ML20127N064
| ML20127N064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1985 |
| From: | Constable G, Johnson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127N039 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8507010424 | |
| Download: ML20127N064 (19) | |
Text
F c'
@ CORRESPONDENCt O
DOLKETED USNRC
'85 JUN 28 P1:43 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF SECRt'IM 00CXElmG A SEPVlu BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD BRANCH In the Matter of
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, Docket Nos. 50-498 ET AL.
)
50-499 (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2)
Testimony of Eric H. Johnson and George L. (Les) Constable Q.1. Please state your name title and by whom you are employed.
A.1.a. My name is Eric H. Johnson.
I am employed by.the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, as Branch Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1.
A statement of my professional qualifications is attached hereto. My initials (EHJ) will follow those answers below attributable to me.
A.1.b. My name is George L. (Les) Constable.
I am employed by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, as Section Chief, Project Section B, Reactor Project Branch 1.
A statement of my professional qualifications is attached hereto. My initials (GLC) will follow my answers below.
8507010424 850626 PDR ADOCK 050 8
. Q.2. What is -the purpose of this testimony?
A.2. The purpose of this testimony is to respond to the Board's Sixth Prehearing Conference Order, as amended, and to provide NRC Region IV management views with regard to application of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and on those other matters in issue.
EHJ, GLC Region IV testimony from the following inspectors addresses issues in the generally identified areas:
Robert G. Taylor Quadrex Reportability Danny R. Carpenter Competence of HL&P Dan. P. Tomlinson Competence of HL&P Claude E. Johnson Competence of HL&P Donald L. Garrison 50.55(e) Reporting / Trending H. Shannon Phillips 50.55(e) Reporting Joseph I. Tapia Soils
- Mr. Phillips.is also supplying separate testimony of how he learned of the Quadrex Report.
Q.3. Please describe your responsibilities and background as these relate to the purpose of this testimony?
A.3.a. I have been Branch Chief for Reactor Project Branch 1 since October
. 1983. The South Texas Project has been assigned to this branch during this entire period of time and I am responsible for the direction of NRC employees who inspect that facility.
In addition, as a routine part of my duties, I am familiar with the documents and NRC filings related to the issues before the Board and am specifically familiar with NRC Region IV's interpretation of 50.55(e) reporting requirements. EHJ Q.3.b. I was assigned to the position of Section Chief, Project Section B, Reactor Project Branch 1 on June 9, 1985. The South Texas Project is assigned to this section. Since my promotion was announced on May 2, 1985, I have coordinated the development of the overall Region IV preparation for Phase II of the hearings. During this time, working with the previous Section Chief (William A. Crossman) who retired on May 31, 1985, I have reviewed the filings before the Board and I have discussed the previous Region IV involvement with those involved at that time.
Three of those individuals are now retired.
Prior to my assignment as Section Chief, during the period 1980 through 1984, I was the senior resident inspector assigned to a reactor under construction (Waterford).
In that position, I routinely reviewed matters reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) and routinely discussed the NRC interpretation (dated 4/1/80) of that regulation with the construction permit holder.
GLC Q.4. Is it your view that, in the preparation of NUREG-0948, the NRC staff considered whether a significant breakdown in QA had occurred?
. A.4 The Quadrex Report is an important document in that it contained over 300 separate findings which could have impacted the design of the South Texas Project and, hence, it's ability to safely operate. When first read by the NRC staff, after being made available in its entirety in August 1981, the staff was concerned over the implications contained in the findings.
They concluded that the report was deserving of a systematic, detailed evaluation.
From mid-September to early October 1982, the NRC conducted this detailed, systematic review and released its findings as NUREG-0948 of December 1982.
The February 26, 1985, memorandum and order raised questions over this review process. NRC Region IV recognizes that a significant breakdown in any portion of the QA program for design would be reportable to the extent that a deficiency was found as described in 10 CFR 50.55(e). The staff has indicated to us that they did consider whether a significant breakdown in QA had occurred in their evaluation of each Quadrex finding in NUREG-0948 and that the information in the Quadrex Report was not sufficiently detailed to conclude that a significant QA breakdown has occurred.
Q.5 How have now you evaluated whether a significant breakdown in the QA program, or a portion thereof had occurred at the STP?
A.5 In order to ensure that these matters have been properly reviewed within the limits described by the Board, we have assigned a project inspector (Robert G. Taylor) with many years of experience involving nuclear plant
. design and construction and 50.55(e) reports to review those Quadrex items specified by the Board. We have reviewed his testimony and agree with same.
Q.6. What guidance had been issued by I&E on the subject of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and how did the HL&P response to the Quadrex Report adhere to this guidance as interpreted by Region IV?
A.6. New guidance entitled " Guidance - 10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction Deficiency Reporting" was formally issued April 1,1980. This guidance was made available to NRC applicants generally. The guidance was given to HL&P and discussed with them, in draft form, in a meeting in March 1980.
This guidance differed from the previous version, dated July 1,1976, mainly in the inclusion, for the first time, of a new category of items, -
the potentially reportable deficiency. Since the intent of 10 CFR 50.55(e) is to provide the NRC with a basis for evaluating safety consequences of significant deficiencies and for determining the need for further action by NRC, it is clear that the NRC would like this information as soon as possible. Since the determination as to whether an item is significant might be time consuming, this guidance set up a new category of item and suggested reasonable time limits for the evaluation process.
In doing so it was recognized that some items called potentially reportable would eventually be evaluated as not meeting the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and, hence, a report would not be issued. Given such an ultimate evaluation, the initial prompt notification (within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
p
. would not have been necessary in the first place.
Significant problems are surfaced in a timely manner by this mechanism at the expense of having to deal with problems that will subsequently be determined to not be significant.
What is then created in practice is a screening mechanism for nonconforming items. At the first step, people at the working level in QC, engineering, or construction who identify nonconforming items note these items on a nonconformance report (NCR) or other similar document.
Over the course of plant construction thousands of these reports may be written. These reports are screened using broad interpretations of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) criteria and those of possible significance are passed to an evaluation group. The remainder are being dispositioned in accordance with the applicant's or contractor's procedures. The broad interpretation of the reporting criteria is intended to ensure that all eventually reportable items pass to the next level. An evaluation of the NCRs that meet the test of possible significance is then undertaken. Some of these are determined to be not reportable and returned to be processed as NCRs.
Some are determined to be reportable deficiencies and should be promptly passed to the applicant's organization that is responsible for making notification to the NRC. Those possibly significant items that are not found to be either definitely reportable or definitely not reportable by the end of the prescribed evaluation period (the ' April 1,1980, guidance suggesting 14 days) are designated as potentially reportable and passed to the applicant who then must notify the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
In my experience, I have found that, on average, one-third to nearly two-thirds
. of these items are subsequently evaluated as nonreportable, having failed to meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) in the continuing evaluation.
In our inspection of construction, Region IV personnel review the screening mechanism to determine that significant items are appropriately reported. Each reportable item is inspected to determine that adequate corrective action has been taken. A sample of those items designated as potentially reportable and subsequently determined to be not reportable are inspected to determine that we agree with applicant's judgement on significance.
NRC Region IV inspectors' views on HL&P's program for reporting significant deficiencies are included in the testimony of D. L.
Garrison and H. S. Phillips and represent NRC Region IV views from 1979 to the present.
In addition, Mr. Garrison describes HL&P's trending program.
In responding to the Quadrex Report, the applicant conducted a review of the report in the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period referred to in the guidance and contained in the regulation and made notification on a number of items. The Quadrex Report was a report of the audit findings of Quadrex and, as noted in Mr.
Taylor's testimony, did not contain sufficient detail on many items to make a determination of reportability without further evaluation.
In our special investigation of the handling of the report (82-02) we did determine that the applicant apparently had sufficient information available to it on two items related to the Quadrex Report that were originally identified in November 1980 and January 1981 that a notification would have been appropriate at that time instead of waiting for the Quadrex Report to be completed. The applicant's response to this
. Notice of Violation indicates that the determination that these items were potentially reportable was only possible when the additional information contained in the Quadrex Report was made available from their contractor in May 1981.
In the staff review of the Quadrex Report as noted in NUREG-0948, the "NRC Staff Response to Licensing Board Memorandum and Order Regarding the Reportability of the Quadrex Report" (August 24,1984), and the recent review by Mr. Taylor, we have found that the applicant adequately applied the IE guidance of April 1,1980, regarding reportability, excepting the two items identified in 82-02 for which a violation was issued for untimely reporting.
Q.7 What are your views on the reportability of the Quadrex Report as a whole under50.55(e)?
A.7 It was not reportable. The Quadrex Report did, however, raise important questions with regard to the design process for the South Texas Project.
Nevertheless, this does not automatically lead one to the conclusion that it should have been reported. At issue is whether, and to what extent, the report represented deficiencies that were significant in whole or in part and whether this represented a QA breakdown. A deficiency must have the potential to adversely affect the safe operation of the facility.
Whether this potential existed or not had to be evaluated by technical experts who reviewed the details of the report. The current staff review has concluded that the findings in the Quadrex Report that were not
_g_
reported under 50.55(e) did not demonstrate significance or did not provide sufficient detail to indicate that a deficiency could exist or that a significant QA breakdown had occurred.
This review does not lead to the conclusion that the Quadrex Report was of no importance; rather, the issues raised therein had not progressed to the point where a significant deficiency as defined by 50.55(e) had occurred.
Q.8 Please provide your views on the character of HL&P in view of the fact that they did not report the Quadrex Report as a potential reportable deficiency.
A.8 With the exception of the three issues identified as significant deficiencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), HL&P was not required to report the Quadrex Report as a potential deficiency. The fact that the report identified potential problem areas that were further evaluated and which resulted in action by the utility to avoid significant deficiencies is a credit to the utility. This reflects favorably on its character.
The utility did discuss the matter with NRR. NRC Region IV would have preferred that the utility have approached Region IV staff with this same information.
However, that the utility seemed to perceive design matters to be more within the domain of NRR is an understandable condition. NRC Investigation Report 82-02 (at 4) reflected this perception.
i
. In my view, looking at the report in 1985, HL&P should have discussed the report with NRC Region IV personnel.
However, I recall that in 1981 it was not clear to me (as a senior resident inspector) what agency-wide policy was appropriate with respect to studies and reports, not required by regulations, that were initiated by the utilities in order to get a third-party view of construction and management effectiveness.
It was conveyed to me, by NRC Region IV managers, in general, that NRC actions, if any, should avoid any " chilling" effect on the conduct of these types of studies since these were viewed as being both useful and necessary.
Even though this approach was openly discussed with the inspection staff, it was recognized, if the results of such a review indicated a construction deficiency as described in 50.55(e), such a deficiency should be promptly reported. Therefore, no negative conclusions can be drawn with regard to the character and competence of HL&P with respect to their candor in keeping the NRC informed. To the contrary, HL&P did discuss the matter with the NRR project manager and it did report the significant deficiencies that they were required to report.
Q.9 Does the fact that the entire Quadrex Report was not reported to the NRC under 50.55(e) indicate a lack of candor or truthfulness on the part of HL&P?
A.9 No, the NRC specific review of the Quadrex Report by Mr. Oberg (NUREG-0948), the staff response of August 24, 1984, (cited above) and, now again, Mr. Taylor, in his testimony, has confirmed that only three of the findings, taken individually, meet the criteria for reportability and
. we have reviewed the report in its entirety and have concluded the same.
Q.10 Does the fact that it was not reported in its entirety indicate an unwillingness to abide by regulatory requirements?
A.10 No, as discussed above, with the exception of the three items discussed above, the report does not contain deficiencies that are reportable in whole or individually.
Q.11 Does the fact it was not reported in its entirety indicate an abdication of, or failure to accept, the responsibility to protect the public health and safety?
A.11 No, as discussed above, the fact that the Quadrex Corporation was commissioned by HL&P to audit the design process indicates to us a certain willingness on the part of HL&P to assure itself that it was carrying out its responsibility.
A.12 Does the fact that the Quadrex Report was not reported as a whole under 50.55(e) reflect adversely upon the character or competence of HL&P.
A.12 No.
Q.13 Please provide an update to the general conclusions of the SALP report (83g26) and to the Regional Administrator's cover letter dated June 22,
Q 1984, with regard to the character and competence of HL&P and its new contractors.
A.13 The Regional Administrator's letter of June 22, 1984 stated that "the overall regulatory performance by Houston Power and Lighting Company at the South Texas Project has been satisfactory" for the period December 1, 1982 through November 30, 1983.
The current views of the NRC Region IV staff indicate that the applicant continues to improve in performance since the last SALP period, and the performance is indicative of a high degree of management involvement in all site activities.
In support of this view is the testimony of Senior Resident Inspector Claude Johnson, Resident Inspector Dan R. Carpenter, and past Senior Resident Inspector Dan Tomlinson. The NRC staff is currently preparing a SALP Report for the period of December 1,1983-June 31, 1985.
Preliminary discussions with the inspectors involved in this effort support the above general conclusion. The specific assignment of performance categories will be determined by the SALP Board currently scheduled to meet in mid-August.
Q.14 Would you describe the staff's observations in assessing the reportability of open item 8312-01 (NRC Inspection Report 83-12 at 10 paragraph 7).
A.14 This open item was identified by NRC Inspector Chet Oberg (retired October 3,1984). A follow-up inspection was conducted on May 28-31, 1985, and will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 85-07. The initial
. observation by the NRC inspector documented in Inspection Report 83-12 was based solely on a review of HL&P audit reports D06-201 and C10-301. The applicant representative, at that time, indicated that additional information was available but the NRC inspector was unable to review those documents at that time. A subsequent review of those documents by the NRC staff has been conducted which indicates there was no breakdown in the Bechtel QA program.
Bechtel's responses to the HL&P audit findings of November 2, 1982, indicate differing opinions on how to impose ANSI daughter standards and quality program requirements to lower tier contractors. These responses show that Bechtel was imposing adequate specific requirements but not in a methodology acceptable to HL&P. These differences were dispositioned on March 3,1983, and were acceptable to the NRC inspector.
The HL&P audit conducted April 1983 was originally scheduled for accomplishment July 1982 but because Bechtel's newly developed, project specific procedures had not been approved and implemented, the audit was delayed on two subsequent occasions. A review of Bechtel's and HL&P's correspondence relating to this subject was reviewed for the period of July 1982 through December 1983. This review showed that necessary corrective actions were taken prior to actual procurement under the specifications.
Professional Qualifications of Eric H. Johnson United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission I am Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1, Region IV, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Arlington, Texas.
I have held this position in Region IV since October 1983.
In 'this assignment, my responsibilities include reviewing, approving and performing routine and special inspections at nuclear facilities assigned to Region IV.
In this position, I was responsible for managing the inspection program at the South Texas Project through the Chief, Reactor Project Section.
I received a Bachelor of Science Degree, with honors, in marine engineering from the United States Naval Academy in 1967.
Prior Work History 1983-1985 Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1, Region IV Responsible for managing the.inspe ion program and assigned inspectors at both operating plants and ph;Njnder construction. This included recommendations and enforcement actions for deficiencies, and approval on NRC inspection reports for routine and special inspections.
Participated in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance as a member of the
4 k
. SALP board. For 3 months during 1983, served as the Technical Assistant 1
-to the Director', Division of Reactor Safety and Projects.
(NRC) 1 4
1982-1983 Enforcement Officer, Region IV 4
. Responsible for managing the enforcement program for the regional office, including review and analysis of inspection findings and recommendations for enforcement actions. Until a reorganization of functions in July 1982, supervised the activities of two investigators in the investigation of alleged wrongdoing at plants in the geographic area covered by RIV (NRC).
1 1981-1982 Reactor Inspector Served as a member of the technical staff of Region IV with responsibility f
for the inspection of assigned power, research and test reactors during test, startup and operation.
(NRC) 1979-1981 Administrator, Nuclear Safety Division Responsible for organizing and coordinating the Secretariat's work in the areas of emergency core cooling research, containment safety, consequence modelling and the International Standard Problems performed in these areas. Acted as Secretary to the International Working Groups in these above areas.
(Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, France) i t
b t -
-4,_-
,_,,o c
w-
+
-w e.,
t wr --
r ---
--1
1975-1981 Reactor Inspector Served as a member of the technical staff of Region IV with responsibility for the inspection of assigned power, research and test reactors during test, startup and operation.
(NRC) 1967-1975 Reactor Operations Various supervisory responsibilities for naval nuclear propulsion plant operation.. Duties includes operation, training of operators, health physics, maintenance, planning and scheduling, and design changes.
(U.S.
Navy) 4
.,-,n,
Professional Qualifications of George L. (Les) Constable United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission I am Chief, Reactor Projects Section B, Region IV, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Arlington, Texas.
I have held this position since June 9, 1985.
Education:
Navy Nuclear Reactor Operator Program (1964)
BSE (Nuclear Engineering), University of Florida (1975)
Experience:
1985 to Present Chief, Reactor Projects Section, RIV NRC Responsible for direction of NRC inspection personnel for South Texas Project and Waterford 3.
1980 to 1985 Senior Resident Inspe ior, RIV NRC 4
e
.,,.. ~. - -. - -
-..v-----.--
en.
- , Assigned to Waterford 3 Nuclear Station (CE-PWR). Responsible for routine and reactive inspection during construction and testing.
1984 to 1985 NRC Waterford Task Force Site Team Leader, RIV NRC Assisted in the overall coordination of NRC Task Force activities-associated with Waterford 3 (NT0L). Activities included coordinating the efforts of up to 50 inspectors and consultants _ during the resolution of numerous allegations.
1978 to 1980 Reactor Inspector, RIV NRC Principal inspector for Cooper Nuclear Station (BWR - operating).
Responsibility included conducting the routine and reactive inspection program for an operating reactor.
_1975_to 1978 Reactor Inspection Specialist. Division of Reactor Operations Inspections, U. S. NRC Participated in development of reactor inspection program, headquarters enforcement cases, principal correspondence, interpretation of TS and Standards. Provided interface between regions and other NRC offices.
Aided in the development of standards and regulations.
1971 to 1975
' Assistant Reactor Supervisor (SRO), University of Florida
. Training Reactor While a full time student, worked up to supervising entire day-to-day operation of facility, including direct supervision of two full time and four part-time R0s and SR0s. Responsibilities included teaching portions of reactor operations courses and training utility operators.
1968 to 1971 Reactor Operator / Instructor, SIC Prototype, U.S. Navy Trained and qualified Navy Reactor Operators in the area of reactor operations and maintenance.
1965 to 1968 Reactor Operator / Electronics Technician, U.S.S.
Shark SSN-591 Qualified reactor operator, radiation control technician, member of nuclear weapons incident response team. Tour of duty included approximately two years of routine submarine operation and a nine month refueling 1964 to 1965 U.S. Navy - A1W Prototype While in training, served as radiation control technician. Qualified as reactor operator on both A1W reactors.
__