IR 05000259/1985044
| ML18029A923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1985 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A922 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-85-44, 50-260-85-44, 50-296-85-44, NUDOCS 8511010028 | |
| Download: ML18029A923 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/85-44, 50-260/85-44, and 50-296/85-44 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
Septe ber 9-13, 1985 Inspector:
at is Approved by:
ape, ection ie Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety zzgr./ IV ate igne pi//~
ate igne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours on site in the areas of refueling activity, spent fuel pool activity and local leak rate testing.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8511010028 851015 PDR ADQCN, 05000259 Q
PDR REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Lewis, Plant Manager
- R. Hunkapillar, Operation Supervisor
- B. C. Morris, Compliance
- J.
D. Wolcott, Engineer
"M. Miller, Refueling Coordinator, Operation
- A. C. Smith, Chemical Engineer
- B. R. McPherson, Engineer
- T. D. Cosby, Superintendent-Maintenance, Acting
>>T.
E. Swindell, Superintendent Operation/Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. L. Paulk, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
- C. A. Patterson, Resident Inspector (RI)
- C. Brooks, RI
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 13, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph l. above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Inspector Followup Item IFI (85-44-01)
Determination by the licensee as to what caused failed fuel assemblies for Unit 2 end of Cycle 5.
IFI (85-44-02)=The licensee committed to reevaluate TS 3/4.10 which contains conflicting requirements of operability of SRM during refueling operations.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Refueling Activity (60710) Unit
During the inspection period, the regional inspector witnessed refueling operations at the Browns Ferry Unit 1 site.
On August 15, 1985, the licensee began fuel movements to defuel the Unit 1 reactor core for cycle six.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures pertinent to core unloading:
a.
TI-14, Unit 1 EOC-6 Fuel Unload b.
G01-100-3, relating to activities required prior to and during fuel handling c.
Technical Specification (TS)
3/4. 10 relating to core alteration, refueling interlocks, core monitoring and crane operability checks..
d.
SI-2, Instrument checks and observations e.
SI-4. 10.A. 1, Refueling Interlocks-Functional Test f.
SI-4.10.A.6, Maintenance on Two Ron-Adjacent Control Rods The above procedures were reviewed to ascertain that changes to the procedures were made in accordance with administrative procedures, the controlling procedures were reviewed, approved and appropriate steps and gA holdpoints were signed off.
In addition to the above procedures, the inspector verified that the following requirements were met:
a.
The mode switch was locked in "Refuel" position and the key removed.
b.
The SRM count rate was greater than 3 counts per second.
c.
Communication was established between the control room and refueling floor.
d.
All control rods were fully inserted and electrically disabled with no control rod maintenance in progress.
e.
Fuel transfer was verified by operations and gA including sign off of fuel transfer steps in TI-14.
f.
The refueling interlocks functional surveillance test was performe g.
Core monitoring instrumentation rod block logic functional surveillance tests performed for the service intermediate and power range instruments.
h.
Tag boards in the control room and on refueling floor were maintained current.
i.
Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
was assigned to the refueling floor and present in area of refueling activity.
j.
Cleanliness in the refueling area was maintained.
The inspector identified no deviations or violations related to the fuel handling operations.
However, an inspector followup item was identified relating to fuel sipping operation for Unit 2 end-of-cycle 5.
Ouring this operation, 764 bundles were tested.
From this population of fuel assemblies tested, 50 were identified as having cladding perforations.
A detailed evaluation of the cause of failed fuel assemblies for cycle 5 of unit two will be made by the licensee.
This will be tracked as an IFI 260/85-44-01, determination by the licensee as to what caused failed fuel assemblies for Unit 2 EOC 5 fuel sipping operation.
In addition to the above, the licensee committed to reevaluate the operability requirement for the SRt<s as descr ibed in TS 3/4.10, which contains conflicting requirements (see report 85-43 for more details).
The licensee made an interim procedure change to leave fuel around the source range monitors (SRM) to maintain an indicated count rate greater than
cps (defined as the limit of counter operability)
on the SRt1s throughout the fuel handling process.
At the time of the exit, the licensee had unloaded 573 fuel assemblies out of a total of 764.
This item is identified as IFI 259/85-44-02.
6.
Spent Fuel Pool Activity - Unit 1 (86700)
The inspector observed fuel handling operations during movement in the spent fuel pool area and reviewed procedures related to fuel handling to verify that the following were included in the procedures:
a.
A limitation on the number of fuel assemblies that can be out of safe geometry locations at the same time.
b.
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pool area crane interlocks or physical stop prevent the crane from passing over fuel storage locations.
c ~
d.
Provisions for verifying that minimum water level for the spent fuel pool is monitored during fuel-handling operations.
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool storage area radiation and airborne radioactivity monitors are operabl e.
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool cleaning and cooling systems are operable.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
7.
Local Leak Rate Test - (61702)
The inspector witnessed portions of the type
"C" local leak rate test for the main steam isolation valve (MSIV).
Procedures used by test personnel were verified to be technically adequate, special test equipment required by procedures was calibrated and in use, and test personnel were qualified.
The following MSIV lines were witnessed for local leak rate test (LLRT).
a.
MSIV line A b.
MSIV line B
c.
MSIV line C
d.
MSIV line D
Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.