IR 05000259/1985030

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-259/85-30,50-260/85-30 & 50-296/85-30 on 850603-07.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mechanical Maint Associated w/safety-related Pipe Support & Restraint Sys Resulting from Torus Mods
ML18029A642
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  
Issue date: 06/21/1985
From: Blake J, Liu W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18029A639 List:
References
50-259-85-30, 50-260-85-30, 50-296-85-30, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8507110291
Download: ML18029A642 (11)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-259/85-30, 50-260/85-30, and 50-296/85-30 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401

. Docket Nos.:

50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:

DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:

Browns Ferry 1, 2, and

Inspection Conduct d:

June 3-7, 1985 Inspector:

W.

Approved by:

J.

.

a e, Section C ief E

in ering Branch D vi ion of Reactor Safety Date Sig ed i 8<

Da e Signe SUMMARY Scope:

site in support support 79-02).

This routine, announced inspection entailed 34 inspector-hours at the the areas of Mechanical Maintenance associated with safety-related pipe and restraint systems resulting from the torus modifications, and pipe baseplate-designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts ( IE Bulletin Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

8507ii029'i 850b24 PDR ADOCK 0500025 PDR 8) i

REPORT DETAILS 1.

I Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. Coffey, Site Director
  • J. Swindell, Superintendent

- Operations/Engineering

  • J. Pittmen, Superintendent

- Maintenance

  • L. Mills, Manager, RPIP
  • J. Rinne, Modifications Manager
  • C. Simms, Supervisor, Office of Engineering
  • D. Nye, Design Services/Nuclear Power
  • S. Hopkins, Modifications
  • J. Garison, Supervisor - guality Assurance
  • L. Parvin, Supervisor, guality Engineering

& Control

  • B. Morris, Compliance Supervisor
  • E. Balch, Compliance R. Baird, Civil Engineer, Office of Engineering J.

Beason, Civil Engineer, Office of Engineering ll Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, gC inspectors and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

  • C. Brooks, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 7, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed bel.ow.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Open)

Inspector Followup Item 259, 260/85-30-01, Corrective Action on inspected pipe supports, paragraph 5.c.

The 'licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio.

Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems a.

Procedure Review The inspector reviewed portions of the following newly created inspection procedures pertaining to safety-related pipe support and restraint systems to determine whether appropriate procedures have been established and whether they comply with NRC requirements and the licensee commitments.

(1)

Instruction BF-SMMI-14.'4.1.3-L, Inspection Program for Reverifi-cation of Correct Pipe Support Installation, May 10, 1985 (2)

Instruction BF-SMMI-5.1-A, Inspection and Repair Program for Verifying Correct Installation of Self-Orilling-Type Concrete Anchors, May 15, 1985 The above work instructions were recently established by the licensee in response to the inspector findings identified in NRC Inspection Report 259, 260, 296/85-26.

The licensee acknowledged that the inspection findings were generic in natures.

b.

Program Status for Reinspection of Pipe Supports There were 468 supports in Unit 3 to be reinspected in accordance with the new instruction BF-SMMI-14.4.1.3-L.

These supports were newly installed or modified in conjunction with the torus modification.

The licensee formed six inspection teams for which each team consisted of one engineer, one gC inspector and one-steamfitter foreman, to perform the reverification of the aforementioned supports.

The tentative schedule for completion of the above inspections was June 30, 1985.

As of June 6, 1985, the licensee had inspected 169 supports.

Results of the inspection indicated that 284 maintenance requests (MR) had to be generated for resolution.

These MRs revealed the following generic problems:

lack of locking devices loose nuts on rigid strut/rod installation undersize welds oversize holes in baseplates lack of thread engagement for bolt installation excessive gap in support installation torque requirements for snubber assemblies

Additionally, the licensee anticipated that based upon the results of the initial inspections conducted by the licensee and the inspection findings identified by the NRC inspector, that the corrective actions

'ould include:

600 locking devices 100 torquing of snubbers 28 major fixes of support installations The corrective actions for Unit 3 implemented by the licensee should start on June 5, 1985 and are expected to be complete by July 12, 1985.

c.

Field Inspection for Units 1 and

The inspector conducted a

general inspection of pipe support and restraint systems in the Units

and 2 Reactor Building area.

The inspector identified the following supports:

Su ort Number Pi in S stem BFN Unit NO.

  • R-12, Rev.

Drywell..L Torus Purge (DTP)

  • R-21, Rev.
  • H-2, Rev.

DTP DTP DTP "

  • D-8, Rev.

Control Rod Drive (CRD)

  • F-2, Rev.

Condensate Storage 5 Supply

  • H-222, Rev.

CRD

  • Indicates discrepancies identified during the inspection.

The above seven pipe supports were partially inspected against their detail drawings for configuration, identification, fastener instal-lation, and damage/protection.

These supports had previously been inspected and accepted by the licensee.

(1)

Support Nos. R-12, Rev.

and R-21, Rev. 0, in the Unit 1 DTP system were inspected.

It was noted that the lock nut on both strut assemblies was loose.

(2)

Support Nos. H-2, Rev.

1 and H-3, Rev.

1, in the Unit

DTP system were examined.

It was found that three 1 1/2" heavy hex nuts were missing from both support assemblie (3)

Support No. D-8, Rev. 9, in the Unit

CRD System and support No. F-2, Rev. 9, in the Unit

condensate storage and supply system were inspected.

It was found that no lock nuts were installed on the support assemblies.

(4)

Support No. H-222, Rev.

1, in the Unit 2 CRD System was examined.

It was noted that four 3/4" diameter anchor bolts were installed through the existing baseplate.

The installation tolerance for the baseplate holes was 1/16" greater than the specified bolt size.

The actual holes in the baseplate were measured in the range of 1 1/8" to 1 1/4" which were much greater than the allow-able tolerance specified in the instruction.

It was further noted that these holes were made by flame cutting.

In accordance with TVA mechanical general notes, Drawing 47B435-1, R7, all bolt holes made in plates, on or after the date of the above drawing, shall be drilled or punched.

Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned seven supports indicate that portions of these supports were not installed and verified in accordance with the detail drawings and the instruction requirements.

As a result, these supports may not be able to perform their intended function as required by the design.

The discrepancies identified above are additional examples to the previous violation (259, 296/85-26-01).

To ensure that proper corrective actions to be taken by the licensee for the afore-mentioned supports, this matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 259, 260/85-30-01, corrective action on inspected pipe supports.

Within the areas inspected, no new violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Pipe Support Baseplate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts ( IE Bulletin 79-02), Unit 3 Currently the licensee is making all efforts to identify, inspect, and modify, if necessary, all anchorages necessary for Unit 3 startup.

a.

Total number of Supports for Unit 3 and Coranon Area (1)

Supports with expansion anchors (2)

Supports with grouted plates Total number of supports 330 110 440

b.

Inspection Teams Ten inspection teams consist of engineers, steam fitters, and gC inspectors, are to inspect non-grouted baseplates and anchor bolts.

Six inspection teams are to inspect and repair grouted baseplates and anchor bolts.

c.

Inspection Schedule Field inspections are to be complete by July 15, 1985.

Inspection documentations are to be complete by July 31, 1985.

d.

Inspection Results (As of June 6, 1985)

(1)

Supports (with non-grouted plates)

inspected:

Repair required

(2)

Supports (with grouted base plates)

inspected:

Modifications completed Work in progress

16 Of the above 58.supports inspected, 30 supports required repair work in that the problem of oversize holes in the baseplates was found to be generic in nature.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ~ w