IR 05000259/1985021
| ML20127F513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127F482 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-85-21, 50-260-85-21, 50-296-85-21, NUDOCS 8505200474 | |
| Download: ML20127F513 (6) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
UNITED STATES
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REGION 11 n
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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Report Nos.: 50-259/85-21, 50-260/85-21, and 50-296/85-21 Licensee: Tenessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: April 1-4, 1985 Inspector:-
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W. C. Liu
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Date Signed Approved'by:
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- ///Ir"1-J. J. BlaW6; Section Chief Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 26 inspector-hours on site
.in the areas of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14), and pipe support baseplate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IE Bulletin 79-02).
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Results:
One violation was identified - Inadequate Design Calculations On Pipe
. Support HPCI R-86, R2.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
' Licensee ~ Employees
' *G. Jones, Plant Manager
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R. Guthrie, Design Service / Nuclear Power
- J. Marshall, Jr., Civil Design Project Engineer, DETS
- D. Miss Engineering Group Supervisor
- B. Morris,' Compliance
- R. Lewis, Senior Shift Manager-J.~ Beason, Civil Engineer, Office of' Engineering R. Baird, Civil Engineer, Office of Engineering
.0ther. licensee employees contacted included engineers, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Paulk, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Patterson, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April, 4,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph above.
The inspector ' described the -
areas inspected -and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
.below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Violation 296/85-21-01, Inadequate Design Calculations on Pipe Support HPCI R-86, R2, paragraph 5.b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 259,260,296/85-21-02, Shear Force Distribution ~ for
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IEB 79-02 Design Calculations, paragraph 6.b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 259,260,296/85-21-03, Frequency / Deflection Criteria Used For Pipe Support Analysis, paragraph 5.c.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 259/85-21-04, Design Calculation for Support No. CS R-11, paragraph 5.b.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio _
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3.
1.icensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. -Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5 and 6.
5.-
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).
a.
Program Status The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives with regard to the implementation of the IEB 79-14 and 79-02 programs.
It was noted that the schedule for engineering design verification had been revised as follows:
Unit No.
Completion Date Scheduled Outage
March, 1987 6/87 - 3/88
September, 1986 11/86 - 6/87
December,1987 2/88 - 10/88 Discussions held with licensee representatives revealed that Browns Ferry pipe support group was responsible for implementation of both the IEB 79-14, pipe support design, and IEB 79-02, baseplate and anchor bolts analysis.
Based on the current information, there are approxi-mately 5500 pipe supports involved in the program; piping stress
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analysis is about 50% complete; pipe support design is 40% complete.
However, no single piping system was finally issued.
b.
Design Calculations
The inspector reviewed portions of the following design calculation l
packages in the areas of the IEB 79-14 and 79-02 programs:
Support No.
Piping System BFN Unit No.
l CS R-11, Rev. 3 Core spray
CS R-21, Rev. 2 Core spray
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L HPCI R-27, Rev. 1 High pressure coolant
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injection (HPCI)
RHR R-18. Rev. 1 Residual Heat Removal
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- Discrepancies identified during the review.
The above design calculations with respect to-pipe support design and
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baseplate / anchor bolts analysis were ' reviewed for. conformance. to analysis criteria,' applicable code, NRC-requirements, and the licensee
< commitments.
In addition, these calculations were evaluated during the review for: thoroughness, clarity, consistency,-- and ' accuracy.
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'7 general, the calculations appeared to be adequate in terms.of using
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. design input, assumptions, references, equations and tables, with the exception of the following two supports:
e (1). Support No. HPCI R-86, Rev. 2, in the Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection system was examined.
It was noted that portions of the
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desigri calculations had not been performed in accordance with licensee commitments ard the NRC requirements.
Sheet-2 of the calculation specified a 5/16-inch fillet weld
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to one-inch plate. The as-installed plate was li-inch thick.
The 5/16-inch weld which was subject to 12,000 pound load was simply evaluated by engineering judgement.
No weld calculations were included in any part of the support calcula-tion to justify the weld sizes.
Sheet-3 specified a 3/4-inch plate for qualification, actual-
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-.4 calculation was based on li-inch thick. Cross sectional area-
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of the plate showed A = 8 square inches, actual cross sec-
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tional area should be 12 square inches.
N Sheet 5 showed two W6 x 15.5 structural members, one vertical
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and one sloped, these two members had been removed, there
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were no notes to indicate that these members were either void-
_ or supersed-ed.
Furthermore,-weld calculation for the two
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attachment plates, li" x 8" x 8", as shown 'on the as-built
. drawing could not be identified from the calculation package.
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s-Sheet 6 specified plate size 11" x 12" x l'-2" with 3/4"
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i diameter bolt.
There were no notes to indicate that the
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L plate had been revis~ed to li" x 15" x l'-3", and bolt size L
had been changed to li" diameter. As-built drawing showed a E
i-inch all around weld.for' the strut connection to the
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horizontal steel beam.
But no weld calculations were per-
formed.
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'N Sheets 10 thru 13 showed Support No. R-90 and support detail
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assembly.
There were no notes to identify that the R-90 and
. the support assembly were void or superseded.
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TVA's Engineering procedure 3.03, Design Calculations, paragraph g.3 states that all design calculations shall be checked for
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adequacy by a qualified person.
The checker must be able to provide independent review; paragraph 4.5 states that any configura-tion change given by an as-constructed drawing must be reconciled with 'the associated calculations.
Calculations are often worked during. development to preserve history, with corner-to-corner-diagonal lines and _words such as " void", or " superseded".
The preparers must ensure that each sheet is identifiable with the
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document, that the status of each sheet is clear, and that the document has continuity.
Figure 11 of the procedure provides
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example revisions to calculation sheets that should be implemented by all design personnel.
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The improper design analyses performed in the aforementioned support calculations are violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion III, and -is identified as Violation 296/85-21-01,
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Inadequate design calculations on pipe support HPCI R-86, R2.
(2) Support No. CS R-11, Rev. 3,.in the Unit I core spray system was i
reviewed.
It was noted that the baseplate had two structural attachments.
Each attachment had three forces and three moments.
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The baseplate had a thickness of 3/8-inch and was analyzed by hand g
calculations.
Sheet 2 of the calculation was revised on March 9,
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1983, but was not signed by the checker.
The inspector held.
< discussions with the licensee representative with respect to the
baseplate analysis.
It was determined that the baseplate will be reanalyzed by the computer applications to ensure that the plate stress and the anchor bolt loads are to be within the allowables.
Pending further review of the design calculation. This matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 259/85-21-04, Design Calcula-
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tions for Support No. CS R-11.
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c.
Design Consideration Browns Ferry Design Criteria No. BFN-50-D707, Rev. 2, Analysis of as-built piping systems, was partially reviewed with respect to pipe
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support. design requirements.
-It was noted that. the
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frequency / deflection criteria for the pipe support design were not addressed in the document.
The inspector held discussions with 11cen-see representatives in the areas of piping stress analysis and pipe
- support design.
It was found that the pipe support group was not instructed to verify whether the supports were able to meet-the rigid requirements when the piping stress engineer modeled the supports as rigid in the stress analysis.
The designing of rigid pipe supports t_
c without ' verifying frequency / deflection requirements had created incon-
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C sistencies between the pipe support designs and the piping stress
, analyses, pending further evaluations with regard to the above
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't.oncerns, this matter -is identified as Unresolved -Item 259, 260, 296/85-21-03, Frequency / deflection criteria used for pipe support analysis.
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Within the areas inspected..one violation was identified.
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Pipe Support Baseplate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IE 6.~ _
a.
Factor of Safety The inspector reviewed six pipe supports in the areas of the baseplate and anchor bolt calculations.
It was noted that the factor of safety of anchor bolts used in the calculations met the IEB 79-02 require-ments.-
b.
Tension Shear Interaction Civil design standard DS-C1.7.1, Rev. 2, General Anchorage to concrete, was partially reviewed, paragraph 5.3 states that the shear capacity of the individual anchors is inversely proportional to the tensile load in the anchor.
The inspector held discussions with licensee represen-tatives with regard to the above concern.
It was found that Browns Ferry pipe support group had performed design calculations in accor-dance with the aforementioned instructions in that the shear force could be reduced to zero when the anchor bolt tensile load approached the allowable value.
As a result, the verification of anchor bolt tension-shear interaction had become meaningless in terms of imprac-tical. shear force distribution to the anchor bolts, pending further evaluations with respect to the aforementioned concern, this matter is identified as Unresolved Item 259, 260, 296/85-21-02, shear force distribution for IEB 79-02 design calculations.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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