IR 05000395/1996013
| ML20133F500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F494 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-96-13, NUDOCS 9701140230 | |
| Download: ML20133F500 (18) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION II
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Docket No.:
50 395 License No.:
NPF-12 Report No.:
50 395/96-13
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Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company Facility:
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Location:
P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville SC 29065 Dates:
October 27 November 30, 1996 Inspectors:
B. Bonser Senior Resident Inspector T. Farnholtz, Resident Inspector Larry Garner, Project Engineer RII (Sections M2.2 and RS.1)
Approved by:
G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
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i ENCLOSURE 9701140230 961230
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PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
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EXECtITIVE SUMMARY V. C. Summer Nuclear Station l
NRC Inspection Report 50 395/96 13 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 5 week l
period of resident insaection; in addition, it includes the results of l
announced inspections ay a regional projects inspector.
l Operations A walkdown of the A and B diesel generator fuel oil transfer systems
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identified no discrepancies (Section 02.1).
Control room operators demonstrated good plant awareness and knowledge
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while reducing plant power.
Licensee management acted conservatively in reducing plant power to 35 percent to perform corrective maintenance (Section 04.1).
A Non Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for two examples of a failure
to follow procedure. One example resulted in lowering containment pressure below the desired level and the second example resulted in
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starting a containment spray pump with no flow path (Section 04.2).
The failure to reach timely resolution for the leakage sump annunciators
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in alarm on the leak detection panel reflected a lack of questioning attitude by Operations. The two annunciators indicating excessive leakage in the Reactor Building (RB) had been in alarm for an extended period (Section 04.3).
Maintenance Maintenance activities were completed thoroughly and professionally
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(Section M1.1).
An NCV was identified for failure to follow a maintenance procedure for
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the erection of scaffolding in the A Diesel Generator (DG) room.
Scaffolding erected in the A DG room used safety related Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) duct work as a support without first performing an engineering evaluation (Section M1.2).
Personnel conducting the surveillance tests observed were knowledgeable.
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An NCV was identified for failure to follow procedure for verifying component position and component lineup (Section M2.1).
Testing demonstrated that the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
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(TDEFP) performance was as anticipated and the TDEFP operated properly (Section M2.2).
The morning maintenance meetings were useful for the review and
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coordination of daily maintenance activities (Section M4.1).
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Enaineerina l
The modification to use the RB sump as a method of Reactor Coolant
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l System (RCS) leak detection was adequately justified and implemented, The modification to abandon the leakage sump equipment had not been i
resolved in a timely manner (Section E1.1).
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An NCV was identified for failure to provide adequate procedural
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guidance for TDEFP >ost maintenance testing. A lack of engineering involvement in esta)lishing proper post maintenance testing requirements was identified as a weakness (Section E8.1).
Plant Support An As low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) meeting was conducted well
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and members from various organizations fully participated in the meeting (Section R5.1).
An NCV was identified for failure to follow the procedural requirements
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for unconditional release of material from the radiation controlled area -
(Section R8.1).
A Quality Assurance (QA) audit of the security area had provided a
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thorough and comprehensive assessment (Section S8.1).
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I Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began this inspection period at full power. The unit reduced power to 35 percent on November 6 to perform maintenance on the main generator alternator excitor collector rings and a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow i
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The plant returned to full power on November 7.
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Operations l
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
l Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent
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reviews of plant operations in the main control room and in the plant.
l In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-l conscious.
The inspectors also reviewed Condition Evaluation Reports (CERs) to verify that the licensee was documenting deficiencies. The licensee was documenting deficiencies appropriately.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment l
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02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)
The inspectors toured accessible plant areas and visually inspected major components. No general conditions that might degrade system I
o)eration were identified. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of t1e A and B Diesel Generator's (DG's) fuel oil transfer systems. There were no discrepancies identified. The inspectors also accom)anied a plant operator on rounds of the lower auxiliary building. T1e operator was knowledgeable of his duties.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Operator Performance (71707)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a planned power reduction to 35 percent )ower on November 6 to polish the alternator excitor collector rings on t1e main generator excitor and calibrate a RCS flow transmitter.
b.
Observations and Findinas i
The power reduction and return to full power were performed without incident. The inspectors concluded that control room operators
demonstrated good plant awareness and knowledge while reducing )lant j
power. The inspectors also concluded that licensee management lad acted conservatively in reducing plant power to 35 percent. At this power
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level, power was below the turbine trip / reactor trip set point and below
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the P 8 setpoint, 38 percent power, for loss of flow in one reactor coolant loop.
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Conclusions A review of a planned power reduction during the inspection period concluded that control room operators demonstrated good plant awareness and knowledge while reducing plant power. The inspectors also concluded that licensee management had acted conservatively in reducing plant power to 35 percent to perform corrective maintenance.
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04.2 Human Performance Errors (71707)
a.
Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed two human performance errors. One error occurred during an alignment of the RB ventilation system. The second error occurred during the performance of a surveillance by the Operations Department Test Group.
b.
Observations and Findinos On November 12, at about 1:35 a.m., the control building operator while performing System Operating Procedure, SOP 114. Reactor Building Ventilation System, Revision 15,Section III.N. Reactor Building Normal Pressure Control, to raise RB pressure opened the wrong valves. The operator opened PVG 6066 and PVG 6067, containment purge exhaust isolation valves instead of PVG 6056 and PVG-6057, purge supply isolation valves. As a result of this error, containment pressure dropped from about 0.01 psig to 0.04 psig. The Technical Specification (TS) low limit for containment pressure is -0.1 psig. At about 2:15 a.m., a control board operator observed containment pressure at 0.02 psig, identified the incorrect valve alignment, and closed the two exhaust valves.
On November 18, during the performance of STP0212.002, Reactor Building Spray Pump Test Revision 2, a technician in the Operations Test Group performing the as found valve lineup identified valve XVG03011 RB spray pump full flow test isolation valve, as open. The operator based his decision on an inability to move the valve handle in the open position.
The valve stem was not visible due to a stem shroud. When the B containment spray pump was started, the main control board flow instrument indicated no flow. The pump was immediately secured to determine the reason for no flow.
Valve XVG03011 was found closed.
Valve XVG03011 is a recirculation valve that directs flow back to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and would not be expected to be open during normal operation. The technician did not question this discrepancy when XVG03011 was identified as found in the open position.
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Both of these events are examples of a failure to follow procedure in l
the operations area and are a violation of TS 6.8.1.
The licensee took i
immediate corrective action when these events occurred.
Plant
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management has also frequently stressed the importance of self verification and a questioning attitude to avoid errors. These two
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events represented human performance errors. This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is identified as 50 395/96013-01.
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Conclusions l
An NCV was identified for two examples of a failure to follow procedure.
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One example resulted in lowering containment pressure below the desired l
level and the second example resulted in starting a containment spray i
pump with no flow path.
04.3 Review of Leak Detection Alarm Panel (71707)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the annunciators in alarm on the leak detection alarm panel, XPN 6034, to assess the licensee's actions to monitor l
leakage into the containment sump and from valve stem leak-off lines l
from various valves in the auxiliary building.
Several of the l
annunciators had been in alarm for several years.
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Observations and Findinas l
The inspectors observed that annunciators on XPN 6034 were in alarm for the RB sum) and several groups of valve stem leak off lines in the
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auxiliary auilding. The purpose of the leak detection alarm panel is to monitor excessive leakage in the containment and from valve stem leak-l off lines from various valves in the auxiliary, intermediate, and fuel l
handling buildings.
1od age in the RB collects in the RB sump.
In the original plant design, containment leakage was monitored in a leakage sump located within the larger RB sump.
Level indicators in the leakage sump initiated a high level alarm and a leakage rate greater than 1 gpm alarm on the leak detection panel. This leakage detection method was subsecuently deleted several years ago by a more reliable monitoring methoc using the RB sump. The annunciators for the newer leak detection method were added to the main control board.
The inspectors observed both of the leakage sump annunciators on the i
leak detection panel to be in alarm. A note in the leak detection panel annunciator response procedure for these two alarms stated that until
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the completion of modification MRF 21902A the annunciator was not valid-
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and the actions in the arocedure should not be performed. The
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modification, however, las been complete for several years. The leakage l
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sump annunciators were not valid since the leakage sump equipment was abandoned. The inspectors concluded that the failure to reach timely resolution to remove the two leakage sump annunciators in alarm reflected a lack of questioning attitude by Operations. The newer leak detection monitoring method has been in use for several years. The two annunciators on the leak detection panel indicating excessive leakage in the RB had been in alarm for an extended period and their response procedures had not been updated to reflect plant current configuration.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for the valve stem leak off annunciators in alarm on the leak detection panel.
Valve stem leak off collects in leak detection drain pots and actuates a high level alarm. As a compensatory measure, the licensee assesses leakage into each of the drain pots quarterly and closely monitors RCS leakage.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was taking appropriate compensatory action to monitor valve leakage.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the failure to reach a timely resolution for the leakage sump annunciators in alarm on the leak detection panel reflected a lack of questioning attitude by Operations. The two annunciators indicating excessive leakage in the RB had been in alarm for an extended period. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was taking appropriate compensatory action to monitor valve leakage.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50 395/96007 03: paint coat in containment does not meet application specification.
This issue was reviewed and will remain open pending the review of additional information.
II.
Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (62707)
a.
Insoection Scope The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities to replace a degraded power supply in a rod control system logic cabinet (MWR 9604133) and to determine the cause of leak by on Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) heat exchanger isolation valve XVT06659 SF (MWR 9603736).
b.
Observations and Findings The inspectors found the work performed under these work requests to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced
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and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.
The rod control power sur. y replacement involved installation of a different model power suppi/ since the original power supply was no longer available. The inspectors found that the licensee had adequately reviewed and justified the new power supply as a replacement through their Equal To/Better Than program.
The SFPCS heat exchanger isolation valve had been the subject of a 3revious NRC violation. The valve was known to leak by its seat and had
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3een used as a tagout isolation boundary resulting in a loss of spent fuel pool level (NRC Inspection Re> ort 50 395/96 05). The licensee's trouble shooting determined that t1ere was nothing wrong with the valve internals. The valve had not been fully closed when it had 3reviously leaked by its seat due to the orientation of the valve handwieel, which made it difficult to mani)ulate. The licensee reoriented the handwheel
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and verified no valve leacage. The inspectors concluded that this maintenance had resolved the leakage issue associated with this valve.
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Conclusions Maintenance activities were completed thoroughly and professionally.
M1.2 Review of Scaffoldina Erected In Diesel Generator Roc 3s (62707)
a.
Insoection Scooe On November 11, the licensee declared the A DG inoperable due to discrepancies found with scaffolding erected in the A DG room. The inspectors reviewed the discrepancies identified by the licensee and reviewed the subsequent erection of scaffolding in the B DG room.
b.
Observations and Findinas On November 11, the licensee identified that scaffolding erected by maintenance in the A DG room did not appear to comply with Civil Maintenance Procedure, CMP 100.009, Scaffold Request, Evaluation, and Erection, Revision 6.
Scaffolding had been erected in the A DG room as part of a plant wide modification to the fire protection system.
Concerns were identified regarding vertical post span length and loading of the scaffolding, tipping of the scaffolding, and using the safety related HVAC duct work in the DG room as a scaffolding support.
The engineering review of these scaffolding discrepancies found that the scaffolding as erected did not create a safety concern and had not rendered the A DG inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
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engineering evaluation of the scaffolding discrepancies and concluded that the discrepancies were adequately reviewed. The construction of the scaffolding, however, did not comply with the procedural guidance.
l Procedure CMP 100.009 states that an engineering evaluation is required j
for scaffolding that is attached or su) ported by safety related systems.
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The inspectors concluded that use of t1e DG room safety related HVAC duct work as a scaffold support without first performing an engineering evaluation was a safety concern.
The licensee took immediate corrective action and established a root cause evaluation team to review this scaffolding problem. This failure to follow procedure is a violation of TS 6.8.1.
This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is identified as 50-395/96013 02 The inspectors also walked down scaffolding erected in the B DG room on November 18 for the same modification with the system engineer and the shift engineer. There were no concerns identified.
Scaffolding was not erected in both DG rooms simultaneously.
c.
Conclusions An NCV was identified for failure to follow a maintenance procedure for the erection of scaffolding in the A DG room.
Scaffolding erected in the A DG room used safety related HVAC duct work as a support without first performing an engineering evaluation. Scaffolding erected subsequently in the B DG room was adequate.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Surveillance Observation a.
Insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:
STP 215.0018, Reactor Building Personnel Escape Airlock Test,
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Revision 4 STP 224.004, Backup Air Supply Accumulator Check Valve Leak Test
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For Control Room Outside Air Intake Isolation Valves Revision 1 b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors found that the tests were conducted using correct procedures and test equipment.
For the personnel escape airlock test the inspectors observed the pre job briefing, the health physics
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controls, the RB closecut, the foreign material exclusion controls, and the control of the activity by the test supervisor. The insaectors concluded that overall the test was completed as required. lowever, during this observation it did not always appear to the inspectors that one individual was in control of the different tasks being performed for
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this test. At one point a QA inspector also observing the test pointed
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out one instance to the test supervisor that 3rocedural steps to verify I
component position and component lineup were >eing aerformed concurrently instead of in sequence as required. T1is oversight was corrected immediately. This licensee identified and corrected violation l
for failure to follow procedure is being treated as an NCV, consistent I
with Section VII.B1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is I
identified as 50-395/96013 03. Overall the inspectors concluded that personnel conducting the tests observed were knowledgeable.
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Conclusions The insaectors concluded that >ersonnel conducting the surveillance tests caserved were knowledgea)le. An NCV was identified for failure to follow procedure for verifying component position and component lineup.
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M2.2 Turbine Driven Emeroency Feedwater Pumo (TDEFP) Test (61726)
a.
Insoection Scooe On October 28, the inspectors witnessed a TDEFP test to verify that the governor would maintain the pump in a stable condition with the
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pneumatic control signal defeated and the pump at low speed.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified that the test was performed using approved procedures and that the vibration monitor and strobe tachometer were
within their calibration intervals. When the instrument air was secured to the pneumatic controller, TDEFP speed changed to its preset manual governor settin,# with only a slight overshoot prior to stabilizing. The
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test verified Laat the manual setpoint remained within the expected tolerance of the previous test's as left set)oint.
No oscillations were
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observed at low pump speeds. Data recorded ay the licensee was verified by the inspectors to be accurate and properly recorded.
After this test, a normal surveillance test was performed. Review of the completed data sheets indicated that the TDEFP performance was within established acceptance criteria.
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Conclusions Testing demonstrated that the TDEFP performance was as anticipated and the TDEFP operated properly.
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M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Daily Maintenance Meetinos (62707)
a.
Inspection Scoce The inspectors observed morning maintenance meetings to evaluate licensee planning of daily plant maintenance activities.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors routinely observed the Maintenance manager's morning maintenance meetings throughout the inspection period.
Each of the maintenance disciplines, and the Planning and Scheduling. Engineering, and Operations groups were re] resented at the meetings. During the meetings supervisors from eac1 of the maintenance disciplines discussed the maintenance to be conducted that day. The Operations shift engineer also reviewed operational status and priorities. The inspectors concluded that these meetings were useful for the review and coordination of maintenance activities.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the morning maintenance meetings were useful for the review and coordination of daily maintenance activities.
III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Plant Modification For Reactor Buildino Leak Detection (MRF 21902 MCN A) (37551)
a.
Inspection Scope The ins)ectors reviewed the plant modification to change the method of RCS lea ( detection from the RB leakage sump to the larger RB sump and to abandon the leak detection equipment associated with the RB leakage sump.
b.
Observations and Findinos Plant modification MRF 21902 MCN A terminated the use of the leakage sump to determine RCS leakage. The inspectors found that this
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modification had been completed for several years and still remained open due to a pending decision on what to do with the abandoned and
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still installed leak detection equipment. As a result, annunciators on the leak detection panel indicated excessive leakage in the RB and remained in alarm. The inspectors reviewed the modification package and
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the safety evaluation and concluded that detection of unidentified RCS leakage by the RB sump level transmitters was ecuivalent to the method employed in the original leakage sum). This mocified method of leak detection appeared to be within the ) asis of the TS and to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems. The inspectors also reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and found it was updated to describe the modified leak detection method.
The inspectors concluded that the modification to use the RB sump as a method of RCS leak detection was adequately justified and implemented.
However, the inspectors also concluded that the modification to abandon the leakage sump equipment had not been resolved in a timely manner.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the modification to use the RB sump as a method of RCS leak detection was adequately justified and implemented.
However, the inspectors also concluded that the modification to abandon the leakage sump equipment had not been resolved in a timely manner.
E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)
E7.1 Review of FSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the FSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compared plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the FSAR description. While performing the insaections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applica)le
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portions of the FSAR that related to the areas inspected. No l
discrepancies were identified.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50 395/96011 03: inadequate post maintenance testing of the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) pump following governor maintenance. On August 9, 1996, maintenance was performed on the TDEFW pump turbine governor, governor valve, and the connecting linkage. At that time, a portion of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-220.002. Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test, Revision 1, which did not include speed control testing, was performed as post maintenance testing and the pump was returned to service. On October 1, STP 220.002, test number one, failed to meet the acceptance criteria when the manual speed control allowed the turbine to exceed the specified speed range.
It is likely that this speed control condition existed since the August maintenance. Details surrounding this event are contained in NRC Inspection Report 50 395/96011. The licensee assembled a root cause analysis team to determine the facts surrounding the lack of an adequate post maintenance test following the August maintenanc.._.
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The inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis team's report and determined that it included all pertinent information and identified the root causes of this event. The root causes included a work organization that did not identify a change in the sco)e of maintenance, work practices which did not include self-checcing, failure to follow the recuired procedure, and inadequate procedural guidance. The inspectors incependently reviewed the licensee's post maintenance testing program and concluded that this event was primarily caused by a lack of adequate
]rocedural guidance.
Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 421, Shift Engineer Conduct of Operations, Revision 5. Section 3.2.4.E indicates that the shift engineer is responsible for providing designated signature authority for the retest requirements per General Test Procedure (GTP) 214 Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 2.
Procedure GTP 214 specifies that a speed control test is required as part of the post maintenance test following work performed on the turbine governor or linkage. However, SAP 601, Application, Scheduling and Handling of l
Maintenance Activities, Revision 9 Section 6.6, indicates that the requirements of GTP-214 do not apply if the Maintenance Work Request (MWR) has been assigned a priority of 1, 2, 1S, or 2S. The MWR that was generated to correct the governor and linkage in August was a priority l
2S.
The root cause analysis team recommended revising SAP 421 to require that the shift engineer be responsible for ensuring that necessary post-job briefings are held with all involved parties to prescribe appropriate post maintenance retesting for maintenance activities which are not pre planned or represent a change in scope from that which was
originally intended. The inspectors considered this change to be
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adequate to correct the situation described above. The failure to provide adequate procedural guidance for post maintenance testing at the time of the August maintenance is identified as a violation. This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50 395/96013 04.
In addition, the inspectors identified an apparent lack of involvement on the part of the system and component engineering organization. The system engineer for the TDEFW pump was physically present during much of the maintenance and testing of the unit during the time in question.
However, there did not appear to be a strong influence on the part of engineering to ensure that adequate testing was performed following maintenance. This indicated a lack of " ownership" on the aart of the system engineer with respect to his assigned component. T1e licensee has tasked the shift engineer with this responsi)ility. The shift j
engineers are assigned to an o3erating crew and rotate every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This could contribute to a lac ( of continuity on work which continues i
over several shifts. The inspectors identified the lack of involvement
of the system and component engineering organization with regard to post maintenance testing to be a weakness.
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Conclusions An NCV was identified for failure to provide adequate procedural guidance for post maintenance testing. A lack of engineering involvement in establishing proper post maintenance testing requirements was identified as a weakness.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
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The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be acceptable. The inspectors also toured a portion of the auxiliary building with the Health Physics to review decontamination practices.
R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C R5.1 As low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Meetino (71750)
On October 30, the inspectors attended an ALARA meeting. The status of previous items was reviewed. Special emphasis was focused on items that could be improved and identified enhancements from the last refueling outage. The discussions included both practice and hardware changes, results of conversations with peers at other utilities, and reviews of initiatives that had been successfully implemented at other utilities.
The ALARA meeting was conducted well and members from various organizations fully participated in the meeting.
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R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues (92904)
R8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-395/96011 05: contaminated material found outside the Radiation Control Area (RCA). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation to investigate how radioactive material had been removed from the RCA. A saecific root cause to explain how an underwater light was removed from t1e RCA could not be determined.
It was clear that the procedural requirements in Health Physics Procedure, HPP 158, Contamination Control For Areas. Equipment and Materials.
Revision 7, governing unconditional release of material from the RCA were violated. The root cause evaluation concluded that the release procedure was violated although the unconditional release limits from the RCA were well known and understood.
The licensee's root cause evaluation also concluded that there was insufficient managerial oversight in the decontamination and unconditional release of material from the RCA process. This was exhibited in concerns identified by the root cause evaluation. The evaluation concluded that it could not be determined who originally
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desired the light cover to be decontaminated and its intended
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It could not be determined who removed the light cover from the decon room and who determined it met l
the necessary limits to be released from a contaminated area.
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procedure this should have been done by a Health Physics (HP)
specialist.
In practice it was identified that decontamination personnel, who are not HPs, release material from the decon room. The evaluation identified that the RCA outdoor fence and back gate were
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found in poor re] air. The skid pan, in which the light was found, was placed next to t1e fence. Tossing material over the fence into the skid pan was viewed as an acceptable practice. The root cause evaluation also found that background radiation requirements for release of material were not consistently known or understood. The adequacy of the
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formal training and qualifications for decontamination personnel were l
questioned.
The root cause evaluation also made several corrective action recommendations. The inspectors reviewed these recommendations with'the HP manager and concluded that the recommendations addressed the problem and should prevent its recurrence. The failure to follow unconditional release requirements in procedure HPP-158 is identified as a violation of TS 6.8.1.
This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This NCV is identified as 50-395/96013 05.
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S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues S8.1 Quality Assurance Audit of Security Group a.
Inspection Scope (40500)
l The inspectors observed a QA security audit exit meeting.
b.
Observations and Findinas On November 19, the inspectors attended a QA security audit exit meeting. Several of the audit findings discussed at the meeting were substantive or indicative of trends. There was good management participation and good discussion of the issues identified. The inspectors concluded that the QA audit had provided a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the security area.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that a QA audit of the security area had provided a thorough and comprehensive assessment.
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Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors 3 resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on December 9 and 27, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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'The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
X3 Management Meeting Summary On November 6. Albert F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, visited the Summer site to tour the plant and discuss current issues with plant management.
l On November 7. Jon R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor l
Projects, visited the Summer site to tour the plant and discuss current issues with plant management.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i
Licensee F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services i
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L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics
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M. Browne, Manager, Planning and Scheduling S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations s
R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systens M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations
S. Furstenberg, Manager. Maintenance Services i
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Safety l
G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering
K. Nettles, General Manager, Strategic Planning and Development
H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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T. Taylor, General Manager, Engineering Services
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R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
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IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92901: Followup Plant Operations IP 92903: Followup Engineering IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED l
l Opened i
50 395/96013 01 NCV failure to follow procedure during containment pressurization and during a containment spray pump test (Section 04.1)
50 395/96013 02 NCV failure to follow procedure during the erection of scaffolding in the A train diesel generator room (Section M1.3)
50 395/96013 03 NCV failure to follow procedure for verifying component position and lineup of components (Section M2.1).
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l 50 395/96013 04 NCV inadequate procedural guidance for post maintenance
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l testing (Section E8.1)
50 395/96013 05 NCV failure to follow arocedure for unconditional release
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of material from t1e radiation control area (Section l
R8.1)
l Closed 50 395/96013 01 NCV failure to follow procedure during containment pressurization and during a containment spray pump test (Section 04.1)
50 395/96013 02 NCV failure to follow procedure during the erection of
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scaffolding in the A train diesel generator room I
(Section M1.3)
50-395/96013 03 NCV failure to follow procedure for verifying component position and lineup of components (Section M2.1).
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50 395/96013 04 NCV inadequate procedural guidance for post maintenance testing (Section E8.1)
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50 395/96013 05 NCV failure to follow arocedure for unconditional release of material from t1e radiation control area (Section R8.1)
50 395/96011 03 URI inadequate post maintenance testing of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump following governor maintenance (Section E8.1)
50-395/96011 05 URI contaminated material found outside the radiation control area (Section R8.1)
Discussed 50 395/96007-03 URI paint coat in containment does not meet application specification (Section 08.1)
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