ML20127C169
| ML20127C169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1984 |
| From: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126J910 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-926 NUDOCS 8410180221 | |
| Download: ML20127C169 (1) | |
Text
- ___ - ____ __________ _ _______
p re g UNITED STATES 8 'o^% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ '$, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.....' it, MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief, Licensing Branch No. 3, Division of Licensing FROM:
Olan D. Parr, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY - BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2, AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH s'
The Auxiliary Systems Branch has reviewed Beaver Valley, Unit 2 FSAR Section
- 9.5.1, " Fire Protection System," the Fire Protection Evaluation Report, and t
3 the responses to previous staff questions concerning the ability of the plant j
to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition following a fire. As a
- result of this review, the enclosed request for additional information has i
been prepared. A response to these questions is needed in order for us to complete our review. Attachment I to the enclosed request provides our
! guidance with respect to the fire protection associated circuit review.
! Attachment 2 provides additional guidance regarding allowable repairs to achieve cold shutdown.
& .k fl a D. Parr, Chief fc4
.a Au iliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration i
Enclosure:
As Stated il
'i cc w/ enclosure:
1 J. Wermiel l N. Fioravante
{ M. Ley
- R. Eberly R. Anand R. Ferguson
, cc w/o enclosure:
R. Bernero 'g i L. Rubenstein T. Novak f 7
, V. Benaroya j
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Contact:
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P R. Anand, X29465 .
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O - - - - -
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
- 1. Section 2.5.3 of the Beaver Valley, Unit 2 Fire Protection Evaluation Report indicates that the postulated control room fire is limited to the ignition of one train of safety-related panel wiring. Section 7.4.1.3 of the FSAR indicates that a control room fire is not postulated to generate spurious'or unwanted control signals which would prevent establishing hot standby from the emergency shutdown panel (ESP). In addition tc above, Figure A5 Alternate Shutdown Panel, contains a note that states "To date, an exposure fire is not postulated in the control room, only loss of habitability."
Standard Review Plan, Section 9.5.1, which incorporates the criteria of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 requires that the fire hazards analysis include exposure fires which could damage both trains of safe shutdown systems if they are located in a single fire area and not sufficiently separated.
Further, the assumption that spurious or unwanted control signals will not result from fire damage is not consistent with the SRP criteria. Based on the above criteria for the control room: '
- a. Revise your submittal " Fire Protection Evaluation Report" and identify any necessary modifications to assure that fires will affect the safe shutdown capability as indicated by the above criteria, or
- b. Provide justification for your position and identify any resulting deviation from the above criteria.
- 2. Describe the details of your proposed design to demonstrate that you satisfy the criteria of Section C.S.b and C.5.c of Branch Technical Positions CMEB 9.5.1 by providing the following information:
- a. Describe the methodology used to verify that proper separation is provided for the safe shutdown capability in accordance with the guidelines of C.5.b of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5.1. Provide the area arrangement drawings showing the safe shutdown system including the cable routing.
- b. Address the means you will provide for assuring the proper functioning of your safe shutdown capability, assuming fire induced failures in the associated circuits. Attachment 1 identifies our concerns with associated circuits. This attachment also provides guidance for reviewing the associated circuits of concern and the additional infonnation we need. Your response should specifically address Part II.C of this attachment.
In evaluating your response to Part II.C of this attachment regarding spurious actuation of equipment, the staff intends to utilize the following guidelines:
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- a. The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by any one spurious actuation or signal resulting from a fire in any plant area; and
- b. The safe shutdown. capability should not be adversely affected by a fire in any plant area which results in the loss of all automatic function (signalg., logic) from the circuits located in the area in conjunction with one worst case spurious actuation or signal resulting from the fire; and
)
- c. The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by a fire in any plant area which results in simultaneous spurious ,
actuation of all valves in high-low pressure interface lines. l
- 3. Aside from the fa'ct that the emergency shutdown panel (ESP) is capable of controlling two safety-related trains while the alternate shutdown panel (ASP) is only capable of controlling one shutdown train, the applicant should identify and describe all functional differences and limitations of the two shutdown panels in attaining and maintaining either a hot or cold shutdown conditions. Also, identify the conditions i for which these panels will be utilized. '
- 4. The applicant's submittal does not indicate whether repairs are required to achieve cold shutdown. The applicant shall identify any required repairs. It is our position that systems and components used to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions must be free of fire damage and capable of maintaining such conditions without repairs. Systems and components used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown should be either free of fire damage or the fire damage to such systems should be limited such that repairs can be made and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Attach-ment 2 (Memorandum from R. Mattson to R. Vollmer dated July 2, 1982) pro-vides additional guidance regarding allowable repairs to achieve cold shutdown.
- 5. The applicant should provide a commitment to develop and implement alter-nate shutdown procedures prior to fuel load. These procedures should address manpower requirements and manual actions to accomplish shutdown.
A summary of the operator actions needed for safe shutdown should be provided for our review.
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- - : 3350CIATE CIRCUf7 P.T. Matt I. ..
IlmtDDUCTION The foT1owing discusses the requirements fier protecting redundant alternative aquipient needed er safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
- The requirements of Appendix R address not shutdown equipmeni: whic be free of fire damage. .
The following requirements also apply to en,1d i' * '
shutdown equipment if the applicant / licensee elects to demonstrate tha I equipment is to'be free of fire damage. Appendix R'does allow repairab damage to cold shutdown equipment. .
using the requirements of Sections III.S and 222.1. of Appendix R.' the c
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' capability to achieve
. hot shutdown must azist given a fire in' atty are of the plant in conjungtfon with a. loss of offsite power 1br 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. .
Section III.8 of, Appendix R proirides fbut methods 1br ensuring that the
. hot s,hutdown capability is pro $ acted Prom fires. . -
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The fint three 6ptions :
as defined in Section III.L2 provijdes ne' t hods for protaction from firas ef equipment needed fbr het shutdown: '
- 1. Redundant' systems including tables. equipment, and associated circuits ,
. . may be separated bf a three-hour. fire rated barrier; 'or. *
- 2. .
Redundant systems facluding cables, equipment and_ associated circuita l ' .
.may be separated,b{ a no,rizontal distance,af more' they. 20 feet with so intervening combustibles. In addition, ftre drtsetion and an auto-estic ftre swpression system are required; or. '
- 3. Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circ he enclosed by a' eme-hour fire rated harrier.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire swpression systas are. required.
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2-The last option as defined by Section III.G.3 provides an alternativ -
abwn capa,bility to the redundant trains damaged by a fire,
' 4. ^ A113$ative shutdown equipment must be independent of ~' .
the cables equihnt and apsociated circuits of the redundant sy the fi m. '
II. Associated Circuits of Concern . , ,
The following discussion. .
preivides A),a definition of associated circuits for J,
Aopendix R consideration. 8) the guidelines fWr protecting'the safe sh capability from the fire-induced failures of associated circuits and C) the
- information required by the staff to myiew associated circuits , . It is
. importan1! to :note that our' interest is IPnly wit'h those circuits '(cable whose fire-induced failure could affect shutdown.
. 1 Suidelines fbr protecting tO safe s,hutdown capability from the fin-induced failures of associ a;1rcuits are provided.
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These guidelines do not limit the alternatives availablelto the lice,ssee f.or' protect.ing the shutdown c
' proposed methods for protaction of the shutdown tapability from fim-
. ' induced failures will he evaluated by,tk s,taff.fbr Acceptab11'ity.
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' 4. 'Our concern is that circuits within the fire' area will receive, '
ilmmage which can affect shutdown c.apability and thereby prev fin safe shutdown. Associated Circuits
- of Concern are de
'. ; - hn.e,aann.in. on for associated circilits..,is not osactly the same a presented in IEEE-384-1777. '
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- 3-cables (safety related, non-safety related Class 1E. and non-Class 1E)that:;, .
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Navt, __ ( physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 ~-
of Appendix R. and;
- 2. Have one of the 1b110 wing:
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a comen power source with the shutdnen equipment (redundant,or alternative) and the' power s'ource Is not electrically protected .
from the circuit of concern by coordinated treakers, fuses, or similar devices (see diagram 2a), or
.. b.
a connection'to circuits of equipment whose spurious operatiori
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would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g.. RHR/RCS 1 sol,ation velves.. ADS valves., PORVs. steam generator atmospheric -
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dump valves.* instrumentatfois steam bypass. inte.) (see diagram 2b).
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, c. a comon enclosure (e.g., receway, panel jenetion) with the shut-o down cables .
,.(redundant.and alternative) and.
(1) are'not al.ectrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or ,
similar devices, or .
. (2) vf 71 allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure
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The following .. guidelines are fbr protecting the shutdown capability from fire faduced failrues of circu;fts (cables) in the fire area. The shutdown capabfid,{y any be protected from the adverse effect of d:nage to associate
. circuits of concern- by the fb11owing methods: -
1.
provide protection'between the associated circuits of concern and the p
shutdown circuits as per Section III.L2 of Appendix 4. or ,
j 2. a. , .
For a .zoomon power. source case of associated circuits: -
provide lead fuse / breaker (interrupting devicas) to feeder with fuse / breaker coordination to prevent less of the redundant or '
alternative shutdown power source'. To. ensure .that the coordina-
, tion criteria 'ars' amt.the ib11owing should apply,:- ,
- . (1) The associated circuits' of concern interrupting devices .
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(breakers of fus,es) time!.overcurrent trip ' characteristic fDr all rfrcuit ilaults should sanse'the'.Li.rs.grting device -
- to interrupt the fabit current prior.to'initfahon of a trip
- of any apstream iirterrsgrting device'which will cause a loss ' '
.. , of the summon ~ power source.
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, (2) The power source stia11 supply the necessary fault current .
1 fbr sufficient time to ensure the paper interruption without .
. :1 ass of. ;.fanction of the shutdoun land.s..
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The acesptabilfiy of a prticular bi.i.wi.iag device is sensidered demonstrated if the $n11 swing cirterta'are met:
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. l (1) The interrgting device, design shall be factory tasted l
- r- to wrify overcurrent protection as designed in acordance i j
._- , with the appl.icable 15., AN5I. er letA standards. .
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.(11) Pbr low and medium voltage switchgear (480 V and above)
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. circuit breaker / protective relay periodic' tasting'shall l
. t demonstrata that the overall coordination scheme enemins - -
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. within the limits specified in the design criteria ;:This - -
. . . t, testing any be perfbrand as ,a series tf overlapping tests.
(iii) Molded cas~a circuit breakers shall per'fodically be senually esercised and inspected ,to insure ease of operation. On 4 .
a rotating refueling, autage basis a,sagle of these bre' akers
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shall be tasted to determine that breater drift is within' -
that alled by the design criteria. Breakers should be f* * .. *
' . htett ift, accordance with an accepted @ testing.nettedolog
. .... such as M!i: 3tD 10. 5'D.
. (iv) Fuses when saed as interrgting devices N not require periodic testing. Aduisiistrative controls must insure that replacement fuses with ratings other than those l .
' selected for proper coordination are not acNdently used.
- b. For circuits of squipment and/or casiponents chose spurious speration
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tenild affect the capabilip to dafety shutdessii
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provide a,means to isolate the equipment and/or components from e-the fire area pript to the fire (i.e.. remove power cables 4 7 . open circuit breakers); or (2)
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provide'ilectrical isolation that' prevents spurious operation?
potential isolation devices inc1,ude breakers, fuses, ampli- ,
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, relays and transducers; or -
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(3) provide a means to.datect spurious, operations and then proce- '
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dures to defeat the saloperation of equipment (f.e., closure
- of the block valve if PORY. spuriously operates, opening of Ue,bers'kers to stop spurious operation of safety in.iection i.
. c.
F.or conson enclosure'cas' es of asso.ciated circuits: .
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(1) provide appropriate sensures to prevent propagation of the c
fire and * '.- .
-(2) . provide electrical protection (i.e. breakers. fuses or t
sistlardevices) . - -
',- . C. INFORMATION REQUIRED
.. The fIs11 swing faforestion is required to demonstrate that associated circuits will act prevent operation or cause maloperation of the
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- s. Describe the methodology used to assess the potential of associated , ,
a, . ar-tv .mee .h. .h.t n .,ahmt,. The escri ,uon e . the.iogy . e d soo m .et
. ed to i .nu fy the -
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- circuits which share a commen power supply or a canon enclosure
.=s edth the shutdown systep and the circuits whose spurious operation .
- 'eiculd affect, .shutdown. .
Additionally, the description should include tiin methods used to identify if these circuits are associated cfrcuits
- of concern due to their locatioit to the fire area. '
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b.
Show that fire-1.nduced failures (hot shorts; open ci,rcuits or. shorts .
to ground) of each of the associated circuits of concern.will not s
- prevent operation or cause as1 operation of the shutdown method. ,
. 2. The residual heat removal system is generally a loit pressure system that interfaces 'with the high pressure primary coolant' system. To) preclude ' ,
- a LDCA through this interfhce, we twquire cespliance with the recommenda-
'tio. ns of Branch Technical position RSS 5'1. *Thus, t.he ii.iterface most -
likely consists of.two redundant and independent untor operated val.ves.
These tuo motor operated.valws and their associatpd gables any be- *
, subject to.a siagle fire hazard. It is sur con' cerh that this single
- c '. -
fire could cause the two valves to spen 1resulting in a fire initiated l- , IDCA through the high-low preskure system interface. To assure that.this interface and other higli-law pressure interfaces are adequately protected '.
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from the effects of a si$gle fire, un require the fb11owing information: -
3
- a. Identify each high-low press.ure interface that. uses. redundant , .
electrically'scritrolled devices (auch as 'two series anter operated .
.m1ves) to isolata et preclude reture of ad primary coolant.,
- 6. For each set of redundant valves identified in a., verify the __
redundant cabling (power and control) hve adequate physical separation as required Ay Section III.E.2 of Appendix R.
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. 3 8, ...For each cs'se where adequate separition is not provided show thiit
" fire induced failures (hot short. open circuits or short to ground)
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":gf the cables will act"cause meloperation and result in a LOCA.
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UNITED STATES l
[ ,y-p, [ gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
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i MEMORANDUM FOR:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director, Division of Engineering FROM:
Roger J. Matt:;on, Director, Division of Systems Integration l
SUBJECT:
1 POSITION 5 STATEMENT ON ALLOWABLE REPAIRS FOR ALTERNATIVE t SHUTDOWN AND ON THE APPENDIX R REQUIREMENT FOR TIME '
REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN Some licensees have experienced difficulties in interpreting two areas of ;
Sections III.G and III.L. The purpose of this memorandum.is to inform you '
of these two areas and interpretations wh.ich we believe are. needed. These interpretations pertain to the (1) allowable repairs to achieve safe shutdown and (2) allowable time to achieve safe shutdown. The interpretations which follow are not new. We request your concurrence in this matter.
Allowable Repairs to Achieve Safe Shutdown i
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R states that one train of systems needed for hot shutdown must be free of fire damage. Thus, one train c.f systems needed for hot shutdown must be operable during and following a fire. Operability of the hot s'hutdown systems, including the ability to overcome a fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation of hot shutdown equipment and the plant's power distribution system, must exist without repairs. Manual operation of valves, switches and circuit breakers is allowed to operate equipment and isolate systems and is not considered a repair. However, the removal of fuses for isolation is not permitted. All manual operations must be achievable prior to the fire or fire suppressant induced saloperations reaching an unre-coverable plant condition.
l Modifications, e.g., wiring changes, are allowed to systems and/or cemponents not used for hot shutdown, but whose fire or fire suppressant induced malopera-tions may indirectly affect hot shutdown. These repairs must be achievable prior to the maloperations causing an unrecoverable plant condition.
Repairs for cold shutdown systems are allowed by Section III.L.5 of Appendix R. For cold shutdown tapability repairs, the removal of fuses for isolation and the replacement of cabling is permitted. Also, selected equipment replace-ment, e.g., such as replacing a valve, pump, control room controls and instru-ments, will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to verify its practicality i within the appropriate time constraints. Procedures for repairing damaged squipment should be prepared in advance with replacement equipment (i.e., cablef-
Contact:
G. Harrison, DSI:ASB X-27970 pW ' ,
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' made-up with terminal ' lugs attached 7 stored onsite. All repairs should be of
. sufficient quality to assure safe operation until the plant is restored to an operating condition. Repairs not permitted include the use-of clip leads in control panels (which means that hard wired terminal lugs must be used), and the use of jumper cables other than those fastened with terminal lugs.
' When repairs are necessary in the fire area, the licensee will have to demon-strate that sufficient tinfe is available to allow the area to be re-entered and that expected fire and fire suppressant damage will.not prevent the repair from
- taking place and that repair procedure will not endanger operating systems. In i
addition, written procedures must exist for the orderly transfer of control from the control room and the remote shutdown stations and vice versa. The repairs to cold shutdown systems are considered .to be. an upper limit. The licensee may design the plant so thjt cold shutdown can be achieved without repair.
Allowable Time to Achieve Safe Shutdown a
Section III.G of Appendix R states that fire damage to cold shutdown capability ruust be limited to damage that can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.Section III.L.1 of Appendix R states that the alternative shutdown capability shall be able to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Further,Section III.L.5 of Appendix R states that fire damage shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved.within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Sections III.L.1 and III.L.5 state that ato prior plant the must elapse be of capable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. of achieving cold shutdown using only onsite power i
. 'Section III.L.5 also clearly states that off-i site power is assumed restored after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in that equipment and systems not needed until 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only. )
i We have been using and propose to continue to use Sections III.L.1 and III.L.5 in our evaluations. Thus, a licensee should have the capability of repairing )
squipment and achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using only onsite power.
The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is considered.an upper limit; a licensee may limit the repairs and achieve cold shutdown in a shorter time frame. ,
l l
We have applied the interpretations of Sections III.L.1 and III.L.5 of Appendix R to approximately twenty plant fire protection reviews. We propose to continue i
to use the interpretations discussed above for future alternative shutdown re-views. If you agree, then please indicate your concurrence at the bottom of 1 this page and return to me.
Roger J. ttson,' Director Division of Systems Integration
- Approved
- -
, Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering i
cc: See next page.
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Richard H. Vollmer 3
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cc: L. Rubenstein
- 0. Parr V. Panciera . ..
W. Johnston V. Benaroya '
R. Ferguson -
T. Wambach N. Fioravante G. Harrison J. Taylor W. Shields J. Stone. I&E S. Trubatch ... .
T. Sullivan H. Denton E. Case D. Eisenhut *
- 5. Hanauer H. Thompson e
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