being challenged as never before by a growing array of Aerce competitors--our own customers, neighboring utilities, independent power producers, and a(oining states and even other countries trying to lure away our customers.
We find ourselves responsible today for a nuclear technology which accounts for about 22 percent of all the electricity generated in the United States. This issue is critical to us, not only in our role as nuclear-power executives, but, more significantly, in our role as major suppliers of a vital resource, namely, electricity.
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Many of us have already had to deal with the management and leadership challenges posed by these powerful competitive forces.
We've found that Soodgates opened to competition are requiring us to become more flexible and quick-acting, to offer customers more options, and to realize that a satisfied customer is the key to our survival. This is as it should be, in my opinion.
However, we're also finding that we must succeed even as we're required to provide a j growing number of subsidies and programs which public policymakers place on our shoulders, with no similar burden being placed on our competitors.
l As an industry, we'n; responding to these challenges with new marketing initiatives, I new rate designs, and extremely aggressive restructuring of our companies. In restructuring, Northeast Utilities, for instance, has reduced its total work force over the past five years by almost 15 percent, and we expect to complete an additional B-to-10 l percent reduction by early next year. And we've accomplished this overall corporate reduction even as we've increased the size of our nuclear work force by nearly 1
15 percent.
I Unquestionably, tie future of nuclear energy will be determined by fundamental l economics. Nuclear energy's clearty demonstrated societal values-the extraordinary 1 air-quality benefits and the extraordinary strategic benefit of reduced dependence on ;
imported oil-will help but cannot ensure the survival of the industry. In an energy- !
supply industry where competitors of all shapes and sizes lurk around every comer, j
- w single most compelling key to longevity will be sound economics; in a word, a l busbar price that's competitive! l j The 64-dollar question is "What strategy provides the greatest likelihood of success in j i such an environment?" l
. - - . ~ . - __ 1
l There's .no question that the subject of this plenary session " Actions to improve Economic Performance and Results"-is critical to the entire nuclear-power industry.
The electric utility industry is being challen2ed as never before by a growing array of fierce competitors-our own customers, neighboring utilities, independent power producers, and aqoining states and even other countries trying to lure away our
! customers.
We find ourselves responsible today for a nuclear technology which accounts for about 22 percent of all the electricity generated in the United States. This issue is l critical to us, not only in our role as nuclear-power executives, but, more signif'mantly, j in our role as major suppliers of a vital resource, namely, electricity.
Many of us have already had to deal with the management and leadership challenges posed by these powerful competitive forces.
We've found that floodgates opened to competition are requiring us to become more flexible and quick-acting, to offer customers more options, and to realize that a satisfied customer is the key to our survival. This is as it should be, in my opinion.
However, we're also finding that we must succeed even as we're required to provide a growing number of subsidies and programs which public policymakers place on our shoulders, with no similar burden being placed on our competitors.
As an industry, we're responding to these challenges with new marketing initiatives, new rate designs, and extremely aggressive restructuring of our companies, in restructuring, Northeast Utilities, for instance, has reduced its total work force over the past five years by almost 15 percent, and we expect to complete an additional 8-to-10 percent reduction by early next year. And we've accomplished this overall corporate reduction even as we've increased the size of our nuclear work force by nearly 15 percent.
Unquestionably, sie future of nuclear energy will be determined by fundamental economics. Nuclear energy's clearty demonstrated societal values-the extraordinary air-quality benefits and the extraordinary strategic benefit of reduced dependence on imported oil-will help but cannot ensure the survival of the industry, in an energy-supply industry where competitors of all shapes and sizes lurk around every comer, the single most compelling key to longevity will be sound economics; in a word, a busbar price that's competitive!
! The 64-dollar question is "What strategy provides the greatest likelihood of success in
!- such an environment?"
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l The approach we're pursuing at NU begins with safe and conservative operating decisions as the primary priorities. Clearly, the approach can result in oost increases in the short term, but, just as clearty, we believe this strategy is the only one offering a hope of long-term success. We believe that a zealous commitment to safe and conservative practices will lead to excellence in operations, which translates into the best possible plant economics.
Now, let's not kid ourselves about the difficulty of implementing this strategy. Our employees know we live in a competitive world. They know that no business or facility will survive unless it meets the test of good economics, and that nuclear-power units l
are no exception. They've seen utilities shut down nuclear units in the recent past.
l i They're clearly aware that nuclear O&M and capital costs have grown at an unsettling pace in the 1980s and 1990s. They've read and heard in the local media about public l
utility commissions demanding economic justification for continued operation of these l
units. They understand that their careers and their livelihoods are at stake.
That leaves management with an extraordinarily difficult job. We must inculcate an inviolate and unbendable commitment in our work force to consen ative decision-making, even if there may be some short-term erosion of nuclear economics, in the '
face of deeply felt employee concoms about their futures. We must overcome the perceived-and i emphasize, perceived--notion that an intense focus on production goals alone will enhance the survivability of a specific unit. We're working mightily at Northeast titilities to deal with this dilemma.
As CEOs and senior managers of nuclear facilities, it's our responsibility to use every available forum to keep hammering at the absolute need to place safety and .
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conservative operating ph!!osophy above all other targets. It's our responsibility to deal with what might be a natural tendency of employees to worry that conservatism !s the problem, rather than the solution, in the competitive world we face today.
This is an extremaly difficult, but absolutely unavoidable leadership challenge. Our role is defined by the ethical demands that have been placed upon all of us as l
managers of the nuclear technology, a technology which is incredibly valuable but extraordinarily exacting. But our role in demanding an unerring commitment to a conservative operating philosophy also flows from what I believe to be the simpfe economic realities of the nuclear-power industry, it's possible that the nuclear- power industry won't survive in this highly competitive horse race. But I can almost guarantee hat it won't survive unless every operating decision and program is approached with nuclear safety as the first priority.
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Without such a conservative philosophy, I'm certain that we'll see errors made which will surely lead to further loss of public and political support for our beleaguered ;
industry. Such a loss would then erode the economics of running these facilities to !
auch an extent that their demise becomes inevitable.
We must do overything in our power to make sure this does not occur!
! Recently we had an experience at Northeast Utilities, which I believe captures the essence of the dilemma facing ea::h and every one of us and which demonstrates
' clearly how well-meaning people could allow a potentially danperous situation to unfold.
On August 5 of this year, our Millstone 2 unit was taken off line after experiencing an '
l increase in reactor coolant system leakage to about four gallons per minute. The ,
l leakage occurred when one of four studs broke in a letdown-system isolation valve, which could not be isciated. The valve had been leaking nyer a period of about two months at generally less than one gallon per minuie, and a number of repairs relying upon both liquid-seal injection and poening had been attempted.
Following the unit's shutdown, we formed an independent Review Team (IRT) and undertook a retrospective review of the entire two-month period leading up to the stud i failure. The IRT was made up of some of our best personnel who conducted the review with extreme intensity because of the recognition that failure of additional studs could have resulted in a small break loss-of-coolant accident.
Although there were a number of important conclusions and mcommendations on this event, which we're following up on, the underlying, clearly emphasized issue was the lack of a sufficiently conservative operating philosophy at Unit 2. Over a ten-week period, the valve had been injected 30 times with sufficient success that we sometimes went a couple of weeks with little, if any, leakage. A number of people in the organization knew of the abnormally large number of injecting and peening efforts.
What we did not know then, but what we do know now as a result of intensive testing, is that the studs can be stressed-more significantly than was generally thought in the past--by poening with less than adequate controls, in other words, too much poening on the outside of the valve can lead to failure of studs on the inside.
We've already shared these preliminary test results with the industry through another Nuclear Network Update and with the NRC. I urge all of you, my CEO colleagues, to make sure that our network update is being properly communicated in your j organization.
.- 4 Our brutally candid independent Review Team underscored that a property conservative operating philosophy would have done a number of things, which would have dramatically reduced the risks involved in this activity.
First, the inability to isolate this valve should have been considered more fully in our maintenance decisions. !
Second, it would have recognized that such a large number of repair attempts is l inordinately high and that a shutdown for valve replacement was indicated.
And third, a safety evaluation should have been performed to prompt us to explicitly address the relevant safety issues.
The full report is available to anyone who'd like to request it from me. I could say much more, but--in a nutshell-we concluded that the Unit 2 staff was too focused on production goals with a consequent loss of conservatism in decision-making.
You might well ask, "How could this have happened? In retrospect, these things are quite obvious." The question is a fair one, par *.tcularly in light of a major initiative called PEP " Performance Enhancement Program"-that we've had under way for more than a yest to improve nuclear operations.
Unit 2 and our other Millstone units have been recovering from a tough couple of years. We've worked hard to focus people's attention on those Key Performance indicators (KPts) identified by the NRC and INPO as critical. And we've been seeing progress in almost every one of the key areas of performance being monitored. I believe this focus on KPls was at least a contributor to our failure to recognize the significance of extensive peening and injection of a leaking valve.
We were being "etemally vigilant" on the items we were measuring-since they were very important items-but we subsequently found that we were not as "etemally vigilant" on the overall operating philosophy of the unit.
We've now initiated aggressive corrective actions-immediate, short term, and long-term-to address these and other conclusions of the independent Review Team.
We've stressed again and again the basics of a healthy nuclear safety othic. And I'm pleased to report that we've already seen progress!
I'm responding to one of the team's conclusions today. They felt strongly that the lessons we loamed from this experience should be shared widely, not only within the company, but with the entire industry as well. I want to thank Zack Pate for providing me with this opportunity to take this step to help carry out the team's recommendation.
l l 5 To be sure, cost containment and production goals wl:1 remain assential to our ,
i success as individual companies and as an industry. But, at NU, we've been l reminded, quite painfully, of an extremely valuable lesson.
! We need to communicate our vision and our expectations regarding nuclear safety and their relationship to economics, and we need to communicate them again and again and again. We need to celebrate and enjoy our successes, like improving KPls, j but we must also be stomally vigilant that improving indicators don't become a substitute for sound, conservative management.
As I've recalled this event, I've been reminded of the slogan used many years ago by a
- famous manufacturer-"Better Living Through Chemistry." Maybe we should adapt that i slogan for our industry, so that it says, "Better Performance and Economics Through Conservative Decision-Making."
It's a bit wordy, but it gets the point across.
I hope you'll find that our experience is useful to share with your organizations. We all need to work together to leam and releam the lesson that a safe and consarvative l operating philosophy forms the only viable path to the economic survival and success
[ of nuclear electric generation.
Thank you.
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PERFORMANCE ISSUES O PERFORMANCE ISSUES WERE !
ADDRESSED IN'THE NOVEMBER 3,1993, i PACKAGE AS FOLLOWS: l l
MILLSTONE 1 - PAGE 2 MILLSTONE 2 - PAGE 3 MILLSTONE 3 - PAGE 4
. SEABROOK - PAGE 2 OF THE ,
SEABROOK SECTION .
O THE FIRST NINE PAGES HEREIN ARE NORTHEAST UTILITIES' PRESENTATION SLIDES 0 THE NEXT DOCUMENT (2 PAGES) IS FROM A NOVEMBER 8,1993, PRESS BRIEFING BY T. MARTIN l
O THE LAST PAGE IS A STAFF
SUMMARY
OF THE SEABROOK, CYCLE 3, OPERATING HISTORY 4
b I Millstone Unit 1 Licensed Operator Remmlification o .
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- Issue j September 1991 Unsatisfactory program rating
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.a September 1992 Unsatisfactory program rating 3
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April 1993 NRC Team inspection: Millstone requalification !
j program weaknesses and violations cited
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- Current Status ft t
i The effectiveness of the Millstone Unit 1 requalification program i ii has been restored: 100% pass rate and no program l 5 weaknesses identified during recent NRC examinations Personnel and Nuclear Training Department organization changes j
- "i are designed to ensure the continued improvement and success
- of all units' training programs i
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MLione Unit 1 Licensed Operator Reautdification (Cont). l
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- Lessons Learned t
Critical, comprehensive self-assessment and management j> monitoring and oversight of the training function are necessary
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'c Millstone Unit 2 2-CH-442 Valve Repair (Cont.)
- Lessons Learned '
t l3 Management expectations regarding conservative operating l3 philosophy must be continually stressed and effectively implemented
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Performance monitoring has its lisnitations m Small changes in performance indicators may be indicative
. of significant performance issues !
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,! = Not a substitute for management oversight and rigorous 1 :
self-assessment ;
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PERFORMANCE ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED I 2
c Millstone __ Unit 3 SunclemenM Leak Collection and i Release Systere (SLCRS1
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In September 1992, the SLCRS wat determined to have, teen
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! u Corrective measures were identified and implemented m Escalated NRC enforcement action was taken 5 -
In September 1993, certain SLCRS features were identified via
- 5 enhanced testing which rendered the system inoperable
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! m Enforcement discretion was justified, requested, and issued
- i a License amendment was requested to obviate enforcement discretion i.
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Millstone Unit 3 SM- ' ;w.antal 1 aak CoNectian and Release _ System (SLCRS) (Cont.) ,
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- Current Status License amendment request is being processed t i
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- Lessons Leamed s .
Integrated testing is an important tool to confirm system operability or reveal deficiencies c
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Any further changes should reflect the low safety significance of the system .
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" [ Additional (as appropriate) to be provided upon completion of Yankee SLCRS assessment] !
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i PERFORMANCE ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED.
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Seabrook Plant Trios and Personnel Error
[To be Modified]
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.g A repetitive pattem of personnel errors has recently been experienced a ;
1 An unacceptably high number of reactor trips have occurred this fuel cycle t
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- Current Status '
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The recommendations of the Personnel Error Response Team are being implemented; recommendations deal with cultural, j programmatic, and management oversight issues
$ i A trip reduction plan has been developed and is being
, implemented; plan includes the identification of situations where i a single fature will cause a plan, trip.
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Sad-rcak Plant Trina and Personnel Error (Ccin.)
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- Lessons i. earned An attitude that regards personnel error as unacceptable must g be instilled is 3 -
Senior Management must monitor and critically assess 9 organizational performance to ensure that undedying issues are SE being effectively addressed 3
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Management must be provided effective tracking tools that are used consistently across the organization
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External sources of information e.g. NRC, INPO, are equally valuable as intemal sources when assessing organizational
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Management must not only identify corrective actions, but must
, also design methods to follow up and measure the effectiveness I of those corrective actions o
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Seabrooit Plant Trips and Permannel Error (Cont.)
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~ i Long-term procedure compliance can only be achieved if management reinforces its expatations and if the quality of procedures is enhanced to ensure ownership by the
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A plant reliability program must be instituted which sensitizes all !
9 o personnel to those components and activities which have the ~ '
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l The technical specifications (surveillance intervals) must be !
,; modified to reduce the amount of time the plant is placed in a !
.i- condition where it is vulnerable to a trip during surveillances Design changes must be implemented to install redundant 2 components or special bypass test equipment to minimize trip j vulnerability during surveillance activities ;
u The same aggressiveness must be applied in resolving human A performance issues as hardware msJes a :
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Seabrooks' ovemil performance is mhed weh some roosnt signs of declinens. The PWoonf*l ere generely well treined and bo '
, been signs of a large number of plant sE&y respond to events very well. There has j c;_ and espo preciplissed by hardwam t
(inaudiblel modi more then we've seen in the past, j
j Further, their operators and mainsenance personnel error rate is encesshe, nu:h I
- higher then it used to be. The probleets in the plant are being identified but we've not seen efective corrective acdon. They how sorterally good managemeht but show have missed some trends that have been aponed by the NRC, l To sive you a feel for this, the let cycle, between refuelines, they only had one trio...one of the reconi runs in eens et she plant sterins on line and working well.
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i During this cysle though, diey had seven different feestor trips. Now tie mejority of than were herowere awociated. Three of them were associated with personnel enors.
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But there were a number' of other personnel striots that they and we identified and it is i
- g. pretty clear to us that they how not pseten on top of thwe problems and as a result we have had some pretty serious dialogue wNh item.
ltecently the licenses has ageln engaged in some significant efforts to tum this l performance around. SA1.P for this faculty is due in the very near future'in lect probably i
next week you'll see h issued.
- tut that plant is not performing as well as it had been in the past.
1 Questlom I wm just wondering how you would explain $ven the Aw plants NU i
opwates, the diflerences between Millstone 1,2 and 3, and sembrook, versus CY, which
! you've shen higher grades tot And second, Seabrook has had some problems on the heels of NU takeover, whether or not you've had any second thoughts on the transfer of
- 2. incennt i
i j Answen First, so emplain the h Wist is tornething we continually search for, but to be quite frank they're not unllite five INNefent foolbell teams. There is a certeln inimmt in them wmpeans assinst ach aner in trying w do bemer, some licennes, t
some management teams, some staffInight cany k off better than others.
1 .
1 4
- ,, s i
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m_-_.- _ ._ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ ,,_ _, _ _ __ _
i 11/17/93 20:54 U.S N.R.C. RE313N 1 KIN 209 P
1 t & 1_6_-1993 -.. 15 #r. .. .USbRC.._ REG.. IONmm I ilERIROG< ,o 683 47 a ,4.1 9818 , ,,,,.63 (i
i j P h "in News U" Erimens T.r a ~~
! Seeikook issues Peps 2 o(2 !
There's e lot of effort poing on to take some of the best people from one feelihy j
and to spread them to others to begin some new good ideas.to the other facilities but !
these are human endeavors and not all humans are equel, and therefom, the i Pedormance P""- of thme organizations wlil say something about the quellty of how they i
4 j one of the things that you win see efter management changes are mode, performance j respect and won't immediately follow. It takes a while for a team to sein of the or5eniastion.
? .
Beck so the Seebrook #istion iss% w4're disappointed that Seabrook is not i
j performing as well this cycle es it did he previous cycle but senior inenagement there is ogeln engaged in eNotts. I think they will pun out of it, and then we'll watch
' [Inaudiblel
~
i They pe,eleuledy have had a problem... overessignment of responsibility e,;
individuals without having a robust oversight. AN these. plants are built on defense in depth. You don't count on one persen.
gesically, if one person falls, the next person will spot it end will help to evold it.
You start getting that defense In<lepth thin, not spending time in the field, not watching the operators, not giving them feedbet$:- the orgnitation is not putting ,together the !
trends. a lot of the this la being in the middle of a forest and not recognizing that you ;
j ere taking a change in droction, so when you can't see the forest for the trees [Inaudiblei i
Am i disappointed in Seabrook, yes. Do I believe that R has its roots in the NU j takeover, No I doni.
They were working really henf so corwinos us as en orsenization that it was right i i is 16 cease them, that it was right to alks them e operees. wim that pressure off them, I i think they got complacent. And with time I think their performance did change in the i wrong dienstion.
But if you look at the orsenisation up there, there is very little impeded by NU, They bmically Id them intner. mm we r.lly wry nido chanse io the orgentacion =
l e result of the takeover.
I have confidence in the senior management team up there once the ,mAJsr. gets 2 them. Unfortunately, they were not ewere of some of these problems until verr recently. They've identifled their problent they have been very cridcol of themseNes i and i think ther ere starting to get le in the right drection. -
i Mmettl@ensorlpt i .
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i
CYCLE 3 OPERATING HISTORY
[
- 1. 11/13/92 Restart from second refueling outage
- 2. 11/27/92 Unit trip due to a failed resistor on overpower delta T (0PDT) setpoint card which caused setpoint to drift lower.
When another channel was surveillance tested, the trip logic was madeup.
- 3. 12/13/93 Unit trip on trip of circulating water pumps due to high differential pressure on the travelling screens. The screens clogged with seaweed stirred up by an ocean storm.
The screen motors were cycling between low and high speed.
The resulting thermal overload trip of the motors on one screen resulted in the pump trip.
- 4. 01/03/93 Manual reactor trip. A high level in the 26A feedwater heater isolated the heater. The A0 was directed to restore the heater. Because of inadequate procedures and training of the operators on an infrequently performed evolution, the A0 failed to open the discharge valve on a heater before closing a bypass valve. This error was repeated two more times causing an isolation of all feedwater.
- 5. 01/14/93 A louvre on an air cooling system for the generator output !
busses came loose and introduced a ground fault on the bus causing the generator breaker to open resulting in a Unit trip. 1
- 6. 05/20/93 Automatic reactor trip. During a routine surveillance test l of an MSIV, the valve failed to stop stroking at the 10%
position. The closure resulted in a Unit trip. The valve i failed to stop due to a such solenoid valve in the control ,
system. During the cooldown, an unnecessary EFW actuation occurred because of poor control room communications. The operator failed to unisolate feedwater causing a low SG level ESF actuation when the EFW pump was secured.
l
- 7. 07/27/93 Automatic reactor trip. While performing surveillance testing of the SSPS train A, the I&C technician tested an l unlit lamp as per to procedure. When the technician pushed l the lamp socket, a short to ground resulted because of l l socket terminals having rotated. The short caused a l transistor to fail on the test card which in turn drew down the power supply voltage to the cabinet. Numerous spurious signals were produced. ;
- 8. 08/22/93 The collector brush assembly on the station exciter failed r (disintegrated) causing a trip of the station generator output breakers and trip of the RCPs on undervoltage resulting in a reactor trip. About four hours after the trip, the D RCP tripped ona ground fault when the pump was restarted. The fault was due to an insulating bushing being mispositioned on the containment penetration.
l
8 i
. \
l PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM (PEP) l 0 THE PEP IS ADDRESS ON PAGE 1 AND l PAGE 3 OF THE NOVEMBER 3,1993 i BRIEFING PACKAGE '
i l 0 THE MATERIAL HEREIN IS NORTHEAST UTILITIES' PRESENTATION
! SLIDES l
I l
l
f PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM STATUS e
e
- Milestone and deliverable schedules continue to be met
- Program continues to proceed as planned with less-than-budgeted
- expenditures required .
m
??
2 = Ongoing PEP activities
,m
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9 -
Engineering Design Backlog Reduction SE
' !! a Millstone 2: Complete m Millstone 1: Due 12/93 l m Haddam Neck: Due 12/94 i e Millstone 3: Due 1996 i3 Procedure Upgrade l:-
l i e [Later] of 4176 ( %) Procedures upgraded (X% upgraded during phase 1)
I -
Design Basis Reconstruction w
m e On schedule for completion in December 1994 s= 13 1
I
PEP STATUS (Cont.) i
=
" l
- Significant Accomplishments New Engineering Program Manuals !
e i en '
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m MOV: Complete
= !
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u Erosion / Corrosion: Complete '
- az ,
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- EEQ: Complete ~
i
- a HELB
- Due 12/93 5 -
Process Mapping of Design Change Process is complete (new Design Change Manual is in development) i w i
- 0i Shutdown Risk Management procedures are in place ,
Root Cause Determination training has been enhanced s
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Action Plan Status
~
Action Plan will be completed by January 1994 -
Action Plan will be completed after January 1994
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9 ,
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ROOT CAUSE Programs &
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m 3 Action Plans Completed by 1/94 93 Expenditures $ 3.9 M
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PEP 1993 DELIVERABLES / MILESTONES q
- e. PERFORMANCECHART .
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119
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- PEP Updata z y,
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. STATUS NO./% @,
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- Action Plans Completed and Validated 7 (17%) *l
- Action Plans Completed to be Validated 11 (26%) R 9*
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- Action Plans to Be Completed by 1/31/94 9 (21 %) g
=
- Action Plans Remaining 15(36%) 5!
Total 42(100%)
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0 20
9 l REORGANIZATION I
i O THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN l
THE NOVEMBER 3,1993 BRIEFING l PACKAGE l 0 THE FIRST TWO PAGES ARE NORTHEAST
! UTILITIES' PRESENTATION SLIDES O THE NEXT DOCUMENT IS A CORPORATE ANNOUNCEMENT (J. OPEKA) OF PERSONNEL CHANGES 1
O THE NEXT DOCUMENT IS A STAFF '
" DAILY HIGHLIGHT" (J. ANDERSEN) EXPLAINING NORTHEAST i UTILITIES PERSONNEL CHANGES O THE LAST DOCUMENT IS NORTHEAST UTILITIES' DESCRIPTION OF ENGINEERING INTEGRATION
ENGINEERING mlTEGRATION AND !
= PERSONNEL CHANGES -
a
- Engineering Integration i
j -
Undertaken to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and g:
e productivity of the engineering function ;
C3
,[ - Current levels of safety and quality will be maintained or improved m i e Four unit specific and one centralized engineering departments under j
= one Vice President e l
-5
- Unit Engineering Departments:
,=
2 -
Improved accountability and decision-making
,j -
System engineering being accelerated
- - Unit Director focus directed toward operations and maintenance m
- More clearly defined roles and responsibilities lE - Reduced handoffs in accomplishing work 1
!W l~ l
'g dl sx 21 i
______._-__-___.________._________.__.__._________._________-__.___._..____.____________.__.-..___-__._m___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._ _ ___ _ _.____
I ENGINEERING INTEGRATION AND
.g PERSONNEL CHANGES (Cont.) .
- Corporate Engineering Department Strategic issues (program development) g -
Specialized expertise (PRA, Nuclear Fuels, Radiological
= Assessment, etc.)
3 -
Reduced size
~. !
+ Net effect is a reduction of approximately 100 positions - half contractors and other half unfilled, previously authorized positions t
=
- Personnel Changes
~E 5 -
94 management positions remain unchanged from previous q organizational structure a
j -
41 new management positions complete the current integrated organizational structure Appointments to managernent positions influenced by corporate '
y assessment model (PEP Action Plan) to identify appropriate 9 placement g i s
=
22 I
. _ . _ _. _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ ~ . _ . . . - _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ .
1
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JONN F. OPEKA SYSTEM BULLETIN BOARD NOTICE assumewormaaswr-maam As part of the engineering integration and restructuring within the Nuclear Group and as we prepare our organization _for the future, I as pleased to announce'the following appointments. Except as noted, all appointments are effective December 5, 1993. l Donald B. Miller Jr. - Senior Vice President, Millstone Station. Since_1990, Don has been Vice. President - Peach Bottom at Philadelphia Electric. Before that, Don worked for NU for almost twelve years at Millstone Station during the startup of Units 2 and 3 and at CY as Station Director. I as particularly pleased to have Don rejoin us as part of our new management team.
Steve E. Scace - Vice President, Nuclear, Operations Services. Since the effective date for Steve's appointment is December 5,1993,:I will assume the responsibility for
.the Vice President, Nuclear, Operations Services position, as well as my own position, from today to December 3, 1993.
All the following appointments are effective December 5, 1993.
POSITION UNIT MP-1 MP-2 MP-3 CY l
l l'
Director, Unit H. F. Haynes G. B. Bouchard F. R. Deciso D. J. Ray Manager Ops P. J. Przekop J. D. Becker J. A. Ruttar M. B. Brothers Manager I&C J. J. Festa M. P. Bain J. R. Beckman J. Stanford Manager Maint.
~
N. G. Bergh B. J. Duffy D. L. Hoisington T. J. Mcdonald Manager Outage M. J. ".sss R. R. Goldsmith M. E. Gentry D. C. Beffernan G. R. Pitaa'n J. J. LaPlatney Director Eng H. P. Risley R. P. Necci Hgr Tech Support P. A. Blasioli J. V. Riley D. C. Gerber R. J. Palmieri R. A. Andren C. J. Gladding Manager Design J. H. Ferguson M. F. Ahern R. F. Benzinger E. F. Murphy H. H. Vong J. B. Overbaugh l Supv Cost & Sch V. M. Hervig Supv Rx Eng J. A. Chunis R. C. Bonner D. T. McDaniel Supv Programs K. E. Murphy J. M. Bergin T. V. Lyons J. L. DeLavrence Supv Syst NSSS J. M. Quinn J. G. Resetar S. A. Sudigala T. J. Galloway ,
Supv Syst BOF D. S. Cleary R. V. Bates P. J. Parulis P. F. L'Heureux 1 N/A R. N. Keller N/A Supv Syst Aux. N/A Supv Sys Elec/I&C N/A N/A S. I. Stricker N/A V. J. Briggs R. V. Wells R. E. LeFebvre P. D. Mason Supv Mec/Civ Eng J. F. Bibby l Supv Mec/Civ Eng C. D. Maxson S. V. Vainio T. J. Mawson Supv Mec/Civ Des P. P. Couvertier V. A. Price R. V. Standish R. E. Bellucci-V. H. Becker J. B._Regan R. J. Young G. R. Townsend Supv Elec Eng G. V. Loftus Supv Elec Des G. A. Tardif J. P. Padden D. E. Deane N/A 'C. J. Ashton N/A Supv.Mec/Civ Eng N/A N/A L. Meyers N/A Supv Mec/Civ Des N/A N/A G. M. Olsen N/A Supv Elec Eng N/A Bold - No change
'N/A = Not Applicable; no position exists
BULLETIN BOARD NOTICE Except as noted, all appointments are effective December 5, 1993.
M. V. Bonaca - Director Nuclear Engineering J. R. Guerci - Manager Nuclear Fuel Eagineering R. J. Schmidt - Manager Radiological Assessment D. A. Dube - Manager Safety Analysis M. Kupinski - Manager Engineering Support A. L. Pollock - Director Nuclear Production Materials (Effective November 8, 1993)
M. B. Brown - Director Nuclear Training (Effective November 8, 1993) l R. V. Heidecker - Manager Operator Training (Effective November 8, 1993)
J. F. Smith - Manager Operator Training (Effective November 8, 1993)
P. S. Strickland - Manager Technical Training (Ef fective November 8,1993) i
- Manager General Nuclear Training (Effective November 8, 1993) ;
P. M. Austin B. V. Ruth - Supervisor Operator Training (MP-3) (Effective November 8, 1993)
J. A. Blaisdell - Manager Nuclear Safety Engineering l R. M. Kacich - Director Nuclear Planning, Licensing & Budgeting l M. J. Vilson - Manager Nuclear Licensing l M. D. Quinn - Manager Nuclear Planning L. A. Chatfield - Director Nuclear Safety Concerns Program D. G. Diedrick - Director Special Projects G. G. Goncarovs - CY Chemistry Manager J. J. Parillo - Supervisor Nuclear Analysis R. L. Bigelov - Supervisor Nuclear Fuel Supply E. A. Osvald - Supervisor PRA B. A. Tuthill - Supervisor Electrical Engineering l B. M. Pokora - Supervisor Mechanical Engineering l N. F. Azevedo - Supervisor Structural Engineering l
A great deal of thought and ef fort was given towards creating this part of the new nuclear organization to ensure that from a people and structural standpoint we are vell prepared to lead the group to success now and in the future.
a P: 11/08/93 Rs 11/15/93
!