ML20126M144
| ML20126M144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1981 |
| From: | INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126M142 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0660, RTR-NUREG-660 IAEA-SM-253-33, NUDOCS 8106110473 | |
| Download: ML20126M144 (8) | |
Text
. .
O IAEA-SM-253/33
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v g'. n UPGRADING OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMMATIC REQUIREMENTS 20R OPEPATING N U C,. : n R P u~n,,
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As a r of analysis of tho TMI accident and experi-ence at seve construction sites for nuclear power plants, the NRC staff nas concluded that certain quality assurance pecgra matic modifications relative to presently existing requirements should be made. These modifications are direct-ed ttward u; grading and strengthening the quality assurance function at ope-ating nuclear power plants to improve its ef fectiveness in identifying and correcting operational de-ficiencies to protect the public health and safety. Speci-fic areas of QA programcatic upgrading include:
- 1. Improving management atcitudes toward quality assurance.
- 2. Expanding the category of s tructures , sys tems ,
and components to which tne Q A prograra acplies to include all items that affect safety.
- 3. Improving the organizational independence of the QA function fecm the performing functions.
4 Increasing QA staffing levels and qualification requirements for QA personnel.
- 5. Increasing the involvement of the QA organization in the inspection and verification of o;erational ac tivi ti es .
- 6. Increasing the involvement of the QA organi:ation in the review and approval of quality affecting documents.
Tne NRC has developed new recuirements in the above areas and has initiated implementation en TMI-l (Restart) and several cther operational units at sites located near high population density areas. It is ultimately planned to require implementatien of these new requirements for all nuclear plants under design and constru: tion as nell as in operation. These and other new requirements are also con-templated for imclementation on new plancs under cesign and 00nstructicn.
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IAEA-SM-253/33 As a result of the analysis of both the TMI-2 accident and recently found quality assuran:e deficiencies at con-struction sites for new nuclear power plants, the NRC staff has identified several areas of pregramatic requirements -
needing upgrading to provide greater confidence in the effec- ^
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tiveness of quality assurance (QA) programs for operating nucisar power plants. The areas of upgrading are intended to previde'overall strengtnening of the QA program by expand-ing i:s formal cover ~a;e to additional items and activities, by imcroving its organisational independence, by improving staffing levels and qualifications of personnel, and, last but certainly not least, by emphasiaing the need for licen-see management to recognize the value of, create, and main-tain an effective QA program. Because of the rather general nature of.the criteria of Appendix 3 to 10 CFR part 50, none of the upgradings require revisicn to the ?,egulations cther than a clarification of certain language regarding the struc-tures, systems, and components to which the QA program ap-
- plies.
Tne specific areas of upgrading for QA programs have been identified in Task I.F. of the TMI Action Plan (NUREG-
- 0660) for nuclear plants under design and construction as well as operational. Several of the more significant areas have been selected for earlier application to specific fa-cilities than is otherwise called for by the Action Plan schedule. ,
Manacement Attitude Teward Quality Assurance The attitude of the licensee's management toward quality assurance is of utmost importance to the success or f ailure of the QA Program. Only with a clearly positive attitude toward quality assurance transmitted from top t management can an effective QA program be created and im-piemented. Too many utilities still view quality assurance as a costly and overdone " paper-mill" rather than a neces-sary and cost-effective management control tool. A properly formulated and implemented QA program can assure a higher degree of plant safety and reliability than would 'otherwise exist. Quality assurance should permeate all levels of management including their active involve ent and should enjcy a strong ccm.it. ment from above to provide tne maximum i potential for full effectiveness. The key activity areas wnere top management involvement should cccur are as follows:
- a. Formulating the company's basic quality assurance policies, goals, and objectives. -
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- b. Establishing a highly qualified quality assurance organi:ation with the necessary authority, organi-zational freedom, freedom from cost and schedule pressures , staff lng levels, and management backing.
Backing by management should confir- to all company perscnnel that the tenets of the QA pr: gram will be enforced. .
- c. Periodically assessing the scope and implementation of the QA program to assure it is satisfying ccm-pany objectives.
The QA program, including the organization for its im-plementation, must have the unqualified suppo t and backing by all levels of management, and this attitude must be clearly demonsvated to the plant working level persor.nel.
Extensien of the CA proc-am to All Items Affectin; Safety Up to the present time, the applicability of the QA program conforming to Appendix 3 requi*ements was limited to those s tructures, systems, and components needed to pre-vent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the public health and safety.
Other items in the plant that had a lesser significance to safety were subjected to the provisions of General Design Criterion 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. Until now, the NRC staff has not developed specific guidance regarding the quality assurance requirements for the latter grouping of i tems . However, given the impetus of the TMI-2 accident in which several plant systems and components not subjected to the Appendix 3 QA . program played an important role in the accident scenario, it became clear that such guidance is needed and could be readily made available by simply expand-ing the applicability of the QA program to include all items affecting safety. These items have a regulatory base in that they can be derived from the General Design Criteria given in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 and from other pertinent regulations and include Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Positions 1 through 4) plus spare and replacement parts, and consumables and expendables needed for the various activities performed in connection with those items. Initia ting such a require-ment at the operating license s tage means that the opera- I tional QA program wculd be applicable to all future activi-ties (backfit not required) conducted in connection with these items such as maintenance, modification, repair, per-fornance tes ting, surveillance testing, and replacement.
As required by Criterion !!, " Quality Assurance program" of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, the QA program snail provide con-trol over all activities af fecting the quality of the iden- )
tified items to an extent consis tent with the item's impcr- l tance to safety. In this regard, it is expected that the i
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4 extent of applicability of the 18 criteria of Appendix 3 and related raquirements given in the 5?.?, ?,egulatory Guides, and endorsed 5 tandards to a specific item shall be determined through a technical evaluation conducted by the Engineering and QA: functions. In this way, a meaningful and efficient QA pro; ram can be established whose pur cse is to assure .
that the specified design requi enents and subsequent acti- .
vities 'affecting safety. for an item are pr:perly implemented. J.
Extension of the QA program to all items important to safety shculd provide greater assu-ance of the proper atten-tion to all safety ' aspects of the plant thereby tontributing to improved cperational . safe ty.
0 gani:atienal *ndstendence In the past, or;ani:ational relationships for operating plants have been fcund acceptable in which the ensite quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) personnel functioned in se;arate portions of the organization and re-ported either directly or indirectly to the Plant Manager.
While the QA and QC functions were acc:mplished by person ,
nel other than those who performed the w:rk, there is con-cern regarding Whether suf ficient independence exists f rom the pressures of cost and schedule attendant in maintaining a plant in an operational mode. To allevia te this concern, the independence of the QA/QC functicn has been strengthened by requiring the QA organization to assure responsibility for all onsite QA activities through implementation of.the necessary review, inspection, surveillance, and audit func-tions. The quality control function would, therefore, be the responsibility of the QA organi:ation. Further, the onsite-QA organization should report technically and adminis-tratively to offsite QA management, and personnel responsi-ble for performing the QA/QC functions should in turn report both technically and administrative 1y to the QA organi:sti:n.
To assure that the QA organi:ation performs its function in a timely manner, close ccmmunication ties (e.g. , daily staff meetings) saall ce maintained with the Plant Manager and his
- staff. We believe that such an organizational arrangement can materially assist in establishing a stronger and there-fore more effective QA function.
0A Staffing and Qualification Recuirements l
.One of the reasons for the lack of proper implementa-tion of QA programs as determine.1 tnrough analysis of QA deficiencies at several constructitn sites, and discussions with sece licensees and IE inspectors is an inadequate staff in tenns of both mancower levels and qualification require-rents for ;ersonnel. Fce this reason, necessary QA tasks
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- b. Review cf procurement documents to assure the necessary CA requirements are specified, and inspection of received items,
- c. Training and indoctrination of plant perscnnel responsible for performing quality-tffecting acti- .
vities involving safety to assure denens'. rated pro- -
.ficiency and capability to perform assigned tasks 2 (not including plant operators).
- d. Surveillan,ce and verification to assure that in-strument calibraticn programs are c:nducted in accordance with procedures and specification requirements.
- e. Over-view of the inservice inspection progran,
- f. Active invcivement (e.g. , frequent visits to the plant site) by the offsite QA Mana;ar to monitor the implementation cf the QA program and to assist in the resolution cf quality-related problems.
- g. Carticipation by the ensite CA/QC persornel in daily staff reetings (e.g. , operation, maintenance, modification) associated with planning the work and schedules for the plant to assure prcper QA and QC staffing levels and quality-rela:ed proce-dures for operational, maintenance, modification, <
and inservice inspection activities.
- h. Performing an overali assessment of the effective-ness of -he QA crogram whicn involves develeping and evaluating trend analysis, and pecmul;ating and mcdifying QA policies and procedures as neces-s a ry.
Involvement of the OA organization to accomplish the above functions is fundamental and essential to gain confi-dence and credibility in assuring plant safety through pro-per implementation of cperational activities.
0A Involvement in the Revisa/Acoroval of Occuments Affectinc Safety Qualified individuals in the QA organization, either onsite or offsite, scould be held responsible for perfoming reviews of documents af fecting cpera:icnal safety f plants and for granting approval of these documents relative to GA re qui remen ts . Again, up to now, the QA involvement in this regard has been at best inconsistent and minimal aith the ,
result that the applicatien of QA controls to many activities n e ,s. , ,--- . , . , - . . . , , - , . . , . - , , . , , . , . - - . ,
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af fecting safety has not reached desired levels. Examples l of documents that should be subject to QA review and approval include administrative directives and procedures addressing cperations, maintenance, technical specifications, inservice inspec tion and testing, mcdification, calibration, testing, fuel handling, and procurement; design change notices; drawfngs; specifications; and nonconformance and corrective action reports. Each document should be reviewed to a depth {
sufficient to assure that applicable QA requirements (e g., ~~
the necessary inspection requirements, final do:cmen ted veri-fication of implemented pmcedures and check lists, methods, and acceptance criteria) have been identified and specified l therein. Evidence of the review shall be d:c.;mented by approval of the CA reviewer.
Involvement of the QA organi:ation in the review and approval of all cperaticnal docurents that have an affect on safety should pr0 vide greater assurance that activities addressed by these documents are subject to a;;rc:riate QA con trols and are properly perfor ed.
0A for Cesign and Cons truction With regard to nuclear plants under desi;n and construc-tien, the .'iF.C staff is also engaged in upgrading the appli-cation of QA requirements similar to that discussed above.
Many of these impr:ved requirements stem from detailed analysis of programatic and implementation deficiencies recently identified at construction sites. Areas that will receive particular attention include:
- a. Expanding the ca tegory of s tructures , systems, and conponents to which the ;A program applies to include all items affe: ting safety,
- b. Ensuring improved independence of the organi:a-tion perfor ing checking functicns f ec: tn e ;er-forcing organization,
- c. Improving management control of the QA function at construction sites by requiring appropriate management levels to be full time at the site,
- d. Parti:ipation of QA personnel in the review and approval of quality-related pro:edures for design, cons truction, and installa tion.
- e. Establishing criteria for assigning OA require-
- ments to specific classes of equi; ment.
- f. Establisning minimum qualifica:icn requirements ,
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- g. Assuring the availability of sufficient staffing levels commensurate with duties and responsibilities.
- h. Establishing pro:edures for preparation and main-tenance of "as-built" documentation in a timely manner, ,
- i. Defining in a clearer manner the role of QA in - 5 design and analysis activities.
Summary and Conclusion NRC staff analysis of the TMI-2 accident and of defi-ciencies noted at construction sites for new nuclear plants has resulted ir. the identification cf seve al CA program-matic areas that should be emphasized and upgraded to in-prove the effectiveness of QA progra's. Areas cf impreve-ment have been identified for operational nuclear. plants and for those new plants under design and construction.
Tne process for inclementation of these requirements has been initiated for several selected operational plants, for the several near term CP plants, and for the one licensee-to-manufacture application for which approval was delayed as a result of :he TMI-2 accident.
, The N?.C views quality assurance as an extremely vital management tcol to assure the proper implementatien of design, cons truction, and operational requirements and activities Oc protect the health and safety of the public.
It is, therefera, necessary that an effective QA pec. gram be established and implemented to accomplish this objective.
Tne N;C believes that the areas of QA prograrnatic involve-ment discussed herein will materially assist in strengthen-ing the QA program to achieve this cbjective.
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