ML20133F412

Observation Rept 70-7002/96-07 on 961026-1206.No Violations Observed.Major Areas Observed:Aspects of Plant Operations, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20133F412
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	01/07/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133F396	List: ML20133F392 ML20133F412
References
70-7002-96-07, 70-7002-96-7, NUDOCS 9701140175
Download: ML20133F412 (15)

Text

. . . . _ . . . __ . . ___ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . - _ , . .

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No. 70-7002 i

l t

Certificate No. GDP-2 Observation Report No.

70-7002/96007 (DNMS)

Applicant: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name:

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Dates: October 26, 1996 through December 6, 1996 i Inspectors: C. R. Cox, Senior Resident Inspector

D. J. Hartland, Resident Inspector l Approved By

Gary L. Shear, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch 1

l i

I i

i 2

9701140175 970107 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C PENT ,

i

l l

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Pcrtsnouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Insp'ction Report 70-7002/96007(DNMS)

This observation report iach. des aspects of plant operations, engineering, and plant support. Observations were made by the resident inspectors as part of their routine duties.

Authority Statement: The Department of Energy (00E) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have agreed to cooperate to facilitate the NRC's obtaining of information and knowledge regarding the gaseous diffusion plants and the United States Enrichment Corporation's (USEC) operation thereof through observation / inspection activities during the interim period before the NRC assumes regulatory responsibility. This report is a summary of NRC observations for the period stated. Each of the observations was communicated to the DOE site safety staff and USEC site staff during and at the end of the observation appropriste.

period to allow for their future followup and evaluation, as Plant Operations The inspectors were concerned that restrictions placed on new activities in the plant were not being reviewed for applicability to existing activities.

The example observed was a restriction on the use of mobile equipment on a new cooldown high bay. pad at the X-344 building, with no such restriction in the building Facility personnel demonstrated poor communication among work groups and a lack of questioning attitude in allowing a compressor to be labelled as

" planned expeditious handling" for an extended period of time in X-333.

Facility personnel did not initiate a problem report to document a failure that occurred during an Operational Safety Requirements (OSR) surveillance.

The inspectors were concerned that caution tags were being inappropriately used to preclude the use of rejected slings.

Enaineerino The facility's operability determination of the degraded CAAS detection crystals was in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 91-18 and plaat procedures. However, the facility did not have adequate justification to maintain the autoclaves operable due to lack of as-found testing of degraded o-ring material.

2 w --

4 Plant Support The inspectors observed poor housekeeping and contamination control practices in the X-330 and X-333 buildings.

Due to pre-staging and an erroneous initiatin; public announcement (PA), a drill was inconclusive in demonstrating the licensee's ability to account for personnel in the event of an emergency. In addition, the facility did not account for personnel in response to a criticality accident alarm activation at X-710.

I I

l l

3 l

Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at approximately 1400 MW during most of this observation period.

I. Operations

01. Conduct of Ooerations' 01.1 General Comments The inspectors observed selected operational activities. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

01.2 Movement of Cylinders in the X-344 Toll Enrichment Facility

a. Insoection Scone The inspectors observed cylinder movements in and around the X-344 Toll Enrichment Facility and discussed the use of the new cooldown pad adjacent to the facility. j 2

b. Observations and Findinos During a routine tour of the X-344 Toll Enrichment Facility, the inspectors noted an abnormally high number of cylinders on the high bay floor. Facility personnel indicated that the large number of cylinders was due to blending operations and the unavailability of the new cooldown pad. The facility manager had not released the new cooldown pad for use because the unreviewed l

safety question determination for the cooldown pad project placed i a restriction on mobile equipment in the cooldown area. The facility manager wanted to clarify the restriction to determine if <

mobile equipment could be brought into the restricted area for crane repair. This was to avoid a situation where a liquid filled cylinder could become suspended for an extended period of time due to a crane failure without a means to repair the crane.

On several occasions, the inspectors noted forklifts bringing empty two and one-half ton cylinders into the crowded high bay area. Facility personnel indicated that the use of mobile equipment in the high bay area was described in the current Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The facility personnel wondered why there

' Topical headings such as 01, M8, etc., are used in accordance with the tiRC standardized inspection report outline contained in flRC Manual Chapter 0610.

Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics, and the topical headings are therefore not always sequential.

4

1

. 1 was a concern with using mobile equipment on the cooldown pad since they were allowed to frequently use mobile equipment in the high bay. The inspectors reviewed the SAR and found one sentence that stated that the high bay area had large roll-up doors to allow entry of such mobile equipment. I 1

c. Conclusion The restrictions on the use of mobile equipment on the new pad I were consistent with the restricted use of mobile equipment on other cooldown pads as noted in Observation Report 70-7002/96005 Section E2.2. The safety concern about the use of mobile equipment around cooling cylinders on the cooldown pads is that the mobile equipment could strike a cooling cylinder causing the release of uranium hexafluoride. That same safety concern existed for the use of mobile equipment in the high bay. Rather than question the use of mobile equipment in the high bay, the facility personnel questioned the restrictions for the cooldown pad. The inspectors concluded that safety concerns identified for new activities that could apply for SAR described activities should also be evaluated against current SAR activities. The inspectors will follow up .on the use of mobile equipment around cooling cylinders as part of an ongoing plant-wide evaluation of liquid-filled cylinder handling activities (Observation Followup Item (GDC 70-7002/96007-01)).

01.3 Comoressor in the X-333 Buildina Found labelled as " Planned Exoeditious Handlina" (PEH)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the status of an Evacuation Booster Station (EBS) compressor that was stored on the X-333 cell floor as a PEH item.

b. Observations and Findinas On' November 20, 1996, the inspectors noted an EBS compressor on the cell floor in the X-333 Building stored in a square defined by a boundary of red barrier tape labelled " danger do not enter". A yellow caution tag was attached on the barrier tape at the center of each side of the formed square. The instructions on the caution tags stated: "PEH compressor, Do not enter with uranium bearing material". The caution tags were dated October 27, 1995.

The inspectors verified that date by reviewing the Caution Tag Log for the X-333 Building. PEH is a term used to identify a piece of equipment that raises a criticality safety concern because it contains a large enough mass of uranium with oil or water, or it has a greater than safe mass of uranium. In either case, such equipment would require special handling.

l 5

The inspectors contacted the acting facility manager and inquired about the compressor. The acting facility manager was unaware of the status of the compressor but called a criticality safety specialist and later determined the following' history of the EBS compressor:

{

The compressor was identified as PEH and cut out on ,

October 27, 1995. It was stored and labelled as found by the inspectors.

The Criticality Safety Manager had an Applied Nuclear Technology (ANTS) technician brought in that afternoon to verify the uranium mass. The technician determined that the  ;

deposit was a critically safe mass and informed the facility manager and Criticality Safety Manager late that afternoon. l l

A criticality safety engineer evaluated the ANTS I' technician's data at the request of the work nlanning organization on July 10 1996 reclassified the compres,sor as, "verified the safehandling" uncomplicated mass, and indicating no criticality safety concerns.

On November 20, 1996, the barrier tape and caution tags were removed after the acting facility manager followed up on the inspectors' concerns and verified the status of the compressor.

c. Conclusion The use of red barrier tape and yellow caution tags to define a criticality controlled area as in the case of the so-called PEH compressor was not consistent with any criticality safety procedure or Nuclear Criticality Safety Agreement (NCSA). There was no approved NCSA for storage of PEH equipment in the X-333' Building.

The fact that on two different occasions the EBS compressor had been identified as " uncomplicated handling" and yet the barrier tape and caution tags remained in place demonstrates the poor communications between Cascade Operations, Criticality Safety, Work Planning, and the ANTS group. It also demonstrated a lack of a questioning attitude. When the question of the status of the compressor arose on July 10, 1996, no one questioned why something that was designated as PEH was stored in the X-333 Building for over eight months.

6 U

01.4 Problem Durino OSR Surveillance Not Documented

a. Inspection Scoog The inspectors observed testing of the Low Assay Withdrawal (LAW) station high pressure venting (HPV) system and discussed system operation with facility personnel.

b. Observations and Findinas On November 6,1996, the inspectors observed a portion of the testing of the LAW station HPV system per procedure P0EF-372 062. The function of the HPV system is to vent off the pressure l in the LAW system upon an automatic isolation signal from the pyrotronics detection system. One of the purposes of the test is to verify that the applicable valves are in the required position following an actuation.

The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the portion of the testing observed. However, during disci!ssion with the Operations supervisor conducting the test, the inspectors learned that a valve had failed to close as required during testing on the previous day. The supervisor said that the valve solenoid had failed, and that a maintenance service request (MSR) was generated to replace it before testing was recommenced.

The inspectors determined that a problem report (PR) was not generated to document the valve failure. The benefit of generating the PR would have been two-fold. First, it would have provided a mechanism for trending the solenoid failure from a-component as well as a system level. The HSR system apparently does not have the capability to provide trending information.

Secondly, the PR would have required that an operability and reportability screening be performed. However, the inspectors determined that the LAW loop that was being tested was out of service for maintenance at the time. Therefore, there was not an operability issue with the pyrotronics system due to the valve failure, as the system O not required when the LAW loop is out of service. In addition, che pyrotronics is required to be operable only in the event of t' ea failure of the cascade automatic data processing (CADP) sy.etem per the OSR.

In response to the inspectors' concern, the facility initiated a PR for the valve failure.

c. Conclusion The safety significance of not initiating a PR for an operability /reportability determination, in this case, was minimal. However, although the HPV is not considered a safety system, the surveillance was required by the OSR. In addition, the 7

(

• l l.

I l

l valve is considered an Augmented Quality (AQ) item, and the PR system is the primary mechanism for trending failures. The inspectors have documented concerns previously, in Observation Report 70-7002/96005, regarding failure to report deficiencies in l the PR system.

01.5 Inconsistent Taaoina of Re.iected Slinas l

a. Inspection Scone l

The inspectors reviewed the tagging process used to identify '

slings that had been rejected for use due to identified defects.

1

b. Observations and Findinas 1 During tours of the X-340 complexes, the inspectors noted that the i

sling racks had a red painted section designated for rejected slings. Some of the slings in the rejected area were labelled '

with a red tag stating " rejected". Other slings in the rejected 1

area were labelled with yellow caution tags stating "do not use, slings rejected". The red rejected tags were used by code inspectors to identify the slings they rejected while conducting their inspections. By procedure, the code inspectors were the l only group allowed to use the red tags. The yellow caution tags l were used by the uranium material handlers when they identified defects in the slings while conducting their daily checks.

c. Conclusion The inspectors questioned the use of a caution tag to identify a safety concern, in this case slings that failed the inspection

' criteria. Caution tags are usually used to identify equipment problems with special precautions written on the tag and are not used to preclude use of that tagged equipment. In addition, storing rejected slings next to approved slings in the facility rather than removing and destroying them shortly after rejection was another concern.

II. Enaineerina El. Conduct of Enaineerina ,

Throughout the observation period, the inspectors observed facility .

engineering activities, particularly the engineering organization j performance of routine and reactive site activities, including  ;

identification and resolution of technical issues and problems. l 4

, 8

E2 Enaineerina Sucoort of Facilities and Eouioment E2.1 Operability of Autoclave 0-Rinas

a. Scope The inspectors reviewed the facility's operability evaluation of a degraded condition of the autoclave o-rings in the X-340 complex.

b. Observations and Findinas On October 29, 1996 documented a concern, an individual stationed in the X-344 building in PR PTS-96-7820 regarding the failure of autoclave (A/C)f 2 o-ring to return to its original shape after release from its compressive load.

The PR noted that the o-ring material had recently been changed from a Viton type "A" to type "B" material. The o-ring makes up the most vulnerable portion of the A/C pressure boundary that contains HF in the event of a release inside the A/C.

The facility declared the A/C inoperable, replaced the o-ring, and performed a successful pressure decay test prior to placing the A/C back in service. The facility also determined, as documented on the PR, that the A/C's with the type "B" material were

" operational" pending an operability evaluation. This determination was apparently based on successful completion of the last pressure decay surveillance and no visible steam leakage when in service.

I The inspectors reviewed the interim operability determination the following day and were concerned that the facility did not have ,

reasonable expectation that the A/C's with the type "B" material would perform their intended function. This was based on a {

related issue discussed in Observation Report 70-7002/96006 regarding lack of as-found data to validate the reliability of the o-rings.

)

The inspectors raised the concern with facility management who, in response, decided to perform as-found testing on two A/C's with type "B" o-rings. The two A/C's, one each in i the X-343 and X-344 buildings, were tested under the new TSR requirements and successfully passed. The inspectors observed ,

portions of the testing and did not identify any concerns.  !

l The facility determined that the reason the type of o-ring material received from the vendor changed was because no specific grade of Viton material was specified. The specification required only 1/2" diameter material with a durometer of 75. The properties of the different types of material are apparently similar with some variation in tensile strength, elasticity, and compression set characteristics. Engineering performed an evaluation and determined that the Type "A" material was appropriate for this application and has updated the specification accordingly.

9

4 7

In addition, the facility issued a policy that required visual

- inspection of the o-ring prior to each closure of the A/C. The policy required that if crushing or excessive extrusion was observed, an as-found pressure decay test would be performed. If the test passed, continued operation would be permitted, but the o-ring would continue to be inspected to verify that the degree of

compression set did not increase.

c. Conclusion Although the safety significance of this issue is minimal due to successful as-found testing, the inspectors continue to have concerns with the facility's operability determinations of degraded conditions. Generic letter 91-18 and facility procedure UE2-TO-NS1032, " Operability Evaluations and Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions," requires that, upon identification

> of a degraded condition, if the facility chooses initially not to declare the system inoperable, the licensee must have a reasonable expectation that the system is operable. As with the o-ring reliability issue discussed previously in Observation Report 70-7002/96006, the inspectors were concerned that the facility did not have adequate justification to maintain the 4

systems operable due to the lack of as-found data.

E2.2 pperability Determination on Dearaded Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS)

a. Insoection Scoce The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations made during the observation period regarding CAAS clusters that were demonstrating degraded performance.

4

b. Observations and Findinas 1

On November 9, -1996, a CAAS cluster failed its scheduled calibration "as found" test. The cluster contained the newer type of detection crystals that in June 1996 were identified as having i an aging problem in high heat areas. The newer detectors were 1 yellowing after several months of exposure to high heat. The yellowing would cause the scintillation's normally blue spectrum to shift to a green light. The photomultiplier tube in the i

detector is more sensitive to the blue light spectrum; therefore, the green shift would cause the photomultiplier tube's sensitivity to be decreased. The decreased sensitivity was causing the yellowed clusters to fail the "as found" testing.

The system engineer determined in June 1996 that the newer detectors were still effective for at least three months in high heat areas and that early indications of the decreased sensitivity would be detected by the need to raise the voltage on the photomultiplier tube. At this time a 3 month voltage check was 10 I

I

I instituted for new type detectors in high heat areas. The cluster i that failed on November 9, 1996, did not demonstrate the trend of ,

the increased voltage on the tube. Therefore the assumption of l early detection of the degraded condition was no longer valid. At i that point on November 11, 1996, the system engineer evaluated the i remaining clusters in the high heat areas in the cascade l buildings. He determined that there were four clusters in the '

cascade high heat areas that had at least one of the three detectors per cluster which were of the new type. Of the four clusters, two clusters had only one new type detector; therefore, the other two detectors were considered capable of performing the safety function of the cluster. In addition, these two clusters had only been'in place for less than a month. The system engineer felt he had reasonable assurance that these two clusters were operable. The other two clusters had two of three or all three detectors of the new type; therefore, the two clusters were .

declared inoperable and removed. The two clusters that were declared inoperable had their "as found" conditions tested. One cluster passed the "as found" while the other one failed.

c. Conclusion In contrast to the o-ring operability determinations discussed in Section E2.1, the determinations in the case of the CAAS clusters appear to be in conformance with UE2-TO-NS1032 " Operability Evaluations and Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions".

III. Plant Suocort R1 Radioloaical Protection and Chemistry Controls RI.1 Contamination Control in the Cascade Buildinas

a. Scoce of Insoection l

The inspector observed contamination control practices during l tours of-the cascade buildings.

l

b. Observations and Findinas During a tour of the X-333 Building, the inspectors noted grinding I activities on a compressor in preparation for welding. The grinding area was established as a contamination area. Curtains were in place to minimize the spread of grinding material. The maintenance personnel grinding were wearing full anti-contamination clothing and respirators. The inspectors observed that the grinding activities caused sparks to shower over the contamination area boundary.

On other tours of the X-333 and X-330 buildings the inspectors  ;

noted that many of the areas controlled as contaminated areas had l

very poor housekeeping with tools, equipment, and waste strewn all '

11 i

over the controlled area and crossing the contamination boundary.

Hoses and electrical cables were not taped in accordance with radiation protection procedures.

c. Conclusion The poor housekeeping in the controlled areas and the inadequate 1

boundary for grinding activities were examples of poor contamination control practices.

. P1 Conduct of Emeraency Plannina Activities I

The inspectors observed various emergency planning activities i during the observation period.

Pl.1 Criticality Accident Alarm Activation at X-710

a. Inspection Scooe The inspectors observed the Incident Command response and the operations at a monitoring station during an inadvertent activation of the criticality alarm in the X-710 Laboratory.

b. Observations and Findinas On November 19, 1996, the criticality accident alarm system actuated in the X-710 building when the mounting for the cluster came loose. Instrument maintenance was in the area of the cluster at the time of the actuation for the purpose of verifying the serial number on the cluster. The inspectors observed that, overall, the facility's response to the incident was good. Plant personnel, including individuals in contaminated areas, evacuated the building in a timely manner and reported to the monitoring station as required. However, the inspectors identified some concerns, including:

Potentially contaminated personnel were not segregated from others at the monitoring station prior to being surveyed.

In response to this concern, the facility is evaluating enhancements to applicable procedures to require segregation.

• No accountability of personnel was performed. Facility management said that the basis for this was that they determined early in the response the cause of the actuation.

i The inspectors observed, however, that the facility l continued to selectively take other precautions until it was '

verified a criticality did not occur, including maintaining the restricted area and performing radiation surveys. Other  !

concerns regarding the licensee's accountability process are  ;

discussed in para Pl.2. I 12 l

• The facility activated the Operation Assessment Team (0AT) for the incident and originally required members to report to X-300, which was located within the restricted area.  ;

Although the building is shielded and does not require I evacuation, 0AT members would have had to enter the restricted area to access the building. A PA announcement was made later to direct the members to a different facility.

c. Conclusion I

Overall, facility response to the event was good. However, the inspectors were concerned about the facility's ability to account for personnel.

P.1.2 Accountability Drill

a. Insoection Scope The inspectors observed a drill to assess the facility's ability l to account for personnel in the event of an emergency.

b. Observations and Findinas On October 22, 1996, the inspectors observed a drill to assess the facility's ability to account for personnel in the event of an emergency. The drill scenario required that personnel contact by phone their predetermined contacts rather than report to their assembly point. The inspectors identified several problems during the exercise, including:

• The plant performed some "prestaging" prior to the drill.

Testing of the plant PA systems was performed prior to the drill to ensure that they were working properly. In addition, a PA announcement was made the day prior to the drill, requesting that personnel review the accountability procedure.

• The cascade coordinator's initial PA announcement to the plant was in error, as it required that personnel report to their assembly area rather than phone their contact. The error was corrected by a subsequent announcement, but still resulted in some confusion and delay in accounting for personnel.

c. Conclusion Due to the prestaging and the erroneous PA announcement, the drill was inconclusive in demonstrating the licensee's ability to account for personnel in the event of an emergency.

13

- . . . .- .- - . . .___ . - . = ~ - -. . ._.. . . _ ~ . . - - .

IV. Management Meetinas X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors met with facility management representatives and the DOE Site Safety Representatives throughout the observation period and on December 4, 1996. The likely informational content of the observation report was discussed. No classified or proprietary information was identified. No disagreement with observations or findings, as described by the inspectors at these meetings, was identified.

l i

14

.- - . - - . . - . . - ~ _-- - . - -.- . - ._ -. ._ -

Partial List of Persons contacted Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS.1

• D. I. Allen, General Manager

• J. E. Shoemaker, Enrichment Plant Manager

• J. V. Anzelmo, Acting Engineering Manager

• R. W. Gaston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager

• G. S. Price, Maintenance Manager

• C. W. Sheward, Operations Manager United States Enrichn'ent Corooration

• J. H. Miller, USEC Vice President, Production

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager United States Deoartment of Enerav (00E)

J. A. Crum, Site Safety Representative

• J. C. Orrison, Site Safety Representative Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)

• R. J. Caniano, Deputy Director Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

• G. L. Shear, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch

• C. R. Cox, Senior Resident Inspector D. J. Hartland, Resident Inspector C. B. Sawyer, Project Manager

• 1996.

Denotes those present at routine resident exit meeting held on December 4, l

i ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 70-7002/96007-01 0FI evaluate liquid-filled cylinder handling activities i

Closed None l Discussed None Certification issues - Closed Hone 15 b